British Jno of SucielProbtogy (1996), 38, 835-555 Printed i Gat Britain 335 © 1996 The British Psychological Sociecy P0523 ‘The Crowd’ century: Reconciling practical success with theoretical failure Stephen Reicher* prrment of ryt Univer of a Este 4406, UK (nthe cenkenary ofthe publication in English of Le Won's The Crow this paper ex ines its legacy. On the one and, many recent theorists point eo he daws of Le Bos «rowed psychology which are centred cn an abstraction af ered from thee social ‘deolagical context. On the other hand, many leaders lai to have based hte tec niques of mass maniputacon us is ideas. How came if Le Bots leas are so awe they ‘were so sel? The paper resto resolve this apparent poradox by examin ee crowed ‘hetore of Le Ron's most nocorious followers, Mussolini and Hicker. lic argued that, lat ‘rom simply using assertion an reperiion 0 sway « mindless mas, both Ivers rooted their cietorie in a particular construction of social catexories though which the sudience was defined and by zelerence ro which actions were leieimare. However, they alo obscured this ideological Rass so asco tener it ineieabe and unchallengeable Pr is cheseloe comclrded that che very weakness of Le Bonian theory i what rerles ita useful sheroieal resource. This makes it all the amore imporcant 0 sty how soc ‘otegories ste constructed horh ia order to wnderstand mats politial decor anal ‘eo undermine Faure authoritarian pacts, The successes of Gustave Le Bon I is now 100 years since Le Bon's wark on the crowd was first published in English. His approach is sufficiencly well known co require only the briefest summary. Essentially, Le Bon argues that when individuals are submerged in a mass they lose their conscious per- sonality. Instead they ste unified by che adoption of a common ‘tacial unconscious’ oF group mind. Because chis mind is primitive, ceowd behaviour is atavistic: unreasoning, emotional, fickle, and genetically desctuctive, Moreover, because the conscious basis of judgmene has been occluded, any idea or (more immediately) any emotion in the crowd —pacticularly chose suggestions emanating from the racial unconscious —will be conca- ssious and spread without check from person to person. In this state, members are partic ularly prey 0 manipulation by chose leaders who know how to adapt their message ro the mental level of the crowd. The successful demagogues are those who concenerate on seducing rhetoric ro che level of crude affirmacion rather than seeking to reason with their audience, It is form, not content that matters; if put simply enough and tepeaced often enough, anything. goes Requests for tpi536 Stephen Reicher “The very face chat Le Bon's name is sill eecognized and his ideas still emembered is in itself a notable face. There are precious few psychologists, let alone social psychologists, ‘who are still known from the previous century. Yet Le Bon is not only remembered as some curious bygone relic. He continues to have an impact, Moscovici (1981) quotes Gordon Allport as claiming that Le Boa's The Crowd—A Study ofthe Popular Mind is the ose influential work of social psychology in history. Moscovici himself goes even further. He claims chat, with the possible exceptions of Tocqueville and Sorel, no French intellec- tual has had an influence equal to that of Le Bon. Indeed he suggests that crowd psychal- ogy is (along wich political economy) one of only ewo social sciences to have not only commented upon but also to have helped shape the history of the 20ch cencury. In shore, ‘Le Bon’s ideas developed the art of government in the age of masses (Moscovici, 1981, 1986), ‘As Moscovici’s claims imply, a proper appreciation of Le Bon requires that we look 0 the different domains in which Le Bon had influence. Being largely rejected! by the intel= lectual establishment of his time, repeatedly being refused enery into the Academie Prangaise, Le Bon soughe and received his appreciation in the world of practical politics. Indeed, his Wednesday luncheon parties, co which prominent right-wing political lead- crs were routinely invited (and who regularly accepted) became a hub of Le Bon's activity (Nye, 1975). That is noe co say thae his work did not have subsequent impact upon the acaclemic sphere. Far from it. Te Bon's most obvious influence is in propagating, a view of group behaviour as irra- tional or, to be more precise, as mindless anc hence non-discriminating. Indeed he is openly acknowledged as che forerunner of recent experimental work on deindividuation (for a review, see Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995). However, more generally, he can be seen as largely responsible for the dominant view in social psychology, neatly summarized in Rupere Brown's phrase, chac groups are batl for you (Brown, 1988). Pechaps che most influential variane ofthis viewpoine ae the present is the ‘cognitive miser’ account of social cognition theorists. According to this perspective, group contexts confront individuals with a bewildering complexity of informacion and therefore impel them to adopt aon~ ‘optimal heuristic straregies of processing information which result in a series of errors and biases (e.g. Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Ostrom, 1994), However, Le Bon’s influence upon soctal psychology is nor limiced to those who agreed with him. Floyd Allport’s work was developed in explicit opposition to Le Bon and the bulk of his seminal Socal Psychalgy, fist published in 1924, soughe to contest the notion that individuality is eclipsed in collective concexts—rather, he argued, it is accencuated. “Thus the bieth of individualism in social psychology bears the mark of Le Bon. Whether in agreement or in reaction, then, his work has had a profound effect on the discipline even if he is not always directly acknowledged. Ie is in this sense that Milgram & och (1969) suggese thar scarcely a Suggestion in Le Bon’s book is nor reflected in contempo- rary experimental social psychology. Such a searemene might seem bold, buc it still underestimates Le Bon’s intellectual impact. His influence within psychology was not limited to the social domain and his, influence was nor limited co psychology hut excended co other disciplines. Within psy- chology itself, probably his most celebraed borrowers were Jung and Freud. If Jung's notion of the collective unconscious takes from Le Bon without acknowledgement, Freud ‘was more open in acknowledging his debt, Ina general sense, concepts such as sugwestion.“The Crowd’ vntury 337 and che unconscious itself are at least partially traceable to Le Bon. More specifically, Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse) is clearly developed our of The Crowd. Freud states that ‘we have made use of Le Bon's description by way of introduction because it firs so well with ou own Psychology in che emphasis which it lays upon unconscious mental life’ (1922, p. 23). Freud's only objec- ‘ion is that, ifthe crowd is akin to a patient in an hypnotic seace, then who, in che case of the crowd, replaces the therapist? This leads Freud to develop an account of crowd behaviour in which all members adopt the leader as theie ego-ideal and are therefore nor only controlled by the leacler but also bound co each other by virtue of having che same ‘eygo-ideal Beyond psychology, Le Bon’s irrationalist account of mass action had an impact on a surprisingly wide vacicty of writers across a variety of disciplines. The list would include Simmel, Adorno, Horkheimer and—miore recently—Smelser in sociology; in the field of political theory, Michels, Sorel, D’Annunnzio and even Gramsci; in the field of philoso- phy, Jaspers, Ortega y Gasset and Russell; and in ehe feld of history, several historians of the French Revolution most nocably Georges Lefebvee (ef. Doise, 1986; Moscovici, 1981, 1986; Nye, 1975). All in all, Barrows (1981) may be somewhat premature in declaring Le Bons immorcality, buc ic is certainly hard to go very far into 20th-century social science withouc detecting has imprint. Ic is already quite an achievement to have such a profound academic effect—especially when one is not dieectly seeking such an effect, However, Le Bon achieved something chat is even rater in works of psychology. He reached a general readership. Giner (1976) describes The Cruuid as ‘one of the first modern ideological bese sellers... it) had the widest influence upon its international public’ (p. 58). Whether directly or indirectly through media descriptions of crowds—which frequently embody Le Bonian accounts and sometimes even quote him directly (Reicher, 1987; Waddington, 1992}—Le Bon's notion of the mindless crowd in which all are prey co suggestions and acavistic impulses has become commonplace. OF course, in this case as in many others, it is hard to dis- entangle the extent to which psychological theory affected common sense as opposed t0 the theory itself being a formulation of existing common-sense formulations (cf. ‘Wetherell & Porter, 1992), Ic is probable cha both are crue to some extene. At che very least, Le Bon's ideas served co legitimate lay understandings. As a resule, people who are asked co explain crowd evemts ofien do so in Le Bonian terms (Reicher & Potter, 1985). Perhaps more worryingly, when police are asked ro explain how crowds behave they also deploy notions of mindlessness, behavioural contagion and vulnerability to destructive suggestions (Stott, 1996). In che end, however, itis probably neither the academic uptake of his ideas nor theit popular renown which is the most significanc aspect of Le Bon's legacy or the cause of his long-lived fame (perhaps infamy would he more appropriate). Indeed Ereud (1922) was bur the firse of many to noce that his ideas about crowel psychology were not particularly voriginal. They had been anticipated by such writers as Fournial, Sighele and Tarde, What ‘marked Le Bon out from the orhers was, firstly, his recognition that crowds were not an aberration but rather the condition of modernity and, secondly, his insistence that crowds, dlon’e just eieaten the starns qo but may be used to support it. Unlike those predecessors who merely bemoaned the dangers of the mass, he posited a choice between being “devoured by crowds’ and using psychology co harness their power. Ie is clear which side538, Stephen Reicher Le Bon took and for whom he sought to harness the crowd, I have already mencioned his courting of nationalist anc fascist leaders. Such efforts were amply repaid. AA list of Le Bon's devotees would form a veritable who's who of internacional right- ‘wing, politics in the first half of the 20th cencury. The lise would include Fathy Pasha, Egyptian Miniscer of Justice; Abdullah Bey, Turkish Minister of Public Healeh; Baron Monrono, Japanese Ambassador to France: Arcuro Alessandri, the Chilean president; and Ton Antonescu, the Roumanian dictator (Moscovici, 1981; Nye, 1975). But all these fade into insignificance compared co Le Bon's impact upon Italian Fascism and German Nazism, Mussolini was wholehearted in acknowledging his debt to the Frenchman. He called The Crowd an excellent work co which he frequently referred (Barrows, 1981) and even claimed to have used some of Le Bon’s principles in order to build his eegime (Moscovici, 1981). Goebbels, in the words of one of his assistancs, felt chat no one since Le Bon underscood crowd psychology as well as himself (Moscovici, 1981). Hieler never publicly paid tribuce co Le Bon, but he had clearly read and was influenced by his work (Moscovici, 1981; Mosse, 1991). Indeed, according to Horkheimer & Adorno (1973), those passages in Mein Kampf concerning the masses and how to manipulate them read like a cheap copy of The Crud. A couple of quotations from each will serve to make the poine. For Le Bon: it wil be semarke thar among the special characerstes of crowds there are several— such as impul= ‘venus irtablity, capaci co eeaon, che absence of jxerment ane of the crical spit the exag- fpration ofthe sentinits an oters besides which ate almose always observed in beings belonging {inferior forms of evolution —in worn, ciklen and savages, for instance (1947, pp While for Hitler: “The puople in a overwhelming majority, ase soFeminine in shir nacure and atecude ec cei acivi= ties and thought are morivaced less by sober coasieration than by feling and sentiment (quoted in ‘Adorno & Horklicimer, 1973, p. 83) ‘Once again, Le Bon: Acmation, pare and simple, kep fe of all easing und ll proof, is one ofthe surest means of mak. ing an idea ener the ria of erode. Affirmation, however, has na cea influence unless i be em stantly repeated, ana 0 fara posible in the sume terns (1947, pp. 124-125) ‘And, in Hitler's words: “The receptivity of ee great masses is very limite cei intelligence is smal, bur their power of forget cing 'enormos. In consequent, l eliectve propaganda must be limited 03 very few points and must harp on these n slogans unl the lat member of ce public understands whac you wart him co under seand by your slogan quoted in Welch, 1993, p.1 In shoet, che nocoriery of Le Bon’s crowd theory desives above all from the way in which it was taken up by the most murderous practitioners of mass manipulation. It is in cis, sense that Le Bon helped make the 20th century, and therefore perhaps Barrows (L981) |was righe in arguing that he deserves co be scen not so much much as the father of crowd psychology but rather as one of che architects of the 20th-cencury right-wing politics ‘The failings of Le Bonian psychology Great ehough Le Bon’s influence upon academia might be, in recene years his name tends ‘only to be invoked in order to criticize his ideas. Amongst historians, starcing with the“The Crowd century 539) ‘work of Rude (1964), a whole school has grown up which disputes che notion thac crowd action is a mindless outburse and instead claims that crowds express alternative ideolo- sical perspectives in what is often a subtle and sophisticated manner (e.g. Davis, 1978; “Hobsbawm & Rude, 1973; Stevenson, 1979: Thompson, 1971, 1991; Tilly, Tilly & Tilly, 1975), Indeed, crowd behaviour has even been used as 2 means of accessing the idcologi- cal perspectives of those groups who do not leave written records behind them (Reddy, 1977;Smith, 1980). In sociology, McPhail (1991) summarizes contemporary views when hhe contends that, as soon as Le Bonian psychology was subject to extensive critical serutiny and empirical examinacion, it was found to have ton many flaws to be raken seri= ously. Morcover, there was political dlistaste for a theory that dismissed anybody who protested against che status guy as lacking in rationality. In psychology too, Le Bon’s form of irracionalism has come under concerted attack (eg. Berk, 1974; Brown, 1965; Milgram & och, 1969). In particular, the notion of a group mind, separate from individual consciousness, has fallen into disrepute. ‘According to Floyd Allport, the idea is « metaphysical abstraction, a mere ‘babble of tongues’ co use his memorable phrase (Allport, 1933). Yet not ony those who followed Allport’ individualise path 2ook such a view. Those intcractionists who accept that chere are emergent properties of the collective but who argue that chese structure the indivi ual psychological field share a like assessment (ef. ‘Turner & Giles, 1981). Moreover, as Milgram & Tach (1969) noted in cheir influential review of the field for the Handbook of Sail Psychology, a global concepe like the xroup mind fails to distinguish between the Ibchaviours of differene types of crowd, fails to specify who will and who won't behave as crowed members and fails ¢o distinguish becween what members of a xiven crowd will of won't do, However if there is one criticism of Le Bon which is shared across the disciphines itis the way in which he abstraces crowd behaviour from its ideological and structural context (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1973; Billig, 1976; Davis, 1978; Giner, 1976; Nye, 1975; Rude, 1980; Turner & Giles, 1981). That isto say, although Le Bon is actually writing about the class struggles of lare 19th-century France, he writes without acknowledging that setting as ifhe were writing abour crowd processes in general. Elsewhere, I have analysed the explanacory and political consequences of such decontextualizacion in some detail (Reicher, 1987, 1991, 1993; Reicher & Porter, 1985). On the explanatory level, a failure co understand crowd behaviours in relation to their social setting means that chey are reified as generic features of the crowd itself, Thus the violence thae characterizes relacions fetueen wroups at a particular poine in time is arcribured as a timeless feature of the crowd alone. Moreover, because such actions can no longer be analysed in cerms of their contextual meaning, they become characterized as meaningless and hence the crowd becomes characterized as mindless if nor irrational. Finally—and perhaps this is the most obvious feature of Le Bonian thcory—the censions and problems of society having been projected into che nature of che crowd, che crowd is treated as an un- reservedly negative phenomenon. Its stupidity is in inverse relation co its destructive power. Crowd behaviour, as Le Bon (1947) puts it, is more like thae of wild beasts than human beings. On the political level, deconrexeualization has three related consequences. The first is a denial of blame. If collective violence is the inevitable result of crowd! formation, then ic can be blamed neither on general social injustices nor on the immediate actions of out-540 Stein Reicher side forces such as police or army. The powers that be are entirely lec off the hook. The second consequence isa denial of voice. Ina famous phrase, Marcin Luther King has called riots the voice of the powerless. Historians have shown how crowds articulate grievances and alternative views of society. Le Bonian crowd psychology silences that voice by saying. that there is nothing to listen co, Crowds by definition are mindless. How could they express a meaningful perspective? The third and final consequence is a legitimation of repression. Ifcrowds are inherently mindless and generically destructive then they cannot be reasoned with, they can only be dealt with firmly, Indeed, ic makes sense to repress the crowd even before it has formed since once people gather the potential for violence is ever present, All in all, Le Bon’s crowd theory forms a porent ideological cockrail So, on the one hand, the succes of Le Bon’ idleas is undeniable, However, on the other, the failings and che bias of his exowd psychology are increasingly evident. There is an obvious tension between these two observations. A scrikiny example of this tension can be found in an edited book on Changing Conceptions of Craud Mind and Behaviour (Graumann & Moscovici, 1986). In one chapter Moscovici mounts an eloquent plea for acknowledging the importance of Le Bon’s conteibution, In che next, Apfelbaum & McGuire (1986) argue that Le Bon’s account of crowd process as akin to hypnotic sug- gestion led co the « priori exclusion of political and social aspects of the phenomena from the field of inquiry and chereby replicated the right-wing anci-Commune polemics of the cra. To which position should we pay more attention: the defence of Le Bon or the attack upon him; the account of his successes or the listing of his failures? But to pose chings in this way and co insist on a choice between che two is ¢o miss the point. The interesting, question is how they can coexist. In other words, how is ie that Le Bon's ideas were so suc~ cessful if they were so wrong? An answer to that paradox is not parochial in the sense of simply resolving a minor historical puzzle in a corner of social psychology. Rather it may. help us €0 unravel che question of how psychology could be used to shape mass action and thereby make history. From theory to practice In a previous article (Reicher & Potter, 1985) I have sought to deal with one aspect of Le Bon’s success—that is, che popolarity of his ideas amongst both the political elise and with a more general audience. This popularity is explained as resulting from the combi- ration of two forms of bias, the first being, termed ‘political bias’ and che second ‘per- spective bias’. The political bias has just been noved—alchoujgh Le Bon saw himself as stricely neutral and, in editing both Alcan’s Bibliotheque dle Philospphie Contepuraine and Flamearion’s Bibliotheque de Philosophie Scientifique, ciceted any macerial chac contested his, politics on the grounds that it violated ‘scientific impareiality’ (Barrows, 1981)! This bias. is clearly congenial to those with power and, particularly, those in government, [Fa prime responsibility oF any democratic government is the welfare of society then any disruption of the social order places its custodianship in question. To attribuce conflice vo che inher- ent pathology of crowas resolves that question without drawing attention to arcss under _xovernment control such as economic and social policy or the behaviour of state forces. The political elite have much co gain if a Le Bonian account is accepted. Such political bias is also a form of perspective bias (although —and ¢his is important —not all perspective bias has a political basis). Le Bon himself and the political elite“The Crowd! century 54 observe the crowd as outsiders, Rarely ifever do they form part of the crowd (except some- times as its target) and therofore have an opporeunity ¢o share in the crowd's viewpoint. ‘Thus, cheir accounts can be seen as an out-group perspective on the crowd involved in incergroup conflict, The implications of this ean be understood by reference to recent work in the social identity tradicion on group and incergroup behaviour (Tajfel, 19825 Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Giles, 1981) which has also been developed to explain crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1996). The premise of this work is thac individuals do not lose identicy when they become crowd members bu rather shift from acting in terms of personal identity to acting in terms of social icentity. Correspondingly, ‘rowid members do not lose control over their behaviour but, rather, control shifis to the values and beliefs which define social idencicy. While such an account stands in oppposi- tion to Le Bon’ irracionalise position, chis does noc mean chat ie subscribes to an equally inflexible rationalism. Racher, it secks to emphasize the ideological basis of collective thought and action which tends to be ignored by both. However to chose who stand out- side the crowd and who do not have access to such underpinnings, the behaviour will remain incomprchensible—much like a languaze may seem like a meaningless torrent of sound to the foreigner. In particular, where outsiders observe a violent crowd and cannot comprehend the basis on which targets are selected and actacked, incomprehension will turn to hostility and fear, for how are they o know whether they too might become a target? Putting che two aspects together, it can he seen that political antipathy to crowds and. preference for irrationalist accounts mesh with the direct experience of outsiders whatever their politics. Hence the political explanations of erowd events make sense toa wider pub- lic while che approval of the public lends further eredence to the explanations. Political and perspective bias are therefore mutually reinforcing in legitimacing the Le Bonian viewpoint. In terms of explaining Le Bon’s success, so far so good. However this is only half of the story, and che lesser half at chat. It is one ching to explain why people believe in what Le Bon has to say—indeed, as he himself contends (Le Bon, 1947), the face chat large numbers of people believe in something is very far from making it so. Ie is quite another thing ro explain how Le Bon’s ideas could provide such a useful resource eo prac titioners if they so profoundly misrepresent che nacure of crowds, In order to address chis issue, the various claims, assertions and acknowledgements con- cerning Le Bon’s influence upon crowd rhetoric are insufficient. Rather, it is necessary to, examine the actual practices of mass rhetoricians and to analyse whether and in what ways they were informed by Le Bon's ideas. Ie makes sense to start with the mose famous of Le Bon’s supposed acolytes: Mussolini and Hieler. It is true that boch leaders spoke of their own rhetoric in Le Bonian terms, either implicitly (Hitler) or explicitly (Mussolini. Ie is also true that audience members describe themselves as in a state of almost mindless receptivicy to whatever these leaders said (Abel, 1986). Finally, i is crue chat acaclemic commentators have described the crucial moments of their rhetoric as almost content free (Stern, 1984). Yee how much can we rely on these claims? Are ideas and reasoning indeed absent from the mass thetoric of chese dictacors such that what counts is not so much what is said as how ie is said? Consequently, is ie sufficient ro concentrate analysis on such pre- sentational features of ehe shetoric as ‘affiemacion, repetition and contagion’ (Le Bon, 1947, p.124) Ie is with these questions in mind that che following. analysis of first Mussolini's and chen Hitler's actual rhetorical praccice should be reac342 Stephen Reicher Mussel rhetoric In the aftermath of the First World War, both Italy and Germany witnessed relatively ‘weak parliamentary systems nearly overthrown by communists, In Italy the higmo ratio (red ewo years) of 1919-20 saw multiple factory occupations. In Germany, the period 1919-1921 saw multiple uprisings, some-—such as that in Munich—temporarily suc~ cessful, Fascism and Nazism arose in opposition to the communists and fought extended battles against them, Both movements sought to counter class-based action through the mobilization of a nationally defined community. Mussolini’s own personal trajectory is ‘emblematic of that shife. Having been editor of the socialist paper Anwnti! he broke av: in November 1914 to found 1! Popolo d'Italia. The cause of his defection had co do with the war. The socialists opposed it, but Mussolini urged intervention on the grounds that it would lead to national renewal. ‘Thus, in the first issue of Hf Prpolo, his appeal was directed in the following, terms: Tris you, the young of Tal. che young of che workplace and the universities, he young in years and in spirit the young who bela tothe generation which deainy hs card with “malin history, 1s yo tha il with cy of peeing eom Ander! Conn! in Pape Walia. 18 November 191, slate in Gaifin, 195, pp. 27-28), This is not an isolated example. Mussolin’s rhetoric, borrowed from the Fralian avane zzarde gathered around the paper H/ Vox, is consistently organized around che theme of replacing; an old wich a new Lealy (Adamson, 1992), However the ewo are not simply alver= native versions of nationhood, The former is portrayed as decadent and as the ‘internal teniemy’ of true nationhood. The latter is portrayedl as representing the authentic spirit of Iealy. This is clearly expressed in Mussolini's speech delivered o the Fascist conggeess of 1922, For us the nation is wor jus ceric, bur something spiritual. A-nacion is grat when it canslates int reality the fore of is spi. Rome becomes geen wher, starting uu a small eur semix racy _racullysprends out across he whole of Hay i accordance wath ies spirit ll encouneets the wat rio of Carcuge and muse fhe chem. Tei the ise wae in istsy, one of he fst, Th eral ‘nears ies standards he end of che eath, but at every tue dhe Ruan Empire isthe cretion ofthe sii, since che weapons wet aimed nox just by the arm of Roman legivnarses, bit by thee pitt, Now there we desire dhe gerarness ofthe nation bueh material an pita laut I divi Nel the aples spvch, 24 Ortaber 1922: tuna in Gian 199%, p. 4) ‘This extract also illustrates another key aspece of Fascist discourse in general and Mussolini’ rhetoric in particular. In order ro ground che notion that Fascism reflects che ecernal and authenti¢ Italy an appeal is made to the pase. Thus, Fascism is likened to chose moments of greaeness where the true Italian spirit shone through. In a speech to war vercrans of 1925, Mussolini asserts that: ‘The Fathesland i no illus! Ic is the sweetest catest, mest human, mont divine of elites! No! Iealy dl nor exaust ise in ceasing ie retard second civilization, bu ale creting a thi (ro Celergcime dll etna celebration of vite) speech, 4 November 1925; translated in Grin, (995, po. ‘The second of these civilizations is the Renaissance bur the first—both ia time and in stattre—is the Roman empire. Visser(1992) argues thar the cule of Romanness (romanita) ‘was not simply an ephemeral matter of « few symbols and earchwords. Rather it was of central importance to Fascist ideology und rhetoric. As Visser puts it, one of che major“The Craud? century 343 postulates of fascist doctrine was that it strove co embody Roman historical aims. Thus the romanita constituted! a Weltanhaunng for the regime. ‘The important thing ro noce about che ronanita is not whether it constitutes an accu- rate view of the past or whether parallels between past and presene are valid, Rather, the pine is that a specific period is used co fixa specific definition of Iralian identity and des tiny, Thus a mythology of such leaders as Romulus, Scipio Africanus, che Gracchi, Marius, Sulla, Cacsarand Augustus was used to define valour, justice, law, order, dedication co col- lective interests and high moral standards as the central Italian values. The rumanita was also used in mote concrete ways in order co legitimace Fascise policies as representing che quintessential Italy. Thus specific policies such as the reclamation of the Pontine marshes were likened to Caesar's agricultural policy. More general policies such as che cogporatist stace were compared to the Augustan economy. The Roman revolution which destroyed the republican constitution and ushered in the supposed golden aye of Augustus and che cx romana ws represented as identical with the fascist replacement of liberal democracy with a faseise imperial democracy. ‘The rumanita was expressed in many ways. The (livetally) most concrete instance was the massive exhibitian mounted ¢ celebrate the 2000ch anniversary of the bisth of Augustus in 1937-8. Through che grancleur of che exhibits and the commemorations sur rounding them, the clear message was spelt out that strong centralized leadershipy was essential co the survival of the Roman state—and hence eo che well-being of Iraly across, time. More ephemeral, but equally important, were expressions of che Punanita in popa- Jar cultural forms, For instance, a marching song from the Abyssinian campaign includes the following verses: Oh Rome, ternal Rome ‘You know chat your sons Will ances rhe call ‘The single ery “me eo us We wat eu new ‘The prea ploy of Rome ‘Marching on ee pth While dhe Dae has show ws Another song from the Spanish campaign (where Fascist ¢roops fought wich Franco's fegions) has the lines: Faith ssrine us always Ie spars uson fae ay Weare ee daring eats OF rhe eeemal Light of Rome However, even when the ranunita is not explicitly mencioned, the construction of issucs in terms of their relevance 0 Italy, the construction of the audience in terms of their Tealian identity, nd the deployment of a particular delinition of Kalian identity by refer- ence to which choices are evaluated and policies are sanctioned, is omnipresent in fascise shetoric in general and Mussolini’sehetoric in particular. Thus he dismisses justifications for che calanization of Ethiopia in terms of ‘negra’ inferiority and instead asserts that che essential arguments sbslurely irrefutable and enough to pur an end to any actempe ro censure us are twofold: he ital ned of the ein pple its miliaty security an Banter Ati eom I Popo Pala, 31 July 1935. tanslsted in Gril, 1995, p75)544 Stephen Reicher (Or again, in his ‘state of the nation’ address of 1929, Mussolini justifies che comporacise state by construing itas the embodiment of Italy ina way that transcends individual capa- bilities: “The Stare, as Fascism comecives sid at alized i, i spiccual and moral entity, because ies the con ‘rete politi, ordic, nd ceunomic organiatig of che nation. This ganization has emerged and con ‘inues en develop as « manifestation of the spcit. The state is the guarantor of internal and external Security bur it als safeguards and perpetustes the pric ofthe people ait has evolved over the ceneuries in ngage, customs an fh, ‘The Seate is nor only presen, but past and, above all fucure. Ie is che Stace which, canscending the brief limits of individual lives, embodies the conscience of the nacion (eom speech o che Quinguedial Assenbly ofthe ceyime, 10 March 1929; eranslated in Grifin, 195, p65). ‘The next extract, taken from che 1922 congress speech which has already been referred to, is even more explicit: (Our mych is he nation, ur nyh the greatness ofthe nation! And wo this yeh, this greaeness, which we wan to trate into a total reality, we suhnedinace everyting else rom I dirs di Nap (he [Naples spec), 24 October 1922: ransated in Griff, 199, p. 44) Thus, as Mussolini himself acknowledges, the theme of nationhoot is constantly repeated in all of his speeches. What is more, ic is often reduced to the level of slogans and mem= orable catch-phaases. ‘Italy is Fascist and Fascism is Taly’ Mussolini claimed in a speech of 1929, and again, in one of his last speeches of 1944: ‘three words... . sum up our pro- gramme, They are these: Italy, Republic, socialization’ (both cranslated in Griffin, 1995). In this sense, his thecoric could be described in Le Bonian terms, Yet, to focus merely on these features of the speeches to the exclusion of al else would consticute, ar best, a very partial analysis ‘The simple slogans of nationalism do noe substitute for ideas bue rather ace themselves, dependent upon an elaborate ideological seeucture. First of all, Mussolini defines his audi- ence in terms ofa specific subjectivity, In che context ofa struxele against syndicalists and ‘communists who sought co mobilize a class-based consticuency, Mussolini substicuces a national mobilization based upon national identities. This national identity is neither self-evident nor neutral. Tes rather a political project and an ideological accomplishment. Seconlly, Mussolini seeks to impose a specific definition of national identity upon his audience. There are many possible ways of defining what it means to be Tralian, but for the dictator itis bound up with a series of militaristic and imperialistic values. Morcover, it isan identity which is both guaranteed and realized by the state which thereby gains she right co speak for the people as a whole, Once again, che merging of audience idlen- city with che authoritarian regime is both projece and accomplishment. ‘Thinlly and finally, « crucial element of Mussolini's ideology is to conceal the idcolog- ical nature of his constructions. The definitions he provides of identicy ate not presented as one choice amongst many but racher as self-evident. Hence they are showa to reflect a continuous historical essence as reflected in key moments of the Tealian past. In short, identity is mythologized. Hitler's rhetoric Nazi ideology centred around two interrelated themes, The firse was the Volésgemeiashaft or national community and the second, the Fibnrprinzip, ot leadership principle. ForThe Crow century 345 Hitler, as for Mussolini everything centred on che category of nation as opposed to eate- otics of class and of class-based internationalism. As Mussolini himself said, speaking. in Berlin: We have many elements of Waltamchuame in common. Nor only have Nazism and Fascism everywhere the same enemies who seve the same masters the Thicd International, but they shaee mati compos ‘of life andl history «fea I! dor di Berne (ve Berlin speck), 29 September 1937: rancatel 1 Grifin, 1995, p. 79). The continuous centrality of nation in Hitlers rhetoric can be illustrated by two extracts; the former is taken from his first ever recorded speech ane) the latter constitutes his last official words: swe want co bury all de petty differences al bring ue ne the Tighe ehe big things the rhings we have ‘© common which bind us 10 ane anodher. That should weld and fase together these who have stil ‘German heart and a love for their people inte fighe aginst che common hereditary fe ofall Germans (rom speech ro the Genoa conference, 1? April 1922: ranslaced in Baynes, 1942, p. 12) ‘Ou of the sacrifice of our soldiers and out of my own bond with hem, which extends iaco death, the seed will besown one way or another co produce che magaiine rebirth of the Nationa Sacialse move mene and heace the creation Of erue national eammunity (om the political testament of Adolf Tit 29 Apsil 1945; unstated sn Grin, 1995, p. 165). More aphoristically, Hitler declared chat ‘during my whole political fight I have been dominated, commanded, so help me God! by one thought alone, Germany’ (from speech, in Hamburg, 17 August 1934; translated in Baynes, 1942, p. 435). Correspondingly, he characterized his political policies as.a master of consteucting the national community and descroying anything that might weaken or divide it. ‘Thus, in the proclamation which. opened the Party Congress at Nuremburg on 6 September 1938, Hitler described. the casks which the Party had to perform Ira eo beak up and destroy the other world of purties; ie had to declare unrelenting war on dhe woeld ‘of class and socal peejudius cad to ensure that wiehout consideration af bith or origin the German ‘who wat strong willed and capable might find his way upwards, I had eo page Germany nf ll these parasites for whom the need of eet Tatherland and people seve asa sure of personal enrichment. Te had to eecnnie che cern values of load snd sol and 0 raise the respect paid to those values wai they became the supreme laws of a ile 1 had so eyin the srugle agaist che geeacest enemy who thrcatcned eo destroy nor people—the international Jewish word enemy (ranslared in Baynes, 192, pb. ‘Of course, as this passage makes clear, Hitler employs a very particular construction of the nation, its interests and its enemies which in turn is used to legitimate very particular policies. Most obviously, nation is defined in racial cerms: those citizens of outside coun- tries who are ‘racially’ German are included in the national community while those citi- zens within Germany who are not ‘racially’ German are excluded from the national community. These ewin corollaries are used to underpin two of the Nazis’ most notorious pol rider's expansionise and militaristic foreign policy was largely justified by reference ro the concepe of Lefersraum. According to his racial doctrine, those ethnic Germans who lived under foreign governments were in fact members of che Getman national commu nicy. On che one hand, then, Germany had to be expanded in order to accommodate all Volédeutsche, On the other hand, the supposed maltreatment of such people at the hands546 Stephen Reicher of foreign states justified invasion (Welch, 1983). As Hitler boasted co the Reichstag in a speech of 28 April 1939: uve given back tothe Reich the eritores olen Fem ws in 1919. [awe le hack io the homeland the mills of deeply wnbsppy Germans who had bees cen away from us. 1 have secreted che thousand year hitcortc nity ul the Geran lng space (quoced in Kershaw, 1987, p. 250). Wichin Germany, Hitler characterized Jewish people as che protorypical racial alien and they were subject co an escalating policy of exclusion culminating. in the extermination camps. However, if the ideological rationale for groups was racial, in practice people were often assigned to groups on a behavioural basis. Thus, in one ‘experc opinion’ delivered ro the Reich Public Iealeh Office, che members of a family are defined as gypsy (and hence subject to extermination) on the grounds of their ‘deficiency as regards opinions and in- stability of personal articudes’ and chat “this type of slackness is not encountered among, settled Europeans with a developed work sense’ (quoted in Peukert, 1987, p. 216). Asa consequence, anyone who failed co conform could be defined as external co the national community (indeed, according t04 law of 1944, anyone who was work-shy, slovenly, dis- orderly or unthrifty was defined as a ‘community alien” and subject to incarceration in police camps). Peukert concludes chat ‘National Socialis¢ racialism, then, was by no means merely a murderous ideological farrago, involving the spurious “scientific” desig.- nation of races of "lessee value”; it was also the instrument and ideological expression of the enforcement, through cerror, of conformist social behaviour within the so-called “nacional community” itself (1987, p. 215). In shore, the racialization of Germanness underpinned Nazi domestic social policy in general, It was used noc only co destroy chose without but also to discipline chese within Closely allied to the racial aspect, and also apparent from che Nuremberg congress proclamation quoted above, is the notion of the nation as an organic unity, possessing & single will to which all other wills (whether individual or collective) must be subordi- nated, Ie ison this basis chat Hitler denies both personal rights such as free expression and collective rights such as association and combination. Political parties and tracks unions, ‘were ubolished, the auronomy of the German states was curtailed, even religious denom- inacions were ateacked under the so-called Gieicbschaltang (coordination), As Hier said ‘of his movemenc in a speech at Reenshery on 6 June 1957. Je puts but une question: Are ys Getman snd do you wish to be Gerrnan? Al ehae oo iy, A yon sleten and do yout wis a he doves? Wil you work as an honourable man i the mide of you pepe? ‘Above all will you, WF ecessry, place the interest of your peuple: belore your va interests? It your saswer is "Yess thea we welonme you. But Fill never alla angen ro divi tis people once mre ine religions cap cl hing che other Canslated in Baynes, 1912, p. 392) Ir is here chac che concepe of the Kibrrprinzip becomes integrated with that of Volbsgencénscajt. For, if Hicler saw Germany as possessing, a single will, he sees himself as representative of that will. Indeed, Steen (1984) coins the term ‘representative individual” to refer co Hitler and he argues that this cakes a double form. On the one hand Hitler is represencative by virtue of being an ordinary persor—being of the people. On the other hand Hitler is representative by virtue of being: extraordinary—being, able co reveal aspects of their national eacial) will of which they were hitherto unaware and hence being. above the people. This notion of Litler, che heroic leader, who is an expression of che national will is constantly repeated in Nazi propaganda. In Otto Dietrich’s eulogy to theThe Crmud etary 347 Fuhrer on his birthday in 1935 itis asserted chac ‘we see in him the symbol of the inde- seructible life-force of the German nation, which in Adolf Lieler has acquired living shape’ (quoted in Kershaw, 1987, p. 72). Surpassing even this is the following, from a speech by the Bavarian Minister of Education, Hans Schemm: He has crated «new fice of Genmany asthe ast and master builder who he Lord Ga has given 10 sv Ife encompass the events ef two thousand Yeas, hen we mu com fo the conclusion the he Bs shape has unly now been found, Th be allowed eo he Adolf Hirer mason, carpenter and lowliest day Iabaurer ia gift ofheaven In che personality of Fits, ilion-fld longing of the German prople hae become reality (quoeed in Kersh. 1987, p. 59) In Hitter's own hancls, the Fahreprinzip is used as a basis for legitimating the destruction of democratic insticutions and cheit replacement with coralitarian rule. Since the people have a single will and he represents thae will then Hitler characterizes his dicear torship: ‘as the people, with the people, and for the people’ (from speech in ehe Reichstag, 30 January 1934; translated in Baynes, 1942, p. 424), Elsewhere in the same speech the logic is spele out more fully: prople alkaf democracies and dictatorships and they have completly failed vo realize that inthis cour ‘ay an upheaval hus taken place uf which—il demoxcaey seo have any meaning a all—nmust be called in he highese sense of he word democratic. OF all those who so ofien aad so readily nekeavour to rep= sent che democeatc Goverocvents a institutions suppurted by ee people in contraistinction so di ‘atorsips chet is oosane eho ean with greater righe speak ithe name oF his penple chan #eransaces in Baynes, 1942, p. 498). This is not the only basis on which Hitler derides democracy. Elsewhere, he characterizes, it as an ‘alien idea'—for instance, referting in his proclamation at the 1935 Nuremberg ‘congress 10 Jewish Marxism and, associated with it, parliamentary democracy’ (translated in Baynes, 1942, p. 449)—or else as a means of dividing and weakening, the national will However, the very multiplicity oFarguments reveals an underlying, unity. Whether as pos- itively representing the national spiric, as negatively rejecting. an ‘alien’ spirit oF as simply preventing the disintegration of the nation, Hitler continuously grounds his argu ments in his construction of Germanness, Moreover, this construction gains strengch through the use of history . This is true in two senses. In rhe frst place, many of Hitler's key ideas borrow fram a German history of ideas—particularly the romantic conservative strain of 19th century volkish-nationalist chought, The cult of the nation, anti-semitism and the idlea of "heroic leadership’ are che most obvious examples (Greenfeld, 1992; Kershaw, 1987; Masse, 1991), What is more, although it is unlikely that Hitler had ever read their works extensively (Stern, 1984), his “ideology of che will’ is clearly derived from the work of Nietzsche and Schopentiauer. In the second place, Hitler personally and Nazi propaganda more generally make repeated comparisons between contemporary policy and German hiscory—both the mychical cales of Gessnan heroes in which Hitler becomes, Siegfried (Kershaw, 1987) and historic events where Hitler typically liked co portray him self ay 4 modeen Frederick the Great (e.g. Baynes, 1942, p.4 and p. 435). More generally, Hirler was clear bout the importance of rooting. the present in the past, ‘Thus, in his proclamarion £0 che nation on assuming power, Hitler staves thar his yovernment: inten) s0 make respect for cur glorious ps and pride in owt aciene traditions the round pine forte education of German youth (ranslted in Baynes, S42, 113) So, although the concepts he used—such as ‘race’ and ‘will’—may have been mystical, sci- cntifically dubious and ill-defined, ehis is not to say hae Ilieler’s rhetoric was devoid of548 Stephen Reicher ideas of ideologically incoherent. However, it might be objected that this lays tow much emphasis on the content of Hitler's speeches. As a number of analysts have pointed out, this was bur one clement of the grander performance (Kershaw, 1987; Mosse, 1991; Stern, 1984) and it may be that the overall form of presentation renclers arguments concerning, the content of rhetoric superffuous, “The most powerful examples come from che Nuremburg rallies which were orches- trated with exceptional care: sited in Albect Speer's massive stadia, “monumental and astounding’ to set the proper mood (Mosse, 1991); che leaders set above the massed ranks of members, with Hitler himself sec apare in the centre; starting in darkness with spor- lights sweeping the audience in order to stress the unlimired and yet homogenous nature ‘of the collectivity. All these elements are exemplified in Leni Riefenstahl’s film of the 1954 sally, Triumph des Willens (Triumph of the Will) which symbolically opens with Hitlers plane descending through the clouds to Nuremburg and casting a crucifix shadow fon the marching ranks of Nazis below (Welch, 1983) In large part both the rallies them= selves and the film were a visual display of power designed to impress and intimidate the immediate and the wider audiences. ‘The speeches themselves were integrated into che overall display. Sometimes, Hitler ‘would march with the crowd and only emerge to give his speech (Mosse, 1991). Yer, even ‘when he spoke, che content was but one dimension. The rhychms—militane and aggres- sive—were equally imporcane and chey required a particularly impressive cone of woice with violene emphasis on key words (Mosse, 1991; Stern, 1984). Indeed Stern (1984, p. 39) argues that: 4 the party sles ae Nuremburs the content drops ove altogether and che “achange’ between the Teacer and eh muses booms pte 1: (Hier Deveschlanl (Answer) Sieg Heil “Three points can be made in response to such arguments, The first is that it would be ‘wrong co abstract the content from the broader performance or to counterpose the one to the other. What is importanc is how contene of speech, form of speech, ricual and secting, work together. AS Mosse (1991) puts it, all the elements form a dramatic totality. Secondly, che purpose of that totality was ¢o make Hider che living symbol of the German Vollsgemeinschafi. Flowever, the performances were not simply meant asa statement of this relationship but as its realization, Thus reference has been made to Naz ‘propaganda of the deed (Childers, 1986) and ro ‘propaganda as a perlocutionary acc’ (Stern, 1984). In the case of Nuremburg, the rallies in and of themselves would forge an undifferentiated national community under Hitler (both literally and figuratively). The nature of this pro= ject and the idvology of Hicler’s shevorie ace cherefore completely consistent. Thirdly, and finally, when viewed in this fight, Stern’ example of ritualized exchange may be highly condensed, but it is hardly conten free, Hitler, alone, starts off by naming the national community. The response, from che assembled masses, is the Nazi greeting. ‘The audience is theretore constituted in national terms, moreover the German people, she party and Hitler are fused into a single torality. This is repeated again at the climactic end of the 1934 Nuremberg rally (and the end of Riefenstah!'s film) where Rudolf Hess pro- claims “The Party is Hitler. Bue Hitler is Geemany, just as Germany is Hitler. Hieler Sieg, Ieil! (quoted in Kershaw, 1987, p. 69). Once this unity has been achieved, little more needs co be said. If Hitler is Germany chen everything he says, proposes or does represents“The Crowd’ century 549) che Vallsgeneinshaft and does not need to be justified to them in any oher way (except, pethaps, by defining who is subsumed under the category ‘German’ and by reminding the audience of how he and his policies reflece the nature of the Getman will). ‘Thus for Hicler, perhaps even more chan for Mussolini, the form of rhetoric may be assertive and repetitive, bue form cannot be dissociated from content. Indeed, the very ability to condense Nazi ideology into such a simple form is a feature of the ideology itself. Thus, the slogan and che ritualized exchange represent the culmination eather that the antithesis of ideological construction. Like Mussolini, Hitler defines his audience in terms of a particular icentity. He also provides a particular definicion of what this iden- tity means. Finally, he seeks to obscure the controversial nature of these definitions and thereby render chem necessary rather chan contingent, The ultimace achievement of this ideological rhetoric is to deay its ideolosical bass Mythological psychology and the psychology of myth A closer look at Mussolini's and Hitler's mass shetoric reveals a picture thae is too com- plex to be summarized by simply concluding that they either did or didn’t use Le Bonian techniques. On the one hand, both orators present their speeches in the form that Le Bon describes as critical. They did express chemselves simply, concisely ancl clearly, ehey were ‘categorical and unambiguous in theit affirmations and they used the same constructions ‘ver and over again On che other hand, an analysis of form may be necessary for an unlor= standing of their rhetoric but it is hardly sufficient. ‘The importance of presentation com= plements racher than substitutes for the importance of ideas. ‘What is particularly striking is the fact chat, despite some important differences in the content of Mussolini’ and Hicler’s ideological constructions (mos notably the particular centrality of ‘race’ in the Nazi case), their processes of construction share the same key features. In the two cases, the rhevoric involves prescribing che identities in terms of which people should see themselves and the meaning of idencities—from which values and priorities ow and hence policies and proposals are legitimated. Moreover, the rhetoric then serves to obscure the contingent nature of these constructions and hence render che values, priorities, policies and proposals unchallengeable. Whether it is Mussolini's mock-Romanized Italy or Hitler's romantically racialized Germany, the prescribed identity is mythologized as part of a timeless tradition. This cradicion can be glimpsed at various points in history, bur the presene political project is presented as its purest expression, As I have concluded of both cases, the ability co distil rhetoric down to simple affirmation reflects che double ideological action of con- steuction and mythologizacion rather than the absence of any ideological work in the speeches, A stress on the importance of myth is not, in itself, incompatible wich che ideas of Le Bon. Indeed, according to Moscovici (1981, 1986), Le Bon and other mass psychol- ogists were keenly aware of the need! to present ideas in the form of a faith, to exploit tradicion in the making of that faith, above all to govern the crowd by directing their imagination, ‘Thus rhetoric will only affect crowd action if it evokes a pre-existing culture. As Moscovici puts it, che critics of crowd theory fail to realize chat “for mass psychology incationality is nothing but anthropolgy’ (Moscovici, L986, p. 19; emphasis in the original.550 Staphen Reicher This may be so, bur in order to understand its significance it is necessary te clarity Le Bon’s model of anthropology. Le Bon’s position is organized around the concepe of racial hericaye—andl itis this concept which links anthropology with collective itrationality. Ir is most fully spelt out in The Paychulogical Lawes ofthe Evolution of Peoples where Le Bon con- cludes thac: ‘the mental constitution of a race represents not only the synthesis of the living beings who compose it, but above all, chat of numerous ancestors whe contributed! coward forming it. Ics not the living but the dead who play the preponderant role in the existence of a people. They constitute the creators of its morale and the unconscious drive of ies conduct’ (Le Bon, 1979, p. 50). Ic isin crowds that the racial unconscious is mest clearly revealed, and collective irrationality consists in the unthinking acceptance of s gestions relacing ¢o this unconscious. Thus Le Bon’s anthropology serves co turn cultural understandings into something fixed and necessary. ff mych plays a pare in hi ides, i is in a way thae is diametrically opposed to ies place in che foregoing analysis of Mussolini's land Hitler's speeches: Le Bon mythologies the basis of mass action and thecotic rather than providing an analysis of mythologizarion in. mass thetoric, To puc ic slightly differ- ently, Le Bon’s theory consticutes less an analysis of rhe slicearors’ speeches than a micror of them. Theoretician and practitioner alike ake a racial-national world-view as the unquestioned substraee of human consciousness, especially as revealed under crowd con- ditions. However, if this lack of questioning isa serious omission at che theoretical level, iis a key advantage at a shetorical level ‘Where Le Bon sees people in crows as losing conscious identity and hence necessarily adopting a racial unconscious, I have already argued that crowd membership entails a shift from personal co social identity. Corsespondingly, members «lo no¢ lose control over their actions bue eaeher behavioural control shifts from personal values and understand- ings to chose associated with the relevant social category. However, if crowd behaviour depends upon the definition of social cateyories, the corollary is that the ways in which these categories are characterized will define the basis of crowd action, The choice of categories provides a basis for social solidarity and division; the boundarics of these categories will be the basis on which others are defined in terms of similarity or difference co oneself; the content of the categories will be the basis for defining actions as either formative, non-normative or counter-normative; who is characterized as prototypical will provide a criterion for who can speak for che category (cf. Reicher, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). I cis isso, one might expect chat chose seeking. to mobilize people to different ends would convey different category definitions in their political rhetoric (ct. Reicher & Hopkins, in press). The more any definition is accepted as self-evident, che less basis there will be for any alternative political mobilizations Should the conringent nature of caregory constructions be concealed, cheir authentic- ity is no longer open to question (Al-Azmeh, 1993). The category definicion—and hence the parameters of collectiviey—are noc even available for challenge. If one wishes to con- struct a particular political constieuency withoue allowing discussion or alternacives it is ‘essential co naturalize che categories chrouh which they are addressed and hence render them both necessary and eternal. That isco say, a particular consteuction of identity must be mythologized as the sole authentic identity. Hence, the very weakness of Le Bon's psy- chology is its strength in the guiding of conservative nacionalise rhetoric, Indeed, there is some evidence that Hitler was aware of how important it is to exclude debate concerning the basis of one’s thetoric, In Mei Kianpf. for instance, he argues thar:“The Crowd century S51 Propaganda. fas neo search into che truth a i as thsi favourable ro ochees, in end to present fe then co the masses with doctrinaty honesty, but 4 has ear to serve ses own ech uninterrupted (quoted in Horkheimer & Adorn, 1973, p. 81. Moreover, at one point, in Berlin on 9 October 1934, Hitler acknowledges that if people are nor defined in racial terms they will be defined in terms of other categories—thouh even here, he nacuralizes nacural categories by characterizing. any alternative form of social ‘organization as no organization at all, but as ‘chaos’ (using a familiar anti-semieic allusion in the process): elie in incernationst y Myeudestroy men's onidence ‘he people aust e able co have fst ia something solidarity. then you muse give iis place he eli fn the narional eosnmunity of che peuple, chen mea will seck afer aousher community, and thet wae ‘more they will lla victim» to those whi as ineermtionaljurasites and weeckers aly he at wt forthe time when they can bre up the framework ofthe peopl’ lives im order eo eansren the word Sno ‘universal chaos Cranslaced in Bayes, 1942, pp. AU —H12), ‘To summacize: Le Bon can be criticized for omirring-—indeed, explicitly precluding —an analysis of the construction of social categories in mass thetoric, This leads a particular racial-national model to be taken for granted as che sole basis for collective action and renders his position as more an ideological model than a eheotetical analysis of crowel behaviour. Ie was as an ideological model chae Le Bon was of such practical use, What Hider and Mussolini took from the Frenchman was above all his lesson by omission: ae the same time as constructing a particular categorical framework, ilo not allow the cate- -gories £0 be questioned. The ability to impose the terms of debate consists noc so much jn arriving ar such a feamework as ia the ways one’s tracks are covered. Ic is therefore pos- sible to resolve the apparent tension hecween Le Bon's theoretical failings and his practi cal successes. Le Bon provides a fruitful chetorical resource for authoritarian politicians nor despite but precisely because of che flaws in his psychology ICthis argument stands, chere are cwo important lessons to be learne. The first is that a psychology of political rhetoric necds to pay attention to what Le Bon and his followers ignored: the ways in which political rhetoric serves to construct social categories—what these eutegories are, who is included in them and how their content is defined. Moreover, as the Navi example shows, it is imporcane co see how discourse is integrated with the form of expression and the structuse of rituals, Rather chan counterposing che various dimensions of a speech to each other, it may be more helpful to look at the ideological coherence of the various elements as they work together. Even more, it may be fruitful ro analyse how Iinguistic category definitions correspond to the instantiation of categories both within the performance and in che wider structures of everyday life (Mosse, 1991; Oxout, 1988; Peukert, 1987). Secondly, 100 years afier Tbe Crud we stand ac another for de siete, another period where much of che world Ins undergone profound social upheaval wich old certainties dis- carded and lieele faith im the mew. Ie is a period where messianic solutions have many aceractions and where nationalism and racism is on the rise. In such a period, one of psychology’s greavese contributions may be co insist on a scepticism towards absolutise ‘models of human relations. If ic was @ psychology, flawed in presupposing the macure of human groups, which provided a powerful rhetorical tool ro che 20th cencury’s most noco- rious architects of genocide, perhaps a critical psychology which takes the construction oF these groups as its point of departure may contribute to making a less yenocidal future352 Stephen Reicher References (Abel, 7 (1986). Why Hider Came nie Poor, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univesity Pres. ‘Adeanon, W. 1. 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