EMETERIO CUI v.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, GR L-15127, 30 May1961

Digest by: John Lawrence Paco

Subject: Persons and Family Law
Topic: Waiver of Rights

Principle in sum:

“ In order to declare a contract, void as against public policy, a court must find that
the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established
interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends
clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.”

FACTS:

1. Emetrio Cui (the plaintiff) enrolled in the preparatory law course at

Arellano University (the defendant) and continued his legal studies there,
completing up to the first semester of his fourth year. Throughout this
period, the plaintiff's uncle served as the dean of the College of Law and
acted as legal counsel for the university.

2. Furthermore, he received scholarship grants based on his academic

achievements, resulting in the reimbursement of his semester tuition fees
upon the conclusion of each semester, coinciding with the awarding of his
scholarships. He was required to enter into a contractual agreement in
which he relinquished his ability to transfer to a different institution
without reimbursing the equivalent value of his scholarship in monetary
terms. During his final semester of law studies, he was unable to settle his
tuition fee due to his decision to transfer to Abad Santos University. This
move was prompted by his uncle's acceptance of positions as dean and
chancellor of the College of Law at that institution. Following his
graduation from Abad Santos University, he proceeded to apply for the bar
examination.

3. The plaintiff requested the defendant to provide him with his transcript.
However, the defendant declined to do so unless the plaintiff reimbursed
the amount of P1003.87 - which had been refunded by Arellano University.
Since the plaintiff needed these transcripts to take the bar examination, he
reluctantly paid the said amount to the defendant, but under protest. This
is the sum that the plaintiff is now seeking to reclaim from the defendant
in this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the validity of the provision in the contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant, in which the plaintiff relinquished his right to
transfer to another school without reimbursing the defendant for the
equivalent value of his scholarships in cash.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. The provision is deemed invalid. Had Arellano University properly
comprehended the true purpose of scholarships and the underlying motives
behind the issuance of Memorandum No. 38, they would not have entered
into a waiver contract with Cui. Such an agreement directly contradicted
our Memorandum and openly challenged the authority of the Director of
Private Schools. The contract violated principles of moral and civic
integrity.

2. Moreover, in the case of Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, a contract can be

declared void if it is against public policy. To do so, a court must determine
whether the consideration or the actions specified in the contract contradict
an established societal interest, or if they conflict with good morals and
sound policy, or if they clearly jeopardize individual rights. The policy
outlined in Memorandum No. 38, issued in 1949, is considered sound policy.
Scholarships are granted to acknowledge merit, not to retain exceptional
students solely for the purpose of enhancing the institution's reputation.
Interpreting scholarships as a business strategy aimed at increasing an
educational institution's commercial potential is not only incongruent with
sound policy but also contrary to good moral values.

3. According to Manresa, morals refer to good customs, which are generally

accepted principles of morality that have received some form of social and
practical endorsement. The practice of offering scholarships to entice and
retain students is not considered a good custom, nor has it obtained
widespread social and practical validation, except in certain private
institutions like Arellano University. The University of the Philippines, in
compliance with Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution regarding the
provision of free scholarships to talented children, does not mandate
scholars to reimburse the equivalent value of the scholarships if they
transfer to other schools. This practice aligns with leading colleges and
universities in the United States, which serve as models for our educational
policies. In these institutions, scholarships are granted not primarily to
entice and retain bright students for self-promotion, but rather to recognize
merit or support gifted students who hold an established societal interest
or priority.

xxx
 IRENEO LEAL v. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, GR L- 65425, 05 November 1987

Digest by: John Lawrence Paco

Subject: Persons and Family Law
Topic: Waiver of Rights

Principle in sum:

“ One such condition which is contrary to public policy is the present prohibition to
sell to third parties, because the same virtually amounts to a perpetual restriction on
the right of ownership, specifically the owner's right to freely dispose of his
properties.”

FACTS:

1. A document titled "Compraventa" pertained to the sale of three parcels

of land. It included annotations indicating the right to repurchase, which
was limited to the Santiago brothers or their descendants. This document
was sold to Cirilio Leal, who was the deceased father of some of the
petitioners. Upon Cirilo's passing on December 10, 1959, the
aforementioned lands were inherited by his six children.

2. Around 1966-1967, Vicente Santiago extended an offer to repurchase the

properties in question. However, the petitioners declined the offer.
Subsequently, on August 2, 1967, Vicente Santiago filed a complaint for
specific performance before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.

3. Following the trial, a decision was rendered, which dismissed the

complaint. In response, the private respondent filed an appeal.
Additionally, the petitioners submitted a motion to modify the annotations
on the back of the Transfer Certificates of Title. The private respondent
promptly filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision,
along with an opposition to the petitioners' motion to amend.

4. The previous decision is hereby overturned and replaced with a new one,
directing the petitioner-appellees to accept the amount of P5,600.00 from
respondent-appellant as the repurchase price for the lots. Subsequently,
they are instructed to execute a deed of repurchase in favor of appellant
Salud M. Santiago.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the the annotation at the back of the title, that the lands
should not be sold to any other party except the seller thereof, is contrary
to law.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. The law asserts that the prohibition on alienation goes against public
policy, as it supports unjustified limitations on the right to property
ownership. Additionally, the contract imposes an everlasting restriction on
the sale of the lands to third parties, which is deemed as a form of ownership
constraint contrary to public policy. Moreover, in accordance with Article
1508 of the Civil Code of Spain (Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines), the contract remains legally binding based on its explicit
agreement. However, Santiago made the decision approximately a quarter
of a century later, rendering the contract clearly expired and nullified.

xxx
 D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS GR 137873, 20 April 2001

Digest by: John Lawrence Paco

Subject: Persons and Family Law
Topic: Waiver of Rights

Principle in sum:

“ A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a
right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with
an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently
must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence.”

FACTS:

1. While Jose A. Juego, along with two of his co-workers, was engaged in
carpentry work at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D in the
Renaissance Tower Building, they were situated on a platform constructed
from a steel beam with pinulid plywood flooring. Suddenly, the bolt or pin
used to secure the chain block to the platform came loose. This resulted in
the entire platform assembly, along with the victim, plummeting down to
the basement of the elevator core, leading to the tragic death of Jose A.
Juego.

2. On May 9, 1991, Maria Juego, the widow of Jose Juego, filed a

complaint for damages against her deceased husband's employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc., in the RTC of Pasig. The employer, as one of its defenses,
pointed out that the widow had previously received benefits from the State
Insurance Fund.

3. The petitioner contends that the private respondent had previously

received the death benefits stipulated in the Labor Code. As a result, she is
barred from seeking damages from the deceased's employer under the Civil
Code. This election is considered tantamount to a waiver of her right to
pursue both remedies simultaneously.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a valid waiver by the private respondent.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. No. In the present case, there is no valid waiver by the private
respondent as a mistake of fact occurred. Waiver entails the deliberate
surrendering of a known right, implying that a party is aware of their rights
but chooses not to enforce them. The party claiming a waiver must typically
demonstrate that the person against whom the waiver is being invoked had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of the party's
rights or of all crucial facts upon which they relied. If one lacks awareness
of a particular right, there is no foundation for a waiver to be established.
Ignorance of a pivotal fact nullifies the possibility of waiver, as consent
given under a misconception or misunderstanding of the facts cannot be
considered a valid waiver. It is important to emphasize that what negates
a waiver is a lack of knowledge or a factual misunderstanding.

2. In this instance, the "fact" that forms the basis for invalidating the
waiver is the alleged negligence of the petitioner's employees. The private
respondent purportedly became aware of this only after the prosecutor
issued a resolution indicating potential civil liability. There is no evidence
to suggest that the private respondent knew of her husband's demise in the
elevator accident at the time she applied for benefits from the ECC.
Additionally, there is no indication that she was aware of the available
remedies when she filed the claim with the ECC. In fact, the private
respondent testified that she had no knowledge of her rights. The case is
hereby referred back to the Regional Trial Court for a determination of
whether the awarded sum in its decision exceeds that provided by the ECC.
If the court's award surpasses what was granted by the ECC, any payments
already made to the private respondent under the Labor Code will be
subtracted to avoid double recovery.

xxx
 VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC. v. COURT
OF APPEALS GR 102316, 30 JUNE 1997

Digest by: John Lawrence Paco

Subject: Persons and Family Law
Topic: Waiver of Rights

Principle in sum:

“ As a general rule, patrimonial rights may be waived as opposed to rights to

personality and family rights which may not be made the subject of waiver. Being
patently and undoubtedly patrimonial, petitioner's right conferred under said articles
may be waived.”

FACTS:

1. Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. entered into an

agreement with Seven Brothers Shipping Corp. Under this agreement,
Seven Brothers committed to load Valenzuela Hardwood's 940 lauan round
logs onto its vessel at the port of Maconacon, Isabela, for transportation to
Manila.

2. The charter party agreement between Valenzuela Hardwood and Seven

Brothers included a provision stating that the owners (Seven Brothers)
would not be held accountable for any losses, splits, short-landings,
breakages, or any form of damage to the cargo.

3. Valenzuela Hardwood obtained insurance coverage for the logs against

potential loss and/or damage from South Sea Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc.

4. The vessel sank, leading to the loss of the logs that were insured. A check
intended to cover the payment of the premium and documentary stamps
required for the insurance policy obtained by Valenzuela Hardwood was
presented to the insurer but was declined. As a result, South Sea Surety
cancelled the insurance policy it had issued, effective from the policy's start
date, due to the non-payment of the premium as stipulated by Section 77 of
the Insurance Code.

5. Valenzuela Hardwood requested South Sea Surety for the disbursement

of the insurance policy's proceeds. However, the insurer refused to
acknowledge liability under the policy. Additionally, Valenzuela Hardwood
 submitted an official claim to Seven Brothers for the value of the logs that
were lost. Regrettably, Seven Brothers rejected the claim.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Valenzuela Hardwood waive its rights for obtaining

payment for damages when it entered into the charter?

2. Whether or not patrimonial rights may be waived.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. Yes. The charter agreement entered into by Valenzuela explicitly stated

that the shipping company would not be held accountable in the event of
loss or damage to the cargo. The petitioner's argument that this stipulation
goes against public policy is unfounded, given that the nature of the task
involves transporting a specialized cargo, effectively categorizing the
common carrier as a private one. Unlike the obligations imposed on public
carriers, in a private carriage contract, the parties have the legal capacity
to agree that the burden of cargo responsibility lies entirely with the
charterer, even in cases where the damage is a result of the ship captain's
negligence.

2. Indeed, as a general rule, patrimonial rights are subject to waiver. In

the present case, the petitioner's waiver through the contractual provision
places the entire responsibility for any damage to the cargo squarely on its
shoulders, effectively absolving the private carrier of any liability for loss
or damage. The Supreme Court referenced Article 6 of the Civil Code, which
affirms the permissibility of waiving rights, unless such waiver contradicts
law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs, or adversely impacts
a right protected by law.

xxx
 CHINESE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. REMINGTON STEEL CORPORATION,
GR 159422, 28 March 2008

Digest by: John Lawrence Paco

Subject: Persons and Family Law
Topic: Stare Decisis Doctrine

Principle in sum:

“Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue.”

FACTS:

1. Remington Steel Corporation rented the ground floor units 964 and 966,
as well as the second floor unit 963, in a building owned by the Manila
Downtown YMCA located on Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. Remington
utilized the combined spaces of ground floor units 964 and 966 for various
purposes, including as a hardware store, offices, and display shops for their
steel products. Additionally, it served as a passageway to the second floor
unit 963, which was designated as a staff room for Remington's sales force
in Manila.

2. The YMCA formally ended the lease agreement for the second-floor unit
963 and provided Remington with a specified period to vacate the premises.
Subsequently, Remington initiated a case for Fixing of Lease Period over
unit 963, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 154969-CV and filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court in Manila. Concurrently, YMCA lodged a
lawsuit for Unlawful Detainer concerning the same unit 963 against
Remington, docketed as CC No. 155083-CV, in the same court.

3. While these cases were still pending, Remington initiated a Petition for
Consignation of Rentals, contending that YMCA declined to accept rentals
for ground floor units 964 and 966. This petition was docketed as CC No.
155897 and was assigned to Branch 24 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Manila. Subsequently, Remington submitted a Formal Surrender of the
Leased Premises, expressing its intention to relinquish possession of units
 964 and 966 and providing two checks to cover all outstanding rentals for
these units. YMCA did not raise any objections to the turnover of the leased
premises. Despite this, Remington persisted in utilizing ground floor units
964 and 966 as a passageway to second floor unit 963. The premises were
kept locked, and Remington did not provide YMCA with keys to access
them.

4. The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a resolution promptly dismissing the

petition for review regarding unit 964, citing William Golangco, the
signatory to the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping, for
not providing evidence of his authority to file the said petition.
Subsequently, YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching a
Secretary's Certificate as proof of William Golangco's authorization to
prepare and submit the petition for review. However, the CA released
another resolution, denying YMCA's motion for reconsideration, and
referencing the case of Spouses Melo v. CA. In this case, it emphasized the
mandatory nature of requiring a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to
be attached to or simultaneously filed with the petition, and that
subsequent compliance cannot excuse a party's initial failure to adhere to
this requirement.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the ruling in the case involving unit 966 a precedent for
the present case.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. Yes, according to the doctrine of stare decisis. Following the denial of

Remington's motion for reconsideration, it proceeded to file a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court, captioned as "Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the
Philippine Islands," which operates under the name Manila Downtown
YMCA, pertaining to unit 966. The Court then issued a Resolution
reinstating the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court-Branch 17, with
the modification that Remington was directed to remit P11,000 monthly to
YMCA from July 1, 1998, until March 12, 2004, as reasonable compensation
for the use of the premises pertaining to unit 966. It is essential to
underscore that the facts of the present case pertain to unit 964 and the
case concerns unit 966.

xxx
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION,
GR 119987-88, 12 October 1995

Digest by: John Lawrence Paco

Subject: Persons and Family Law
Topic: Dura Lex Sed Lex Principle

Principle in sum:

“The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony
with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of the
judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges
may regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to
the authority or department concerned, its amendment, modification, or repeal, still,
as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the
law-making body.”

FACTS:

1. On or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said

accused, conspiring and confederating together with one alias ‘LANDO’ and
other persons whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage
of their superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use
of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into
a warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her nether regions, hitting her
head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person
of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age,
against the latter’s will and consent and on said occasion the said
ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. ‘LANDO’ and others, caused her fatal
injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.

2. Following the aforementioned incident, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela,

also known as 'Booster,' residing at 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila,
Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, also known as 'Lando,' residing at 1274
Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, also known as
'Curimao,' likewise residing at 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and
Catalino Yaon y Aberin, also known as 'Joel,' residing at 1282 Lualhati St.,
Tondo, Manila, were charged with the same offense of Rape with Homicide
in an Information dated August 11, 1994.
 3. The two criminal cases were merged and heard in Branch 47 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the jurisdiction of the presiding
Judge.

4. All the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who had already passed
away, were formally informed of the charges. They entered pleas of 'Not
Guilty.' Due to Abundio Lagunday's demise, he was removed from the
Information. It was reported that he was allegedly shot by police escorts
after attempting to fire a gun he managed to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on
August 12, 1994.

5. After a thorough trial and consideration of evidence from both the

prosecution and the defense, the trial court issued a verdict on January 31,
1995. It found the defendants, Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero
y Maristela, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. The court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, along with
all the legal accessories associated with this sentence.

6. Expressing disagreement with the imposed sentence, the City

Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 8,
1995. In this motion, they requested that the original penalty of reclusion
perpetua be changed to the death penalty for respondents Lagarto and
Cordero. However, on February 10, 1995, respondent Judge issued an
Order refusing to consider the substance of the said Motion for
Reconsideration, citing a lack of jurisdiction as the basis for denial.

ISSUES:

1. Do courts consider the wisdom, effectiveness, or ethical aspects of laws?

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. Courts do not take into account the wisdom, effectiveness, or morality of

laws. The trial judge's reluctance in imposing the death sentence due to
religious beliefs is acknowledged. However, it must be emphasized that a
court of law is not the appropriate forum for an extended discussion on the
morality or suitability of the sentence, especially when the law clearly
outlines death as a penalty for specific and well-defined cases. The unease
experienced by those obligated by law to enforce the death penalty is a
longstanding issue, but it is a matter judges are bound by. Courts do not
consider the wisdom, effectiveness, or morality of laws.
2. The Rules of Court dictate that once guilt has been established, the
judge must impose "the appropriate penalty and civil liability as prescribed
by law on the accused." This is not a scenario where a judge is unaware of
the law. Instead, it is a case where a judge, fully cognizant of the relevant
legal provisions, chooses not to impose a penalty with which he personally
disagrees. In doing so, the respondent judge acted beyond his authority or
in excess of it, or with serious misuse of discretion amounting to a deficiency
in jurisdiction, as he imposed the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua when the
law clearly mandates the penalty of Death.

xxx
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA, GR 148311, 31 March 2005

Digest by: John Lawrence Paco

Subject: Persons and Family Law
Topic: Interpretation/Application of Laws

Principle in sum:

“Art. 10 of the New Civil Code . . . is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of
right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized
by some way of interpreting the law.”

FACTS:

1. Honorato Catindig filed a petition to legally adopt his minor illegitimate

child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He requested that the child's
middle name, originally Astorga, be changed to Garcia, which is her
mother's surname, and that her last name Garcia be changed to Catindig,
his own surname.

2. The trial court approved the petition and recognized Stephanie as

Honorato Catindig's legitimate child and legal heir. In accordance with
Article 189 of the Family Code, her name was officially changed to
Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

3. Honorato submitted a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration,

requesting that Stephanie be permitted to include the surname Garcia as
her middle name.

4. The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,

supported Honorato's position, emphasizing the importance of maintaining
Stephanie's connection with her biological mother. This approach aims to
prevent potential confusion and difficulties in the future. According to
Article 189, Stephanie continues to be recognized as an intestate heir of her
mother.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, an illegitimate child,

to be granted the use of her mother's surname as her middle name, given
that it serves her best interests and complies with legal requirements.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. Yes. The established principle is that adoption laws should be

interpreted in a broad manner to fulfill the benevolent aims of adoption.
The well-being and best interests of the adopted child are of utmost
importance, thus, any reasonable interpretation that advances these
admirable goals of the law should be supported and embraced. Article 10 of
the Civil Code serves as a crucial guideline in favor of fairness and justice,
especially in situations where the law may be unclear or uncertain.

2. Therefore, given that there is no law forbidding an illegitimate child

adopted by her natural father, such as Stephanie, from using her mother’s
surname as her middle name, there is no valid reason to deny her this
option.

3. Lastly, it is a prevailing custom among Filipinos for individuals to

possess a middle name, typically taking the mother's surname. This
practice has been officially acknowledged by both the Civil Code and Family
Code. Moreover, the Family Law Committees have reached a consensus
that the mother's initial or surname should directly precede the father's
surname, allowing room for a second name, if applicable, to come before the
mother's surname.

xxx