Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican’ Philip Pettit 4. Introduction ‘This poper introduces a new distinction between two different conceptions of negative liberty. The distinction is more or less analytically precise. It has an ‘enormous policy-making significance. And, what is more, it connects with the historical divide between the recent iberal wadition and the more ancient republican one. Or sot east shall argue. Bot before the argument, some stage sting ‘The livers notion of liberty, onthe contemporary understanding of liberalism, is essentially negative? To be a fee petson isto be an agent fee fom the Interference of others however broly that is understood ~ in the exercise af the traditional Uberti It sto be free in following your thoughts sehere they lead, in speaking your mind, in moving where you will in associating with anyone who will have you in disposing othe things that belong to you by local property convention; roughly tito Be free fom interference i the pursuit of {hose independent actives that you can perform, given local conventions, ‘without the active help of others. All iberals see Hberty i this sense asa value ly ‘ben constructed, or something that has only come to be cherished, inthe past, century or #0? Many politcal thinkers write a f hey thought this was indeed the case. They may take their cue from Benjamin Constants assc essay on "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that ofthe Moderns* According to Constant, who was weting early in the last century, we modems cherish the negative liberty ofeach individual to determine her own affais, whereas ou predecessors cherished instead the liberty ofan individual to participate in 3 fallectve process of selfdetermination; they cherished a variety of what Isaiah erin deseibes as positive iver, not the negative Hberty that more commonly appeals tous believe that the Constant Berlin dichotomies of negative and positive,16 Php Pt rmodesn and ancient, have served usin thinking about the history of liberty. between of the "In maintaining this line, I rely on a recent tradition of historical scholarship and interpretation, in particular on the work of Quentin Skinner I have few Fistorcl arguments to add to those that Skinner and others have deployed. But do have same philosophical reasons for finding ther pictre of the history of liberty attractive: As argue in this paper, there an important distinction to be ‘made between two conceptions of negative Hberty and the distinction maps fairly closely onto. the aliferences. that they find between liberals and republicans. The distinction is of inorest In its own sight, having both {heoretieal and. practical significance. But its connection with the bers. republican divide gives it special claim to attention “The main thesis ofthe papers the philosophical claim abou the two different «conceptions of negative lberty, ad I belive hat his hess swell supported by the argument developed in sections two to four. The historical thesis that connects this distinction to the lberabrepublcan divide ls motivated by the considerations in section five but, of neces, tis not adequately defended there. In any case the historal thesis is inherently more controversial ‘Traditions can be identified and unified ~for example, writers ca be selected 35 figures representative of different trations on a variety of grounds and on various mises of those grounds, One ground may be the diferent aimsNegative Liety, Liberal aut Repub ” ‘defended, another the individuals acknowledged as heroes oF antsheroes, another the texts taken as authoritative or heretical, yet another the events Alepicted as porous or tragic. I ascocateUiberalism with one conception of ‘negative liberty, republicanism with another, and I do s0 with good reason: there is fair fit so shal be urging, Between the two traditions and these val constrais of liberty, But [admit that there iste T can say against someone {who wants to carve up the traditions on other grounds, or even against someone ‘who wants to weight other grounds mare heavily. What is at issue in that sort of tiscusion is not s0 much a matter of fat asa matter of how the cts are most perspicuously organised and presented 2, Realisation, resilience and non-interference Consider two balls, exch of which ros along a plane on a straight path, in ‘sccordance with Nevton’s Inws of motion.” Ball A difers fom ball B inthe following espe: the path along which rolls has posts stationed at intervals on either side, These posts do not actually affect is rolling but they serve wo ‘elated purposes, Pst they belp to shield the ball from any outside forces that ‘would detect from ts course. And sécond, if they fallin this, and an eutsde Force does deflect the bal, hey wll dampen the deflection and restore the bal to the original course. This litle setup enables us 10 distinguish between the fesllence as distinc rom the realisation of a property Take the property of rong on a stright line whichis realised by both balls, ‘This property is ealently realize in the cae of ball A but notin that of bal B fs relenay realised inthe sense that not oaly does the ball sick to a straight path as things actually transpire; it would have stuck or at leat returned t0 3 Straight path even ifa disturbing force had been active. Bal A has a tenacious ‘sup on the property of roling along a stright line, as we might say, whereas ball B has only a fagile hold. Ball A's possession of the: propery is not ‘ulerable in the same way as ball B's othe possiblity of outside interference “The apparatus of possible worlds gives san atactive way of marking the ‘contrat between the to cases” The two bls both stick othe straight course Inthe actual world, Where they ifr iin how they rollin the possible worlds where they are subjected to various counterfactual influences. Ball A sticks or Fetuins to staight course in thowe counterfactual situations as well as in the ‘actual world it displays the property resiently or robustly across those words Ball B voor ff a straight course in every world but the actual one it displays the property insecarly, not resiliently Thope this simple physical analogy will serve to illustrat what I mean by the resilient relation of « property. The property of rong on a straight line resiliently realised 0 fara there isa suitable apparatus in plac for maintaining the continued presence of the property and for restoring it in the event of isturbance. Before moving on from the analogy I might ad just ane farther18 Phiip Peis. point. Whether the apparatus is sufcint forthe straight rolling to count as teslient wil depend, a5 I se things, on the technology availble. Given the availability ofa teran technology we may say that bal rolls resiently on ¢ Straight line. But were a superior technology to become available ~ say. ¢ technology allowing fewer disturbances or compensating more quickly for the slistubances that do occur ~ we might lose reason to do 0: the technology jo ees ‘The notion of resilience clearly applies beyond our physical analogy." In particular, it clearly applies to various goods that an indivi nay enjoy. Two Individuals may be alike, fr example, in the degre to which they actualy enjoy 00d health over their lives but sil differ inthe resiience with which they enjoy {tin particular, they may differ inthe reslence oftheir good health a thet is defined relative to contemporary medial technology. One may be in such a position, say because of the availablity of medial help, that he would have ‘maintained or recovered his level of health even under shocks that he didnot actually suffer. The other may not have access to such resources and may be vulnerable tothe shocks that would not have seriously compromised the fist person, ‘Again two people may be alike in the degree to which they actually enjoy the favour of someone they both cherish but sil differ in the resilience with which they enjoy it here the technology’ relative to which resilience is defined is more ‘oriess unvarying. The one individual may be such that had he acted diferenty in certain ways ftom how he did, he would stil have commanded the affection ‘of the cherished person. The other individual may not have the tome Teale hold on the cherished perso’s favour. It may be that had he acted diferent in those ways from how he did ~ had he been less congenial or attentive, for ‘example ~ he would not have continued inthe person's favour The distinction between resilient and non-zstient realisation alzo applies to the sort of nowinterference to which the concept of negative liberty directs attention. Two people may enjoy eacty the same degree of non interference in the course of ther ives and yet one may enjoy it resenty, the other only in 2 fragile or vulnerable way. Furthermore, this Is so even on the stifer of (WO possible accounts of hati is for agents to enjoy the same degree Of Aon Interference. loose account of what tis involves would require only that other individuals refeain inthe same measure from interfering wth what the agents sctually do, The srcter account would say that a counterfactual condition must iso be fulfilled: other individuals must not only refrain in the same measure from interfering with actual doings; # must be that they would have refrained in the same measure from interfering with things thatthe agents might have done but didnt Let the resilience of nominterference, as that is relevant to liberty, be defined relative tothe sorts of social and legal arrangements that are not slanted in favour of any particular individuals et it be defined tlaive to-a rule-ot law. CeresNegtieLierty, Lira and Republic ~ sway, then, inhich Bo # ‘ver their ives, yet one enjoy i resiienty, the other not The frst individual ‘hay enjoy the protection ofan effective Iw against interference, so that had Anyone wished to interfere, then the law would have inhibited him or, where posible would have enstred an end to the interference and perhaps even Provided compensation for the interference slready endured: this wil not be possible with murder and the like batt wil be possible in most ases. The other Individual may have no such protection, so that had someone in @ positon of power decided to interfere, he could have done so with impunity and in non fatal eases could have continued o do so indefinitely How could an unprotected individual ever enjoy the same degree of non- {interference asa protected agent? Well it maybe for example that he enjoys this ‘non-interference though curring favour with the powerful toadying to them Ina way that ins thee tolerance. A person may remain vuloeable to arbiary Jnerference ~ may fal t possess non-interference ina suitably resilient way ~ ‘while enjoying sucha degree of acceptance that the powerfl do not interfere Iwith the independent activites he actually pursues and would not have Inerfred with any independent activites that he might have pursued. With FonstnGinaple will enjoy the same freedom fhe # lucky enough, or clever and fawning enough, to avoid interference to the same Feat2» Phi Pei fentent as his legally protected counterpart. "Whether a Commonwealth be ‘Monarchicl, or Popular, the Freedome isl the same’ 5. Resilient non-interference as an independent object of value We have seen enough to recognise that there is distinction between the realisation ofa property, no matter how insecure, and the resilient realisation of ‘that propery. The next question is whether the esent realisation of a property| can matter independently of any concern with its realisation ae such: whether it fan represent a distinct object of desie and appreciation, a distinct good. The ‘question arises for us in particular with the property of not being interfered ‘with. Let us assume that non-interference as such, nowintesference no matter hhow procured, is something that ean plausibly mater to us. Is resent non Interference something that there i reason to desire independently of deste for non-interference a8 such? Are there features for which we might easure resilient nonsnterference, in particular features that age not guaranteed by the enjoyment of non-interference as such? I people are aware of enjoying some good resiliently, that has a poweeul and normally postive impact on them, over and beyond the impact of the good itsl.Ithey are aware of enjoying health or happiness resilny, fr example, {that gives them a sense of security against possible sometimes improbable — contingencies, a sense of security which can boost the enjoyment conlderaly, ‘Thus wecan eadily imagine why someone might be concerned, not just have fuich a good realize! in her owt atc, but to have it eased rently We can Se thatthe eslience ofthe good might be important ta her independently oft furthering the realisation af the good. We can even envisage the possiblity of someone's preferring to have lest of the good resent realised over having more oft realised non-real ‘Our conceen is with non-interference in particular and the question is whether this is something whose resilience is likely to be independently important, through promoting such desirable effects, I shall argue that itis. Ualike health and happiness, nowinlerference is lgially avaiable only at the hands of ‘others in this respect it resembles the love and loyalty thata person may recive from others. If the non-interference is resienty realised, and ifthe fact of that resilience is more or less salient then tis wil give the person enjoying the non Interference thee distinct sorts of benefit, rst, asin the ease of health and happines, i will give the petson a security and a sense of security against the sorts of contingences that would undermine the non-interference that she enjoys. What ae those contingencies? They are the possible shifts in the perceived opportunities or the operative motives of others {hat would lead them to want 1 interfere. At the limi, they are the possible whims that might lead others to try to disrupt her lie. If the agent enjoys her non-interference resiliently then she can relax ~ or af least relax fo 3 greater eeNegative Liberty, Litera and Republica a ‘extent than would otherwise be possible ~ about such contingencies: even ifthe Shifts in question occureed, they would be unlikely to lead to interference or at least a lasting or uncompensated interference "A second benefit that would flow from enjoying resilient ~ in particular, ssliently resilient ~ nonvintrference closely related to this first Benefit but ‘needs to be mentioned separately. The contingencies against which the Feslence would give her secuily and a sense of security ae contingencies that ‘would inhibit her in the performance of certain activities: the exercise ofthe Ureditonal bberies- The fact that she is consciously secure against such Contingencies means tha, atleast the ideal, she is given the scope for such civics and a sense of that scope, She has consciously available to her province where she con make decisions autonomously, without having to Eonsider wither this wll annoy others and make them more likely to interfere Inthe relevant area she can ignore others, oat east those others who represent ‘tea she i her own bors, Security and scope, having non-interference resiliently realised wll also confer a third and different sort of benefit on an agent. Being salient, the fact of resilience ought to become a matter of avareness, not only fr the person herself, but also for potential interferers; we may assume that there are bther people around. Moe than that, it ought to become a matter of common Swareness, with each individual being aware that the person enjoys non- interference resiliently each individual being aware that thers ar also aware of lence, and so on up the familie hierarchy." With any benefit hata person receives atthe hands of others, thee is always the possiblity ofthe expertence being demeaning, with the recipient cast in the role debtor and dependant With the lave orloyaly of others, its absolutely clear that if someone sto enjoy this fully oF perhaps enjoy propery tall = then she must avoid the demeaning effec: she must enjoy the benefits on offer resienty. The other nue give those benefits in such away thatthe recipient knows, and knows that itis known in common between them that they ae given robustly they are not given just becuse the recipient happens to elit favour at the moment oF happens toe the target ofthe give's genera projects" aoe2 Php Petit tthe fact that he enjoys i only ‘because his lek or charm or cunning ets the good will ofthe powerful only, at thelimit because thee whims are congenial-means thatthe nom interference ‘comes tainted with the demeaning effect. Hes notable a stand eye to eye with thowe at whose of Laces might. A sutjtve ou? aa ee benefits all have a psycholog sarc 2 ratural question to ask is whether they could be produced, not by the salient enjoyment of actually resilient non-interference, but just by the illusion of {enjoying that good.” Ifthe illsion is enough, then it would seem to be her than salient resence that really raters. er ine I might takes that, this consideration aside theres stil ite to istinguish Between the case where someone enjoys relent non-interference ‘aliently and the case where she enjoys nor interference in such a way that itis made to appear lo her that the non-interference is resent. Imagine the case Where the others ply joke of refraining fom interfering in order to give her the impression ofenjoying non-interference witha certain resilience: say, the same resilience as they, This arrangement must continve if the vitim of the joke Js to remain undistinguishable in her psychological attudes from the person ‘who actually enjoys resent non-interference, And soi the end ane wonders ‘whether the joke isn't continuing a the expense of the slf inhibiting interferers "ather than atthe expense ofthe person who is supposedly duped. That person ‘may be duped but the arangement she enjoys begins to approximate to resent nominterference, the longer lt coninues. Taegate Literty, Literal an Republics 2 A composite value? | claim that while non-interference as such may be valuable, resilient non- interference is valuable in a diferent way and so can representa different explication ofthe value of negative bert In order to maintain this ine, Thave to 'be able fo cast resilient noninterference and non-interference as such a8 ‘squaly simple vals, each with is own attractions. But it may be objected now ‘hat fo all Thave argued, resilient non-interference isnot simple value that it ‘comes toa composite of two distinc values: on the ane hand, honinterfeence Sesuch, and on the other, the enjoyment of certain secu. This abjecton ‘would undermine my claim, for the combination ofan independent value with horvinesference as such could not make fora genuinely aterative explication ‘of negative liberty: an equally primitive articulation of the value of being free from interference. Ifthe objection carried, then we would have to ideally negative Hberty wilh nowintererence ss such and would have to see the ‘observations I have made as arguments fr the value, in addon to negative Ibert, of a certain secur. “Take the property of non-interference as such, whether or not thisis regarded 54 value. There are two sors of distnet properties that may be defined by feferenceto nom inererence snd that maybe values, even if tists not. One is a more determinate version ofthe property: property that relates fo now interference a being blue lates to bing coloured, being triangular to being ofa ‘regula shape, The other is» composite version of the propeety: property that involves non-interference as one element among many. The determinate version {an represent an equally simple alternative to the original propery, the Composite version ean nat. The objection in play now ix that resent nom Interference is 9-composte version of nondnteserence as such, and not therefore an equally simple alternative: not the sort of allemative that could represent a rival explication of the value of negative liberty. The objection, in particular, i that resent nonvinerference is a componite version of non Interference as sach rather than a more determinate version, for there will be No problem if isa more determinate version, “Once the objection stated in this way, I think tat it canbe seen to fal. AST have presented the value of resent nomintrference, it does not involve reslsing 2 certain amount of aoninterference on the one hand, as if that were ‘one sort of thing and a certain amount of security onthe other a5 if that were 2 thing of a distinc kind. Whenever non-interference is realised, itis always realsed with some degree of resience or nor-resience; the non-interference realised is resilent, the is resence is an aspect of the nowinterference, not Something added to it 'Nom-interference a such may not be a value a all under the approach that have distinguished: the only value identified is that sort of nom intererence ‘which counts, by relevant ctera, as resilient, Nors resilience tel necessary Snindependent value under this approach resience is a sie gua non inthe sort™ Phi Pet of nominterference that counts as valuable bu it need not be an object of desire In self. Consider a parallel. I may value ed ine without valing wine as such and without valuing redness a5 such I may have no taste for any wine olher {han red wine and I may have no interest i redness except as a condition thet ‘identifies the sort of wine I cate fr ‘The fact that esilent non interference is simple value, nota composite one, does not mean that it raises no problems of weighting and trade-off Consider a simple value like that of material equality. Such simplicity is consistent with problems of trade-of arising when we wonder how best to promote equality in an imperfect world. Suppose we want to further equality between five people and we have to decide between allocations of 10, 55,5, Sand 7, 6,6, 6 3.1n deciding, between these allocations, we will have to deade how releively importants the gap between top and bottom, on the one hand, andthe number ‘of people atthe same level, on the other, Simialy, we may hold thet reient notintrference is simple value and acknowledge that in an lanperfect world it will certainly give rise to problems of weighting and trade-off, The point Is Important to grasp, a6 the existence of such problems may otherwise Seem to sugges that the Value isa composite one "hope that the comments inthis section are sufficient to make cle that with Something lke non-interference, its resilient realsaion may be an object of desire independently of any concer for ils esistion as such. Those who hail nom-interference as an ideal then ~ those who endorse negative liberty may be ‘Why should the republican conception of liberty, as expiated here, ever have given way tothe Ibera alternative? Tend with a speculation on this mater ‘Where there is shit from one conception of some robject-matter to ante, that shift often occasioned by the conception coming, #0 be opposed to 4 dlferent antonym.* I believe that the shift fom a quality centred conception of Ibert toa quantity centred one could have been occasioned by a certain shift of antonym and I suggest that itis intelligible why there should have Been such 3 shift in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. "The quantij-centred conception is 3 conception of iberty under which the antonym is any form of restraint or interference, If uneedon consists in being strained, then freedom involve not being, retained i invelver nom Interference, pure and simple. The qualty-centred conception of liberty, onthe ther hand, isa conception under which theantonym s slavery or subjection or, ‘more generally, any condition in which a person i vulnerable tothe will of Another. If unfredom consists in being vulnerable in this way, then freedom involves not being vulnerable: it involves resilient non-interference. In onde to enjoy such freedom itis necessary aot o be anyone's slave or subject an, more than that, iis necessary, asthe Romans realised, to be the very opposie of 2 slave: t bea iter whois equally protected with the best, aot ust sero ie domino? Tes understandable why, in the republican tradition, the antonysn oferty should have been slavery or subjection or vulnerability. The aim of republican ‘theorists was to identify the characteristics of society in viet of sehich i citizens its ctizens as distinc rom residents who do nat enjoy tizenship are marked off from those who are the vit of despotic rule, corp officildom, ‘external contr, and the like. They used the concept of Hberty t0 serve this ‘purpose of demarcation and so its no surprise that they should have conclved Of Iberty as the antithesis of slavery’ oe subjection. The approach i dleary in place, for example, in Cao's eters, “Liberty is to live upon one’s own Terms, Slavery is, to liveat the mere Mercy of anopher and a Life of Slavery i, to those ‘Seatewarba onEy Phi Pei who can bear it, continual State of Uncertainty and Wretchedness, often an Apprehension of Violence, often the lingering Dread ofa violent Death." ‘Ait ineligible why republican theorists should have taken vulnerability to be the antonym'of liberty, 0 itis understandable why Hberal thinkers inthe late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries should have hegun to think of liberty a5 something primarily opposed, not to subjection, but to restraint. Liberel thinkers in that period, especialy beral thinkers in Britain, were concerned argue that the Interference of the state was undesirable: that it hampered ‘commerce and trade and, uitimately, the wellbeing of al. Liberals were the prophets of the nser fire economics advocated in Adam Smith's Wealth of [Natons and they were, in effec, the advocates ofthe rising commercial classes, ‘The language of liberty offered them a rhetoric with which to combat the pretensions of the slate ~ it was protubly the only store that could have Served ther purposes adequately and in adopting that language, they teforged ‘the existing conception of negative liberty. When they procaine the glones of liberty, they were not heaping scom, as sepubicans did, on conditions of slavery or subjection or vulnerability. The other sie oftheir devotion toberty ‘was an antipathy, not to sch traitona ils, but to restraint, in particular 10 testraint imposed by the state: all restraint, qua restraint, isan evi, 9 Jobin Stuart Mill expressed the new orthodoxy” ‘These lst remarks ae but suggestions as to hove the history ofthe concept of livery, in particular negative lbery, i likly to have gone Toffer them merely as tentative speculations. Their ole inthe present essai to increase further the plausibility of the central thesis: that there are wo conceptions of negative Tiverty and tat the earlier epublican conception was superceded by the current oral notion. raat hat the tests wl have Len iy tw see wonvineng, IF it does seem convincing, then points us towards further ds of inquiry. Tt suggests that there is substantal work tobe done in exploring the signieance of the republican, quality-centred conception of negative Hbery forthe assessment of socal and politcal institutions forthe assessment of institutions which we have been used to examining in the weaker ight of the Uber ideal Pip Petit ‘Australian National University, Canberra Noes * Lam gael for comments made at various seminars where versions of his paper were presented, was helped by discussions with David raddon Mitchell, Jab Brathwaite, Gelfey Brennan, Andrew Be, Joh Carve, Tony Cony, Bb Codi Davi Mller, Graham Ose, Michael Sith Jeremy Walon an Timothy Wilarson ko benefited from weien comments recived fom Will Kyilce snd Mat Sacks ‘competed the paper wl olding iling appointment fi atthe London Sool of Economics and then a the Ecole Pyeng Pars, sho thank bs nto for thelr supper.NegatoeLierty, Liberal and Repos 38 2 the so-called modem tera ofthe Inte nee century — hea the T. Gren mould = defended sporti concept of nepve Het. See Gaus (198), “Ginthevatous ways neigh interference cam be understood anon other matters releant to the definiton ofthe eoneap of negative ery, see Pett (58%), Reprinted in Fontana (588, = Seen (1955) onthe negative pstive distinction. Theresa useful dscusson of the projet of distinguishing betwen these diferent concept of liberty im NCallm 36h. Se Wiebe (948) oncround nd, onthe modern raion ofrepublcnim, ee Poet (1975, * seein prbular Skinner (989) and (158) 'T have veten cbewnere on the republican notion of iberty but have not reconstructed I along the Ines pursed here; have ovrked with 3 rented but ess "hort expan fe ea See Pett (196) and rata and Fett (199). T fstur athe reconstruction atlemped hee, but do not prs Pet (1933. Tone the dea for this example to Jon ister, who produce similar analogy in 2 erent contet of dleion i 73 " Forte use ofan anlogous notion in the probit area sy, ditingushing Ierweendiflerent ways in which an agent can have a subjective probably sce Skins (09) and Davidson an Parte (187). On this itnction ace Pett (985). Given the steer account there sa doubly ounertactl character tothe notion of reset non nterference The person who nyoys sack nominfererence ino ceiin measure int enjoy Hat ita he cal ‘wold where perhaps he dows no stempt evant cite bt ala under the pore ‘Teraior a the pees rede - where he dows. And, given the ealiene, he person ‘eho enjoys such tondnerference must enjoy not usta work where oer are we “hapore bt last words where they become more hose. Ban Bary persuaded Te that useful o ae tis pont esl This ot necessarily to serum tat nly the sort of resent non-ntererence tha ‘produce by such rangement salable iis jon to enue thatthe standard for ‘whether the nom intererence enjoyed by someone vals resent determined By ‘hat such arrangements can achieve. The tonge assumption might be supported by Imnosing he constant of ight in partic the ply constant that play such hlimpestnt part in fn Ras A Thay sie. Fora cussion f these constants ‘See Kuhathas and Pts (951, Me Hots (98, et p 266 5 Gee Laws (1969), chaper 2, foe why the reson ought fo become matter of Se Pett (8. Frank Jaron kod the question: Tim Wakao helped nein thinking about the CEE nt jc a ne yea rad VK Ser oqo FL mt eo nde ogc enna ed ere rah ete no es eee letter 0s mc nebo fey acne a reins tear TST eee)% Php Pet ® Geofray Brennan helped me to make the connection with ak aversion. Notice tht there nothing uratonal bout ekcavesoneltve to ordinary sorts of good ke non Intererene; iskversion rational t most, reative ts good He uty, where hat [i duined o av aoa to ake acount of atte fo ek, See Huey (989) and Broome (0981 for alscusions othe matter "2'Adam Morton has dawn to my atenton «possible extension ofthe noton of resent non interferene unde which ts ky to bean even more divergent eet a pig Under ts constr, we shuld concern ourseves, nat Just wth roth people as they scaly ave agaist poseable forms of intrernce, but so th Protecting people as they might wel comet be say, under worsening ceumstances— eine sch forme of interference. 2 Var gael io Nar Cartwright for pressing ene on this sue, Iam grateful to Francois Rena for ascssing i wh pein (1958), p 8. Se too Cranaton (1967) on English Literals, Benn and Peters (099, p. 23, and Arbater 1984), pp 8-9. Ceanston 1967p. 8 % aster (1988) p58. Locke (1, Tao Treaties of Goverment, . 248. Bentham is perhaps the most insistent in general tat al nw sei an invasion of beryl juste invasion Buteven be sip on at eal ne occas info amore reencecented way of peaking: ‘personal bry is secur againt cera specs of inary which alfecs the person: ‘rh as opal bry, tisanoter branch of secuy~sccuy gana he jstice ‘tthe meters the Government [Dentha (189), p02 ths owe eit tothe fepobican way af expresring things hes one by eter Hees Thus Lord Adon: By It Tmean the surance that every man shal be protected ia doing what he televes ‘is dy gaia the inucnce of ethory nd majoies, cstom and opinion.” (ears (0585, p. 71 Ifthe ambiance In question survives among contemporary Hoel forbes cana Haye Seu as dco in Hagel (00) of how gone [Ber do nt fly diapay the ei atre of soerton (p13). ‘The question complied by the fc thet Rays fot iret jut Mert Dt In equal ety. This complication is onhogoal to our discussion, however. Someone tro thinks of Hert uably salen nrinteserence may al fous inert on ual bert, though i woe noting hat the promotion of stably rete no IMleverence aleady as an egal spec ris una Unt the promotion ofthis oad wl be consistent wth much inequaly ints strut, since eve of estiont Foninteernce cannot remain unchanged a Y goes to a higher level thn X; Ue fot that hae the exta resources involved In going to higher lew! wil almost cereniy tnean that X sufers am abscate ou in restiont non inererence: il mean That Xe ‘neraiiy to Yi increased ‘See Rate (970), > id. p32 2 Sc in parca Skinner (198) and Skinner (198. See Wizsbskt (1958) 2 Trenchard and Gordon (7), p28 3 Wires (1989, 2% Vial (95, p18 % Se Skinner (180, p. 134 * Lewis (1967, p 125: Note that Lewis, by our acount, misrepresents Latin usage is relted comments on Hers almaNegatceLiterty, Liber and Repubicn y % Guarini 990, p 28 © Skinner (180), pp 12-13. Skinner smtimes desrie he connection teticen ae and iet in causal ens whereas on my reading so a more constitutive character the lw eonaitley what ii to be foe rather than ust meeting een Casal preonditons a feedom "8 Pocock, ed (177) p 170 Montesguie (1977) The Spt of Ls, p. 200, © Sec Wohl 987 ‘For more on these alters ee Petit (9%), p. 312 ad following. See the bilan essay By Hames (95), yp. 247-8, Batterson (191, stresses the apposition Between liberty and slavery in wadtonal though we Frenchard and Gordon (197), pp. 249-50 © mal 72), toy, Chapter. "for further work along the projected lines ae Petit (1400), and especially Braithwsite and Pett (90) Those works offer a more detaed acount of what required for republican fcedom, though aot in the terms of INS oper Uy do Rot reeonsract the epabian notion in the way altered hee [REFERENCES Alter, A (990, The i ond Din of Western Lien. Ono: Blache. 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