West European Politics

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On the Politicisation of the European Union:

Lessons from Consociational National Polities

Yannis Papadopoulos & Paul Magnette

To cite this article: Yannis Papadopoulos & Paul Magnette (2010) On the Politicisation of the
European Union: Lessons from Consociational National Polities, West European Politics, 33:4,
711-729, DOI: 10.1080/01402381003794571

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Published online: 14 Jun 2010.

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West European Politics,
Vol. 33, No. 4, 711–729, July 2010

On the Politicisation of the European

Union: Lessons from Consociational
National Polities
YANNIS PAPADOPOULOS and PAUL MAGNETTE

The debate on the politicisation of the EU should consider its consociational nature.
Comparing the EU to Switzerland and Belgium, this article discusses S. Hix’s and S.
Bartolini’s contrasting views on politicisation. S. Hix’s recipe for bipolar politicisation
is based on some incorrect assumptions. It is not obvious that the EU is evolving
towards more Left–Right polarisation. Even if this were the case, the nature of the EU
implies that compromises are indispensable. Therefore, Hix’s suggestions would not
suffice to clarify political choice, and Euroscepticism would not be reduced. The
consociational nature of the EU also makes less credible S. Bartolini’s fears of possible
negative consequences for governability. The politicisation of constitutive issues can
even help to integrate Eurosceptic segments of public opinion. The authors suggest a
middle way regarding EU politicisation based on lessons from consociational polities,
and the coupling of a system of ‘negotiation democracy’ with mechanisms of direct
popular participation.

In an article on the contribution of policy analysis to a better understanding

of how democracies work, French political theorist Jean Leca identified a
divorce between politique d’opinion and politique des proble`mes (Leca 1996) –
in other words, between the arena of electoral politics and the arena of often
technocratic policy-making. Such an uncoupling is accentuated in the
European Union because the sphere of politique d’opinion is practically
absent. Vivien Schmidt (2006: 268), for instance, refers in her book on
Democracy in Europe to ‘policies without politics’. Based on such
considerations, a debate has emerged on the plausibility and desirability
of the politicisation of the EU. By this is usually meant a more important
role for mass, competitive, and partisan politics,1 both in the input side
(expression of preferences) and in the output side (collectively binding
measures and resource allocation) of the European decision-making system.
In this article, we argue that the debate on the politicisation of the EU
should take into consideration its ‘consociational’ nature. We assume in fact
that the socio-cultural structure, institutional system, and political practices
Correspondence Address: ioannis.papadopoulos@unil.ch

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online ª 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402381003794571
712 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

of the EU share much with national consociational polities, such as Belgium

and Switzerland, and that losing sight of this feature leads to analytical or
normative biases. Our definition of consociationalism has two facets: it is a)
a particular style of consensual politics that is a response to the socio-
cultural background of heterogeneous societies characterised by centrifugal
tendencies; and b) this style is consolidated by an institutional architecture
designed to ensure (through power fragmentation and ‘checks and
balances’) the preservation of the vital interests of the composing segments
of these societies.
We are fully aware of the limits of consociationalism, be it in terms of
governability (‘veto points’, ‘joint decision trap’), or in terms of representa-
tion (‘cartel’ politics). We do not aim at defending consociationalism as
such, but argue that scenarios for the politicisation of the EU should take
into account its consociational features, as described in a) and b). We think
that learning from politics in countries such as Belgium or Switzerland is
necessary before proposing formulas for the politicisation of the EU. These
two countries are indeed unique in Europe in cumulating an accommodative
policy style with federalist institutions (Belgium more recently). Of course,
the socio-cultural heterogeneity of the EU – especially after the last
enlargements – is higher than the heterogeneity of national consociational
polities. But it is even higher than the heterogeneity of majoritarian polities
that most authors have in mind when thinking to replicate the national
institutional traits in the EU. By contrast, the EU comes close to being one
of the ‘plural societies’ which are, according to the founder of consociational
theory, ‘sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural,
ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate subsocieties with their own
political parties, interest groups, and media of communication’ (Lijphart
1999: 32).
Initially the concept of consociationalism was employed to analyse
nation-states – the Netherlands being the primary example – where the
socio-economic coexisted with the religious cleavage. As a result, the party
system was bi-dimensional (Left–Right and secular–religious), and parties
were rooted in densely organised societal ‘pillars’ (Lijphart 1974). Electoral
proportionality coupled with mutual veto rights (formalised or de facto) and
the frequent use of grand governmental coalitions are the major institutional
features of consociational democracies (Andeweg 2000: 512–13), distin-
guishing them from classical majoritarian systems. In a second stage, the
concept of consociationalism was extended to other polities where a third
cleavage (centre–periphery) had remained prominent, such as Switzerland
and Belgium since the revival of infra-national mobilisations in the late
1960s. It was argued that the autonomy of territorial segments could be
compared to the autonomy of socio-cultural ‘pillars’ (‘isomorphism’). Thus,
the diversity of territorially defined entities should be safeguarded through
federalist decentralisation, but because broad self-government entails
centrifugal risks, it is combined with mechanisms of representation
 On the Politicisation of the EU 713

‘reconnecting the self-governing community to the larger federation’

(Kymlicka 1998: 237n), and awarding it each time a significant voice on
national politics (think, for instance, of the need to achieve concurrent
majorities).
Because they combine denominational, ideological, and territorial–
linguistic cleavages, Belgium and Switzerland can be considered as the
types of consociational polities that more closely resemble the socio-cultural
structure of the EU. The same applies to their combination of horizontal
and vertical power fragmentation, comparable to the ‘co-decision triangle’
and ‘multi-level governance’ structures in the EU. While Lijphart (1999: 32)
has mentioned such an analogy without getting into more detail, others have
demonstrated that the EU presents the major features of a consociation
(Bogaards 2002; Costa and Magnette 2003; Papadopoulos 2005a), and
interestingly Manfred Schmidt (2000) labelled it ‘bureaucratic consocia-
tional’ because of its lack of democracy.

The Terms of the Debate

We take as a starting point for our discussion the most elaborated
expression of the debate on the politicisation of the EU, namely the
disputatio opposing Simon Hix and Stefano Bartolini, launched by Jacques
Delors’ Foundation ‘Notre Europe’ in spring 2006 and entitled ‘Politics:
The Right or the Wrong Sort of Medicine for the EU?’2 We wish to critically
discuss here the line of thinking, conclusions, and recommendations of these
authors, who adopt contrasting views, and we also wish to propose a
‘middle way’ based on lessons from consociational polities. Let us begin by
briefly summarising Hix’s and Bartolini’s positions, before coming to our
own argument.
Simon Hix is in favour of more Left–Right politicisation in EU politics,
and he shows that this form of politicisation has already started taking
place, above all in the European Parliament, but also in the Commission
and the Council. Hix assigns several virtues to Left–Right politics: it
strengthens the public debate, clarifies its terms, encourages reform and
policy innovation, and as a result also increases the legitimacy of the EU.
The latter’s legitimacy will also be enhanced because, according to Hix,
Left–Right polarisation tends to absorb the classic pro-/anti-integration
split. It is thus likely that it will alleviate Euroscepticism through the
enhanced accountability that it generates. In his works, Hix (1999, 2008)
recognises the existence of consociational features in the EU, such as its
fragmented social foundations and the existence of a checks-and-balances
institutional system, which resemble the social and political architecture of
Germany or of small European states. He knows that such features require
the narrowing of bipolar opposition and the building of grand coalitions, so
that policy change becomes difficult and policy outcomes are generally
centrist. However, and a bit surprisingly, this does not make him reduce the
714 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

ambition of his plea for Left–Right politicisation. He firmly believes that

more Left–Right politicisation would place a curb on the consensual
behaviour observed so far (but less and less according to him) in EU politics.
Stefano Bartolini, by contrast, hardly sees any virtues in politicisation.
First, he fears that it would lead to ungovernability because of divided
government. Given the non-coincidence of the electoral cycles at the
national and European levels, the circumstances under which the majorities
of the European Parliament, Commission, and Council would converge
would remain very rare. What is more, the risks of politicisation in fact,
according to him, go much beyond the risk of policy gridlock. Politicisation
would undermine the integration process itself because it would spill over
from Left–Right policy issues to ‘constitutive’ issues, such as the
geographical boundaries of the EU, its sphere of competences, or the rules
for decision-making. This is likely to happen mainly because political parties
are too weak at the European level to act as efficient gatekeepers for
channelling politicisation. On the other hand, Bartolini (2005) is well aware
in his work that the preferences on key European issues of a considerable
proportion of the European electorate – namely, those voters who are
sceptical on integration – are not represented by their respective parties. He
is also concerned with the fact that crucial issues are depoliticised, because
political elites prefer to avoid dealing with them. Consequently, he sees the
integration process as one in which power shifts to politically uncontrollable
bodies (such as intergovernmental institutions, courts or agencies). What is
surprising in Bartolini’s case is that one would expect him to emphasise the
risks of such a trend rather than those of politicisation.
In this article we suggest that politicisation is to a large extent (but not
thoroughly) absorbed and tamed by consociational mechanisms. Therefore,
advocates of politicisation along Left–Right lines, such as Simon Hix,
should lower their expectations. Further, those like Stefano Bartolini, who
fear by contrast that politicisation would lead to ungovernability, ought not
to forget that consociational mechanisms have, overall, a fair potential to
prevent ungovernability, so that one should rather trust such mechanisms
instead of dismissing politicisation from the agenda. Understood in
consociational terms, the politicisation of the EU is both possible and
desirable, but it cannot be reduced to the Left–Right dimension. And as a
remedy to the present accountability deficit of the EU, politicisation is less
promising than Hix assumes and has less perverse effects than Bartolini
tends to believe.

The Accountability Deficit and Left–Right Politicisation as an Illusory

Remedy
Democratic accountability in the EU is limited, and the accountability
deficit of the EU (Magnette 2003; Papadopoulos 2005a) is a major
component of its democratic deficit (see Follesdal and Hix 2006: 534–7).
 On the Politicisation of the EU 715

Though it is not the only triggering factor, this deficit contributes to the
decline of popular support for integration. Between 1991 and 2003, support
for the EU fell by about 17 per cent across the population of the EU-15
(Mair 2007a: 2), and today the proportion of those believing that their
country’s EU membership is a good thing does not exceed 50 per cent (Hix
2008: 51–7). Voters are increasingly aware of the consequences of
integration on their lives, and at the same time they increasingly challenge
the integration projects; popular and elite estimations of the benefits of
integration strongly diverge; and this is all the more embarrassing as
supranational competences have steadily expanded (Majone 2009: 1). As
suggested by Hooghe and Marks (2009: 5, emphasis original): ‘The period
since 1991 might be described . . . as one of constraining dissensus. Elites,
that is, party leaders in positions of authority, must look over their
shoulders when negotiating European issues. What they see does not
reassure them.’
To these problems Hix offers a simple remedy: Left–Right politicisation.
According to him, the tendency in the EU is towards more ideological fights,
and national specificities are less important than in the past: political parties
in the European Parliament are increasingly divided along Left–Right
dimensions and decreasingly along national lines; the same thing happens
with governmental voting in the Council, and the Commission is more
partisan too.3 The Left–Right polarisation might even, according to Hix,
absorb the classic pro-/anti-integration split, as most left-wing parties tend
to support more regulation at the EU level, while right-wing parties tend to
reject EU legislation that reduces market autonomy.
One line of critique would consist in analysing the way Hix and his co-
authors (Hix et al. 2007) operationalise Left–Right polarisation. For example,
parties are not always the dominant players in EU legislative decision-making,
and their effect varies across and within EU institutions (Lindberg et al. 2008).
We will, however, leave this kind of discussion to specialists of partisan and
elite behaviour (for a synthesis, see Lord 2006). Even assuming that the trend
towards more Left–Right polarisation is correct, Hix’s argument still suffers
from flaws. First and foremost, it tends to read the EU’s political regime
through the lens of a model of parliamentary government that does not fit the
EU. Internal diversity within the Parliament, the Council, and the Commis-
sion, the wide majorities required, and the necessity to make the respective
positions converge through ‘political exchange between the three lawmaking
institutions’ (Majone 2009: 3), all combine to narrow bipolar oppositions and
lead to policy outcomes that are ‘generally centrist’, as recognised by Hix
himself (2008: 20).
To be sure, Hix argues that enhancing politicisation precisely intends to
curb this consensual behaviour, but this raises a second objection: we share
Bartolini’s argument that, even if this were possible, the circumstances under
which the majorities of the three organs would converge would remain very
rare, given the non-coincidence of the electoral cycles at the national and
716 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

European levels. To support Hix’s argument, one would need to

demonstrate that a clarification of partisan oppositions at the EU level
would trigger a realignment of national debates, so that the Council’s
discussions would reflect those of the EP. So far, however, nothing
corroborates this hypothesis, and the experience of consociational polities
indicates, on the contrary, that such systems tend to preserve the lack of
coordination across levels, thereby maintaining the autonomy of their
segments.

The Desirability of Politicisation: Clarification of Political Choices and Better

Accountability?
In this section, we would like to suggest that, even if Hix’s scenario were
plausible, it would not produce the effects the author assumes, given the
consociational logic of decision-making in the EU. Bartolini, who thinks
that politicisation will lead to policy stalemate and can even undermine the
integration process, also fails to take into account the consociational nature
of the EU system. Hence it is worth trying to extrapolate more from our
knowledge on existing consociational polities – notably Belgium and
Switzerland, which are both multinational states.
The first consequence of consociational politics is that it narrows the
polarisation of policy choices, hence reducing the virtues of politicisation as
stated by Hix. We know that in reality even pure Westminster style politics
does not operate with so much clarity, as reform attempts require
compromise even in the absence of formal veto points in the policy process.
As to the moderating effects of checks-and-balances systems, Hix fails to see
that they undermine the clarification of the policy choice he advocates. If
even majoritarian systems do not lead to as much clarification of policy
choices as Hix assumes, this is all the more true for consociational systems.
Bartolini, by contrast, overestimates the dangers of politicisation. The
second lesson we can draw from consociational systems with power
fragmentation is that policy gridlock can be avoided, so that Bartolini’s
fears about the unintended effects of politicisation can be nuanced. A major
risk, according to him, is deadlock deriving from fights between institutions
controlled by different partisan majorities. But Bartolini does not consider
that consociational polities surmount veto points through cooperative
mechanisms and behaviour.4 Crepaz (1994) has demonstrated that block-
ades in such systems can be overcome through deliberation and negotiation
in concertation procedures. These often informal procedures can be viewed
as ‘escape routes’ from deadlock, but at the price of incrementalism and of a
lack of transparency (Benz 1998). Both Hix and Bartolini underestimate
their role: the former fails to see that they undermine accountability, and the
latter that they reduce the dangers of politicisation.
Such procedures are widespread in so-called ‘negotiation democracies’
(Verhandlungsdemokratien), where majoritarian rule is coupled with
 On the Politicisation of the EU 717

influential negotiation systems, and decision-making results from the

interpenetration of arenas that follow different operation logics (Lehmbruch
1999). In this kind of democracy, however, the coupling between politique
d’opinion and politique des proble`mes remains weak. Even if politicised, the
EU would remain a negotiation democracy. Hence Hix’s expectation that
politicisation would lead to more sustained participation of the public in the
EU should be qualified: perhaps in ‘politics’, but this would not necessarily
translate into influence on policy-making. Increasing the choice for voters is
one thing, but finding an agreement among decision-making institutions
about how to translate ‘political mandates’ into policies is quite another.
Hix (1999) recognised the consociational features of the EU in his book
The Political System of the European Union (p. 164: ‘a plural society’; p. 201:
‘the consociational cartel’). More recently he wrote that ‘the EU should
become more like the German or the Scandinavian models’ (Hix 2008: 4; on
p. 111, he added the Benelux countries and added Switzerland on p. 188).
However, he does not take sufficiently into account the effects of the
consociational architecture and practice on politicisation. Hix knows that in
plural societies, ‘a consensus-based design is preferable to a majoritarian
design’, and that policy change thereby becomes ‘difficult and broad
coalitions need to be built’ (p. 12). Nevertheless, he fails to see that the EU
faces exactly the same dilemma – one could even argue that in the EU the
features of existing consociations are accentuated. Hix does not seriously
consider what kind of adjustments of bipolar competition would be required
in order to achieve the coupling with a consensual institutional system.
Hix’s solution would, in our view, lead to symbolic Left–Right politics
that would not substantially affect the compound nature of policy-making in
the complex EU system. For instance, even if the president of the
Commission were elected by a clear-cut majority in both EU Chambers –
the governments gathered in the Council being considered as a kind of
European Bundesrat – there would have to be so much compromise, notably
to confront the problem of forging majorities in the EP and of adapting to
shifting balances in the Council, that it would be impossible to implement
programmes. In other words, politicisation would most likely bring the EU
closer to the operation of national consociational systems, where the sphere
of politique d’opinion is present, however loosely connected to the sphere of
politique des proble`mes. It would not solve the problem of the weak influence
of ‘politics’ on policy-making, which reduces accountability.
As we already noted, if Hix’s expectations are too high, Bartolini’s fears
are exaggerated. He underestimates that under conditions of divided
government, power-sharing institutions face strong incentives to mutually
adjust their preferences or even internalise each other’s positions (according
to Carl Friedrich’s law of ‘anticipated reactions’). This is again amply
corroborated by the literature on co-decision in the EU (Raunio and
Shackleton 2003). But according to Bartolini ‘the risks of politicisation are
highly underestimated’ (p. 31), because they go in fact beyond the risk of
718 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

ungovernability. The ‘first and foremost risk’ (p. 44) in his view is that the
politicisation process spills over in the EU from Left–Right policy issues
(which are ‘isomorphic’ to issues at national level) to ‘constitutive’ issues
(which are not): the geographical boundaries of the EU, its sphere of
competences, and the rules for decision-making (see also Bartolini 2006: 35;
2008: 16). We believe by contrast that the risk of spill-over can largely be
managed through the consociational setting, as we shall seek to show in the
next section. Let us just remind ourselves at this point that, unlike
Bartolini’s pessimism, policy convergence can be achieved in spite of
politicisation, but unlike Hix’s optimism, this takes the form of compro-
mises that reduce the clarification effects of Left–Right polarisation.

Politicisation and the Management of Euroscepticism

So far, we have argued that the consociational nature of the EU narrows the
scope for polarisation. In this section, we argue that Hix’s expectations –
more Left–Right polarisation would legitimise the EU – miss part of the
nature of current Euroscepticism. But this position also leads us to argue
that Bartolini’s fears regarding the politicisation of the EU’s constitutional
foundations are not empirically grounded, and they are not normatively
justifiable.
Left–Right is today the most salient dimension in national politics,
including in consociational systems and in the EU. In that sense Hix is
correct when he holds that politicisation along these lines is inevitable.
However, the pro- and anti-integration cleavage is also present, and it does
not overlap with the Left–Right cleavage. This has been made clear mainly
by Hooghe’s and Marks’s work (for a recent account, see Hooghe and
Marks 2009): the pro-/anti-integration split5 is orthogonal to the Left–Right
one, and it overlaps with a ‘Gal–Tan’ split, that is, with the opposition
between Green/Alternative/Libertarians and Traditionalists/Authoritarian/
Nationalists. Euroscepticism today primarily emanates from traditionalist
far-right parties which articulate cultural concerns about the erosion of
national identities, whereas only in Scandinavian countries is there a rather
strong Leftist opposition to the EU, which is primarily related to socio-
economic concerns for fear that negative integration will weaken the Nordic
welfare model.6 Euroscepticism requires ‘management’, but this has not
much to do with Left–Right politics. In this respect, Bartolini is right to
point out that a stronger politicisation of the identity conflict around
integration may jeopardise the latter because, unlike the Left–Right conflict,
this conflict affects the constitutive dimension of the EU (in a manner not
too dissimilar to ethno-regional oppositions with respect to nation-states).
However, two objections can be raised against Bartolini’s (2006: 54)
argument that politicisation would lead to ‘terrible tensions’.
First, from an analytical viewpoint, tensions seem inevitable. Bartolini is
certainly right in arguing that the structures of interest representation (and
 On the Politicisation of the EU 719

above all political parties) are too weak at the European level to act as
efficient gatekeepers for channelling politicisation. However, it is question-
able how any gatekeeping structures (whatever their strength) can become
legitimate in the absence of politicisation. After all, in national settings also
the constitution of a common public space often took place under a centre–
periphery cleavage, and here we follow Bartolini (2005: xiii), that a lot can
be learned on European integration from turbulent national processes of
centre formation: ‘This process of cultural homogenisation and nation
building was never peaceful, completed, comprehensive or uniform’
(Bartolini 2005: 86). Because of that, we cannot agree with him that
politicisation on constitutive issues should be dismissed because it entails
risks for the pursuit of integration.
In the past integration ‘by stealth’ (Majone 2005) through elite decisions
was considered possible thanks to a ‘permissive consensus’ among the mass
public, whereas nowadays elite politics, according to Bartolini, seems
necessary because of the erosion of the consensus on integration. True, the
politicisation of integration itself refers to the most contentious issues, but
the latter cannot be solved if they are kept off the democratic agenda. As
suggested by Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004: 47), established elites have
not succeeded in depoliticising the European issue (‘the sleeping giant’),
which is now ripe for politicisation, whether we want it or not. But we see no
reason why the monopoly of framing the debate on European integration
should be left to Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs, as has been the case so
far (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 21). Besides, with the trend towards holding
more frequent referendums on European issues, constitutive issues are
inevitably put on the agenda repeatedly, and referendums reveal the
divisions on these issues. Nevertheless, Bartolini’s belief that the politicisa-
tion of constitutive divisions may aggravate them seems too pessimistic: as
suggested by Risse and Kleine (2007: 78) ‘one should not confuse
politicization with populist politics’. What we have learned from national
consociational polities is that political actors adjust their conduct in order to
cope with the politicisation of constitutive issues. They deploy strategies in
order to integrate into the political system those who are sceptical with
respect to its very constitution. For example, in Switzerland the Catholic-
conservative movement that initially opposed the creation of a federal
system was gradually integrated into the federal executive, and its
parliamentary force increased, thanks to electoral reform that introduced
proportional representation.
A second objection can be raised against Bartolini’s point, this time from
the viewpoint of normative democratic theory: politicisation should be
perceived as a value in itself, and not just as a positive or negative
instrument for European integration, which is considered as the only
desirable goal. Bartolini’s idea that constitutive issues should be spared from
politicisation has some resemblance to ‘the elitist ethos of pro-integration
leaders’ (Majone 2009: 7). Bartolini seems to agree with the implicit
720 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

‘operational code’ of the EU according to which ‘integration has priority

over all other competing values, including democracy’ (Majone 2009: 4).
These elitist tones are problematic not only on abstract normative grounds,
but also because the elitism of the EU, which is part of that constitutive
dimension, is indeed a political issue. Bartolini points out (p. 41) that ‘a
considerable proportion of the European electorate has preferences on key
European issues that are not represented by their respective parties’, that
‘the positions of those voters who are sceptical or opposed to integration are
almost totally ignored’, and that ‘voters and their representatives live in two
different worlds’. But he fails to consider that politicisation may have the
latent function of integrating anti-European and anti-establishment parties
into the system, thus depriving them of the major justification for their
populist rhetoric. Mair (2007a: 6) wisely asserts in that respect that ‘when
classical opposition is limited or constrained, it then becomes more likely
that critics will mobilize around an opposition of principle’.
Hix, by contrast, believes that politicisation will alleviate Euroscepticism
through the enhanced accountability that it will generate. However, this
should also be qualified: recent comparative research on the nature of
Euroscepticism shows that its motivations certainly have to do with the
democratic deficit, but also with quite different reasons, such as the lack of
the social dimension, concerns about preservation of sovereignty, and also
more narrowly utilitarian considerations (Sorensen 2008).7 Hix is confident
on the virtues of public deliberation, which he believes will alleviate
Euroscepticism. He is right in holding that open democratic politics is
necessary to ‘win people back to Europe’ (p. 11), but wrong when he thinks
that democratic politics is necessarily conducive to that. It is not certain that
public deliberation suffices to favour more nuanced viewpoints, because pro-
and anti-European positions are also a matter of interests whose perceptions
cannot be easily transformed by deliberation.8 In other words, such
positions have – as cleavages in general – a structural basis, which is not
seriously considered as Hix focuses on the salience of the Left–Right
dimension without referring to its social bases. Today the social bases of
Left–Right partisan competition differ from the social bases of the cleavage
between losers and winners of denationalisation that is largely at the origin
of pro- as opposed to anti-integration attitudes. And the Left does not
represent the losers: its electorate is currently, to a large extent, composed of
members of the new middle class.
Eurosceptic (‘Tan’) parties, by contrast, are strongly entrenched within
social groups composed of those who consider themselves to be on the
losing side of globalisation and supranational integration (Kriesi et al.
2006).9 Now anti-European actors are not easily integrable to the
consociational system because they tend to be anti-establishment too: ‘It
is those who stand away from the mainstream, or those who are outside the
cartel, who tend to be the more Eurosceptic’ (Mair 2007b: 165). The
difficulty of integrating anti-establishment actors has been confirmed by
 On the Politicisation of the EU 721

national experiences, even though consociational polities pursued different

paths. In Belgium, consociationalism reached its limits when established
political actors decided to build a cordon sanitaire in order to insulate the
xenophobic Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang). In Switzerland, consocia-
tional politics were continued with respect to the equally xenophobic Swiss
People’s Party (SVP), with the election by the Federal Assembly of its leader
C. Blocher as a minister. However, this did not yield the expected effects in
terms of a de-radicalisation of this party, and Blocher was not re-elected as a
minister in 2007. In sum, the efficacy of consociational mechanisms with
respect to the ‘taming’ of opposition varies according to the nature of this
opposition.
This leads us to the conclusion that in a heterogeneous polity like the EU,
the problem is how to ensure that a competitive game will not generate
structural minorities, that is, groups who deny their support because they
feel that they are systematically losers in political competition. Hix is aware
of that, but argues, erroneously in our view, that the structural losers today
identify with the Left, so that a bipolar competition would make them hope
that they would win in the future, attaching them through that hope to the
European undertaking. This viewpoint underestimates the fact that
opposition to integration is above all captured by national-populist parties.
The idea that the big parties of the Left would integrate the segments that
perceive themselves as the structural losers from European integration does
not find much empirical support. Bartolini is right in suggesting that
European electorates divide more on ‘constitutive’ issues (by the way,
unsuitable for politicisation, according to him) under the banner of
nationalist parties. The latter cannot realistically hope to become winners
in a context of bipolar competition. This largely explains the difficulty of
integrating them in consensual politics, but unlike Bartolini we do not think
that preventing politicisation is a successful strategy to gain legitimacy for
European integration. The complex architecture of the EU permits
avoidance of the marginalisation of structural minorities having a
regional-territorial basis (namely, through institutional devices like qualified
majority voting). Consociational style politics is less efficient in avoiding the
formation of structural minorities that have no territorial basis, such as
modernisation losers. However politicisation of their concerns is less
dangerous, in our view, than leaving the monopoly of their representation
to anti-establishment actors.

How Can a Compound Polity be Politicised?

We have argued so far that Hix’s expectations about the virtuous effects of
the politicisation of the EU are overestimated, while Bartolini tends to
exaggerate the risks inherent in politicisation. It remains to be seen whether
a form of politicisation that would fit the EU’s institutional and civic
features is conceivable. Drawing lessons from Belgium and Switzerland, we
722 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

argue in this section that the EU might afford a consociational politicisation

and would benefit from it in terms of legitimisation.
Several scholars and political leaders tend to distinguish between a
politicised democracy, which can only be majoritarian, and a consensus
democracy, which is necessarily depoliticised. In other words, the
majoritarian model would be the only alternative to the consensus style of
EU decision-making and the lack of interest (or even discontent) that it
generates. The analysis of European national experiences shows, however,
that the opposition between consensus and politicisation is not so clear-cut.
The classic distinction made by Lijphart (1999) between majoritarian and
consensus democracies is often misunderstood. First, bipolar majoritarian-
ism is not necessarily a factor of clarification, because major parties usually
compete for the centrist segment of the electorate and therefore have to
water down their messages. Second, in several consociational countries
governments have often been made up of large coalitions, associating two or
more parties from both the (centre) Left and the (centre) Right, but this does
not mean that these countries have been dominated by consensus, the
absence of public deliberation, or civic apathy. Political parties have indeed
been able to discuss their divergences in public, even though they were part
of the same ‘majority’.
In Belgium, for instance, vivid oppositions on taxation or social policies
have been frequent within the recent liberal-socialist governments and have
been publicly exposed. In Switzerland, participation of the nationalist SVP
and of the social democratic party in the collegial federal executive does not
prevent each of them from playing the opposition ‘card’ as well, in
parliament or in referendum campaigns. However, Left–Right polarisation,
which has indeed grown, does not inhibit the forming of (changing)
majorities, this being necessary to overcome the numerous veto points
embedded in the system. The same institutional setting providing incentives
for the multiplicity of interest representation also provides incentives for
overcoming this multiplicity in making decisions. There may be a tension,
but that tension is not unhealthy.10 Moreover, governments in majoritarian
systems too are often coalitions of parties that publicly disagree, as shown a
couple of years ago by the ‘plural left’ in France or more recently by Prodi’s
or Berlusconi’s governments in Italy.
Given that a majoritarian bipolar model does not seem to be adaptable to
the complex structure of the European polity, an alternative kind of
politicisation could be encouraged that could take place under the existing
Treaty framework. The Commission could remain a large coalition of the
major European parties and thereby preserve its power to initiate and
execute policies even when there is no clear majority in the EP or Council.
But it would help clarify the issues if the Commission decided to change its
style of action. When it presents its programme or a given policy, it could
choose to explain the different possible options, rather than present ready-
made compromises (see also Schmidt 2006: 47–54).11 As a collegial organ
 On the Politicisation of the EU 723

closer to the model of the Swiss Federal Council (where the president is a
primus inter pares) than to the model of a ‘presidentialised’ partisan
executive, it would identify a number of options based on different
ideological assumptions and explain them in order to stimulate delibera-
tion.12 Parties within the EP – and governments within the Council, which
would remain the chief place where national/territorial divisions are
negotiated – would be encouraged to clarify their own positions. This
requires some form of simplification of political discussions, but not
necessarily a reduction of the debate into two opposed camps. If the
majoritarian model and the hyper-consensual model of the contemporary
EU are the two extremes of a continuum, a middle position, where
deliberation would be organised around a maximum of six or seven political
identities (extreme left, greens, social democrats, liberals, Christian
democrats, conservatives, national-populist right) should be possible. The
current EP party system is the matrix of this kind of politicisation.

Integrating Direct Forms of Democracy into the EU Consociational

Framework
On the other hand, the pathologies of consociational politics should not be
ignored either. The rise of strong anti-establishment parties in most
consociational systems indicates that they are not spared from dissatisfac-
tion with politics (Papadopoulos 2005b). Frequently opaque summit
negotiations can generate a feeling among ordinary citizens that they are
powerless in the face of elite collusion. Consequently, politicisation along
consociational lines in the EU would probably alleviate Euroscepticism
(through inclusion in the political agenda of the constitutive issue of
integration) but would not eradicate it, because it would reduce the current
uncoupling between politique d’opinion and politique des proble`mes, but
would not suppress it.
This is good reason to complement mechanisms of politicisation in the
representative circuit with more direct forms of political participation. The
latter would, however, require a radicalisation of the provisions for
participatory democracy introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. The Swiss case
shows that consociational elements can be combined with participatory
elements obeying a majoritarian logic. The latter is not incompatible with
the overall consociational logic, as the effects of participatory mechanisms
are to a large extent absorbed by negotiation mechanisms. As a matter of
fact, in complex decision-making systems, distinct institutional elements
coexist in a sort of ‘mixed constitution’. What is decisive is the kind of
formal and informal rules that regulate their mutual coupling (Benz 2005).
Parliamentary politics can coexist with elements of direct democracy as in
Switzerland, or with federalism and consociational devices as in Switzerland
and Belgium. Regarding the EU, the approach to a better accountability,
which rests mainly on the shadow of the replacement of governors, is
724 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

precluded by the dispersion of power (Lord 2004: 195). We find a similar

horizontal and vertical power fragmentation in Switzerland, but in this
country accountability through direct democracy mechanisms replaces, in
practice, accountability through parliamentary elections that are, to a large
extent, non-competitive and that deploy only indirect effects on government
formation (Linder 1994).
Citizens’ initiatives (on ordinary Pillar 1 European legislation), leading –
under stringent institutional checks aiming to safeguard minority protection
and stringent conditions aiming to ensure that their claims echo broad Europe-
wide concerns – to binding referendum votes at the EU level, can be described
as an institution of this type (for more detailed discussion, see Papadopoulos
2005a). Initiatives could be phrased as a general wish to introduce novel
legislation, or to abrogate or modify the existing one. They would stimulate
the debate on integration, because ‘publics have historically been mobilised
into political arenas in response to ‘‘concrete’’ experiences and problems’
(Lord 2004: 227). Referendum votes also force political parties to take
positions on European-wide policy issues, thus contributing to the formation
of the stronger EU parties that Hix wishes to see. In addition, referendum
campaigns would generate more media coverage, which contributes to
accountability because it simplifies ‘the complex set of actors, policy networks,
institutions and procedures’ (Magnette 2003: 153) that make decisions.
To be sure, even the availability of safeguards for minority protection would
not prevent the emergence during or after referendum campaigns of various
divisions, including those along state lines, or about the depth (e.g. degree of
liberalisation) or breadth (enlargement) of integration. For the constitution of
a public space there may indeed be a certain price to pay in terms of European
cohesion or of the pursuit of integration (Risse and Kleine 2007: 78). However,
instead of pleading for ‘the sacrifice of democracy on the altar of European
integration’ (Majone 2009: 4), we should rather agree to accept the contrary
(which is not certain, because direct democracy would reduce the democratic
deficit, and this would bring at least some people ‘back to Europe’).
Ultimately, even in (or because of?) the absence of politicisation, the
‘permissive consensus’ on integration has faded out anyway.
Although some observers see in direct democracy a source of ungovern-
ability, it can be argued that these are short-term problems. The more
frequent and unexceptional the utilisation of direct democracy instruments,
the more referendum campaigns become immune from excessive dramatisa-
tion. Oppositional forces receive incentives to become critical of policies
instead of remaining critical of the polity (for a related distinction see Mair
2007a: 7). One should also not forget that this kind of ‘selective’
politicisation through referendums on individual policy issues would not
affect the constitutive aspects of the European polity (a major matter of
concern for Bartolini), which would continue to be defined through treaty-
making. Moreover, the risk of ungovernability should not be exaggerated.
In the EU where consociational decision-making is the rule, the Damoclean
 On the Politicisation of the EU 725

sword of direct democracy would probably above all (as in Switzerland and
unlike in polities with more competitively oriented politics, such as Italy or
the United States at state level) allow outsiders to gain better negotiation
positions in policy-making. Decision-makers would have to anticipate the
risk of citizens’ initiatives, and that would make them become more
responsive. As to the outsiders, they would have to moderate their claims,
either to obtain the consent of representative institutions of the Union, thus
avoiding expensive and time-consuming campaigns, or to achieve the
required concurrent (super) majorities.
The characteristics of the European political system make it plausible that
the effects of direct democracy would be similar to the Swiss model: citizens’
initiatives would serve as negotiation devices that produce, above all,
indirect effects. In a consociational polity they are largely incorporated into
the overall negotiation framework, instead of simply acting as majoritarian
devices (Papadopoulos 2005a). True, it can be argued that this reduces the
benefits of politicisation. However, though the integration of novel or
oppositional claims under the shadow of direct democracy is a process that
takes place at the elite level, the public is not absent from the debates. Media
extensively report on the content of the policy agenda partly shaped under
referendum threats. If in the end an issue is submitted to a popular vote,
then direct democracy campaigns clarify political choices by their ‘yes or no’
logic, and this reduces the accountability problems typical of consociational
polities. It is thus worth specifying the conditions under which citizens’
initiatives are likely to produce virtuous effects for governability. These are,
above all, the presence of incentives for elite cooperation due to power
fragmentation, accompanied by a consociational culture that allows elites to
react to these incentives through accommodative practices. Such conditions
are particularly present at the EU level.
In addition, the Swiss example shows that the toolkit of direct democracy
not only has an instrumental value, but also contributes to the formation of
a common identity. The history of modern Switzerland teaches us that the
problem of the missing ‘demos’ can be alleviated if we opt for demos-
enhancing institutions such as Europe-wide referendums.13 The latter would
allow extension of Europeanisation from the elite to the mass level (Majone
2009: 1). Thanks to a more open opportunity structure consisting in the
availability of direct democracy institutions in Switzerland, the citizens have
increasingly viewed the newly established federal system as ‘theirs’. Such an
identification might be more difficult in the far more heterogeneous and
complex EU, but it is virtually impossible under the present state of affairs.
Etzioni (2007: 39) correctly emphasises the virtues of the ‘moral dialogue’
that would be established thanks to EU-wide referendums: ‘The debate
would surely be emotional and would likely produce different conclusions
than a Commission committee. However, it would reflect the people, their
values and their preferences and it would commit them to EU-wide policies
and, in the process, to the EU itself.’
726 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

Conclusion: Is the Remedy Worse than the Disease?

In this concluding section we would like to summarise our argument. We
first claim that the ‘Left–Right’ recipe for politicisation is based on some
incorrect assumptions or predictions:

. It is not obvious that the EU is evolving towards more Left–Right

polarisation.
. Even if this were the case, the consociational nature of the EU implies
that compromises are indispensable; therefore, politicisation along Left–
Right lines will not suffice to clarify political choice and enhance
accountability.
. Simon Hix is not correct in anticipating that politicisation along the
Left–Right dividing line will alleviate Euroscepticism. He tends to
associate the latter with this dimension, whereas Euroscepticism has a
distinct social base (‘losers of modernisation’) and is above all
propagated by anti-establishment parties.

At the same time, we think that the consociational nature of the EU also
reduces the risks that politicisation would entail with regard to govern-
ability:

. The negative effects of divided government can be offset by cooperative

mechanisms.
. The politicisation of constitutive issues can contribute to a better
integration of anti-system segments of public opinion.
. Consequently, Stefano Bartolini is only partially right in stressing the
destabilising potential of the politicisation of opposition on these issues.

We suggest that consociational patterns of politicisation are both desirable

and possible in the EU system, but we do not believe that they are a
panacea. As a remedy to the accountability deficit of the EU, (consocia-
tional-type) politicisation is less promising than Hix assumes, and less
dangerous than Bartolini tends to believe. Therefore we suggest the coupling
of a system of politicised ‘negotiation democracy’ with mechanisms of direct
democracy. Such a coupling would help cope with the limits of
consociational systems, would remain compatible with the compound
nature of the EU, and would provide added value regarding public
legitimisation of the European integration. Even the Lisbon Treaty
acknowledges now the necessity to develop mechanisms of citizens’
participation, by stipulating in article 11 that

[n]ot less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant
number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the
European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit
 On the Politicisation of the EU 727

any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a

legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the
Treaties.

Such a device comes closer to a citizens’ petition right than to a citizens’

genuine initiative. It thus contributes only to the politicisation of input
formation in the EU system. Such an instrument should be strengthened to
produce binding effects on the decision-making process, so that politicisa-
tion also spills over into the output dimension of EU integration.

Acknowledgements
This article is a revised version of a EUROGOV (‘European Governance’)
paper (C-08-01). We are grateful to Florian Robyr for editorial assistance.
We are also indebted for comments to EUROGOV and WEP anonymous
reviewers. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes
1. Discussing neofunctionalism four decades ago, Schmitter (1969) identified as an initial core
element of politicisation the increased controversy of decisions, which he correctly expected
to lead to a widening of the interested publics.
2. This paper, which constitutes the apex of the ongoing debate, is in fact composed of a paper
by Simon Hix (‘Why Does the EU Need (Left–Right) Politics? Policy Reform and
Accountability are Impossible Without It’), followed by a rejoinder by Stefano Bartolini
(‘Should the Union be ‘‘Politicised’’? Prospects and Risks’). If not specified, quotes are from
this ‘double’ paper. Meanwhile Hix (2008) published a book and Bartolini (2006) an article
with similar arguments, to which we also refer if necessary. Follesdal and Hix (2006)
formulate recommendations similar to those in other works by Hix.
3. For references on works emphasising the prevalence of the Left–Right cleavage in
European politics, see Hooghe and Marks (2008: 15 n. 48).
4. Hix (2008: 111) cites bi-partisan deals in the case of divided government in the United
States.
5. Or the cleavage between integration and demarcation as put by Kriesi et al. (2006).
6. One may also think of the opposition to the Constitutional Treaty that manifested itself
from the Far Left during the French referendum. The cleavage pattern in new EU
members is again different: ‘Tan’ parties such as agrarian or populist movements opt
together with the Left (of Communist origin) for redistributive policies (Hooghe and
Marks 2009: 18).
7. See also Hix (2008: 57–63), who mentions himself the prevalence of cost–benefit
calculations among the mass public.
8. See also Bartolini (2006: 52) for a critique of this idealised view on the contribution of
policy debate to citizens’ ‘enlightenment’.
9. Hix (2008: 59–63) is aware of the gap between mass and elite and of the relevance of social
inequalities as a predictor of EU support, but does not make the link with the success of
Eurosceptic parties.
10. This point was emphasised by one of the reviewers.
11. Actually, this was already the case on some very sensitive questions such as the reform of
the Common Agricultural Policy in 2002: when different Commissioners defend different
options publicly, this helps the public understand the issues at stake.
728 Y. Papadopoulos and P. Magnette

12. The suggestions made in the Commission’s White Paper in order to clarify the framework
of EU deliberation go in the direction of such a strategy of politicisation. Cross-cutting
policy agendas would broaden the issues instead of fragmenting them; the organisation of
key events that would reduce the number of occasions and places where deliberation takes
place would also help to simplify the process of expression of oppositions and compromise
thereafter.
13. Hix (2008: 105–6) believes that party competition is the crucial variable to create a ‘demos’
and a public sphere. He considered the option of Europe-wide referendums (Hix 1999: 184–
5), but believed that they would in reality be about national concerns. In his 2008 book,
however, Hix (2008: 50) refers to studies of voting behaviour on more recent referendums
revealing that it is attitudes towards the EU that are the strongest predictors of people’s
choice in referendums on European integration. In the same book, Hix (2008: 5) argues that
‘referendums are a crude and ineffectual mechanism for expressing citizens’ preferences on
EU policy issues’, but he does not explain why he thinks this is so.

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