Arroyo vs. de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997

9/7/23, 10:32 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 277
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia
*
G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R.

OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;

Legislative Rules of Procedure; The cases, both in the Philippines and
abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed
to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.—
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of
the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law,
i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but
only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House,
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to
the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings” and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases, the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules
of its proceed-ings” was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct
its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. But the
cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing
that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing view is that Rules of

Proceedings are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.—We
conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in
character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the legislative body the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have
to look over the shoulders of the justices, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.—In this case no rights of private
individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no
more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members
of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that each of the
three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter
upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While Art. VIII, §1 has

broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it
has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations.—Petitioners, quoting former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion’s sponsorship in
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the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, “nothing
involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government]
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.”
Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the requirement
of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For
while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions
such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If, then, the established rule is that courts
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a
case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
“gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for
the exercise of the Court’s Art. VIII, §1 power.—As we have already held,
under Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s function is merely [to] check whether or not
the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our
Art. VIII, §1 power.
Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Bicameral

Conference Committee Reports; No rule of the House of Representatives has
been cited which specifically requires that in cases involving the approval of
a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.—Petitioners argue that, in
accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano’s motion for the
approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the
Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken.
They say that the method used in
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this case is a legislator’s nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the

fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report. No rule of the
House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was
by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way
the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local
Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills
amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The advantages or disadvantages, the

wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial
consideration—the Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the
best procedure.—Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate and even more just. The
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present
any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals, “this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best
procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for
the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution does not require that the
yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances—upon the last and third readings of a
bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a
bill over the veto of the President.—Nor does the Constitution require that
the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings
of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing
a bill over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had
already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has a settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure—it means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power.—Given this fact, it is difficult
to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with
grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase “grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial
power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concep-cion himself
said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art.
VIII, §1 extends to cases where “a branch of the government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The question of quorum cannot be

raised repeatedly—especially when the quorum is obviously present—for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House; A Member of the House
waives his objection to the presence of a quorum by his continued
interpellation for in so doing he in effect acknowledges the presence of a
quorum.—Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. To
repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo
was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly—especially when the quorum is
obviously present—for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the
sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Presumptions;

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of
its due enactment; There is no claim either here or in the decision in the
EVAT cases that the enrolled bill embodies a con-
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clusive presumption.—Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H.

No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and
the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much
energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no
claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive
presumption.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is no evidence to the

contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of
both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.—In one case we “went
behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. But, where
as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly
passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the
three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution
had not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule
of evidence, is well established, and to overrule it now is to repudiate the
massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of
evidence.—The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well
established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The
enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the President
has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that
it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and
to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To
overrule
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the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching
of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative Journals; The Journal is

regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitution to be recorded therein, and with respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journal has also been accorded
conclusive effect.—The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to
matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With
respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v.
Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the
Journals as “public memorials of the most permanent character,” thus:
“They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they
should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has
been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote
period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.” As
already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery—it would be acting in excess of its power and
would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so.—It
would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch
in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made
in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In
the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.
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PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Political

Questions; In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power.—In the Philippine setting, there
is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts “x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.” This power is new and
was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not
also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary
vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In
cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government
can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of Article
VII completely eliminated this defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.—I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once
more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of
the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we
wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath
the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
276
Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Enrolled Bill

Doctrine; An enrolled bill is a declaration by the two Houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in
due the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him.—An enrolled bill is one
which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by
the proper officers of each House and approved by the President. It is a
declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Modified Entry
or Affirmative Contradiction Rule” and “Extrinsic Evidence Rule,”
Explained.—Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone
important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or
affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of
the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled
bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the legislature a
statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of the
constitutional requirements. Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic
Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence
that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however,
can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the
constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received.
Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The principle of separation of

powers is the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine.—The principle of
separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine.
The doctrine is also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids
difficult questions of evidence. It is also believed that it will prevent the
filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws
passed by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren “if the validity of
every act published as law is to be tested by examining its history, as shown
by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount
of litiga-
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tion, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and

multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law.” The
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is high time we re-examine our

preference for the enrolled bill doctrine.—Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine
no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United States.
Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940’s, “x x x the tendency seems to
be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the
adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity
which may be attacked by any authoritative source of information.” It is
high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was
in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, that this Court, with three (3)
justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is time to bury the enrolled bill for
its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations—giving an
enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate
our task of dispensing justice based on truth.—I respectfully submit that it is
now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no
longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are
compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one, the
enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in
England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For
another, many of the courts in the United States have broken away from the
rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical adherence
to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules. In
Mabanag, we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as
amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled
bill. This section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A
half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an
enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which
all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the
1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live
not only under a rule of law but also
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under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy

requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public
interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be
disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power
to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of
government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of
conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense
justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I
submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of
correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The rules on how to question the
existence of a quorum are procedural in character, and their observance or
non-observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators
and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this judgment when
untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.—In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction
over the petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable.
Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the
public respondents to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points
out, the petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented
from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation
of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a
non-member of the House which requires constitutional protection. The
rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in
character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the
House enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the
House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment call on
the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse
this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and/or

Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V.
Saguisag for petitioners.
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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 279

Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for Jose de Venecia.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the

validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin
taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer
and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They
brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority
Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
“constitutionally mandated” so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No.
7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12,
1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which
approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November
17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the
House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess,
Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he
was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for
a head count. After a roll call, the Chair
1 (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza)
declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the
_______________________
1 JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66-68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21,
1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6, par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.
280

ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote.
The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was
fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation,
Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the
session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as

published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and
6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I
want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished
sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the
Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the
motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one
minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr.
Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock,
Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until
four o’clock, Wednesday, next week. (It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and
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certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as

having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by
the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into
law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of
the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation: (1) the
transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session
hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman
obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of
the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996,
as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November
21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as

certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28,
1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on
three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
“approved,” which appears on line 13 in the three other versions,
cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996
the word “no” on line 17 appears only once, while in the other
versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version
does not contain the sentence “(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum
because I will raise the question of the quorum,” which appears in
the other versions.
Petitioners’ allegations are vehemently denied by respondents.
However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have
announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition,
they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts
relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of
this proceeding the word “approved” appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question.
Petitioners’ principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is
282

null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House; that these rules embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art.
VI, §16(3) that “each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings” and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is
a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed
is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation
2 of Rule
VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, the Chair,
in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not
call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion
in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the 3 presence
of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, the Chair
deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo’s question, “What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker?” and did not repeat Rep. Albano’s4 motion to approve or
ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, the Chair refused to
recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep.
Albano’s motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4)
in violation 5of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule
XVIII, §109, the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on
___________________
2 Rule VIII, §35. Voting.—Every member present in the session shall vote on
every question put unless he inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary
interest therein. Rule XVII, §103. Manner of Voting.—The Speaker shall rise to put a
question saying “As many as are in favor of (as the question may be). say Aye” and,
after the affirmative vote is counted. “As many as are opposed. Say Nay . . .”
3 Rule XIX, §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions.—The Speaker shall state
the motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General before
being debated. A motion may be withdrawn any time before its approval.
4 Rule XVI, §97. Recognition of Member.—When two or more members rise at
the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.
5 Rule XX, §121. Definition.—Questions of privilege are those affecting the
duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity of
283
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 283

Rep. Arroyo’s question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a

privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo’s query should have
been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28,
1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the
adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at
3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker
Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of
the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed,
considering the Court’s power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims
of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government, and they6 ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all
respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents’ defense is anchored on the
_____________________
reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.
§122. Precedence.—Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall have

precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn and a point of order.
Rule XXI, §123. Definition and Precedence.—A privileged motion pertains to a subject
matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over others. The order of precedence of
privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.

Rule XVIII, §109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions.—When a bill, report or motion is
adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority may move for its reconsideration on the
same or succeeding session day. The motion shall take precedence over all other questions,
except a motion to adjourn, a question of privilege, and a point of order.
6 235 SCRA 630 (1994).
284

principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They

argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
the rules of the House and that there is no justification for
reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution
provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its
rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in
the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days
before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that,
in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the
House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully
observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that
his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends
that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the
petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of
Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21,
1996, shows that “On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no
objection, the Body approved
7 the Conference Committee Report on
House Bill No. 7198.” This Journal was approved on December
8 2,
1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no
ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to
have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely
internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27.
Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by
some maneuver allegedly in vio-
___________________
7 Rollo, p. 228.
8 Id., p. 229.
285
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 285

lation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively

prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to
the constitutional provision
9 that “each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings” and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. To begin with, 10this contention stands the principle on its
head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision that “each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings” was invoked by
parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of
autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the
opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was
a violation of a constitutional provision11 or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate,
courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.’ ”
__________________
9 Art. VI, §16(3).

10 E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1862);
Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F. 2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14 (1982);
Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com’n. 675 F.2d 1282 (1982). See also
Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
11 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance],
235 SCRA 630.
286

12
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus:
“The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules
is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal.” 13
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, it was held: “The provision that each

House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict
the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the
proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the
absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a
majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken
by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty
conferred upon it by the Constitution.” 14
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the Supreme
Court of Ohio stated: “The provision for reconsideration is no part
of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the
General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but
a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It
has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also
by the United
__________________
12 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).

13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
14 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).
287
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 287

States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared

invalid for noncompliance with15rules.”
In State v. Savings Bank, the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut declared itself as follows: “The Constitution declares
that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and
shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a
free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of
the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused,
but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it
would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the
legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void
because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed
from its own rules of procedure.”
16
In McDonald v. State, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held:
“When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be
permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not
complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the
bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption
is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever
declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the
rules of procedure made by itself, or the respective branches thereof,
and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any
such adjudications, we decline
17 to follow them.”
Schweizer v. Territory is illustrative of the rule in these cases.
The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the
rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling
statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the
suspension of the
___________________
15 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).

16 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).
17 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).
288

rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-
thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature

should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own
rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for
the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures.
It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only
at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a
hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a
violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own
proceedings, could be no reason for the court’s refusing its
enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each
branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re
Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11
S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings
by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each
House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the
question
289
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 289

presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even18 its validity is open to

question in a case where private rights are involved.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only

those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power
to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation
of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our

government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional
order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part
to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the
House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion’s sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission,
contend that under Art. VIII, §1, “nothing involving abuse of
discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting
19 to
lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.” Implicit in
this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the
case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to
the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can
adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the
scope of
_____________________
18 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

ANNOTATED 188-189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
19 Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional
Commission, in 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436
(Session of July 10,
1986).
290

judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political 20departments

to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not
altogether done away with political questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under
Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective

21 power. . . . It has no power to look into what
it thinks is apparent error.
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules
of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for
the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House
was “railroaded.” They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a
query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion
approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the
Chair was saying this, however,
__________________
20 Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
21 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 701
(1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA at
480-481 (emphasis added).
291
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 291

Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?” The Chair
and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House,
Rep. Albano’s motion for the approval of the conference committee
report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual
votes of the Members should have been taken. They say that the
method used in this case is a legislator’s nightmare because it
suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which
specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of
a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion
and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the
Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by
no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the
way the conference committee report on the bills which became the
Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee
report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were
approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the
rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader
Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair.
Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action
of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been
a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure
in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte,
and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of
292

order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial
compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to
statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my
mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying “Is there
any objection?” and nobody objects, then the Chair announces “The bill is
approved on second reading.” If there was any doubt as to the vote, any
motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe
there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the
House he can always ask for it, and 22 the Chair can announce how many are
in favor and how many are against.
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some23other

way would be better, more accurate and even more just. The
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly
24 of a method do not
present any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, “this Court cannot provide a second
opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the
deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as
a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be
allowed to manage its own affairs

25 precludes us from even attempting
a diagnosis of the problem.”
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only 26 in
the following instances: upon the last and third readings
27 of a bill, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a
bill over the veto of the Presi-
__________________
22 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

23 United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v.
Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).
24 United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).
25 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).
26 Art. VI, §26(2).
27 Id., §16(4).
293
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 293

28
dent. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the

original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already
been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking
reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
29 suspension
and subsequent adjournment of the session. It would appear,
however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle
the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep.
Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the
Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday
of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he
did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the
session adjourned until four o’clock in the afternoon of Wednesday,
November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one

objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners’ predicament was largely of
their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the
House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep.
Arroyo’s question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep.

Arroyo’s question was not, in form or substance,
30 a point of order or
a question of privilege entitled to precedence. And even if Rep.

Arroyo’s question were so,
_____________________
28 Id., §27(1).
29 Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.
30 INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMENTED AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963);
294

Rep. Albano’s motion to adjourn would have precedence and 31 would
have put an end to any further consideration of the question.

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be
contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase “grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice
Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power
granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where “a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an32 abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.”
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but
only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly—especially when the quorum is
obviously
33 present—for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the
____________________
REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE

157-158, 172-173 (1963).
31 Rule XIX, §13.
32 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of
July 10, 1986).
33 ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY
PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).
295
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 295

sponsor 34for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a

quorum.
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House
earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e.,
petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that
day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the
manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña
did not participate
35 in the bicameral conference committee
proceedings.
36 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the
report but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if
voting had been conducted, Rep. Tañada37 would have voted in favor
of the conference committee report.
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No.
7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate
opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this
doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision
in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that38 the
enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case we
“went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved
by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court
will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses
that a bill has been duly passed. Under
___________________
34 PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335 (1953).

35 Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
36 Ibid.
37 Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
38 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
296

this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-
fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the
Constitution had not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated
bill or 39resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts.” This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the
following excerpt which embodies good, if oldfashioned, democratic
theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to
check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by
the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and
higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend
casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll 40
may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled
bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been
“surreptitiously” inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of

bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that
the Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases
would be to41disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
__________________
39 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40 Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW ON
EVIDENCE §1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne
edition of this locus classicus. See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 834
(James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
41 EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf. Morales
vs. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
297
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 297

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made

upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the
Constitution that 42“upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
shall be allowed.” 43
In other cases, this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a
bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well
established.
44 It is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by

Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, 45whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the

massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of
evidence.
____________________________
42 Philippine Judges Ass’n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v.
Subido, 27 SCRA 131.
43 Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins,
Inc. v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).
44 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6
MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).
45 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303 (1891).
298
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a

departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the
membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed
to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule.
Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason,
JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been taken by four new members
(Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.). Petitioners
are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the
Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in
question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of Novem-ber 21,
1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No.
7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The
keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI,
§16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to46 matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to
other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also
47 been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v.
Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for
regarding
____________________
46 The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays
on the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26[2]); (2) the yeas and nays on any
question, at the request of onefifth of the members present (Id., §16 [4]); (3) the yeas
and nays upon repassing a bill over the President’s veto (Id., §27 (1); and (4) the
President’s objection to a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)
47 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348
(1886).
299
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 299

the Journals as “public memorials of the most permanent character,”

thus: “They should be public, because all are required to conform to
them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the
faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in
the memory of individuals.” As already noted, the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has
been duly proven.
——————————————
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of
its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of 48 its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a
new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and49 deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED.
____________________
48 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.

49 Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com’n, 675 F.2d 1282.
300

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and

Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Davide, Jr., J., I join with Mr. Justice Puno’s
concurring/dissenting.
Romero, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Bellosillo, J., No part due to relationship to parties.
Puno, J., See Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.

Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion (concurring).
Panganiban, J., No part. Former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J., No part: On leave during deliberations.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition,
I am not backtracking from the 1 dissent which I expressed in
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. I am somewhat bothered that if I
do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be wrongly
construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my
firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under
consideration, involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality of
a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a
number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by
petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the
ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did
not entirely
_________________
1 235 SCRA 630.
301
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 301

disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most

especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main
objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I
perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature
of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be
followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority
seemed to have cavalierly2 put to rest by hiding under the cloak of
the enrolled bill theory and the precept that the Court is not the
proper forum for3 the enforcement of internal legislative rules
allegedly violated. To
_________________
2 Id., at p. 672: “Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm
adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had
not been obtained or that certain provisions of a state had been ‘smuggled’ in the
printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a
coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule. No claim is here made that the ‘enrolled bill’
rule is absolute. In fact in one case we ‘went behind’ an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal
to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of
the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a
mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not
been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
‘surreptitiously’ inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the ‘enrolled bill’ rule in such
cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.”
3 Id., at p. 675: “Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, ‘parliamentary rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.’ Our
concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enact-
302

me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind

adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not,
however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I
objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or
obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a
case which I believe did not call for their application.
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the
enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that reliance
thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be
limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues
which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law
itself. Thus:
“As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the
procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements
which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be
impugned, having been ‘saved’ by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled
bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure
followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent
engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do
not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural
legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily
mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts—whether or not the bill had
enough votes, or three readings, or whatever—not over the meaning of the
constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a
court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would
be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive
changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip
____________________
ment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have
been faithfully observed in these cases.”
303
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 303

through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and
altering the same beyond recognition even4by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith.”
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I
were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent
of the Court’s review power in respect of internal procedures in this
wise:
“I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the

Constitution which provides that ‘(j)udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.’ We are also guided by the
principle that a court may interfere with the internal
5 procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution.”
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was

applied. In this respect, I showed that the introduction of several
provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not
only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the
limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last

reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these
lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in
order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however,
disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified
the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to
the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same
time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not
hold true in the instant petition.
___________________
4 Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.

5 Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.
304

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of

Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the instant
petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of
the House’s business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the
requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court’s intervention.
Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining that
substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No.
8240. The thrust of petitioners’ arguments in attacking the validity of
the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was
effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not
that the substance thereof offends constitutional standards. This
being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous
argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as
regards “substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of
its tortuous trip through Congress,” when it is palpably unwarranted
under the circumstances of instant petition.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of

Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar.
Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-
justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
applicability of the archaic enrolled bill doctrine in light of what I

perceive as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987
Constitution and the winds of changing time.
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over
the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregna-
305
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 305

ble impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases

involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators. 1
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, as a

window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries
2 of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
“x x x
“The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings.” It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the

names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who
do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker
may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum,
nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon
the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or
folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the
courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established

by the rule and the result which is sought to be
________________
1 144 US 1 (1891).
2 The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in violation of House
Rule XV which provided that members present in the chamber but not voting would be
“counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business.”
306

attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.”
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the

validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional.
Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the
test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did
not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers. 3
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. In
Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US
Senate was in issue, viz.:
“x x x
“3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in
the majority may move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the
vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual executive session
of the Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection of a
nomination shall have been sent to the President before the expiration of the
time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to
reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to
return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on
a nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination,
and shall be a final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned

by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for
making a motion to reconsider the same, or
____________________
3 286 US 6 (1932).
307
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 307

while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the

Senate.”
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the

Federal Power Commission has been confirmed by the US Senate.
The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President who
then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however,
reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President
refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over
the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although “the
question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the
applicable rules, not to their constitutionality.” Significantly, the
Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it
held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
“x x x
“Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction
different from that adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was
under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power. The
Constitution commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it
is not the function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A
rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the vital
function of advising and consenting to nominations for public office,
moreover, should receive from the Court the most sympathetic
consideration. But the reasons, above stated, against the Senate’s
construction seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in the view we have
taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of Smith’s
confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering
of immediate notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him
to proceed to perfect the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling
falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.
308

4
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States.

Christoffel testified before the Committee on Education and Labor
of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and
was charged with perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence
during the trial that the committee had no quorum when the
perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in
view of the judge’s charge to the members of the jury that to find
Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that—
“x x x
“x x x the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least
thirteen members of the said Committee, and that ‘at least that number must
have been actually and physically present . . . If such a Committee so met,
that is, if thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon
session of March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing
some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to
the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there
would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that
Committee as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath was
administered and before the testimony of the defendant was given there
were present as many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning of
the afternoon session . . . .”
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the

jury to assume there was a continuous quorum simply because it was
present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the
House rules, a quorum once established is presumed to continue
until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as “what rules the House had
established and whether they have been followed.” It held:
_________________
4 338 US 89 (1948).
309
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 309

“x x x
“Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative

business is of course none of our concern, and by the same token the
considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice
to treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before
us. The question is neither what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect the
validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the
House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has
the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the
conditions that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is
that by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact was
not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted
the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it.
As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a
procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the
elements of the crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of
a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The
House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a
quorum, and we agree with the trial court’s charge that to convict, the jury
had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were ‘actually and
physically present’ a majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding
that there was a majority present two or three hours before the defendant
offered his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to
rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is
committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of
the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he
be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged
against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.”
The minority complained that the “House has adopted the rule and
practice that a quorum once established is presumed
310

to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this

decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule x x x.” The
minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the 5same line in 1963 in
deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. Yellin was indicted on
five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a

sub-committee of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities.
He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress on
four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the
ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in
executive session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee
Rule IV which provides that “if a majority of the Committee or
subcommittee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House
of Representatives, believes that the interrogation of a witness in a
public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly injure
his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the Committee
shall interrogate such witness in an executive session for the purpose
of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such
interrogation thereafter in a public hearing.” In a 5-4 decision, the
Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
“x x x
“Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review
when he discovers at trial that his rights have been violated. This is
especially so when the Committee’s practice leads witnesses to misplaced
reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the Committee’s rules,
which must be distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the witness’
reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports
to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules,
simply because the witness was deceived by the Committee’s appearance of
regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for
prosecution in
________________
5 374 US 109 (1963).
311
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 311

Yellin’s case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the

Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules.”
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary

has pruned
6 the “political thicket.” In the benchmark case of Baker v.
Carr, the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition
for re-apportionment of the Tennes-see legislature ruling that “the
political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government
order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder” and that
“the courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit,’ a bona fide controversy as
to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds

constitutional authority.”
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cob-bled to empower
courts “x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law
where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the
eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-
vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In
cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
__________________
6 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).
312

Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it

provided:
“x x x
“The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ.”
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question
defense in national security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its
use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing

courts to penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government “x x x to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack 7or excess of jurisdiction.” In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, I posited the following postulates:
“x x x
“Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this
provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the
reach of judicial power as follows:
____________________
7 235 SCRA 630.
313
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 313

‘x x x
‘x x x In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute political question.’
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not
a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their
more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to

disagree for the view misses the significant changes made in our
constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered during
martial law. One of the areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987
Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among the three great
branches of our government—the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commission strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it
further protected the security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by
providing ‘No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.’ It also guaranteed fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the
Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with screening the list of
prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming
appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The
President was likewise given a specific time to fill up vacancies in the
judiciary—ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of
the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of
recommendees by the Judicial and Bar
314

Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate

appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court
was given the power to ‘appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary
in accordance with the Civil Service Law.’ And to make the separation of
the judiciary from the other branches of government more watertight, it
prohibited members of the judiciary to be ‘x x x designated to any agency
performing quasi judicial or administrative functions.’ While the
Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the
powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive.
Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The
exercise of this power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise,
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power may be
reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including the ‘duty of the courts of
justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government’ constitutes the capstone of the
efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by
our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x.
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation,
dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary
but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress—this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it
should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration

to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more
calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of
the rules of the House. We will not be
315
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 315

true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we

refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To
be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword
that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government
8 to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it

relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the
petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally
enacted by both Houses, signed by9 the proper officers of each House
and approved by the President. It is a declaration by the two
Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill,
thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in

Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written
Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the government,
and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial
—as emanating from the highest tribunal in the land—are placed on
the same footing and regarded with the same veneration as the
judgment of the
__________________
8 Supra.
9 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.
316

10
courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. In England, the

conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that “an act
of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that
this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same
forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in
law that it11requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation.
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important
mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or
affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in
favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes
validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the
journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been 12
compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements.

Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which
holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has
been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can
be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the
constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For
this purpose,
13 journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be
received. Some
14 limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud
or mistakes.
___________________
10 Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Vir-ginia 523 [1897].
11 Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel. Reed v.
Jones, 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to the common law
rule of the inviolability of the Sheriff’s return. The Sheriff is considered as an officer
of the King just as a parliamentary act is deemed as a regal act and no official can
dispute the King’s word. Dallas, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol.
1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).
12 Sutherland, op. cit., p. 410.
13 Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).
14 See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E.
2d 220 [1957].
317
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 317

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of

the enrolled bill. The modern rationale
15 for the enrolled bill theory
was spelled out in Field v. Clark, viz.:
xxx
“The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It
is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of

the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of
16
convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence.
It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases
which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte
_________________
15 Op. cit., footnote No. 2.

16 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd ed.
1940).
318

17
Wren “if the validity of every act published as law is to be tested
by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses
of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, difficulty,
and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and
multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law.” The
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not
fraud. These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been
rejected in various jurisdictions in the United States. In his
Dissenting Opinion18 in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its
companion cases, Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the leading
American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not
demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz.:
“x x x
“Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of
validity originally attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and
qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it
has been held that “(u)nder the ‘enrolled bill rule’ by which an enrolled bill
is sole expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence
and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to
what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals of
respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the
legislative offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed,
yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the
legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by
the legislative officers, contains provisions that have not passed both
houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber
Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
___________________
17 63 Miss 512 (1886).

18 Op. cit., pp. 729-732 (1994).
319
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 319

‘This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they
control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.’
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision

promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W
Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts
wherefrom are extensively reproduced here-under.
x x x In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the
validity of a long line of decisions of this court which created and nurtured
the so-called ‘enrolled bill’ doctrine.
xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures
that the legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final
passage. x x x.
xxx
x x x Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a
court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the
appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.
xxx
x x x In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision,
yet the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In
declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety of its enactment,
the court enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First,
the court was reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal
branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which
discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated
considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly
and expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather
than opening up the records of the legislature. x x x.
xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of
judicial whim. There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An
enrolled bill was a ‘record’ and, as such, was not subject to attack at
common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of
government, the courts, being coequal, must indulge in every presumption
that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule
320

was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so

inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final act, the
enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as
expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been
without its critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can
summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially
conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not accord with facts or
constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic
record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original
reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary obligation of the
courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by
any branch of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The maxim is “Stare decisis et non quieta movere,” which simply
suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points of law.
Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require
perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel’s Adm’r v. Hoofnel,
287 Ky 834, 155 S.W. 2d 469, 471-72 (1941).”
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the
extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation
of the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are
whether there is clear error and urgent reasons ‘for neither justice nor wisdom
requires a court to go from one doubtful rule to another,’ and whether or not the evils
of the principle that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly
result from a change.’
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on

facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual
experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the
poor record-keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment
and technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly.
Tape recorders, electric typewriters, dupli-
321
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 321

cating machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers,

electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to
the ability of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible
records.
It is also apparent that the ‘convenience’ rule is not appropriate in today’s

modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that
the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see
that justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not
deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so
provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches
of government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and
other errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not agree.
Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to
the constitution is ‘void.’ The proper exercise of judicial authority requires
us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void.
Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228 of the
Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to ‘support . . . the Constitution of
the commonwealth.’ We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution
—by any person, corporation, state agency or branch or government—are
brought to light and corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that
silences our voices when confronted with violations of our constitution is
not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor
Sutherland describes as the ‘extrinsic evidence.’ x x x. Under this approach
there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such
presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence establishing that constitutional requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following
the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a
conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. x x x.”
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once

unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that
starting in the 1940’s, “x x x the tendency seems to be toward the
abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of
the third rule leaving only a prima
322

facie presumption of validity which 19 may be attacked by any

authoritative source of information.”
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled20 bill
doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, that

this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule
that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we 21firmed up this ruling in
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, thus:
“x x x
“Hence, ‘urea formaldehyde’ is clearly a finished product which is
patently distinct and different from ‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde,’ as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as ‘urea
formaldehyde.’ Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction ‘and’ between the term
‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde,’ and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt ‘urea’ and ‘formaldehyde’ separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called ‘urea formaldehyde,’ not the
latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements
made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before
said House, by members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs.
Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors, Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19,
1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled bill—which uses the term
‘urea formaldehyde’ instead of ‘urea and formaldehyde’—conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Execu-
______________________
19 Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.

20 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
21 7 SCRA 374.
323
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 323

tive—on which we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of

separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system—the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not
by judicial decree.”
22
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, we reiterated our fidelity to
the enrolled bill doctrine, viz.:
“x x x. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really

happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government
demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said
branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth

trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process. The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to
make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning—the
immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the
petitioner—can best be effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed
elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell
Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.”
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the

enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:
“By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as

holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of
a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on
the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that
with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal,
the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.”
23
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, we further diluted the
enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the
_____________________
22 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.

23 56 SCRA 714.
324

Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We

ruled:
“x x x
“Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment, required, it is said,
by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that
the invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never
been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded
even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a
reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the

certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity
of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other
words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that “[e]very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President.” In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri,
interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
“makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows
that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, the proof that it has ‘passed both houses’ will satisfy the
constitutional requirement.”
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but
argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to
have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at
all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out,
Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs
the issue. It would limit the court’s inquiry to the presence or absence of the
attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute.
The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what
evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted.
In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
325
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 325

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary

record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the
point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether
the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate
journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as
indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by
the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would
be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.”
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary 24
rationale in the case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado. In

this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary
appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this
contention, this Court ruled:
“While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for

compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:
‘A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it
may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses.
Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative
___________________
24 227 SCRA 703.
326

custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee
produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions
occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference
committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell,
1986 Ed., p. 81).’
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in

question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both
Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers
of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule
that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that
have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading
of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court,
as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we
explained the reason thus:
‘To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.’
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’

charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted
i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.”
327
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 327

Finally in 1994 came the case of 25Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,

et al. and its companion cases. Involved in the case was the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise 26 known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority partly relied on the
enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:
“x x x
“Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest
firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not
only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a
proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes
for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute
had been ‘smuggled’ in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us
to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the ‘enrolled bill’ rule is absolute. In fact in
one case we ‘went behind’ an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the
Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had
signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so
that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage
of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation
that the Conference Committee ‘surreptitiously’ inserted provisions into a

bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the ‘enrolled bill’ rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.”
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice
Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that “no claim
____________________
25 Supra.
26 Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno dissented.
328

is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute.” I respectfully submit

that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement
that we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill
doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in
stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England
where it originated because in England there is no written
Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the
courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and
un-realism of the enrolled 27 bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill28 is inconsistent with our Constitution,
laws and rules. In Mabanag, we relied on section 313 of the Old
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal
reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long
been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will
show that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the
conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not
all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results
in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987
Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live
not only under a rule of law but also under 29a regime of truth. Our
Constitution also adopted a national policy requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule
which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored.
And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to
pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality
of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill
for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We

cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is
the search for truth. I submit that giving
___________________
27 See writer’s dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

28 Op. cit.
29 Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.
329
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 329

an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will

facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable.
Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed
by the public respondents to justify granting said petition. As the
ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint that
petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The
petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the
Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the
House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to
question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They
are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House
enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of
the House. Their observance or nonobservance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business
of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of

judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the
determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the
Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed,
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked
with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire

bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been
understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and
whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
330

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of a
Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of
Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls and
the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an
unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it
would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the
fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure,
from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but
balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There is, of
course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on
the understanding of the term “judicial power.” Now, the Court is
under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial
inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions
provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion—the sole test of
justiciability on purely political issues—is shown to have attended
the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No.
115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition dismissed.
Notes.—The House without the Senate which had adjourned sine

die, is not “Congress”—neither the House nor the Senate can hold
session independently of the other in the same manner as neither can
transact any legislative business after the adjournment of the other.
(Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966])
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts
331
VOL. 277, AUGUST 15, 1997 331

Court of Appeals vs. Escalante
to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the

principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General or
other officer acting under his direction. (Lasco vs. United Nations
Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681
[1995])
——o0o——
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Arroyo vs. de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997

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9/7/23, 10:32 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 277

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R.

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 269

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing view is that Rules of

Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While Art. VIII, §1 has

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Bicameral

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 271

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

this case is a legislator’s nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the

Same; Same; Same; Same; The advantages or disadvantages, the

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The question of quorum cannot be

Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Presumptions;

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 273

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

clusive presumption.—Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is no evidence to the

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative Journals; The Journal is

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 275

PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Political

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Enrolled Bill

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The principle of separation of

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 277

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

tion, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is high time we re-examine our

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and/or

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 279

Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for Jose de Venecia.

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 281

certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as

proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 283

Rep. Arroyo’s question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a

reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.

§122. Precedence.—Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall have

privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.

6 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 285

lation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively

9 Art. VI, §16(3).