Family Law Cases On Wills and Children

WELFARE PRINCIPLE;
IN RE MCGRATH (infants)
Lord Justice Lindley held that;
The welfare of the child is not to be measured by money only nor by physical comfort only.
The word welfare must be considered in its widest sense. The moral and religious welfare of
the child must be considered as well as its physical well being. Nor can the ties of affection
be disregarded.
NAKAGGWA V KIGGUNDU
The term welfare though incapable of exact definition means in relation to custody, that all
circumstances affecting the well being and up-bringing of the child have to be taken into
account and the court has to do what a wise parent acting for the interests of the child ought
to do.
GUARDIANSHIP
Previously foreigners would be granted guardianship.
IN THE MATTER OF ALICIA MIREMBE ANGILLIS A MINOR
Alicia Mirembe Angillis was abandoned by its unknown mother after it was delivered at \
Mulago Hospital on the 17/4/2003. The applicants collected the child from Welcome
Children's Centre at Jinja when it had been three months previously. After picking it from the
Centre on the 11/8/2003, the applicants have since kept Alicia under their roof and care at
their residence in Kabalagala zone Makindye Division, Kampala. The first applicant is a
Belgian national which the second is a Ugandan. The applicants had taken all the possible
steps to trace the parents of the child by advertising in the media but no one has come
forward to claim the child.
HELD
A guardian is defined in section 1(K) of the Children Act as a person having parental
responsibility for a child and Parental responsibility in the same section 1(0) means all rights,
duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation
to the child.
In all matters relating to the guardianship of a child the first and paramount consideration is
its welfare. The child is defined in section 2 of the Children Act as a person below the age of
eighteen years. The welfare principle is a set of rights and facilities which a child must have
and enjoy during his childhood. These rights are God-given and cannot be taken away, even
by the operation of the law. No law shall be enforceable against the child if such law would
FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

in effect infringe upon the child's rights enshrined in the welfare principle.
See: Article 34(1) of the Constitution.
The child in this application is a Uganda National having been bornin Uganda (chapter III
Article 11(1) of the Constitution and one of the applicants is a Belgian. Where the best
interest and welfare of the Child is concerned, the guardianship of the Child may be granted
to a foreign national. It is better for the child to have a home and parental love and care in the
hands of a foreign national than to live without any one to care for it (child).
IN THE MATTER OF IREN NAJJUMA, AN INFANT
The applicant was a United States female citizen who sought an order for legal guardianship
of one Irene Najjuma an infant estimated to be 8 months old whose parents were unknown.
She was abandoned near the Sanyu Babies Home, which took custody of the baby. Court
granted guardianship to non citizens basing on the welfare principle.
Per Egonda Ntende “What is needed for this infant and many other children in a similar
position is a home with loving parents and a family. This child is being provided an
opportunity to grow up in a loving family environment to be provided by the applicant. The
child‟s current circumstances as a ward of an orphanage was only intended to be temporary,
pending the availability of a suitable home in which she could be raised. Unfortunately no
suitable home has been available locally since she was picked up abandoned. Institutional
upbringing denies children their natural and legal rights of being raised by their parents
whether natural or adopted”. However J Egonda-Ntende called upon government to
streamline the law relating to guardianship and inter country adoption. NB this was addressed
under the Children (Amendment) Act 2016.
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION OF JANE NAMUKASA AN INFANT
It is now trite law that the guiding principle in cases of guardianship is the welfare of the
child. Whatever decision is taken by the court it must be in the interest of the child.
Guardianship has been granted to applicants who are foreigners after the court has satisfied
itself that it was for the benefit of the child. In this case court granted guardianship of the two
year old Jane Namukasa to an Italian couple

IN THE MATTER OF CAROL GIFT NAKILINYA…………… (A CHILD)
In this case court granted legal guardianship to US nationals where the child was chased
away with her mother from her father‟s home by her step mother. Her biological parents
failed to look after her and she was in custody of Dr. Babiiha who had no intentions of
keeping her permanently. There was evidence on record that the applicants desire to help the
child and provide her with a loving home environment. Court granted guardianship in the
best interests of the child to enjoy the said basic needs permanently in the course of her
growing up.
IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL (AN INFANT)
Egonda Ntende, J.; stated that “ … the infant’s current circumstances as a resident of an
orphanage are only intended to be temporary, pending the availability of a suitable home
in which the infant can be raised…No governmental support, be it local or central, is
available for the care and upkeep of the infants generally or specifically in the case of this
child. Right now it is under the care of a local non-governmental
organization………………………………. There is no offer from Ugandans or non-
Ugandans resident in Uganda to take up the responsibility of looking after this infant. I
find therefore exceptional circumstances exist for an order to be made in favour of
IN THE MATTER OF DEBORAH JOYCE ALITUBEERA and IN THE MATTER OF

RICHARD MASABA
The child, Deborah Joyce Alitubeera, the subject of the appeal, is the issue of Moses Lugya
Mboka and Nansubuga Rita. Her birth certificate shows that she was born on 1st May 2010;
and was one year old at the time of the ruling. After her birth, irreconcilable differences
developed between Mboka and Nansubuga. Nansubuga moved away from Mboka and left
the child with him when she (the child) was only 2 months old. Soon thereafter, it became
obvious that Mboka (an exceedingly irresponsible and worthless drunkard) could not look
after the child properly. As a result, the local authorities intervened and on the 16th February
2011, the lower court made an order placing the child in the care of a Non Governmental
Organization called Mercy Child Care Ministry for three years. Subsequently, the applicants,
a married American couple living in, California (USA), developed interest in the child and
sought orders for the grant of legal guardianship of the child.
Richard Masaba was an infant who was at the time of the application, 4 years old. His
unknown parents abandoned him when he was only two days old. They dumped him at one

Michael Wandah‟s verandah in Shikoye village, Bungokho County, Mbale District, during
the night of 7th February, 2007. Wandah picked him up and informed the local authorities of
the area and the Police about the child. Subsequently, he handed the child to the Probation
Officer of Mbale District, (a one Ms. Mutonyi Meresi). In turn, Ms. Mutonyi took the child
to Kizito Babies Home where he stayed for some time. On 1st November 2010, the applicants
obtained a Care Order from the Family and Children‟s Court at Mbale authorizing them to
take custody of him and look after him. They have been doing so since then. Subsequently,
the appellants also lodged Family Cause No.81 of 2011 for legal guardianship and authority
to obtain a passport for the child so that they could take him along to the USA.
Both applications were dismissed on the grounds that the applicants in both cases did not
qualify for the grant of the orders sought as they were foreign nationals who were not
residents in Uganda. They appealed
HELD
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be the primary consideration. This is contained in Article 34 of the
Constitution, Section 3 and the 1st schedule to the Children‟s Act, international conventions
to which Uganda is a party such as the UN Convention in the Rights of the Child (Article
3(1)); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Article 4(1)); as well as
text books on family law notably Bromley‟s Family Law, 8th Edition specifically pages 336
and 341.
Court allowed both appeals and granted guardianship to foreigners by holding that the judge
erred in not appreciating the welfare principle of the infants.
NB. Under the Children (Amendment)Act 2016 guardianship is only granted to Ugandan
citizens. S.43A
IN RE MARVIN KAKOOZA
HELD; In this case, where the applicant, who is child‟s biological mother, seeks an order that
will enable her to sell the land she jointly owns with the child, and where the child, who is of
understanding age, is not opposed to the sale, and where both state that it is for construction
of the family‟s residence and paying the minor‟s school fees, such order should not be denied
as it is for the welfare and best interests of the minor. Court thus granted guardianship to the
biological mother of the child.

IN RE OTIM GABRIEL
Court granted legal guardianship of a minor aged 17 to his big brother. The applicant, who
was child‟s brother, sought an order that would enable him to sell the land he jointly owned
with the child and another brother, and court held that where the child, who was of
understanding age, was not opposed to the sale, and where their other brother, also a joint
proprietor of the same land, also stated that it was for acquiring a bigger piece of land and
paying the minor‟s school fees, such order should not be denied as it is for the welfare and
best interests of the minor.
IN THE MATTER OF NAMUGERWA JOYCE
The applicant was the paternal aunt of the minors who claimed that she was given
powers to take care of the minors after the death of their father, the applicant averred
that she had been responsible for the children‟s welfare and further that she was
registered as a joint owner of the property with the minors. The applicant averred that
she was desirous of selling part of the land in order to provide some basic necessities
to the minors such as pay for education, buy clothing. The applicant sought to be
appointed the guardian of the said minors in order to effect the sale of the part of their
property.
HELD
According to s.1 (k) of the Children Act, a “guardian” means a person having parental
responsibility for a child. S. 1 (o) provides that “parental responsibility” means all rights,
duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation
to the child. Parental responsibility includes the parent‟s right at common law over the child‟s
property together with such rights as a guardian of the child‟s estate would have
Section 3 of the Children Act provides that the welfare principle and the children‟s rights set
out in the First Schedule to the Act shall be the guiding principles in making any decision
based on the Act. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 of the Act then provides that whenever the State,
a court, a local authority or any person determines any question with respect to the
upbringing of a child; or the administration of a child‟s property or the application of any
income arising from it, the child‟s welfare shall be of the paramount consideration
One of the grounds of this application was that the applicant was given powers to take
care of the minors after the death of their father. However, the applicant did not give
any information about who gave her the powers or how she came to have them. Under
the law, the right to act as legal guardian may be vested by the parent in another
person by a will or some other document that takes effect after the death of both

parents who by law have parental responsibility. In my view, the fact that the
applicant is jointly registered as proprietor of the land with the minors does not
necessarily mean that she is de facto to be appointed their guardian or that she is the
best person to ensure that their rights are sufficiently respected, enforced and
protected.
The children are obviously too young to make decisions about their guardianship and
that of their property. That may be so, but the applicant did not disclose whether these
minors have a mother or mothers who would be the automatic guardian(s) in the
absence of their father. I therefore suspect that the decision to make the applicant the
guardian of these infants and their property may have been premised on the fact that
she is the paternal aunt of the children and that ordinarily under the customary laws
of most traditional communities in Uganda she would have better rights to
guardianship of the children than their mother(s). S.2 (n) of the Succession Act
reinforces this practice which is premised on the dominance of the male who is the
father because it still provides that with regard to kindred and consanguinity “a
paternal ancestor shall be preferred to a maternal ancestor.
However, decisions that are premised in customary law and patriarchy are often
discriminatory and controversial. Courts have to be careful in accepting them
wholesale without adequate information on how they came to be made. This is so
because customary law has come to be known as the tool by which women‟s and
children‟s rights are made subordinate to those of other persons who are sometimes
also women. That is a position that can no longer be accepted without question in
light of the decision of the Constitutional Court in Law & Advocacy for Women in
Uganda v. Attorney General, Constitutional Petitions No. 13/05 and 13/06. In
that case the Justices of the Constitutional Court ruled that ss.2(n) (i) and (ii) of the
Succession Act are inconsistent with and contravene Articles 21 (1) (2) (3) 31,
33(6)of the Constitution and they are null and void.
A court may only appoint a guardian if a minor has no surviving parent who automatically
has parental responsibility. In this case it was not disclosed whether the minor herein has a
surviving parent or not. Court was therefore unable to make the decision requested for
without adequate information, i.e. whether the minors herein had a mother(s) and about how
the applicant got powers to act as the guardian of the minors.
IN THE MATTER OF ROSETTE KANYUNYUZI

Court declined to grant legal guardianship to the applicants who wanted to take an 11 year
old female child to Poland as it was not in her best interests. Court noted that it was
concerned that an abrupt change in environment, feeding, company and circumstances of a
girl child who is very close to puberty would affect this child adversely. She is at a delicate
age. It would be best if she was brought up in the stability of the environment she is used to.
It is also most likely that she would suffer psychological trauma which may become more
complicated given her age. Poverty alone is not a good reason for unsuspecting parents to
give away their children.
IN THE MATTER OF MATHIAS MUTEBI AN INFANT
The applicant, a single female, is residing and working in this country. She cohabits with a
male friend. In this application she is seeking an order of legal guardianship of Mathias
Mutebi, hereinafter referred to as the infant. The applicant applied to be appointed a foster
parent of the said infant and the Family and Children Court of Nabweru issued a care order
dated 27th May 2009 that appointed her as a foster parent to the infant.
PER EGONDA NTENDE;
Foster parent is defined under the Children Act, Section 1 (j) as, „means a person not being
the biological mother, father, or relative of the child who assumes parental responsibility of
the child by way of a care order.‟
Guardian is defined by the same Act, Section 1 (k) as, „means a person having parental
responsibility for a child.‟
In my view it is clear from the foregoing that a foster parent, appointed by the Family and
Children Court, is a guardian of the infant. A foster parent is a guardian of the infant by virtue
of appointment as a foster parent. A foster parent has parental responsibility for the child. A
guardian is a person who has parental responsibility for a child. So a foster parent is a
guardian.

Revocation.
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ROXANE TURNER AND JOYCE

NALUBOWA
In this case court revoked legal guardianship of the minors where the record showed they
were granted by a Magistrate Grade 1 at Kalangala Family and Children Court. The
applicants had lied when they averred that it was granted by a Chief Magistrate of Masaka
Court. Court found therefore that the Kalangala Family and Children court presided over by a
Magistrate Grade 1 exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted a legal guardianship order in
respect of the two children to the 2nd applicant who is a non Ugandan. “This was clearly an
illegality and this court cannot be a silent spectator of the same. It was held in Cardinal
Nsubuga & Another V Makula International Ltd [1982] HCB 11 that an illegality, once
brought to the attention of court, overrides all questions of pleading, including any
admissions made thereon.” Court therefore revoked the guardianship order to Turner, the 2nd
applicant on grounds that it was illegally granted by the Magistrate Grade 1 of Kalangala
Family and Children Court and ordered for the children to be returned back to their
grandmother as the closest known relative to the said children.
CUSTODY
PULKERIA NAKAGGWA V DOMINICO KIGGUNDU

In this case each parent wanted the custody of the child and court held;
In determining who should have custody of a child, it is well established that the paramount
consideration is the welfare of the child, such factors as the father‟s natural and superior right
to the custody over the child as against the mother, the claims of other relatives and the
conduct of the parties, among others have to be taken into account.
The term welfare though incapable of exact definition means in relation to custody, that all
circumstances affecting the well being and up-bringing of the child have to be taken into
account and the court has to do what a wise parent acting for the interests of the child ought
to do.
Although there was no rule of law that an infant girl must stay with the mother, it was
generally considered better for a child of tender years to stay with the mother but this had to
be weighed against the father‟s natural right to the custody. And in the absence of evidence
that the child was not being well looked after, court granted custody to the father who was

living with the child
That where custody of the child is given to another parent, a parent had a right of access to
the child provided such access did not interfere or disrupt the well being of the child.
RWABUHEMBA TIM MUSINGUZI v HARRIET KAMAKUME

The respondent is the natural mother of one Ashley Kijumba, a minor. While the child was 2
years old the respondent went to London leaving the child with its father in the year 2002.
After the respondent had gone to London the applicant who is a paternal uncle took custody
of the infant. in the year 2006 the applicant applied for legal custody in the Family Court at
Nakawa and he got custody of the child. The mother opposed the original application stating
that she wanted custody of the child, and that she was able to look after the child.
HELD
Article 31 of the Constitution states in part,
„(4) It is the right and duty of parents to care for and bring up their children.
(5) Children may not be separated from their families or the persons entitled to bring them up
against the will of their families or of those persons, except in accordance with the law.‟
Parents have a fundamental right to care and bring up their children. This is a constitutional
right. Of course it is not considered in isolation. The welfare of the child is a consideration to
be taken into account, and at times may be the paramount consideration. A parent can only
be denied the right to care for and raise her children when it is clear and has been determined
by a competent authority, in accordance with law, that it is the best interest of the child that
the child be separated from the parent.
Both parents have similar and equal rights with regard to their child. The father of the child
elected not to look after the child. The mother wants to care for and raise her child. She is
entitled to do so in law. The mother‟s right to raise her child cannot be ousted by a wealthy
relative on the basis that the relative is well off and competent to look after the child. Or that
the child having initially joined the wealthy relative by consent of one of the parents of the
child and the blessing of the clan the other parent is to be denied custody because the wealthy
relative‟s children have gotten used to the company of the child. In effect that was the case
put forward by the respondent. The appellant (mother) is, as of constitutional right, entitled
to custody of the child.

This case is to the effect that custody of a child cannot be granted to another person where
one of the biological parents is ready and able to take care of the child.
NAKALULE CHRISTINE v KAKOOZA HERBERT

This was an appeal from the judgment of the Chief Magistrate‟s Court at Nakawa wherein the
Chief Magistrate dismissed the appellant‟s appeal brought on grounds that the trial magistrate
erred in fact and law when he disregarded the welfare principle and ordered the Respondent‟s
children and their mother to vacate the family home at Kawaala and relocate to a house in
Wakiso. The wife complained that the offer of the house at Wakiso was not convenient and
affordable as the distance to her place of work in Owino was far.
In his judgement the judge stated
“And my reasoning is that welfare of the children cannot be considered while disregarding
the wishes of their mother, with whom they were going to stay with in this case. The children
will be psychologically and mentally tortured and may not even concentrate on their studies if
their mother is uncomfortable or miserable. That is the reality of life which Courts in this
country must be alive to. I therefore agree with the submissions of Counsel for the Appellant
that the Chief Magistrate erred in law and fact when he concluded that shifting the children of
the Respondent and Appellant to Wakiso from Kawala, was in their best interest. It is not
only the issue of raising school fees for the children by renting the house at Kawala that
should have been considered, but also other relevant factors about the welfare of the children
such as whether the proposed house at Wakiso was conducive or proper for the upbringing of
the children as opposed to Kawala where they have been all along. What the comfort and
satisfaction of their mother. That cannot be isolated from the welfare of the children.
Children are at their best where both their mother and father are together and happy. But in
the non-recommendable circumstances of separation or disagreements as is apparent in this
case then it is better that the children are closer to their mother whereas both parents play a
crucial role as far as the welfare of the child is concerned, there are certain nitty gritty
detailed roles of their mothers which cannot be ignored or taken for granted. I find the
reasoning of the Grade II Magistrate indeed very absurd and in total disregard of Gender
Policy and generally the law with equality of men and women, husbands and wives as
enshrined in the Constitution of this country and other enabling laws.
The Magistrate concluded as follows:-

“The Appellant was given a house to stay in not as a wife but as someone with
custody of children and that she was not entitled to choose where she should
stay.”
The above statement in my view is not only derogatory and demeaning of women in society
but unexpected from a Court of Justice. It is not proper to refer to appellant, who is
customarily married to the Respondent as someone having custody of children. In the first
instance whose children are they? Don‟t they belong to both the husband and wife, in this
case Appellant and Respondent? Did the Respondent produce those children alone without
the natural and inevitable and enjoyable imput of the wife? How can the wife then be
referred to as “someone”, when she is the natural mother of the children in question. This
Court, as a Court of record and exercising its appellate Jurisdiction in conformity with the
Principles of law, Justice, Equity and good conscience as spelt out under Section 2(a) and (c)
and Section 15(1) of the Judicature Act, shall and will not be derailed by such naïve and 14th
century reasoning of reference to a wife as someone, contrary to Article 33 of the
Constitution of this country.”
KIRUNGI DOREEN v MUGABE RONALD
In dissolving the marriage of the parties court found that the petitioner (wife) had been caring
for the child since it was born, including paying her school fees. Court thus held that the
cardinal principle on whom to grant custody of a child in cases of this nature is the welfare of
the child. At her tender age of three years, the child needs to live with the parent who has
cared for her since she was born rather than the parent who has been absent from her life and
has not catered for her. There are also case decisions that where a child is of tender age,
custody should be granted to the mother. See Kayongo V Sekiziyivu [1973] HCB 24.
Custody was thus granted to the mother.
KAGIMU V KAGIMU
The cardinal principle in determining to whom to grant custody of a child in cases of this
nature is the welfare of a child.. in the matter of custody of children of tender years it is trite
that such custody should go to their mothers. In this case court found that the child was six
years old and of tender age and the man was not paying her fees nor buy food or pay rent, it
was for the best interests of the child to be under the custody of the mother.
NYAKAIRU V NYAKAIRU

This was an appeal by the appellant against an order granting custody of his three children of
7, 3 and 1 ½ years to the respondent in a divorce petition. For the appellant it was argued that
the father had a common law right to the custody of his children of whatever age and that
moreover the wife was a young woman of 25 years who could easily remarry and thus be
forced to return the children back to their father.
HELD
In Uganda the law relating to custody of children was the common law and this was that the
father had a right to the custody of his children however young, and the mother had to bring
in special circumstances and prove them to show that the father‟s common law right to the
custody of his children should be superseded.
Although the underlying principle in all custody cases was that the welfare of the children
was the paramount consideration, the courts in applying this principle had to consider other
ancillary circumstances. These circumstances includes, for example, such matters as who of
the spouses was to b lame for the breakup of the marriage, who of the spouses was more
financially equipped to look better after the interests of the children and which of the spouses
could provide a more comfortable home.
For the guilty spouse to be deprived of the custody of the children, it had to be proved that
such custody would adversely affect the physical and moral welfare of children. Immorality
on the part of the father was not a sufficient justification for interfering with a father‟s
common law right to custody of his children unless such immorality was very flagrant
coupled with other habits injurious to the children. Similarly cruelty could be good ground
for interfering with the right if such cruelty extended to the children as well as the mother.
In deciding whether custody of the children should be granted to their mother, the court could
not shut its eyes to the natural desire of a woman to remarry after divorce.
In this case as there was nothing to show that the wife would not remarry and the fact that the
children were still living with their father and there was nothing to show that their physical
and moral welfare had deteriorated as a result of living apart from their mother, court granted
custody to the father.
NTANDA v KAYEMBA 2008 HCB 116

HELD; custody of children of tender years should be granted to the mother. However, the
party‟s previous conduct is essential to establish the certainty of children‟s welfare upon
custody. Access to children should be carefully granted without causing inconvenience to
either party or interfering with the children‟s school programme.
In KATUNGYE v KATUNGYE
Court held that as the children were very young, it was in their best interests to be in custody
of their mother as they still needed the tender care of their natural mother.
MAINTENANCE
Parents has the responsibility to maintain their children.
KIRUNGI DOREEN V MUGABE
In a divorce petition, court stated that on maintenance of the child, S.5 of the Children Act
puts a duty on parents to maintain their children. That duty gives the child a right to education
and guidance, immunisation, clothing, shelter etc. Court ordered the husband to pay 400 USD
per month for maintenance of the child whose custody was granted to the mother.
The application for maintenance can be made during the subsistence of a marriage, during
proceedings of divorce, separation or termination of cohabitation and after a declaration of
parentage. S 76(3) Children Act. It can also be made at any time during pregnancy or before
the child attains 18 yrs of age. S. 76(4)
Where there are divorce proceedings and the application is not made, the applicant loses the
right to apply.
This was held in JULIAN GALTON FENZI v NABBOSA NATASHA MARIE
The grounds of the application are that the applicant and the respondent got divorced on 10th
May 2011 vide Divorce Cause 9 of 2010 where the applicant was granted custody of the two
children in the marriage aged 17 years and 11 years respectively and that since then, the
respondent being mother of the children has failed to support them financially
notwithstanding the fact that she was granted all the property which is valued at
approximately US $ 1 million and that it is just and equitable that the application for

maintenance be granted as it is in the best interest of the children. It was held that the matter
was res judicata and should have been brought under the divorce proceedings.
The maintenance order will cease once the child attains 18 years (S.82). This was seen in the
case of AYO v OJAMBO where court dismissed the application that sought for maintenance
costs of a child who was above 18 years.
The amount to be paid is at court‟s discretion taking into account the circumstances of the
case and the financial means of the parents.
CHAMA V RWALINDA
The husband petitioned for divorce and custody of the only child in the marriage. The wife
cross petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, custody and maintenance of the child. The
maintenance was for school fees, food, medical expenses and contribution towards shelter
and a lump sum of 3 million refund of money spent on maintenance of the child. Court
granted the maintenance order as the sums prayed for were fair and wife was unemployed.
Custody was granted to the mother.
ADOPTION
IN THE MATTER OF MIREMBE NANSAMBA CLARE (A MINOR)

The petitioner, a 27 married British citizen of Ugandan decent and maternal uncle of an 11
year old Mirembe Nansamba Clare sought to adopt her. The wife of the petitioner consented
to the adoption and so did the parents of the child.
HELD; In order to adopt a child, the petitioner must have attained 25 years of age, and be at
least 21 years older than the child, according to section 45(1)(a) of the Children Act. The
applicant here is 27 years of age, and is 16 years older than the child and does not have the
required age difference. However, since the applicant is an uncle, the age difference is of no
consequence.

Under section 45(3), an adoption order should not be made in favour of a sole male applicant
in respect of a female child or in favour of a sole female applicant in respect of a male child
unless the court is satisfied that there are special circumstances that justify, as an exceptional
measure, the making of an adoption order.
In the present case, the petitioner was a male and the child was a female, but he was the
maternal uncle who had been sending money for all the basic necessities of life to wit food,
medication, clothing and education to the said child. Court held that this qualified as
exceptional circumstances in the eyes of the court and adoption was granted.
IN THE MATTER OF PETER SSEBULIBA ALIAS NAMANSA JAMES
Susan Nagayi brought this application in respect of Peter Ssebuliba, her biological son. The
applicant sought for a writ of habeas corpus against one Victoria Kalungi Namakonzi who was
holding the infant pursuant to an adoption order that had been issued by the Chief Magistrate at
Jinja.. The main ground for the application was that the adoption order had been procured
fraudulently because Victoria Kalungi did not obtain the consent of the child‟s mother (his only
surviving parent) before obtaining the order. Further ground was that the continued denial of the
opportunity for the child to live with his biological mother was not only unlawful but
unconstitutional. It was contended that the order was a nullity because there were no exceptional
circumstances that warranted granting an adoption order in respect of a male child to a female
adoptive parent. Further that the order was a nullity because the consent of the only surviving
parent (the applicant) had not been obtained which was contrary to the provisions of s. 47 of the
Children Act. That according to Article 34(1) of the Constitution, it was the right of the child to
be cared for by the applicant and this had been contravened.
HELD
The requirement for consent of the parents of the child before an adoption order is granted is
provided for by s. 47 of the Children Act. S.47 (1) provides that the consent of the parents of the
child, if known, is necessary for the adoption order to be made; but the consent may be revoked
at any time before the pronouncement of the adoption order. Rule 8 (1) of the Children (Adoption
of Children) Rules provides that a consent required by the Act shall be given in the manner set
out in Form C in the Schedule to the Rules. Rule 8 (2) of the Adoption of Children Rules further
provides that all consents shall be sworn before a commissioner for oaths and shall be submitted

together with the affidavit of verification of the petition or accompanied by a separate affidavit of
verification.
PER Irene Mulyagonja Kakooza
The consent to adoption is a very important document because it is in it that the parents or
guardians of the child to be adopted vest their parental rights in the adoptive parents
On welfare the judge quoted;
Lord McDermott in J v. C [1970] AC 668 at page 710 where it was held that welfare connotes:
“a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents,
risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to be
followed will be that which is most in the interests of the child’s welfare as that term has now
to be understood”
“Paramount consideration”, as Lord Mac Dermott continued, means a consideration which

“rules upon or determines the course to be followed”.
The respondent obtained the adoption order illegally contrary to the provisions of s.47 of the
Children Act for the respondent‟s failure to get the written consent for adoption from the
applicant. Also that the respondent or her advocates omitted to serve the petition on other
persons interested in the child contrary to the provisions of the Adoption of Children Rules.
In this case, curt found no evidence on file to show that the petition was served on any of the
interested parties. For that reason, the judge found that the adoption order was fraudulently
and or improperly obtained.
That the respondent‟s continued support to Nalule and the child‟s siblings while the child was in
Nalule‟s care may be construed as consideration for the adoption, however subtle. s.48 (1) (c) of
the Children Act provides that one of the duties of the court in an application for adoption is to
ensure that the applicant, or any person on behalf of the applicant, has not paid or agreed to pay
money or anything in place of money to the parent, guardian or any person in charge of the child
in consideration of the adoption of the child. There appears to have been some consideration for
the adoption. In that regard therefore, the adoption order was improperly obtained.
The judge then made the following comments regarding adoption in Uganda.

“I have taken all the above factors into account but I still have to consider the aspect of
public policy and its links to welfare. Sadly, this is a case of an unlawful adoption where the
child went to live with a new family contrary to the provisions of the Children Act. There is
concern that the process of adoption in this country is not properly regulated. There is a fear
that I hold but which is also felt by the wider public that the adoption of children in this
country may be on its way to being transformed into a market and characterised by a one-way
flow of children from poor families to families that are financially better endowed.
There is also concern about the burgeoning reality of international adoption which has been
transformed into nothing short of a market regulated by the capitalist laws of supply and demand,
and characterised by a one-way flow of children from poor countries or countries in transition to
developed countries. There is a strong likelihood that the inadequacy of adoption laws and the
increased frequency of inter-country adoptions in this country have led to the development of
dishonesty, subterfuge, criminality and exploitation of the vulnerable. The possibility exists that
the courts have unwittingly been led to participate in a subtle kind of child trafficking whose
proportions have not yet been established. This is especially so because many children were
orphaned during the war in Northern Uganda. Many children have also been orphaned by AIDS.
Because of the grave danger posed to such children by illegal adoptions, courts need to be very
firm in situations where the inadequate laws on adoption in Uganda are not respected”
Adoption order was set aside.
NB. It must be noted that under the Children (amendment) Act 2016 inter-country adoption is
considered as the last option. S.46(6) of the amended Act. Also the amendment provides for
rescission of an adoption order if it is in the best interests of the child or if it was procured
through fraud or misrepresentation. S.46A of the amended Act (Peter Sebuliba‟s case is a good
example).
In the case of Samwiri Massa vs. Rose Achen [1978] HCB 297, Justice Ntagoba observed
that “it’s trite law that where issues of custody of child is between the father and its mother
and taking into account the paramount interest of the child, custody of such child, especially
when it’s of tender years must be granted to the mother…”

IN RE NDAGIZIMANA ANDREW
Adoption order was granted to an Italian couple who had been residents in Uganda for 34
months and had fostered the child for 2 years and 5 months. Court held that the residence
requirement of 36 months is not mandatory but regulatory and that the time requirement for
fostering the child was for government authorities to assess the suitability of the petitioners to
adopt the child. The child was two years and they had taken care of her since she was 3
months.
IN RE MICHEAL BENJAMIN
Court held that although the petitioners had not been resident in Uganda for all three years,
court gave a liberal interpretation of S.46 while considering the circumstances of the case and
the interests of the child as paramount.
IN RE PAULA ROBERTSON
Court held that the provisions of S.46 are not mandatory on account of the reason that the
welfare principle is paramount.
IN RE SHARON
Court relying on the above decisions, granted adoption to an American couple who had
resided in Uganda for two years and 4 months holding that the provisions of S.46 are
directory and provide the conditions for which the court may exercise its discretion to grant
an adoption order but the guiding principle still remains the welfare principle.
IN RE RUBANGA KENE
The petitioners married Dutch citizens sought to adopt Edwin a four year old. The Husband
was 50 years, the wife 49, they were husband and wife. They had fostered the child for 4
years and had stayed in Uganda for 19 years. The parents of the child were dead. Court
granted the adoption order as all the requirements were fulfilled

CASES ON WILLS
CAPACITY
MENTAL OR TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
Persons of unsound mind are incapacitated from making a valid will, although this does not
mean that such persons are destined to die intestate. If such a person makes a will before his
mind becomes afflicted or makes, it during a lucid interval such a will is valid. S.36(4) of
Succession Act
The test of mental capacity to make a will is not directly linked to mental disorder. Cockburn
C.J. set the test in Banks vs. Goodfellow (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 549 in the following terms:
“It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall understand the nature of
the act and its effects, shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing,
shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect and
with a view to the latter object that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections,
pervert his sense of right, or pervert the exercise of his natural faculties that no insane
delusions shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it
which if the mind had been sound would not have been made.”
Where the testator posses sound mind, memory and understanding at the time of making of a
will
1). The testator must be aware that they are making a testamentary disposition at the time
of making a will.
2). Must be aware of the property at his disposal
3). Must know those who are close to him of whom people expect him to give
(beneficiaries)
HARWOOD v. BAKER (1840) 3 Moo PC 282
A testator executed his will on his death bed and left all his estate to his second wife to the
exclusion of other family members. He was at the time suffering from a disease that affected
his brain. It was held that it was necessary to determine whether he was at the time capable of
recollecting who those relations were, of understanding their respective claims on his regard
and bounty and of deliberately forming an intelligent purpose of excluding them from any
share of his property. That based on the evidence, he did not have sufficient recollection of
his other family members and the will was invalid
BATTAN SINGH v ARMICHAND

The testator had only 4 nephews as relatives and was fond of them. He had been sick for a
long time and one of the defendants had taken him to his home and cared for him for 2
weeks. At the time of the execution of the will, he had been so sick and said he had no
relatives yet one of the defendants who was present was aware of this. He left the property to
the defendants who were in no way related to him.

HELD
If the testator was reduced by disease to extreme weakness and declared in a will that he had
made a day before he died to people in no way related to him, the will was felt to be a will by
a man so enfeebled by disease as to be without sound mind or memory at the time of the
execution. The will was held to be invalid.
WOODS V SMITH 1993 CH 90

The testator told someone at the time he was making the will that he had investments worth
105,000 where as the actual value was in excess of that. It was held that this showed that he
was seriously confused as to the extent of his assets and such confusion of mind indicated the
deceased lacked testamentary capacity.
INSANE DELUSIONS
The fact that the testator is labouring under insane delusions at the time of making the will is
not necessarily fatal to the validity of a will so long as the delusions leave the testator‟s
power of understanding unimpaired. According to the court in the case of Dew vs. Clark
(1826) 3 Add 79 a person suffers from an insane delusion if he holds a belief of a particular
matter which no rational person could hold and the belief cannot be eradicated from his mind
by reasoning with him.
An insane delusion will only affect the testator‟s capacity to make a will if it in some way
affects the way he disposes of his property. In Dew vs. Clark (1826) 3 Add 79 the testator
made a will which was rational superficially, but which excluded his daughter from benefit.
The daughter showed by way of extrinsic evidence that the testator had an insane aversion of
her. He had refused to see her for the first three years of her life and he had made her sleep
with an insane woman. It was held that the will was invalid because the delusion affected the
manner of the testator‟s disposition of his property.
In Banks vs. Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 the testator believed that evil spirits and a
person who was already dead were pursuing him. The court found that although the testator
suffered from an insane delusion the same did not affect his testamentary capacity as the
delusion did not affect the way in which he disposed of his property by will. The will was
held to be valid.
Sometimes the delusion may only affect the validity of part of a will. In such a case probate
will be granted to such parts of the will as are not affected by the delusion.
IN RE BOHRMANN’S ESTATE (1938) 1 ALL ER 24
A testator made three codicils to his will all giving substantial gifts to various charities. He
later began to suffer from an insane delusion that the London County Council was
persecuting him. The insane belief arose out of the council‟s attempt to acquire part of his
land to build a hospital on it. As a result of the delusion the testator executed a fourth codicil
of which one clause provided that all references to English charities should be read as
referring to corresponding American charities. Probate was granted of the will and the four

codicils excluding only the clause in the fourth codicil on the American charities, which was
declared invalid for lack of testamentary capacity on part of the testator. That the judgement
in Banks v Goodfellow, made it perfectly clear that the law has recognised that a man may
suffer from delusional insanity and yet make a perfectly good will so long as the delusions
from which he suffers have no relation to any testamentary capacity.
UNDUE INFLUENCE
WINGROVE v WINGROVE; 1885
HELD; To establish the presence of undue influence it is not enough to establish that a person
has the power to overbear the will of the testator. It must be shown that the will was a result
of the exercise of that power
Sir James Hannen said: „To be undue influence in the eyes of the law there must be – to sum
it up in a word – coercion. It must not be a case in which a person has been induced by means
such as I have suggested to you to come to a conclusion that he or she make a will in a
particular person‟s favour, because if the testator has only been persuaded or induced by
considerations which you may condemn, really and truly to intend to give his property to
another, though you may disapprove of the act, yet it is strictly legitimate in the sense of its
being legal. It is only when the will of the person who becomes a testator is coerced in to
doing that which he or she does not desire to do that it is undue influence.
The coercion may of course be of different kinds, it may be in the grossest form, such as
actual confinement or violence, or a person in the last days or hours of life may have become
so weak and feeble, that a very little pressure will be sufficient to bring about the desired
result, and it may even be that the mere talking to him at that stage of illness and pressing
something upon him may so fatigue the brain, that the sick person may be induced, for
quietness‟ sake, to do anything. This would equally be coercion, though not actual violence.
These illustrations will sufficiently bring home to your minds that even very immoral
considerations either on the part of the testator, or of someone else offering them, do not
amount to undue influence unless the testator is in such condition, that if he could speak his
wishes to the last, he would say „this is not my wish, but I must do it‟.
There remains another general observation that I must make and it is this, that it is not
sufficient to establish that a person has the power unduly to overbear the will of the testator.
It is necessary to prove that in the particular case that power was exercised, and that it was by
means of the exercise of that power, that the will such as it is, has been produced.‟
CRAIG v LAMOUREUX
Two days before her death the testatrix, to whom morphine was being administered to
alleviate pain, executed two wills in the English form. She requested her husband to have a
will prepared and, on his instructions, his brother, an advocate, drafted a will whereby the
husband was made sole beneficiary. Upon this will being read over to her, in the forenoon,
the testatrix took exception to it because it ignored a promise, made to her father, that certain
property she had received from him should ultimately revert to members of her own family;

and she did not then execute it. Another will was drafted by the husband‟s brother to meet her
wishes, but, either on account of her drowsiness or because of the presence in her bedroom of
friends, including her sister, the plaintiff, the second will, though ready at noon, was not
presented to the testatrix for signature until late in the afternoon, when she attempted to sign
it, but the brother declared it worthless owing to the illegibility of the signature. On being told
of this opinion, the will read to her in the morning, or one similar in its contents, was
presented to her for signature and her husband offered to read it to her, but she declined to
have this done, saying that she had already heard it read and knew its contents; she then
signed it with her mark in presence of witnesses. The Supreme Court of Canada held against
the will, that the evidence failed to establish that the will in question expressed the true last
testamentary wishes of the testatrix and, consequently, that it should be set aside. On appeal
to the Privy Council;
Per VISCOUNT HALDANE
When once it is proved that a will has been executed with due solemnities by a person of
competent understanding and apparently a free agent, the burden of proving that it was
executed under undue influence rests on the party who alleges this.
There is no reason why a husband or a parent on whose part it is natural that he should do so,
may not put his claims before a wife or a child and ask for their recognition, provided the
person making the will knows what is being done. The persuasion must of course stop short
of coercion and the testamentary disposition must be made with comprehension of what is
being done.
He quoted Boyce v Rossborough (1856) where it was decided that in order to set aside the
will of a person of sound mind, it is not sufficient to show that the circumstances attending its
execution are consistent with hypothesis of its having been obtained by undue influence. It
must be shown that they are inconsistent with a contrary hypothesis.
Undue influence, in order to render a will void, must be an inference which can justifiably be
described by a person looking at the matter judicially to have caused the execution of a paper
pretending to express a testator‟s mind, but which really does not express his mind, but
something else which he did not really mean . .
It is also important in this connection to bear in mind that which was laid down by Sir James
Hannen in Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) it is not sufficient to establish that a person has the
power unduly to overbear the will of the testator. It must be shown that in the particular case
the power was exercised, and that it was by means of the exercise of that power that the will
was obtained.‟
HALL V HALL
The will was challenged for undue influence by alleging that the plaintiff had used violence
and made threats against the deceased. That therefore the will had been made in the
consequence of this for the sake of peace and quietness and did not express the deceased‟s
real testamentary intentions.

Court rejected the will on probate and held that to make a will a man must be a free agent but
all influences are not unlawful. That influence of a mistress to induce a will in the absence of
coercion does not amount to undue influence.
Per SIR JP WILDE
“Even a reprehensible placing of pressure on a testator will not always be undue influence so
as to avoid the will. To make a good will a man must be a free agent. But all influences are
not unlawful. Persuasion appeals to the affections or ties of kindred, to a sentiment of
gratitude for past services or pity for future destitution or the like – these are all legitimate
and may fairly be pressed on a testator. On the other hand, pressure of whatever character
whether acting on the fears or hopes if so exerted as to overpower the volition without
convincing the judgement is a species of restraint under which no valid will can be made.
Importunity or threats such as the testator has no courage to resist, moral command asserted
and yielded to for the sake of peace and quiet, or of escaping from distress of mind or social
discomfort, these if carried to a degree in which the free play of the testator’s judgement,
discretion or wishes is overborne will constitute undue influence though no force is either
used or threatened. In a word a testator may be led but not driven and his will must be the
offspring of his own volition and not the record of someone else’s”.
Undue influence is common in confidential relationships, particularly those of a religious

nature. In Parfitt vs. Lawless (1872) LR 2 P & D 462 the testatrix left her residuary estate to a
Roman Catholic priest who was her confessor and who lived with her and her husband. It
was alleged that the confidential relationship between them gave rise to a presumption of
undue influence. It was held however that there was no positive evidence of undue influence.
RE HARDEN (1959 CYLB) 3448,
A testatrix left property to a spiritualist medium after he allegedly transmitted messages

„from the other side‟ to her as to what she should do with her property on death. The
messages were dictated to her and resulted in her executing two wills that made the medium a
substantial beneficiary of her estate. It was held that the medium had taken control of the
testator‟s mind to the extent that she had written what he wanted rather than the record of her
mind. The will was invalidated on the ground of undue influence
FRAUD
S.47 SA.A will made under fraud, coercion or importunity is void.
In Karanja and another vs. Karanja (2002) 2 KLR 22, held that the burden of proving that a
will was caused by fraud or coercion or importunity was on the person alleging the same.
WILKINSON v JOUGHIN 1866
A gift to a married woman who represented to the testator that she was free to marry him
while indeed her marriage with another man was still subsisting was held to be fraudulent and
so it was omitted from probate.
SANYU LWANGA v SAM GALIWANGO

the respondent applied for letters of administration claiming that the deceased left no will.
The appellant sought to revoke the letters of administration granted to the respondent on
ground that the deceased had left a will in which she was named a beneficiary and that the
respondent was fraudulent,
HELD; S.233(1)(2)(b) Succession Act provides that a grant may be revoked where it was
obtained fraudulently by making a false statement. There was evidence that the deceased left
a will which fact the respondent was privy to. By making a false allegation to the effect that
the deceased left no will, the grant of the said letters was obtained by fraud and had to be
revoked.
MISTAKE
The knowledge and approval of the testator may be absent because of a mistake on the part of
the testator or of a person employed by him to draft the will. The mistake may relate to part
or whole of the will. A mistake relating to the whole will renders it invalid, while a partial
mistake may be corrected or otherwise that portion of the will revoked.
In the Goods of Hunt (1875) LR P & D 250 the mistake related to the whole will. A woman
living with the sister prepared two wills in similar terms for their respective execution. By
mistake, she executed the will of the sister rather than the will she had prepared for her own.
Probate of the will was not granted on the grounds that the woman would not have executed
the will had she known it had the content of the will she had drawn up to her sister. She was
deemed to have died intestate.
IN THE GOODS OF BOEHM (1891) P 247
A testator gave instructions for the preparation of a will to his unmarried daughters Georgiana
and Florence. The conveyance prepared the will and mistakenly inserted the name Georgiana
in both clause of the will relating to gifts to the unmarried daughters and omitted the name
Florence altogether. Court held that the will was valid as it could be understood from the
reading despite the mistake of not including the second name.
Jeune J stated „mistake is to be regarded as a question of fact and there is no difficulty in

striking out a clause or a single word if shown to have been inserted by mistakes.
EXECUTION OF A WILL
IN THE GOODS OF COLES
The deceased executed in the presence of two witnesses a paper, which commenced „i have
given all that i have to A an ]d her two sons.‟ It contained directions in what way the
deceased desired his property to be distributed but without any reference to his death. There
was evidence that he executed this as his will.
HELD; where a paper is intended by the testator to take effect after his death, it will be
admitted to probabte whatever maybe its form. The paper was held to be testamentary.

This case followed cock v cooke
COCK v COOKE
The deceased left a paper in the following words; „i wish my sister to have my bank book for
her own use‟. She told a friend that she wanted to make a will in favour of her sister. After
writing out the paper a second witness was called in and it was executed. The plaintiff gave
evidence that the deceased made declarations to the effect that she wished her to have the
money in the bank after her death.
HELD; it is undoubted law that whatever maybe the form of a duly executed instrument, if
the person executing it intends that it shall not take effect until after his death and it is
dependent upon his death for its vigour and effect, it is testamentary. The very nature of the
transaction points to her intention that the paper should only take effect in the event of her
death an event which both she and her sister considered certain and imminent. The paper was
testamentary and not a present deed of gift.
SIGNATURE
IN THE ESTATE OF COOK
The deceased made a holograph will which commenced with the words „i Emma Cook
declare this to be my last will‟ and then set out her testamentary dispositions in the presence
of two witnesses, the deceased wrote the words „your loving mother‟ at the foot of the
document and the witnesses duly attested the same.
Whether the will was signed?
Court referred to in the Goods of Sperling where the deceased having signed his will in the
presence of a servant, the servant described himself as @servant of Mr. Sperling@ not
writing his name or giving any further identification. This was held to be sufficient attestation
and subscription.
In Baker v Dening, court held that where a party makes a mark to be a signature instead of
writing his name, it is sufficient signing.
HELD; the words „your loving mother‟ were meant to represent the name of Emma Cook
hence constituted sufficient signature.
WITNESSES
BURTON v NEWBERRY
A testator made a will bequeathing property to 12 beneficiaries including A and B in 1837.

He then made a first codicil in 1838 bequeathing property to the same beneficiaries as the
first will. However this codicil was attested by A and B. He then made a second codicil
described as a codicil to his will of 1837 and the testator died shortly thereafter.
Whether the second codicil republished the first codicil?

HELD; any gift by a testamentary instrument to attesting witnesses and certain persons such
as wives and husbands of attesting witnesses is void.
If a testator makes a testamentary disposition containing a gift to the attesting witness, the
attesting witness takes nothing under it but the will is duly attested.
The second codicil did not operate as a republication of the first codicil. A codicil which
refers to a will of a particular date and does not refer to a subsequent codicil does not operate
as a republication of that subsequent codicil and accordingly the gifts to A and B under the
first codicil failed and that these shares fell into the residue and were divisible between A and
B and the other 10 legatees.
Where a will has been amended, the alterations must be attested to like any other will for it to
affect the original will.
IN RE WHITE
The testator wishing to alter his duly executed will, proposed alterations to the defendant who
wrote them on the manuscript of the original will. He then handed the will to the testator who
added at the end of the last page, „Alterations to will dated 14 December 1984‟ whereupon
the defendant and another witness added their signatures. The testator‟s original signature
duly witnessed by different witnesses at the time when the will and originally been made
remained on the page but he did not sign the will again after the alterations had been made.
The testator died the following year.
HELD; an alteration in a duly executed will made after the execution thereof is not effective
unless the alteration is executed in a manner required by law for the execution of the will.
Since none of the alterations to the original will had themselves been individually signed by
the testator or by two witnesses, they were invalid as alterations to the original will. The
amended will had not been signed by the testator and attested by two witnesses as required by
law and therefore invalid though the original will remained valid and could be admitted to
probate
Position of signature
The testator‟s signature must be placed at the foot or end of the will.
IN RE BEADLE
The will of the testatrix was dictated in the presence of her two executors. It was written on a
single piece of paper and signed by her and one of the executors in the top right hand corner.
The other executor did not sign. The testatrix then placed the paper in an envelope and wrote
on the front‟ “My last will and testament E.A Beadle to Charlie and Maysie (the
executors)”on the back of the envelope was written “we certify that the contents of this letter
were written in our presence” and both the executors signed. The sealed envelope was then
put away with the testatrix papers.
Whether the will was duly executed?

HELD
Since the words after the signature were inoperative by law, the sheet of paper was
insufficient as a will nor was it sufficient when taken with the envelope for the court was
satisfied that in writing her name on the front of it the testatrix meant her signature to be no
more than a label identifying the document when placed with other papers. That in any event
the signature on the front of the envelope was unattested and the signing on the back was
merely to record that both the executors were present when the will was signed and not to
give effect to the will. Accordingly the court would pronounce against the will.
This must be contrasted with the case of In the Goods of Mann where a testatrix made an
unsigned will which she placed in an envelope. On the envelope were the words „last will and
testament of J. Mann‟ followed by the signature of the testatrix and two other persons.
Probate was granted to the will since court found that the signature of the testatrix on the
envelope was intended to give effect to the will.
IN THE ESTATE OF BERCOVITZ
A will was made on a single sheet of paper at the top of which were the words „my last will
and testament‟ followed by an attestation clause followed by the signatures of the testator and
the two attesting witnesses. There followed various dispositions and the testator‟s signature
appeared again at the bottom of the sheet but without those of the attesting witnesses.
HELD;
Since on the facts the witnesses were not witnessing the lower signature at all, that was not an
effective signature properly attested in accordance with the law and nothing underneath the
top signature could be effective. The witnesses did not see the lower signature because it was
covered up and only saw the upper signature so that they were attesting that signature. No
signature gives effect to any disposition which is underneath or which follows it or any
disposition inserted after the signature has been made.
WOOD V SMITH 1991
The testator made a will commencing with the words, „my will by Percy Winterbone‟ but did
not sign it at the end after setting out the dispositions he wished to make. When the attesting
witnesses remarked on this he explained that he had signed will at the top and this sufficed
under the law.
HELD; That the signing of the testator‟s name at the top of the document and the dispositive
provisions were part of the same single operation and the signing was clearly intended to give
effect to the will as contemplated by the law as being valid.
The complimentary requirements of a signature and of an intention that the signature should
give effect to the will demanded a practical approach. A written name not being a normal
signature was capable of being a signature but that where a testamentary document was
signed before the dispositive provisions had been written, affirmative evidence was necessary

to show that a testator had intended the signature to give effect to the provisions. That by
writing his name and the dispositive provisions in one single operation, the deceased had
provided such evidence.
ATTESTATION;
The will must be signed and attested by two witnesses.
ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL V NORAH NAKIYAGA
The plaintiff applied to court for the determination of the validity of the wills that were in his
custody. One of the wills was not attested at all and the other though attested the witness
could neither be identified nor found.
HELD; the first will being signed by the deceased but not attested was invalid for the reason
that it was not attested as required by S.50 of the Succession Act. The second will could not
be relied on as its execution was not proved by one of the attesting witnesses as required by
the mandatory provision of sections 66 and 67 of the Evidence Act.
To qualify as a witness one must have seen the testator sign and that person must sign
the will.
BROWN V SKIRROW
The testatrix took her will to a shop to have it witnessed by the shop assistants W1 and W2.
The testatrix signed the will observed by W1 but W2 was busy serving a customer and paid
no heed when the testatrix signed it. W1 and W2 then attested the will.
HELD; the will was not attested on the ground that the testatrix did not sign in the presence
of W2 even though W2 had been in the room when the testatrix signed.
IN RE COLLIN G (1972)1 WLR 1440
The testator while a patient in hospital started to sign his will in presence of a nurse and
another patient both of whom he had asked to act as his witnesses. Before he had completed
his signature, the nurse left to attend to a patient elsewhere in the ward. During her absence
the testator completed her signature and the other patient who had been present during the
whole exercise signed as a witness in presence of the testator, when the nurse returned too,
the other patient and testator acknowledged their signatures to her and she signed as a
witness.
Whether the testator‟s signature complied with the law?
HELD; that a part of the testator‟s name which was subscribed before the nurse left was not
the signature of the testator nor was it a mark intended to represent the name and therefore
the signature did not comply with the law. It was essential that the testator should have signed
the will or acknowledged his signature before either of them had attested and subscribed to
the document. Witnessing part signature is not attestation.

This is however different from where the testator shorten his name. In the Goods of
Chalcraft 1948 the testator executed a codicil just before she died. Because she was so ill,
she could not complete her signature and what appeared on the codicil was „E‟chai‟. Court
held that this was a valid signature.
INCORPORATION OF DOCUMENTS
Where gifts are made by documents incorporated in the will, there must be in the will itself a
reference to the documents. However, words in the will and corresponding words on the
document may constitute sufficient incorporation.
IN THE ESTATE OF SAXTON
The plaintiff bank claimed probate as executors named in the last will of the deceased
contained in a dated paper writing and 4 other undated paper writings found therewith. The
defendant denied that the 4 paper writings found with the will were either duly executed or
incorporated by reference in the will and formed no part the will. Evidence showed that the
testator sat down to write his will at about 11am and continued up to 1.15pm when he
telephoned the defendant bank, for two witnesses to come to his house. The witnesses were
sent and the will duly executed and the document was placed in a drawer. About a month
later, when the testator was seriously ill, this drawer was taken up to his bedroom and the
testator took from it two documents which he put into an envelope. After his death, the actual
will was found to be of no dispositive effect (contained no disposition of property at all). It
contained an appointment of executors and then proceeded as follows; “I give and
bequeath..to the following persons”. There was found with the will a number of lists (the 4
papers referred to hereinbefore) with the statement; “I wish to leave the following amounts..”
Whether the lists are sufficiently identified and referred to by the will?
HELD.
The body of the will contains no disposition of property at all if one excludes the lists. It is
only by incorporating the lists that the will has any dispositive effect. The words “the
following persons2 connotes some list of their names. The words 2I wish to leave the
following amounts” is sufficient to establish a cross reference between those words and the
words of the will.
In the circumstances of the case, it must be taken that the lists were intended to be part of the
will and the will and the lists were admitted to probate.
Where the will is executed in different pieces of paper stapled together
IN THE ESTATE OF LITTLE
A draft will consisting of 4 sheets of paper and a back sheet all stapled together were to the
deceased by his solicitor. The evidence as to the attestation was that on 21 November 1967,

the deceased placed a number of apparently unattached sheets of paper on a table with the
reverse of the back sheet on the top, wrote his own name some inches down the page and
caused the attesting witnesses to sign beneath. On the death, the will was retrieved from
deposit in a bank stapled together in the order in which they had been dispatched from the
solicitor.
HELD; even if there were no mechanical attachment of the separate sheets of the will at the
time of execution, the pressing of the sheets together by the deceased constituted a sufficient
nexus to produce a single testamentary document.
IN RE WHITE (Knight v Briggs)
By his will dated November 29 1922, the testator directed his trustees to hold three-
twentieths of his residue upon trust for his sister. By a codicil, which was in form a direction
to prepare a codicil, the testator instructed his solicitor Mr. Knight to settle bequest to his
sister as in a former will. The codicil was admitted to probate. However, the solicitor had in
his possession only one will of the testator dated October 29, 1920, in which the sister‟s share
was settled.
Which former will did the codicil refer to?
Held;
There was only one will by reference to which instructions to prepare a codicil could be
carried out; namely, the will dated October 29, 1920 in possession of the solicitor which was
identified as a former will.
MUTUAL WILLS
IN RE OLDHAM
A husband and wife made mutual wills in the same form in pursuance of an agreement so as
to make them, but there was no evidence of any further agreement in the matter. Each gave
his or her property to the other absolutely with the same alternative provisions in case of
lapse. The wife having survived and accepted her husband‟s property under his mutual will
subsequently married again, and made a fresh will ignoring the alternative provisions of her
own mutual will.
HELD; that in the circumstances there was no implied trust preventing the wife disposing of
her property as she pleased. Where there is no agreement not to revoke the will, a trust is not
created.
STONE V HOSKINS
A husband and wife agreed to make mutual wills under which the husband left all his
property to his wife while the wife had thereby left all her property to him. However the wife

secretly without notice to the husband and contrary to the said arrangement purported to
revoke her will and to make a fresh one whereby she progressively reduced the benefits to the
husband. The wife died first.
HELD; if two people made wills which were standing at the death of the first to die, and the
survivor had taken a benefit by that death, the survivor cannot depart from the arrangement
on his part, because by the death of the other party, the will of that party and the arrangement
have become irrevocable.
However where the first to die has not stood by the bargain, her mutual will has in
consequence not become irrevocable. The only object of notice is to enable the other party to
the bargain to alter his or her will also but the survivor in the present case is not in any way
prejudiced as he has notice as from the death.
It must be noted that in both Oldham and Hoskins though there were arrangements to make
mutual wills but there were no agreements not to revoke.
GRAY and Ors v PERPETUAL TRUST COMPANY
The husband and wife both made wills and these were contemporaneous. By the husband‟s
will he left all his property to trustees to pay income to his wife for life and the remainder for
their children. The will of the wife made on the same day appointed the respondent company
as trustees and executor and she also left all her property to her trustees to pay income to the
husband and on his death to their children. The husband died first and the wife took the
benefits conferred on her by his will and she later made another will which interfered with the
provisions of the earlier will and by her new will she bequeathed all her property to her
daughter.
Whether the simultaneous wills of the husband and wife were mutual wills that neither the
husband nor the wife could revoke without the assent of the other?
HELD; it is necessary to establish an agreement to make and not to revoke mutual wills,
some understanding or arrangement is insufficient without such a definite agreement there
can no more be a trust in equity than a right to damages at law.
The fact that a husband and wife have simultaneously made mutual wills giving each to the
other a life interest with similar provisions in remainder is not itself evidence of an
agreement not to revoke the wills in the absence of a definite agreement to that effect.
Therefore there is no implied trust precluding the wife from making a fresh will inconsistent
with her former will even though the husband has died and she has taken the benefits
conferred by his will.
IN RE DALE
In 1988 a husband and wife each executed identical wills. Each contained a bequest of all real
and personal property in favour of the testator‟s daughter and son in equal shares or the

survivor of them and appointed them as executors. Two months later, the husband died
without having altered or revoked his will and probate was granted. Later the wife made a
fresh will which revoked all her former wills and testamentary dispositions and gave the son
majority of the estate. The plaintiff issued a writ alleging that the mutual will had been made
and pursuant to and in consideration of a binding and irrevocable agreement and that on the
death of the husband the wife had become bound in equity to give effect to the agreement and
that as a consequence of revocation of the mutual will, the son held the property as a trustee.
Whether the application of the doctrine of mutual wills necessitated the second testator to die
to have obtained a personal benefit under the will of the first testator to die?
HELD;
The application of the doctrine of mutual wills required the parties to have entered into a
legally binding contract to make and not to revoke mutual wills and that the first testator to
die had performed his part of the agreement. That since the aim of the principle underlying
the doctrine was to prevent fraud on the first testator to die, it was not confined to cases in
which the surviving testator had benefited under the will of the first testator to die but
extended also to cases where the two testators had left their property to beneficiaries other
than themselves. Issue answered in the negative.
IN RE HAGGER
A husband and wife made a joint will whereby they left certain property which each
possessed at the time of the death of the spouse first dying to the survivor for life with certain
absolute remainders over and they agreed that the will should not be revoked without their
mutual consent. The wife died first and as from her death the husband received the income
from the whole estate. The husband died leaving everything to his executors upon trust to be
divided equally among various persons, several of whom were not mentioned in the joint
will.
HELD; that from the death of the wife the property of which the husband was then possessed
was subject to a trust under which the legatees in absolute remainder took vested interests
subject to the life interest of the husband.
Court applied Dufour v Pareira where Lord Camden held that; “ the instrument itself is
evidence of the agreement and he that dies first, does by his death carry the agreement on his
part into execution. If the other refuses he is guilty of fraud, can never unbind himself, and
becomes a trustee of course. For no man shall deceive another to his prejudice. By engaging
to do something that is in his power, he is made a trustee for the performance and transmits
that trust to those that claim under him.‟‟
Court therefore held that „Where there is a joint will, on the death of the first testator the
position as regards that part of the property which belongs to the survivor is that the survivor
will be treated as holding the property on trust to apply it so as to carry out the effect of the
joint will. If the survivor takes a benefit conferred on him by the joint will he will be treated

as a trustee and he will not be allowed to do anything inconsistent with the provisions of the
joint will.‟
IN RE GREEN
A testator and his wife made mutual wills in like terms in 1940. They then had little property
but were subject to a life interest, absolutely entitled in reversion to a substantial estate given
to them in equal shares or to the survivor if only one of them survived the tenant for life. The
wife agreed that if she survived the man and have use of all his property she would provide in
her will for the carrying out of the husband‟s wishes as expressed in his will and in
consideration of such promise by the husband, she agreed to leave all her property on the
husband‟s undertaking to provide for the carrying out of the terms of her will. In his will the
husband directed that his trustees should stand possessed of his residuary estate upon trust for
his wife if she survived him absolutely and if not, to divide into two equal moieties or half
shares held onto respective trusts. The wife died in 1942, her estate was succeeded to by the
testator. In 1943 the tenant for life died and the testator received the whole estate of the wife.
He remarried in 1945, made a second will devising a number of gifts to individuals and
charities some of which differed from the provisions of his first will, and he left his residue to
his second wife.
HELD
The effect of the mutual scheme entered into by the spouses, as expressed in the will, was
that the wife‟s moiety was impressed upon a trust binding on the testator while the testator‟s
moiety remained at his free disposition and accordingly that the estate must be divided into
two moieties one of which was to be distributed in accordance with the trusts in the first will
while the other was to be distributed in accordance with the terms of the second will.
The first will must take effect not as a will (had been revoked by marriage) but as evidence of
a trust which is plainly to be discerned in the two will.
REVOCATION
Revocation by marriage.
under S.56 every will shall be revoked by the marriage of the maker.
FARASIA RWABAGANDA V DONATO BAHEMURWABUSHA
The deceased had in 1964 got married to the defendant in church but they separated in 1965.
Though they were not legally divorced, the defendant never returned to the matrimonial home
till the death of the deceased. The deceased made a will in 1966 and in 1970 married the
plaintiff customarily.
Whether the will of 1966 was revoked by the marriage of 1970?

HELD;
A will is revoked by the marriage of the maker. The will of 1966 was revoked when the
deceased married the plaintiff in 1970 and being no subsequent will, the deceased would be
regarded as having died intestate.
A void marriage does not revoke a will
METTE V METTE 1859
The testator made a will during his marriage to his wife but shortly after her death, he married
her half sister. The marriage was held to be void ab initio because it fell within the prohibited
degree of affinity and therefore could not have revoked the earlier will which stood as valid.
Howver, a voidable marriage also revokes a will.
RE ROBERTS (1978) 3 ALL ER 225
In 1973 the deceased made a will under which the defendant was a beneficiary. The deceased
subsequently married the plaintiff. It was alleged that the deceased was suffering from senile
dementia at the time of marriage and that there was no valid marriage which could have
revoked the will.
HELD;
The fact that either party did not consent to the marriage in consequence of unsoundness of
mind merely made the marriage voidable and not void.
A marriage which was voidable always revoked an earlier of a party to the marriage whether
or not the marriage was subsequently annulled because annulment of a voidable marriage was
not retrospective in effect. Therefore there was a valid marriage for the purpose of revoking
any prior will.
The exception is that a will expressed to be made in contemplation of a marriage shall not
be revoked by the solemnization of the marriage contemplated.
PILOT v GAINFORT
The testator, being married to a woman who had left him some years before and had not been
heard of, bequeathed the whole of his estate to a woman with whom he was living and whom
he described as his wife in the will though she was not his wife at the date of the will. Shortly
afterwards he married the woman in question, relying on the legal presumption of the death
of his wife.
Whether solemnization of marriage revokes an earlier will made in contemplation of that

marriage?

HELD; That the marriage was prima facie valid and that the will was expressed to be made in
contemplation of it, and was accordingly not revoked by the marriage. Therefore the
solemnization of marriage does not revoke a will made in contemplation of that marriage.
IN THE ESTATE OF LANGSTON
The testator was a widower who executed a will bequeathing property to his fiancée Edith as
sole beneficiary and appointed her as sole executrix. 2 months after executing the will, he
married her.
Whether a will with the expression unto my fiancée is a will expressed to be in contemplation
of marriage?
HELD
The test is; did the testator express the fact that he was contemplating marriage to a particular
person?
Court cited Sallis V Jones where the expression used was that “this will is made in
contemplation of marriage. Court rejected the expression because it did not refer to a
particular marriage.
Court also cited In Re Knight where by his will a testator gave all his estate to “E.L.B my
future wife” and thereafter married E.L.B and it was held that the will was not revoked by
that marriage.
Court held that in this case when the testator used the words “unto my fiancée Edith”, he was
expressing a contemplation of marriage to that named lady. Relying of Re Knight as an
authority court held that there is no difference between “my future wife” and “my fiancée”
and the will was therefore not revoked by the subsequent marriage.
A covenant not to revoke a will does not relate to revocation of a will as a matter of law.
IN RE MARSLAND;
The testator and his wife entered into a deed of separation and the husband made a covenant
not to revoke certain provisions in his will. His wife died and the husband remarried. It was
HELD that the covenant not to revoke his will was on its true construction confined to acts of
revocation performed as such by the testator but does not extend to where revocation follows
as a matter of law whether the testator wishes it or not.
Revocation of a will by another will or codicil. S.57
Such codicil can only have effect if executed in like manner as required for the execution of
the will;

IN RE WHITE
The testator wishing to alter his duly executed will, proposed alterations to the defendant who
wrote them on the manuscript of the original will. He then handed the will to the testator who
added at the end of the last page, „Alterations to will dated 14 December 1984‟ whereupon
the defendant and another witness added their signatures. The testator‟s original signature
duly witnessed by different witnesses at the time when the will and originally been made
remained on the page but he did not sign the will again after the alterations had been made.
The testator died the following year.
HELD; an alteration in a duly executed will made after the execution thereof is not effective
unless the alteration is executed in a manner required by law for the execution of the will.
Since none of the alterations to the original will had themselves been individually signed by
the testator or by two witnesses, they were invalid as alterations to the original will. The
amended will had not been signed by the testator and attested by two witnesses as required by
law and therefore invalid though the original will remained valid and could be admitted to
probate.
A general clause in a will revoking all former wills, revokes all existing former wills.
SOTHERAN V DENING
A married woman having a general power of appointment by will over real estate executed a
will appointing the estate in favour of the plaintiff. After the death of her husband, she made
another will revoking all former wills and containing a general devise and bequest of all her
real and personal estate. She afterwards made a third will also revoking all former wills and
bequeathing her personal estate but not devising or appointing her real estate. She had no real
estate except that subject to her power of appointment of which in default the estate would go
to the respondent and her heirs.
Whether the third will revoked the first will?
HELD;
That the testamentary appointment under the first will was revoked by the second will and the
second will by the third and that the real estate went as in default of appointment.
The execution of another will is sufficient to revoke a former will. A revocation when it is
clear in words, has the effect of revoking all former wills just as if they had never existed.
Where the revocation clause is not clear, the will is not revoked.
SIMPSON V FOXON
A testator in 1898 executed a will disposing of all his property and appointing his daughter
executrix. In 1903 he duly executed a document on a printed form commencing “this is the
last and only will of me” whereby he bequeathed the proceeds of an insurance policy and

appointed an executor. In 1905, he duly executed a further document described a s codicil to
the “last will” whereby he made certain bequests and appointed other executors.
Whether the words “last and only will” revoked the will of 1898?
HELD;
That words “last and only” in the intermediate document did not preclude the admission to
probate of all three documents.
Per Sir George Barnes; the words the “last and only will” would not revoke a former will, if
not inconsistent with it. It is necessary to see what are the provisions in the last will and if
these provisions are inconsistent with those in the earlier document it may be that the later
revokes the earlier one. But it does not necessarily follow that it always will do so if the two
documents can stand properly together.
Revocation by writing
RE SPARKLANS ESTATE
A letter signed by a testatrix and duly attested was made to revoke a will. in this letter the
testatrix requested her will to be destroyed by the bank manager who had express possession
of it. It was held that the letter effected a valid revocation of the will since it had been duly
executed.
Revocation by destruction.
The act of destruction must be carried out by the testator himself or by another person in his
presence and by his direction.
IN RE GOODS OF DADDS
The testatrix shortly before his death desired to revoke a codicil to his will. The codicil was
brought to her room and she asked for it to be burnt but there was no fire in the bedroom. The
codicil was then taken to another room and burnt in the absence of the testatrix. HELD; that
the codicil was not effectively revoked by destruction as it was destroyed in the absence of
the testatrix.

Similarly in the Estate of De Kremer, where the testator instructed his solicitor by telephone
to destroy his will and the solicitor did so in the absence of the testator, court held that no
revocation was done.
GILL V GILL
The testator‟s will was torn up by the testator‟s wife is a fit of anger in the presence of the
testator but without his direction. Court held that the will was not revoked.
Conditional Revocation
IN RE JONES
The testatrix made a will devising a small holding to the plaintiff and her sister. Shortly
before her death she told the bank manager that she had decided to leave the property to the
children of her nephew instead of her nieces. She then went to her solicitor‟s office but the
solicitor was not available to take her instructions that day and before he was able to do so the
testatrix died. After her death the will was found mutilated, a piece having been cut off
which had contained on one side most of the specific bequests including that of the small
holding and on the other side the testatrix‟s signature and the attestation.
Whether the testatrix mutilated the will with an intention of revoking it? Whether the doctrine
of dependent relative revocation applied?
HELD; a mere intention to make a new will at the time of mutilation or destruction of an
existing will was not enough of itself to make the testator‟s revocatory intention conditional
on the subsequent execution of a new will. That the correct inference to be drawn from the
facts was that in mutilation of her will, the testatrix had intended to achieve its revocation
forthwith not being content that it should depend on the making of a new will.
NB. If the revocation was conditional upon execution of a new will, then without such
execution, there would be no revocation by mutilation.

Family Law Cases On Wills and Children

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WELFARE PRINCIPLE;

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

IN THE MATTER OF IREN NAJJUMA, AN INFANT

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION OF JANE NAMUKASA AN INFANT

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL (AN INFANT)

IN THE MATTER OF DEBORAH JOYCE ALITUBEERA and IN THE MATTER OF

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

IN THE MATTER OF NAMUGERWA JOYCE

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

IN THE MATTER OF ROSETTE KANYUNYUZI

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

concerned that an abrupt change in environment, feeding, company and circumstances of a

give away their children.

IN THE MATTER OF MATHIAS MUTEBI AN INFANT

PER EGONDA NTENDE;

the child by way of a care order.‟

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ROXANE TURNER AND JOYCE

PULKERIA NAKAGGWA V DOMINICO KIGGUNDU

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

RWABUHEMBA TIM MUSINGUZI v HARRIET KAMAKUME

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

NAKALULE CHRISTINE v KAKOOZA HERBERT

In his judgement the judge stated

The Magistrate concluded as follows:-

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

KIRUNGI DOREEN v MUGABE RONALD

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

NTANDA v KAYEMBA 2008 HCB 116

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

Parents has the responsibility to maintain their children.

KIRUNGI DOREEN V MUGABE

This was held in JULIAN GALTON FENZI v NABBOSA NATASHA MARIE

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

IN THE MATTER OF MIREMBE NANSAMBA CLARE (A MINOR)

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

IN THE MATTER OF PETER SSEBULIBA ALIAS NAMANSA JAMES

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

PER Irene Mulyagonja Kakooza

On welfare the judge quoted;

“Paramount consideration”, as Lord Mac Dermott continued, means a consideration which

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

Adoption order was set aside.

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

MENTAL OR TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

HARWOOD v. BAKER (1840) 3 Moo PC 282

BATTAN SINGH v ARMICHAND

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

WOODS V SMITH 1993 CH 90

IN RE BOHRMANN’S ESTATE (1938) 1 ALL ER 24

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

WINGROVE v WINGROVE; 1885

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

Per VISCOUNT HALDANE

FERDINANDIUS VIVA CHRISTO REY AMDG

Per SIR JP WILDE

Undue influence is common in confidential relationships, particularly those of a religious

RE HARDEN (1959 CYLB) 3448,

A testatrix left property to a spiritualist medium after he allegedly transmitted messages

S.47 SA.A will made under fraud, coercion or importunity is void.