Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A GIS STUDY
Lancaster University
Department of History
August 2020
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………p. 8
The Bombings on Southern Italy – 1940 -1942. Incessant Raids on the South……………………………p. 35
The Bombings on Italy – October 1942 – September 1943. Bombings All Over the Country….……p. 43
The Bombings on Italy - September 1943 – April 1945. Bombs on the Wehrmacht And Bombs on the
Civilians……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……………………..p. 55
The Air War and Turin. Why Was Turin a Relevant Target?............................................................p. 59
The Bombings on Turin. The First Phase - June 1940 – September 1941….…………………………………p. 73
The Bombings on Turin. The Area Bombing Phase - November 1942 – August 1943…………………p. 90
The Bombings on Turin. The Final Phase - September 1943 – April 1945……………………………………p.106
Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………..…………………………………………..p. 111
Appendix A………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………..p.159
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………p. 221
1
List of Abbreviations
AF – Air Force
Aa - Armée de l’Air
Raf Nasaf - Royal Air Force 205° Group - Northwest African Strategic Air Force
Raf Maaf - Royal Air Force 205° Group - Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Raaf Maaf - Royal Australian Air Force - Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
9th Usaaf – 9th Air Force – United States Army Air Force
12th Usaaf – 12th Air Force – United States Army Air Force
2
Introduction
The topic of the bombing war on Italy during the Second World War has been largely ignored by the
Italian historiography for many decades. Until the beginning of the new millennium, the only studies
were made during the 1970s by Giorgio Bonacina and were concentrated on the debate about the
evolution of the Allies bombing strategies on Italy1. These studies were focused on a “high-
perspective” with little to no attention on the “low-perspective” of the Italian society involved in
the bombing war. Among the reasons why the topic has been mostly ignored by Italian historians,
we can state that the subject in Italy, as the wider topic of the Second World War, was object of
a general collective removal both because of the weight of the responsibilities of the conflict and
the support that people gave to the fascist regime, and the difficulties in re-elaborating a collective
memory concerning painful events suffered by the civil population during the war.
From the 1990s the Italian historiography showed a renovated interest in the topic and produced
From the 2000s, Italian historians started publishing some monographs about the bombing war on
Italy. These monographs had a general and national angle, concentrating on both the debate about
the bombing strategies, considering the most updated literature, and the impact on the civil
population. These new researches were able to demonstrate the link between the bombing
1
Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al 1945 (Milano: Mursia,
1970); Giorgio Bonacina, Comando bombardieri operazione Europa. L'offensiva aerea strategica degli
alleati nella seconda guerra mondiale (Milano: Longanesi, 1975).
2
An example is the Naples case study by Gabriella Gribaudi, Guerra totale. Tra bombe alleate e violenze naziste.
Napoli e il fronte meridionale 1940-44 (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2005).
3
campaign and the end of the fascist regime, as well as the ultimate Italian surrender of 1943 3.
Moreover, these monographs shed some light on the “low-perspective” of the civil population that
suffered the bombing campaign. On this aspect, these studies and especially the most recent ones,
were able to demonstrate that the reactions to the bombings were multifaceted, ranging from
panic, desperation, social indifference, increase of criminality and collapse of social assistance to
These studies claimed that a combination of aspects (military, social-economic and political) led
to the end of the fascist regime and to the surrender of Italy in 1943, and not only the bombing
Overall, the Italian historiography which was able to rebuild the history of the bombing war on Italy
by the 2000s, showed that further researches on the topic have to avoid the risk of abstraction and
have to be made taking into account the more vast social, political and military context where the
If the topic of the bombing war on Italy has started having a space among the Italian historiography
from the 2000s and so quite recently, the British historiography has dedicated even less attention
to it.
The only studies that we have are the monograph edited by Richard Overy, Andrew Knapp and
Claudia Baldoli published in 2011, the monograph edited by Andrew Knapp and Claudia Baldoli
3
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate l'Italia. Storia della guerra di distruzione aerea 1940-1945 (Milano:
Rizzoli, 2007); Marco Patricelli, L'Italia sotto le bombe. Guerra aerea e vita civile 1940-1945 (Roma: Laterza, 2007);
Nicola Labanca (edited by), I bombardamenti aerei sull'Italia. Politica, Stato e società (1939-1945) (Bologna: Il Mulino,
2012).
4
Claudia Baldoli, Andrew Knapp, Richard Overy (edited by), Bombing, States and People in Western Europe 1940 1945
(London: Continuum, 2011); Claudia Baldoli, Andrew Knapp, Forgotten Blitzes: France and Italy Under Allied Air Attack,
1940-1945 (London: Continuum, 2011); Richard Overy, The Bombing War. Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane,
2013).
4
These publications have been able to shed some light on the topic using British archival material,
but they are not entirely focused on that topic. They devote just some chapters to it.
With regard to what will be our case of study, the topic of the bombing war conducted on the city
of Turin has received attention by the Italian historiography from the 1990s.
We must mention the works of the historian Giovanni De Luna. De Luna focused his research on the
broader topic of the impact of the war on Turin and so the bombing war represents a part of his
research5.
From the 2000s the historians who produced the already mentioned monographs that rebuilt the
topic from a “national angle”, as predictable devoted some parts of their researches to Turin, since
the city was one of the main targets. From these publications we are able to know the bombing
patterns and variables related to Turin, as well as some aspects of the “low-perspective”, such as
the creation of the shelters and the role of the National Corps of the Firefighters.
The topic of the public shelters has been quite recently faced by Paolo Bevilacqua in his monograph
The history of the Firefighters involved in the bombings on Turin has been studied by Michele Sforza
in his monograph published for the first time in 1998 7. This monograph, which rebuilds once more
the effects of the bombings from a broader perspective, rebuilds also the history of the Firefighters
during the war and the assistance they devoted to the civil population hit by the raids, exalting their
work and considering also the city of Turin, though not as the central research theme.
5
Giovanni De Luna, Torino in guerra: La ricerca di un'esistenza collettiva, in L'Italia in guerra, 1940-43, ed. by Bruno
Micheletti and Pier Paolo Poggio (Brescia: Fondazione Luigi Micheletti, 1992); Giovanni De Luna, Torino in guerra, in
Nicola Tranfaglia (edited by), Storia di Torino. Dalla grande guerra alla guerra di liberazione, 1915 – 1945 (Torino:
Einaudi, 1998).
6
Paolo Bevilacqua, I rifugi antiaerei di Torino (Bologna: Paolo Emilio Persiani, 2018).
7
Michele Sforza, La città sotto il fuoco della guerra: la tragedia delle città italiane e l'impegno dei vigili del fuoco nella
seconda guerra mondiale (Torino: Allemandi, 1998).
5
Other publications with a more journalistic angle, dedicated to the bombings on Turin, are the ones
There is little sign of use of the GIS in the topic of the bombings on Italy. The only works are one
that was made with the purpose of mapping the bombing damages inflicted to relevant artistic
treasures and monuments throughout Italy9. The other one was a case of study written to show the
relationship between the topography and the bombings in Emilia-Romagna, an Italian region.
As for Turin, there is evidence of maps created with GIS that show the intensity of the damages to
buildings caused by the bombings, but not published studies with the use of GIS.
In conclusion, it is only quite recently that this topic has found a space in the Italian historiography
and there is evidence of even less attention dedicated to it by the British historiography. Moreover,
there is no sign of the use of the GIS in order to rebuild the history of the bombings on the peninsula
from a broader perspective and to analyse the bombings spatial variables and their impact. In
addition, there is no sign at all of the use of the GIS in order to map the bombings on the city of
Turin and to make a spatial reflection about the location of the bombings, taking into account the
The value of this work would be to offer a GIS based research about the bombings on Italy and with
a particular focus to the bombings on Turin in order to see whether the GIS will be able to show
aspects that it is not possible to visualise without it and possibly to see whether there will be further
research paths to follow using the GIS and the spatial perspective angle.
8
Pier Luigi Bassignana, Torino sotto le bombe nei rapporti inediti dell'aviazione alleata (Torino: Edizioni del Capricorno,
2012); Pier Luigi Bassignana, Torino in guerra: la vita quotidiana dei torinesi ai tempi delle bombe (Torino: Edizioni del
Capricorno, 2013).
9
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=35aa692ea02e47b799ece77b79121a35&webmap=3f94
301451664db6a0cde15711a1aa0d
6
The main purpose of this dissertation is to utilise the GIS in order to make a spatial analysis of the
bombing war. The first purpose is to create several maps that will take into account the bombing
I believe that the GIS visualization of the “full picture” of the bombings on Italy will allow me to
make a spatial reflection about the bombing variables and possibly to highlight aspects that without
In particular, I believe that the GIS will allow me to visualise the spreading of the bombings on the
peninsula in order to make spatial considerations about the most bombed places and the
relationship between the number of bombings and casualties. These maps will be made considering
the bombing patterns and the evolution of the bombing strategies and so they will return a picture
Another spatial variable that the GIS will allow me to display is related to the bombers range.
Utilising the buffer maps, that the GIS allows to create, I will be able to display the relationship
between the bombers range capacity with the places where the bombings occurred. It will be
interesting to compare the bombers range for missions from England that had as main target
Northern Italy, with the missions from Malta, that normally had as main target Southern Italy.
Another interesting spatial variable that I will try to visualise is related to some raids performed in
Southern Italy by 1941, that are “the target of opportunity missions” and the “nuisance raids”. These
types of missions had different bombing patterns and changed some of the bombing manners. The
GIS will allow me to visualise this type of raids, so that I will be able to compare them with the other
In order to create the broader maps of the bombings on Italy, I will utilise the Italian secondary
literature related to the topic and, in particular, monographs which are able to provide me all the
information that I will need, such as the location of the raids, their dates, the number and type of
7
bombers involved, the casualties and, when possible, any additional information about the raids
After the GIS explorations that I will make with the broader maps of the bombings on Italy, I will
I believe that focusing on a case of study will allow me to make more accurate spatial reflections
I will focus my dissertation on the specific case of study of the city of Turin. Turin, as one of the most
industrialized cities in Italy and among the most populated cities of the country, was, during the
whole war, one of the main bombing targets for the Allies.
Firstly, I will try to display the bombings on Turin accurately with the GIS. This will allow me to
visualise exactly where the bombs fell during the raids and so I will be able to visualise bombing
clusters and I will be able to see whether the bombing patterns matched with the actual result of
the raids. This will lead to a spatial reflection about the real effectiveness of the bombings and their
“real impact” on the city. In order to do that, I will utilise sources from the National Corps of the
Firefighters archive. The documentation produced by the firefighters, and in particular the reports
of their interventions during and after the raids, allows to know accurately where the bombs fell,
since in every report is reported the accurate location of their interventions with some additional
information such as the nature of their interventions, that allow to have a better understanding of
8
Part I
9
The Bombing Strategies: The Precision Bombing
From the beginning of the Second World War the British Bomber Command experienced an
animated debate about which bombing strategy was to be preferred in order to perform the
bombing missions.
Initially, the Bomber Command Chief, Sir Edgard Ludlow-Hewitt, agreed with the Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain that the bombings should exclude any involvement of the civil population,
even though conducted against military targets, with a perspective of a chivalric war to be fought in
The situation changed drastically when the Germans performed the bombing of Rotterdam on 14th
May 1940 in the meanwhile of the offensive against the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The
infamous Luftwaffe bombing was conducted without care towards the city centre and towards the
civil population. From that moment, the new British cabinet lead by Winston Churchill, authorised
the new Bomber Command Chief, Sir Charles Portal, who from 6th April 1940 had substituted Sir
Edgard Ludlow-Hewitt, to be more unscrupulous and to consider hitting any strategic-military target
The new strategy of the “precision bombing” represented certainly a step forward for the Bomber
Command, but the enormous difficulties that the British pilots faced while performing daylight
bombings against German cities, with losses between 20% and 50% due to the efficient German
anti-air defensive system, forced the Bomber Command to start performing only night bombing
missions which were safer, but far less accurate. During the night it was extremely difficult for the
bombers to spot the targets because the navigation system, dead reckoning, was very rudimental,
10
and, while during daylight missions it could have a precision of 40%, during night missions it simply
The Bomber Command did not have even the proper bombers to perform other types of bombings.
From the beginning of the conflict there were four types of bombers which constituted the strength
of the Bomber Command: the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley MK, the Vickers Wellington, the
Handley Page Hampden (which never operated on Italy) and the Bristol Blenheim.
The Whitley MK. 5, on service by 1937, and that was used to bomb Italy, was a bomber with a
maximum speed of 309 Km/h, an autonomy of almost 3.900 Km and had a cargo capacity of 8.000
pounds. It had a remarkable autonomy if we consider that it was a two-engine airplane. Not less
than 1.824 units were produced by 1943, when the production was suspended. The Vickers
Wellington was a two-engine bomber with a maximum speed of 402 Km/h, an autonomy of 5.150
km and was able to carry on 4.500 pounds of bombs. It was produced in not less than 11.461 units.
It was a very versatile aircraft used for multiple roles. The Bristol Blenheim was a very small bomber
with only three men of crew and was used especially for tactical bombings11. It is important to bear
in mind that all these airplanes were medium bombers, able to perform the strategic bombing, but
lacking the proper capacities to perform well for long-distance missions and to perform area
bombing missions, a particular type of bombing mission that the Bomber Command will start to
carry out by 1942, making the most of two years of bombings experience and utilising a new
The operative difficulties faced by the British bombers performing night mission precision bombings,
along with the objective limits of the aircraft they had, cannot prevent us to claim that the precision
10 Richard Overy, La Strada della vittoria. Perché gli Alleati hanno vinto la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna: Il Mulino,
2002), p. 161.
11 Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al 1945 (Milano: Mursia, 1970),
pp. 11-17.
11
bombing resulted in a failure. It will take two years for the Bomber Command to admit this failure.
It will be necessary to wait for the Butt report. The Butt report, written in September 1941 (it took
its name from the chief of a commission appointed to study the results of the Bomber Command),
analysing a sample of 650 photos about 100 raids conducted on 18 targets, will show the failure of
the precision bombing and will force the Bomber Command to elaborate a new bombing strategy12.
Nevertheless, from 1940 until 1942 the precision bombing was the only possible bombing strategy
12 Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia. Storia della guerra di distruzione aerea 1940-1945 (Milano:
Rizzoli, 2007), p. 109.
12
The Bombings on Northern Italy – 1940 – 1942. The Slight Phase
On the 10th June 1940 Mussolini decided to declare war to Great Britain and France. Mussolini’s
decision to end the non-belligerency grew up after the clamorous successes that Germany was
obtaining against the Allies in France. Despite Mussolini was aware about the fact the country was
not ready for a long-term war, he believed that once France had surrendered, Great Britain,
remained alone, would have signed soon a white peace with the Axis power. This certainty would
have “obligated” Italy to a short-term war participation and so the Italian military lack of preparation
The Italian population received the news with indifference, despite the regime propaganda had
spent many years in preparing the population to the war with a progressive collective militarisation
of the civil society, fostered by a warmongering propaganda dressed with imperial ambitions.
The beginning of the hostility corresponded to the beginning of the bombings on the Italian
peninsula.
Except for some missions conducted by French bombers until 24th June 1940, during the first two
years of war the country was bombed exclusively by the British. Northern Italy was reached by the
British Bomber Command bombers which were not able to perform over Bologna, as the city
As it is possible to observe with the following map made with the GIS, the RAF bases location
actually allowed the bombers to perform even further than Bologna and almost until Rome. But we
must consider that the ideal bombers range, represented in the map, was not the real bombers
range. This because when performing over Northern Italy, the bombers were affected by
13
circumstances which influenced the range such for example the carriage of the bombs and the fly
What it is certain, anyway, is that the bombers performed on Livorno and Porto Marghera, places
which were located at a greater distance than Bologna and which are part of the range represented
in the map, but which probably were considered more interesting as targets.
14
15
For the first two years of war, from June 1940 until October 1942, Northern Italy was bombed by
bombers taking off from bases located in Northern England and in particular in the Yorkshire. The
choice of the targets, during this phase, was focused on military targets and, in particular, aeronautic
factories, refineries and fuel deposits of the main Northern Italian cities such as Turin, Milan, Genoa,
but even Trieste, Livorno, Savona, Brescia and Vado 13. The missions were made with the precision
bombing strategy that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, implicated several problems.
The first problem that the British bombers had to face while performing missions on Northern Italy
was represented by the journey itself. As mentioned before, the RAF bombers were used to take off
from bases situated in the Yorkshire, then, after a journey of over than 1.000 Km which included
crossing the occupied France with the nearly certainty of been spotted by both the fearsome
German anti-aircraft and German fighters, the bombers had to cross the Alps. The crossing of the
Alps represented the greatest obstacle for the missions on Northern Italy. The mountain chain
showed itself to the British pilots as a gigantic natural barrier. Passing through the Alps meant, for
safety reasons, to go up to an altitude of 5.000 to 6.000 metres. At those altitudes there were
numerous problems caused mainly by the cold. Firstly, the cockpits were not pressurised, and this
forced the members of the crew to reach the end of the oxygen tanks that were not always
functioning. Moreover, at those altitudes there are frequent precipitations that made the flight
unpleasant and not exempted of risks. The greatest nightmare of the members of the crew was
constituted by the cold and the ice. It was quite frequent that parts of the plane froze themselves,
especially near the wings or the engines; moreover, the ice caused many problems to the on-board
equipment, to the hydraulic systems, to the sighting system and to the bomb hold doors. Even the
13 Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia. Storia della guerra di distruzione aerea 1940-1945 (Milano:
Rizzoli, 2007), p. 98.
16
crews were not spared by the cold, some degree of protection was offered by their good quality suit
but, at those altitudes the temperatures could drop even to minus 40 degrees 14.
Moreover, many missions resolved in partial or total failure because of the difficulty of spotting the
right targets in the darkness. Many times, the bombers mistook the cities or wandered in order to
find alternative targets and eventually they were forced to drop the bombs randomly in order to
The map below shows the bombings on Northern Italy performed by the Bomber Command on the
correct targets. As it is possible to observe, the targets, when they were correctly spotted, were
concentrated on some key areas such as the Italian industrial triangle composed by Turin, Genoa
and Milan. Some other bombings were performed against Porto Marghera, a port and industrial
district close to Venice and on Savona and Vado Ligure, both ports and industrial districts not far
from Genoa.
Between 13th August 1940 and 12th January 1941, Turin was attacked ten times (13th and 26th
August, 5th September, 19th October, 8th, 23rd, 26th November, 4th December, 11th and 12th January),
Milan six times (13th, 15th, 18th, 24th, 26th August, 18th December), Genoa two times (2nd and 11th
December), Porto Marghera three times (20th October, 21st December and 12th January), even
though only the last time the planes were able to spot the targets and to cause some damages to
some ships15. After January 1941, the RAF bombers will bomb again Turin and Genoa on 9 th
September 1941 and Genoa again on 20th September 1941, and then no longer until October 1942.
In the first twenty-seven months of war the most significant missions are no more than thirty-five
were frequent bombings even on wrong places, as showed in the following map.
The map shows the mistaken bombed places. It is interesting to observe that there is a
concentration of bombings in the area between Piedmont and Lombardy. Considering that the
targets, in that area, were Milan and Turin, we can affirm that the RAF bombers, often, had such big
difficulties spotting the right targets that they bombed places in the surrounding areas. This so called
surrounding areas were extended from places such as Nichelino and Moncalieri, towns of the Turin
city belt, Monza, Mariano Comense, Olgiate and Merate, towns situated in the surrounding area of
Milan, to places such as Pavia, Alessandria, Vercelli and Tortona, cities situated farther in relation to
Turin and Milan, and not exactly being part of their city belt. A bombing happened even on Verona,
in the Veneto region, showing clearly the problematic laying behind the precision bombing strategy
Considering all the variables we have talked about, it is not difficult to affirm that, during this phase,
The overall number of casualties caused by the bombings are a little bit more than 70 dead and
roughly a double number of wounded. The raids caused even limited damages to the buildings. In
Milan, during the raid between 4th and 5th December 1940, some bombs caused irrelevant damages
to the Caproni Aircraft factory and some other lesser damages to some private houses and public
buildings.
19
20
Despite the Bomber Command were aware that the bombings on Northern Italy could achieve only
limited results, they believed that the bombings could have at least a strong psychological impact
During the raids, the alarms sounded almost all-over Northern Italy and they forced the civilians to
spend the entire nights awake in their houses or into the shelters, wasting hours of sleep, in a very
bad psychological state, scarred by the fear of being hit from a moment to another.
In the absence of relevant damages to the bombed areas, the Bomber Command remained aware
The bombing war on Southern Italy was conducted by the RAF with peculiarities that made it very
The first huge difference is that the bombings must be integrated into the bigger context of the war
in the Mediterranean theatre and so the bombings were an essential part of the aero-naval
operations carried out to take the control of the maritime routes to North Africa (Egypt for the
British, Libya for the Italians and the Germans), the Middle-East and the Balkans. The Italian cities
and towns which were bombed during this phase were hit not because of their industrial targets,
but because they hold ports, airports, marshalling yards, refineries and fuel depots, all targets that
The bombings on Southern Italy were conducted by the RAF, with some exceptions of missions
conducted by Greece between November 1940 and April 1941, and some missions conducted by
Malta, during the conflict, gained a central strategic role for being in the middle of the
Mediterranean Sea, threating the Axis maritime routes from Italy to Libya, and it represented a real
thorn on the Axis side for the whole war in the Mediterranean. Until the end of 1942 the RAF did
not have long range bombers which could operate on Italy from places other than Malta, thus that
is why most of the operations conducted on Southern Italy were accomplished by bombers taken
The importance and the centrality of Malta for the Mediterranean war is clearly showed in the map
below. It is evident that from the isle the British could easily intercept any convoy directed to Libya,
22
The map buffers represent the range of different planes which operated for missions on Southern
Italy. The shortest one represents the fighter range, while the other ones represent the bombers
range.
One aspect that deserves to be highlighted is that since from Malta the RAF used the same planes
that were used from England and, in particular, the Wellingtons, the real bombers range from the
isle was far superior to the one represented in the map. The British in theory could reach easily even
Rome but they did not do it. It is likely that the RAF decided intentionally not to operate above
23
24
During the prolonged confront to achieve the control over the Mediterranean Sea, the Royal Italian
Navy took advantages for its forces of bases situated all over Southern Italy, especially in Taranto
and Naples, as the first one was the main military port and the main base for the Italian fleet, and
the second one the largest port in the South of the Peninsula. In addition to these, the Navy took
advantages of the ports of: La Maddalena, Cagliari, Palermo, Messina, Augusta, Catania, Porto
Empedocle, Trapani and Brindisi. Most of these ports were even the seaports for the convoys
Similarly, the Royal Italian Air Force used a network of numerous and important airports. In Sicily,
the main ones were Catania Fontanarossa, Gerbini, Comiso, Sciacca, Trapani Milo, Castelvetrano,
Bo Rizzo, Gela, Palermo Boccadifalco and Siracusa. In Sardinia, there were Cagliari Elmas,
Monserrato, Decimomannu and Villacidro. Other airports situated in the south of the Peninsula
were Reggio Calabria, Crotone, Naples Capodichino, Lecce Galatina, Brindisi, Foggia and
Grottaglie18.
Considering that the bombings on Southern Italy were an integrated part of the war in the
Mediterranean Sea, this long list of ports and airports corresponded to the RAF target list between
1940 and 1942. Moreover, most of these ports were even seats of many fuel depots. Sometimes,
along with these targets, the RAF hit even the industrial complexes situated in Southern Italy, such
as the ones in Naples, in the Bagnoli district and the Montecatini chemical factories situated in
Crotone.
By the end of 1940 the main raids made by the British were against Naples, which was bombed
seven times, with the heaviest action against the port fulfilled on 14th December 1940. The other
and greatest raid was made by 21 Swordfish torpedo bombers, taken off by the carrier HMS
important because it was made directly against the Italian Navy and the British were able to hit
several targets, including three battleships, half of the Italian overall number of battleships, halving
the Italian Navy operative capacities for more than six months 19.
As showed in the following map, other bombed locations in 1940 were Palermo, Trapani and
Augusta in Sicily, Cagliari in Sardinia and Bari, Brindisi, Lecce and Crotone in the mainland territory.
What emerges from the map is that there is a relative concentration of targets and this might be
explained if we consider that Malta was totally unprepared at the beginning of the war in the
Mediterranean. In the isle there was a serious lack of any type of planes, from bombers to modern
It will be only with the energic initiative of admiral Andrew Cunningham, the commander of the
Mediterranean Fleet by 22nd August 1940, carried out in agreement with the RAF commander in
that sector, air marshal Arthur Longmore, that the reluctant British government will be convinced
Reinforcing Malta with bombers was far than easy. There were many logistical problems because
only the Wellington bombers could reach the isle by flight, but that was a very dangerous journey
across occupied France and Italy. The other bombers had to be carried on the carriers and then
transported to Malta by sea with the risk for the ships to be intercepted by the Italians during the
journey. Due to the logistical problems to provide Malta with bombers, it will be necessary waiting
until the autumn to see, at Malta, six Wellington bombers of the 148° RAF Squadron, detached by
19 Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al 1945 (Milano: Mursia, 1970),
pp. 68-70.
20 Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate l’Italia, pp. 140-142.
26
The ability of the British to bomb Southern Italy depended entirely on the effectiveness of Malta as
an air base.
The effectiveness of Malta as an air base depended entirely on the Axis greater or lesser ability to
neutralise the isle. By the beginning of the conflict the isle underwent a continuatively bombing
campaign made firstly by the Italian Air Force and, by January 1941, also by the German X
Fliegerkorps, an air unit of 250 planes, transferred from Norway to Sicily to support the Italian war
The German-Italian hail of bombs did not break Malta’s defence, but between January and July 1941
the isle was nearly unable to perform bombings on Southern Italy and so, despite Wellingtons of
the 37° and 70° Squadron performed two raids on Brindisi on the 14th April 1941 from Greece, the
rest of the Italian Southern cities was able to breathe for a while.
27
The situation changed drastically in July, when the German air corps was redeployed on the Eastern
Despite the Italians kept on bombing the isle, the British were able again to restart bombing
Southern Italy.
From July the bombings restarted on the city ports and on the naval bases. On day 6th Palermo was
By autumn 1941 the RAF was able to drop on Southern Italy new heavier bombs of 4000 pounds
called “cookies” or more realistically “blockbusters”. These bombs contained roughly 1600 pounds
of explosive, 40% of their total weight. They were medium power bombs, but the scientific
evaluations claimed that the bombs could have this destructive power: a 2000 pounds bomb could
destroy an area of 6.184 m2, a 4000 pounds bomb, an area of 20.607 m2 and an 8000 pounds bomb,
an area of 39.730 m2 . This was the theory, since the experience taught that to destroy an area of
The bombings of the second half of 1941 had two main innovations.
The first one is that it became more frequent for the bombers the spot of the so called “targets of
opportunity”. In order to improve the general effectiveness of the raids, the pilots were instructed
to look for secondary targets if the primary target was not reachable. An example occurred during
the night between 31st October and 1st November 1941, when the RAF bombers could not hit
Naples, because of bad weather conditions, and so they bombed Palermo as a secondary target.
When both targets were not reachable, the pilots were instructed to drop the bombs at their
discretion, on any relevant target on the area rather than returning to the base with the bombs.
21 Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al 1945 (Milano: Mursia, 1970),
pp. 89-90.
28
These were small raids conducted by no more than four or five bombers with the instruction to
remain on flight on a target and dropping occasionally some bombs. Then, when the fuel was in
shortage, they could return to the base to be substituted by other bombers to repeat the mission
Both these bombing innovations increased the sufferings of the civil population because, from one
side, the “targets of opportunity” missions could be made on many different areas, even on the
countryside and they were at the total discretion to the bombers crew. Sometimes the targets
On the other hand, the “nuisance raids”, while not causing many material damages, caused serious
psychological damages. The length of these missions could force the city alarms to sound for whole
nights, compelling the civilians to spend time awake in the shelters with the fear of being hit by the
From the following map, it is possible to visualise the spreading of the bombings in 1941, in
comparison to the bombings in 1940. It is evident that these two new bombing variables resulted in
a huge increase of bombed locations, especially in Sicily. The bombed locations were mainly on the
coast and this demonstrates that the bombings were accomplished against targets which had a
relevance for the war in the Mediterranean. It is interesting to observe that there is a concentration
of bombings on both the western and the eastern Sicilian coasts. This because locations such us
Syracuse, Augusta and Catania, on the eastern coast, and Palermo and Trapani on the north-western
coast, represented seaports for the convoys directed to Libya and they also held important airports.
This demonstrates that the reasons behind the RAF bombings were contextualised in order to hit
Another example of this is represented by the concentration of bombings on the Strait of Messina,
which separates the Italian mainland and Sicily and which was another key strategical area, being
the only link between Italy and the isle. That is why the city of Messina and its ferryboat stopover
30
31
The bombings on Southern Italy revealed again a significant reduction between January and June
1942. This because the war context changed again drastically. By December 1941, the powerful II
German Fliegerkorps was redeployed in Sicily from the Eastern Front, exploiting the absence of air
operations during the Russian winter. This because the Axis commanders believed that it was time
to neutralise completely the isle of Malta which was causing too many casualties to the convoys
directed to Libya and was a threat even for Southern Italian cities which were experiencing
continuous bombings.
The renovated Axis bombing campaign against Malta raised to a nearly breaking point for her
garrison and the local civil population by the summer of 1942. From January to April 1942, the Italian
raids raised from 709 to 858, but the German ones raised from 1741 to 4965.23
The ultimate purpose of the Axis was to land on the isle (Operation Herkules) to secure the position
in the Mediterranean for the war in North Africa. The bombing campaign of this period had the
effect to annihilate Malta’s capacities to perform almost any either naval or air offensive and, in
addition, the Axis efforts had the result to nearly interrupt the supplies directed to the isle. On the
other side, as a consequence of this, the supplies that the German-Italians were able to send to
Between January and June 1942, the only significant raid performed by the RAF was made against
When the isle of Malta was nearly on the verge of collapsing by June 1942, the planned amphibious
operation was postponed to an undefined date. This because Erwin Rommel, who in the meanwhile
had been able to achieve outstanding successes against the British in North Africa, penetrating
through Egypt, was able to convince Hitler to give priority to his offensive against Alexandria and
The Axis commanders will regret this decision since such a favourable moment to occupy Malta will
In June, the most significant raids were fulfilled on Taranto on day 9th and on Cagliari on days 2nd
and 7th.
The transfer of units from Sicily to North Africa allowed Malta to recover gradually and to be ready
to operate again in the autumn, when the war context will turn once and for all to the Allies favour.
From the following map, it is evident the reduction of raids performed by the British during the first
half of 1942. Nevertheless, there is still a concentration of bombings on the eastern coast of Sicily,
which was the base of the German II Fliegerkorps, demonstrating the importance of those Axis air
bases for the war in the Mediterranean theatre and the bombing campaign over Malta.
24
It is necessary to say that an amphibious invasion of Malta was considered very difficult. The Germans, who
experienced heavy losses during the invasion of Crete in May 1941, were reluctant to invade Malta that for its
geomorphology was a natural stronghold. Moreover, there were concerns that the Italian Navy would not have been
able to protect the landing troops, especially during the night, since the Italian Navy did not have training for night
operations. For a more accurate reflection, see the relative chapter in Giorgio Giorgerini, La guerra italiana sul mare. La
Marina tra vittoria e sconfitta 1940-1943 (Milano: Mondadori, 2001).
33
34
The bombing war on Southern Italy for the first twenty-seven months of war and until October 1942
had a far more meaningful impact in comparison with the bombings on Northern Italy. In Southern
Italy roughly 160 significant raids were performed and the civilian casualties were at least 70025.
Moreover, the raids performed against the ports were particularly dangerous for the civilians, since
25 Marco Gioannini, Bombardate l’Italia. Le strategie alleate e le vittime civili, in Nicola Labanca (edited by), I
Bombardamenti aerei sull’Italia. Politica, Stato e società (1939-1945) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012) p. 84.
35
The Bombing Strategies: The Area Bombing
Until 1942, the bombings on Italy were conducted with the “precision bombing” strategy. This
strategy implicated the idea of hitting relevant military targets and trying to spare the civil
population.
In 1942 the British Bomber Command was able to mark a turning point regarding the bombing
strategies.
The new area bombing strategy included to hit indiscriminately the civil population in order to
provoke serious both physical and psychological damages and to break the morale with the ultimate
purpose to force the civilians to revolt against their government. The area bombings, to be truly
devastating, will be conceived preparing an impressive impact force of bombers, concentrating the
action on both space and time in order to achieve more destructive results. As a model, the RAF
took the devastating bombing conducted by the Luftwaffe on Coventry on the night of 14 th
November 1940 and that model was perfected to its extreme consequences.
Many aspects contributed to get to the strategic turning point that will allow the British to abandon
Recent historiographical studies underlined that the transition from the precision bombing to the
area bombing was not only the result of the ineffectiveness of the precision bombing, as clearly
demonstrated by the Butt report in 1941, but was also the result of an accurate study started in
1941 by the British Research Laboratory. The research was based on the house models of both the
German and the Italian cities in order to find the weakest points to destroy them. The British
36
research team was assisted in 1942 and 1943 by exponents of the American National Fire Protection
Association in order to study how to increase the fire spread during the bombings 26.
When Sir Arthur Harris became the new Bomber Command Chief on 22 nd February 1942, the
decision to transit to the area bombing had already been taken time before 27.
Arthur Harris’s “merit” is that he applied with determination the new strategies and that he solicited
The Avro 683 Lancaster was an airplane of extraordinary technical capacities, with an extraordinary
manoeuvrability, an excellent robustness, but above all an extraordinary cargo capacity: 14.000 tons
of bombs. Due to its qualities, its production reached the total number of 7.374 28.
Certainly, it was thanks to this bomber and the other two new heavy bombers, the Short Stirling and
the Handley Page Halifax, that the British were able to perform the area bombing against German
The so called “High Capacity” bombs of 4.000 and 8.000 pounds started to be regularly used
between 1941 and 1942 and represented a decisive qualitative increase in terms of destruction. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, they were called “blockbuster”. Other devices were the
incendiary bombs that contained thermite and magnesium and were able to cause a fire which could
reach 2.500 degrees. Less used were the phosphorus bombs (particularly brutal because of the
phosphorus to stick on the victims) and the heavy incendiary bombs of 100, 250, 500, 1.000 and
2.800 pounds. This fearsome weaponry found, from Mach 1942, a new navigation tool, called Gee.
This tool was more accurate than the ones used before and of the German ones and allowed a better
spotting of the targets, even though it was not exempted from flaws.
26 Richard Overy, I bombardamenti nella seconda guerra mondiale: nuove prospettive di ricerca, in Nicola Labanca
(edited by), I bombardamenti aerei sull'Italia. Politica, Stato e società (1939-1945) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012), pp. 22-28.
27 Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al 1945 (Milano: Mursia,
1970), pp. 121-122.
28 Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia, pp. 110-111.
37
The area bombing strategy will be applied firstly on German cities, starting from spring 1942 and
38
The Bombings on Italy - October 1942 – September 1943. Bombings All Over the
Country.
By 22nd October 1942 Northern Italy, which until that time had received only little attention from
the Bomber Command, experienced a tremendous bombing campaign conducted with the area
bombing strategy. Between 22nd October 1942 and 12th July 1943, the RAF performed twenty-two
great raids on Turin, Milan, Genoa, La Spezia and Savona, causing at least 2.500 dead without caring
to hit specific military or industrial targets, but hitting the civil population intentionally29. The aiming
point will become directly the city centre and the Bomber Command will use a tremendous
combination of HP bombs and incendiary bombs with the ultimate purpose of annihilate the civil
population morale30.
The decision of the Allies to start a massive bombing campaign on Italy, using the area bombing,
corresponded to the political perspective of “knocking Italy out of the war”. This strategy was
confirmed by the Allies during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, as Churchill stated that
it was necessary hitting Italy, the Axis “soft underbelly”, convincing even the reluctant Americans to
start their own bombing campaign against Italy31. Besides, the British were sure that since the Italian
civil population’s morale was fragile, it will have been easy to force the civil population to rise against
29
Marco Gioannini, Bombardate l’Italia. Le strategie alleate e le vittime civili, in Nicola Labanca (edited by), I
Bombardamenti aerei sull’Italia. Politica, Stato e società (1939-1945) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012) p. 88.
30
The Bomber Command was able to cause fire storms (Feuersturm) on German cities and hoped to cause them on Italy
too. Nevertheless, the lack of wood houses and the particular city planning of Italian cities such as Turin and Milan,
prevented the British to cause the fire storms on Italy to the disappointment of the pilots who certified that Italy “does
not burn!”.
31
The Americans added to the list of the targets the Marshalling Yards that, until that time, were not a target of
bombings.
39
By January 1943 the American USAAF started a massive bombing campaign on Southern Italy,
causing tremendous devastations that had never been experienced neither during the previous two
years of bombings, using their tremendous arsenal of heavy bombers constituted by the B-17 Flying
Fortress and the B-24 Liberator, two bombers which excelled performing the strategic bombing32.
By July 1943, the tremendous area bombing campaign had the effects of wiping out any residual
support of most of the Italians to the fascist regime and to Mussolini, as he was increasingly
considered the only responsible of the disaster caused by the war. As a reaction to the bombings,
by late autumn 1942 the civilians had started also a massive evacuation from the bombed cities to
the surrounding countryside areas, a phenomenon that was even initially encouraged by the regime,
The final hit to the fascist regime was caused by the first bombing on Rome on 19 th July 1943,
performed by 556 American bombers, which caused more than 2.000 dead33, provoking a deep
shock on the population as it was interpreted that no place was going to be spared. The regime
The peak of the indiscriminate bombing will be reached on August 1943 in order to force the new
post-fascist Italian government to surrender and sign an armistice. Thus, the Allies increased even
more the area bombings on Northern Italy and especially on Milan and Turin, without sparing the
32
The American strategy was not based on the area bombing strategy. The Americans were confident that with their
superior navigation and sighting tools, they were able to perform a sort of “precision bombing” which for their standard
was accurate when at least half of the bombs hit an area of 1.000 feet. Moreover, the Americans performed only daylight
missions. Indeed, due to their inexperience and the fact that they used to bomb from 6-7.000 meters of altitude, their
bombings were far from being accurate and caused even more devastations to the civil population. Cfr. Marco Gioannini,
Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia. Storia della guerra di distruzione aerea 1940-1945 (Milano: Rizzoli, 2007), pp.
275-282; Marco Gioannini, Bombardate l’Italia. Le strategie alleate e le vittime civili, in Nicola Labanca (edited by), I
Bombardamenti aerei sull’Italia. Politica, Stato e società (1939-1945) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012) pp. 89-90.
33
Marco Gioannini, Bombardate l’Italia. Le strategie alleate e le vittime civili, p. 91.
40
The following map, which shows the bombings on Italy between October 1942 and September 1943,
What stands out is the huge increase of bombed places all around Italy and especially in Southern
Italy. Along with the same targets as before (ports, airports), the USAAF started to bomb more
frequently the cities themselves as well as the M/Y (marshalling yards of the areas). The bombings
on Sicily are located around the isle with a huge concentration on the Eastern coast. Once more, the
targets hit on that area were the ferry gates of Messina, Catania and Syracuse, the ports and
airports. One possible reason of this increase of bombings on Sicily and on the Eastern coast, can be
explained by the fact that the isle became a priority target by the summer 1943, due to the fact
that the Allies were preparing to invade it by July 1943 (Operation Husky). Before the invasion, the
Allies were able to drastically reduce the Axis air operative capacity and so the main targets were
Another interesting concentration of bombings is the one on the region of Campania, in the
surrounding areas of Naples. Despite Naples had been a bombing target continuatively from 1940
to 1942, it is evident the huge spreading of bombed places in the surrounding area and cities.
The targets of the raids on Campania, except for Naples, were the Marshalling Yards of the area.
These areas were hit continuatively from the summer until September 1943. The purpose of these
raids was firstly, to paralyse the Axis logistical system and the ability to move units from Southern
Italy to Sicily to prevent the Axis forces to reinforce the isle and secondly, once the campaign in Sicily
ended, to support the following invasion of the Italian mainland which started by 3rd September
1943.
34
Between 3rd and 9th July Gerbini is hit by 1.500 tons of bombs and on 5th July are destroyed 104 Axis planes. Marco
Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 310.
41
From August and until September 1943 the attacks on the communication lines were nearly 4.500
Regarding the bombings on Northern Italy, it is evident from the map that they remain more
concentrated on relevant targets such as Milan, Turin and Genoa. What it is new is the addition of
targets in the region Emilia-Romagna and Trentino Alto-Adige. Another relevant target, during this
phase, was the port of La Spezia, being the main military port of Northern Italy and the port in which
the Italian Navy had deployed many ships in order to escape from the more exposed bases in
Southern Italy.
Another interesting new area of bombing is Central Italy. The GIS shows bombings on cities such as
Grosseto, which was hit by the USAAF, with the most destructive raid made on 26th April 1943 and
causing more than 145 dead36. This demonstrates that from Spring 1943, when the Allies had
gradually occupied North Africa and ultimately Tunisia in May, they could bomb all over Italy without
logistical limitations caused by the distance of the bases, exploiting the bases in North Africa.
Moreover, the Allies could count more and more on an overwhelming air superiority which limited
35
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 358.
36
Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al 1945 (Milano: Mursia, 1970),
pp. 183-184.
42
43
The Bombings on Italy - September 1943 – April 1945. Bombs on the Wehrmacht And
The Armistice between Italy and the Allies, signed on 3rd September 1943, and announced on day
8th, caused a significant turning point for the war on the Italian peninsula. The Germans, suspecting
from many months a betrayal by the Italians, had constantly flocked units into Italy and, after 8 th
September, quickly occupied Central-Northern Italy, exploiting the fact that the Italian Armed
Forces, de facto remained abandoned to themselves and with no orders from the high commands,
dissolved themselves in a few days. On the other hand, the Allies, immediately after the Armistice,
launched the invasion of the Italian mainland on Salerno (Operation Avalanche), but because of the
tenacious defense made by the Wehrmacht, they were stopped at a new frontline which went from
the eastern coast (from Ortona, near Pescara) to the western coast (near Gaeta) of the country in
Southern Italy, called “Gustav Line”. From this time until the end of the war, the battles will be
fought by the Allies, by 1944 supported by the Corpo Italiano di Liberazione (a renovated formation
of Italian units, loyal to the Royal government sitting in liberated Italy) and by Partisans, showing a
slow advance through Italy, and the Germans, supported by the Republican fascists, who, exploiting
the particular Italian morphology that facilitates the defense, were able to offer a very deep and
tenacious resistance.
Because of this new strategic scenery, the bombings in this phase will be performed mainly to
support the advance of both the American 5th Army and the British 8th Army, which were advancing
through the Italian peninsula. The targets of the bombings were the German communication lines,
the airports and the Italian industries that in the North were exploited by the Germans to feed the
Reich’s war effort. Along with these targets, even the Wehrmacht itself became a relevant target
of tactical bombings. The greatest change was that in order to perform the tactical bombings the
44
Allies will use even the heavy bombers which were used mainly for strategic bombings and which,
from now, will be used along with fighter-bombers and tactical bombers, for tactical bombing roles.
As the Allies gradually advanced and occupied new airports, the bombings output increased because
the distance between the bases and the targets was obviously decreasing. On 27th September Foggia
was occupied with its great airport system and between September and October the Allies were
able to force what remained of the Luftwaffe to withdraw to Northern Italy. It is important to keep
in mind that the Allies had an overwhelming air superiority, and so the only real defence towards
the bombings was provided by the German anti-aircraft “Flak”. By the end of 1943 the remaining
strength of the Luftwaffe in Italy was constituted by no more than 230 fighters and 30 bombers,
since the Germans had decided to withdraw nearly all the bomber units for a total number of 180
bombers 37. Moreover, the Germans operated only in the night, hoping in this case to have some
chances of success, since they had to face a force of roughly 4.700 Allied planes.
From November 1943, the Allies decided to extend the Operation Pointblank (a part of the
Combined Bomber Offensive, decided at Casablanca, to annihilate Germany), whose purpose was
to destroy the aircraft industries working for the Germans in occupied Italy. The main target in Italy
was constituted by the Northern industries and, in particular, the industries located in Turin and
dedicated to the production of the ball bearing that were fundamental for the production of planes.
The subject of these bombings on Turin will be deepened in the next part.
The last relevant number of bombings of the end of 1943 is strictly related to the ground operations.
It was during the winter 1943-44 that the wearing number of battles near the Gustav Line occurred.
The Allies were able to reach the line, with difficulty, by January 1944, but the German defence was
37
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 411.
45
efficient to the point that Germans will force the Allies to an exhausting and bleeding number of
In this context the Allied bombings were made essentially with the purpose of hitting the German
army deployed deep in defence, and in order to support the Allied ground offensives. The most
important and infamous bombing was made on the Cassino Abbey on 15 th February 1944 by 222
American bombers which destroyed entirely the Abbey. The Abbey was a highly valuable heritage
site, but the Allies believed that it was a fundamental intersection of the German defensive system
and that they had to bomb it, but they were wrong. The Germans were not occupying the Abbey for
military purposes, and so the Abbey destruction was an evident mistake not justifiable for any
military reason.
From the following map it is possible to observe the extension of the bombings during this phase of
the war. There is a huge bombing cluster in the area near Naples. These bombings are mainly related
to the ground operations around the Gustav Line which we have talked about previously, as the one
on Cassino. Nevertheless, the most interesting bombing clusters are the ones above Rome, in
Tuscany near Florence and in the area between Emilia-Romagna and Veneto. From the second half
of October, the Allies started to bomb a new target: the railway bridges. Considering the difficulties
to bomb the Marshalling Yards (M/Y) that were heavily defended by the Flak, the Allies convinced
themselves to interrupt the communication lines on more points and contemporarily. The Allies
identified fifteen bridges on the nine main Northern communication lines and five on a line that
goes from Ancona to Pisa. By the end of the month they carried out 650 raids with over 1.350 tons
In particular, the bombing cluster in the area between Tuscany, Umbria and the Marche
corresponded to the bombings against the railway bridges started by the Allies by the second half
of October 1943. The Allies calculated that in order to maintain efficient their units, the Germans
46
needed 40 tons of supplies per day for each division and to guarantee this flow, it was necessary
only 5 per cent of the normal railway traffic between Northern and Central Italy38. Consequently,
the idea of hitting specific targets as railway bridges corresponded to the idea of avoiding hitting
the great and heavily defended M/Y in the area. The GIS map shows the extension of these
bombings which, by the end of October, were extended even on Ligurian cities such as Genoa,
Savona, Imperia, Varazze and Recco. From the map it is possible to observe a bombing area on
38
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 397.
47
48
In March 1944, the Allies were facing serious difficulties to overcome the Gustav Line. Neither the
landing on Anzio, accomplished on 22nd January 1944 by the Allies, with the purpose to outflank the
line, was able to break the German resistance and so the Allies decided to start a new bombing
campaign.
The strategy was again based on the assumption of interrupting the German supply lines which
maintained the divisions deployed on the Gustav Line. Thus, the Allies decided to hit continuatively
the entire railway system, the road network and, lastly, the convoy system that operated near the
coasts. The operation, named “Strangle”, concerned the two main railway lines of Central Italy: the
Florence-Orte-Rome and the Pisa-Florence. The interdiction area of the bombers was roughly a
quadrilateral that had to be made impassable by the German supplies. For this operation, the Allies
decided to use the medium bombers and the fighter-bombers which were more adapted to perform
this task.
The Strangle raids were the result of a compromise between two schools of thought, one of the
Solly Zuckerman research group who, studying the results of the previous bombing campaign,
considered the M/Y as the main targets of raids, the other one was the school of thought which
believed the bridges being the main targets of bombings. The compromise of Strangle is that it
includes all the elements that constitute a railway system: M/Y, stations, bridges, viaducts and even
The Strangle raids were carried out between 19th March 1944 and 12th May 1944, with a total
number of raids of 21.688 and 25.375 tons of bombs dropped 39. It is difficult to affirm whether this
operation was successful or not. During the entire operation, it is registered an average of 75 line
interruptions a day. Only on the Florence-Rome line twenty-two targets were hit, nineteen of whom
39
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 440.
49
were bridges40. Nevertheless, the German were able to maintain open the supply flow through Italy,
improving the railway engineering and quickly repairing the damages made by the Allies during the
nights. The Germans were able to show all their military effectiveness maintaining the supply flow
in apparently impossible conditions. Moreover, the targets were defended only by the German Flak
which improved its effectiveness day by day. On the other hand, the operation improved also the
precision of the American bombers B-25 and B-26, which changed from an average of 59 raids and
106 tons of bombs, needed in November 1943 to destroy a bridge, to the one of 31 raids and 68
tons of bombs at the end of March 1944, for the same task41.
The last phase of the bombings is connected again with the ground operations. The outcome of the
Gustav Line, fulfilled eventually in June 1944 and which culminated with the liberation of Rome by
the American 5th Army of General Mark Clark on 4th June 1944, forced the Germans to quickly
withdraw from Central Italy to establish a new defensive line, called “Gothic Line”, which went from
Viareggio to Pesaro through the Tuscan-Emilian Apennine. Marshal Albert Kesselring’s, the German
supreme commander in Italy, intention was to exploit the natural morphology of the terrain that,
From the following map it is possible to observe the bombings of the last phase of the war in Italy.
40
Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. III, Argument to E-V Day: January 1944
to May 1945 (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), p. 373.
41
Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, p. 379.
50
51
What emerges is the concentration of raids in Emilia-Romagna and along the Adriatic coast, as well
as the raids in the area between Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. These raid concentrations are
related to the massive bombing offensive of the 22 nd June 1944, made by nearly all the heavy
American bombers in Italy (nearly 600) against the M/Y and the railway bridges of the Emilian cities
(Bologna, Modena, Parma, Castelmaggiore, Fornovo and Ferrara), in Friuli (Trieste, Udine and the
important railway bridge on the Tagliamento river at Casarsa) and lastly, in Piedmont (on Turin,
Chivasso). During the day were dropped over 1.400 tons of bombs of the American 15th AF42.
The concentration of bombings in the Padania plain from Piedmont to Emilia-Romagna and in Liguria
is also the consequence of another bombing campaign started by the Allies between 12 th July and
15th July 1944, called “Mallory Major”. This campaign was the result of an accurate selection of
twenty-one bridges: fourteen route bridges, five railway bridges and two mixed route-railway
bridges which had to be destroyed in order to interrupt the German supply flow directed to the
troops deployed on the Gothic Line. It seemed as a repetition of the operation carried out the year
before to interrupt the supply flow to the Gustav Line, but this time the Allies had selected
accurately the targets and had improved their effectiveness, as mentioned before, and so the results
were excellent43. Twelve bridges were destroyed or heavily damaged, other eight were impassable
and only one in Ostiglia (near Mantova) resisted because made of reinforced concrete 44.
Consequently, after the operation nearly all the bridges on the Po river (between Alessandria and
Mortara), were impassable, Genoa was isolated, Milan’s communication lines to the south were cut
and all the routes in the Northern Apennines were out of order apart from the Bologna-Pistoia line
which was open at Piteccio. On the 4th August, to the Allies’ judgement, Kesselring was virtually
42
Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, p. 397.
43
See pag. 49.
44
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 457-58.
52
isolated from the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, the Germans had such high military and
organizational abilities that they were able someway to supply their units in Italy.
After months spent on the Gothic Line, the Allies finally launched their final offensive on 19 th April
1945. The British 8th Army and the American 5th Army were heavily supported during the offensive
by the Air Force. With an air superiority of three to one, in the days before the offensive, the Allies
made 1.673 raids with heavy bombers and 624 with medium bombers, followed by hundreds
performed with fighter-bombers. The Allies were able to literally saturate the space occupied by the
Wehrmacht, hitting artillery batteries, trenches, concentration of troops, headquarters with sucha
number of units that sometimes it was possible to see fifteen planes hitting a single tank45.
The final days of the war in Italy showed the Allies bombers keeping on performing tactical missions
against the withdrawing German Army with overwhelming units. The 2 nd May 1945 the Germans
surrendered to the Allies and by the 5th all the operations in Italy ended.
Overall, the air war on Italy caused lots of damages to the country. The general impoverishment of
the country is calculated to roughly one third of the entire net worth, with a fall of the national
income of roughly 50 per cent. Roughly 9.000 bridges were destroyed, 40 per cent of the railway
lines, 50 per cent of the rolling stock material, 90 per cent of the trucks, 50 per cent of the cars and
30 per cent of the buses. Great damages were caused to the mercantile fleet, sunk to 91 per cent,
the houses destroyed were 3.2 million, 42 per cent of the school classrooms were destroyed as 20
per cent of the hospital equipment; 50 per cent of the docks were lost and 6 per cent of the routes.
In addition, the consumptions between 1944 and 1945 decreased to less than half of the ones of
194046.
45
Andrew J. Brookes, Air War Over Italy (Shepperton: Ian Allan Publishing, 2000) p. 149.
46
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 493.
53
The air war on Italy caused also a high number of casualties. The exact number is not certain. The
main source is constituted by a publication made by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)
of 195747. According to that publication, the total number of victims caused by the bombings is
64.357 (32.082 males and 27.714 females, among the civilians, plus 4.558 militaries). We must add
other 6.237 dead for “other bombings” and so the number increases to 70.591 people killed by air
raids between 1940 and 1945, with a percentage of tons per dead of 5,29 per cent48. The literature
agrees claiming that this data is underestimated. Indeed, the effects of the war affected the
functioning of the public administrations and especially of the civil registry, a situation that
worsened after the Armistice and the German occupation. In addition, the phenomenon of the mass
evacuations created additional confusion. Finally, it is unlikely that the victims of the target of
opportunity missions and of the air machinegun fire raids were recorded. It is highly likely that the
number of victims be higher, but the lack of certain data does not allow to formulate a more
From the last two years of air raids on Italy, so between September 1943 to April 1945, it emerges
The victims are 41.420 civilians, plus 1.982 militaries from aerial bombings and 5.154 civilians and
167 militaries from “other bombings”. Considering the overall number of casualties, it is evident
that more than two thirds of the victims were caused after the Armistice. Thus, from 1940 to 1943
47
Istat, Morti e dispersi per cause belliche, 1939-1945, (Roma: Istat, 1957).
48
Cfr. Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate L’Italia, p. 491; Claudia Baldoli, Marco Fincardi, Italian Society
Under Anglo-American Bombs: Propaganda,
Experience and Legend, 1940-1945, in The Historical Journal (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1017-1038; Andrew Knapp, La Francia sotto le bombe degli Alleati (1940-
1945), in Nicola Labanca (edited by), I Bombardamenti aerei sull’Italia. Politica, Stato e società (1939-1945) (Bologna: Il
Mulino, 2012) p. 39.
54
“only” 18.376 civilians and 2.576 militaries were killed by aerial bombings, and, by “other bombings,
This data is even more interesting whether we consider that after the Armistice the civilians were
no longer the target of the bombings and rather the Allies tried to spare the civil population of a
country which had surrendered to them, and whose civil population was suffering a tough German
occupation.
However, it is likely that the Allied far superior air power and the possibility of making continuative
raids facing very low opposition contributed to create a tremendous war machine that simply
prevented the Allies to limit the damages and the suffers inflicted to the civil population. Moreover,
the lack of experience of the crews, the practice of releasing the bombs before returning to the base
and sometimes even the deliberate intention of making criminal acts, tolerated by the commanders,
Finally, it is necessary to say that even the most accurate bombing made on a specific target was
not accurate. The technology of that time simply did not allow to hit a specific target that accurately,
and so the bombers inaccuracy is another possible explanation of such many civilian casualties. This
aspect is clearly highlighted by the GIS maps which show the general lack of precision of the even
49
Claudia Baldoli, Andrew Knapp, Forgotten Blitzes: France and Italy Under Allied Air Attack, 1940-1945 (London:
Continuum, 2011) p. 4.
55
Part II
56
Turin and the Air War. Why Was Turin a Relevant Target?
The city of Turin represented one of the main poles of Italy. Great metropolis, among the most
populated Italian cities, with a population in 1936 of 629.000 inhabitants 50, it was one of the most
important industrial centres of the Italian peninsula, being along with Genoa and Milan one of the
vertexes of the so called “Italian industrial triangle”, heart of most of both the civilian and military
industrial production. It was also the FIAT headquarters, the biggest Italian automotive
manufacturer.
Symbolically, it was also the ancient capital of the Italian Monarchy and of the House of Savoy and
the so called cradle of the Italian Risorgimento, the process of Italian unification carried on in 19 th
century under the leadership of the piedmontese leading class. The city, due to its geographical
position, was also one of the most important railway and infrastructural intersections of the Po
valley industrial complexes. Being relatively near to the French border and to the Alps mountain
ridge, Turin could be considered more exposed to potential air raids, in comparison with other more
As a consequence of these considerations, we can easily understand why from the fundamental
anti-air paper document (Carta Fondamentale della PAA), in which the Italian cities were divided
between 1st, 2nd and 3rd level, for importance and defensibility, Turin, along with Venaria Reale
(another place considered industrially relevant in the Turin city belt), was put in the 1st level51. Thus,
Turin was among the centres of highest priority regarding the anti-air defences and this clearly
50
ISTAT, Censimenti popolazione città metropolitana di Torino 1861-2011.
51
In 1936, it was published the royal decree 29 October 1936, n. 2216, converted in law on 10th June 1937, n. 1029, that
along with the 1934 regulation, constituted the fundamental anti-air paper document (Carta Fondamentale della Paa).
57
corresponded with the intention to defend the centres of greatest industrial concentration and
In truth, this choice was not followed by a real and adequate assignment of resources to build an
effective anti-air defence and protection. The fascist regime limited itself to promote an intense
propaganda campaign restricted to the use of the anti-gas mask, in case the enemy would have used
chemical weapons. Regarding the anti-aircraft, as well as the training and the preparation of the
civil population, about the measures to adopt and about the shelters to go to, in case of an air raid,
The British Bomber Command dedicated, during the first war months, few and relatively light
precision bombings, conducted exclusively in the night, due to the logistical difficulties they had to
By October 1942, Turin became target of numerous area bombings made by the RAF, which caused
devastating damages and casualties to the city. By November 1943, the British bombers will be
flanked by the American USAAF bombers, which will start their own bombing campaign against
It is interesting to observe the idea that the Americans had about Turin and about the relevant
targets of the bombings. From the July 1943 and August 1943 reports it is underlined clearly the
high industrial concentration, represented by the FIAT, in relation to which the military production
is highlighted. The situation is so described: “The principal industries of Turin are the manufacture of motor
and mechanical construction in general; aircraft construction, forrous and non-forrous metal fabrication for the motor,
shipbuilding and aircraft industries; artificial silk; heavy chemical and pharmaceutical products. […] The engineering and
52
ISTORETO, NA, Rg. 243 in copy from the National Archives.
58
Beyond the industrial complexes, the city is considered as an important M/Y of north-west Italy,
represented by the Lingotto railway station and by the railway intersection linked to the station:
“ The main railway target is the Lingotto Marshalling Yard (T 64 B) situated south of the city. The Yard controls traffic to
France via the Mont Cenis Tunnel, position at the Italian end of the Mont Cenis53” (sic). From these reports, it
emerges that Turin had deserved a particular attention, not only for its industrial targets, but even
for its strategic geographical position which made it a concentration of military units and a resources
pole.
53
ISTORETO, NA, Rg. 243 in copy from the National Archives.
59
The Bombings on Turin. The First Phase - June 1940 – September 1941.
The first phase of the bombings on Turin, conducted by the British Bomber Command, must be
contextualised into the broader strategical context of the bombing doctrine adopted by the RAF. As
explained previously, the Bomber Command, between 1940 and 1942, decided to adopt a “precision
bombing” strategy in order to hit military and industrial targets, but sparing the civil population from
the bombs.
Between June 1940 and September 1941, Turin was a target of few and limited bombings with only
twelve raids. This because, considering that the RAF bombers had to take off from England to bomb
Northern Italy with all the logistical difficulties that we have talked about previously 54, it is
understandable why the bombings during this phase were not that massive and destructive.
With the precision bombing doctrine, the British pilots were instructed to spot and hit the military
and industrial targets, which for Turin corresponded to the FIAT industries located between
Mirafiori and Lingotto districts, in the southern part of the city. Indeed, all the raids during this
phase had as target always the FIAT Mirafiori and/or the FIAT Lingotto.
Thanks to the Italian Firefighter Corps records, it is possible to rebuild the accurate location of the
bombings on Turin during the war. The firefighters who were engaged at the forefront during the
raids, doing their best, many times over their real possibilities, recorded every single intervention
they had to do, usually with the accurate location. This allows to map the bombings on Turin very
accurately.
What emerges from the visualisation of the first bombing on Turin, performed by nine RAF Whitley
bombers during the night between 11th and 12th June 1940 on FIAT Mirafiori, which was also the
54
See chapter: “The Bombing Strategies. The Precision Bombing, pp. 8-10.
60
first bombing on Italy, is that the target was not spotted at all. On the contrary, the British bombers
dropped the bombs on some central districts which were not target of the bombings and other
bombs fell even on Settimo Torinese a town located in Turin’s city belt. Other bomb clusters were
in the southern part of Turin but not on the FIAT Mirafiori which was southerner. However, the raid
55
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
61
62
The lack of precision of the British bombers is evident even from the raid made on the 6th September
1940. In that occasion, the British pilots had as target the FIAT Lingotto, located in the southern part
The six Whitley bombers, that reached the city, were able to hit the southern part of Turin, apart
from one bomb cluster located on the western part of the city near the district of “Pozzo Strada”,
but the British missed the target again, as the other few bomb clusters are located elsewhere.
63
64
A quite significant change happened with the raid of 8th-9th November 1940. Even this time the raid
target was the FIAT Mirafiori and twelve Whitley reached Turin. The visualisation of the bombing
shows that the British pilots were able to hit the mission target but, at the same time, they dropped
the bombs on many other city districts not related to the target. The spreading of the bomb clusters
from central districts to other districts located in both the western and southern part of the city, as
well as one bomb cluster located even in Moncalieri (a town in Turin’s city belt), demonstrates again
the ineffectiveness of the precision bombing strategy, since those districts were densely populated
and so they were certainly not the target of the bombers, considering that the Bomber Command
was trying to spare the civil population from the bombs. Moreover, one interesting aspect that
emerges from this raid is that, despite the bombs fell on populated districts, the casualties were
very limited with only one dead and six wounded. 56 This data allows us to claim not only the lack of
precision of the bombers, but also the scarce destructiveness of these type of raids.
56
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
65
66
The bombing of 4th December 1940 does not add anything to what we have stated about the
precision bombing, besides the concentration of the bomb clusters on the southern part of the city
and on the western one and that the twelve British bombers caused one dead and eight wounded 57.
57
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
67
68
The following year opened with the raid performed on Turin by the Bomber Command on 11 th
January 1941. This raid, in comparison to the ones of the previous year, shows more bomb clusters
in different city areas. Despite the British had not changed their bombing doctrine yet, the six
Whitley which participated to the raid were able to drop bombs on various areas of the centre. From
the GIS map it is possible to observe a circular bomb cluster surrounding the central city area, with
areas hit even close to the Po river in the eastern part of the city and the Dora river in the northern
one.
69
70
From the broader perspective map, it is possible to observe bomb clusters on areas far from the city
of Turin, as the ones in the hills located in the south. Both these maps and the bomb clusters
comfirm again the lack of accuracy of the precision bombing strategy, since the raid hit again not
relevant military and industrial targets. The action, however, caused three dead and six wounded.58
58
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
71
72
The Bomber Command returned on Turin again on 13th January 1941 and on 11th September 1941,
without causing significant casualties and damages and then never until October 1942, when the
The twelve raids performed by the RAF between June 1940 and September 1941 caused a total
number of “only” 37 dead and 65 wounded with limited damages to the city, which are
understandable, considering all the problematics behind the precision bombing and the logistical
Nevertheless, the GIS visualisation of the bombings on Turin, during this phase, confirms the lack of
accuracy of the precision bombing and its relative ineffectiveness, but moreover the GIS shows that
the bombers were not only unable to spot the right targets but that, in many occasions, they
dropped bombs on central areas of the city, mistaking entirely what was their mission purpose of
not hitting central and densely populated city areas and, consequently, killing civilians.
59
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
73
The Bombings on Turin. The Area Bombing Phase - November 1942 – August 1943
After the bombings of September 1941, the British Bomber Command decided not to hit Turin
anymore for over a year. Bombing Turin and, more in general Northern Italy, was extremely
complicated and demanding, and the limited results achieved by the Bomber Command were not
comparable to the enormous costs of these missions. As we have already discussed previously,
most of the attention of the Allies, during this period, was concentrated on Southern Italy, as
bombing Southern Italy was a part of the war in the Mediterranean theatre.
Nevertheless, by October 1942, the Allies reached the decision to start again a massive bombing
campaign on Northern Italy and on so, on Turin too. The new bombing campaign was inspired by
the area bombing basis. The British Bomber Command, who had already applied with significant
success this new bombing doctrine on the German cities in spring 1942, was ready to reapply it on
The area bombing, as we have previously described, was carried out with the purpose of deliberately
hitting and terrorising the civil population. Due to this purpose, the bombers aiming point, rather
than being on specific targets such as the industries, became the city centre and the most populated
city areas, so that the chances to hit the civilians could increase.
Turin started to be hit with the area bombing on 18th November 1942 by 71 bombers. The quality
lead of the bombing in terms of destructiveness was certified by the number of casualties caused
by the bombers: 42 dead and 72 wounded, who, in only one night were already more than the total
60
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
74
Besides that, the GIS visualisation of the bombing allows to show the specific aspects of the area
bombing.
It is possible to observe from the map the spreading of the bomb clusters.
The bomb clusters accuracy level showed on the map legend has the following meaning: the
“maximum accuracy level”, represented by the red box pin, means that the data taken from the
firefighters record were recorded the highest possible accuracy. This means that we know the street
and the civic number of the intervention, an information that allows us to rebuild exactly where the
bombs fell. The “minor accuracy level”, represented by the blue box pin, means that the data taken
from the firefighters record are less accurate. Thus, this means that we know the street of the
intervention, without knowing the exact civic number. This allows us to rebuild where the bombs
fell on the street, but without knowing the exact location, an information that would require to
Considering this, from the map it emerges that more areas were hit by the bombers, hence
demonstrating the higher intensity of this raid in comparison with the previous ones. One
interesting aspect, that emerges from the map, is that rather than being concentrated on the city
centre, which was the main target, the bomb clusters were located all around the city, with a
concentration on the “Cit Turin” district, a district close to the city centre but not “the city centre”.
The city centre itself has some bomb clusters, but less than other districts located in the southern
75
This allows us to consider that despite being an area bombing raid, this bombing was relatively
dispersive in comparison to what the area bombing was able to do on the German cities 61.
Moreover, various FIAT sections were hit, and many linked industries were hit too62
61
A clear example of what the area bombing could cause is demonstrated by the bombing of Cologne on 31st May 1942.
On that day, 1.047 British bombers dropped 1.478 tons of bombs, causing 469 dead and devastating the city centre in
barely half of an hour. For the following five days the city was covered by an acrid smoke. Data taken from Giorgio
Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia, pp. 125-126.
62
Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al 1945 (Milano: Mursia, 1970),
p. 155.
76
77
Actually, the British had just started their area bombing campaign on Turin. Indeed, the area
bombing on 20th November 1942 will be quite catastrophic for the city and its population. In that
occasion, 198 bombers among Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster, plus the Wellington, dropped 100.000
four pounds incendiary bombs and one thirty pounds incendiary bomb, in addition to a mass of
fragmentation bombs (50 per cent of the overall number), including the 4.000 pounds bombs 63. As
predictable, the damages were extremely heavy both in the centre and in the suburbs, but Turin,
despite being desolated, avoided a real catastrophe thanks to its squared and geometric planimetry
with wide avenues and squares. Nevertheless, 117 civilians died and 120 were wounded. Only three
The GIS visualisation allows to show the devastation level of Turin on 20th November. The data taken
from the firefighters records are from the night of the 20th November, when the bombing effectively
happened, and from the following twenty-four hours, since the raid forced the firefighters, as well
as the other appointed institutions, to work continuously even during the following days. In
comparison with the bombing of 18th November, it is evident that this time practically the entire
city was hit by the bombs. The map shows well the destructiveness of a well-made area bombing.
Turin was effectively covered by bombs, as the bomb clusters are located on almost all the central
63
Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia, p. 156.
64
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
78
79
A zoom to the city centre allows to visualise better the impact of the bombing on the centre. It is
possible to observe significant bomb clusters in the centre, which allow to confirm the deliberate
intention of hitting the city centre, but moreover it is evident the deliberate intention of practically
hitting any populated area in the city with no distinction, as there are many other bomb clusters
scattered all around the city, such for example the ones close to the railway stations of Porta Nuova
80
81
The month of November 1942 ended with other two heavy raids performed on the 28th and the
30th. On 28th November, the 194 British bombers dropped for the first time on an Italian city two
8.000 pounds blockbusters65. The raid caused 67 dead and 83 wounded and only three bombers
were shot down66. The 30th November raid was relatively light since only eighteen bombers could
reach Turin, causing sixteen dead and fifteen wounded 67. Because of these raids, roughly 300.000
civilians, half of the population of Turin, evacuated the city on their own initiative, trying to run away
from the bombings, anticipating the instructions that soon will be announced by Mussolini himself68.
Indeed, on 2nd December 1942 Mussolini, speaking for the last time at the House of Fasces and
Corporations (the formal fascist Lower House), provided data about the current area bombing
campaign on Northern Italy. According to the official data about Turin, 161 houses resulted
destroyed, 874 were heavily damaged and 2.195 were lightly damaged69. Probably the data are
Moreover, the dictator encouraged the civil population of the hit cities to evacuate from the urban
areas to seek refuge in the countryside during the night. This declaration had the effect of lowering
down even more the civilians’ morale, as it was perceived as the only possible solution and a sort of
“save yourselves”, revealing even more the great unpreparedness of the regime to protect the civil
65
Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia, p. 156.
66
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
67
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
68
Claudia Baldoli, Marco Fincardi, Italian Society Under Anglo-American Bombs: Propaganda,
Experience and Legend, 1940-1945, in The Historical Journal (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2009, p. 1037.
69
Marco Patricelli, L'Italia sotto le bombe. Guerra aerea e vita civile 1940-1945 (Roma:
Laterza, 2007), p. 123.
82
In addition, the Duce accused the Allies of making atrocious barbarian acts, so trying to incite the
civil population to hate the enemy even more and hoping to achieve some success in terms of
propaganda.
The area bombings on Turin restarted on the 8th December 1942, when 118 bombers among
Lancaster, Halifax, Stirling and Wellington hit the city with great violence. The FIAT, the Lancia car
factory and other industrial locations were heavily damaged. Many 4.000 pounds blockbusters and
some 8.000 pounds ones gutted many central districts and the smoke columns raised to 2.5 Km of
height. Only one bomber was shot down. However, the British caused 212 dead and 111 wounded,
data that made this raid as the worst one from the beginning of the air war on Turin70.
The GIS map shows a concentration of bomb clusters on the city centre, accompanied by another
huge bomb cluster on the Borgo San Paolo district, a district located in the western part of the city.
An interesting aspect highlighted by the GIS visualisation is that despite one bombing target was the
FIAT, the GIS visualisation does not show any bomb cluster on the FIAT, which is in the southern
part of the city. This because there are not recorded interventions of the firefighters involving FIAT.
70
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
83
84
85
The following night, on 9th December 1942, the Bomber Command replied the same attack of the
previous night with 196 bombers, causing 73 dead and 99 wounded 71.
However, the summer of 1943 will be a nightmare for the population of Turin.
During the night of 13th July 1943, of the 295 Lancaster taken off from England, only 64 were able
to reach Turin. They were enough to drop 792 tons of bombs among fragmentation and incendiary
bombs, in barely 40 minutes, causing 792 dead and 914 wounded 72. Until that time, it was the most
devastating air raid of the entire air war. The mixture of blockbuster bombs and incendiary bombs
saturated so much some districts that the effect of the fires was visible even from Novara, that
That time the RAF bombers were able to concentrate well their bombing on the central area of the
city. The numerous central bomb clusters allow us to consider that the British pilots sharpened their
accuracy after the several missions they performed on Turin. It is possible to claim this if we compare
the location of the bomb clusters of this raid with the ones made in November where, despite they
were area bombings too, the concentration of bomb clusters in the centre is less evident. The area
bombings of November were still made hitting different areas of the city not essentially linked with
71
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
72
Cfr. ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08; Giorgio Bonacina,
Obiettivo: Italia, p. 204.
86
87
A zoom on the central area of the city allows to visualise better the entity and the concentration of
Considering that “only” 64 bombers were able to bomb Turin, fewer than the number of bombers
of the raids made in the previous autumn, when for example on 8th December 1942 there were 118
bombers and on 20th November 1942 there were 198, the 64 Lancaster were able to cause far more
This was possible, probably, thanks to their better accuracy, showed by the GIS, and their ability to
Thus, in this occasion the area bombing was successful, matching with its purposes of hitting
indiscriminately the civil population and causing devastating damages to the buildings, both aspects
carried out by concentrating the bombs in the space and in the time, as happened for example on
After the fall of the fascist regime on 25th July 1943, the Allies decided to increase the intensity of
their area bombings on Northern Italy and consequently on Turin too, in order to force the new
government to sign the armistice. As we have seen previously, the main purpose of the Allied area
bombing campaign on Northern Italy was to knock Italy out of the war. Overall, the August bombing
campaign was even heavier than the one of the previous months and this despite the civil population
hoped that to the fall of the regime corresponded even the end of the war.
Thus, Turin was hit on 8th August, on 13th August and on 17th August 1943. The three raids caused
43 dead and 218 wounded, far less than the 13th July raid. These actions concluded the area bombing
campaign on Turin. Overall, from November 1942 to August 1943, the Bomber Command caused
73
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
88
89
In conclusion, the GIS visualisation of the area bombings on Turin confirms the increase of
destructiveness of these raids in comparison with the previous precision bombing phase. This is
possible to see from all the maps related to this phase as they show more bomb clusters than before.
In addition, the GIS is able to show that despite the area bombings were supposed to be made on
the city centre of Turin in order to increase the casualties and the damages, sometimes the raids
were not that concentrated. This happened for example during the area bombings of November, as
demonstrated by the maps. Finally, the visualisation of the heaviest area bombing of the 13th July
1943 shows a possible increase of accuracy of the British pilots, as that time, thanks to the map, the
raid appears as very concentrated on the city centre. This would explain also the high number of
casualties since, on that occasion, the number of bombers was even smaller in comparison with the
90
The Bombings on Turin. The Final Phase - September 1943 – April 1945
After the Armistice and the consequent occupation of Central-Northern Italy by the Germans,
including the city of Turin, the Allied bombing strategy on the city changed again. After the bombing
of the 17th August 1943 and until the 8th November 1943, the city was spared by the Allies and the
With the beginning of the Operation Pointblank, Turin became again a bombing target and the city
began to experience the tremendous American daylight air raids, which were not less traumatic
In the context of the Operation Pointblank, which had as main purpose the destruction of the entire
German military, economic and logistical system, the Northern Italian industries exploited by the
Reich became a relevant target. Thus, the target was no longer the civil population and consequently
the centre of the cities as during the area bombings, but delimited targets, relevant for the military
In Turin, this delimited area was located into the southern peripheral part of the city, where was
situated the huge M/Y of the Lingotto, one of the most important in Northern Italy, with the nearby
FIAT Lingotto factories which were exploited by the Germans for military purposes.
However, in that moment, the most relevant target was the Riv factory, quite close to the FIAT
Lingotto, but in a northerner location. The Riv produced ball bearing which were fundamental for
the military production of ships, planes, tanks and vehicles. In the context of Pointblank, interrupting
this production was crucial for the Allies in order to weaken the German military capacities. Indeed,
91
the Riv workshops were a resource for the Germans, in both the factories of Turin and Villar Perosa
(40 Km from Turin), contributing with roughly the 20 per cent of the whole German needs 74.
Thus, on the 8th November 1943 81 American Flying Fortresses, taken off from Tunisia, dropped 183
tons of bombs on the Riv workshops, causing quite heavy damages which forced the Germans to
The bombing was quite accurate and caused 202 dead and 346 wounded 75. This huge number of
casualties is interesting whether we consider that the civilians were not the main target of the raid.
Actually, the Americans hit a densely populated worker’s district developed surrounding the
factories and partially destroyed even the nearby Molinette Hospital. It is necessary also to say that
the civil population of Turin did not expect bombings anymore and, since the civilians never
experienced a daylight raid, they remained imprudently in the streets even when the alarms
The GIS visualisation of the raid shows that effectively the bombing was quite accurate and that the
Nevertheless, it is possible to observe even some bomb clusters located very far from the main
target. This means that the Americans hit also other areas of the city not relevant for their mission
74
Ferdinando Pedriali, L’Operazione Point Blank. L’attacco all’industria italiana dei cuscinetti a rotolamento nel 1943-
1944, in Storia Militare, (Parma: Edizioni Storia Militare, Vol. 163, 2007), p. 7.
75
ASCT, Archivio Fotografico – Ufficio Protezione Antiaerea, 1945_9F02-06 e 2031_9F02-08.
92
93
A zoom on the hit area shows the location of the bomb clusters. It is evident the presence of many
bomb clusters in the area surrounding the FIAT Lingotto and more precisely were the Riv workshops
were located. This confirms that the Americans, while spotting the northerner Riv workshops,
bombed even the populated surrounding areas, hence causing such a high number of casualties.
94
95
The Americans returned on Turin on the 1st December 1943, performing another heavy bombing
This time the hit areas were concentrated on the Lingotto M/Y and the Riv workshops were quite
spared by the bombs. However, the raid caused 101 dead and 74 wounded76.
The GIS visualisation of this raid shows a long stripe of bombing clusters located close to the big M/Y
It is evident from the map that the Americans, trying to spot the Lingotto M/Y, hit many populated
areas adjacent to the M/Y. This could explain the high number of casualties as well as the difficulty
of spotting the right target by the Americans, who actually once again caused many civilian
casualties while trying to hit a military relevant target. This aspect is even confirmed by the bomb
clusters located on the hills surrounding Turin and more precisely on the district of Cavoretto, a
place that had nothing to do with both the Lingotto M/Y and the Riv workshops.
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97
However, the Allies believed that they had to perform another raid to destroy the Riv workshops
production.
The final hit to the Riv workshops was inflicted on the 3rd January 1944. On that day Americans Flying
Fortresses of the 15th AF hit both the Villar Perosa Riv workshops and the Turin’s ones. In Turin the
Americans hit also again the Lingotto M/Y and the factories of Via Nizza, causing damages and 16
This raid, which was less heavy than the previous ones carried out by the Americans, results less
Nevertheless, it is possible to observe some bomb clusters even on areas that had nothing to do
with the mission target, such for example the ones on Parella, Campidoglio and Barriera di Milano
districts, demonstrating again the impossibility of having a 100 per cent accurate bombing on a
specific target.
The zoomed map allows to visualise the bomb clusters on the mission target. As we have already
stated, there are fewer bomb clusters in comparison with the previous raids. However, it is evident
that the Americans bombed even populated areas of the city, as showed by the map, since the bomb
clusters are located in the populated working class districts close to both the factories and the M/Y.
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99
100
Despite this raid, the Germans were able to move again the Riv workshops and restart part of their
production in Orbassano, a town in the southern city belt of Turin. The site will be hit and destroyed
by the Americans on the 24th July 1944, with a raid that will cause 122 dead and 118 wounded 78.
In the first half of 1944 Turin endured other heavy daylight American raids. Some of them were
concentrated on the usual Lingotto M/Y targets. Other raids were still part of the Operation
Pointblank and had the purpose of interrupting the FIAT production of planes and preventing the
Germans to transfer machineries and workforce involved in the military production in more
The raid of 4th June 1944 is one of the last examples of a massive American action on Turin.
On that occasion the Americans concentrated their action again on the Lingotto M/Y and on the
Despite this, the GIS map shows that the bombing was quite inaccurate, since there are many bomb
clusters on other areas of the city. Indeed, most of the bomb clusters are on other areas, as for
example on the Crocetta district and the Borgo San Paolo district, as well as we can find bomb
clusters on other towns in the city belt, such as Grugliasco and Beinasco.
The following raids of 22nd June 1944 and the already mentioned raid of 24th July 1944 were the last
From August 1944 until the end of the war, the Americans returned on Turin only with a few planes,
no more than seven, mostly performing small scale raids with machine guns and dropping few
bombs. Consequently, the victims were also very limited. Indeed, the victims of these type of raids,
from August 1944 to April 1945 (with the only exception which we will tell about below), were “only”
17 dead and 22 wounded 80. From the firefighters reports it emerges also that these raids, due to
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their nature of being fulfilled with machine-guns, did not cause practically any damage to the
buildings and in fact the fire-fighters themselves were involved only in interventions to rescue
102
103
The only exception to this practice was a raid made on the 4th April 1945, one of the latest on Turin.
In that occasion, 32 American bombers attacked Turin, causing 70 dead and 128 wounded81.
The GIS map shows that the bombing was concentrated on the southern part of the city, probably
against the Lingotto M/Y. This because on April 1945 the Allies’ main bombing purpose was to hit
the German communication lines in order to disturb the Wehrmacht withdrawing forces.
Nevertheless, the Americans caused once again heavy civilian casualties. Thus, it is again evident
that any air raid conducted by a reasonable consistent number of bombers would have caused
significant civilian casualties, even when the civilians were not the bombing target.
As the war was ending, Turin was target of a machine-gun raid, a final time on 24th April 1945 by
one American plane which did not cause any casualty or damage.
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105
Overall, the American bombing campaign on Turin, started in autumn 1943 and ended in April 1945,
caused 631 dead and 895 wounded, demonstrating that the Americans were able to cause quite
significant civilian casualties despite not performing the area bombing and despite not having as a
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Conclusions
It is necessary now to take stock of the work done. The GIS analysis of both the bombing war on
Regarding the bombings on Italy, the GIS analysis allowed a better visualisation of all the phases and
the bombing variables that the raids had. Despite being made with a higher perspective, the GIS
Regarding the bombings on Northern Italy, the GIS allowed to visualise the evolution of the raids
made by the Bomber Command. It was possible to observe the increase of the raids’ intensity from
the first limited bombings of 1940-41 to the tremendous area bombing campaign of 1942-43.
Moreover, the GIS allowed to show the lack of precision of the precision bombing and especially its
level of the inaccuracy, as it was possible to observe wrong bombed places and their location in
relationship with the mission targets. This spatial reflection adds meaning to the traditional
Regarding the bombings on Southern Italy, the GIS visualisation allowed to observe the different
bombing variables of the raids occurred in Southern Italy. In particular, it was possible to observe
quite clearly the more intense and practically non-stopping bombing campaign that the British
conducted from 1940 until the Armistice, accompanied from January 1943 by the American
The GIS was able to show even the higher spread of the bombings on Southern Italy in comparison
with the raids on Northern Italy. It emerged that Southern Italy did not experience only a more
intense bombing campaign, at least until the starting of the massive area bombing campaign on
Northern Italy, but it experienced an even more spread bombing campaign, as the spreading of the
bombings is clearly located in many areas of Sicily, Campania and Calabria, whereas the bombings
107
on Northern Italy, even during the area bombing phase, were always more concentrated on the
mission targets.
This aspect, as already discussed, was even the consequence of different bombing practises which
were implemented on Southern Italy only, such as the “missions of opportunity” and the “nuisance
raids”.
Regarding the last phase of the bombings on Italy, after the September 1943 Armistice, the GIS
visualisation allowed to show the bombings that on this phase were concentrated mainly on the
Italian M/Y and the railway stations in order to interrupt the German supply lines. It was possible to
observe the extension of the bombings on the railway lines, as well as the other bombings occurred
Overall, the GIS analysis is accompanied by an accurate dataset contained in the appendixes, which
adds information to the maps such as the unit, the type and number of the bombers involved in
each raid, as well as the shot down bombers, the mission target and the bombing result. This dataset
adds depth to the maps, allowing to have a better understanding of each raid and to know
accurately all the relevant information. Moreover, it allows to see whether the mission target was
reached or not. It adds also information about where the bombs fell, and which parts of the cities
were hit.
Regarding the bombings on Turin, the GIS analysis has been conducted on a more zoomed level in
order to put in relationship the bombing strategies and their actual application, in order to highlight
The GIS visualisation allowed to show the evolution of the air war on Turin from the first very limited
precision bombing raids, passing through the subsequent area bombing phase and eventually
108
The GIS spatial analysis demonstrated the general lack of precision of the bombers, a constant that
The GIS visualisation allowed to visualise the great lack of precision of the precision bombing raid,
confirming what we already knew from the traditional historiography as, from the maps, it is
possible to observe the presence of bomb clusters on different areas of the city that had nothing to
The GIS visualisation of the area bombing phase allowed to show the evident increase of intensity
and destructiveness of this type of raid in comparison with the precision bombing doctrine, a data
which is even confirmed by the great increase of casualties caused by the raids.
Moreover, an interesting aspect highlighted by the GIS is that even the area bombing, despite being
conducted on the city centre, as the aiming point for the bombers was to cause as more casualties
as possible, was far from being accurate. The maps of the 18th November, the 20th November and
the 8th December 1942 show that despite the presence of many bomb clusters located in the city
centre, there also many bomb clusters located in other parts of the city and even in other less
The reasons behind this lack of precision could be the same as the ones for the precision bombing,
such for example, the rudimental navigation and sighting bomber systems and the fact that the raids
were made in the night. This despite the technological advances that we have described in a
dedicated chapter83.
Lastly, the GIS visualisation of the bombings on Turin conducted by the Americans after the
83
See the chapter on pp. 34.36
109
Despite the American bombing campaign was conducted on selected targets, such as the Riv
workshops and the Lingotto M/Y, the practice of hitting other areas of the city remains evident.
This would explain even the great number of civilian casualties caused by the Americans, in a phase
Regarding the bombings on Italy, a possible further research path could be followed by having
access to the British sources contained in the British National Archives, in order to see what could
The impact of COVID-19 did not allow to have access to the British archives, limiting the research
only to the Italian local archives of Turin. Moreover, even a research based with the Italian archives
would benefit from the analysis of the data contained in both the Italian Central State Archive (the
equivalent of the British National Archives), as well as the data contained in the Italian Air Force
Archive, both located in Rome. The access to these archives was not possible due to the COVID-19
pandemic too.
Regarding the bombings on Turin, a possible further research path could be followed by exploiting
data contained into the firefighters’ reports, the main source used to create the GIS maps.
The reports state the length of each intervention which the firefighters had to fulfil and so it would
be interesting to make a reflection based on the length of the intervention in order to see the
different impact of the bombings on each bombed place. This would allow to create maps that could
show the intensity of the bombings starting from the damages perspective, putting these maps in
Even a more long-term research based on the Turin’s local archives would allow to gather more
material in order to create different layer maps, adding more meaning to the existing bombing
maps.
110
In conclusion, this work provides a contribution both to the Italian historical literature on the topic,
since it adds a spatial perspective to the traditional studies, allowing to make spatial reflections, and
to the British literature, since, as mentioned in the introduction, the latter offers a rather scarce
111
Appendix A
This list of tables shows the bombings on Italy with relevant details. The first column shows the date
of the raid. When there is a N, it means that the raid was made during the night and the date is the
one that precede the midnight (e.g. 11th/06/40 N, night between 11th and 12th June 1940). The
second column shows the bombed location. The third column shows the planes involved in the
bombing. When it is possible, it is indicated the number of planes used for the raid, the number of
the planes which reached the target and the number of casualties (e.g. 5/3/1: 5 planes departed, 3
arrived on the target, 1 shot down). The bold text means that a unique formation departed to hit
multiple targets. The fourth column shows the mission target. The last column shows the bombing
effects. When on a) it is written “target” it means that the target mission has been hit (e.g. Target
and city (S.Filippo) it means that have been hit the specific mission target and areas of the city,
All the tables have been translated from Italian into English.
Data taken from Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate l’Italia. Storia della guerra di
112
Date Place Airplanes Target a) Damages
b) Victims
c) Notes
11/6/40 N Torino Raf Bc 36/9/2 Fiat Mirafiori a) City
Genova Raf Bc 36/2/2 b) 17
13/6/40 N Genova Faa 9 Fuel depots c) Bombs even on Novi Ligure airport
Savona-Vado Aa 8 Refineries
Ligure Aa 1
Venezia Porto
Marghera
15/6/40 N Genova Milano Raf Hf 8/1/0 Aa? Ansaldo, Piaggio a) City
Livorno Raf Hf? b) 2
Aa a) City (Port)
16/6/40 N Milano Raf Hf 22/8/0 Aircraft factories a) City
Genova Raf Hf 22/3/0 Caproni, Macchi c) Bombs even on Monza
(Va), Savoia
Marchetti (Sesto
Calende)
Ansaldo, Piaggio
21/6/40 N Livorno Aa a) City (hotel and beach resort)
c) the airplanes are spotted by a rudimental
Italian radar
13/8/40 N Milano Raf Bc 35/3/1 Officine Caproni a) City (Headquarters of «Popolo d’Italia»
Torino Raf Bc 35/12/1 Fiat Mirafiori newspaper)
b) 15
a) City
c) Bombs even on Tortona and Alessandria
113
11/1/41 N Torino Raf Bc a) City
b) 3
12/01/41 N Venezia Porto Raf Bc a) Lagoon (two ships hit)
Refineries
Marghera
12/01/41 N Torino Raf Bc a) City
Fiat b) 1
2/8/40 N Cagliari Faa HMS Port and Elmas Airport a) Target e city
Ark Royal b) 1
14/12/2
13/8/40 N Augusta Faa Malta Port b) 15
9/9/2 a) City
a) Target
11/11/40 N Taranto Faa HMS Port a) Target (battleships Duilio, Littorio and
Illustrious Cavour heavily damaged)
21/15/2
114
22/11/40 N Bari Raf Malta Port a) City
10 b) 1
2/12/40 N Napoli Raf Malta a) Eastern industrial area, S.Giovanni a
10 Teduccio
8/1/41 N Napoli Raf Malta Port and M/Y a) Targets and city (battleship Giulio
Palermo 8/8/0 Cesare damaged,
Raf Malta Borgo Loreto, Rione Carità, gasometer)
b) 5
115
18/7/41 N Palermo Raf Malta Port
Catania Raf Malta
116
31/10/41 N Napoli Raf Malta Industrial area c) Bombs even on Palermo
14
7/11/41 N Brindisi Raf Malta Port a) Target and city
b) 107
c) greater number of civilian casualties
caused by an aerial bombing on an Italian
city from the beginning of the war
10/11/41 N Napoli Raf Malta Industrial area a) Target and city (Imam, port, Borgo
Brindisi 20/?/1 Loreto, Forcella, Secondigliano, S.Giovanni
Raf Malta Teduccio)
b) 16
19/10/41 N Napoli Raf Malta Port and Airport a) City (Port, Eastern industrial area)
Brindisi Raf Malta Port c) Nuisance raid
a) Target and city
b) 1
27/11/41 N Napoli Raf Malta Royal Arsenal a) Target, M/Y, industrial area and city
21
4/12/41 Messina Raf Malta Ferry Gate a) Target
Villa S. 4/4/1 M/Y
Giovanni Raf Malta
4/4/1
5/12/41 N Napoli Raf Malta Royal Arsenal a) Target and industrial area
20 b) 12
117
7/12/41 N Catania Raf Malta Airports a) Targets
8/8/2
10/12/41 Trapani Raf Malta Port a) Target
11/12/41 Catania Raf Malta Port a) Target
b) 3
12/12/41 Crotone Raf Malta
15/12/41 N Taranto Raf Malta Port a) Target (Royal Arsenal)
Brindisi Raf Malta a) Target and city (Cathedral)
13/2/42 N Catania Raf Malta 6 Airport c) Failed target, hit Biancavilla and
S.Maria Licodia (7 dead)
118
27/5/42 N Messina Raf Malta 8 Ferry Gate a) Target and city
30/5/42 N Messina Raf Malta 3 Ferry Gate a) Target and city (military hospital: 5 dead)
b) 1
22/10/42 N Genova Raf Bc Area bombing a) Historical centre, port and eastern
112/100/0 districts (Station Brignole, shipyards,
Pammatone hospital, S.Maria
della Passione,
119
S.Silvestro, S.Agostino, Palazzi Spinola,
Tursi, S.Giorgio and Ducale, Sottoripa)
b) 39
c) first raid of the new Bomber Command
cycle on Italy, in coincidence with the
offensive at El Alamein. Massive use of
incediary bombs. Bombs and incendiary
bombs even on Turin.
24/10/42 Milano Raf Bc Area bombing a) City (p.Tricolore, Stations Porta Genova
88/73/4 e Vittoria, Cemetery, S.Vittore, Edoardo
Bianchi, Hoepli) b) 171
c) first and only daylight area bombing on
Italy. Bombs and incendiary bombs even
on Novara.
7/11/42 N Genova Raf Bc Area bombing and Ansaldo a) Eastern districts and Ansaldo (Church of
175/143/6 the Annunziata, S.Chiara, Pal.Doria,
Spinola, Arcivescovile and of the linguistic
Academy, Sottoripa)
b) 23
9/11/42 N Cagliari Raf Malta Elmas and Decimomannu a) targets and surroundings
Airports b) 1
120
13/11/42 N Genova Raf Bc Area bombing and Ansaldo a) City and Ansaldo (M/Y Sampierdarena,
76/70/0 Rione Brignole, Ospedale Galliera, S.Siro,
S.Stefano, Pal.Spinola and
of the linguistic Academy, Loggia dei
Mercanti)
b) 10
15/11/42 N Genova Raf Bc Area bombing a) City and port (SS.Cosma and Damiano,
78/68/0 S.Siro, N.S.Assunta di Carignano,
Pal.Cattaneo)
b) 5
18/11/42 N Torino Raf Bc Area bombing, Fiat, a) City (Fiat Spa, Westinghouse, Nebiolo)
77/71/0 Arsenal b) 42
29/11/42 N Torino Raf Bc Area Bombing and Fiat a) City (Fiat Lingotto, Stipel, S.Giovanni
36/18/2 and Psichiatrico hospitals) and
surroundings
b) 16
121
8/12/42 N Torino Raf Bc Area bombing a) City (Fiat Grandi Motori, Fiat
133/118/1 Aeronautica, Fiat Mirafiori, Municipal hall,
Church Madonna di Campagna, S.Croce,
Alfieri theatre, Polytechnic and University,
Martini and Molinette hospitals)
b) 212
9/12/42 N Torino Raf Bc Area bombing a) City (Fiat Aeronautica, Fiat Officine
227/196/3 Riparazione, University, Police
headquarters, Oftalmico hospital)
b) 73
14/12/42 N Napoli Raf IX Bc 6 Port and steel plant Bagnoli a) Targets and city (Arsenal, M/Y,
refinery)
122
4/2/43 N Torino Raf Bc Area bombing a) City (Fiat Spa, Fiat Aeronautica, Fiat
188/156/3 Ricambi, Fiat Lingotto, Lancia, Riv,
University, Central district)
b) 29
17/2/1943 Cagliari 12ª Usaaf Elmas Airport a) City (Station, v.S.Efisio, S.Restituta)
43 b) 200
c) On the same day Americans B-25 bomb
erroneously Gonnosfanadiga town (ca.
100 dead)
20/2/43 N Palermo Raf Boccadifalco Airport a) Target and city (suburban districts)
123
24/2/43 N Napoli 9ª Usaaf 6 Port a) City and surroundings (Arenella, Bagnoli
e Pozzuoli)
b) 119
26/2/1943 Cagliari 12ª Usaaf Elmas Airport a) Target and city (Bonaria, Castello e
20/17/0 Stampace districts, Station, Municipal hall,
Police headquarters, Civic theatre, Civic
hospital, Bastione S.Remy)
b) 73
c) Primary target convoy at sea
28/2/1943 Cagliari 12ª Usaaf Port and Elmas airport a) Targets and city (V. Roma, Stampace,
47 Station, Palazzo Dogana)
b) 200
c) Prefecture indicates 411 civilian dead on
raids 26-28/2. Begins the evacuation of
the city
1/3/1943 Napoli 9ª Usaaf Port a) Target (ships hit) and city (University,
Palermo 19/9/1 Port Gesù e Maria hospital, v.Roma, p.Cavour)
12ª Usaaf b) 30
a) Target (ships and shipyards hit) and
city
124
24/3/43 N Messina Raf IX Bc Ferry Gate a) Target and city (Macello area, contrade
Catania Raf IX Bc Pian del Tiglio e Pompei)
b) 5
a) City (v.Villa S.Giuseppe)
b) 7
31/3/1943 Cagliari 12ª Usaaf Port a) Target (ships sunk) and city (Church of
24 Carmine, Station, S.Avendrace district)
b) 60
c) other formations bomb surrounding
airports
4/4/1943 Napoli 9ª e 12ª Capodichino Airport, Port a) Targets and city (Siap Conserve Cirio,
Siracusa Usaaf 99 and M/Y c.Vittorio Emanuele II, v.Medina,
? v.Forcella, v.Maffei, Borgo Loreto,
S. Pietro at Paterno, Secondigliano, Police
headquarters, General hospital) b) 225
a) City
b) 3
5/4/1943 Palermo 12ª Usaaf Boccadifalco Airport and a) Targets and city
Trapani 12ª Usaaf port b) 9
Milo and Chinisia Airports a) Targets and surroundings
125
11/4/1943 Napoli 9ª Usaaf Port and M/Y a) Targets and city
Trapani 22 Port b) 4
12ª Usaaf a) Targets (ships sunk) and city (Municipal
hall)
c) Bombs even on Marsala
13/4/1943 Trapani 12ª Usaaf Port and airports a) Targets and city
b) 20
c) Bombs even on Marsala
13/4/43 N La Spezia Raf Bc Area bombing a) Port and city (Salita Spallanzani, Bank
211/199/4 of Italy, Civic hospital)
b) 44
c) Bombs even on San Remo and Savona
16/4/1943 Catania 9ª Usaaf Port a) Target and city (d ella Rotonda area, v.
Palermo 12ª Usaaf Port Etnea, Pal. S.Demetrio e Carcaci, v.Idria)
b) 146
c) Begin of city evacuation
a) Target and city (Foro Italico, rioni
Castellammare, Tribunali and Ponte
Ammiraglio)
126
18/4/1943 Catania 9ª Usaaf MY a) Target and city
Palermo 12ª Usaaf Port, Boccadifalco Airport a) Targets and city (Brancaccio and other
Alghero 75+ and M/Y districts)
12ª Usaaf Fertilia Airport b) 20
18/4/43 N La Spezia Raf Bc Area bombing a) Port (destroyer Alpino sunk) and city
186/170/1 (Station, Municipal hall, Public market
b) 13
26/4/1943 Grosseto 12ª Usaaf Airport a) Target and city (Hospital, Luna park)
Bari Augusta 43 Airport Seaplane base b) 134
9ª Usaaf a) Target
62 9ª b) 2
Usaaf a) Target and city
b) 7
28/4/1943 Napoli 9ª Usaaf Port a) Target and city (Agip, Albergo di Russia,
Messina 25/22/1 Ferry Gate v. Monte di Dio, v. Gianturco)
Siracusa 9ª Usaaf Port b) 125
9ª Usaaf a) Target and city (Station)
a) Target and city
30/4/1943 Messina 9ª Usaaf Ferry Gate and M/Y a) Targets and city
1/5/1943 Reggio 9ª Usaaf Port
Calabria.
4/5/1943 Reggio Calabria 9ª Usaaf Airports a) Target and city
Taranto 9ª Usaaf Port a) Target and surrounding city
6/5/1943 Reggio Calabria 9ª Usaaf Port a) Target (ships sunk) and city (rioni
Trapani 12ª Usaaf Port Carmine, S.Caterina, Tre Mulini)
b) 200
a) Targets (ships sunk) and city
c) Bombs anche su Marsala
127
11/5/1943 Catania 9ª Usaaf Port a) Target and city (Civita and S.Cristoforo
50 districts, Prefecture,
Theatre Massimo area,
v.Etnea) b) 216
12/5/43 N Napoli Raf Nasaf Port and M/Y a) Targets and city (Vomero, Posillipo,
21 c.Vittorio Emanuele II, v.Medina,
psychiatric hospital)
13/5/1943 Cagliari 12ª Usaaf Port and M/Y a) Targets and city (nearly all the districts
Augusta 196 Port b) 30
9ª Usaaf a) Target and city
b) 19
13/5/1943 Italian-Germans forces surrendered in Tunisia. End of the North African Campaign
13/5/43 N Cagliari Raf Nasaf
23
14/5/1943 Civitavecchia 12ª Usaaf Port a) Target and city (Station, Cathedral,
Bank of Italy)
b) 295
21/5/1943 Reggio Calabria 9ª Usaaf Port and Airport a) Target and city (p.Italia, p.Mercato,
Villa S. 9ª Usaaf Ferry Gate Castel S.Anna, Orfanotrofio and
Giovanni Brefotrofio)
b) 100
b) 41
128
25/5/1943 Messina 9ª e 12ª Ferry Gate and MY a) Target (ships sunk) and city (v.I
Palermo Usaaf 100 Boccadifalco Airport Settembre, Civic hospital, viale S.Martino,
12ª Usaaf v. Risorgimento, Falcata and contarda
Cristo areas)
c) 260 civilians dead during the raids in
May
31/5/1943 Foggia 12ª Usaaf Airport and MY a) Targets and city (p.Cavour)
125 b) 150
21/6/1943 Napoli 12ª Usaaf M/Y and Cancello German a) Targets and city (Station, Arsenal,
Salerno 99/88/1 depot torpedo factory, gas workshop, Imam)
Reggio Calabria 12ª Usaaf M/Y b) 59
9ª Usaaf a) Target and city
28/6/1943 Livorno 12ª Usaaf Port, refinery and M/Y a) Targets and city
97 b) 252
28/6/43 N Messina Raf Nasaf Ferry Gate and M/Y
130
29/6/30 N Messina Raf Nasaf ferry Gate and M/Y
Reggio Calabria Raf Nasaf Airport
30/6/1943 Palermo 12ª Usaaf Boccadifalco Airport a) Target and city (University, hospital)
Trapani 12ª Usaaf Milo Airport b) 84
b) 123
8/7/43 N Catania Raf Nasaf Airports
9/7/43 N Catania Raf IX Bc
Siracusa Raf IX Bc Seaplane base and M/Y
131
12/7/1943 Reggio Calabria 9ª Usaaf Port, M/Y ferry Gate a) Targets and city
Villa S.Giovanni 89 M/Y b) 110
Messina 12ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target and city
Agrigento 79 b) 76
12ª Usaaf
58
12/7/43 N Torino Raf Bc Area bombing a) City (Fiat Ferriere, Grandi Motori,
Caltanisetta 295/64/13 Fonderie and Sima; Gradenigo, S.Giovanni
Enna Raf Nasaf and Mauriziano hospitals, Cottolengo,
Raf Nasaf Pal.Chiablese and University, Cemetery,
Centro, Vanchiglia, Regio Parco districts)
b) 792
c)Raid with the greatest number of planes
on an Italian city by the beginning of the
war. Greatest number of civilian casualties
on an Italian city by the beginning of the
war
13/7/43 N Napoli Raf Nasaf Capodichino Airport a) Target and city (Riviera di Chiaia, Caffè
Palermo Raf Nasaf Vacca)
Messina Raf Nasaf
43
14/7/1943 Messina 9ª e 12ª Ferry Gate and M/Y a) Target and city
Palermo Usaaf 212 c) On the same day American B-25 bomb
Enna 9ª Usaaf Paternò into the Catania plain
24 (400 dead)
9ª Usaaf
19
14/7/43 N Napoli Raf Nasaf Port and airport a) Targets and city
76/72/0
Capodichino and
Catania Raf IX Bc Pomigliano b) 1
132
15/7/1943 Napoli 12ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target (Central Station) and city (Royal
Foggia 81/72 Airports and M/Y Arsenal)
Villa S.Giovanni 9ª Usaaf b) 200
44 a) Targets and city (Poligrafico dello Stato)
12ª Usaaf b) Hundreds. Regarding te number of the
civilian casualties related to Foggia (in
particolar, of 15th and 22nd July, 19 and
25 august 1943) see the relative
paragraph, Chap. 10.
15/7/43 N Bologna Raf Bc Generating station a) Target (irrelevant damages) and city
Reggio Calabria 24/19/2 Port, M/Y and airport Ferry (v.Agucchi)
Villa S.Giovanni Raf Nasaf Gate b) 10
Crotone 32 Airport c) other three generating stations
Raf Nasaf attacked, with irrelevant damages:
26 Arquata Scrivia (Al), S. Polo d’Enza (Re),
Raf Nasaf Reggio Emilia. Bombs even on Alessandria
11 and Savona. Shuttle bombing GB- Algeria-
GB
133
17/7/1943 Napoli 9ª e 12ª M/Y a) Target, port, airport and city (Siap,
Reggio Calabria Usaaf Precisa, Navalmeccanica, Arsenal Reale,
374/344/8 S.Giovanni a Carbonara)
Raf IX Bc b) 60
c) Raid on an Italian city with the greatest
number of planes from the beginning of
the war.
22/7/1943 Foggia 12ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target (Station underpass) and city
Salerno 71 M/Y (Agip depot, historical centre, Ospizio)
12ª Usaaf b) Hundreds. Regarding the civilian
52 number of casualties related to Foggia (in
particolar, of 15th e 22nd july, 19th and
25th august 1943) see the relative
paragraph Cap. 10
134
23/7/1943 Crotone 12ª Usaaf Airport a) Target and surroundings
Reggio Calabria 72 Airport b) 1
Raf IX Bc
12ª Usaaf
Crotone Airport
71
135
11/8/1943 Terni 12ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target and city
b) 564
12/8/43 N Torino Raf Bc Area bombing a) City (Fiat Spa e Ricambi, Pal.Carignano,
Milano 152/142/2 Area bombing Molinette hospital, Theatre della Moda,
Raf Bc b) 18
504/478/3 a) City (Alfa Romeo, Fiera, Palazzo Marino,
Castello Sforzesco, S.Maria delle Grazie,
Theatre Manzoni, Duomo, Venezia,
Vittoria, Sempione, Garibaldi and Ticinese
districts )
b) 700 ?
c) Bombs even on Legnano (10 dead)
13/8/1943 Roma 12ª Usaaf M/Y S.Lorenzo and Littorio a) Targets and city (Tiburtino, Prenestino,
310/273/0 Tuscolano, Porta Maggiore, Casilino
districts, stations Tuscolana, Tiburtina,
Casilina, passenger train)
b) 502
14/8/43 N Milano Raf Bc Area bombing and Breda a) City (Breda, Pirelli, Innocenti, Isotta
140/134/1 Fraschini, Scalo Farini, Castello Sforzesco,
Palazzo Reale, S.Ambrogio, Theatres Dal
Verme and Verdi, Università Cattolica)
b) 9
c) Bombs even on Novara (14 dead)
15/8/43 N Milano Raf Bc Area bombing a) City (Duomo, Theatre alla Scala, State
199/186/7 Archive, Conservatory, Rinascente,
Centro, Magenta,
136
19/8/1943 Foggia 9ª e 12ª M/Y a) Target and city (all the districts,
Salerno Usaaf 233 M/Y Municipio, Ospedali riuniti, Cathedral)
12ª Usaaf b) Hundreds. For the number of civilian
victmins of the bombings of Foggia (in
particular, of 15th and 22nd July, 19 and
25 August 1943) see the relative
paragraph on Chap. 10
26/8/43 N Napoli Raf Nasaf Industrial area and M/Y a) Targets and cityu (Agnano, tunnel
51 Bagnoli Ferrovia cumana)
137
28/8/1943 Taranto 9ª Usaaf Port and airport
Terni 12ª Usaaf M/Y
76
2/9/1943 Bologna 12ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target and city (Manifattura Tabacchi,
Trento 81/74 M/Y Lame area)
Bolzano 12ª Usaaf M/Y Airport b) 30
Crotone 12ª Usaaf a) Target and city (p.Dante, Portela
12ª Usaaf district)
12 b) 200
a) Target and city (centre, Duomo)
a) Target and surroundings
138
8/9/43 N Potenza 9ª Usaaf
23/9/43 N Pisa Raf Nasaf 80 M/Y and Airport a) Targets and city (Borgo
Stretto)
24/9/1943 Pisa 12ª Usaaf 54 M/Y
24/9/43 N Livorno Raf Nasaf 80 Port
139
25/9/1943 Bologna 12ª Usaaf 113/71 M/Y a) Targets and city (historical
Firenze 12ª Usaaf 113/11 M/Y Campo di Marte centre, Bolognina areas and
Bolzano 12ª Usaaf 14 M/Y M/Y Ippodromo, Hospital
Verona 12ª Usaaf 6 Airport Maggiore)
Pisa 12ª Usaaf 12ª Usaaf Airport b) hundreds
Lucca a) Target and city
b) 218
c) Firenze bombed from
planes that cannot bomb
Bologna because of bad
weather conditions
21/10/1943 Genova 12ª Usaaf 153 Port and industrial a) Targets and city
area
23/10/1943 La Spezia 12ª Usaaf Port a) Target
c) Sunk cruiser Taranto to
prevent the Germans using it
to obstruck the offshore dyke
30/10/1943 Genova 12ª Usaaf 20 12ª M/Y and Ansaldo a) Targets and city
Savona-Vado Ligure Usaaf Port a) Target and city
Frosinone 12ª Usaaf b) 117
c) Bombs even on Varazze
and Imperia
140
1/11/1943 Rimini 15ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target and city
Ancona 12ª Usaaf 24 Port and M/Y b) 92
La Spezia 15ª Usaaf Port a) Targets (hit cruiser
Ottaviano Augusto in setting
up) and city (old city, prison
shelter)
b) 875
a) Target and city
2/11/1943 Ancona 12ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target and city (old city)
Zara 12ª Usaaf Port b) 1
a) Target and city
b) 200
141
9/12/1943 Terni 12ª Usaaf M/Y and industrial
area
15/12/1943 Trento 15ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target and city
Bolzano 15ª Usaaf M/Y b) 2
a) Target and city
b) 48
30/12/1943 Padova 15ª Usaaf 15ª Usaaf M/Y M/Y a) Target and city (Tempio
Rimini 15ª Usaaf 31 M/Y Malatestiano)
Ravenna b) 100÷200 dead on the raids
of 28, 29, 30/12
a) Target and city
142
b) 11
143
13/1/44 Roma 12ª e 15ª Usaaf Guidonia and a) Targets
Perugia 15ª Usaaf Centocelle Airports
Airport
144
28/1/44 Verona 15ª Usaaf M/Y
Ferrara 15ª Usaaf M/Y a) Target and
city
145
15/2/44 Montecassino 12ª e 15ª Usaaf 222 Benedectine Abbey a) Target
completely
destroyed
b) Hundreds of
victims among
the refugees
that took shelter
into the Abbey
16/2/44 Prato 15ª Usaaf M/Y
Siena 15ª Usaaf M/Y
146
18/3/44 Roma 12ª Usaaf a) City
Udine 15ª Usaaf (v.Nomentana,
Gorizia 15ª Usaaf General
Airports hospital,
Airport p.Bologna)
b) 100
a) Targets
a) Target
20/3/44 Terni 12ª Usaaf M/Y
22/3/44 Bologna 15ª Usaaf 134/88/0 M/Y a) Targets and
city
Rimini 15ª Usaaf 11 b) 200
Verona 15ª Usaaf c) Primary
Ravenna 15ª Usaaf target:
Verona
a) City
M/Y (S.Vitale)
M/Y b) 3
147
29/3/44 Torino 15ª Usaaf 100 M/Y and Fiat Lingotto a) Target and
Milano 15ª Usaaf 139 M/Y Lambrate city (General
Bolzano 15ª Usaaf M/Y Markets)
Ancona 15ª Usaaf b) 10
a) Target, città
e dintorni
(Segrate)
b) 59
a) Target and
city
b) 1
c) Ancona not
primary target
148
20/4/44 300 c) The bad
15ª Usaaf weather
15ª Usaaf forces many
15ª Usaaf planes to
15ª Usaaf renounce or to
Padova 15ª Usaaf M/Y bomb targets
Venezia Mestre M/Y of opportunity
Treviso M/Y a) Target and
Ancona M/Y city
Trieste Port
149
30/4/44 Milano 500 M/Y Lambrate and a) Targets, city
Alessandria 15ª Usaaf Breda (Innocenti,
Varese 15ª Usaaf M/Y v.Venini) and
Reggio Emilia 15ª Usaaf Macchi aeronautics surroundings
15ª Usaaf workshops (Cologno
Reggiane aeronautics Monzese)
workshops b) 40
a) Target and
city
a) Target and
city
b) 86
a) Target and
Firenze 12ª Usaaf M/Y Campo di Marte surrounding
districts
2/5/44 N Piacenza Raf Maaf 9 M/Y
Genova Raf Maaf 12
Livorno Raf Maaf 12 c) Bombs even
on La Spezia
150
12/5/44 730 c) Colpiti
15ª Usaaf anche altri
15ª Usaaf obiettivi
15ª Usaaf ferroviari
Reggio Emilia M/Y
(Chivasso -
La Spezia M/Y and port
To, 73 morti)
Ferrara M/Y
151
19/5/44 Genova 500 M/Y and port c) Hit other
La Spezia 15ª Usaaf M/Y and fuel depot minor targets
Livorno 15ª Usaaf Port a) Targets and
Bologna 15ª Usaaf M/Y city (historical
Venezia Porto Marghera 15ª Usaaf Refinery, fuel depots centre, Hospital
Rimini 15ª Usaaf M/Y S.Martino,
15ª Usaaf University,
S.Lorenzo)
b) 111
a) Target and
city
c) Bombs even
on Faenza
La Spezia Port
25/5/44 Venezia Porto Marghera 15ª Usaaf Refinery, fuel depots
Piacenza 15ª Usaaf Airport
4/6/44 Torino 15ª Usaaf 100 M/Y and Fiat Lingotto a) Target and
Genova 15ª Usaaf M/Y city (Lancia and
Savona-Vado Ligure 15ª Usaaf Port Fiat Spa,
Lingotto,
Crocetta,
S.Paolo
districts)
b) 54
a) Targets and
city (Voltri,
Sampierdarena,
Cornigliano,
S.Bartolomeo
del Fossato)
a) Target and
city
b) 7
4/6/44 The Allies enter Rome
5/6/44 Bologna 440 M/Y c) Hit other
Ferrara 15ª Usaaf M/Y miror railway
15ª Usaaf targets
a) Target snf
city (Madonna
del Soccorso)
a) Target
152
7/6/44 Genova 340 Voltri Bowls a) Target and
Savona-Vado Ligure 15ª Usaaf M/Y city
La Spezia 15ª Usaaf Port a) Target and
Livorno 15ª Usaaf Port city
15ª Usaaf b) 11
153
6/7/44 Verona 530 M/Y c) Hit other
Venezia Porto Marghera 15ª Usaaf Oil depots minor targets
Trieste 15ª Usaaf Refinery
Bergamo 15ª Usaaf Steelworks
15ª Usaaf
154
12,13,14/8/44 Costa ligure da Genova 15ª Usaaf Coastal batteries a) Bombs on
a Albenga different places
b) 150
c) Actions in
preparation for
the landing in
Provence
13/8/44 N Genova Raf Maaf 59 Port a) Target and
city (Palazzo
Reale, S.Siro)
b) 100 (included
the ones of the
daylight
13)
17/8/44 N Imperia Raaf Maaf Port
24/8/44 N Bologna Raf Maaf 76 M/Y a) Target and
city (S.Orsola
and Bolognina
areas)
b) 100
25/8/44 N Ravenna Raf Maaf 72 M/Y and canal a) Targets, city
(Duomo,
S.Francesco)
b) 20
26/8/44 N Pesaro Raf Maaf 66
28/8/44 N Pesaro Raf Maaf 40
31/8/44 N Ferrara Raf Maaf 74 M/Y
1/9/44 N Bologna Raf Maaf 76/67/0 M/Y a) Target and
city
(Bolognina, and
Arcovegggio
areas)
b) 100
2/9/44 N Ferrara Raf Maaf 78/2 M/Y
4/9/44 Genova 400 Port c) Hit other
Trento 15ª Usaaf M/Y railway
15ª Usaaf targets
a) Target (ships
and submarines
sunk) and city
(Theatre
C.Felice,
S.M. alle Grazie,
Palazzo
Arcivescovile)
b) hundreds
(143 in the
shelter Galleria
alle Grazie)
a) Target and
city
b) 4
a) Target and
Pavia 12ª Usaaf Town bridges
city
4/9/44 N Ravenna Raf Maaf 66 M/Y a) Target and
city
b) 20
5/9/44 Pavia 12ª Usaaf Town bridges a) Target and
city
5/9/44 N Ferrara Raf Maaf 62 M/Y
6/9/44 N Bologna Raf Maaf 67/48/1 M/Y a) Target and
city
(Certosa and
S.Donato areas)
9/9/44 N Ravenna Raf Maaf 77 M/Y a) Target and
city
b) 13
10/9/44 Trieste 15ª Usaaf 88 Port
155
10/9/44 N Milano Raf Maaf 71 M/Y Lambrate a) Target and
city
b) 52
12/9/44 Pavia 12ª Usaaf Town bridges a) Target and
city
12/9/44 N Bologna Raf Maaf 90/76/2 M/Y a) Target and
city
16/9/44 Bologna 12ª Usaaf M/Y a) City (Porta
Zamboni)
17/9/44 N Brescia Raf Maaf 93/2 M/Y
23/9/44 Pavia 12ª Usaaf Town bridges a) Target and
La Spezia 12ª Usaaf Port city
a) Target
c) Sunk for the
second time the
cruiser Taranto
to prevent the
Germans using
it to obstruct
the offshore
dyke
26/9/44 Pavia 12ª Usaaf Town bridges a) Target (Ponte
Vecchio) and
city
10/10/44 N Verona Raf Maaf 33 M/Y
11/10/44 Trieste 15ª Usaaf Port
Bologna 12ª Usaaf 123 Ammunitions depot a) Target and
hospitals area
Udine Airport
Vicenza 15ª Usaaf Airport a) Target, city
Verona 15ª Usaaf Airport and
surroundings
(Frazione
Laghetto)
b) 317
156
4/1/45 370+ M/Y c) Hit other
15ª Usaaf M/Y railway targets
15ª Usaaf M/Y
Verona
15ª Usaaf M/Y
15ª Usaaf
Vicenza a) Target and
city
b) 2
Bolzano
Trento
15/1/45 Treviso 15ª Usaaf M/Y
20/1/45 Trento 12ª Usaaf M/Y
20/1/45 N Udine Raf Maaf 93 M/Y
30/1/45 Trento 12ª Usaaf M/Y
7/2/45 Trieste 15ª Usaaf Port
Pola 15ª Usaaf 60 Fuel depots a) Target and
città
b) 4
157
15ª Usaaf M/Y
Udine
Padova
Ferrara
24/2/45 N Brescia Raf Maaf 74 M/Y
27/2/45 N Verona Raf Maaf 81 M/Y
28/2/45 680 c) Hit other
15ª Usaaf railway targets
15ª Usaaf in Austria and
15ª Usaaf in Italy
Verona M/Y
a) Target and
Brescia M/Y
city
Vicenza M/Y
b) 16
158
6/4/45 Verona 380+
Brescia 15ª Usaaf
15ª Usaaf M/Y
M/Y and Breda
Support the
ango-american
offensive in
Bologna area
without hitting
the city
23/4/45 N Verona 12ª Usaaf Airport
Bergamo 12ª Usaaf Airport
Trento 12ª Usaaf M/Y
Piacenza 12ª Usaaf M/Y
159
Appendix B
The following tables contain the firefighters reports consulted in the Archivio Storico dei Vigili del
Fuoco di Torino (Turin’s Firefighters Historical Archive) and used to create the GIS maps of the air
war on Turin.
The reports contain the number of the intervention column which starts from the first day of the
year, every year. Thus, for example, from the 1st January 1940 the interventions are numbered from
the number one and so on until the 31st December 1940 to restart again from the number one on
Then, there is the intervention time column which tells when the firefighters were alerted and had
to move to the interested place. Moreover, there is the nature of intervention column which
explains briefly what happened and what the firefighters had to deal with.
Successively, there is the return time column which tells when the firefighters returned to the base.
Eventually, there are the geographic coordinates columns, created manually in order to build the
When there are no geographic coordinates, it means that the report was not to the maximum level
of accuracy and so those reports were copied on another excel file to build the GIS maps. The
geographic coordinates were added once the reports were copied on the new excel file and not
For reasons of completeness we have displayed all the reports, not omitting even those concerning
interventions that, depending on the situation, certainly or probably were not related to the
All the reports have been translated from Italian into English.
160
161
Raid of 12/06/1940
Time
Settimo Torinese
359 14:20 Collision between car and tram in Via Po corner 14:00 7,690147 45,068147
360 02:00 Fire of paint department in Carello factory, in 06:05 7,679137 45,048489
Via Petrarca 30
361 02:25 Fire of gasometer hit by air bomb sliver, in 04:05 7,687128 45,077218
Corso 11 Febbraio
Raid of 06/09/1940
Time
538 01:40 Serious fire at M/Y in via Bisalta Unknown 7,667704 45,036306
539 02:08 Fire of auto workshop in Via Buenos Aires 03:55 7,647073 45,035311
Peschiera 213
162
Raid of 08-09/11/1940
Time
643 18:20 Gas counter burnt in Via Urbano Rattazzi 10 18:40 7,681063 45,062847
644 20:00 Lift small motor burnt in Via Mario Gioda 5 20:45 7,684067 45,066557
645 23:24 Fire at Military Hospital of Corso IV Novembre, caused by 00:00 7,649935 45,04751
incendiary bombs
646 23:29 Fire of auto workshop in Via Cumiana 27, caused by 01:25 7,643219 45,065002
incendiary bombs
647 23:40 Burnt house in Via Bagnasco 5, caused by incendiary 00:30 7,651027 45,055845
bombs
648 00:15 Fire at farmstead in Corso Stupinigi at corner with Via 04:55 7,644039 45,031006
649 00:30 Fire at farmstead in Corso Orbassano 785, caused by 03:40 7,612008 45,031131
incendiary bombs
650 00:42 Collapsing of houses at Testona with victims; caused by 07:00 7,714309 44,996727
fragmentation bombs
651 01:10 Collapsing of house in Corso Parigi 137, caused by 02:50 7,683123 45,045674
fragmentation bombs
652 01:14 Fire of Gas pipe in Corso Lepanto at corner with Corso 01:45 7,661624 45,046644
163
Raid of 04/12/1940
Time
702 18:08 Fire of a truck in Via Nizza 30 bis (int.16) 19:00 7,675861 45,055124
703 22:42 Fire of a tannery located in Via Don Bosco 92 (caused by Unknown 7,658889 45,085604
704 22:48 Fragmentation bombs explosion, causing the break and the 23:30 7,657679 45,080682
705 23:10 Beginning of a fire in the Paracchi factory, Via Pianezza 16 - 23:30 7,563071 45,094987
706 23:40 Break of high voltage wire caused by fragmentation bombs - 00:45
707 23:45 Fire of flats in Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 47 00:48 7,660067 45,058213
708 23:59 Gas and water leak in Via Cibrario 71 caused by 00:25 7,656663 45,081123
710 16:43 Fire of loft in Via Valperga Caluso 27 bis 17:30 7,680514 45,053012
712 00:25 Fire of bakery in Via San Secondo 68 bis 01:30 7,671194 45,056637
164
Raid of 11/01/1941
Time
40 15:10 Fire of a wooden shack located in Corso Peschiera 297 16:55 7,63059 45,071759
41 23:25 Beginning of fire in Via Scarlatti corner with Via Crescentino 00:30 7,697212 45,090082
42 23:47 Flooded basement following the break of the pipes, caused 00:10 7,694686 45,062567
43 23:53 Beginning of fire at teatro Parco Michelotti caused by lighted 00:25 7,703092 45,065907
stove
44 00:05 Breedings caused by incendiary bombs in Via Santa Maria 02:30 7,676611 45,072548
Siccardi
44 00:05 Breedings caused by incendiary bombs in Via Santa Maria 02:30 7,676249 45,072827
Siccardi
44 00:05 Breedings caused by incendiary bombs in Via Santa Maria 02:30 7,675113 45,071359
Siccardi
45 00:10 Breedings caused by incendiary bombs in Via Parma and Via 02:45 7,693485 45,077898
Cagliari
45 00:10 Breedings caused by incendiary bombs in Via Parma and Via 02:45 7,697066 45,075339
Cagliari
46 00:27 Fire of flat caused by incendiary bombs in Via Santa Maria 12 02:00 7,676611 45,072548
165
47 00:37 Fire of flat caused by incendiary bombs in Via Consolata 1 01:30 7,676918 45,074522
48 00:58 Fire of flat (6th floor) in Via Santa Maria 12 02:30 7,676611 45,072548
49 10:40 Removal of unstable masonry parts in Via Scarlatti 18 11:40 7,694867 45,09058
53 05:20 Fire of farmstead in Strada Cenasco, Moncalieri municipality Unknown 7,723751 45,004387
56 21:20 Fire of sawmill in Corso Brescia corner with Via Bologna 05:10 7,69251 45,081134
57 03:10 Fire of coal and wood warehouse in Via Belfiore 61 04:50 7,677472 45,051163
Raid of 18/11/1942
Molinette Hospital
685 22:33 Fire on a factory in Via Nizza 294 00:38 7,664254 45,028947
58
80
Hospital
690 22:30 Fire on a flat in Via Principe Tommaso 32 22:50 7,680426 45,056295
693 22:20 Unfounded alarm in Via Pietro Micca 22:38 7,680377 45,070563
166
694 22:20 Lights turning off in Via XXIII Marzo 22:47
696 22:40 False alarm at Dora Railway Station 23:05 7,677433 45,09085
Jolanda
698 22:46 Fire on a flat in Via Duchessa Jolanda 02:30 7,662442 45,073991
18/20
699 23:35 Fire on a flat in Via Duchessa Jolanda 12 01:15 7,663724 45,073613
700 23:30 Fire on a flat in Via Duchessa Jolanda 32 00:15 7,66051 45,07471
701 00:30 Fire on a flat in Via Duchessa Jolanda 14 01:15 7,663389 45,07373
703 23:30 Fire on a flat in Via Principe Amedeo 06:40 7,689446 45,067094
706 22:20 Fire on a factory in Via Duchessa Jolanda 23:35 7,659043 45,075199
38
708 22:55 Collapsing of a factory in Via Nizza 250 23:25 7,66708 45,033138
709 00:22 Collapsing of a ceiling in Via Nizza 289 00:35 7,666608 45,030836
710 22:20 Fire and collapsing of an house in Via 07:40 7,629826 45,07754
Lionetto 19
and in Collegno
713 23:20 Fire and collapsing in Piazza Martini 09:20 7,661589 45,073654
714 23:04 Fire on a flat in Via San Paolo and Via 01:15 7,653587 45,064355
Gambasca 13
715 22:07 Fire on a flat in Via Nizza 81 and 83 23:05 7,67501 45,051034
167
716 23:50 Fire on a barrack in Corso Brunelleschi 00:20 7,625349 45,066655
717 23:20 Fire and rescuing of victims in Piazza 05:10 7,649074 45,064963
Sabotino
718 23:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Cadorna 26 00:00 7,647174 45,044289
720 00:15 Fire on ceilings in Via Principi d'Acaja 28, 05:00 7,662833 45,074333
30 and 39
721 23:50 Lights turning off in Corso 4 Novembre 00:40 7,651979 45,047771
350
723 23:10 Fire on car warehouses in Via Vinadio 03:10 7,652203 45,069422
724 23:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Vinadio 02:05 7,652203 45,069422
730 00:01 Fire on a roof in Piazza Duca d'Aosta 00:35 7,663108 45,062348
732 22:46 Fire on a flat roofs in Via Principi d'Acaja 00:40 7,66276 45,074231
30
733 22:50 Fire on a flat roofs in Via Principi d'Acaja 00:40 7,66316 45,074151
37
in Via Oropa
735 00:40 Fire on a farmsted in Corso Orbassano 402 06:20 7,617841 45,033766
737 00:55 Unstable balcony in Via Fratelli Carle 32 10:00 7,659003 45,053878
168
Raid of 20/11/1942
Bagetti
Via Aosta
Emanuele
Alberto
Arsenale 14
Francesco da Paola
759 21:50 Fire on lofts and flats in Via Pio V 5 12:55 7,681389 45,060926
760 21:50 Fire on lofts and flats in Via Goito 5 11:35 7,681209 45,061225
761 21:50 Fire on lofts and flats in Via Pio V 7 11:00 7,68179 45,06085
169
764 22:00 Fire on a factory in Via Bologna 33 09:00 7,693771 45,081876
16
Bardonecchia
Emanuele
772 22:18 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Mattie 8 23:45 7,636824 45,0735
773 22:20 Fire on roofs and flats in Corso Palermo 02:01 7,692627 45,076345
774 22:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via 23:15 7,632165 45,072545
Sant'Ambrogio 28
775 22:30 Fire on a FIAT factory in Via Caserta 27 08:30 7,67138 45,083926
Bardonecchia 101
teathre
780 23:00 Fire on a gasometer in Via San Paolo 01:45 7,635874 45,057196
140
Umberto
170
782 22:55 Fire on roofs and flats in Corso Re 23:30
Umberto
Avenue 15
Oporto 13
Bonservizi
790 22.50 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Ponza 2 00:00 7,675048 45,066909
Arcivescovado
degli Abruzzi
degli Abruzzi
degli Abruzzi
799 23:00 Fire on roof and flats in Via Sacchi 44 06:50 7,673434 45,057529
Umberto
171
801 23:02 Fire of farmstead in Via Maria Vittoria 12:00
803 23:10 Fire of block of flats in Corso Italia 397 03:30 7,668901 45,017398
(Aeronautica)
806 23:10 Fire of roofs and flats in Corso Duca 08:10 7,662592 45,065673
Genova 61
808 23:15 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Massena 06:30 7,671069 45,058413
51
809 23:15 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Sacchi 8 23:55 7,676665 45,062067
Umberto
811 23:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Corso Oporto 14:40 7,67262 45,066833
23
813 23:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Colli 18 00:00 7,663658 45,065875
818 00:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Susa 43 02:00 7,657742 45,074362
Jolanda
821 23:00 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Oporto 02:05 7,665858 45,069187
57
172
822 23:00 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Bolzano 01:55
823 23:00 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Oporto 00:40 7,666847 45,069371
42
824 23:00 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Oporto 01:10 7,666413 45,069003
53
825 23:00 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Bolzano 03:00 7,665627 45,069981
14
826 23:00 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Oporto 06:00 7,665401 45,069378
61
827 23:00 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Oporto 02:35 7,665401 45,069378
61
828 00:05 Fire of roof and flats in Via Vincenzo Vela 08:10 7,664144 45,066068
35
830 00:15 Fire of Musueo antichità in Via Accademia 02:20 7,685155 45,069123
delle Scienze
832 00:15 Fire of roof and flats in Via Cottolengo 6 01:30 7,682424 45,078144
833 00:22 Rescuing of people in Via San Tommaso 8 02:00 7,682 45,071386
835 00:30 Fire of roof and flats in Corso Duca 01:15 7,663467 45,065382
Genova 57
836 00:33 Fire of philarmonic academy in San Carlo 09:30 7,682987 45,067495
197
173
837 00:50 Fire of roof and flats in Via Garibaldi 4/6 09:00 7,683714 45,071813
838 00:55 Fire of roof and flats in Via Garibaldi 4/6 10:00 7,683714 45,071813
839 01:00 Fire of roof and flats in Via Cernaia 20 03:30 7,674221 45,071683
840 01:00 Fire of roof and flats in Via San Quintino 02:20 7,672735 45,066322
22
841 01:00 Fire of roof and flats in Via Giusti 6 02:35 7,666433 45,070118
844 01:10 Fire and collapsing of an house in Piazza 12:07 7,682639 45,068561
845 01:15 Fire and collapsing of an house in Via San 02:10 7,684297 45,061557
Francesco da Paola 41
Carignano
849 01:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Bellini 9/11 14:30 7,672548 45,065364
850 01:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Donati 15 04:10 7,669233 45,068952
851 01:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Corso Duca degli 02:55
Abruzzi
853 02:10 Fire of roofs and flats in Via San Francesco 05:30
da Paola
854 02:15 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Cernaia 2 10:12 7,677655 45,070425
855 02:20 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Santa Teresa 12:00
Ferraris
857 02:30 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Lucio Bazzani 05:40
174
858 02:30 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Amerigo 07:00
Vespucci
860 02:40 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Vittorio Alfieri 12:50
Moncalieri
863 03:10 Fire on a factory in Via Pier Carlo Boggio 09:10 7,656938 45,065416
19
864 03:10 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Frejus 103 07:45 7,641835 45,070174
865 03:35 Fire on a roof and flat in Via Sant'Agostino 05:35 7,680377 45,075118
20
Micca
Domenico
870 04:00 Fire on a roof and flats in Corso Oporto 47 04:45 7,668302 45,068385
871 04:05 Fire on a roof and flats in Via Iuvara 20 12:25 7,670136 45,074817
872 04:15 Fire on a roof and flats in Via Magenta 41 05:40 7,666468 45,066018
873 04:40 Fire on a roof and flats in Corso Duca degli 13:55
Abruzzi
874 04:45 Fire on a roof and flats in Via San Quintino 06:00 7,669445 45,06714
39
875 05:00 Collapsing and rescuing in Corso San 13:15 7,690718 45,074122
Maurizio 1
175
876 05:00 Fire on a paper warehouse and flats in Via 18:10
Sant'Agostino
Ferraris
Francesco da Paola
Bonelli
Arsenale 12
884 06:00 Fire on workwood in Corso Duca degli 17:55 7,660599 45,060105
Abruzzi 36
885 06:00 Fire on a perfume factory in Via Marco 13:55 7,659331 45,060108
Polo 36
886 06:15 Fire on a villa in Via Asinari di Bernazzo 23 11:10 7,635976 45,079473
887 06:45 Fire on a block flat in Via Magenta 48 16:45 7,664257 45,067129
888 07:00 Fire on a roof and flats in Via San Quintino 12:00 7,672182 45,066375
25
891 07:15 Fire on EIAR offices in Via Arsenale 21 11:20 7,679178 45,067204
894 07:45 Fire on a roof and flats in Via Pio V 11 10:30 7,682969 45,060497
895 08:00 Fire on a roof and flats in Piazza Solferino 11:00 7,677009 45,068872
176
896 08:00 Fire on a garage in Via Marco Polo 29 13:40 7,660017 45,059691
898 08:10 Fire on a roof and flats in Via Stampatori 15:00 7,678422 45,073112
899 08:10 Fire on a roof and flats in Via San Pellico 11:30 7,683675 45,057353
22
900 08:12 Fire on a roof and flats in Corso Re 14:35 7,670486 45,06016
Umberto 42
901 08:15 Fire on a roof and flats in Corso Vinzaglio 09:30 7,6697 45,071471
Francesco D'Assisi
906 08:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via San Quintino 12:00 7,674196 45,065832
16
907 08:40 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Corso Galileo 14:40 7,577815 45,132189
Ferraris 35
909 09:05 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Stampatori 13:55 7,678093 45,072204
14
910 09:05 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Pio V 13 11:20 7,683096 45,060383
912 09:30 Fire on a wood deposit in Via Morghen 5 12:45 7,657502 45,076958
913 09:30 Fire on roof and flats in Via Gioberti 78 12:00 7,6703 45,056561
177
915 09:35 Fire on roofs and flats in Corso Re 12:15 7,667421 45,055823
Umberto 76
919 09:55 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Bologna 33 11:30 7,693769 45,081871
922 10:00 Fire on block flats in Corso Govone 10 13:55 7,664924 45,062569
923 10:10 Fire at Municipal schools in Via Belfiore 46 11:00 7,677825 45,053047
924 10:15 Fire on a chocolate factory in Via Bologna 14:35 7,693769 45,081871
33
925 10:20 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Mercanti 18 14:30 7,680304 45,070706
926 10:20 Fire on block flats in Corso Trieste 27 13:55 7,664489 45,062192
927 10:30 Fire on roof and flat in Via Villa Regina 21:15
928 10:30 Fire on roof and offices in Via Arsenale 14 17:00 7,679122 45,067633
930 10:35 Fire on sawmill in Corso Costanzo Ciano 13:40 7,676869 45,076063
11
931 11:00 Fire on roof and flats in Via Santa Maria 2 16:40 7,678658 45,07179
933 11:00 Fire on block flats in Corso Govone 14 13:55 7,664766 45,061295
934 11:35 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Duca Abruzzi 14:15
935 11:00 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Belfiore 30 19:30 7,679152 45,056673
939 11:30 Fire at material deposit in Via Bellini 7 13:45 7,673047 45,065726
178
940 11:30 Fire at furniture factory in Via Pinelli 3 14:00 7,669622 45,079943
Lucio Bazzani
Lucio Bazzani
delle Scienze
Ferraris
Stampa"
948 13:00 Fire on rofs and flats in Corso Duca di 18:00 7,668414 45,063126
Genova 29
949 13:00 Fire on rofs and flats in Via Arsenale 14 17:00 7,679124 45,067631
950 13:20 Fire on rofs and flats in Via Pio V 9 17:27 7,681947 45,0609
Ilarione Petitti
952 14:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Pio V 11 15:30 7,682976 45,060487
953 14:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Santa Chiara 18:00
955 15:10 Fire on roofs and flats in Piazza San Carlo 20:00 7,685073 45,070698
956 15:30 Fire at fabric factory in Via Arsenale 12 23:55 7,679394 45,067788
957 15:30 Fire on a fabric factory in Via Arsenale 10:00 7,678758 45,066852
Francesco d'Assisi
179
959 15:30 Fire on vary warehouses in Corso Unità 17:00
d'Italia
Pallamaglio
Cristina
967 17:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Corso Duca di 19:30
Genova
968 17:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Corso Duca di 18:45
Genova
970 18:05 Fire on roofs and flats in Piazza San Carlo 03:00 7,682772 45,067939
971 19:00 Fire on a loft in Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 21:15 7,661139 45,060217
Domenico
974 19:40 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Vincenzo Vela 22:50 7,663963 45,066223
37
975 20:00 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Villa della 06:35
Regina
180
979 20:15 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Goito 4 23:50 7,680983 45,06127
982 20:40 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Mercanti 18 21:45 7,680306 45,070706
985 21:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Bertola 48 01:00 7,676356 45,071922
986 21:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via San Pio V 9 02:00 7,681946 45,060907
988 20:45 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Stampatori 22:35 7,67803 45,072014
Gallinari
Statuto 5
994 23:50 Fire on roof and flats in Via Amerigo 11:55 7,662644 45,056093
Vespucci
996 00:10 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Santa Maria 02:15 7,6784 45,071778
181
Raid of 08/12/1942
Time
Solferino
1756 15:55 Fire of roof and offices - Casa Littoria 19:00 7,685535 45,067987
1757 16:00 Fire of roof and flats in Piazza San 20:30 7,682757 45,067939
Carlo
1758 21:35 Fire of roof and flats in Casa Littoria 02:45 7,685535 45,067987
1759 21:35 Fire of roof and flats in Piazza San 04:00 7,682757 45,067939
Carlo
1760 21:45 Fire of roof and flats in Palazzo Reale 01:50 7,686331 45,072842
1761 21:45 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Ormea 3 13:20 7,685929 45,059503
Emanuele
Emanuele
182
1766 21:50 Fire of roofs and flats in Via delle 01:05 7,692123 45,066275
Rosine 4
1769 22:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Legnano 00:00 7,66927 45,061076
27
1770 22:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Mario 10:00 7,686076 45,065714
Gioda 13
Arcivescovado
Pianezza 280
Altacomba
1783 22:15 Fire of sawmill in Via Chiesa della 00:00 7,67769 45,093037
Salute 7/9
183
1786 22:20 Fire on roofs and flats in Via 04:50
Stampatori
1788 22:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Della 03:30 7,69187 45,06229
Rocca 25
1792 22:30 Fire of graphic workshops in Via Santa 07:30 7,699414 45,069082
Giulia 54
Maurizio
1794 22:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Napione 13:30 7,699437 45,066312
11
1796 22:40 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Santa 06:30:00 7,677615 45,076603
Chiara 34
1797 22:40 Fire on roofs and flats in Via San 06:35 7,720505 45,057582
Martino 46
1798 22:45 Fire on roofs and flats in Piazza 04:00 7,685213 45,069587
Carignano
Settembre
184
1805 22:50 Fire in University in Via Po 11:05
1807 22:20 Fire of foundry in Via Monginevro 121 00:30 7,637969 45,064383
Cottolengo
1814 23:00 Fire in factory Incet in Via Monte 01:30 7,66647 45,013207
Bianco 5
Barbaroux
Cigna
1817 23:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Garibaldi 11:37 7,680689 45,072738
19
1820 23:00 Fire of Offices FF.SS. In Via Sacchi 02:45 7,67684 45,062013
1822 23:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Ottavio 04:00 7,67225 45,068334
Revel 20
Accademia Albertina
185
1826 23:15 Fire of warehouse in Via Piave 8 03:00 7,675866 45,075724
1827 23:15 Fire of Mulini Molassi in Via Priocca 10 00:20 7,686029 45,077792
Marconi
Vinzaglio
Francesco da Paola
1836 23:50 Fire on roofs and flats in Piazza San 04:00 7,668285 45,073874
Martino
1837 23:40 Fire on roofs and flats in Piazza San 10:05 7,668285 45,073874
Martino
Amedeo
Cernaia
Campagna
1845 00:15 Fire on roofs and flats in Via dei Mille 04:00
186
1846 00:15 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Balbis 01:35
Settembre
1848 00:25 Fire in Accademia delle Belle Arti 12:15 7,6895 45,067531
1849 00:25 Fire on roof and flats in Piazza Carlo 02:10 7,689076 45,066006
Emanuele
Umberto
Arsenale
Genova
Vittoria
1862 01:22 Fire of roofs and flats in Corso Oporto 06:50 7,678102 45,064998
Settembre
Marconi 6
187
1865 01:25 Fire of shoe factory in Via Miglietti 11:10
1866 01:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Villa 05:45 7,700601 45,062017
Regina 3
1867 01:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Corso Re 02:30 7,665944 45,053307
Umberto 99
1869 01:45 Fire of roofs and flats in Piazza Statuto 08:10 7,670228 45,076745
1871 02:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Bogino 31 13:00 7,686054 45,066018
1874 02:00 Fire of foundry in Via Lucio Bazzani 33 03:15 7,678431 45,057345
Molinette
Montecuccoli
1877 02:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Arsenale 04:00 7,678225 45,065779
31
Bazzani
Vela
Vittoria
188
1884 03:10 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Garibaldi 06:15 7,684184 45,071522
1887 03:16 Fire of roofs and flats in Via San 07:05 7,683234 45,000301
Martino 10
Racconigi
Margherita
Sant'Agostino
1892 04:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Franco 09:30 7,681274 45,075917
Bonelli 4
1894 04:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Ottavio 07:00 7,672231 45,068461
Revel 19n
Settembre
1896 04:10 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Garibaldi 06:20 7,676215 45,074309
43
1898 04:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Vico 11 07:30 7,667093 45,056343
1900 04:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Piazza San 12:15 7,668282 45,073871
Martino
189
1901 04:35 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Andrea 11:35
Provana
1903 05:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Corso Oporto 17:00 7,6781 45,064992
1904 05:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Allioni 4 07:50 7,672036 45,077203
Principessa Clotilde
Principessa Clotilde
Emanuele
Cervino 60
Francesco d'Assisi
1912 06:04 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Po 22 12:15 7,690735 45,067672
1913 06:30 Fire of roofs and flats in Via 07:35 7,65137 45,065216
Monginevro 28
Accademia Albertina
Accademia Albertina
190
1919 07:00 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Provana 19:40
Millio
1922 07:05 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Luigi 09:50 7,702767 45,064687
Ornato 1
Quintino
Colombo
Amedeo
1934 08:05 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Bogino 13 11:55 7,687294 45,067928
1935 08:05 Fire of roofs and flats in Corso Oporto 11:45 7,677384 45,065272
1936 08:20 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Corso 14:20 7,690366 45,081995
Brescia 30
36
1938 08:25 Fire of roofs and flats in Via Garibaldi 11:45 7,680682 45,072731
19
191
Raid of 13/07/1943
677 01:30 Fire in flats in Via Accademia Albertina 15 05:00 7,687529 45,064286
680 01:45 Fire in Armeria Reale in Piazza Castello 03:05 7,687435 45,069321
684 02:30 Fire in warehouse of woods in Via Stradella 10:50 7,66514 45,103918
232
687 02:30 Fire in sawmill in Corso Principe Oddone 04:20 7,67371 45,084388
corner with Corso Cirié
692 02:35 Fire in Piazza Emanuele Filiberto and barracks 07:10 7,681176 45,076454
693 02:35 Fire in factory in Corso Principe Oddone 17 09:00 7,670368 45,079955
694 02:35 Fire on roof Palazzo Reale in Via Verdi 7 06:35 7,689277 45,069652
696 02:40 Fire on roof in Piazza Carignano (theatre) 08:00 7,684605 45,069284
697 02:40 Collapsing with victims in Via Mazzini 42 20:30 7,687991 45,061471
698 02:45 Fire in warehouse in Corso Italo Balbo 94 07:00 7,712351 45,067626
699 02:45 Fire in a block of flats in Corso Vittorio 04:20 7,688317 45,059629
Emanuele 14
192
700 02:45 Fire in block of flats in Via Giacosa 32 06:15 7,682017 45,05457
704 02:45 Fire at sawmill Via Italo Balbo 130 06:00 7,703496 45,06771
706 02:50 Fire in a pianos factory in Via Principe 04:55 7,681362 45,057127
Tommaso 31
710 02:59 Fire in flats in Via Mario Gioda 9, 11,18, 20 12:45 7,685048 45,066345
711 03:00 Fire in a furniture warehouse Corso Valdocco 03:50 7,675612 45,078577
19
713 03:00 Fire on roof and flats in Via Italo Balbo 203 05:45 7,725315 45,070226
714 03:00 Fire and collapsing in Via Maria Vittoria corner 04:25
Lg. Doglia
717 03:00 Fire in sawmill and blocks of flats Corso Regio 10:20 7,686457 45,084978
Parco
718 03:00 Fire in factory in Corso Vercelli 14-16 15:30 7,68651 45,084992
721 03:15 Rescuing of a person in Via Cossilla - Via 04:40 7,07984 45,074087
Gattinara
723 03:15 Fire in flats in Via Accademia Albertina 9 18:00 7,688671 45,065806
193
725 03:20 Fire in a block in Via Davide Bertolotti 7 13:45 7,674937 45,068445
726 03:20 Collapsing with victims in Corso Regina 22:30 7,665101 45,083199
Margherita 230
731 03:25 Fire in flats in Via delle Rosine 1 bis 12:00 7,692405 45,06636
735 03:30 Fire in warehouses in Via Stradella 180 07:40 7,66862 45,100293
737 03:30 Collapsing with victims in Via Artisti 18 06:15 7,696971 45,069224
739 03:30 Collapsing and rescuing in Corso Regio Parco 06:20 7,696928 45,070693
corner Via Reggio
744 03:35 Fire on roof in Via Bertola (Azienda Elettrica) 08:10 7,676613 45,071768
745 03:45 Fire in a block of flats in Via Alfieri 17 05:15 7,678121 45,068446
746 03:46 Fire on roof in Corso Regina Margherita 16 05:00 7,704364 45,070286
747 03:50 Collapsing with victims in Via Guastalla 15 12:45 7,697229 45,070266
749 03:50 Fire in a block of flats in Via Luini 59 06:25 7,665023 45,097208
751 03:50 Collapsing and rescuing in Via Porta Palatina 06:10 7,68409 45,074214
194
752 03:50 Collapsing with victims in Corso Regio Parco 23:00 of 7,694351 45,076551
26-28-30 and Via Messina 13 21st July
756 04:00 Fire in a block of flats in Via Garibaldi 6 16:00 7,683495 45,072036
759 04:00 Fire at Banca d'Italia in Via Arsenale 6 08:00 7,680055 45,06879
761 04:10 Fire on roof in Via Verdi (military draft offices) 09:20 7,69235 45,068419
762 04:10 Fire in military warehouses in Via Cervino 60 10:00 7,681287 45,091938
763 04:15 Fire on roof in Via Bologna 118 10:50 7,700716 45,084594
765 04:30 Fire in flats in Via Santa Teresa 11 11:00 7,679713 45,069188
768 04:30 Fire in power plant in Via Bertola 08:10 7,676646 45,071692
770 04:45 Fire in flats in Corso Regina Margherita 138 06:20 7,687484 45,075754
775 04:50 Fire on roofs in Via Giuseppe Verdi 3 11:15 7,687728 45,070293
777 04:50 Fire in blocks of flats in Via Cavour 50 07:00 7,692685 45,061604
778 04:50 Collapsing with victims in Corso Napoli 2 12:25 7,686227 45,08191
195
779 04:53 Fire in block of flats in Via Cottolengo 22-24-26 08:30 7,67867 45,07962
780 04:55 Fire at Banca d'Italia in Via Arsenale 6 07:40 7,680055 45,068805
781 04:55 Fire on roof in Via Principe Tommaso 29 06:30 7,681338 45,057287
783 05:00 Fire in a factory in Corso Firenze corner Via 14:30 7,688508 45,080582
Aosta
784 05:00 Fire on roof in Corso Giulio Cesare 14 06:00 7,68636 45,080413
786 05:10 Fire on roofs in Via Fratelli Calandra corner Via 12:20 7,689713 45,061617
dei Mille
787 05:12 Fire on roofs in Via Garibaldi 31-33 08:00 7,678295 45,073403
788 05:14 Fire in military warehouses in Via Cimarosa 53 19:00 7,706442 45,089270
789 05:14 Fire in flats in Via Rossini 23-25 11:20 7,693345 45,072836
790 05:15 Fire in A.C.T. warehouse in Corso Stupinigi 11 13:30 7,654166 45,039664
791 05:15 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Torquato Tasso 08:00 7,682711 45,073846
792 05:30 Fire at Lenci factory in Via Cassini 7 09:30 7,663966 45,057684
794 05:30 Collapsing of a shelter and rescuing of persons 20:35 7,69273 45,072877
in Via Santa Giulia 5
795 05:30 Fire in flats in Via Mario Gioda 42 10:30 7,690015 45,064137
796 05:30 Fire in flats in Corso Vittorio Emanuele 60 07:00 7,677579 45,063551
798 05:40 Fire at Tecnical School in Corso Cirié 7 07:10 7,675352 45,084189
802 05:50 Fire on a roof in Corso Principe Oddone 87 12:40 7,670233 45,079195
803 06:00 Rescuing of persons in Corso Giulio Cesare 15 08:00 7,685381 45,07996
804 06:00 Fire at wood warehouse in Corso Savona 38 19:20 7,690486 45,076249
805 06:00 Fire in a flat in Via della Rocca 22 10:00 7,690954 45,061438
196
806 06:00 Fire at Palazzo Chiablese 22:30 7,686141 45,072929
807 06:00 Fire on roof in Via San Francesco d'Assisi 2 09:00 7,680631 45,072402
809 06:00 Fire in a flat in Corso Quintino Sella 129 09:15 7,718068 45,06652
811 06:03 Fire on roof in Via Santa Chiara 10 16:50 7,681209 45,075301
813 06:05 Fire in flats in Corso Regio Parco 41 12:00 7,698057 45,078648
815 06:10 Fire at Istituto Convitto delle Rosine 06:20 7,691611 45,065394
816 06:15 Fire on roofs in Piazza San Carlo 161 08:20 7,683137 45,067868
817 06:23 Fire in flats in Corso Savona corner Via Bazzi 10:30 7,689438 45,077894
818 06:25 Collapsing with victims in Corso Regio Parco 26 07:05 7,694341 45,076559
819 06:30 Fire in a stationery shop in Corso Regina 08:50 7,692918 45,073388
Margherita 89
820 06:30 Fire in flats in Via Mario Gioda 1 18:00 7,682905 45,06691
822 06:30 Fire in Via Bava 18 (and collapsing of roof) 08:00 7,699077 45,066898
823 06:30 Fire on roof in Via Giuseppe Verdi 3 11:30 7,687704 45,070324
824 06:30 Fire on roof in Corso Regina Margherita 1 09:10 7,706435 45,06897
825 06:30 Fire and collapsing in Corso San Maurizio 75 - 10:00 7,698038 45,066664
77-79
826 06:30 Fire in a pasta laboratory in Via Nizza 30 07:25 7,675817 45,055127
830 06:30 Fire in a paper warehouse in Via Baretti 22 09:55 7,681824 45,057013
832 07:00 Fire in a tar depot in Via Cigna corner Via 09:00 7,68571 45,09249
Valprato
197
833 07:00 Fire in a flat in Via Mario Gioda 29 15:10 7,689807 45,064373
834 07:10 Rescuing of a person in Corso Giulio Cesare 70 08:25 7,69174 45,088789
835 07:10 Collapsing with victims in Via Rivarolo 15 08:10 7,687498 45,079672
838 07:20 Fire in a tannery in Via del Fortino 34 10:15 7,678681 45,085597
841 07:30 Fire on roofs in Via delle Rosine 5/7/9//8 14:30 7,691557 45,065387
842 07:30 Collapsing with victims in Corso Palermo 36 21:20 7,692997 45,081907
846 08:00 Collapsing with victims in Piazza Bottesini 2 10:30 7,696571 45,089025
847 08:00 Fire on roof in Via delle Orfane 23 09:20 7,680067 45,076776
848 08:05 Fire in blocks of flats in Corso Antonelli 11-13 02:00 7,710289 45,069498
850 08:10 Fire on roof and flats in Via delle Rosine 8 12:45 7,691574 45,065623
851 08:15 Fire in Via Valprato corner Via Cigna 12:40 7,68571 45,092467
853 08:15 Fire in flats in Corso Novara corner Via Perugia 14:00 7,698799 45,081513
856 08:30 Collapsing and rescuing of persons in Corso 08:50 7,691547 45,082914
Alessandria 39
858 08:40 Fire at Torquato Tasso School in Piazza San 09:05 7,685246 45,073009
Giovanni
859 08:45 Fire at Sacro Cuore Church in Via Pallamaglio 13:50 7,678305 45,054568
198
860 08:45 Fire on roof and flats in Via Barbaroux 33 09:10 7,678074 45,072722
861 08:45 Fire on roof and flats in Via Accademia 01:30 7,690184 45,067895
Albertina 1-5 and Via Po 18-20-22
862 08:55 Fire on roof and flats in Via Po 51-55 19:40 7,692879 45,066694
863 08:55 Collapsing with victims in Via Cottolengo 14 14:30 7,680589 45,079289
867 09:00 Fire in a shoes warehouse in Via Cesare Balbo 19:00 7,70125 45,069392
21
868 09:00 Fire on roof and flats in Via Po 20 11:10 7,690457 45,067793
870 09:15 Fire in a block of flats in Via Mario Gioda 2 18:10 7,682726 45,066838
871 09:30 Fire in block of flats in Via della Rocca 20 15:00 7,691275 45,061959
873 09:30 Collapsing with victims in Corso Regio Parco 17:35 7,705915 45,081997
874 09:30 Fire in flat in Piazza San Carlo 18:10 7,682973 45,067658
875 09:55 Collapsing and fire in Via Aquila 8 22:30 7,665097 45,083674
876 09:55 Fire in medecine warehouse in Via Orto 11:45 7,68568 45,055093
Botanico 19
877 09:55 Fire in wood and coal warehouse in Corso 22:30 7,660527 45,084086
Regina Margherita 227
878 09:55 Fire in wood and coal warehouse in Via Don 22:30 7,665843 45,083677
Bosco 42
880 10:00 Fire at Palazzo Chiablese in Piazzetta Reale 12:05 7,686152 45,072937
881 10:00 Fire in block of flats in Via Bologna 152 11:15 7,70482 45,086494
882 10:00 Fire in a canopy in Corso Firenze corner Via 11:17 7,689279 45,07971
Bologna
199
885 10:10 Fire on roof in Piazza Cavour corner Via Mario 12:10 7,690946 45,063827
Gioda
888 10:20 Collapsing with victims in Via Pisa 57 15:00 7,695724 45,074315
889 10:20 Restarted fire in tannery in Via Fortino 11:30 7,678797 45,08495
890 10:20 Fire on roof and flats in Via Duchessa Jolanda 7 12:00 7,66426 45,07314
891 10:20 Collapsing with victims in Via Catania 23 14:30 7,696808 45,076269
892 10:30 Fire in family house in Via Cigna 16 11:50 7,677768 45,081163
895 10:30 Fire in military and coal warehouse in Corso 14:10 7,692653 45,081654
Brescia 47
896 10:30 Fire in laboratory in Via Stradella 226 14:30 7,665468 45,103597
898 10:40 Collapsing and fire in Via Palazzo di Città 19 11:30 7,682362 45,072657
899 10:40 Fire in block of flats in Via Accademia Albertina 13:10 7,690163 45,067888
1
900 10:15 Fire at Palazzo Chiablese in Piazzetta Reale 14:00 7,686109 45,072922
903 11:00 Fire on roof in Via San Domenico - Via Milano 13:35 7,681893 45,074267
(church)
906 11:15 Fire in building of Banca d'Italia in Via Arsenale 13:30 7,679911 45,068592
908 11:15 Fire in headquarters of Fire Brigade in Corso 13:00 7,649273 45,088863
Regina Margherita
909 11:16 Fire on roof and flats in Via Giuseppe Verdi 12 23:05 7,690474 45,069091
200
910 11:25 Fire in sawmill in Corso Casale 299 - hamlet of 12:50 7,731953 45,077571
Sassi
911 11:30 Restarted fire in building warehouses in Via 13:50 7,676387 45,085375
Urbino 9
912 11:35 Fire in house in Via Lagrange corner Via Mario 13:40 7,68327 45,066633
Gioda
913 11:35 Fire in paper warehouse in Via Catania 35 14:25 7,698682 45,077031
916 12:00 Fire in house and wood warehouse in Via 17:00 7,680821 45,089315
Giaveno 38
917 12:00 Fire on roof at Regia Prefettura in Piazza 13:15 7,687168 45,071385
Castello
918 12:00 Fire in flats and roof in Via Barbaroux 42 19:00 7,677552 45,07316
919 12:00 Fire in flats in Via delle Rosine 4 18:00 7,692126 45,066274
921 12:00 Fire on roof at Regia Prefettura in Piazza 13:40 7,687133 45,071396
Castello
922 12:30 Fire in factory of ink and pencils in Via Modena 13:20 7,697898 45,074386
- Corso Firenze
923 12:30 Fire in factory of electrical lamps in Via 17:00 7,680033 45,088431
Giaveno 24
924 12:40 Fire in sawmill in Via Giovanni Poggio 36 17:20 7,694837 45,099202
925 12:40 Fire at Collegio San Giuseppe in Via San 16:05 7,685341 45,063195
Francesco da Paola 23
926 12:50 Fire on roof and flats in Via Po 16 15:30 7,689574 45,068434
927 13:00 Fire at Palazzo Chiablese in Piazzetta Reale 20:10 7,686152 45,072922
928 13:00 Fire at City Hall in Piazza Palazzo di Città 23:05 7,681528 45,07318
929 13:00 Fire in paper warehouse in Via Catania 35 21:50 7,698639 45,077031
930 13:00 Fire in shoes warehouse in Via Cesare Balbo 21:40 7,700257 45,069941
932 13:15 Fire in factory of fibers in Via Montemagno 71 20:30 7,718302 45,067021
201
933 13:30 Collapsing with victims in Via Pisa 18 22:30 7,695209 45,074428
934 13:30 Collapsing and rescuing of persons in Via 19:10 7,69622 45,076541
Reggio 18
935 13:30 Collapsing and search for victims in Corso 23:00 7,69433 45,076589
Regio Parco 26
937 13:40 Collapsing with victims in Via Catania 26 21:00 7,697380 45,076114
938 13:40 Fire on roof at Palazzo Chiablese in Via XX 17:15 7,684592 45,073052
Settembre 80
939 13:45 Fire on roof and flats in Via Pisa 18 14:10 7,691761 45,078208
940 13:50 Restarted fire on ceilings in Via Cottolengo 6 17:10 7,682429 45,07815
942 14:00 Fire in coal depot in Corso Regina Margherita 18:10 7,698933 45,071864
52
943 14:00 Fire on roof in Via Conte Verde 7 15:20 7,682277 45,073607
944 14:00 Fire and collapsing with rescuing of persons in 17:45 7,681919 45,072427
Via Garibaldi 10
947 14:10 Fire on roof and flats in Piazza Baldissera 3 21:50 7,677937 45,090106
948 14:20 Fire on roof and flats in Via delle Orfane 11 16:55 7,67887 45,075161
949 14:20 Restarted fire in coal depot in Via Fossata 56 19:50 7,687262 45,095464
950 14:20 Fire in Via Parma corner Via Foggia (change of 22:20 7,693479 45,077897
personnel)
951 14:30 Fire on roof and flats in Via Barbaroux 5 16:30 7,682543 45,071201
952 14:30 Fire in wood warehouse in Corso XI Febbraio 20:05 7,688475 45,079065
corner Corso Savona
953 14:40 Fire in block of flats in Via Volta corner Via San 04:45 7,677909 45,064334
Quintino
954 14:40 Fire in flats and roof in Via delle Rosine 6-7-8 22:30 7,69179 45,06579
202
956 15:00 Fire in private house in Via Cappel Verde 71 20:05 7,683123 45,072832
958 15:05 Collapsing with victims in Via Pisa 57 17:10 7,695756 45,074307
959 15:05 Fire in headquarters of Fire Brigade in Corso 17:15 7,686027 45,076173
Regina Margherita 126
961 15:25 Collapsing with victims in Corso Regio Parco 7 22:10 7,691005 45,075457
962 15:30 Fire in Arcbishop's Palace in Via Arcivescovado 21:00 7,678107 45,067128
12
964 15:30 Restarted fire in flats in Via San Francesco 18:00 7,680598 45,072394
d'Assisi 2
965 15:30 Fire on roof in Via Palazzo di Città 17 16:40 7,682809 45,72477
966 15:30 Fire in block of flats in Via Garibaldi 9 20:30 7,683038 45,071726
967 15:30 Fire in block of flats in Via Palazzo di Città 17:00 7,683925 45,072239
corner Via XX Settembre
968 15:30 Fire on roofs and flats in Via Palazzo di Città 7- 22:20 7,684292 45,0721
11
969 15:30 Fire in wood and coal warehouse in Via Fossata 18:00 7,68821 45,093026
25
970 15:30 Fire in block of flats in Via Cavour 5 23:40 7,682746 45,065453
971 15:30 Collapsing and fire in private house in Vicolo 19:25 7,684559 45,072442
San Lorenzo
973 15:40 Fire in private house in Corso Vittorio 16:15 7,677281 45,063505
Emanuele corner Via Volta
974 15:50 Collapsing with victims in Via Volta 3 16:25 7,677572 45,064188
975 16:00 Fire in private house in Via Catania 35 21:50 7,698639 45,077046
976 16:00 Fire in CEAT factory in Via Parma 43 16:25 7,693981 45,077472
977 16:00 Fire in factory in Via Monte Bianco 26 19:30 7,666616 45,014606
978 16:15 Fire in private house in Via della Rocca 22 20:30 7,690933 45,061422
203
979 16:15 Fire in private house in Via della Rocca 22 17:00 7,690933 45,061422
980 16:15 Fire in private house in Piazza Cavour 6 17:15 7,690214 45,063022
981 16:20 Fire on roof and flats in Corso Valdocco 9 20:10 7,67457 45,077134
982 16:20 Fire on roof and flats in Piazza E. Filiberto 12 17:45 7,681197 45,076444
983 16:24 Fire in private house in Piazza Carignano 18:37 7,684904 45,068936
984 16:30 Fire in Gilardini factory in Via Aosta 21:30 7,69478 45,087196
986 16:35 Fire on roof in Via Porta Palatina 5 17:30 7,683006 45,072755
989 16:43 Fire in offices and flats in Piazza San Carlo 197 21:20 7,682865 45,067278
990 17:00 Fire in private house in Via Rivarolo corner 17:30 7,686657 45,07975
Corso Palermo
991 17:00 Restarted fire in building of Banca d'Italia in 23:30 7,679892 45,068593
Via Arsenale
992 17:00 Fire on roof in private house in Piazza Vittorio 20:45 7,695996 45,06376
Veneto 23
993 17:10 Fire in private house in Via Garibaldi 6 18:10 7,68357 45,072013
994 17:15 Fire in WAMAR biscuits factory in Via Parella 5 10:35 7,680613 45,090625
995 17:30 Fire in City Hall in Piazza Palazzo di Città 22:20 7,681518 45,073093
997 17:32 Fire on roof in Via San Tommaso 1 19:00 7,682543 45,071901
998 17:35 Fire in block of flats in Piazza San Carlo 17:35 7,682773 45,06793
999 17:45 Fire on clock tower of church in Via Pallamaglio 18:40 7,678305 45,054576
- Via Belfiore
1000 18:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Messina 27 19:00 of 7,697532 45,077721
14th July
1001 18:05 Fire in blocks of flats in Via Belmonte 13-15 22:40 7,687997 45,093274
1002 18:10 Fire at Hotel Venezia in Via XX Settembre 6 22:20 7,680828 45,067865
204
1003 18:10 Fire in flats in Piazza San Carlo corner Via 22:30 7,68167 45,06731
Mario Gioda
1004 18:15 Fire on roof and warehouses in Via San Simone 20:40 7,683872 45,079031
15 and Via Borgodora
1005 18:20 Fire on roof in Piazza San Carlo and Via Mario 22:30 7,682931 45,067666
Gioda
1006 18:30 Fire in workshop in Via Bologna and Via 20:00 7,707787 45,088007
Cimarosa
1009 18:45 Restarted fire at Torquato Tasso School in 20:45 7,685278 45,072987
Piazza San Giovanni
1010 19:00 Fire at San Gioacchino church in Corso Giulio 08:45 7,685877 45,079708
Cesare
1012 19:10 Fire at nuns school in Via Mario Gioda 27 21:50 7,689133 45,064636
1014 19:30 Fire in city administration offices in Via San 03:45 7,686455 45,064911
Francesco da Paola
1015 19:40 Fire in flats and halls at Palazzo Chiablese in 22:20 7,686152 45,072952
Via XX Settembre
1016 20:00 Fire on roof in Via Mario Gioda 29 22:50 7,689809 45,064388
1017 20:00 Fire in block of flats in Via Bonelli corner Via 22:00 7,680756 45,075922
Sant'Agostino
1018 20:15 Fire in wood laboratory in Via M. Sonzini 11 21:30 7,68657 45,07249
1019 20:20 Fire at Fortino cinema in Via Cigna 22:30 7,678839 45,084897
1020 20:30 Fire in private house in Via Cappel Verde 3 01:05 7,683127 45,072982
1021 20:30 Fire in private house in Via Campana 6 23:30 7,67737 45,055081
1022 20:30 Fire in tobacco factory in Corso Regio Parco - 23:00 7,715024 45,091518
Via Rossetti
1023 20:45 Fire on roof and lofts in Via Barbaroux 21 23:05 7,679732 45,072164
1024 21:00 Fire on roof in Corso Vittorio Emanuele 60 23:30 7,67759 45,063536
205
1025 21:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Catania 23 05:30 7,696797 45,076262
1026 21:00 Fire in block of flats in Via IV Marzo 06:00 7,682955 45,073454
1027 21:10 Fire in block of flats in Via Principe Amedeo 43- 01:30 7,691937 45,066277
49
1029 21:30 Fire in flats in Via Santa Chiara 22 23:30 7,680052 45,075762
1030 21:30 Fire in flats in Via San Tommaso 1 22:30 7,682522 45,071901
1033 21:30 Fire in flats in Via San Simone 15 02:00 7,683915 45,079024
1034 21:30 Fire in flats in Via San Massimo 38 23:10 7,686964 45,06119
1035 21:40 Fire in flats in Via Accademia Albertina 3 03:00 7,690166 45,067522
1036 22:00 Fire on roofs in Via Carlo Alberto 16 22:30 7,68486 45,066956
1038 22:00 Fire in flats in Via San Domenico 40 23:30 7,672886 45,0775
1040 22:00 Fire in flats in Via Palazzo di Città 10 05:25 7,683559 45,072421
1042 22:00 Fire on roofs in Via Porta Palatina 6 23:55 7,683084 45,072645
1044 22:00 Fire in flats and roofs in Via Po 20-22 01:30 7,690713 45,067655
1046 22:15 Fire in flats in Via Palazzo di Città 00:10 7,682863 45,072605
1047 22:15 Fire in flats in Via Mario Gioda 27 24:00:00 7,689133 45,064636
1048 22:30 Fire in flats in Via Bologna 152 00:50 7,704852 45,086502
1050 22:40 Fire in flats in Piazza San Carlo - Via Mario 00:30 7,682952 45,067643
Gioda
1051 22:50 Fire on roofs in Via delle Rosine 13 02:48 7,691031 45,06445
206
1052 22:50 Fire on roofs and flats (Arcbishop's Palace) 08:10
1053 22:55 Fire on roof in Via Milano corner Via IV Marzo 03:20 7681463 45,073514
1054 23:00 Fire in flats in Via XX Settembre - Via Santa 08:30 7,681745 45,068838
Teresa
1055 23:10 Fire on roof in Via XX Settembre - Via Santa 01:20 7,681745 45,068838
Teresa
1056 23:15 Fire in flats in Via Nizza - Via Caluso 01:50 7,675564 45,053917
1057 23:20 Fire in warehouses in Via Santa Teresa - Via XX 01:30 7,681717 45,068893
Settembre
1059 23:20 Fire on roofs in Via delle Rosine 19 02:40 7,690900 45,064184
1061 23:45 Fire in flats in Via Carlo Alberto 16 01:25 7,684849 45,066918
1063 23:55 Fire in flats in Via XX Settembre - Via Santa 06:35 7,681717 45,068893
Teresa
207
Raid of 08/11/1943
3030 06:55 Tram derailed in Strada del Nobile - Valsalice 07:50 7,714488 45,051367
3031 14:00 Fire in private fouse in Via Alassio 21:30 7,667551 45,039614
3032 14:00 Collapsing of a building in Via Nizza 136 18:00 7,670603 45,041381
3034 14:35 Fire at Register office and infirmary at the New 20:35 7,650052 45,041816
Stadium
3035 14:40 Transport of injured persons to the hospital of 18:30 7,67084 45,037321
Corso Spezia
3036 14:45 Fire in stable and warehouses in Via Leonardo 22:30 7,669475 45,043744
da Vinci 12
3037 14:50 Fire in a shop in Via Nizza 176 20:05 7,670644 45,041176
3038 15:00 Transport of injured persons to the Molinette 20:00 7,673967 45,036057
hospital of Corso Spezia
3039 15:00 Transport of injured persons to the Molinette 18:10 7,671178 45,042393
hospital of Piazza Carducci
3040 15:00 Fire in garage and warehouses in Via Genova 6 21:00 7,672262 45,041454
3041 15:00 Collapsing of a building in Via Nizza 161 21:00 7,671169 45,042272
3042 07:15 Collapsing of two ceilings in Via Cuneo 45 08:30 7,680703 45,086957
3043 15:00 Transport of injured persons to the Molinette 17:05 7,675531 45,038998
hospital from Corso XXVIII Ottobre
3045 15:00 Collapsing with victims in Corso Spezia - 19:20 7,673977 45,036027
Hospital Molinette
3046 15:00 Collapsing of RIV factory in Via Nizza 148 18:30 7,670145 45,04031
3047 16:00 Fire in RIV factory in Via Nizza 148 23:20 7,670145
208
3050 15:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Genova corner 19:05 7,671756 45,037904
Via Varazze
3051 15:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Genova corner 19:05 7,671119 45,036464
Corso Spezia
3052 15:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Tepice 2 19:05 7,670621 45,039467
3053 15:05 Transport of injured persons to the Molinette 16:05 7,668011 45,028795
hospital - Via Millefonti
3054 15:10 Transport of injured persons to the hospital 0,875 7,671068 45,03643
old location in Via Genova - Corso Spezia
3055 15:10 Fire in laboratory and warehouse in Piazza 20:05 7,671628 45,041834
Carducci 165
3056 15:15 Fire in RIV factory in Via Nizza 154 17:00 7,670036 45,039642
3058 15:15 Fire in warehouse and cellar in Piazza Carducci - 22:30 7,671799 45,043052
Corso Bramante
3059 15:15 Transport of injured persons to the San 17:50 7,687885 45,063535
Giovanni hospital - old location
3060 15:20 Collapsing with victims in Via Pietro Giuria 80 21:00 7,676864 45,045944
3061 15:20 Fire in buiscuits factory in Via Stellone and Via 21:35 7,670978 45,038937
Alassio
3062 15:25 Fire and collapsing in Via Tepice - Nizza - Alassio 21:45 7,672015 45,039448
3063 15:30 Transport of injured persons to the Molinette 18:45 7,674132 45,041623
hospital from Corso Spezia
3064 15:30 Fire in Microtecnica factory in Via Madama 17:20 7,78524 45,051507
Cristina
3065 15:30 Transport of injured persons to the hospital 18:00 7,670897 45,039618
from Via Nizza and surrounding streets
3066 15:30 Collapsing with victims in Via Alassio 10 21:45 7,667483 45,039624
3067 15:30 Fire in factory of paints in Corso Spezia 1 18:50 7,666758 45,038417
3068 15:30 Collapsing with victims in Via Alassio and Via 21:50 7,671113 45,040336
Augusto Abegg 6
209
3070 15:30 Collapsing with victims in Via Alassio 8 21:45 7,669867 45,039242
3071 15:30 Fire in FIAT factory in Corso Lepanto 18:20 7,660852 45,04764
3072 15:30 Fire in Ambrosetti warehouses in Via Leonardo 22:00 7,669475 45,043736
da Vinci 12
3074 15:40 Fire in wood depot in Corso Bramante 60 19:20 7,668509 45,043141
3075 15:45 Fire in shops and collapsing in Piazza Carducci - 21:15 7,71073 45,043156
corner Corso Bramante
3076 17:45 Recovery of corpse in Corso Dante 131 22:45 7,683096 45,045658
3077 17:50 Recovery of corpses in Corso Spezia 15-18 18:50 7,668201 45,03797
3078 19:15 Fire in private house in Via Nizza 161 23:35 7,671115 45,042401
3080 20:00 Fire in depot of RIV factory in Via Nizza 22:45 7,670276 45,039626
3081 20:15 Collapsing with victims in Via Pietro Giuria 80 21:05 7,676875 45,045966
3082 20:30 Fire in flours warehouse in Piazza Carducci 124 01:00 of 9th 7,670512 45,042439
November
3083 20:30 Collapsing with victims in Via Nizza 161 23:30 7,671169 45,042303
3085 21:50 Fire in cellar in Via Michele Lessona 2 22:50 7,650816 45,08305
3086 23:00 Fire of a hangar in the tram depot of Piazza 2:00 of 9th 7,669715 45,04281
Carducci November
09/11/1943
3087 00:06 Fire in depot of RIV factory in Via Alassio 12 11:50 7,667583 45,039599
3089 06:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Nizza 183 17th 7,67094 45,040637
November
3091 06:30 Tram derailed in Corso Regina Margherita - 06:45 7,655865 45,085751
Tassoni
210
3092 06:30 Collapsing of private building with victims in Via 07:00 7,671745 45,037926
Genova and Varazze
3093 07:00 Recovery of victims from ruins in Via Pietro 20:00 7,676875 45,045944
Giuria 80
3094 07:05 Fire in butchery and private house in Via Nizza 15:00 7,67065 45,040299
185 E - 185 F
3095 08:00 Recovery of victims in Via Cherasco 21-23 - 18:40 7,672288 45,037858
Molinette hospital
3096 08:05 Recovery of corpse in Via Stellone 14 13:20 of 10th 7,671298 45,038326
November
3097 09:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Demonte - face to 10:05 7,666919 45,038945
STIPEL (telephone company) building
3098 12:50 Collapsing and search for victims in Via Nizza 18:30 of 10th 7,670987 45,04115
177 November
3099 13:00 Collapsing and recovery of victims in Via Alassio 18:30 7,67015 45,039218
and Via Nizza
3100 14:30 Fire in farm in Strada Pianezza 177 15:00 7,626834 45,097634
3101 14:40 Collapsing and recovery of victims in Via 9:30 of 10th 7,671809 45,03904
Genova 22 November
3102 15:00 Removal of ruins for search for victims in Via 16:20 7,672037 45,039471
Tepice 4
3103 15:05 Fire in private house in Via Gradisca 43 15:30 7,644547 45,050378
3104 17:40 Collapsing and recovery of victims in Via 10:30 of 10th 7,671735 45,037904
Genova corner Via Varazze November
10/11/1943
3105 00:20 Picking up of abandoned car from Piazza San 00:55 7,682963 45,067681
Carlo to Corso Littoria
3106 06:00 Recovery of corpses from collapsed building in 18:00 of 17th 7,672299 45,037858
Via Cherasco 21 - Molinette hospital Novemberr
211
Raid of 1/12/1943
3219 14:40 Transport of wounded from air raid from Via 17:50 7,666621 45,031277
Nizza 264
3221 14:40 Fire in foundry in Via Nizza 326 18:30 7,663189 45,024746
3223 15:00 Fire in FIAT Lingotto in Via Nizza 250 20:00 7,667095 45,033131
3224 15:00 Fire in FIAT Lingotto in Via Nizza 250 20:30 7,667095 45,033131
3225 15:00 Recovering from ruins of two wounded 16:20 7,669168 45,036836
people in Via Nizza 223
3227 15:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Genova - Corso 15:30 7,671173 45,036554
Spezia
3228 15:10 Fire and collapsing in Via Nizza 216 civil house 17:25 7,668491 45,035915
3230 15:15 Fire and collapsing of block flat used by 17:45 7,671998 45,037256
offices Piazza Bozzolo
3231 15:15 Fire and collapsing in Via Nizza. FIAT Lingotto 18:10 7,666869 45,032609
3232 15:15 Fire in FIAT in Via Nizza 294 20:15 7,664276 45,028864
3233 15:20 Collapsing of a shelter in Via Cellini corner 19:30 7,676171 45,043273
with Via Pietro Giuria
3235 16:00 Fire in flat in Via Nizza 393 17:15 7,662245 45,01885
3236 16:45 Fire in FIAT in Via Nizza 250 17:45 7,667095 45,033131
3237 16:20 Fire in FIAT in Via Nizza 250 19:30 7,667095 45,033131
3239 16:50 Fire in FIAT Via Nizza 244 18:55 7,663395 45,023223
3240 19:50 Rescuing of victims from collapsing in Strada 23:00 7,681976 45,020331
Cunioli Alti 27
3241 21:45 Flooding of basements in Via Nizza 224 22:15 7,668007 45,035267
3242 22:00 Flooding of basements in Via Nizza 224 02:00 7,668007 45,035267
212
3243 22.10 Removal of damaged car in Via Garibaldi -Via 22:30
XX Settembre
3244 00:00 Rescuing of victims from collapsing in Via 10:30 7,687446 45,027681
Sapone 364 (Cavoretto)
Raid of 03/01/1944
21 13:37 Recovering of ACM 146 runned over in Corso 15:00 7,677677 45,63148
Vittorio Emanuele and Via XX Settembre
213
23 16:35 Precarious balconies in Via Ellero 20 18:00 7,669918 45,03571
04/01/1944
26 18:35 Person runned over by tram in Corso Italia and Via 19:00 7,636379 45,079939
Salabertano
29 16:20 Search for corpses under ruins in Via Nizza 201 not 7,670167 45,038822
readabl
e
05/01/1944
214
Raid of 04/06/1944
453 10:55 Collapsing of building and shelter - Rescuing of 13:30 7,642953 45,060366
persons in Via Entracque 7
454 10:25 Search for victims due to collapsed building in Via 18:30 7,577127 45,023135
Roma 7 - 9 - Beinasco
455 10:30 Inspection for checking in Via Piazzi and Cristoforo 15:00 7,662134 45,057418
Colombo
456 10:30 Collapsing of building with victims in Via Fratelli 16:45 7,659449 45,053676
Carle
457 10:40 Fire in private house in Corso Orbassano 16 - 18 12:00 7,616832 45,034486
458 10:40 Collapsing of private house in Via Torricelli 70 15:00 7,655504 45,05637
459 10:40 Inspections in collapsed private houses in Via 14:20 7,661947 45,05824
Giacomo Bove and surroundings
460 10:45 Inspections in collapsed private houses in Beinasco 14:40 7,583885 45,028516
461 10:45 Collapsing of building with victims in Corso Duca 16:10 7,656812 45,054745
degli Abruzzi 90
462 10:50 Transport of injured persons from Lingotto to 14:50 7,674265 45,040767
Molinette Hospital
463 10:55 Recovery of victim of bombing close to Sangone 11:24 7,476842 45,027684
river
464 10:55 Rescuing of persons closed off in a cellar in Via 15:10 7,646955 45,01787
Onorato Vigliani
465 11:00 Inspections in collapsed buildings in Via Donizetti 12:10 7,677458 45,050068
466 11:00 Inspections in collapsed buildings in Via Nizza and 12:45 7,663262 45,022077
Via Passo Buole
467 11:00 Recovery of victims due to collapsed building in Via 19:55 7,667980 45,052833
San Secondo 95
468 11:00 Inspections in collapsed buildings in Via Donizetti 12:10 7,677458 45,050068
469 11:05 Rescuing of injured persons in a shelter in Via Prato 11:20 7,577381 45,062244
4
215
470 11:05 Rescuing of injured persons due to collapsed bulding 12:55 7,659468 45,016527
in Via Basse di Lingotto 496
Raid of 05/04/1945
180 13:30 Rescuing of a person in Via Nizza 162 14:15 7,669702 45,039096
181 13:40 Rescuing of a person in Via Cellini corner with 13:40 7,66957 45,044522
Via Muratori
184 13:55 Collapsing with victims in Via Cellini - Via Bruno - 20:15 7,669956 45,038978
Via Nizza 199 - Ambrosetti
186 14:00 Collapsing with victims in Via Nizza 162 15:10 7,669707 45,039095
187 14:10 Collapsing with victims in Via Cellini (Ambrosetti) 20:40 7,674343 45,043652
188 14:15 Collapsing with victims in Via Cellini (Ambrosetti) 19:40 7,674343 45,043652
189 14:15 Collapsing with victims in Via Cellini 2 14:15 7,669711 45,044397
190 14:30 Collapsing with victims in Via Cellini 2-4 18:35 7,669711 45,044397
191 15:10 Collapsing with victims in Corso Bramante 16 a 15:40 7,663173 45,04572
192 16:06 Collapsing with victims in Corso Bramante 68 17:25 7,669694 45,042822
193 16:55 Collapsing with victims in Via Leonardo da Vinci 20:05 7,669528 45,043913
13-15
216
Archives consulted:
Istituto Storico per la Storia della Resistenza e della Società Contemporanea “Giorgio Agosti”
(ISTORETO).
217
Bibliography
Books
Claudia Baldoli, Andrew Knapp, Forgotten Blitzes: France and Italy Under Allied Air Attack, 1940-
Claudia Baldoli, Andrew Knapp, Richard Overy (edited by), Bombing, States and People in
Pier Luigi Bassignana, Torino in guerra: la vita quotidiana dei torinesi ai tempi delle bombe (Torino:
Pier Luigi Bassignana, Torino sotto le bombe nei rapporti inediti dell'aviazione alleata (Torino:
Paolo Bevilacqua, I rifugi antiaerei di Torino (Bologna: Paolo Emilio Persiani, 2018).
Giorgio Bonacina, Obiettivo: Italia. I bombardamenti aerei delle città italiane dal 1940 al
Andrew J. Brookes, Air War Over Italy (Shepperton: Ian Allan Publishing, 2000).
Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. III, Argument to E-V
Day: January 1944 to May 1945 (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983).
218
Giovanni De Luna, Torino in guerra: La ricerca di un'esistenza collettiva, in L'Italia in guerra, 1940-
43, ed. by Bruno Micheletti and Pier Paolo Poggio (Brescia: Fondazione Luigi Micheletti, 1992).
Giovanni De Luna, Torino in guerra, in Nicola Tranfaglia (edited by), Storia di Torino. Dalla grande
Nicola Della Volpe, Difesa del territorio e protezione antiaerea, 1915-1943: storia, documenti e
Marco Gioannini, Giulio Massobrio, Bombardate l'Italia. Storia della guerra di distruzione
Giorgio Giorgerini, La guerra italiana sul mare. La Marina tra vittoria e sconfitta 1940-1943 (Milano:
Mondadori, 2001).
Gabriella Gribaudi, Guerra totale. Tra bombe alleate e violenze naziste. Napoli e il fronte meridionale
Istat (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica), Morti e dispersi per cause belliche, 1939-1945, (Roma: Istat,
1957).
Nicola Labanca (edited by), I bombardamenti aerei sull'Italia. Politica, Stato e società (1939-
Richard Overy, The Bombing War. Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013).
Marco Patricelli, L'Italia sotto le bombe. Guerra aerea e vita civile 1940-1945 (Roma:
Laterza, 2007).
219
Giorgio Rochat, Le guerre italiane 1935-1943. Dall'impero d'Etiopia alla disfatta (Torino: Einaudi,
2005).
Michele Sforza, La città sotto il fuoco della guerra: la tragedia delle città italiane e l'impegno dei
vigili del fuoco nella seconda guerra mondiale (Torino: Allemandi, 1998).
220
Journal Articles
Claudia Baldoli, Fascist Italy’s Aerial Defenses in the Second World War, in Global War Studies
(Newcastle University Library: Brécourt Academic, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2018, pp. 5-34).
Claudia Baldoli, Marco Fincardi, Italian Society Under Anglo-American Bombs: Propaganda,
Stephen Harvey, The Italian War Effort and The Strategic Bombing of Italy, in History
(Hoboken NJ: Wiley, Vol. 70, No. 228, 1985, pp. 32-45).
Ferdinando Pedriali, La Flak in Italia, in Storia Militare (Parma: Edizioni Storia Militare, Voll.
Ferdinando Pedriali, La quindicesima Forza Aerea USAAF, in Storia Militare (Parma: Edizioni
rotolamento nel 1943-1944, in Storia Militare (Parma: Edizioni Storia Militare, Vol. 163, 2007).
Website links
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=35aa692ea02e47b799ece77b79121
a35&webmap=3f94301451664db6a0cde15711a1aa0d
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