G.R. NO.

L-24837 (QUASI-DELICT) case no 1

JUNE 27, 1968
JULIAN C. SINGSON & RAMONA DEL CASTILLO (PLAINTIFFS) V. BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, & SANTIAGO FREIXAS (DEFENDANTS)

SUMMARY:
● Singson was one of the defendants in civil case no. 23906; judgement was rendered
in which na-sentence yung mga kasama niyang co-defendants which is sila Celso
Lobregat at Villa-Abrille & Co.
● Singson and his co-defendants were sentenced to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to
Philippine Milling Co.
● Singson and Lobregat filed an appeal against said judgement, but not Villa-Abrille.
● A writ of garnishment was served upon the BPI in which the singson’s current
account and Villa-Abrilles credits were concerned.
● Ang nabasa lang nung clerk na in charge sa bangko sa writ of garnishment ay
yung pangalan nung mga nung defendants–meaning nabasa niya as a whole
party without reading the body of the said garnishment.
● Yung writ of garnishment ay para lamang kela Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus,
Fernando F de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona
● Nag prepare ng letter for the signature of the president of the bank to inform si
singson regarding don sa writ of garnishment
● Another letter was prepared and signed by said president of the bank for the special
sheriff dated April 17, 1963.
● Nag issue ng check si singson na nag aamount sa P383 sa B. M. Glass Service
nung April 16, 1963, bearing No. C-424852, and check No. C-394996 for the amount
of P100 para sa Lega Corporation. These two checks were drawn against the said
bank, and were deposited by the said drawers with the said bank.
(DRAWER=SINGSON)
● The checks were dishonoured and were refused payment by the said bank since
they thought na kasali si Singson don writ of garnishment.
● The first check was returned to the bank by BM glass service, and wrote to Singson
nung April 19, 1963 sabi na yung check niya for P383 bearing no. c-424852 ay hindi
honored ng bangko kasi yung account ni Singson ay already garnished and BM glass
service further stated that they were constrained to close his credit account with them
as well.
● Singson then wrote the defendant (BPI, Freixas) a letter nung April 19 1963 din
claiming na his account was not included don sa Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment which was served upon the bank.
● Santiago Freixas, said president of said bank, took steps to verify this information
and apologized to Singson and wrote a letter nung April 22, 1963 na nagsasabi na
i-disregard yung letter nung April 17 (writ of garnishment) and that his account has
already been removed from garnishment. Santiago also wrote a letter on the same
day to the Special Sherriff–that the letter dated April 17, 1963 was to be cancelled
and that the Notice of Garnishment be removed from Singson’s account.
● The defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff for a
short time.
 ● May 18, 1963 Singson commenced the present action against the Bank and
Santiago for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs account.
● The court of first instance of Manila dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the
plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict
because the parties is contractual in nature; because this case does not fall under
article 2219 of our civil code
● The lower court held that the plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a
tort or quasi-delict because their relation with the defendants is contractual in nature.
● HOWEVER, the existence of a contract between the parties does not remove the
possibility of the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the
consequent recovery of damages therefore. Na kahit contractual in both origin and in
nature, yung act na magagawa/mangyayare that BREAKS the contract may also be
a tort/quasi-delict.
● Nagkaron ng nominal damages and BPI and Santiago were ordered to give 1000 for
damages, and 500 for attorney’s fee.

**Writ of garnishment: The Writ will authorize the sheriff to attach the properties in the
Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be
sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand. If it involves funds and other incorporeal
property, the attachment is enforced through a Notice of Garnishment.

G.R. NO. 138739 (BREACH BY DEFAULT) case no 3

JULY 6, 2000
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY (PETITIONER), V. SPOUSES VICENTE & MA.
SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO (RESPONDENTS)

SUMMARY:
● BASICALLY AKALA NUNG RESPONDENTS SINCE WALANG DUE DATE YUNG
MONTHLY PAYMENT AY MAG SISIMULA SILA WHENEVER, KAYA AKALA NILA IS
YUNG OBLIGATION NILA IS PREMATURE. IF SO, EDI SANA NILAGAY NILA SA
PROMISSORY NOTE.
● Respondents theorize that the action for immediate enforcement of their obligation is
premature because its fulfillment is dependent on the sole will of the debtor. Hence,
they consider that the proper court should first fix a period for payment, pursuant to
Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code.
● While the specific date on which each installment would be due was left blank, the
Note clearly provided that each installment should be payable each month.
● PETITION IS GRANTED. APPEALED DECISION IS MODIFIED IN THAT THE
REMAND IS SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE ORDERED TO PAY
P138,948 PLUS 2.5 PERCENT PENALTY CHARGE PER MONTH BEGINNING
APRIL 2, 1991, UNTIL FULLY PAID, AND 10% OF THE AMOUNT DUE AS
ATTORNEYS FEES.
● Ang nag file ng demurrer sila spouses tapos dinismiss ng case ng court
● Tapos ni-reverse ni appellate court. Tama naman yung pagka-reverse, kaso
nagkamali lang dun sa further proceedings kasi dapat nag make na ng judgement
don.
● Nagkamali lang yung supreme court
● Appellate court = court of appeals
 ● Nung hindi pa sila ni-reverse, may right pa rin sila (defendants; spouses). Eh
kaso na-reverse, so na-waive yung right nila.
● Kaya na-lose yung right kasi pinandigan nila na insufficient yung evidence ng
kalaban.

FACTS:

● A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence
produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out
a case or sustain an issue.
● Petition for review on certiorari of the dec 9, 1997 decision, and the may 9, 1999
resolution of the CA in CA-GR CV No. 47737.
● On March 2, 1991, spouses vicente and maria sumilang del rosario, jointly and
severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth finance company
(petitioner) a promissory note for P138,948.
● The promissory note read: we promise to pay jointly and severally Raidiowealth
finance co. the sum of 138, 948 without need of notice or demand in installments:
11,579 payable for 12 consecutive months until the amount is fully paid. A late
payment penalty charge of 2.5% per month shall be added to each unpaid
installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
● It is hereby agreed that if default be made in the payment of any of the installments
or late payment charges shall at once become due and payable without need of
notice or demand.
● Basically, the respondents defaulted on the monthly installments and despite
repeated demands, they failed to pay their obligations under their promissory note.
● June 7, 1993: petitioner (sila Radiowealth) filed a complaint for the collection of a
sum of money before the RTC Manila Branch.
● During the trial jasmer famatico which is the credit and collection officer of
radiowealth presented evidence against the respondents’ check payments. The
demand letter dated july 12, 1991, the customers ledger card for the respondents,
another demand letter and the metropolitan bank dishonor slips. Famatico stated that
he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of
these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him
● July 4, 1994: the trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence
for the petitioner. Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits and rested
its case on July 5, 1994.
● July 29. 1994: Respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause
of action.
● November 4, 1994, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to
substantiate its claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay.
● On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and remanded the case
for further proceedings.
● According to the appellate court, the judicial admissions of respondents established
their indebtedness to the petitioner, on the grounds that they admitted the due
execution of the Promissory Note, and that their only defense was the absence of an
agreement on when the installment payments were to begin. Indeed, during the
pretrial, they admitted the genuineness not only of the Promissory Note, but also of
 the demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Even if the petitioner's witness had no
personal knowledge of these documents, they would still be admissible "if the
purpose for which [they are] produced is merely to establish the fact that the
statement or document was in fact made or to show its tenor[,] and such fact or tenor
is of independent relevance.
● which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant's evidence so that all
the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for
adjudication as well as before the appellate courts in case of appeal. Nothing is lost.
The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of
trials that the trial court liberally receives all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it
to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record
● "The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred (very clearly had a mistake) in
ordering the remand (reversal) of this case to the trial court instead of rendering
judgment on the basis of petitioner's evidence.”
● While the CA correctly reversed the trial court, it erred in remanding the case "for
further proceedings."
● The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997
Rules, but the consequence on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed.
As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33.
● In other words, defendants (spouses) who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's
evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees
with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose
the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve
the case and render judgement on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to
discourage prolonged litigations.
● The trial court, acting on respondents' demurrer to evidence, dismissed the
Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced (to bring forward/to lead in an
argument) mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court
reversed the trial court because of the genuineness and the due execution of the
disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.
● Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have
rendered judgement on the basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner.

G.R. NO. L-10394 (MORA ACCIPIENDI) case no. 4

DECEMBER 13, 1958
CLAUDINA VDA. DE VILLARUEL, ET AL., (PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES) V. MANILA MOTOR
CO., INC. AND ARTURO COLMENARES (DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS)

KEY ISSUES:
Whether the defendant-appellant Manila Motor Co., Inc. should be held liable for the rentals
of the premises leased corresponding to the lapse of time that they were occupied as
quarters or barracks by the invading Japanese army, and whether said appellant was placed
in default by its refusal to comply with the demand to pay such rents.

For if the Motor Company was not so liable, then it never was in default nor was it
chargeable for the accidental lose of the buildings, nor for any damages except the rental at
the contract rate from its reoccupation of the premises leased until the same were
accidentally destroyed by fire on March 2, 1948.

**erroneous and untenable yung ruling ng appellees; basis is Civil Code of Spain 1889 Art.
1554 & Art. 1560

**Art. 1554: It shall be the duty of the lessor;

1. To deliver to the lessee the thing which is the subject matter of the contract;

2. To make thereon, during the lease, all repairs necessary in order to keep it in serviceable
condition for the purpose for which it was intended;

3. To maintain the lessee in the peaceful enjoyment of the lease during the entire term of the
contract.

**Art. 1560: The lessor shall not be liable for any act of mere disturbance of a third person of
the use of the leased property; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the
trespasser. If the third person, be it the Government or a private individual, has acted in
reliance upon a right, such action shall not be deemed a mere act of disturbance. (Emphasis
supplied)

**perturbacion de hecho v perturbacion de derecho (de derecho yung case na ito)

**We are thus forced to conclude that in evicting the lessee, Manila Motor Co., Inc. from the
leased buildings and occupying the same as quarters for troops, the Japanese authorities
acted pursuant to a right recognized by international and domestic law. Its act of
dispossession, therefore, did not constitute perturbacion de hecho but a perturbacion de
derecho for which the lessors Villaruel (and not the appellants lessees) were liable (Art.
1560, supra) and for the consequences of which said lessors must respond, since the result
of the disturbance was the deprivation of the lessee of the peaceful use and enjoyment of
the property leased. Wherefore, the latter's corresponding obligation to pay rentals
ceased during such deprivation.

**The lessor's position is not improved by regarding the military seizure of the property under
lease as a case of force majeure or fortuitous event.

**The proffered explanation is that the lessors could not refuse to renew the lease, because
the privilege of renewal had been granted to the lessees in the original contract. if the
lessors deemed that the contract had been breached by the lessee's non-payment of the
occupation rents, how could they admit the lessee's right to renew a contract that the lessee
itself had violated?

**The lessors accepted payment of current rentals from October 1945 to June 1946. It was
only in July 1946 that they insisted upon collecting also the 1942-1945 rents, and refused to
accept further payments tendered by the lessee unless their right to collect the occupation
rental was recognized or reserved. After refusing the rents from July to November 1946,
unless the lessee recognized their right to occupation rentals, the appellees (lessors)
demanded rescission of the contract and a rental of P1,740 monthly in lieu of the stipulated
P350 per month.

** the dispossession by the Japanese army exempted the lessee from his obligation to pay
rent for the period of its ouster; and second, because even if the lessee had been liable for
that rent, its collection in 1946 was barred by the moratorium order, Executive Order No. 32,
that remained in force until replaced by Rep. Act 342 in 1948. To apply the current rentals to
the occupation obligations would amount to enforcing them contrary to the moratorium
decreed by the government.

**Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that the appellant Manila
Motor Company should pay to the appellees Villaruel only the rents for the leased premises
corresponding to the period from July up to November 1946, at the rate of P350 a month, or
a total of P1,750. Costs against appellees in both instances.

THE WHOLE CASE:

● Manila motor co., inc., and arturo colmenares interposed (intervened) the appeal
against the decision of the court of first instance negros occidental civil case no. 648,
which ordered manila motor co., inc., to pay plaintiffs villaruel a sum of (a) P11, 900
with legal rest from May 18, 1953 on which date the court below declared invalid the
continued operation of the Debt Moratorium, under the first cause of action; (b)
P38,395, with legal interest from the date of filing of the original complaint on April
26, 1947 on the second cause of action; and against both manila motor co., inc., and
its co-defendant, arturo colmenares, the sum of P30,000 to be paid, jointly and
severally, with respect to the third cause of action.
● May 31, 1940: the plaintiffs villaruel and the defendant Manila motor co., inc.,
entered into a contract whereby the former (villaruel) agreed to convey by way of
lease to the latter the following described premises; (a) 500 square meters floor
space of building of strong materials for automobile showroom offices and store room
for automobile spare parts (b) another building of strong materials for automobile
repair shop; and (c) 5-bedroom house of strong materials for residence of Bacolod
Branch Manager of the defendant company.
● Term of lease was 5 years; to commence from the time that the building was
delivered and placed at the disposal of the lessee company (manila motor co., inc.)
which was ready for occupancy.
● The contract was renewable for an additional period of 5 years.
● Manila motor company agreed to pay the lessors (Villaruel) a monthly rental of 300
pesos payable in advance before the 5th day each month, and for the residential
house of its branch manager a monthly rental (not to exceed) 50 pesos payable
separately by the manager.
● Leased premises were placed in the possession of the lessee (MMC) on the 31st of
October 1940 from which the date period of the lease started to run under their
agreement.
● 1941: the Japanese invasion started and they held and occupied the buildings from
June 1 1942 to March 29, 1945, ousting the lessee. No payment of rentals were
made during the period.
● 1945: American forces occupied the same buildings that were vacated by the
Japanese until October 31, 1945. During this time period, monthly rentals were paid
by the said occupants to the owners with the same rate that the MMC used to pay.
● After the said occupation, manila motor co through their branch manager, Rafael B.
Grey exercised their option to renew the contract for an additional 5 years, and the
parties agreed that the 7 months that the Americans occupied the building would not
be counted as part of the new 5 year term. The company sublet the same buildings
except that used for the residence of the branch manager to the other defendant,
Arturo Colmenares.
● Bago nag simula yung pag cocollect ng rentals, nakipag consult si Villaruel kay atty.
Luis hilado kung meron ba silang right na kunin yung rentals nung panahon na
dumating/inoccupy ng mga hapon yung building. Sinabi naman na may karapatan
naman sila, kaya nag demand tong si Villaruel don sa Manila Motors ng payment,
pero hindi nag comply/nagbayad Manila Motors (refused to pay). Dahil don, nag
bigay ng notice tong si Villaruel, seeking the (rescission) cancellation of the contract
nung lease at yung payment ng rentals simula june 1, 1942 - july 27, 1946 (yung time
na inoccuppy ng mga hapon). Sinend to ni villaruel nung July 27, 1946, pero nireject
din nung company.
● On the same month, si Rafael B. Grey ay inalok na bayaran si Villaruel ng 350
pesos, in which the tenderer requested a receipt. Yung laman nung receipt ay
nakalagay na full payment na raw yon sa said month.
● Itong si Villaruel, tinanggap naman pero yung pagtanggap niya ay “his acceptance
should be understood to be without prejudice to their demand for the rescission of the
contract, and for increased rentals until their buildings were returned to them”
● Tapos itong si Villaruel, biglang nagbago na naman isip. Nagpakita siya ng motibo na
i-limit yung condition ng pagtanggap "neither the lessee nor the lessors admit the
contention of the other by the mere fact of payment"
● As no accord could still be reached between the parties as to the context of the
receipt, no payment was thereafter tendered until the end of November, 1946. On
December 4, 1946 (the day after the defendant company notified Dr. Villaruel by
telegram, that it cancelled the power of attorney given to Grey, and that it now
authorized Arturo Colmenares, instead, to pay the rent of P350 each month), the
Manila Motor Co., Inc. remitted to Dr. Villaruel by letter, the sum of P350.00. For this
payment, the latter issued a receipt stating that it was "without prejudice" to their
demand for rents in arrears and for the rescission of the contract of lease.
● Since nahihirapan na i-settle tong case na to, yung mga lessors (sila Villaruel) dinala
na nila sa korte (April 26, 1947).
● KASO HAHAHAHAHAH bigla naman nagkaron ng sunog na nag originzate sa
Projection room ng City theatre. Cinonvert na ni Arturo Colmenares yung former
repair shop tapos nagbukas sha ng soda fountain at refreshment parlor and partitions
for store spaces na pinaparentahan niya sa ibang tao.
● Dahil don, yung mga plaintiffs, nag demand ng reimbursement sa defendants, pero
dahil nag refuse sila na magbayad, nag file sila ng supplemental complaint as their
third cause of action, yung recovery of the burned buildings.
● Nag file rin yung mga defendants ng amended answer and moved for the dismissal
of the plaintiff’s first and second causes invoking the Debt Moratorium na in-force
during nung time na yon. Na-grant naman yung dismissal by the trial court nung
 February 5, 1951, pero yung naka-set pa rin yung hearing tungkol don sa third cause
of action.
● Nung August 11, 1952, nag file na yung mga defendant (Manila Motors Inc) ng file for
motion of summary judgement dismissing the plaintiffs, third action, kung saan nag
register ng objection tong mga plaintiffs na may kasamang petition for
reconsideration sa order ng korte ng pag dismiss dun sa first and second causes of
action nila.
● Yung plaintiff naman nag papansin sa korte (more like pinapakitaan ng sample case
yung korte) about dun sa cases ng Rutter vs Esteban, na nag iinvalidate nung
effectivity nung Moratorium Law (R.A. 342).
● Nung November 25, 1953, dineny ng korte yung motion for summary judgement
nung defendant’s company (Manila Motor), and sinet aside yung previous order
dismissing the first and second causes of action.
● Afterwards, judgement was rendered in plaintiff’s favour.
● The defendants-appellants (sila Manila Motor) raised a number of procedural points;
(1) dapat daw hindi na na-admit yung supplemental complaint na included yung third
cause of action dahil nagkaroon ng pagbabago sa theory nung case tapos biglang
may mga bagong issues na na-raise na hindi naman dapat i-consider.

G.R. NO. L-40486 (CULPA AQUILIANA/CRIMINAL CASE) case no. 2

AUGUST 29, 1975
PAULINO PADUA & LUCENA BEBIN PADUA (PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS) V. GREGORIO
N. ROBLES AND BAY TAXI CAB (DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES)

**case a quo - reference from a previous case??

**court a quo - reference from a previous court??

FACTS:
1969 a taxicab which was driven by Romeo N. Punzalan, operated under Bay Taxi and
owned by Gregorio N. Robles, struck the 10 year old Normandy Padua on ntl road Barretto,
Olongapo City. The impact was about 40 meters away from the point where the taxicab
struck him–Normandy Padua died.

Normandy’s parents (plaintiffs-appellants) filed with the court of first instance of zambales
and sought damages from Punzalan and Bay Taxi Cab (CIVIL CASE); yung city Fiscal of
Olongapo filed with the same court (CRIMINAL CASE) and charged Punzalan with homicide
through reckless imprudence.

CIVIL CASE (OCT 27, 1969): Romeo Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs (magulang nento ni
Normandy) P12,000 as ACTUAL damages, P5,000 as MORAL & EXEMPLARY damages,
P10,000 as ATTORNEYS fees, and dismissing the complaint to the degree/extent as the
Bay Taxicab is concerned. With costs against romeo punzalan.

CRIMINAL CASE (OCT 5, 1970): romeo punzalan was found GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE through the
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code sentencing him to TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the cost. The civil liability of the
accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled
Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.'

ISSUE:
whether the judgement dated October 5, 1970 in criminal case 1158-O includes a
determination and adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability arising from his criminal act upon
which Robles' subsidiary civil responsibility may be based. (kung sinabi ba nung criminal
case na yan as to whether may civil liability pa ba si robles or wala na)

In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of
the Civil Code.

The Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action proved
ineffectual.

DECISION:

The Paduas' complaint in a civil case (case number 1079-O) is valid and can proceed
because of a related criminal case (case number 1158-O) where someone named Robles
was found responsible for something. The previous decision from October 25, 1972, which
dismissed the Paduas' complaint, was canceled. The case is sent back to the same court
(court a quo) for more legal actions in line with this decision and the law. No decision has
been made about who should pay the legal costs yet.

G.R. NO. 137552 (CONDITION PRECEDENT) case no. 5

JUNE 16, 2000
ROBERTO Z. LAFORTEZA, GONZALO Z. LAFORTEZA, MICHAEL Z. LAFORTEZA,
DENNIS Z. LAFORTEZA, & LEA Z. LAFORTEZA petitioners V. ALONZO MACHUCA
respondent.

X = MACHUCA
Y = ROBERTO
Z = GONZALO

FACTS:
The late Francisco Q. Laforteza (kasi patay na sha duh) has a property which consists of a
house and lot located sa No. 7757 Sherwood Street Marcelo Green Village, Parañaque,
Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (220656) 8941 of the
Registered of Deeds of Parañaque.

Lea, Michael, and Dennis Laforteza (ABC) all executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor
of Roberto (Y) and Gonzalo (Z) Laforteza, allowing Y & Z to jointly sell the property and sign
any documents for the settlement of the estate.
January 20, 1989, Y (Roberto) and Z (Gonzalo) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(contract to sell) with X (Machuca) over the said property for the sum of P630,000. Yung
nakalagay dun sa MOA ay may 30 days lang si buyer-lessee, in this case si X, na mag
produce nung balance of P600,000 which shall be paid to Y and Z upon the execution of the
extrajudicial settlement with sale.

(a) 30,000 to be forfeited in favor of X (Machuca) if the sale is not effective due to the
fault of Y and Z
(b) 600,000 upon issuance of the NEW certificate of title in the name of the late
Francisco Laforteza and upon execution of an extra-judicial settlement of decedent's
estate with sale in favor of Y and Z.

January 20, 1989 nagbayad si X ng P30,000 upfront.

September 18, 1998, yung sila ABC through their council, sent a letter to YZ a furnishing the
latter (Muchaco, X) a copy of the reconstituted title to the subject property, advising X that he
had 30 days to produce P600,000.

October 18, 1989, X (Machuca) sent the defendant heirs YZ (implied na kasama sila ABC) a
letter requesting for the extension of the 30 days deadline up until November 15, 1989 to be
able to produce P600,000. Defendant Y (Roberto) assisted by his counsel, signed his
conformity to X’ request for the extension. Z (Gonzalo), however, did not.

November 15, 1989, si X may pera na na P600,000 covered by United Coconut Planters
Bank Manager check. Kaso, hindi naman tinanggap yung balance nila YZ yung balance
tapos sinabi pa nento ni Y (Roberto) na hindi na for sale yung sinabing property.

November 20, 1989, YZ informed X that they were cancelling the MOA dahil na fail daw si X
sa pag comply with his contractual obligation. Nag reiterate tong si X na ibayad yong
P600,000, eh nag iinsist talaga tong sila YZ na i-cancel yung MOA kaya nag file na ng
instant action tong si X.

Ang naging judgement sa July 6, 1994 ay in favor kay X:

(a) To accept the balance of P600,000.00 as full payment of the consideration for the
purchase of the house and lot located at No. 7757 Sherwood Street, Marcelo Green Village,
Parañaque, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (220656) 8941 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal Parañaque, Branch;

(b) To execute a registrable deed of absolute sale over the subject property in favor of the
plaintiff;

(c) Jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees plus
cost of suit.

Petitioners (Laforteza geng) appealed to the court of appeals; WHEREFORE, the

questioned decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
defendant heirs Lea Zulueta-Laforteza, Michael Z. Laforteza, Dennis Z. Laforteza and
Roberto Z. Laforteza including Gonzalo Z. Laforteza, Jr. are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages

Motion for reconsideration was denied but Z (Gonzalo Z. Laforteza Jr.) was excluded from
liability for paying moral damages.

Sabi ng mga petitioners (YZ, ABC) na yung MOA raw ay isang mere lease agreement with
an option to purchase. At dahil nga option siya, binibigyan daw ng right si X na mag
purchase nung property within a limited period without imposing any obligation to purchase
it. At dahil yung bayad ni X nung P600K ay tapos na (bago mag one month extension at
humingi si X ng extension hanggang Nov 15 at pinirmahan lang ni Y), hindi nagkaroon ng
perfection of a contract of sale.

Pinipilit din nila ABC YZ na nag err daw yung CA sa ruling. Dinagdag pa nila ABC YZ na
yung MOA is a mere contract to sell and yung obligation lang nung mga petitioners ay ibenta
yung property kay X upon the condition na may issuance of a new certificate of title and the
execution of the extrajudicial partition with sale and payment of the P600k; hindi ito
na-deliver kay X kasi sabi nila ABC YZ na nag fail nga raw tong si X sa pag purchase in full
price yung property hence the prevention of the petitioners obligation to convey the title from
acquiring obligatory force. Basta pinipilit talaga nila ABC YZ na yung contract of sale was
perfected at nagkamali yung CA na yung failure to pay ni X ng full price ay “slight or casual
breach” lamang. Tapos hearsay daw yung sinasabi nento ni X na may third person na nag
offer ng higher price.

In any case, X cannot say that the people who filed the complaint were not prepared to fulfill
their responsibility. This is because he already recognized that they could do it when he
asked for more time to make the payment. If he really thought they were not ready, he
wouldn't have asked for more time.

A contract of sale is a consensual contract and is perfected at the moment there is a meeting
of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. 10 From
that moment the parties may reciprocally demand performance subject to the provisions of
the law governing the form of contracts. 11 The elements of a valid contract of sale under
Article 1458 of the Civil Code are (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate
subject matter and (3) price certain money or its equivalent. The issuance of the new
certificate of title in the name of the late Francisco Laforteza and the execution of an
extrajudicial settlement of his estate was not a condition which determined the
perfection of the contract of sale. Petitioners' contention that since the condition was not
met, they no longer had an obligation to proceed with the sale of the house and lot is
unconvincing. The petitioners fail to distinguish between a condition imposed upon the
perfection of the contract and a condition imposed on the performance of an
obligation. Failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a contract, while
the failure to comply with the second condition only gives the other party the option either to
refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. Thus, Art. 1545 of the Civil Code

In this case, there was already a legally binding agreement in place. The condition
mentioned was only related to fulfilling the responsibilities mentioned in the agreement.
However, since the property title was later "reconstituted" and the people who filed the
petition (ABC, YZ)admit they can carry out the necessary legal steps to distribute their
father's estate, the other party (X) had a valid reason to ask them to fulfill their obligation to
hand over and transfer ownership of the house and land. Tsaka, nakapag bayad na ng
earnest money tong si X ng P30k; Whenever earnest money is given in a contract of
sale, it is considered as part of the purchase price and proof of the perfection of the
contract.

Ineffective rin yung paghingi ni X ng extension kasi si Y lang naman yung may pirma. Hindi
naman pumirma si Z. After the expiration of the six-month period provided for in the contract,
the petitioners were not ready to comply with what was incumbent upon them, i.e. the
delivery of the reconstituted title of the house and lot. It was only on September 18, 1989 or
nearly eight months after the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement when the
petitioners informed the respondent that they already had a copy of the reconstituted title
and demanded the payment of the balance of the purchase price. X could not therefore be
considered in delay for in reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other
party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what was
incumbent upon him.

The failure of X to consignate the P600,000.00 is not tantamount to a breach of the contract
for by the fact of tendering payment, he was willing and able to comply with his obligation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 47457 is

AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

G.R. No. L-6515, October 18, 1954 (DEBTOR LOST BENEFIT) case 8

DAGUHOY ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RITA L. PONCE and DOMINGO

PONCE, Defendants-Appellants

FACTS:
In 1950, Domingo Ponce, Chairman and Manager of Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc., and his son
Buhay M. Ponce, Secretary-Treasurer, granted a loan of P5,000 to Rita L. Ponce, secured
by a mortgage over a parcel of land in Manila with 12 percent annual interest. In 1951, Rita
executed an amendment to the mortgage, increasing the loan to P6,190 but leaving the
terms unchanged. The mortgage deeds were not registered, and after encountering
registration issues, Rita and Domingo withdrew them and subsequently mortgaged the same
property to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) for another loan.

Potenciano Gapol, a majority stockholder in Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc., filed a separate

lawsuit (Civil Case No. 13753) against Domingo Ponce and Buhay M. Ponce, seeking an
accounting of the P6,190 loan and potentially other sums. In response, Domingo and Buhay
deposited an RFC check of P6,190 and P266.10 in interest with the court. Gapol,
representing Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc., sought to withdraw these funds to apply them to the
loan repayment, but this was opposed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 13753.

Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc. then initiated the present case against Rita and Domingo Ponce
to collect the loan and associated interest. During pre-trial proceedings, Daguhoy
Enterprises, Inc. waived its cause of action for accounting in Civil Case No. 13753.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rita Ponce lost the benefit of the loan period, making the loan due and
immediately demandable.
2. Whether Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc. had legal capacity to sue due to its alleged
dissolution.
3. The effect of the deposit made in Civil Case No. 13753 on the present case,
specifically concerning the payment of interest.

RULING:
The trial court held that Rita Ponce lost the benefit of the loan period under Article 1198 of
the Civil Code due to her failure to provide proper security (registered mortgage) and her
withdrawal of the mortgage deeds, leading to their use as collateral for another loan. Thus,
the obligation became pure and immediately demandable. The court agreed with this finding.

The argument that Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc. had no legal capacity to sue due to its
dissolution was rejected. Mere resolutions for dissolution do not effect dissolution; other
administrative or judicial steps are required. Additionally, under Section 77 of the Corporation
Law, a dissolved corporation continues to exist as a judicial entity for three years to wind up
its affairs.

The deposit made in Civil Case No. 13753 did not relieve the defendants of paying interest
from the time of deposit. The two cases involved different parties and issues, and the court
denied the petition to withdraw the funds for loan repayment. Therefore, the loan remained
unpaid.