An Ethics of Relationality: Destabilising the Exclusionary Frame of Us vs.

Them

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) is undoubtedly the most celebrated champion of an ethics of

responsibility towards the other. What is often forgotten is what motivated Levinas to criticise

and re-found traditional ethics: the desire to unmask and demolish the roots of genocide from

within Western society. As one of the few in his family (who were mostly in Lithuania when

the war broke out) to survive the Shoah, Levinas’ critique of Heidegger, who symbolises the

Western tradition of ontology, was both political and personal. In his earliest writings on the

rise of fascism in Germany, he exposed how the ontological roots of Western culture are

exclusionary and potentially genocidal (1934). While exclusion does not inevitably lead to

genocide, it is a necessary first step, which – as such – needs to be stopped before it has the

potential to snowball into any form of violence. This is precisely the claim Levinas sought to

make when he stated that:

The crime of extermination begins before murders take place, that

oppression and economic uprooting already indicate its beginnings, that the
laws of Nuremberg already contain the seeds of the horrors of the
extermination camps and the ‘final solution’. (1994: 27)

Genocide, however one defines it, is the most hideous of crimes against humanity. Regardless

of whether one is a victim, a perpetrator, or a bystander (local or global), such crimes destroy

the fabric of the world we all share. Nonetheless, it is imperative not to detach genocide from

other acts, whether physically or symbolically violent, that – if permitted to occur – may

potentially lead to genocide.

With reference to the Shoah, Levinas identifies several of these ‘potentially genocidal

precursors’ such as domination, fiscal injustice, and legal discrimination, which he claims are

rooted in the Western ontological tradition. He presents, in Totality and Infinity (published in

1961), a critical phenomenological account of the Western ontology of the self, and makes a
plea for a social ontology of the other in the form of an ethics of alterity. He unmasks the

different forms of violence rooted in ego-logy, the logic of the ego that dominates our

thinking and choices, demonstrating how it leads to the reduction of the other to the same as

well as forms of prejudice that destroys and denies difference (such as anti-Semitism or

Islamophobia). What is most troubling about this claim is that, at least according to the media,

politicians and many scholars, this same ontology still permeates society at large.

While Levinas’ entire opus was dedicated to developing an ethics of alterity that goes beyond

being, that is the current philosophical and political obsession with the self, it remains very

abstract (at a level beyond meta-ethics) and as such only its spirit, or basic principles, are

exportable to the realm of applied ethics. While the former is of immense importance for

theoretical reflections on genocide, it is the latter that we must consider when seeking to

prevent future genocides. It is for this reason that I turn to Judith Butler’s Frames of War

(Butler), which is clearly inspired by Levinas. She analyses how the post-9/11 wars (both in

Iraq and Afghanistan) are being reported, or framed, by the government and the media – and

more importantly, why. It is in the most popular frame (sadly not only during times of war or

emergency) of ‘us vs. them’, also known as the friend – enemy distinction, that one can

identify the ontological roots of genocide. To be clear, I am not arguing that this frame leads

to genocide but rather that the ontological roots of genocide can be identified in the type of

exclusionary thinking associated with this frame. While this type of ‘us vs. them’ logic is

surprisingly common and is by no means always associated with violence, it is a potential

genocidal precursor and as such needs to be nipped in the bud.

A first step towards this goal, which must be completed collectively, is to identify this

exclusionary frame and to present an alternative frame. This is precisely the goal of this

contribution. I begin by providing an account of this frame connecting it to what I identify as

the ontological roots of genocide. I then present the alternative frame of relationality, which

offers both an ethics and an epistemology based on a social-ontology inspired by Levinas and

Arendt, as a concrete means to destabilise the ‘us vs. them’ frame. Relationality, in its

theoretical form, frames relations in terms of interdependency and horizontality between co-

constituting decentred subjects. Concretely, it asks us to consider our responsibility for others

– within and without – when thinking, judging and acting. The crux of this contribution is

dedicated to providing an account of relationality, which I hope can help destabilize the

exclusionary ‘us vs. them’ frame that is potentially genocidal.

Frames of War: The Ontological Roots of Genocide

In her most recent book Judith Butler analyses and criticizes the media for creating an

unspoken distinction between lives that are grievable, and those that are not (and implicitly all

of us who support the media by watching it). While we find comfort in justifications such as

proximity and fiscal limitations, it is undeniable that a parent dedicates more time and care

grieving their child’s bruised ego then the death of an unknown child whose face flashes

before them on CNN. Saturated by such images and stories of suffering across the globe, we

frame the other as one whose death is somehow less grievable, somehow less valuable than

ours (or those near to us). While the military may be the only institution most infamous for

entering into the human-value calculus , the media has long acknowledged this by means of

McLurg’s Lawi, but we are all silently complicit. While war, and specifically contemporary

wars which are brought into our homes by the media, is perhaps the strongest example of such

framing of lives as (non)grievable, it is by no means an anomaly. After the recent tragic bus

i
Arguably medicine should be included when doctors have limited resources and decide which lives to say, as
well as the law since it puts a dollar value on people’s limbs and that can change given what the person
does…even large corporations that refuse to do recalls if the price of the recall is more than the price of a pay-
out to dead victims’ families as a result of their faulty product. McLurg’s Law refers to a deceased British news
editor who used the death toll of a disaster to quantify its newsworthiness as being inversely proportional to its
distance from a particular location.
crash in which 28 Belgians, 22 children and six adults, were killed – the public, the politicians

and the media were all in solidarity – no expense was to be spared, minutes of silence were

observed throughout the country, and everyone was in a form of collective shock. Without

denying the tragic nature of this event, why is it that we (Europeans) have failed to give – as

promised – even 0.07% of GDP to help prevent the death of many more people across the

globe, why do we not even observe a second of silence for those dying every minute, and

most importantly – why does the tragic reality of precarity across the globe no longer even

shock us?

Butler’s exploration of the frames of war, as a supplement rather than a substitution for

Levinas’ phenomenological analysis of Western ontology, provides us with a clear and

concrete case in which the other is denied dignity, difference and as such is dehumanised. It is

because we accept certain frames, which shape the way we see the world, that help us to

silence other frames, frames which might be more ethical, more critical or more onerous.

While there are no perfect frames, dualistic, exclusionary and rigid frames are certainly the

most problematic. These types of frames permit certain ontologies, such as those Levinas

criticises, to dominate our way of thinking, judging and acting and as such create a fertile

ground for dehumanisation, which in itself is by no means a monolithic process. The claim

Butler makes is that because we have accepted the frame of us vs. them, although in a milder

form, we no longer feel the need to grieve the loss of lives across the globe. While this frame

may not seem problematic, and is not always problematic, when one reads the literature on

genocide and more specifically interviews of perpetrators of genocide, the recurrence of this

frame, in different forms and disguises, is undeniable (Kiernan 2009; Totten 2008; Waller

2007; Dallaire 2004). Frames, such as those used overtly during so-called times of emergency

and war, enable us to simplify the world, to reduce the other, to silence or at least hush certain
voices – within and without. In military and psychological terms, frames all too often play a

pivotal role in the process of moral disengagement that leads to the type of dehumanisation

that is one of the root causes of genocide. It is for this reason that I claim that such frames,

rooted in ontologies of the self, are dangerous and potential precursors to genocide.

Moral disengagement is the psychological process of separating oneself from one’s conduct,

deemed unethical or unacceptable according to one’s own standards (McAlister 2001; Aquino

et al. 2007). Just as we might spend a lengthy period of time justifying a difficult moral

choice, such as whether to put aside money for a family vacation or to give it to a charity,

moral disengagement is a difficult mental procedure in which we attempt to convince

ourselves that the harm we have done to another, which is contrary to our conscience or

intuition, is in fact permissible because of a specific situation, moral exceptions, etc.

According to social psychologists, it is the process of disabling the mechanism of self-

condemnation, of silencing our moral intuition or conscience (Fiske 2004). Simply put, it is

how we detach ourselves from a particular person(s) or distance ourselves from a particular

situation by means of a gradual process of justification, which allows us to ‘turn off’ an

otherwise operational sense of morality. Many first-hand accounts indicate that others can

actually observe this process. One mother describes her experience of her son, returning from

his first tour in Iraq, as follows: ‘He would get this glazed look over him and we’d be in a

discussion and his eyes would literally get glassy and he would just disconnect’ (Phillips

2010: 6). Levinas was critical of any dehumanisation of the other and did not often distinguish

between lesser and viler forms (perhaps because this would open the door, even slightly, to a

space for justifying minor forms of violence), nonetheless, as Butler elucidates, the greatest

danger – experienced during times of war which is all too often a cover for genocide – are

those forms of dehumanisation rooted in a fundamental exclusionary binary logic of ‘us vs.

them’.
According to Bandura, dehumanisation and/or blaming the victim is one of four mechanisms

of moral disengagement each of which occurs by turning off one, or more, of the following

sanctions: 1) cognitive restructuring of conduct often by means of sanitizing language, 2)

displacing or diffusion of responsibility, and 3) disregarding or misrepresenting injurious

consequences (1991; 1999).

Mechanism of Moral Disengagement (Bandura et al, 1996)

Moral Justfication Minimizing, Ignoring, or

Dehumanization
Palliative Comparison Misconstruing The
Attribution of Blame
Euphemistic Labeling Consequences

Reprehensible Detrimental
Victim
Conduct Effects

Displacement of Responsibility
Diffusion of Responsibility

While for Bandura dehumanisation is but one mechanism of moral disengagement, what we

refer to as the ‘us vs. them’ frame (and associate with dehumanisation in a more general

Levinasian sense) plays a role in all of these mechanisms. Rather than clearly identifying

excluded groups, euphemistically masked frames are used thereby enabling these other

mechanisms of sanitisation, misconstruction of consequences, and diffusion of responsibility,

etc. According to Moshman, the most common types of euphemisms are those of dangerous

beings (the enemy, racial impurity, etc.), non-human (i.e. animals, insects etc.), or non-beings

(i.e. garbage, machines, etc.) (2007).What is most common in the military are euphemistic

abbreviations, such as PAX for people. These exclusionary frames, regardless of their

particular form, are the first step in a process that potentially leads to genocide. Frames create

binary modes of thinking; this exclusionary process is then connected to a hierarchy by means

of force or power. Following upon this polarisation, the other or them is seen to be different,

and lesser in some manner, than us. As a result of this, the other is seen as dangerous, non-
human or not-living enabling the self, or the ‘us’, to harm them – most often first verbally,

often guised in terms of humour, then publically or psychologically, and lastly physically.

According to Moshman, the fourth step is the process of self-justification, which is less

painful because of the moral disengagement enabled by the frame.

Dichotomization elevates one dimension of identity over others and,

within that dimension, sharply distinguishes two categories: us and
them. This may lead to (2) dehumanization, in which “they” come to be
seen not just as different from “us” but as outside the human universe of
moral obligation. (3) Destruction may result, accompanied and followed
by processes of (4) denial that enable the perpetrators to maintain their
moral self-conceptions. (2007)

An ‘us vs. them’ frame, dichotomisation in the above terms, such as those with which we

characterize our interactions with strangers is not necessarily enlaced with power or rigidity.

The cause of the second step to dehumanisation and potential destruction (third step) is often

to be found in the particular context such as in times of crisis, instability or emergency politics

all of which intensify a culture of fear. The question, which needs to be asked, is whether it is

possible to prevent this by destabilising these frames.

In line with Hannah Arendt’s conclusions in her analysis of the Eichmann trial (2006), I do

not believe that genocide is the result of a real hatred or an act of a monster (to argue such

would be to deny the humanity of the perpetrator) but rather that it is an extreme form, the

final step in a longer procedure, of a much more ordinary process – one that finds its

ontological roots in exclusionary frames. Genocide, and its psychological and physical

precursors, is often the tragic combination of 1) instability (political, economic, etc.), 2) fear

(violence, war, etc.) and 3) a perceived threat to one’s identity. Instability, which is

unavoidable in post-foundational societies, is pervasive today and it would be foolish to deny

its inevitability or the possibility of an alternative (such as returning to the supposed certainty

of the past). Closely related – but different in that it is avoidable – is the ethos of fear. This

fear, often justified as the only possible response to the series of crisis that mark our times –
environmental, economic, political, etc. – is by no means the only means to address these

problems. The realisation that so many supposed certainties are sinking into an abyss need not

lead us to live in fear (one of the major causes for the rise of the far right in Europe today).

Yet fear and instability alone do not lead to genocide. The missing element, the key, is the

role of identity. In agreement with David Moshman, “genocides are perpetrated by individuals

acting collectively on behalf of what they perceive to be their own group against what they

perceive to be a different group. … At the heart of any genocide, in other words, is identity”

(2007: 116). In our terms, the missing link is that of exclusionary frames, ‘us vs. them’.

Genocides find their origins in moments when identities are reduced first into a dichotomy, an

aporetic either/or, and second when this Manichean dualism is perverted into a dehumanising

hierarchical threat of ‘us vs. them’.ii To summarise, the claim I wish to make is that

‘identities’, which plays a critical role in potentially genocidal situations, that arise from an

ontology of the self create exclusionary frames and as such are the first step in a process of

moral disengagement that can lead to genocide. These exclusionary frames, and type of

thinking they permit, need to be challenged if we are to make the words ‘never again’ mean

anything ever again.

The Ethics of Relationality: Destabilising the ‘Us vs. Them’ Frame

Having clarified the ontological roots of genocide to be the connection between exclusionary

identity frames rooted in an ontology of the self (that currently dominates our societies) and

genocide, I now wish to consider the options before us. The first option, to reduce all others to

ii
While I appreciate that as a foreigner writing in Belgium I do not have the same sensitivity to its colonial past,
even prior to living here the most cited example of such a process was that of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
While the king of Belgium, whose private property this was, did not create the identities of Hutus and Tutsis, he
did exploit this previously dynamic ethnic identity frame for his purpose and in so doing created a rigid ‘us vs.
them’ frame that was made official by means of identity cards. In Moshman’s terms, this is the process of
creating a dichotomy that divided society. By giving one group many material advantages, a clear hierarchy was
introduced. While the transformation from dichotomy to dehumanisation was a slow process that took over half a
century (just as was the case for Jews in the early 20th century and Muslims in Europe today), it seems in
retrospect inevitable. It is in this sense that the colonial past set in motion the exclusionary identity frame upon
which hatred, political and economic instability and fear grew that eventually left over 800, 000 dead.
the same, that is to see all others as part of the ‘us’, is both problematic and unrealistic; it is

also a denial of our lived experiences. Another option, the route Judith Butler takes, is to find

a shared ethical ground. She writes,

For Levinas, violence is one ‘temptation’ that a subject may feel in the
encounter with the precarious life of the other that is communicated through
the face. This is why the face is at once temptation to kill and an interdiction
against killing (2010:172) … The meaning of responsibility is bound up with
this anxiety that remains open, that does not settle an ambivalence through
disavowal, but rather gives rise to a certain ethical practice, itself
experimental, that seeks to preserve life better than it destroys it. (2010: 177)

Her claim is that we must recognise that this happens and take responsibility for the fact that

we, whether consciously or not, accept that certain lives are valuable and others are

insignificant. Inspired by Levinas’ ethical practice of responsibility, she puts forward the

notion of precarity as something shared by all beings as a means to overcome the exclusionary

frame of grievable and not grievable. Butler, like Levinas, asks us to take responsibility for

having created this frame, and for allowing it to dominate the way we think when relating to

others (2010). While I appreciate Butler’s suggestion, I believe we must take Arendt’s

warning regarding the importance of addressing political problems in the political arena

seriously. While our shared precarity is undeniable, it by no means destabilises the root

problem of exclusionary frames. Our precarity is still distinct from their precarity; my

precarity, my problem … your precarity, your problem. Butler proposes an ethical solution to

a political paradox. What follows is my attempt to offer a political response.

As we have shown, the ‘us vs. them’ frame is potentially dangerous and as such must be

destabilised. This highly polarizing binary approach to the world, which is by no means easy

to escape, fails to recognize that while inclusion and exclusion will always play a role in

human interactions, they are always partial, contingent and as such meant to be challenged

and changed. Relationality is a post-foundational response to the destabilizing revelations

that come with the end of foundationalism. It is this end that creates a space for uncertainty in
our lives, the same uncertainty that often leads to fear and the desire for an exclusionary

frame, which is easily found in binary identities such as ‘us vs. them’. Concretely,

relationality asks us to engage in dialogue with ourselves, in order to address our own internal

differences, and others’, in order to understand each other – and specifically our unique and

different perspectives on the world. The aim of engagement – which often takes the form of

an agonistic disagreement – is to create shared political ‘ground’. This by no means suggests

that communication has consensus as its telos. By contrast, the goal – if there is any – is to be

able to understand, even when we disagree, the justifications of other perspectives,

disagreements in fact aid in understanding more than agreements. It is by means of a process

of communication that one develops ‘shared standards’ based on a more complex and closer

understanding of others. While this standard is dynamic, continuously open to change, and

contingent upon the particular persons engaged in communication, it nonetheless provides

partial ground for judgment – an inter-subjective standard, rather than a purely subjective or

objective one. Rather than take reality to be objective or completely subjective, relationality

grounds reality in a form of ‘decentred intersubjectivism’, which arises between people.

While there are few guarantees, relationality does act as social safety net. The less certain one

feels, the more likely one will act out of fear and it is all too often that these reactions, more

instinctual than reflective, lead to violence. While relationality cannot promise the type of

stability once supposedly ‘guaranteed’ by foundationalism, it can promote stronger bonds

between people.

Despite the fact that there is no causal link between awareness and responsibility, the former

often weighs heavily on us and at least makes us aware of the call to responsibility. As we

become more aware, and begin to acknowledge, how interdependent we are and the reality

that all we have is each other, an increased sense of responsibility for the other may arise.
Relational ethics asks us to reflect and consider our current estimation of the value of

autonomy and individualism. In addition it asks us to consider how these are often related to

egoism and the denial of our interdependence. By making us question the notion of the self as

an autonomous and absolute independent being, relationality prevents us from creating an

illusionary (albeit comforting) distance barrier the self and other. It is also by means of this

post-modern decentring of the self in which the notion of autonomy is deconstructed, that

relationality differs significantly from ethical approaches such as care-ethics which likewise

place a strong emphasis on the relation to the other. It is this fictional ‘border-like wall’ that

allows us to deny our fundamental relationality to alterity and opens the door to a denial of

responsibility for the other (Levinas 1980; 1997). While this calls for a rather difficult

reflection upon our narrative identity, it forces us to question the grounds upon which we fear

the other; it equally creates a space, from within, for difference.iii By minimizing the distance,

one that is often framed in terms of ‘us vs. them’ thinking, and promoting a type of thinking

that allows us to better understand ourselves and with those whom we interact, we are better

able to make judgements and avoid actions of the type that result from either ignorance, or

fear, of the other (which are often violent in nature).

At an epistemological level, relationality helps to make us understand that the relationship to

the other is constitutive of both the shared world and ourselves. Critically, this allows one to

recognise that all our beliefs, judgments, and actions are a product of relationality. Thus,

rather than justifying one’s actions based on a fixed norm that itself has no foundation, one is

forced to turn to the other(s) and to engage in a reflective dialogue. It is by means of

communication, both in terms of contradiction and verification,that a shared – although by no

means one of absolute consensus – standards can be developed between people. Learning to

iii
Recognizing that difference is fundamental to the self is equivalent to Arendt’s recognition of plurality as a
social ontology that leads to her identification of plurality as the condition of the political rather than its
enemy/threat/menace.
judge from such an intersubjective perspective means being open to have one’s thoughts

questioned and to reconsidering ones judgments. Likewise it makes one partially responsible

for the actions of others as these are also produced in relation to oneself. While this rather

tangled web of relations certainly makes it difficult to extricate oneself from any situation, not

only is it a more accurate depiction of our relational reality, it may also make it much more

difficult to treat another as someone ‘foreign or strange’iv in a dehumanizing sense. Likewise

it becomes almost impossible to say, ‘I am not responsible’. While this may seem daunting,

such a realisation is greatly supported by the reality that one is never alone (although this does

by no means prevent one from feeling this way). By accepting this reality, one is also refusing

the fear that feeds on loneliness and alienation. Ideally, relationality will help us to recognise

that it’s not all that tragic that all we have is each other. On the contrary, this might be its

unique post-foundational ‘selling point’. Instead of searching for certainty from either above

or below, relationality seeks it by means of horizontal transcendence.

A social ontology that views human relationality, a horizontal dynamic web-like multi-

dimensional interconnectedness, is in fact a counter-balance to the contingency of our reality.

While aware of its own limits and contingency, it claims that the self and other are co-

constitutive by means of a fundamental relationship of interdependency. Relationality, in this

sense, thus means not only that the self and the other are co-constitutive, but also that the

relationship between the self and other is the basis of social reality and existence. What is

critical is that relationality is not rooted in what is shared or common (it is not a tribal form of

connectedness), but rather it arises precisely because of the differences between, and within,

us. This seemingly subtle distinction is critical to relationality. As a social ontology it is

iv
The Stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between him and ourselves common features of a national,
social, occupational, or generally human, nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend
beyond him or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people. – Georg Simmel The Stranger
1908.
rooted in plurality, which arises from alterity rather than similarity. In addition to the

important ethical and political implications of this difference, it is also what distinguishes

relationality from many consensus-oriented theories. Aligning itself with alterity, relationality

values difference, debate, and non-violent conflict.

Concretely what this entails is the realisation that the subject is the product of society. More

specifically this entails that the subject is formed by discourse which itself arises from within

relationality. While this notion of a decentred and deconstructed self is as difficult to grasp

and reconcile, as is the impossibility of absolute foundations, the two are in fact linked. The

notion of an autonomous centred independent subject was itself, as Foucault demonstrated in

Les Mots et les choses, a form of illusory foundation for the past few centuries (1966).

Nonetheless, the end of the subject need not mean the end of meaningful existence or the end

of ethics. On the contrary, as thinkers such as Levinas have shown, the death of metaphysics

may create space in the world for the birth of a new type of ethics (1961; 1974). Levinas

develops an ethics of alterity that arises from the self yet called by the other. This call

awakens responsibility in the receiver, as the ethical subject does not exist prior to this

relationship with the other. Being summoned by the other constitutes the self. It is in terms of

this fundamental co-constitutionality that relationality is a social ontology. Yet, in addition,

this co-constituted relationship between self and other is the basis of the human realm.

What is critical is that relationality promotes a type of solidarity that is best described as

radical tolerance? Rather than solidarity rooted in similarity, like that of tribes or families,

relationality seeks to develop a solidarity rooted in alterity, that is radical tolerance of

difference – an extreme anti-thesis to the paradoxical notion of zero-tolerance. It is this

difference, and our recognition of its ontological basis, that is the basis of relationality and the

solidarity it seeks to promote rather than any shared basis. Relationality is strengthened by an
interdependence, which arises from difference. Unlike Habermas, who defines the goal of this

public discourse to be consensus-oriented, relationality is much closer to the idea of

empowerment, or power in Arendt’s model of the political, ‘Power is never the property of an

individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keep

together’ (1972: 143). Concretely, what this entails is that power can only arise between

people; an individual does not possess power. In terms of relationality, it is an ideal basis

from which power can arise and also creates an affective feeling of empowerment shared by

all those engaged in a collective action which in addition to awareness helps strengthen one’s

sense of responsibility for the other. While relationality is a passive interdependence, it is also

the perfect springboard for a more active form of empowerment – a transformation which

calls for a particular action to arise from a relational awareness. It is in this change from

passive to active that relationality is also transformed into a form of solidarity with both

ethical and political import in terms of taking responsibility for the other and the world.

Conclusions

As Viktor Frankl so aptly described after his experiences in Auschwitz, life’s meaning is

found in the act of making a choice – even when there seems to be no choice, one can still

choose one’s attitude towards this sombre reality (1946). Post-foundationalism, and the notion

of relationality, is precisely such a choice. While it is completely understandable that we

would rather cling to the supposed certainties of foundationalism, this option is no longer

open to us in the 21st century (although this claim is by no means true across the globe). The

other alternative, an anti-foundational one, is all too often a turn to nihilism and a denial of

our shared responsibility for the world. Post-foundationalism offers a third alternative, which

has yet to be tested. The rise and return of strong foundational claims, whether financial,

religious or political, is itself proof of our continued need for such ground.
While relationality only offers a contingent ground, this offer does destabilise the alternative

frame that I have argued is a potential precursor to genocide. Relationality seeks to embrace

the contingency of post-foundationalism by means of a horizontal social ontology of

interdependence rooted in alterity. The proof of this relational social ontology is everywhere

to be seen ... in our networked, intertwined networks of social relations as well as within our

own internal struggles with the difference that define (if this is possible) who we are both to

others and ourselves. Relationality offers no absolute guarantees, it does however promote an

ethics of non-violence, dialogue, solidarity, respect for alterity and the unicity of every human

being, as well as a critique of binary thinking, exclusion, egoism and the dehumanisation of

the other, the result of an ‘us vs. them’ genocidal frame hidden in the roots of Western

ontology. By refusing a simple ‘us-them’ frame, relationality seeks to destabilise the ontology

of the same that pervades our view on the world and the other.
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