Commissioner of Customs v.

CTA, 224 SCRA 665,671 (1993)

G.R. Nos. L-48886-88. July 21, 1993

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and

LITONJUA SHIPPING COMPANY represented by Granexport Corporation as sub-
agent, Respondent.

FACTS: LITONJUA SHIPPING COMPANY with GRANEXPORT as sub-agent

(Hereinafter referred to as “private respondent” for brevity) has used the berthing
facilities of ILIGAN BAY EXPRESS CORPORATION, a private corporation which
exclusively operates and maintains said facilities, at Kiwalan, Iligan City for the
following vessels which are engaged in foreign trade: 1) MS “Chozan Maru”; 2) MS
“Samuel S”; 3) MS “Ero”; 4) MS “Messinia”; 4) MS “Pavel Rybin”; 5) MS “Caledonia” and
MS “Leonidas”. For the use of said berthing facilities on various occasions, the
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS assessed berthing charges for each vessel, amounting to
a total of PhP 40, 551, which were paid by private respondent under protest.

Private respondent then filed cases before the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS through the
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS for the refund of berthing fees under protest, but it did not
prosper. This matter was then elevated at the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, but of
no avail.

On July 28, 1978, the COURT OF TAX APPEALS reversed the decision of
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, rendering that the private respondent is entitled to a
refund, amounting to PhP 40, 551.

The COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS contends that the government has the authority
to impose and collect berthing fe226es whether a vessel berths at a private pier or at a
national port. It is also of the belief that KIWALAN is a national port, for it is within the
jurisdiction of the collection district and territorial limits of the national port of Iligan.

On the other hand, private respondent countered that the right of the government to
impose berthing fees is limited only to national ports; further, KIWALAN is not a national
port, considering that it is operated by a private corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not a vessel engaged in foreign trade which berths at a privately
owned wharf or pier is liable for the payment of berthing charges under Sec. 2901 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34?

HELD: NO, the Supreme Court ruled that the subject vessels, not having berth at a
national port, but at the port of KIWALAN which was constructed by a private
corporation, are not subject to berthing fees. Private respondent are further entitled to
receive the refund for the berthing fees it previously paid.
 KIWALAN was not accorded the status of a national port as per Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 or in Executive Order No. 72. It was neither included
in the list of national ports specified on said orders, nor there was a showing that it was
converted as a national port. It is a settled rule in Statutory Construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. This rule
is expressed in the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction
be extended to others. It further lies on the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Moreover, Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No.
34, expressly provided that only the national ports are subject to berthing fees, to wit:

“Definition – Berthing charge is the amount assessed a vessel for mooring or

berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or channel marginal wharf at any
national port in the Philippines; for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or
for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river, or canal under the
jurisdiction of any national port of the Philippines; Provided, however that in the last
instance, the charge shall be fifty (50%) per cent of rates provided for in cases of piers
without cargo shed in the succeeding sections.

Said amendment, in comparison with the provision it superseded, included the

word “national” before the word “port”, thus, indicating that a change from the former
one has been made, rendering the court to give and apply the legislative meaning and
intent of the amendment.