SIRULIUKTS ANU bET(JI\LJ
(92) If Johnhasat leasttwo cars,thethird oneparkedoutsidemustbe somebody
or two). The implicature then is that more than two (i.e., possibly three)peoplewho
smoke and drink live to the relevantlesserage. This seemsright.
3.2.2. Default override
As we observed,the default is usually the strong meaning.However, implicatures
can be cancelled.Under the presentview, cancellation amounts to a simple kind of
backtracking. Let me illustrate with a few examples. (In what follows, c + S stands
for the incrementationof context c by S.)
(S9) a. Johnor Theoarethere'Maybe/infact, they both are'
vs there'(theo'))
b. (c + there'(sue')
vs there'(theo')) + there'(sue')n (there'(theo')
c. (c + there'(sue')
Here is what one expects.One first processesthe first sentencein (89a) and addsit to
the context, as in (89b). At the point where the first sentenceis processed,the hearer
will hypothesize that the strong interpretation of (89a) is being intended (as that is
the default). Then, the secondsentenceis processedand added to the context, as in
(89c). But this resultsin a contradictionbecausethe exclusiveinterpretationof or is
incompatiblewith the secondsentence.At that point, the hearerthrows away the strong
interpretation of the first sentenceand switches to the plain one (in accordancewith
Stalnaker's1978felicity conditions).Items like infact or maybeare markersto sig-
nal that some backtracking must take place.
We also noticed in section2.2thatsometimes implicaturesarenot cancelledwhen
one would expect them to be. The example we discussedthere was
(90) It was a two coursemeal.But everyonewho skippedthe first or the secondcourse
enjoyedit more.
The point is that or in this sentenceis not construedinclusively, becauseotherwisea
contradictionwould ensue(at leastin "normal" contexts).Now in casessuchas (90),
my theory predicts that the strong interpretation and the plain interpretation are one
and the same. So, how does such a sentencecome to have the reading it seemsto
have ("Everyone who skipped the first or the secondcoursebut not both enjoyed the
meal more")? How come we see what looks like an implicature in a context where
we wouldn't expect one? A simple way of thinking about this is in terms of accom-
modation. We know that quantificational domains are subject quite generally to such
phenomena.The interpretation of (90) requires a domain of people who don't skip
toth courses.This yields the sameeffect that we would obtain by not removing the
locally added implicature.
Casesof a similar sort are also pointed out in Levinson (2000), who discusses,
for example,
else's.
(91) If Johnhastwo cars,the third oneparkedoutsidemustbe somebody
Notice how this sentencebecomes a blatant non-sequitur if we introduce an overt
"at least" in the antecedent:
else's.
Clearly,here too we want to accommodatein the antecedentof (92) an "and no more"
proviso.I.e., we want to restrictour considerationto setsof worlds from which people
with more than two cars are excluded. The effect of this accommodationis the same
as the computation of an implicature. But if we are right, the mechanismthrough
which this happensis very different from how implicatures come about normally. In
(92) the implicature is not added locally. It is accommodatedat somepoint to avoid
a near contradiction.
A first consequenceof this view is that we would expect phenomenalike those
exemplifiedin (90) and (91) to be hard to obtain in contextswhereaccommodation
is hard. In particular, we know that accommodationwith antecedentsof conditional
or quantificational domains is relatively common. But, for instance,it is quite hard
in the scopeof negation or of a negative quantifier (as in the famous"no one ate with
theking becausethere is no king"), and indeed in such contexts it is much harder to
havethe appearanceof implicature preservation.
(93) No one skippedthe first or secondcourse.
It is hard or impossible to construe (93) as equivalent to 'onoone skipped the first or
secondcourse but not both." To the extent that this happens,immediately the sen-
tencegets a very strong metalinguistic flavor.
A secondconsequenceis that if somethingprevents us from reintroducing a
removedimplicature, we should be in trouble (i.e., the sentenceshouldsound awk-
ward). Something like (94) might be a casein point:
(94) ??No onewho earns940,000a yearcanaffordthishouse
I believethat this sentenceout of the blue is strange(we need to add an understood
"or less").The reasonis the following. First you removethe "exactly" implicature in
the DE context of no. At that point we would get a sentencesuch as "No one who
earns$40,000 a year or more can afford this house," which (given what afford
means)is a contradiction (or a near contradiction). At that point, we try to intro-
ducethe implicature. But the result is not much better (why should it be that no one
who earnsexactly $40 a year should not be able to afford this house).So in the end
we are left with a pragmatically odd sentence.
I shouldconcludethis discussionby pointing out that the caseof nonmonotone
quantifierslike (95) now also follows.
(95) a. Exactlytwo studentssmokeor drink.
b. exactlytwo (student')(smoke'vs drink')
c. exactlytwo (student')(smoke'v drink')
Thescalarinterpretationof (95a) is (95b), and the plain one is, of course,(95c), despite
the fact that the strong and the weak interpretation are, in this case,informationally
independentof each other (i.e., neither entails the other). The reasonwe expect the