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To treat of
“To treat of the world” the world
Paul Otlet’s ontology and epistemology and
the circle of knowledge
Steffen Ducheyne 223
Research Foundation, Flanders, Belgium, and
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Received 5 February 2008
Revised 14 May 2008
Ghent University, Belgium Accepted 16 May 2008

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to document how Paul Otlet, founding-father of what is termed
at present as “information science”, attempted to provide a complete “image of the world” (and reality in
general) by establishing the scientific discipline he dubbed “documentation”. The paper also aims to
focus on how Otlet represented human knowledge and reality in a systematic and unified way.
Design/methodology/approach – A close reading of Otlet’s primary works and some of his
personal archives was undertaken.
Findings – Most importantly, it is shown that Otlet’s views on documentation were immersed in a
cosmological, objectivist, humanitarian and ontological framework that is alien to contemporary
information science. Correspondingly, his alleged affinity with positivism is reassessed.
Originality/value – The philosophical foundations of the origins of information science are
highlighted. Indirectly, this paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on realism and anti-realism in
information science.
Keywords Information science, History, Knowledge sharing, Document management, Encyclopaedias,
Entrepreneurialism
Paper type Research paper

1. The need for encyclopaedia

After the second scientific revolution which occurred during the first decades of the
twentieth century, several scientists, social reformers, utopians, philosophers and
many others felt the ardent necessity of establishing a uniquee synthesis (“une
systématisation unique”, as Otlet (1934, p. 7) wrote) of the ever increasing myriad of
scattered scientific material, which could harvest intellectual and social progress (Otlet,
1934, pp. 3-4, 9, 23)[1, 2]. The call for a unifying synthesis that could guarantee social
stability and a peaceful world society was a typical inter bellum period topic[3]. The
ensemble of the sciences, Otlet noted, leads to knowledge of the Universe and its
totality (Otlet, 1935, p. vii). Otlet firmly believed that one could give a unique
description and classification of reality. The universality of scientific knowledge helps
to conceive the world as a universal (Otlet, 1935, pp. 260-261). The Leitmotiv question
in Otlet’s oeuvre was “How to grasp this complex universal, the World, at a single
glance?” (“Comment d’un coup d’œil embrasser ce complexe universel, le Monde?”
Journal of Documentation
The illustrations from personal papers of Paul Otlet (Papiers Personnels Paul Otlet) are Vol. 65 No. 2, 2009
reproduced with the permission of the Mundaneum, 15 Rues Passages, B-700 Mons, Belgium pp. 223-244
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
(www.mundaneum.be). The author is highly indebted to Stéphanie Manfroid, the Director of the 0022-0418
Mundaneum, for her kind assistance during his consultation of the archives. DOI 10.1108/00220410910937598
JDOC (Otlet, 1935, p. 105). “Documentation”, or what we would nowadays call “information
65,2 science”, was the means by which the required synthesis Otlet envisioned was to be
established[4]. He wrote as follows on the aims of documentation:
[. . .] a general science, a philosophy of science, encyclopaedia are necessary to unite all
particular sciences, so that their fragmentary connections are removed[5], that they reveal[6]
their principles, methods, [and] the program of their development and succeed in simplifying
224 their conception and their expositions (Otlet, 1935, p. 360)[7].
He stressed the need of profiting from the modern instruments for synthesizing and
representing our knowledge: “[t]here no longer is a Temple of Artemis[8] [a sacred
temple where manuscripts could be consulted], but [now] we have Typography,
Typographers, [and] unknown and loyal friends” (Otlet, 1934, p. 436)[9].
As Otlet himself noted, the word “encyclopaedia” derives from the Greek “ky klo6”
(circle) and “paid1ia” (general education), both combined thus meaning “the circle of
science” (Otlet, 1934, p. 137, p. 360). According to Otlet, science (including
documentation) represents the elements of reality either verbatim, graphically or
plastically. The aim of documentation is to represent and generalize the elements that
science provides into a meaningful and unified whole that transcends mere fragmented
knowledge (Otlet, 1934, pp. 372-3). As we shall see, in stark contrast to contemporary
information science, Otlet’s documentation was imbedded in a metaphysical and
cosmological framework. Birger Hjørland, himself a proponent of realism in
information science, notes that:
In information science, most research activities have in recent decades been directed toward
user preferences and attitudes, not toward the basis for the knowledge claims represented in
information systems. Most relevance research seems to assume that the relevance of given
kinds of information can be established by studying the relevance criteria for users. This is
clearly an idealist position, although probably nobody would admit it (Hjørland, 2004, p. 497).
This tendency to focus on the subjective has removed attention from reality in
information science, Hjørland (2004, p. 498) notes. In documentation, as Otlet conceived
it, the world and reality occupied centre-stage. It is this objectivist framework we shall
address in section 2. Correspondingly, we shall reassess Otlet’s affinity with positivism:
I shall argue that Otlet’s objectivist views were at odds with positivism. Furthermore, I
show that the representations and figures Otlet used in documentation and information
science can only be understood within this objectivist setting (section 3).

2. Otlet’s epistemology and ontology

The world as we observe it, Otlet noted, provides only knowledge of prima facie
unconnected and chaotically distributed particulars. In order to arrive at true, i.e.
scientific, knowledge of the world, human beings have to simplify and order this
multiplicity:
The world presents itself before our eyes as a multiplicity. To think, to act on it, [or] to be
simply moved by it, we have to enumerate it, to name it, to decompose it, to classify it, to
measure it, to recombine it, to create or display it with the elements of new compositions.
Placed before the panorama of things – the most general expression to indicate these
particular elements by which the entirety constitutes itself – we perceive substances, beings,
phenomena, viewed either by themselves or in [their respective] environments (Otlet, 1935,
p. v)[10].
The world unfolds itself to as according to four modalities: by direct perception of To treat of
reality, by thought, by language, and by documents: the world
The World presents itself to humans living in societies under four modalities: the Real World
(Reality), the known World (Thought), the expressed World (language), the depicted World
(Document). These four modalities of the same world are interdependent. In principle all their
parts should perfectly match. In fact, there is discrepancy, inexactness and incompleteness
(Otlet, 1935, p. vii-viii [italics added])[11]. 225
Otlet aimed at unravelling the essential unity (“unité essentielle”) behind all pluralities,
separations and particular scientific disciplines (Otlet, 1935, pp. iii-iv). Science tends
towards universality, certainty and necessity, and serves as the basis of both our
worldview and our practical and intellectual needs:
Goal: to form an intellectual image of the varying world (static and dynamical science) and
the determination of the action items on the basis of which action is possible according to
their transformation of the world in view of human needs (material and intellectual
desiderata) (Otlet, 1935, p. 248)[12].
By an increasing process of abstraction the human mind is able to trace and generalise
the necessary connexions between these particulars (Figure 1) (Otlet, 1934, p. 30).
Accordingly, we gradually establish a synthesis of the world:
Synthesis is the establishment of a science of total knowledge, of an exposition of the world
(its conception and laws) that encompasses all particular knowledge which is [normally] dealt
with by the study of analytic facts and partial syntheses (Otlet, 1934, p. 351)[13].
Documentation, as a scientific discipline, conforms to the standard scientific methods
of analysis[14] (reasoning from particular instances to more general ones) and
synthesis (reasoning from general notions to particular instances):
We distinguish between analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, [and] by
consequence rational sciences are founded on deduction; empirical sciences are founded on
induction. Documentation is an empirical science which, once a general expression of certain
general connexions has been arrived at, uses the deductive method to generalize givens and
the methods of combination or invention to imagine new givens (Otlet, 1934, p. 23, cf. p. 97;
Otlet, 1935, p. xiv)[15].
By means of the analytic method we establish a general principle which is a
generalization of the particular elements we have considered. Afterwards, by the
method of synthesis we deduce new elements, which were not included in the set of
particulars that served as the basis of our initial inductive generalization, from the
previously established principle[16]. Encyclopaedia’s primary aim is to provide us with
a set of abstract and universal concepts that captures reality and it may therefore be
aptly considered as “the book of books”[17] or Index Scientiae. On concepts Otlet notes:
Thought proceeds from the real (immediate givens of consciousness) and tends towards the
intelligible. What thought seeks are abstract concepts (as economically as possible), that serve
[thought] to deal with facts, to anticipate them, to understand them as simple, practical and
manageable as possible, to case them in the most universal, the most systematic, (and by
consequence) the most abstract forms (Otlet, 1935, p. 351, emphasis added)[18].
Otlet, as has I have argued elsewhere, endorsed linguistic objectivism. Linguistic
objectivists subscribe to the following thesis:
JDOC
65,2

226

Figure 1.

(LO): Linguistic atoms [which express concepts] uniquely correspond to certain discrete and
well-defined elements in the world and further combinations of these linguistic atoms can
objectively capture “the order of the world” (Ducheyne, 2005b, p. 114).
As a linguistic objectivist, Otlet endorsed the view that a true synthesis of our
knowledge should be more than a scheme we merely and arbitrarily impose on nature.
Scientific knowledge should thus be based on representative concepts of things
themselves (cf. “concepts représentatifs des réalités elles-mêmes” (Otlet, 1935, p. vii)).
For instance he noted that:
The definition of words must be based on the definition of things, the facts and the notions
themselves which they serve to express. A definition has to expose in a precise way the
necessary and sufficient qualities in order to create a class to indicate the objects which
belong to this class. [. . .] Definitions lead to (scientific) laws. The definitions here considered
are the expression of the relations between things. An expression can only be as clear as the
related things themselves have been clearly defined (Otlet, 1934, p. 12)[19].
It seems therefore that Otlet, in line with his linguistic objectivism, endorsed what we To treat of
today would call the “classical theory” of lexical concepts[20]. According to the the world
“classical theory”, a lexical concept x is defined by a set of simpler concepts that
express necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under concept x[21]. In their
endeavour to construct an ideal representational system, linguistic objectivists
frequently attempted to cleanse natural language from its inherent ambiguities. Otlet
indeed made statements that referred to this kind of purification of natural 227
language[22]. After the discussion of his world formula in Monde, for instance, Otlet
noted that his notation is international and does not depend upon any natural
language: “it refers to concepts and not to words and their fluctuating synonyms” (Otlet,
1934, p. xxiii, cf. p. vii [italics added]). Likewise, science in general deals with the
“specific and irreducible logical elements” of things (Otlet, 1934, p. xv).
Correspondingly, Otlet was also an essentialist: he believed that for each entity there
is an enumerable set of characteristic properties which is shared by all its instances. In
the Otletian framework there was a rigid correspondence between knowledge and
reality. According to Otlet, the permutations delivered by the Universal Decimal
Classification correspond both to “motions” in objective reality (“réalité objective”) and
to “motions” in the mind (Figure 2) (Otlet, 1935, p. xxiii).
Ontology was an essential part of Monde[23], for Otlet noted that to treat of the
world (“traiter du monde”) is to expound a conception of the world, which has been a
perennial quest in philosophy (Otlet, 1935, p. xiii, cf. pp. 10-11). Otlet was clear from the
onset about the aim of Monde:

Figure 2.
Otlet’s decimal system
JDOC This book is in a sense a response to the questions each mind has to pose itself: What is the
world? Of what does it consist? Where does it come from and where does it go? There are
65,2 three spheres involved (the one in the other) on the basis of which Man pursuits his existence
(Otlet, 1935, front page)[24].
Otlet noted that the “image of the World” has long-time been expressed by the
allegories of artists and poets (Otlet, 1935, p. xxv). The time had come to provide an
228 increasingly concrete and exact representation of the world which could at the same
time, by the underlying logic of its corresponding notational system, provide a scheme
that displayed the objective relations between its elements. Otlet’s metaphysically
loaded Monde provides us, I shall claim, with the underlying theoretical framework of
the Traité de Documentation.
According to Otlet’s metaphysical outlook, reality can be considered objectively (in
terms of space, time and things) and subjectively (in terms of the self and its creations
and expressions) (Otlet, 1935, p. 401). The world and the self mutually affect and
transform one another (Otlet, 1935, p. v). Otlet’s well-known equation of the world
(“équation du monde”) is meant to provide an analysis of the primary elements of
reality. The second part of the equation is the analysis of the world (Otlet, 1935, p. xxi).
This formula goes as follows (Otlet, 1935, pp. v-vi, xxi-xxii, 335, 359, 401): World ¼ {(1)
objective components (which consists of the following four elements: (1.a) Things
(including Nature, Man, Society and Divinity), (1.b) Movement, (1.c) Space, and (1.d)
Time)} £ {(2) subjective components (including (2.a) the self, (2.b) human creations,
and (2.c) expression)} £ {(3) the Unknown and the Mysterious (x þ y)}[25]. Otlet’s
“x” and “y” refer to what is yet undiscovered and to what is beyond reach of human
understanding, respectively. The former is potentially knowable, the latter is
fundamentally unknowable. Reality and its objective elements are conceived as
substances and movements in space and time (Otlet, 1935, p. vi).
It is worth noting that Otlet considered space and time in explicitly Kantian terms:
as synthetic a priori principles of perception (Otlet, 1935, p. 305)[26], i.e. as the
necessary conditions of our perceptions of objects. Such “intuitions” are not arbitrary:
they are pure concepts of reason and they form the conditions that order and constitute
our perceptions. Only Kantians will accept that our perception of the world can be
uniquely categorized. Nowadays, “modern science”, as David M. Stamos notes, “is not
Kantian” (Stamos, 2004, p. 137, cf. p. 135). This observation also applies to information
science (Hjørland (2004)). In line with Kantian philosophy, Otlet wrote as follows on
time:
Time is not a phenomenon, but a form of apperception by which the phenomena appears to us
(Otlet, 1935, p. 317)[27].
Otlet similarly conceived of space:
The external world as far as it appears to us shows us bodies juxtaposed in space and states
of bodies that succeed [each other] in time. One therefore cannot separate in one’s study what
is so profoundly united in reality. Thus a theory of space always presupposes a symmetric
theory of time (Otlet, 1935, p. 304)[28].
The equation of the world consists of the fundamental concepts, i.e. the analytic atoms,
which constitute the world and represent the inner essence of things (Otlet, 1935, p. vii).
Objective knowledge is the result of an inter-subjective, i.e. collective, process of
reflexion based on experience which results in “impersonal and total science” (Otlet, To treat of
1934, p. 10). Objective knowledge about reality can be obtained by assembling different the world
perspectives (cf. “la réalité totale étant faite de l’ensemble de ces points de vue” (Otlet,
1934, pp. 6-7)). Knowledge is an image of the real (Otlet, 1935, p. 337) and it gives us
knowledge about what is (Otlet, 1935, p. 332). The object of science is to truthfully
represent the world. Otlet stated that because of the limitations of the human mind, our
representations of the world are never perfect. But nevertheless, he assumed, they 229
increasingly tend towards perfection[29]. Moreover, Otlet believed that subjective
elements and distortions (Otlet, 1935, p. 387, p. 395) could gradually be filtered out in
the long run[30]. Otlet was, what we today would call, an intentional realist: our
knowledge tends more and more to a true picture of reality (e.g. atomic theory (Otlet,
1934, p. 43)). The goal of science is to provide “a set of evident and certain, necessary
and universal, systematically organized, propositions which are immediately or
indirectly drawn from the nature of the subject and which give the intrinsic reason of its
properties and laws of its action” (Otlet, 1935, p. 248, emphasis added[31]). This thesis is
at odds with positivism, since it assumes that “the order of the world” is derived from
the essences of things, a view to which the positivists à la Mach and Comte objected.
This is also my crucial objection against Day (1997). Ron Day’s interpretation,
according to which for Otlet there was no sharp boundary between the inside and the
outside of a text and, correspondingly, that a text had no objective essence, does not
hold any water, for Otlet wrote, that books express a unique idea and that when this
idea has not been understood the book has not been properly read[32].
The ultimate aim of documentation was to establish a truthful copy of the World
(“véritable double”) (Otlet, 1935, p. 391). In similar spirit, he recorded that, a museum, our
modern temple of knowledge, ought to represent reality. Otlet noted: “it tends to become
a World in miniature, a Cosmoscope, which permits to see and to understand Mankind,
Society and the Universe” (Otlet, 1914, p. 7)[33]. In contrast to positivists, he also believed
that science could provide knowledge of imperceptibles (Otlet, 1935, p. 31).
Otlet’s metaphysical project was at odds with positivism, pace W. Boyd Rayward
who claims that Otlet’s work was the reflection of “an outdated paradigm: nineteenth
century positivism” (Rayward, 1994, p. 247; cf. more recently: Sander (2002)).
Positivism, broadly conceived, refers to either: a stance on how the results of a
confirmed scientific theory should be interpreted; or to a philosophical position which
seeks to ban all non-empirical elements in our knowledge and to replace metaphysics
by the tools provided by empirical science[34]. According to positivism, understood in
the first sense, only the empirical content of a scientific theory should be accepted and
the theoretical terms postulated by it should merely be considered as handy tools
necessary for the construction of scientific theories; they should not be thought of as
corresponding to something objective in nature. Scientific theories do not track truth;
they are mere instruments to predict phenomena (positivism in this sense is
synonymous with instrumentalism). According to positivism, understood in the second
sense, all speculative, metaphysical and causal statements need to be rejected, since
they transcend what is empirically accessible to us.
Positivism, considered of historically, refers to the “positive philosophy” developed by
the Frenchman Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Comte sought to establish a philosophical
framework based on the “positive sciences”, i.e. sciences that are based on observation, in
order to enhance social and political reform. Comte classified the sciences according to
JDOC their historical development and their level of complexity: mathematics, astronomy,
physics, chemistry, biology and sociology (a term he himself coined). According to Comte,
65,2 all knowledge rested on the observation of facts. Comte therefore rejected the
meaningfulness of the concept of causality: “the proper business of science is to classify
phenomena in terms of relations of succession or resemblance and not to engage in any
causal explanations” (Comte, 1855, p. 28). In the age of positive science there was no room
230 for metaphysical speculation. Correspondingly, in the final “positive stage” of human
development (which follows the theological and metaphysical stage, respectively), the
human mind has “given over to the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and
destination of the universe, and the causes of the phenomena, and applies itself to the
study of their [descriptive] laws” (Comte, 1855, p. 799). Correspondingly, positive
philosophy set out to establish the following: “[o]ur real business is to analyse accurately
the circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them by the natural relations of
successions or resemblance” (Comte, 1855, p. 28). Therefore, in mechanics we do not deal
with causes, but only with observable motions (Comte, 1855, p. 190).
Otlet, by contrast, stressed that the aim of science is not only descriptive (as the
positivists did), but also explanatory and causal (Otlet, 1934, pp. 23, 31)[35]. Otlet noted
that positivists “preached an exclusive love of science and condemned ontology”, while
metaphysicians (e.g. Henri Bergson) attempted to pursue ontology in particular
sciences (Otlet, 1935, p. 11)[36]. Positivism fiercely broke with knowledge of causes: it
exclusively focused on the how and not on the why (Otlet, 1935, p. x). Although Otlet
granted that some young scientific disciplines did not (yet) provide causal explanations
(e.g. sociology (Otlet, 1935, pp. 407-429)), he did not doubt that in mature sciences
knowledge of causes is attainable. He even stated that cosmology could provide a basis
for metaphysics (cf. “Par là on accède vraiment à la métaphysique, aux premiers
principes” (Otlet, 1935, p. 126)). According to Otlet, the circle of knowledge objectively
corresponds to reality and does not refer to something we arbitrarily impose on it
(Otlet, 1935, pp. 10-11). The unity of our knowledge is based on the inherent unity of the
world (Otlet, 1934, p. 430). The tendency towards increasingly economical concepts is
not merely a matter of pragmatic usefulness (cf. Mach (Otlet, 1934, p. 431)): rather it
reflects the inherent economy of the Universe.
Also, on Otlet’s view, scientific knowledge could offer instruments to help us to
arrive at where we as a species should evolve (thus referring to finality and teleology)
(Otlet, 1934, p. 31). Knowledge of the elements of reality would also stir individuals to
become strong and harmonious persons characterized by a rational physical,
intellectual, moral, social and professional development. Education, Otlet noted, should
therefore be based on our knowledge of the Universe:
One has to strongly adopt the following points of view: education, conceived as a complete
and continuous formation of a human being, [is] based on knowledge of the Universe, on the
determination of our active and passive interactions with it, [and] on the harmonisation of our
individual actions on the level of social evolution (Otlet, 1914, p. 6)[37].
In his characteristic optimism, Otlet assumed that the progress of scientific knowledge
would automatically yield personal, social-political and spiritual growth. As can be
clearly seen in Otlet’s writings on sociology, social sciences could also play an
important role in the establishment of social reform, human progress and happiness
(Otlet, 1935, pp. 407-29). In contrast to (logical) positivism, Otlet explicitly situated
human growth and progress in a cosmological and teleological picture of the Universe.
3. Otlet’s spherical metaphysics and the image of the World To treat of
Otlet considered reality as a collection of encapsulated spheres. Otlet’s metaphysical the world
views clearly permeated his “Image of the World” (“image du Monde”) both in his
documentation and universal encyclopaedia. The spherical or circular models used by
Otlet had important metaphorical and symbolic connotations. They were bearers of
additional ontological and cosmological contents.
In Monde Otlet announced that the Universe consists of three spheres: 231
(1) First sphere: that of remote things that overwhelm by their immensity, variety
and contradictions[38].
(2) Second sphere: that of entities and events within immediate human reach: the
Earth and its five continents, with two billion inhabitants in sixty-one
Governments and in which the parts are subject to interdependence and
repercussion.
(3) Third sphere: that of the individual and the self, spectator and actor, passive
and active, at the same time, mirror and micro-cosmos of all external realities.

To decompose the total sphere of the universe in its particular spheres and its segments,
meridians and great circles, is the object of this book, which is dedicated to a conception of
the World and its representation in the Mundaneum (Otlet, 1935, front page)[39].
The outer or “first” sphere, i.e. the universe, was bounded. Modern science had
shown, Otlet stated, that the universe was not infinite, but that it had a spherical shape:
Gravitation is an inertial forces, which gives the illusion of a force of attraction, while in fact it
is the resultant of the curvature of the universe which is itself results from the presence of
matter. The universe seems to have a spherical form of definite, although magnificent,
regions (Otlet, 1935, pp. 23-4, cf. p. 402)[40].
Otlet noted that Einstein, who at a certain point had indeed speculated that all matter
present in the universe curves itself into a finite four-dimensional sphere without
boundaries (Einstein (1917)), had shown that the Universe is “not infinite, though
unbounded” and that it assumes the form of “a piece of soap” (Otlet, 1935, p. 59). The
second sphere contains the earth, its inhabitants and the social relations between them.
Otlet conceived the social interactions between humans, i.e. individual “third spheres”,
as an autonomous sphere “floating around” the world:
An immense sphere, human and social, has come to super-add itself to the other spheres
whose encapsulation constitutes the world. This sphere is directly ours (Otlet, 1935,
p. 104)[41].
Otlet’s views on this derive from Édouard Le Roy (Bergson’s successor at the
Académie Française), to whom Otlet explicitly refers:
The intellect constitutes a veritable sphere around the whole planet, the “Noosphere” as the
philosopher Leroy referred to it (Otlet, 1935, p. 237)[42].
According to Le Roy there is a human sphere surrounding the biosphere: a “sphere of
reflection, of conscious and free invention, of thought in its pure sense: the sphere of the
mind or noosphere [the prefix “noo-” derives from the Greek “ ”, meaning “mind”] (Le
Roy, 1999, p. 65)[43]. Figure 3 represents the cycle of intellectual work and can be
considered as representing the noosphere, which transforms the world as given. The
JDOC world, i.e. “la réalité totale”, is captured by thought: each individual reproduces a
65,2 fragment of the Universe (“chaque individuelle reproduit un fragment du monde”
(AP, Encyclopedia Universalis Mundaneum, II 1 A2). Obtaining objective knowledge
of the Universe could, therefore only be attained by combining our fragmentary
perspectives into a collective one (this supposes collaboration and unity amongst
researchers). The world of thought if properly systematized yields science, which
232 “compiles and classifies thought and individual experiences in a collective form”
(“concentre et classe en forme collective les pensées et les experiences individuelles” (AP,
Encyclopedia Universalis Mundaneum, II 1 A2). By thought human beings analyze,
order, classify, and synthesize the multiplicity of reality as given (“le monde donné”)
so that a transformed world (“le monde transformé”) emerges. The “transformed
world” then serves as a point of departure for a new cycle of knowledge (cf. “Il est
l’aboutissement de ce cercle. A son tour il devient le point de repart d’un cycle nouveau”
(AP, Encyclopedia Universalis Mundaneum, II 1 A2).
Figure 4 relates the micro-cosmos of human beings to the macro-cosmos (the
Universe). Otlet noted:
(1) The Universe is the universality of what exists.
(2) To understand the Universe, to sense emotions in it, to act on it or by means of
it, Thought analyses its elements, series and classes and distributes them.
Thought then makes an intelligible and communicable synthesis out of it [i.e.
out of the elements established in the analysis][44].

Figure 3.
Drawing of Otlet
 To treat of
the world

233

Figure 4.
A drawing by Otlet (1936)

The outer or “first” sphere represents the Universe. It has three axes or dimensions
which denote:
(1) space (including the five continents);
(2) time (including cosmological, geological, and historical time (further including,
prehistory, antiquity, Middle Ages, Modern History, the present and the
future)); and
(3) things (nature, mankind, society and God).

The middle sphere represents the noosphere. Its dimensions are:

(1) the Unknown and the Mysterious;
(2) expression (documentation and technology); and
(3) human creations (harmony and synthesis).
JDOC The smallest sphere represents the micro-cosmos of the self. Its dimensions are:
65,2 (1) knowledge;
(2) sentiment; and
(3) actions.

As we have seen above, Otlet insisted that knowledge should correspond to reality:
234 knowledge should be a “mirror”, “a World in miniature”, or “a truthful copy” of reality.
In order to count as an adequate image of the world such representations had to be
isomorphic to their target: the world. That is: an adequate image of the world should
also be spherically (or circularly) structured, so that the circle of knowledge, i.e. the
externalisation of human knowledge, reflects the sphere of the Universe. Ultimately,
documentation had to become a “cosmoscope” whereby all knowable elements of
reality and the relations between them could be overseen, comprehended and
contemplated. Given this structural correspondence, further analogical inferences
could be made. First, a greater level of abstraction, corresponding to an increase of the
radius of a sphere/circle, involves knowledge of increasingly abstract entities (Figure 5).
Consciousness, as Otlet (1935, p. 337) noted, extends itself from sphere to sphere.
Second, just as the central point of a segmented circle is the meeting place of the apexes
of the segments, the centre of the circle of knowledge is the place where our knowledge
is unified and the relations between the “segments” of knowledge are highlighted. On
Figure 6 Otlet depicted man at the focal point of the circle of knowledge[45]. When we
observe things from a central point we observe them from a vantage point, for we are
able to perceive things from an overall view, i.e. we obtain an objective view of them. In
the short chapter entitled Notation du Monde, Otlet noted, as follows:
One could also [next to the UDC notation] schematically represent the totality of the world by
a sphere wherein different great circles, divided in segments, correspond to diverse categories
of elements and their subdivisions. The circles and segments are supposed to be projected on a
central point where they intersect to depict the entirety of there mutual relations (Otlet, 1935, p.
xxv [italics added][46].
A panoptic view would offer us a God-like perspective on reality, Otlet claimed (see
Figures 5-8). He recorded: “[b]y means of these instruments [i.e. documentation] of

Figure 5.
Detail from Figure 7
 To treat of
the world

235

Figure 6.
Detail from Figure 7

ubiquity, universality and eternity, mankind will come closer a state of divinity, that is
[closer to] a radiant contemplation of total reality; this state of being is supposed to be
that of the God’s chosen ones” (Otlet, 1934, p. 431)[47]. Otlet claimed that by
documentation man could attain divine knowledge!
The circle or sphere is traditionally seen as symbol of perfection, unification and
harmony. Otlet’s images of the world did not only reflect the harmony of reality, but
also the yet to be achieved political, social and humanitarian harmony and
connectedness (Figures 9 and 10). On Figure 9, Otlet wrote “per orbem rerum
humanitas unita”: “united humanity throughout the world”. The aim of Encyclopedia
Universalis Mundaneum was “the representation and visualisation of the World –
by documentation and object; the presentation and the reunion of individuals”
(Figure 9) and “to help humanity to cooperate towards a universal civilisation”
(Figure 10). Otlet’s worldview encompassed not only science but also what he called
“transcendentals” in Monde, i.e. metaphysical and moral elements: res (thing), ens
JDOC
65,2

236

Figure 7.
Drawing of Otlet (1943)

Figure 8.
Detail from Figure 7
 To treat of
the world

237

Figure 9.
Otlet’s Encyclopaedia
Universalis Mundaneum
(1936)

(“being” or “entity”; this terms comes from Scholastic Philosophy and is derived
from the Latin “esse”: “to be”), unum (the one), verum (the true), bonum (the good),
essence, existence, and unity (Otlet, 1935, p. 10). Such transcendentals had no place
in the positivist worldview, for as we have seen they preached an exclusive love of
science. On Figure 10 Otlet recorded three elements of his list of transcendentals:
verum, pulchrum and bonum. Otlet’s image of the world was not restricted to
discursive knowledge: it also included ideals on the direction in which humanity
should evolve (prosperity, fidelity, hope, love, freedom, equality, brotherhood, etc.).
By extending the spheres of human consciousness a global consciousness would
emerge: humans would become “Mundaneans”. The Mundaneum was thus both an
edifice, that mirrored the world and an idea, that reminded us of our destination; a
reality and an idea(l), a present and a future.
JDOC
65,2

238

Figure 10.
A drawing by Otlet (1937)

4. Conclusion
In this essay we have seen how the pioneer of information science attempted to
adequately represent knowledge. We have also pointed to the underlying ontology and
epistemology that give Otlet’s representations of the World their semantic depth.
Meyer H. Abrams has described “two common and antithetical metaphors of mind
that were crucial in conceptualisation of knowledge in the West: “one comparing the
mind to a reflector of external objects [the mirror], the other to a radiant projector which
makes a contribution to the objects it perceives [the lamp]” (Abrams, 1958, p. vi). Abrams
claimed that the former was popular from Plato to the eighteenth century and the latter
from the nineteenth century (Abrams, 1958, p. 57, p. 69). In addition to this Richard Rorty
has shown (in a rather programmatic than historical study) that from the seventeenth
century and onwards philosophers compared the mind to a mirror that captures external
reality (Rorty, 1979, esp. pp. 131-164). Otlet was an epigone of the mirror tradition.
Representing and disseminating knowledge is and will be an ongoing pursuit and
challenge for generations to come (especially in this “Age of Knowledge”), as science is
never complete and our concepts never sufficient. Continuamus Otleti laborem. To To treat of
conclude, let me quote Otlet one more time: the world
Oh human being – simple reed, but thinking reed[48] – have courage. [. . .] Yours successive
discoveries manifest in yourself the spirit of research, struggle and life (Otlet, 1935, p. 404,
emphasis in original)[49].

239
Notes
1. For this study I have consulted the following indexed material of Otlet’s archives: (1)
Classification Décimale Universelle (CDU), (2) Le Musée International, and (3) Encyclopedia
Universalis Mundaneum (EUM). What is left of Otlet’s personal archives is conserved at the
Mundaneum, Centre d’Archives de la Communauté Française, 76 Rue de Nimy, B-7000 Mons
(Bergen), Belgium (www.mundaneum.be).
2. Cf. Diderot and D’Alembert’s encyclopaedia (1751-1772) which was published after the (first)
“Scientific Revolution” during the seventeenth century.
3. For an excellent case-study on this matter in The Netherlands, see Baneke (2005).
4. See, e.g. Buckland (1997), Rayward (1994), Rayward (1997), and Rieusset-Lemaire (1997).
5. “Déverser” literally means “to flow off” or “to drain”.
6. “Puiser” literally means “to dig up”.
7. Author’s translation of: “Ainsi une science générale, une philosophie de la science, une
encyclopédie sont nécessaires pour unir entre elles toutes les sciences particulières, afin qu’elles
y déversent leurs rapports fragmentaires, qu’elles y puisent leurs principes, leurs méthodes, le
programme de leur développement et qu’elles parviennent à simplifier leur conception et leurs
exposés.”.
8. The temple of Artemis is also the place where Heraclitus (sixth century BC ) allegedly
deposited his scroll On Nature.
9. Author’s translation of: “Il n’y a plus de Temple d’Artémise, mais il y a l’Imprimerie, il y a des
Typographes, obscurs et loyaux amis.”.
10. Author’s translation of: “Le Monde à nos yeux se présente comme une multiplicité. Pour
pouvoir penser, agir sur lui, être simplement ému par lui, il nous le fout énumérer, dénommer,
décomposer, classer, mesurer, recomposer, faire ou voir faire avec ses éléments des composés
nouveaux. Placé devant le panorama des choses, expression la plus générale pour désigner tous
ces éléments particuliers dont se constitue l’ensemble, nous percevons des substances, des
êtres, des phénomènes, envisagés soit en eux-mêmes, soit dans des milieux”.
11. Author’s translation of: “Le Monde s’offre donc aux hommes vivant en sociétés sous ces
quatre modalités: Monde réel (Réalité), Monde connu (Pensée), Monde exprimé (Langage),
Monde graphisé (Document). Ces quatre modalités du même Monde sont interdépendantes.
En principe, en toutes leurs parties, elles devraient concorder parfaitement. En fait, il y a
décalage, inexactitude et incomplétude de l’une à l’autre.”.
12. Author’s translation of: “But: former l’image intellectuelle du monde mouvant (science
statique, dynamique) et la détermination des points d’action sur lesquels est possible une
action en vue de leur transformation du monde selon les besoins humains (desiderata
matériels et intellectuels).”.
13. Author’s translation of: “La synthèse est l’établissement d’une science à connaissance totale,
d’une explication du monde (sa conception et ses lois) embrassant toutes les connaissances
particulières auxquelles sont réservées l’étude des données analytiques et des synthèses
partielles.”. Cf.: “Traiter du Monde (de Mundo), c’est exposer dans ses généralités essentielles
JDOC l’état d’avancement de nos connaissances à l’égard des éléments principaux; c’est à dire les
sentiments qu’ils font naı̂tre en nous; c’est proposer l’action organisatrice qui en découle.”
65,2 (p. xiii).
14. It is important to distinguish between two senses of “analysis”. In the first (and most
commonly used) sense, “analysis” refers to the decomposition of a compound into its
elements (cf. Otlet’s “equation of the world”, infra); in the second sense it refers to induction
(reasoning from particulars to general propositions). Here Otlet used “analysis” in the second
240 sense.
15. Author’s translation of: “On distingue l’analyse et la synthèse, l’induction et la déduction, par
suite les sciences rationnelles reposant sur la déduction et les sciences d’observation reposant
sur la déduction [sic; this is most likely a typo: it should read “l’induction”]. La documentation
est une science d’observation qui, une fois arrivée à l’expression de certains rapports
généraux, se sert de la méthode déductive pour généraliser les données, et des méthodes de
combinaison et d’invention pour imaginer des données nouvelles.”.
16. The method of analysis (1pagvgh)(?1pagvgh) and synthesis (apod1izi6)(?apod1iji6)
derived from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and was very popular during the sixteenth and
eighteenth century. The following quote from Newton’s The Opticks is a striking example of
this: “As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by
the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis
consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general conclusions from
them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are
taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For hypotheses are not to be regarded in
experimental Philosophy [...] By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to
Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to
their causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the
most general. This is the Method of Synthesis: and the method of Synthesis consists in
assuming the Causes discover’d and establish’d as Principles, and by them explaining the
phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations.” (Newton, 1979, p. 369).
See further, Ducheyne (2005a).
17. On the nature of books, Otlet observed that they: “constituent dans leur ensemble la Mémoire
matérialisée de l’Humanité, en laquelle jour par jour sont venus s’enregistrer les faits, les
idées, les actions, les sentiments, les rêves, quels qu’ils soient, qui ont impressionné l’esprit de
l’homme” (Otlet, 1934, p. 43, emphasis added).
18. Author’s translation of: “La Pensée part du réel (données immédiates de la conscience) et tend
vers l’intelligible. Ce que cherche la Pensée, ce sont des concepts abstraits, les plus économiques
possible, qui leur servent à traiter avec les faits, à les prévoir, à les saisir, de la manière la plus
simple, la plus commode, la plus maniable, à les envelopper dans les formes les plus
universelles, les plus systématiques et par conséquent les plus abstraites.”.
19. Author’s translation of: “La définition des mots doit reposer la définition des choses, des faits
et des notions elles-mêmes qu’ils doivent server à exprimer. Une définition doit être un exposé
précis des qualités nécessaires et suffisantes pour créer une classe afin d’indiquer les choses qui
appartiennent à cette classe. [. . .] Les définitions conduisent aux lois. Celles-ci sont l’expression
de rapports entre des choses. Il n’y a aura d’expression claire que si les choses mises en rapport
ont été elles-mêmes clairement bien définies.”.
20. I have based my discussion on Margolis and Lauwrence (2008).
21. Other theories are: “prototype theory”, which states that a lexical concept has a probabilistic
structure: potential instances of a concept are evaluated in terms of their closeness to a
typical example of the concept at hand, “theory theory”, which states that a concept is
holistically determined by its role in a network of concepts, and “conceptual atomism”, which
states that concepts are primitive and have no internal structure and that the content of a
 concept is determined not by its relation to other concepts but by its direct relation to the To treat of
world. In other words, the meaning of a concept derives from what it refers to: inferential
relations between concepts are not constitutive of meaning. the world
22. Cf. “Le Langage, œuvre du temps, soit empirique ou arbitraire, soit disciplinée et logique,
comprend toutes ces distinctions à l’état virtuel, implicite, caché ou désordonné. La notation
scientifique opère le redressement, mais devant la synthèse à opérer, il est temps que toutes les
notations particulières viennent à se fusionner en une notation universelle.” (Otlet, 1935, p. 241
xxiii, cf. p. 274). The diversity of language is the cause of misunderstanding (Otlet, 1935, p.
271).
23. It is important to stress that the French word “le monde” means both “world” and “universe”.
24. Author’s translation of: “Ce livre est une certaine réponse aux questions que tout esprit doit se
poser: Qu’est-ce que le monde? De quoi est-il composé? D’où vient-il et vers quoi marche-t-il? Il
est trois sphères impliquées l’une dans l’autre au sein desquelles l’Homme poursuit son
existence.”.
25. The variants Otlet provided throughout Monde are not always univocal. Sometimes Otlet
considered time as a substance; at other occasions he considered space and things as a
function of time.
26. It is worthwhile noting that Otlet (at least in his published work) did not seem to be aware
that Kantian epistemology, which states that the thing-by-itself (“Das Ding an Sich”) was
unknowable, was incompatible with his view that knowledge directly represents the
objective world. In other words, in Kantian philosophy a different meaning was given to the
notion of objectivity.
27. Author’s translation of: “Le temps n’est pas un phénomène, mais une forme de l’aperception
dans laquelle se présente le phénomène.”.
28. Author’s translation of: “Le monde extérieur tel qu’il nous apparaı̂t nous présente des corps
juxtaposés dans l’espace, et des états de ces corps se succédant dans le temps. On ne peut pas
donc séparer dans son étude ce qui est si étroitement uni dans la réalité. Ainsi une théorie de
l’espace entraı̂ne toujours une théorie symétrique du temps.”.
29. Cf. “La Pensée ne connaı̂t pas tout, le Langage n’exprime pas tout et le Document n’enregistre
pas tout. Mais ils y tendent ou doivent y tendre.” (Otlet, 1935, p. viii).
30. Cf.: “Tout effort doit donc être fait: a) pour supprimer ou atténuer les déformations et les
frictions intermédiaires; b) pour créer des moyens de percevoir ou se représenter la réalité.”
(Otlet, 1934, p. 44).
31. Author’s translation of: “[. . .] un ensemble de propositions évidentes et certaines, nécessaires
et universelles, systématiquement organisées, qui sont tirées immédiatement ou médiatement
de la nature du sujet et qui donne la raison intrinsèque de ses propriétés et des lois de son
action.”
32. Cf. “La bonne lecture n’est pas le résultat d’un acte spontané. Elle doit être organisée; l’esprit
doit être formé, il faut une méthode. [. . .] Le livre bien fait est un véritable édifice intellectuel,
une synthèse d’idées et non uniquement une collection classée des renseignements. [. . .] Les
mots, les phrases, les chapitres, se succèdent comme moyen d’exprimer, de faire comprendre et
sentir une pensée unique, mais complexe, divisée, ramifiée. Tant que la pensée du livre n’est
pas perçue, comprise, assimilée, le livre n’est pas bien lu.” (Otlet, 1934, p. 317, emphasis
added, cf. p. 107)). Otlet noted that there is a perfect parallelism between thought and
language (Otlet, 1934, p. vii).
33. Author’s translation of: “[. . .] il tend devenir un Monde en miniature, un Cosmoscope,
permettant de voir et de comprendre l’Homme, la Société, l’Univers.”.
JDOC 34. For an interesting discussion of positivism in information science see: Budd (1995) and
Hjørland (2005).
65,2
35. Otlet states that Einstein and Reichenbach have shown that humans can only attain
probabilities but no causal knowledge (Otlet, 1935, p. 395). However, in Traité de
Documentation he noted in a section entitled “Mouvements internes dans la constitution de la
Science”, that the notion of function should be replaced by that of cause and that probabilistic
242 laws should be substituted by causal laws (Otlet, 1934, p. 31).
36. The same caveat holds for Otlet’s affinity to the Wiener Kreis, whose members aimed to
eliminate metaphysics. Otlet’s friend, Otto Neurath, was sympathetic to Otlet’s Palais
Mondial project (Neurath, 1973, p. 219, cf. Neurath, 1937, p. 274; on Otlet-Neurath, see esp.
Vossoughian (2003). He also shared with Otlet the view that scientific synthesis could “help
to ameliorate personal and social life” (Neurath, 1955, Vol. I, p. 1). However, the synthesis
Neurath envisioned was not related to a particular cosmological world view. Moreover,
Neurath defended the abolishment of metaphysics, a view totally unacceptable for Otlet.
37. Author’s translation of: “Il faut adopter résolument ces points de vue: l’éducation conçue
comme une formation intégrale et continue d’être humain, basée sur la connaissance de
l’Univers, sur la détermination de nos rapports actifs et passifs avec lui, sur harmonisation de
nos actions individuelles sur le plan de vue d’évolution sociale.”.
38. The latter probably refers to the fact that the universe is finite yet unbounded.
39. Author’s translation of: “Première Sphère: celle des choses lointaines qui accablent par leur
immensité, leur variété, leurs contradictions. Deuxième Sphère: celle des entités et des
événements à portée humaine immédiate: la Terre et ses cinq parties, avec les deux milliards
d’habitants répartis en une soixantaine d’Etats, et dont toutes les parties sont soumises à
l’interdépendance et à répercussion. Troisième Sphère: celle de l’individu et son moi, à la fois
spectateur et acteur, patient et agissant, miroir et microcosme de toutes les réalités extérieures.
Décomposer la sphère totale du monde et ses sphères particulières et celles-ci en leur fuseaux,
méridiens et grand cercles, c’est l’objet de cet ouvrage consacré à une conception du Monde et à
sa représentation dans le Mundaneum.”. Compare with the fact that his “exposition de la
conception du monde” is undertaken in three successive steps which correspond to three
different systems (Otlet, 1935, pp. xiv-xv): (1) The first system deals with establishing the
basic facts about the world provided strictly by experimentation. This part of the exposition
of the concept of the world is analytical; (2) In the second system, these core data gained in (1)
are synthesized by means of the laws of logic and other (mostly ampliative) reasoning
strategies (such as: hypothesis-formation, interpolation and limiting-procedures). (3) The
third system is that of religious thought and correspondingly deals with revelation. (Otlet,
1935, pp. xiv-xv). Otlet was serious about the third part. In Monde, for instance, he stated his
belief in the Christian doctrine of Holy Trinity and in the existence of angels (Otlet, 1935, p.
xix). He also believed that the world religions could play an important role in providing more
unification (Otlet, 1935, p. 300).
40. Author’s translation of: “La gravitation est une force d’inertie, donnant l’illusion d’une force
d’attraction, alors qu’elle serait la résultante de la courbure de l’Univers, cette courbure étant
elle-même fonction de la présence de la matière. L’Univers semble affecter une forme sphérique
de rayons définis quoique formidables.”.
41. Author’s translation of: “Une immense sphère, humaine et sociale, est venue se surajouter aux
autres sphères dont l’emboı̂tement constitue le monde. Cette sphère, c’est directement la
nôtre.”.
42. Author’s translation of: “L’intelligence constitue une véritable sphère autour de la planète tout
entière, la «Noosphère» ainsi dénommée par le philosophe Leroy.”.
43. This volume provides a partial translation of Le Roy (1928).
44. Author’s translation of: “Le Monde est l’Universalit[é] de ce qui existe. Pour comprendre le To treat of
Monde, en percevoir les émotions, pour agir sur lui et par lui, la Pensée en analyse les
éléments, les série[s], les classe[s] et les distribue[.] La Pensée ensuite en forme la synthèse the world
intelligible et communicable (Otlet, 1935)”.
45. Cf. “En place un milieu avec lequel s’établissent des relations classable en 10 classes” (AP,
Encyclopedia Universalis Mundaneum, II 14 III 2.F3).
46. Author’s translation of: “On pourrait aussi, schématiquement, représenter le total du monde 243
par une sphère dont divers grands cercles, divisés en segments, se rapporteraient aux diverses
catégories d’éléments et à leurs subdivisions, cercles et segments étant supposés projetés en un
point central et s’y entrecouper pour figurer l’ensemble de leurs rapports réciproques.”.
47. Author’s translation of: “Par ces instruments d’ubiquité, d’universalité, et d’éternité, l’homme
se sera donc rapproché de l’état de divinité, de l’état présumé être celui des élus devant Dieu,
c’est-à-dire la contemplation radieuse de la Réalité Totale.”.
48. The expression “roseau pensant” derives from Blaise Pascal’s Pensées (1670).
49. Author’s translation of “Courage, ô Homme, simple roseau, mais roseau pensant. [. . .] Tes
découvertes successives n’ont fait qu’exalter [sic] en toi l’esprit de recherche, de lutte et de vie.”.

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Further reading
Otlet, P. (1926), L’Education et les Institutions du Palais Mondial (Mundaneum), No. 121, Vol. 11,
Union des Associassions Internationales, Brussels.

Corresponding author
Steffen Ducheyne can be contacted at: steffen.duckeyne@ugent.be

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