Energy Transition in Brazil (Drielli Peyerl, Stefania Relva

The Latin American Studies Book Series
Drielli Peyerl
Stefania Relva
Vinícius Da Silva Editors
Energy
Transition
in Brazil
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Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, Ceará, Brazil
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Drielli Peyerl · Stefania Relva · Vinícius Da Silva
Editors
Energy Transition in Brazil

Editors
Drielli Peyerl Stefania Relva
Institute of Energy and Environment Energy Group of Department of Energy
University of São Paulo and Electrical Automation Engineering
São Paulo, Brazil Polytechnic School
University of São Paulo
University of Amsterdam
São Paulo, Brazil
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Vinícius Da Silva
Energy Group of Department of Energy
and Electrical Automation Engineering
Polytechnic School
São Paulo, Brazil
ISSN 2366-3421 ISSN 2366-343X (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-031-21032-7 ISBN 978-3-031-21033-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21033-4
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To all the researchers that work toward a
sustainable future
Foreword
The 2021 United Nations Climate Conference held in Glasgow, Scotland, known as
COP26, shed light on new global challenges to be surpassed and the urgent and irre-
mediable need to adopt commitments that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and limit
climate change. During COP26, Brazil assumed a bolder responsibility to contribute
to these goals. Thus, the country intends to mitigate about 50% of its greenhouse gas
by 2030.
Hereupon, the present book is presented in a vital moment of discussion and
learning about how the energy transition to a low-carbon future is directly connected
to our past, present and future and how we can contribute to making this happen in
an affordable, reliable, and sustainable way. The 15 book chapters cover a range of
subjects which varies from history and geopolitics to new technologies and energy
carriers such as carbon capture and storage and hydrogen and even the effects of the
measures adopted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in the energy sector. In
addition, the book is one of the first results of the Brazil Energy Transition (BET)
group formed by researchers from the most diverse areas of knowledge and focuses
on the 5Ds of the energy transition (Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing
Consumption, Democratization and Digitalization). The collaboration of interna-
tional researchers in the book has demonstrated the group’s interdisciplinarity and
internationalization.
Finally, the book presents innovative research that Brazil can follow to achieve
the goals outlined at COP26. I wish you all an enjoyable read and that it brings
excellent reflections and inputs to the discussions on the energy transition pathways
to a low-carbon future in the country.
June 2022 Prof. Dr. Julio Romano Meneghini

Director of the Researcher Centre for
Greenhouse Gas Innovation
São Paulo, Brazil
vii
Introduction
In January 2019, a project aimed at studying energy transition in Brazil was approved
through the Young Researcher modality (Proc. 2017/18208-8), funded by São Paulo
Research Foundation (FAPESP). One of the objectives of this modality is to implant
new study lines. Since then, one of the main results of this project has been the
formation of a research group made up of researchers who are not only interested
in the topic of energy transition but also believe in a sustainable future. This group
was also consolidated as a research group on Energy Transition studies in Brazil
via the Scientific Division of Environmental Management, Science and Technology
at the Institute of Energy and Environment of the University of São Paulo and in
partnership with the Research Center for Greenhouse Gas Innovation.
Today, this group called Brazil Energy Transition (BET) is made up of 25
researchers and students (15 women and 10 men) from different areas (biologists,
lawyers, economists, engineers, historians, geographers, environmental managers,
geologists, meteorologists, among others). This multidisciplinary has allowed the
construction of a solid book on the energy transition process in Brazil. Over a year and
a half of research, we editors and authors worked hard to deliver original content to
readers interested in the topic that could offer the most varied and detailed information
about the past, present and future of the energy transition in Brazil.
The book’s objective is to present the energy transition process in Brazil over time
and offer new perspectives to achieve a sustainable future. The book unfolds over
15 chapters covering historical, geopolitical, technical, and economical aspects and
elements conceptually familiar to the energy transition, such as social acceptance,
low-carbon technologies, digitalization, Sustainable Development Goals, and even
recent topics such as the pandemic of COVID-19. The Brazilian electricity and
transport sectors and climate change governance are also one of this book’s main
focuses.
The first three chapters provide a theoretical-conceptual basis on the past, present
and future of the energy transition in Brazil, answering how the past energy transition
aspects have shaped the current Brazilian energy landscape; how the theme is little
explored and quoted in the Brazilian context when compared to the international
scope; and what are the possible impacts for Brazil’s energy geopolitics in a scenario
ix
x Introduction
of successful global energy transition toward low-carbon future. Chapters 4 and 5

discuss how the concepts of energy democracy, energy justice and social acceptance
are being addressed and incorporated into the Brazilian reality. Chapters 6 and 7
innovate and align with two central D’s of the energy transition by focusing on the
digitalization and decentralization of the Brazilian electricity sector. Chapters 8–10
discuss if natural gas has behaved as an energy transition element in the Brazilian
context; what are the possibilities for carbon capture, storage and utilization and
how Brazil can become a major hydrogen economy player and driver in the world.
Chapters 11 and 12 focus on the transport sector, offering new perspectives on one
of the sectors that most emit greenhouse gas in Brazil. Finally, the last three chapters
reflect on the paths Brazil has been taking in search of an energy transition that aims
at the potential of renewable natural gas, the main challenges of Brazilian energy
governance to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and what are the main lessons
we can learn from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on the energy
sector.
Thus, this book is the result of the hard work of the researchers of this group,
who work with a team spirit and with the same ideal of believing in free and quality
education, which has changed the lives of many of them, especially in the context of
difficulties characteristic of developing countries. Behind all these 15 chapters, we
have the story and dream of each researcher to do quality research, believe in science
and make a difference around them. The paths taken throughout this book demon-
strate the particularities of Brazil and present this country in a unique and differen-
tiated way in terms of the various approaches to the energy transition. Finally, it is
a book that brings a multidisciplinary, innovative vision and information published
for the first time.
We wish you a pleasant reading.
Drielli Peyerl
Stefania Relva
Vinícius Da Silva
Contents
1 Energy Transition: Changing the Brazilian Landscape Over

Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Drielli Peyerl, Stefania Gomes Relva, and Vinícius Oliveira da Silva
2 Knowledge Mapping: A Review of the Energy Transition
Applied to Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Vinicius Oliveira da Silva, André dos Santos Alonso Pereira,
Stefania Gomes Relva, and Drielli Peyerl
3 Geopolitical Losses and Gains from the Pathways
of the Energy Transition in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
André dos Santos Alonso Pereira, Vinicius Oliveira da Silva,
Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos, and Drielli Peyerl
4 Democracy and Energy Justice: A Look at the Brazilian
Electricity Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Alex Azevedo dos Santos, Rodolfo Pereira Medeiros,
Milena Megrè, and Drielli Peyerl
5 Social Acceptance and Perceptions of Energy Transition
Technologies in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Anna Luisa Abreu Netto, Pedro Roberto Jacobi, and Drielli Peyerl
6 Digitalization in the Brazilian Electricity Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Stefania Gomes Relva, Maria Rogieri Pelissari,
Vinicius Oliveira da Silva, and Drielli Peyerl
7 Regulatory Pathways for the Decentralisation of the Brazilian
Electricity System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Marcella Mondragon and Drielli Peyerl
xi
xii Contents
8 Brazilian Natural Gas as a Low-Carbon Energy Transition

Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Lauron Arend, Yuri Freitas Marcondes da Silva,
9 Possibilities for Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage
in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Maria Rogieri Pelissari, Stefania Gomes Relva, and Drielli Peyerl
10 Hydrogen: A Brazilian Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Sabrina Macedo and Drielli Peyerl
11 The Future of Diesel: Paths and New Alternatives to Energy
Security and Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Luis Guilherme Larizzatti Zacharias, Luiza Di Beo Oliveira,
Victor Harano Alves, Xavier Guichet, and Drielli Peyerl
12 Trends and Prospects for Transport Fuel Consumption
in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Celso da Silveira Cachola, Ana Clara Antunes Costa de Andrade,
Letícia Schneid Lopes, Evandro Matheus Moretto,
and Drielli Peyerl
13 How Can Renewable Natural Gas Boost Sustainable Energy
in Brazil? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Saulo Vieira da Silva Filho, Mariana Oliveira Barbosa,
and Drielli Peyerl
14 The Main Challenges of the Brazilian Energy Governance
for the Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Leonardo Yoshiaki Kamigauti, Ana Luiza Fontenelle,
Felipe Coutinho, Ana Maria Heuminski de Ávila, and Drielli Peyerl
15 Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Brazilian Energy
Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Mariana Ciotta, Drielli Peyerl,
and Luis Guilherme Larizzatti Zacharias
Chapter 1
Energy Transition: Changing
the Brazilian Landscape Over Time
Drielli Peyerl, Stefania Gomes Relva, and Vinícius Oliveira da Silva
Abstract The energy transition associated with historical context requires us to

rethink the type of energy source and the methods we should use to generate energy.
Throughout history, the use and choice of energy sources determined and shaped
the dynamic of the cities and countries, urbanistic process, environment, landscapes,
social, economic, and political factors. Understanding the historical process helps
us discuss the possibilities and urgencies, such as global warming and reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions, to a sustainable energy transition in a world reinventing
itself at incredible speed, searching for clean and renewable energy sources. The book
chapter plots a historical panorama, through literature review, from the past energy
transition aspects that shaped the current Brazilian scenario, describing the main
drivers and local singularities that led to the building of the current national energy
mix. The book chapter brings some lessons on how (i) the appropriation of energy
resources changes according to the context of the period; (ii) the design of a consistent
and long-term public policy is fundamental for the development and insertion of new
technologies and energy sources in the different sectors of the economy and (iii) the
global economy shapes different realities. Lastly, understanding the historical context
contributes directly to the present and future perspective of the energy transition going
in the country presented throughout this book.
Keywords Energy transition · History · Natural resources · Brazil
D. Peyerl (B)
Institute of Energy and Environment, University of São Paulo, Av. Professor Luciano Gualberto,
n° 1289, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: dpeyerl@usp.br; d.peyerl@uva.nl
University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 Amsterdam, The Netherlands
S. G. Relva · V. O. da Silva
Energy Group of Department of Energy and Electrical Automation Engineering of the
Polytechnic School, University of São Paulo (GEPEA/EPUSP), Av. Professor Luciano Gualberto,
Travessa 3, n° 158, Prédio da Engenharia Elétrica, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: stefania.relva@gmail.com
V. O. da Silva
e-mail: vinicius.oliveira.silva@outlook.com.br
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 1

D. Peyerl et al. (eds.), Energy Transition in Brazil, The Latin American Studies Book
Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21033-4_1
2 D. Peyerl et al.
Introduction
Large-scale energy transitions have occurred over the decades or even centuries
(Smil 2010) mainly due to the different technology development steps and the
presence of fossil fuels in all the economic aspects and lifestyles (IRENA 2017).
However, understanding the technological trajectories, the regional particularities,
and the availability of natural resources in the past energy transitions of each nation
help us identify features that may be useful for outlook at the local and global level
(Fouquet 2010; Fouquet and Pearson 2012; Markard et al. 2015).
Lessons from historical experiences imply understanding these transitions’
temporal dynamics (Fouquet 2016; Sovacool 2016). Full energy transition involves
multi-sectors and services and has taken much longer, whereas the fastest transi-
tions occurred in a specific sector, local and short periods (Fouquet 2016; Sovacool
2016). Several processes can determine this time scale as technological innovation
to the niche market and transformation in energy or economic systems (Fouquet and
Pearson 2012; Myhrvold and Calderia 2012; Smil 2010; Sovacool 2016). In addition,
past energy transitions were driven by the successful scale-up of technologies and
industries (Grubler 2012).
The past transition occurred at the territorial scale level, following individual,
local, regional, national, and, at last, international levels, boosted by exploitation
and scarcity of natural resources and technology. Currently, the drives for an energy
transition from fossil fuels to a sustainable future are more related to agreements
at international levels (e.g., Paris Agreement), emerging technologies (e.g., Carbon
Capture and Storage), and global actions (e.g., climate change). In contrast, the gap
between developed and developing countries, energy security, and natural resource
availability are key factors in building and maintaining a sustainable energy transition
(Chen et al. 2019; Kim 2019). Thus, the actual transition has a global scale first, then
regional, national, and sectoral scales.
Historically, the demand for natural resources and their uses shaped the coun-
tries’ dynamics, economies, and, posteriorly, worldwide. Thinking about it, what
lessons can we draw from past energetic transitions? How have large-scale transi-
tions impacted the energy course at the national level? How can the particularities
of each country respond to the courses of an ongoing energy transition? The case
study analyzed in this work is the Brazilian energy sector to answer these questions.
Brazil has a particular context of the past transition energy. A country known for its
diversity of biomes and natural resources has depended heavily on fossil fuel imports
throughout its history, mainly in the transport sector, and bet on hydroelectric power
plants in the electricity sector (Leite 2014; Magalhães 2018; Peyerl et al. 2018).
The Brazilian energy sector is internationally known mainly for its renewable
electricity mix, the use of alcohol in flex-fuel cars, and the oil and natural gas fields
in the offshore area (Goldemberg and Lucon 2007; Moretto et al. 2012; Zhang et al.
2019). However, the Brazilian energy background was boosted mainly by the avail-
ability of natural resources and technologies. Recognizing this, the book chapter
plots a historical panorama from the past energy transition aspects that shaped the
1 Energy Transition: Changing the Brazilian Landscape Over Time 3
current Brazilian scenario, describing the main drivers and punctual singularities that
led to the building of the current national supply energy mix.
The Demand and Exploration of Brazilian Energy Resources
In Brazil, after a long period of Colonial (1500–1822), the transition to the Imperial
period resulted in commercial and industrial ventures that were slow and without
government interference. The country continued to depend on agricultural activities,
which did not require large amounts of energy (Leite 2014). However, the First
Industrial Revolution triggered coal as one of the primary sources of power in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Therefore, the Imperial government investment
in searching for mineral coal was predominant in the first decades of the nineteenth
century but unsuccessfully. The analysis of the samples collected, mainly in the south
of the country, indicated that coal was of such low quality, hampering its use as an
energy source and resulting in one of the first energy challenges faced by the country
(Leite 2014; Peyerl et al. 2018).
The use of coal in the country as an energy source was intended for industry and
steam engines (Peyerl et al. 2018). From 1840 onward, industrial diversification was
a subtle movement in the country. The use of steam machines, supplied by boilers,
depended on burning firewood, and in particular situations, water wheels were also
used (Leite 2014). In addition, mineral coal became an indispensable energy source
for the country in the period mentioned (Leite 2014; Magalhães 2018; Peyerl et al.
2018). Small foundries, construction of steam-powered ships, and equipment with
boilers where coal was burned began to make up the industrial landscape in Brazil
(Leite 2014). Also, gas lighting started to be produced with coal to supply the central
part of Rio de Janeiro state, and the first steam locomotive began to operate in the
territory in 1854 (Borges 2011; Leite 2014).
In the mid-nineteenth century, the construction of railroads and growth in the use
of locomotives resulted in the dependence on coal imports from England (Magalhães
2018). Nevertheless, the price of imported coal from England became very high and
uncertain, primarily until World War I (1914–1918). The high cost of coal led to
the search for technological alternatives such as briquette. However, the briquetting
method was unsuitable and economically feasible to apply to Brazilian coal (Peyerl
et al. 2018). Consequently, the Brazilian government started to import coal from
the USA; however, the coal quality was lower than England’s (Lisboa 1916). Thus,
the government needed to find solutions to meet the domestic supply of fossil fuels
(Peyerl et al. 2018).
At the end of the nineteenth century, a new source, known as petroleum or black
gold, arose on the world energy scene (Peyerl et al. 2016). The Universal Exposition
of Paris (1889) contributed to the development and expansion of petroleum globally
by describing its uses and applications in industry (Heizer 2009). The advent of
internal combustion engines and replacing old steam engines with diesel engines
provided growth in the oil industry (Peyerl et al. 2019). However, the search for
4 D. Peyerl et al.
petroleum in Brazil remained secondary in the period mentioned for several reasons,
such as (i) the coal as the leading domestic fuel to the transport and industry in the
country (Lisboa 1916); (ii) incomplete knowledge about the geology of the territory
(Peyerl et al. 2019); and (iii) dependence on specialized workforce, knowledge, and
technology from other countries (Peyerl et al. 2019).
The Brazilian government began to invest in building thermoelectric plants in the
electricity sector. The first thermoelectric was constructed in Rio de Janeiro state
in 1883 with an installed capacity of 52 kW (Ackerman 1955). Then, investments
focused on the country’s hydraulic potential, building the first hydroelectric plant for
public supply with a capacity of 1475 kW in Minas Gerais state in 1889 (Ackerman
1955; Paixão 2000). According to Ferrari (2006), the hydroelectric development in
the country started with small exploitations. These small power plants, generating
hundreds of kW, were built and operated mainly by municipalities or private compa-
nies. This initial use took place in the center-south region of Brazil, especially in the
southeast region, due to the local geography, favorable to hydroelectric use and the
history of greater occupation and socioeconomic development. In 1901, the installed
capacity of hydraulics surpassed the total of thermoelectric plants, remaining the
primary source of the electricity sector to the present day. Therefore, we can consider
that the energy transition of the Brazilian electricity sector from replacing fossil fuels
with renewable ones occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, see Fig. 1.1.
This transition occurred mainly due to the construction of the first large hydroelectric
power plant in São Paulo state in 1901, with a power that quickly grew to 27,379 kW
(Ackerman 1955).
Fig. 1.1 First landmark of the energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources in the
Brazilian electricity sector
It is noteworthy that, in parallel with the search for coal and oil in the territory, and
investments in hydroelectric plants, firewood was the main alternative to make up
for the lack of fossil fuel sources. In the first decades of the twentieth century, some
Brazilian studies still endorsed the idea that coal was the solution to the Brazilian
energy issue, mainly due to the opening of several railways where could traces of coal
come to light and the development of new technologies (Lisboa 1916; Magalhães
2018; Pires 1916). Besides, opposite and diverse opinions occurred during this period
in the political environment. On one side, several Brazilian nationalist politicians
began to create stricter laws regarding exploiting natural resources found in the
territory; in contrast, others affirmed that the Brazilian land was poor in fossil fuels
and the investments were not economically viable (Calógeras 1905; Lisboa 1916;
Pires 1916).
On the other hand, the technical development resulted in a profound transforma-
tion in the international landscape, for example, in the developing of liquid fuels for
the transport sector. By distilling crude oil until 1910, gasoline was obtained, which
provided a low octane rating (Dias and Quaglino 1993). During this period, cracking
processes began to be developed, producing gasoline with higher octane levels and a
greater economy of crude oil (Dias and Quaglino 1993). This technical development
expanded the world’s car fleet (Dias and Quaglino 1993).
In a nutshell, Brazil adapted and built its energy supply mix according to the
agricultural, economic, and demographic growth, without planning for the long term,
dependent on the technology and availability of the energy resource in its territory.
Initially, the lack of available fossil fuel resources was the ghost of the country’s
economy but analysing the history; however, this lack boosted the development of
new and own techniques and the use of other energy resources, as we will see in the
next section.
We Need Energy!
In Brazil, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the government
invested mainly in surveys to search for coal reserves, while foreign companies
unsuccessfully invested in oil exploration (Peyerl et al. 2019). In 1922, the First
Brazilian Congress of Coal and other National Fuels’ holding brought new perspec-
tives about energy sources and their uses. Among the topics discussed at the Congress,
it stands out the economic exploitation of coal, the value of bituminous shale, the use
of alcohol as fuel, and the possibility of prospecting for oil in Brazil (Lopes 2019).
In the same year, in a search for coal reserves, a new energy source was found in
the country: natural gas (Peyerl et al. 2019). However, the lack of technology and the
uses of this resource were not in line with the energy reality in Brazil (Peyerl et al.
2018). Thus, the investments in new energy resources did not focus on this resource
in the period.
In the electricity sector, the investment still concentrated on the hydroelectric
potential; however, the energy and water crises due to the drought in the state of São
6 D. Peyerl et al.
Paulo presented a series of consequences to the sector between 1924 and 1925 (Hunt
et al. 2018). The main measures adopted by the municipal government resulted in:
(i) the absolute and complete suspension of trams transporting regional cargo; (ii)
increased restrictions on electricity-powered public lighting; (iii) break of passenger
trams from 10:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m., as well as during the day on lines with lower
passenger flows; (iv) suspension of private lighting during the day; and (v) closing
of nightclubs, restaurants, and bars after 10:00 p.m. (Prefeitura de São Paulo 1925).
By replacing public transport powered by animal traction and public gas lighting
with electric energy, both for moving trams and electric lighting, the Brazilian govern-
ment indicated the first steps in the modernization of the energy sector, considering
the changes taking place abroad (Curi and Saes 2014). However, the government
faced several problems related to this expansion, such as the lack of fossil resources,
technology, appropriation of natural resources, economical and political issues.
From 1930, the Brazilian political scenario gradually transformed from an
agrarian-exporting economy to an urban-industrial economy. This political change
directly impacted the national energy sector for the following decades, see Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Main actions that impacted the national energy sector in the 1930s
Name Category Creation Highlights
Nº 19.717 Decree 1931 It is mandatory to mix 5% of alcohol
with imported gasoline and the use
by vehicles belonging to public
bodies of fuel containing at least
10% alcohol (Brazil 1931)
National Department of Mineral Institution 1934 Assess energy reserves represented
Production by hydraulic potential and
investment in search of petroleum in
the territory (Ministério da
Agricultura 1939)
Nº 24.642, known as Mines Code Decree 1934 Remove obstacles related to subsoil
richness and exploration, that is, to
make the subsoil property
independent of that one of the soils
(Brazil 1934a)
Nº. 24.643, known as Water Decree 1934 It established the dissociation
Code between land ownership and
ownership of waterfalls and other
hydraulic energy sources and
defined the regime for authorizations
and concessions for hydroelectric
projects (Brazil 1934b)
National Petroleum Council Decree 1938 CNP became responsible for the
(CNP) entire oil industry in the country and
nationalized the oil even before its
discovery in the territory (Peyerl
et al. 2019)
From the 1930s, the first regulations of the energy sector occurred, including
mainly in the electricity sector, with emphasis on implementing the Water Code,
which highlights water as a public domain good, of common interest, whose conser-
vation is essential (Brazil 1934b; Gomes and Vieira 2009). The political changes of
the period also occasioned the acceleration of Brazilian economic development and,
at the same time, the increase in energy demand (Gomes and Vieira 2009).
In 1939, through the Ministry of Agriculture, the Brazilian government empha-
sized the excessive use of firewood as fuel in various sectors, stating that this source
should only be a subsidiary in large industries (Ministério da Agricultura 1939).
Furthermore, it is pointed out that this excessive use of firewood should come together
with rigorous reforestation, which in fact, did not happen (Ministério da Agricultura
1939).
Therefore, concern for the environment directly related to an energy source
emerges in government speeches. In addition, the potential of wind as a new energy
source to be explored, mainly in the country’s northeast region, began to be discussed
in the Brazilian government agenda. However, the world energy economy of the
period turned to petroleum. After discovering petroleum in the state of Bahia in the
same year, this discovery brought a new political, energy, and economic scenario
to the country for decades to come (Peyerl et al. 2019), which will be discussed
throughout this chapter.
In the 1940s, Brazil underwent intense political revision of economic nationalism
linked mainly to petroleum issues, as the oil industry had not developed yet (Peyerl
et al. 2019). In addition, the Brazilian energy supply mix was still dependent on
firewood; the amount of coal available did not supply the demand for large-scale
development of the industrial sector; fuel oil and diesel were still imported, which
affected the country’s exchange rate balance; and the bets for the electricity sector
were focused on the country’s rich hydroelectric potential (Ackerman 1955). It is
highlighted that, from 1930 to 1940, the installed power of hydroelectric plants almost
doubled in the country, going from 630 MW to 1009 MW of electricity generation
(Ackerman 1955).
From 1940 to 1951, electricity consumption rose from 62.4 kWh/inhabitant/year
to 166 kWh/inhabitant/year, and the installed capacity, which was 1.2 GW, rose to
2 GW (Oniga 1955). Despite investments, these increases were still considered low
according to the country’s electricity needs. In 1950, through another example, the per
capita consumption of petroleum products in the country was 110 L per population,
while in the USA, this consumption reached 2340 L (Ackerman 1955).
At the beginning of the 1950s, the developmental policy came stronger in Brazil,
searching for the necessary technologies and precise actions to achieve the energy and
transport goals to supply all the sectors (Vargas 1994). The lack of energy resources
to supply the growing national demand, mainly fossil fuels, and the technologies
available for their use made the Brazilian government look for alternative resources
and technologies even more little-explored both internationally and nationally. The
Brazilian government invested in developing the industry and technologies based on
these plans.
8 D. Peyerl et al.
In 1953, for example, the investment in petroleum led to the creation of Petro-
bras (Brazilian Petroleum Industry), through Law 2.004, monopolized the research,
mining, refining, trading, and transportation of oil from wells or shale from its deriva-
tives and any related or similar activities (Brasil 1953). From 1955, the potential of
other resources was being discussed in Brazil:
● Solar energy: Use of energy in a thermal way; economically unviable in countries
like Brazil with energy supply problems; technological development and innova-
tion still in progress; and the uncertainties about an adequate government policy
for the exploration of the source (Nunes 1955).
● Natural gas: The possibility of using gas turbines. This is widely used in other
countries in Latin America, which was still incipient in Brazil (Yépez-García et al.
2011).
● Thermal energy of the seas: Favorable geographic conditions to explore this type
of source. The main technical difficulty was placing the tube to draw water from the
bottom of the sea. It is noteworthy that, in 1934, some experiences had already
taken place in the world, including in Brazil, in which a plant installed on a
freighter had problems with the ballast placed at the end of the tube vertically
submerged in the ocean, which caused oscillations that displaced it and lost it at
sea. The possibility of installing floating plants could occur mainly in Northeastern
regions (Casal 1955).
● Wind Energy: Instability and insecurity of the supply offered and the impossi-
bility of direct storage for regularization. And as far as technology goes, growing
knowledge of aerodynamics, electrotechnics, and structural engineering could
produce economically viable technologies in the future (Oniga 1955).
Despite the interest and attempts to invest in other sources, energy density
(consumption) did not correspond to demographic density in Brazil. Due to the
industrial and urban process, states like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo lacked energy
much more than regions like the northeast (Oniga 1955). Therefore, the wind poten-
tial, which could obtain investments in the northeast region, was not a priority due
to precarious infrastructure and the other problems already mentioned above. In
addition, the necessity of energy boosted the geopolitics of energy interconnec-
tion between South American countries intensified in the 1950s to 1960s (da Silva
2022; da Silva et al. 2018). Following the flow of developed countries, the country’s
investments focused on the oil industry and fixed on the potential hydraulics for the
electricity sector.
The Transformation of the Landscape: Opening Roads

and Building Hydroelectric
From 1926 onward, the first road plans were drawn up, and the motto of the govern-
ment in the period was to open roads, becoming one of the first initiatives to prior-
itize the road modal (de Paula 2010). It is highlighted that road construction was
intensified from the middle of the 1940s, with road layouts parallel to the rails.
This contributed to boosting competition between modes instead of stimulating the
intermodal integration of transport (de Paula 2010).
The diagnosis of the economy in the early 1950s pointed to the need for invest-
ments in infrastructure (for example, electricity generation and transport facilities)
to boost the industrial sector (de Paula 2010). Followed later by the developmental
policy of Juscelino Kubitschek’s government in the middle of the 1950s with the
motto 50 years in five (Vargas 1994). This policy accelerated investments in tech-
nologies to achieve the long-awaited targets for the energy and transport sectors,
including integrating the Brazilian states through the road system (Vargas 1994).
Due to the investments in building roads, the prices and the availability of diesel
imports and production, the Brazilian government invests massively in using this
fuel for heavy vehicles, mainly after 1955. In addition, Petrobras invested in onshore
fields exploration and building and operation of refineries (e.g., Landulpho Alves
Refinery began its operations in 1950); Presidente Bernardes refinery (started its
operations in 1955); Duque de Caxias refinery (beginning of construction in 1957);
Gabriel Passos refinery (beginning of development in 1962) what fostered the use
of diesel in Brazil during the 1950s and 1960s (Peyerl et al. 2018; dos Santos and
Peyerl 2019). These investments caused a replacement or transition from gasoline
and alcohol to diesel in trucks in the 1960s (see Chap. 11), and gasoline became the
primary fuel for light cars. Also, in 1964, Brazil stopped exporting diesel from other
countries representing further great landscape transformation due to the increased
number of trucks moved by diesel, see Fig. 1.2.
This landscape transformation in the Brazilian scenario also made part of the
electricity sector, but in a different way. From the 1940s, the electricity sector was
affected by: (i) the difficulty in importing equipment due to World War II (1939–
1945) (Hunt et al. 2018), demonstrating the country’s fragility as an importer of
technology for the sector and; (ii) the growing increase in demand about generation
capacity, linked to the processes of urbanization, industrialization, and the use of
electrical household appliances (de Oliveira 2018).
The accelerated economic growth from the Plano de Metas (Target Plan) of
Kubitschek’s government prioritized projects for the electricity sector and invested
43% of the government budget between 1957 and 1961, including building
hydroelectric plants (Gomes and Vieira 2009).
The creation of the Ministry of Mines and Energy in 1961 and Centrais Elétricas
Brasileiras S.A. (Eletrobras—national electricity company) in 1962 boosted the
process of restructuring the institutional model of the electricity sector (Gomes and
Vieira 2009; Paixão 2000). In this period, the hydroelectric resources came under
10 D. Peyerl et al.
Diesel imported (Liters) Diesel exported (Liters)

7000000
6000000
5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
1000000
0
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Fig. 1.2 Brazilian importation and exportation of diesel between 1954 and 1960 (IBGE 1987)
state control, enabling the project to integrate the energy resources of the same
basins. It was also in this decade that many projects for large hydroelectric plants
were started; the small hydroelectric plants, from that moment on, ceased to be a
priority for the generation of hydroelectricity in Brazil.
Eletrobras became a company inducing the nationalization process of the elec-
tricity sector, where the government, through federal and state public companies,
assumed the investments both in the construction of plants and in the interconnec-
tion of the systems (Gomes and Vieira 2009; Sasse and Saes 2016). From 1951 until
1962, 58 dams were built in the country, increasing the production of electricity from
the hydraulic source by 138% (de Oliveira 2018).
In sum, the formation of the know-how of the oil industry (Peyerl et al. 2019) and
the great acceleration of hydroelectric construction (de Oliveira and Florentin 2019)
in the period mentioned above contributed to the shape of the landscape throughout
Brazil. For instance, both cases led to the opening of roads, the rapid population
and urban growth, the investments in the infrastructure of the electricity sector,
the creation of jobs, and increased consumption through household appliances (de
Oliveira and Florentin 2019; Peyerl et al. 2021a). It is highlighted that the country’s
energy supply mix was still dependent on wood and charcoal in the period mentioned
(Fainzilber 1980).
Brazil After the Oil Crisis: Moving Away from Oil

Dependence?
The economic effects of the oil crisis in 1973 impacted the energy sector worldwide,
forcing the countries to review their energy policies and mainly the dependency
on oil imports (Balassa 1979; Potter 2008; Yergin 2010). In the case of Brazil, the
country was highly dependent on imported oil supplies to fuel an industrialization

process (Barrera 2018). In addition, the price of oil imports quadrupled (Balassa
1979). Consequently, new strategies for the energy sector had to be adopted (Potter
2008).
In the transport sector, the creation of the Proálcool program in 1975 aimed to
develop techniques and improve inputs to produce ethyl alcohol (de Andrade et al.
2009). In the first years, the production of anhydrous ethyl alcohol to be added to
gasoline, posteriorly, the first cars powered entirely by hydrated ethyl alcohol began
to circulate in 1978 (de Andrade et al. 2009).
It is highlighted that Proálcool is one of the most public policy programs developed
by the Brazilian government (Andersen 2015). In 1981, around 90% of cars sold could
be fueled, demonstrating the program’s success and a quick transition (Sovacool
2016). In the 1980s, the Brazilian government started to invest in natural gas as a
fuel. In 1987, the National Plan for Natural Gas (Plano Nacional do Gás Natural),
known as PLANGÁS, was launched, aiming the use natural gas as a substitute for
diesel in the collective transportation of passengers and heavy transport (União 1989).
In the case of the electricity sector, 90% of the total electricity generated arose
from hydroelectric plants; in addition, 40 large dams were under construction in
the country in 1974 (de Oliveira and Florentin 2019). In 1979, the second oil crisis
also strongly affected the upward investment curve in the Brazilian electricity sector
(Gomes and Vieira 2009). Despite the low investments in the sector in the 1980s,
three large projects were carried out: Itaipu and Tucuruí hydroelectric and the nuclear
plants in Angra dos Reis (de Oliveira and Florentin 2019). The growing economic
crisis of the 1980s and the search for energy security in the electricity sector led to
the government investing in thermoelectric plants, increasing by 140% in installed
capacity (IBGE 1987).
From the 1990s onward, electricity generation was surrounded by numerous regu-
latory problems throughout history (Peyerl et al. 2021b). Then, the Brazilian govern-
ment acted to privatize and restructure the electricity sector, initiating, in 1996, the
Restructuring Energy Sector Project (RE-SEB) (Paixão 2000). Important institu-
tions/agencies were created during this period: National Electric Energy Agency
(ANEEL) in 1996, National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) in 1997, National Elec-
tric System Operator (ONS) in 1998, and National Water Agency (ANA), in 2020.
After that, the problem of sector regulation Brazilian electricity sector began to orga-
nize itself; however, the insufficient supply of electricity, the occurrence of energy
rationing in 2001 due to droughts, and the negative impact on the economy still
forced the government to act quickly (Bermann 2007), defining the New Model of
the Electricity sector in 2004, when the Regulated Contracting Environment and
Free Contracting Environment were determined, and the creation of bodies such as
the Electric Energy Commercialization Chamber (CCEE) and the Energy Research
Company (EPE) illustrate the growing participation of private capital in the energy
sector, making the commercialization of energy and growing planning of the national
energy sector, both in the generation, transmission, and distribution.
Other events related to the energy sector marked the beginning of the century in
the country related to the electricity and transport sector:
12 D. Peyerl et al.
● The creation of the Programa de Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia

Elétrica (Incentive Program for Alternative Sources of Electric Energy—
PROINFA) by the federal government in 2002 to increase the participation of
renewable sources such as wind and solar in the Interconnected National System
(SIN) (Dutra and Szklo 2006). Also, this public policy resulted in the addition of
renewable sources in the electricity sector (York and Bell 2019). Since the authors
consider that the energy transition from fossils to renewables took place in the
early twentieth century, as demonstrated in the first section of this chapter; and
● There was a rapid energy transition in the Brazilian transport sector between
2004 and 2009 when the government incentivized flex-fuel vehicles. In this case,
the new automobile sales of flex-fuel vehicles surpassed other types of vehicles
powered by other fuels (Sovacool 2016).
In a nutshell, the country was heading toward what we questioned in the title of this
section: moving away from oil dependence. Brazil created and developed alternatives
to guarantee energy security, industrialization, and fuel consumption. While all this
government investment and a possible non-dependence on fossil fuels were observed,
this was far from our reality for two reasons: (i) the largest percentage of the Brazilian
energy supply mix belonged to petroleum; and (ii) investments records and highs in
finding oil in the country, specifically in the offshore area.
In other words, the unexpected happened, the pre-salt discovery was announced
in 2006, and it reached its self-sufficiency in 2010 (dos Santos and Peyerl 2019).
The long-awaited self-sufficiency sought throughout the history of oil in the country
(Peyerl et al. 2019). And not only that, but also a way to increase the country’s revenue
by exporting hydrocarbons. What could Brazil expect then? The Paris agreement and
its goals, the search for an energy transition from fossil fuels to renewables, a distant
world of fossil fuels which we have been looking for since the mid-nineteenth century
in the territory.
Final Remarks: What Does the Energy Transition

from the Past Teach Us?
The energy transition associated with historical context requires us to rethink the type
of energy source and the methods/technologies we should use to generate energy.
However, this book chapter intended to go further, not only demonstrating the energy
transition processes observed throughout history, bringing lessons on how: (i) the
appropriation of energy resources changes according to the context of the period;
(ii) the design of a consistent and long-term public policy is fundamental for the
development and insertion of new technologies and energy sources in the different
sectors of the economy (e.g., Proálcool, PROINFA, Eletrobras); (iii) the presence
and investments of the state are decisive for accelerating the process of building the
energy sector; (iv) the global economy shapes different realities; and (v) each country
needs to have a bit of luck about the energy potential available in the territory (i.e.,
currently, Brazil has one of the cleanest electrical matrices in the world).
Finally, we can observe that large-scale transitions have a much more signifi-
cant impact factor on countries through international agreements. But, in fact, quick
and alternative energy transitions occur according to regional characteristics and
internal needs. Therefore, Brazil faces the challenge of remodeling its energy sector,
contributing to a low-carbon energy transition, which will be seen in subsequent
chapters of this book.
Acknowledgements All the authors gratefully acknowledge support from SHELL Brazil and São
Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) through the Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Innovation
(RCGI) (FAPESP Proc. 2014/50279-4 and 2020/15230-5), hosted by the University of São Paulo,
and the strategic importance of the support given by ANP through the Research & Development levy
regulation. Peyerl thanks the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9,
FAPESP. Stefania Relva and Vinícius Silva thank especially Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Científico e Tecnológico, for the scholarship. This work was partially financed by Coordenação de
Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior.
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Chapter 2
Knowledge Mapping: A Review
of the Energy Transition Applied
to Brazil
Vinicius Oliveira da Silva, André dos Santos Alonso Pereira,

Abstract This book chapter aims to map the knowledge on the theme of energy
transition applied to Brazil. The methodology applied is the bibliometric review,
which uses as input the keywords of this book’s chapters to obtain in the indexed
journals portal—Web of Science—published records. Then, they were analyzed and
discussed to result in the current map of knowledge on the theme. The results demon-
strate that: (i) international exploration in the energy transition is not recent, but the
first record identified about energy transition applied to Brazil is from 2007; (ii) the
evolution of the number of annual publications can be divided into three periods, the
last one (2021–2022), more intense—20 publications against 22 publications in the
first two periods; (iii) the number of published records, 42, is scarce, when compared
to records that are not specific to Brazil (6191); (iv) the main institutes linked to the
records are Brazilian and public; (v) funding is almost exclusively public, 97% of the
total; (vi) there are no authors with an evident number of records, maximum of two
records for the same author; and (vii) the main keywords are related to energy tran-
sition assessment data and indicators and environmental issues. It is concluded that
the theme inserted in the Brazilian context is little explored and quoted compared to
the theme in the international scope. Thus, expanding funding sources and enabling
the formation of new research are needed. Therefore, this chapter was intended to
V. O. da Silva (B) · S. G. Relva

Travessa 3, N° 158, Prédio da Engenharia Elétrica, São Paulo, Brazil
S. G. Relva
A. S. A. Pereira · D. Peyerl
N° 1289, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: andre.santos.pereira@usp.br
D. Peyerl
D. Peyerl
University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam, Netherlands

18 V. O. da Silva et al.
improve the research environment and strengthen the debate with fundamentals, data,
information widely discussed and validated, nationally and internationally.
Keywords Energy transition · Bibliometric review · Knowledge mapping · Brazil
Introduction
Energy transition (ET), as a prominent theme, is in vogue in global discussions

(Pastukhova and Westphal 2020) and has been explored and debated over the
years (Leach 1992; Smil 2010; Solomon and Krishna 2011; Taylor and Tainter
2016; Selvakkumaran and Ahlgren 2020), mainly about the types of energy sources
(Daioglou et al. 2012; Coelho et al. 2018; de Vieira and Carpio 2020; Campos and
Viglio 2021) and its relevance on decarbonization and climate change (Solomon and
Krishna 2011; Lap et al. 2022; Vatalis et al. 2022).
This debate, as Peyerl et al. (2022) points out, must be carried out on common
bases—time, impulse, and scale of the ET; keeping in mind that the ET can incor-
porate different concepts—fair ET, sustainable ET, low-carbon ET, green ET, and
energy addition -; and e actions—short (Sovacool 2016; Xiong et al. 2020; Dong
et al. 2021) and long term (Kumar et al. 2019; Doh et al. 2021); the last one is more
common. However, regardless of the bases and concepts applied, the actual ETs
encompass a common goal, which is to achieve a low or zero-carbon society (see
Chap. 1).
This chapter explores ET in a broad way, dissecting the knowledge developed and
accumulated over the years. To achieve this knowledge mapping of ET, it is essential
to understand the concepts that are directly or indirectly related to it. Mapping this
concept is important to be able to differentiate the methodologies of analysis (Power
et al. 2016; Geels et al. 2018; Wieczorek 2018) and to standardize and direct the
debate about ET—be it local, regional, national, or international (da Silva 2022) (see
Chaps. 3 and 7). Though this is not a trivial task since only on the Web of Science
(WOS), there are more than six thousand indexed publications on the theme (WOS
2020b) and on the Dimensions are more than 89.5 thousand, considering only records
of type articles (Digital Science and Research Solutions 2022).
Nonetheless, when ET is analyzed under the lens of its discussion and application
in Brazil, there is a lack of indexed records of bibliographic review. This type of
record is important because they map the knowledge, reflect the limitations and
advances, and demonstrate this production’s temporal and locational landscape. They
are common in some countries and regions (Marvuglia et al. 2020; Elie et al. 2021;
Omrany et al. 2022; Qin et al. 2022), including in developing countries (Nalule 2021;
Todd and McCauley 2021; Zhang et al. 2021; Revez et al. 2022).
In this sense, the objective of this chapter is to conduct a bibliometric review on the
theme of energy transition applied to Brazil (ETB), aiming at knowledge mapping.
Given this, a guiding question, “Is there a consistent production of records being
published on ETB?” is used as a starting point for constructing the content review.
Based on the analysis and results of the methodological review stage, we propose to
2 Knowledge Mapping: A Review of the Energy Transition Applied to Brazil 19
answer a second question: “What is the amplitude of the results found in the analysis
of the specialized literature on the theme? And through the response, it is possible to
analyze and systematize information, assumptions, risks, procedures, obstacles, and
bottlenecks in the existing ETB research answered in the following sections.
Mapping Brazilian Energy Transition Knowledge
The bibliometric review is adopted in this book chapter, which consists of mapping
the knowledge (Zhou et al. 2018; Jiang and Ashworth 2021; Silva 2022) about
the evaluated theme—TEB. The bibliometric review is organized in three phases:
(i) identification, (ii) sorting (research algorithm and screening process), and (iii)
visualization of the knowledge domain, see the schematic arrangement in Fig. 2.1.
The phases of the identification process consist of: (1) selection of the information
source; (2) stipulated period of publications; (3) idiom; (4) record type; and (5)
keywords and grouping and classification of keywords. The records survey conducted
on the WOS portal considered the types: article and review, published in all years
and available idioms.
The keywords used for the bibliometric survey are the keywords utilized in all
the chapters of this book—apart from this chapter—see Fig. 2.1. Thus, all keywords
used are in the English idiom. These keywords were adopted to focus the bibliometric
review of ET in the themes developed in this book. To better organize the research,
these keywords were grouped into five main themes: resources; technical–economic;
sector; environmental; social and political. These groupings define the structure of
the bibliometric review. The keywords from the same group were combined using
the Boolean operator OR to retrieve records that contain at least one of the searched
keywords (WOS 2020a).
In the sorting phase, three surveys were conducted: Research #1 resulted in the
number of records related to energy transition; Research #2 resulted in the number
of records that are related to energy transition and considered at least one of the
keywords of Group 1 to 5; and Research #3 resulted in the records of Research
#2 that are related to Brazil. In this last research, an operator is used to find word
variations: the operator “?” is used (Bra?il), to identify and return all possible word
variations and expand the search results. This was made because Brazil in Portuguese
is written with s instead of z.
After the survey, the records of the published journals are collected from the WOS
portal in a format compatible with .xls files and the screening step is performed, which
consists of (i) exclusion of records with missing information; in this case, records
without title, keywords, and abstract are excluded; (ii) verification and deletion of
duplicated records; and (iii) verification of adherence of records to the theme, e.g.,
Do the records address issues correlated to TEB? If they do not, they are excluded;
and (iv) consolidation of the records to form the final analysis sample.
Finally, from the final records, the domain visualization is performed in two
phases: (i) statistical analysis of records (Chen 2006); e (ii) co-occurrence analysis
(Zhou et al. 2018; Jiang and Ashworth 2021) using the software VOSViewer.
Fig. 2.1 Schematic arrangement of the bibliometric review based on da Silva (2022)
Brazilian Energy Transition for Whom, Where and When
The bibliographic survey from Research #1 identified 6,191 records, of which 92

have Brazilian researchers and institutions. Germany (1104), the USA (801), China
(720), and the Netherlands (501) are the countries with the highest number of records
attributed to their researchers and institutions.
The analysis of Research #1’s international collaboration network (see Fig. 2.2)
demonstrates that this collaboration is greater with researchers from European coun-
tries, mainly Germany, Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Italy. The thicker the network
of nodes line, the greater the interaction of researchers from different countries.
This network of nodes has seven clusters, of which Brazil is present in cluster
03, containing ten countries. That is, it is a country with medium participation of
researchers who work in an international network on the theme of ET.
After applying the keyword groping filter (Research #2) and the geographic filter
(i.e., limiting results related to Brazil in Research #3), 45 records are identified.
Thus, 0.7% of the records on ET are applied to Brazil. To start the manual screening
phase, these complete records are exported from the WOS portal in .xls format. Three
records with missing information were excluded, resulting in 42 pre-selected records.
After applying this filter to analyze the network of nodes, the result corroborates that
Brazil has become the main regional cluster (largest circle) because of the emphasis
on ETB research (See Fig. 2.3). This network shows four sets, of which Brazil is
inserted in only one—indicating that the ETB is addressed in international research
without necessarily the participation of Brazilian researchers and institutes.
Fig. 2.2 Network of international collaboration nodes of researchers
Fig. 2.3 Network of nodes after the application of geographic screening

Still, in the screening phase, the idiom and types of documents in the records are
verified. Regarding the idiom of the 42 records, 39 are in English, two in French and
one in Portuguese. Besides that, all have titles, keywords, and abstracts in English.
As for the type of document, the article type represents 93% of the total (39); while
review represents 5% (02), of which one is classified in both review and early access
(Lewis 2021); and one in article and proceedings paper; in this case, the article was
initially published at a conference and later selected and published in an indexed and
peer-reviewed journal (Breyer et al. 2018).
In this type of classification, it is normal for the sum of the distribution of records
to be greater than 100%, as records can be classified simultaneously in more than
one type of document (Dechy et al. 2004; Babrauskas 2017).
Finally, the bibliometric analysis is performed based on the 42 identified, screened,
and selected records. The results and discussions are presented in the following
subsections.
Knowledge Growth of Energy Transition Applied to Brazil
The analysis of data from the 42 records found that the first record published on the
topic ETB was from 2007. This record discusses fusion technology—experimental
reactor ITER—characterizing it as a promising source due to the almost unlimited
fuel reserves, which allows environmental sustainability. This project is developed
by a network of institutes distributed in European Union countries, Japan, Russia,
the USA, China, and Brazil. However, the record demonstrates that other physical
structures must be developed to design this type of energy production (Janeschitz
and Bahm 2007). Therefore, considering the research methodology established in
this chapter, this record opens the theme of ETB.
After a three-year hiatus, a second record was published in 2010, which discusses
the increase in global energy demand, directly impacting countries’ energy security
and climate change, requiring a reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The
author argues that there is a need for an ET to move away from fossil fuels to the
detriment of low-carbon alternatives, advocating the use of renewable and nuclear
energy and the technology transfer from developed countries to emerging and devel-
oping countries (Bradshaw 2010). It is noted in this article the introduction of topics
near to the ET, such as the use of low-carbon alternatives, the substitution of fossil
fuels, and technology transfer between developed and developing countries (Relva
et al. 2021).
Following Jiang and Ashworth (2021) and da Silva’s (2022) suggestion to under-
stand the evolution of the theme, the period of records published annually is divided
into three phases: (i) limited interest phase (2007–2016); (ii) initial interest phase
(2017–2020); and (iii) rapid growth phase (2021–2022), where it is observed that
there is an increasing trend in the number of records published annually (see Fig. 2.4).
In the limited interest phase (2007–2016): a single record is published annu-
ally, with an interval of up to three years between successive publications; only
20 45
18 Annual publications 40
Accumulated publications
16 35
Number of acumulated publicatins

Number of annual publications
14
30
12
25
10
20
8
15
6
4 10
2 5
0 0
2007 2010 2011 2012 2015 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Fig. 2.4 Evolution of the number of records published annually
between 2010 and 2012 was one record published annually; in total, five records
were published in ten years; the most cited record, with 147 citations, explores
long-term scenarios for changes in residential energy use in developing countries,
demonstrating that climate policies can delay the ET from traditional fuels to modern
fuels for low-income populations (Daioglou et al. 2012); and the second most cited
record, with 141 citations, analyzes the ETs that took place in the past, one of them
being the transition from fossil fuels to sugarcane ethanol that took place in the
Brazilian transport sector, identifying which political instruments can accelerate the
energy transition of countries or some sectors (Solomon and Krishna 2011).
In the initial interest phase (2017–2020), there was a substantial increase in the
number of records published annually compared to the previous period. In this period
of four full years, 17 records were published, more than four per year, with a peak
in 2020, when six were published, of which one has 114 citations and models the
power sector with 100% renewable energy, among them, the Brazilian power sector,
concluding that solar photovoltaic (PV) generation can play a leading role in this
transition (Breyer et al. 2018). In addition to this record, there is one with 47 citations
(Dong et al. 2018), one with 29 (Kumar et al. 2019) and one with 28 (dos Carstens
and da Cunha 2019).
In the rapid growth phase (2021–2022), although it has only one full year (2021)
and the first quarter of 2022 (the survey is considered until the end of March 2022),
research on ETB has become mainstream, as 18 records were published in one year
(2021), more than the total of records published during the initial interest phase and
almost all published in the first two phases, 22 against 20 published in the last one.
Some of these records, although published recently, have a considerable number of
citations, such as (i) one with 36 citations, which addresses low national emission
scenarios for some countries, such as Brazil (Fragkos et al. 2021); (ii) one with 28
Table 2.1 Main research

Categories Number %
areas of the analyzed records
Energy fuels 19 45.2
Environmental sciences ecology 16 38.1
Science technology other topics 9 21.4
Business economics 8 19.0
Engineering 6 14.3
Thermodynamics 3 7.1
Development studies 2 4.8
Geography 2 4.8
citations, investigating, from the sociotechnical point of view, the emergence of PV

technology in Brazil, identifying its challenges and opportunities (dos Carstens and
da Cunha 2019); and (iii) one with 26 citations, which applies the Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC1 ) model in emerging countries, like Brazil, suggesting that the
policymakers should commit to the environment and the ET from fossil fuels to clean
and modern energy sources (Bekun et al. 2021).
Considering these three periods, there are 15 whole years. The records, in general,
were cited on average 16 times, but with a median equal to two. Three received more
than 100 citations, 14 had no citations; 14 were cited less than twice; and 10 had
below-average citations.
The most cited records explore the construction of energy demand scenarios in
economic sectors or technological niches in developing countries or on a global scale
(Breyer et al. 2018; Daioglou et al. 2012) and carry out a bibliographic review with
systematization and characterization of bottlenecks and long-term projections for an
ET, considering sustainable development (Solomon and Krishna 2011). In addition,
the two most cited records belong to the phase of limited interest; that is, they were
published at the beginning of the historical series constructed in this review.
An Analysis of the Research Area and Main Journals of ET
Since the same record can be classified in more than one area, the 42 records are
classified into 20 different areas on the WOS portal, of which 45% are in energy
fuels, followed by environmental sciences ecology 38%, science technology other
topics 21%, business economics 19%, and engineering 14%, see Table 2.1.
1 The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) is a hypothesized relationship between various indicators
of environmental degradation and per capita income. In the early stages of economic growth,
pollution emissions increase and environmental quality declines, but beyond some level of per
capita income (which will vary for different indicators) the trend reverses, so that at high income
levels, economic growth leads to environmental improvement (Stern, 2018).
Table 2.2 Main journal of the analyzed records

Journal Number % IF
Energy policy 5 12 5.042
Energy research and social science 5 12 6.834
Energy 3 7 7.147
Journal of cleaner production 3 7 9.297
MRS energy sustainability 2 5 –
Renewable energy 2 5 8.001
Renewable and sustainable energy reviews 2 5 14.982
This evaluation demonstrates that the records are produced mainly by researchers
linked to the area of the exact sciences and, more specifically, to engineering, that is,
the records have a technical and environmental bias on the engineering lens. This is
evident in the two principal areas of research, energy fuels and environmental sciences
ecology, where research focuses on the use of energy resources, whether they are
renewable or not, and their relationship to the environment. This same characteristic
was found by da Silva (2022), who evaluates the models and tools applied to energy
planning in specific countries.
Regarding journals, 42 records are published in 27 peer-reviewed journals. 39
of these journals are in English, two in French, and one in Portuguese. The journal
Energy Policy (Impact Factor IF = 5.042) and Energy Research and Social Science
(IF = 6.834) have five records (12% of the total) each, followed by the journals
Energy (IF = 7147) and Journal of Cleaner Production (IF = 9297), with three
publications each. The other journals have two to one published records (see Table
2.2).
Two important features: (i) publishers have offices in European cities (Oxford and
Elsevier are the most frequent), which demonstrates the European hegemony in the
publishing market of articles related to this theme; and (ii) 60% of the records were
published in journals by publisher Elsevier (25 records), and 19% were published
by MDPi, Springer Nature, Taylor & Francis, and Wiley—two records each, other
nine publishers have one records, see Table 2.3. These results demonstrate that the
Elsevier publisher has the largest number of articles published on this theme, and the
other publishers have secondary participation in the discussions and on the research
theme.
Content Producing Regions and Countries
The 42 records are produced by researchers from institutions allocated in 24 countries

on five continents. Of these countries, twelve are in Europe, seven in Asia, two in
North America (NA), one in South America (SA), one in Africa, and one in Oceania.
Table 2.3 Main publishers of the analyzed records

Publishers Number %
Elsevier 25 60
MDPi 2 5
Springer Nature 2 5
Taylor & Francis 2 5
Wiley 2 5
Table 2.4 Regions of the institutions linked to the records

Region Number
SA 23
EU 31
NA 6
Asia 11
Oceania 2
Africa 1
European institutions are presented in the highest number of records (31), followed
SA institutions (23), all developed by researchers linked to Brazilian institutes, see
Table 2.4. It is important to highlight that the same record can have more than one
institution linked.
When analyzing the production by countries individually and not by region,
Brazilian institutes have the highest number of records—expected value, given the
geographic scope applied to Brazil—followed by England with six, Italy and USA,
with five records each, see Table 2.5. It is important to note that no other SA country
beyond Brazil appears on the list. After Brazil, the NA and European institutions are
linked to the highest number of records. This characteristic demonstrates that there
is a collaboration between the authors and institutions of these two regions with
the Brazilian ones, an expected fact, as they are the main destinations for technical-
scientific exchange of Brazilian researchers (CAPES 2021), and there is a tendency
to adapt solutions and models from these regions to the SA region, by technological
and technical transfer (Kahen 1998; Liu and Liang 2011; Urban 2018).
Institutions, Funding Agencies, and Authors
As for the institutions, there are 107 different institutions linked to the production
of the 42 records. These institutions include universities, research institutes, public
companies, private companies, and non-governmental organizations. The number of
institutions is 255% higher than the total number of records, reinforcing the strong
Table 2.5 Countries of the institutions linked to more than two published records
Country Number
Brazil 23
England 6
Italy 5
USA 5
Netherlands 4
China 4
Austria 3
Russia 3
Australia 2
France 2
Germany 2
India 2
Turkey 2
collaboration of researchers from different institutions to produce research and subse-

quent publication. This also suggests that research on Energy Transition and Brazil
is inseparable from international institutions since of the 107 institutions, 20 are
Brazilian or 19% of the total.
Regarding the number of records, the two leading institutions are the Universidade
Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and the Universidade Estadual de Campinas
(UNICAMP), with 17% and 7%, respectively, of the total number of records. The
institutions outside Brazil that contribute the most are English and Dutch universities,
such as Durham University and Utrecht University. However, in absolute terms, 96
institutions participated in producing a single record (see Table 2.6).
About the other Brazilian institutions, only the Instituto Federal do Rio Grande do
Norte, the Universidade de São Paulo (USP), and the Universidade Federal Flumi-
nense (UFF) participated in the production of two records each. The other 15 Brazilian
institutions participated in the production of a single record each.
As for the funding agencies, 26 were found, with 24 records. The other records do
not contain data for this field. These data show that more than one agency is funding
researchers from a single registry.
Of the 26 agencies, 10 are Brazilian. The two main, Coordenação de Aperfeiçoa-
mento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) and Conselho Nacional de Desen-
volvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPQ), with five records each (see Table
2.7).
Regarding the types of agencies, there is clear evidence that state agencies are
the main funders of research, and if added to non-governmental agencies (founda-
tion type), this number is higher than 97%, that is, on the total records with evident
funding, only one was financed by a private institution, Volvo Group, which evalu-
ates the wind profile to determine the potential of the wind resource as an option to
Table 2.6 Main institutions

Institutions Number %
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) 7 17
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) 3 7
Durham University 2 5
Fed. Inst. Educ. Sci. Technol. Rio Grande do Norte I 2 5
Institut de Recherche Pour le Developpment IRD 2 5
Int Virtual Inst. Global Change Ivig 2 5
Istanbul Gelisim University 2 5
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2 5
Universidade de São Paulo 2 5
Universidade Federal Fluminense 2 5
Utrecht University 2 5
Table 2.7 Main funding agencies

Funding agencies Number %
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) 5 11.9
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Capes) 5 11.9
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (Fapesp) 3 7.1
National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) 2 4.8
replace coal-fired thermoelectric plants, as a decarburization solution for the elec-

tricity sector. However, even in this article, a state agency has funding (Dong et al.
2018).
This result demonstrates that the participation of funding agencies, not only in
Brazil but in all regions of the world, is essential for developing and producing
scientific knowledge. This same finding has already been determined by da Silva
(2022).
Regarding authorship, the data show that there are 167 authors for the 42 records,
approximately four authors for each record, with only two having a single author, 13
having two authors and one having 17 authors. Four authors, two of whom are Brazil-
ians, are represented in two records, while the remaining 163 authors are represented
in a single record (see Table 2.8).
The two Brazilian authors, da Silva N.F. e Pereira M.G., are co-authors of the same
records. They belong to research institutes in Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ and CEPEL)
and approach the ET (i) in the light of the insertion of wind power as a renewable
and decarburization resource, and (ii) the nexus between energy poverty and CO2
emissions in Brazil (de Azevedo Dantas et al. 2019; Pereira et al. 2019).
Another expressive characteristic is that almost all the authors are men and
conduct research in collaboration with other male authors. In the case of authors from
Brazilian institutions, the records show that the collaborations are mostly between
Table 2.8 Main authors

Authors Number %
Da Silva, N. F 2 5
Daioglou, V 2 5
Pereira, M. G 2 5
Viglio, J. E 2 5
researchers from the same institution. In contrast, for authors from other regions, the
records show an intense collaboration between different regions, demonstrating that
no networks of international organizations are linked to the analyzed topic.
Keywords Clustering
The keywords with the highest number of occurrences are energy transition (17),
followed by Brazil (07), renewable energy (05), energy poverty (03), natural gas (03).
These terms are the network’s main nodes (see Fig. 2.5) and have a high centrality
value. In the case of energy transition, the centrality is 81, more than double the
second keyword, Brazil (37), and more than three times that of the third, renewable
energy (25).
At the center of the network are the main terms used in research on ET. As one
moves to the periphery of the network of nodes, the terms become more specific, like
carbon reduction, smart grid, and electric motors, which are possibly related to case
studies for particular regions and energy end-uses. This network of nodes is formed
by 176 keywords and 15 clusters—median of 08, maximum of 13 and minimum of
three items per co-citation cluster.
The two largest clusters, items 13 and 12, respectively, demonstrate that: for the
first, the main keywords are related to data and evaluation indicators, mainly linked to
the composition and quality of these data, such as interval data, composite indicators,
interval-based composite indicators, see Fig. 2.6a; the second, the keywords are
related to environmental issues, mainly linked to climate change, such as GHG
emissions, land-use change, and climate change mitigation, see Fig. 2.6b.
Energy Transition Knowledge Evolution in the Brazilian

Scenario
Based on the results of the BR, it is possible to explore the amplitude of research on
the ETB and answer the guiding question “Is there a consistent production of records
being published on ETB?” and the second question, “What is the amplitude of the
results found in the analysis of the specialized literature on the theme?”.
Fig. 2.5 Keywords node network
Fig. 2.6 Map of the two largest keyword co-citation clusters

The results show that the theme, compared to international literature, is under-
developed and underexplored, given the limited number of records published by
national and international indexed publishers. There are 42 in total, while Germany,
the USA, China, and the Netherlands have more than five hundred each. Addition-
ally, these 42 records have a low citation rate: 14 were never cited; another 14 were
cited less than twice (equal to the median of citations); and 10 were below average.
However, three have more than one hundred citations, being linked to international
discussions on the ET but using Brazil as an analysis subject for a case study.
As for the evolution of the theme, there is an initial period with mono and inter-
mittent annual publications (2007–2016). As of 2017, there is a consistent increase
in the number of annual publications until 2021, when the annual number of publi-
cations intensifies, signaling a growth trend and focus on the theme. These research
and publications are conducted mainly through public universities, with resources
from public research funds. In the case of the records produced exclusively by SA
institutions, and more specifically in Brazil, funding is 100% public and research
is conducted mainly in public institutes or universities, with links between them or
with foreign institutions, mainly European.
Another characteristic is that the surveys are carried out in countries undergoing
incisive changes in their energy and power sectors, such as Germany, China, Italy,
and the Netherlands. (BP 2014, 2021, 2022; IEA 2020). Perhaps, the need to conduct
a rapid and sustainable ET using modern sources and technologies will expand the
scope and amount of available funding, arousing the interest of researchers and
institutes, given the predictability of research maintenance in the medium and long
term.
One factor that may have favored the growth of academic production on ET was
the Paris Agreements in 2015 (UN 2015) since the increase occurred just after that
date. Given the greater importance of climate change in state agendas, the incentive
for research on the topic naturally increases. A notable exception is the USA, which
was absent from these agreements between 2017 and 2021 (US Department of State
2019) but officially returned in early 2021 after a change in the management of
executive power (US Department of State 2021). This demonstrates the importance
of joint action between national governments and research institutions to expand
knowledge production.
As for the authors, of the total of 167, only four are in more than one registry, and
of these, two are Brazilian, allocated in Brazilian institutions, and two are foreigners,
assigned in European institutions, who research the theme ET addressing Brazil, as
a case study.
These numbers demonstrate that, although TEB is rarely published in indexed
journals, it is explored by more than a hundred Brazilian and foreign researchers,
presenting a vast network of collaboration between researchers from institutions in
different countries. This network has four clusters, of which only one has research
in Brazilian institutions, reaffirming the importance of Brazil as an element of
discussion and analysis in the debate on the global ET.
Final Remarks
In order to improve the institutional environment for Brazilian Energy Transition

research and strengthen the debate with data and information widely discussed and
validated among peers and stakeholders (Udaeta 2012; Galvão 2015; de Bernal 2018),
this book chapter points out some recommendations from an academic and public
policy scope:
● The focus of publications: There is evident international and national research
published in indexed journals. This number is below the number of records linked
to other countries. Perhaps, the topic is widely explored by researchers located in
Brazil. Still, the lack of standardization and categorization of the theme (e.g., not
using keywords such as energy transition in the title, abstract or even as a keyword)
may have made the search and access to the published records unfeasible. Relva
et al. (2021) faced the same challenge in evaluating ET in developing countries.
Another predominant factor may be the difficulty of researchers working in Brazil
publishing articles in English or indexed journals. This weakness separates such
publications from journal portals, trivially used in bibliographic surveys, making
access, appreciation, and citation of these articles by peers difficult;
● Expansion of financing: It is evident that research funding is carried out by
public funds, with a focus on science and technology, but, perhaps, access to these
resources is scarce, or they are directed to other lines of research in Brazil, although
the theme ET is in vogue globally, due to the current reality of climate change
linked to the current paradigm of the energy sector—expand access to energy
sustainably and cleanly—access to resources—financial and non-financial—and
the construction of a multilateral program, which must be grounded and mandatory
in all research and public policies aimed at the energy sector. If, on the one hand,
this seems to limit, from the point of view of scientific freedom, on the other
hand, it can direct and consolidate several fronts of research and development in
the countries, and at the same time, it can increase the impact and performance
of Brazilian research on the global scenario;
● Formation of new research networks: Brazilian researchers from Brazilian insti-
tutes work in an evident network with researchers allocated to the same institu-
tion. When there is international cooperation, this is mainly with Western Euro-
pean countries. These cooperation results from partnerships promoted by public
funding, from the training of Masters and Doctors in international institutions,
implying research related to the use of methodologies, models and solutions devel-
oped by European institutions. This network profile limits the debate on the theme
since the locational and cultural bias tends to impact and direct the research. In
this sense, it is essential to encourage the expansion of research networks with
countries in other regions, mainly in Africa and Asia, since most are developing
countries—low- and middle-income populations, with restrained demand and
technological and regulatory bottlenecks. Among researchers from other regions,
joint work allows the exchange of experiences, fosters critical mass and solutions
for local problems, and avoids importing methodologies, solutions, and practices
applied to locations with different socioeconomic and environmental profiles in

developing countries. However, it is worth mentioning that existing partnerships
must be maintained and expanded while encouraging and building new and various
forms of a research network.
regulation. Peyerl thanks the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9,
FAPESP. Stefania Relva and Vinícius Silva thank especially Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Científico e Tecnológico, for the scholarship. This work was partially financed by Coordenação de
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Chapter 3
Geopolitical Losses and Gains
from the Pathways of the Energy
Transition in Brazil
André dos Santos Alonso Pereira, Vinicius Oliveira da Silva,

Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos, and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract The energy transition toward a new reality where fossil fuels are less
consumed and renewables become predominating is a tendency for some countries,
notably developed ones. As this situation unfolds, the balance of power in energy
geopolitics will shift from oil-exporting countries to those with an energy supply
system focused on renewables. Amidst this, Brazil faces challenges and dilemmas in
its energy sector, particularly on which pathway should follow in this context. This
work aims to identify and analyze possible impacts on Brazil’s energy geopolitics,
where energy transition toward low carbon should be successful globally. Based on
a qualitative approach, energy geopolitics concepts and the creation of scenarios,
we discuss the outcomes Brazil’s energy geopolitics might take in a post-carbon
world. The results demonstrated that: (i) energy transition sources are not yet in
a position to replace or supplant fossil fuels; (ii) fossil fuels will hold sway over
energy geopolitics for the foreseeable future; (iii) fossil fuels will continue to be
an important component of Brazilian energy planning; and (iv) during the energy
transition, Brazil’s main geopolitical benefit will be linked to its power to influence
the South American region. In conclusion, the ability of countries to adapt to the
new paradigm, in which renewables sources and carbon-free drive technologies have
replaced the era of oil and natural gas, will determine their strengths and relevance
A. S. A. Pereira (B) · E. M. dos Santos · D. Peyerl

e-mail: andre.santos.pereira@usp.br
E. M. dos Santos
e-mail: edsantos@iee.usp.br
D. Peyerl
V. O. da Silva
D. Peyerl
University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 Amsterdam, Netherlands

38 A. S. A. Pereira et al.
in energy geopolitics. Concerning Brazil, the four scenarios suggest that the country
should not seek short-term profits from the sale of its oil reserves due to the difficulty
of entering a market with established powerful sellers.
Keywords Energy transition · Geopolitics · Brazil · Hydrocarbons · Renewables
Introduction
The present work aims to identify and analyze the possible impacts on Brazil’s energy
geopolitics, where energy transition toward low carbon should be successful globally.
Previous results in the literature regarding this subject (Overland et al. 2019) discuss
which countries would benefit or lose the most in this situation by establishing criteria
based on socioeconomic and energy factors. Would Brazil be a winner or a loser in
such a scenario? The country has a vast potential for renewable energy. Still, since
major discoveries in the offshore oil basin in its maritime territory in the middle
2000s, Brazil has been consolidating as an oil producer and exporter. Those reserves
are estimated at around 12 billion barrels (ANP 2020), but a study from Jones and
Chaves (2015) claims they could reach 176 billion barrels. In 2018, oil became the
second most exported commodity of the country (only behind soy), with exportations
worth more than USD 25 billion, mainly to China (Brazil 2019).
It could be presumed the country would suffer an economic downturn as oil
demand falls in the international market if the low-carbon energy transition should
be successful. Although this might be true, Brazil possesses the strengths to deal
with this scenario and come out as a winner. It is of the few countries in the world
where renewable energy are the majority in its electricity supply mix, particularly
hydropower (with more than two-thirds of its output) and biomass (ANP 2020). The
last one is also responsible for a useful technology in reducing carbon emissions: cars
fueled by a flex engine that runs on both oil-derived gasoline and sugarcane-based
ethanol, a most reliable biofuel (Sovacool 2016).
Therefore, we can observe that Brazil has a foothold to better capitalize on a less
oil-dependent economy but is still interested in high oil demand. As such, Brazil is
an exciting case of analysis in energy geopolitics. Some factors indicated the country
could benefit from the presumed scenario, but others point to the opposite. For this
reason, the discussion brought up in this chapter is synthesized into four scenarios
that consider policy-making decisions from the Brazilian government to deal with a
post-carbon world and how it affects its energy security. Will energy transition affect
Brazilian planning for its energy sector?
This book chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents a brief
literature review about the dynamics of energy geopolitics and how it is one of the
key elements in the power of nations and companies while focusing on oil as its main
driver, energy security and use as a power tool between nations. Then, a context of
Brazil’s energy mix is given to contextualize further its strengths and weaknesses
and how energies sources are relevant to the country’s infrastructure, logistics, and
3 Geopolitical Losses and Gains from the Pathways of the Energy … 39
general well-being. At last, a discussion is made to instigate and contribute to a

debate on low-carbon energy transition, making Brazil a winner or a loser in energy
geopolitics. As a result, we proposed four scenarios, based on methodologies found
in other studies (Overland et al. 2019; Muñoz et al. 2015; Brand and Missaoui 2014)
and reports from institutions, for example, the International Energy Agency (IEA)
and the World Energy Council (IEA 2021b; WEC 2021)
Energy Geopolitics: A Brief Overview
The field of energy geopolitics analyzes how energy themes impact national security
on a geographic scale and disputes among nations. Its epistemology is historically
determined by oil involvement in strategic struggles between countries, and so we
focus this section on the influence of oil, whose hegemon has shaped the capitalist
economy as no other commodity did in the last 150 years. Scarcity was a constant
worry of great nations, motivating long-term strategies to secure continued access
to oil in their territory (Conant and Gold 1981). Nevertheless, its decline may be
closer than expected, mostly because of the aforementioned energy transition, which
in turn will remake the current energy global chain into a new order, with new
energy potencies emerging thanks to widespread use of renewable sources, while oil
becomes abundant, as new reserves are discovered, and its consumption ceases to
increase (Escribano 2021; Valkuchuk et al. 2020).
Energy as a Source of Power and Conflict
Since energy is essential to human survival and lifestyle, it has been a cause of
war and attrition between civilizations throughout history. Those who controlled the
energy sources most frequently held political and military power as well. Therefore,
access and control of these energy sources are at the center of many Causus Belli
military conflicts, justifications for colonial expansion and crises that caused civil
wars (Yergin 2006). This situation escalated after the nineteenth century with the
second industrial revolution. Increased demand for energy emerged, since then, on a
continuous rise, as countries worldwide enter their different stages of industrialization
and urbanization (Balmaceda 2018).
During the period mentioned above, oil consolidated as an inductor for the power
struggle around energy control and access, especially after naval vessels and military
equipment started using oil as their main fuel. For many scholars, the 1st World War
and later the 2nd Second World War were essentially a dispute for control over oil
reserves, better exemplified by the fronts in the Middle East and treaties after the war,
such as the Sykes-Picot agreement (Engdahl 2007). However, energy geopolitics is
not restricted to oil, as nuclear power rose to prominence during the Cold War. The
threat of mutually assured destruction impacted relations between great powers and
determined much of its diplomatic direction to avoid further proliferation (Wilson
2019).
However, energy geopolitics is not limited to non-renewable sources. Subsidies for
biomass sources, such as corn in the USA, are targeted by World Trade Organization
penalties due to what is perceived as an unfair commercial practice (Condon 2006).
The best modern-day example of conflicts involving renewables is the Egypt-Sudan
coalition against the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’s project, where conflict is brewing
among these countries over the control of the Nile river’s flow—essential to supply
their population—and to which Ethiopia intends to use for power generation. Its
main intention is, not by chance, to reduce its dependence on oil (Chen and Swain
2014).
Perhaps the most relevant concept to measure and grasp energy’s role in nation
stability is energy security. In simpler terms, the idea summarizes a country’s need and
ability to attend to its own energy demand daily, at a continuous flow from its sources
(domestic and foreign) and at a small price, so its whole economy is not compro-
mised (Conant and Gold 1981). Based on historical events, Yergin (2006) defines
energy security as primordial to national strategy, being one of the main priorities of
a country stability and assuring its population well-being. Also, this paradigm high-
lights how energy geopolitics involves conflicts among nations (Sébille-Lopez 2006).
Recently, newer definitions emerged to consider environmental issues, as climate
change imposed a threat to all countries’ stability. Thus, energy security nowadays
encompasses the notion that economic development, which needs an increase in
energy consumption, must be accompanied by environmental sustainability (IEA
2021b).
Oil Hegemon and Slow Decline
At the beginning of the 1970s, oil surpassed coal to become the world most consumed
energy source (Hinrichs 2014). Even the oil crises from the same period did little to
change this scenario. Indeed, before reaching this pinnacle, oil was already domi-
nating energy geopolitics since the second industrial revolution, further amplified
with both world wars and the nationalization processes of the fifties and the subse-
quent formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Oil has dominated the literature concerning energy geopolitics in the post-war
world (Overland et al. 2019). Still, its debate is focused on the asymmetry between
producers and consumers countries, economic dependence, the resource curse, and
oil as a diplomatic (and literally) weapon (Sébille-Lopez 2006).
However, the age of fossil fuels will be remarked, not only from the many wars
and conflicts caused but primarily by the environmental impact on a global scale,
bringing up climate change. Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change estimated that emissions from the burning and combustion of fossil fuels
as one of the main causes of global warming, whose consequences could be drastic
(Mbow et al. 2017; IPCC 2019). To minimize these effects, multilateral organizations
and treaties are establishing goals of zero carbon emissions until 2050 (IEA 2021b).
New technologies and an increase in the output from renewables are essential to
achieve those ambitious goals (Cash 2018).
Nevertheless, oil trends toward keeping relevance for the next decades. Many
circumstances explain this, but we must emphasize how energy transitions are a
slow-paced process that does not culminate in the extinction of the previous dominant
source once it falls from dominance (Sovacool 2016). In fact, oil has yet to reach its
peak demand, and after that, its consumption is expected to remain high (EIA 2021).
Not every country will be graced with new technologies like electric-moved cars
with the same intensity the developed ones will. To many, oil will remain the best
energy-efficient commodity and, most of all, the cheapest energy source. Therefore,
one must be cautious in projecting its downfall, even with all the sociotechnical
changes currently happening.
Energy Transition as a Soft Power Instrument
For decades, countries like Germany have highly depended on importing natural gas,
mainly from Russia. The two countries do not share a trustful relationship due to what
Germany perceives as aggressive interventions from Russia in regions like Crimea
and Donbass, both in Ukraine. However, energy security compels Germany to sign
treaties and build more pipelines that connect them to Russian reserves, showcasing
the power of the so-called gas weapon (Busygina 2017). But, if a decarbonization
energy transition process occurs successfully, Germany would gain the upper hand
against Russia, altering their current diplomatic relation (Quitzow et al. 2020). As
Russia’s invasion on Ukraine unfolded in 2022, Germany and the rest of UE countries
applied sanctions against them. Energy transition was already a necessity, now it
became a strategic imperative.
As Overland et al. (2019) points out, this new scenario will create a situation with
countries becoming winners or losers. If we consider the aforementioned Russo-
German relation, it is possible to conclude that Germany would be the winner,
whereas Russia would be the loser. Not only that, but this could happen without
any coercive means being utilized by either side. Griffiths (2019) argues that energy
transition can be used as a soft power tool, much like hydrocarbons have been used
by producer’s countries as an strategic instrument. The concept of soft power was
conceived by Nye (2004) to describe a nation’s ability to induce other countries to
follow its policies without coercion, in other words, without military intervention or
economic sanctions, which represents its opposite concept—hard power.
Renewables can reshape the main characteristics of energy geopolitics, shifting
from conflicts between hydrocarbon exporters and importing countries to a situ-
ation where the formers will inevitably suffer significant losses in revenue. This
could compromise their abilities to exert power and influence, obligating them to
change their economies and adapt their geopolitical ambitions to accommodate a
new dynamic that would not favor it (Wigell and Vihma 2016). International organi-
zations, like OPEC, might very well have no reason to exist at all, unless they adapt
their strategies and promote coordination among their members to better deal with a
post-oil world (Van der Graaf 2016).
There is speculation among scholars about how energy geopolitics will be once
renewables become dominant in the global energy mix. Vakuchulk et al. (2020) point
out difficulties in establishing parameters for this kind of analysis but conclude that
while renewables may face some challenges like cybersecurity, they can improve
the current energy world order thanks to the need for cooperation on environmental
issues and mostly due to a tendency of fewer conflicts between nations. This would
mean, as Quitzow et al. (2020) defended, that energy transition can become a soft
power instrument, reducing the potential of conflict as oil-exporters lose power and
influence but implying that more regional integration will be needed as electricity
demand rise.
Escribano (2021) argue that new emerging sources, like hydrogen, rare earths or
even renewables ones such as solar power, will overlap with hydrocarbons as energy
transition goes on as the main causes of energy disputes, following historical patterns,
until it slowly replaces it. Therefore, a low-carbon energy transition would not alter
energy geopolitics disputes among nations. However, its spatial configuration will
be remodeled, grids networks replacing pipelines as the main drivers of energy inte-
gration. He also warns that while renewables are rising in the global energy mix, oil
and natural gas will still have a high demand for decades.
Brazil’s Role in Energy Geopolitics
Although major energy geopolitics tensions occur far from Brazil’s territory and
regional zone of influence, economic interdependence among nations and interna-
tional supply chain integration make any country susceptible to any disturbance in
the energy world order, including Brazil (Moutinho dos Santos and Peyerl 2019).
However, this does not imply that Brazil is a passive actor in energy geopolitics,
especially on a regional scale.
Moreover, its offshore oil reserves and vast potential in renewables might turn
the country into an energy powerhouse with the capacity to self-sustain and export
massive quantities of energy sources (Sauer and Rodrigues 2016). To better under-
stand this context, we will briefly describe Brazil’s energy sector, going from its
energy supply mix profile to its importance to the country’s bilateral relations, partic-
ularly with its regional neighbors, and sum it up with a balance between strongest
points and main weaknesses.
Internal Scenario: The Brazilian Energy Supply Mix
Unlike most countries, Brazil possesses a relatively clean energy mix, with renewable
making up more than 40% of its total, a goal that several countries want to achieve by
2050 (IEA 2021a). According to Energy Research Company (EPE), in 2019, 83% of
electric energy generated in Brazil came from renewable sources, with hydropower
being the leader with approximately 63.4% (EPE 2020). Owning the second-largest
hydropower structure in the world in generation capacity, the Itaipu Dam (alongside
Paraguay), Brazil is an exponent of this source, exploiting its vast hydric potential
to reach 260 GW (Eletrobras 2018).
When considering all energy supply throughout the country, non-renewables,
especially oil, still have a large predominance in its energy supply mix, with 34.4%
in total being the biggest one (Table 3.1). Since transportation and logistics mostly
depend on trucks, oil derives like diesel and gasoline have huge demand and annual
consumption. Brazil consumed more than 130 million m3 of oil-derived fuel in 2020
(ANP 2021). Even though the country has been considered self-sustained in oil
production since at least 2006, there is still a need to import some derives (or export
crude oil to be processed in refineries abroad and bring back the production). One
of the reasons is the lack of investment in refineries and Brazilian oil characteristics,
considered too heavy, which explains why even the Pre-Salt offshore reserves did
not change that scenario (Gomes 2020).
However, thanks to sugarcane-produced ethanol and automobiles engines—
known as “flex”—this situation is partly mitigated in automobile transportation,
and biofuel also helps to minimize the dependency on diesel for freights. Therefore,
Brazil is also an exponent in biomass, being a pioneer in many technologies and
advances in this sector (Sovacool 2016). Apart from hydrocarbons and biomass, the
energy sector in Brazil has a lot of potentials to be untapped and fully explored yet
(see Chap. 13). With low-carbon energy transition looming on the horizon, some will
gain more incentive and investment, while others will fall behind.
Table 3.1 Brazil energy

Energy source Participation (%)
domestic supply
Petroleum and oil products 34.4
Sugarcane products 18.0
Hydropower 12.4
NG 12.2
Firewood 8.7
Other renewables 7.0
Coal 5.3
Uranium 1.4
Other non-renewables 0.6
Source EPE (2020)
For instance, coal, an energy source frequently considered to be fading out, has
been in relative decline in Brazil, although its southern states still utilize it in industrial
activities (Evangelista and Dias 2021), making 5.3% of the country’s total. Nuclear
power never really got into full traction in Brazil, with only two power stations built
to this day and a third being a long-time project, even with the country possessing
prominent uranium reserves (Leite 2014). This table also shows a still relevant use
of firewood in Brazil, mostly for cooking in poor areas of rural zones and urban
peripheries. This end-use is considered detrimental, as it can provoke respiratory
diseases. Besides, it shows socioeconomic inequalities and technological gaps, as its
use by the Brazilian population increases when the price of natural gas soars (Gioda
2018).
Oil and natural gas are important components of the Brazilian energy matrix,
particularly after the nineties. With the recent discoveries in the Pre-Salt layer, internal
production increased in the past years, but the country still lacks an adequate infras-
tructure to deal with this addition (Moutinho dos Santos and Peyerl 2019). Brazil’s
energy sector has passed through privatization phases for the past three decades, but
state-owned enterprises still have a strategic role (Silva 2020). The biggest one is
Petrobras, essential to Brazil’s energy sector and a significant player in the interna-
tional oil market. Recent governments have been steadily promoting openness to the
market, and new legislation, such as the New Gas Market (Law nº 14.134/2021),
has been approved by Congress. This aims to amplify the options for consumers,
while Petrobras must prioritize oil extraction from offshore reserves (Brazil 2021;
Petrobras 2020).
Energy’s Role in Brazil’s International Relations
As a commodity exporter country, Brazil surprisingly does not rely much on energy
sources exports, unlike its neighbor Venezuela, whose gross domestic product (GDP)
has been dominated by the oil industry with more than 90% of all economic activities
(Pereira 2019) or even Paraguay, that sells his energy output share from Itaipu to
Brazil (Neto 2021). In part, this relates to Brazil’s industrialization process being
more evolved than its regional partners. Still, development never reached its full
potential since the country remains essentially an agro exporter to more powerful
markets like China and the USA, especially soy and iron ore (Brazil 2019). Thanks to
Pre-Salt production, Brazil is slowly becoming an oil exporter, reinforcing its status
as a primary exporter in the international trade chain. Consequentially, if this export
becomes a reliable revenue source for Brazil, combined with practices like sovereign
funds, it will be more interconnected for the Brazilian economy (Machado e Silva
and Costa 2019).
On a regional scale, energy is the main link between a couple of Brazilians’
bilateral relations. First, with Paraguay, Brazil has a tense situation concerning the
Itaipu dam, whose ownership is shared between the two. Still, since Paraguay’s half
is more than enough to supply itself domestically, the surplus is, by contract, sold to
Brazil. More than once in the past decades, Paraguayans governments complained
about this subject, alleging that Brazil pays less than it should (Neto 2021). In 2006,
Bolivia made a similar allegation about its natural gas exports to Brazil, whose main
infrastructure was created by Petrobras. This provoked a crisis that eventually was
settled with all former Petrobras’s assets in the country being nationalized. However,
as natural gas productions rise in Brazil, it is possible to mitigate imports from
Bolivia, which might not benefit either of the two since keeping Bolivia as a strategic
partner is a long strategic goal of Brazil diplomacy, and Bolivia would lose its main
buyer (Pereira 2019).
As we can observe, energy has two main roles in Brazil’s trade and diplomatic
relations: as a source of income and a tool for attracting its neighbors under its
economic and geopolitical influence. This is a small example of Brazil’s main general
goal of using its natural resources to carve itself a place among the world’s most
powerful and influential nations by projecting its strength from a leadership position
in Latin America (Martin 2018; Pereira 2019). So far, it is unclear if the energy
transition toward decarbonization can help Brazil achieve those goals. It can be an
obstacle to overcome, as dependence on new materials, like lithium from other South
American (SA) countries, became more relevant to developed countries’ energy
security (Sauer et al. 2015). This would attract major powers and multinational
enterprises to compete with Brazil’s state and companies for market shares and
regional influence. On the other hand, it could open new opportunities and pathways
for regional energy integration by building new corridors and infrastructure based
on new technologies for renewables.
Brazil’s Main Geopolitical Assets and Structural Gaps
Apart from the offshore oil reserves and its untapped potential in renewables, Brazil
has other geopolitical assets to take advantage of energy geopolitics that other coun-
tries do not possess. First, it is in a relatively stable region of the world, despite its
socioeconomic problems, to be sure. Still, no military conflict per se is going on, like
the Syrian and Yemini Civil Wars in the Middle East, which affect major players. A
stable country is a factor that attracts investments, and, at least in that regard, Brazil
is a safe option. Also, the government has no sanctions due to external policies that
threaten other nations, like the Iranian nuclear program.
Another strong geopolitical point is its territory, looming over the western South
Atlantic region, an important route to oil ships, significantly since oil exportations
in African countries located around the Gulf of Guinea have increased in the past
decade. Those countries have good commercial and diplomatic relations with Brazil,
thanks to international organizations such as G-20 and Petrobras’s regional invest-
ments (Ricupero 2017). However, those are in decline due to the current company
strategy of de-investment. The last strategic planning of the company, which defines
its strategy for 2040, estimated that it could obtain about US$ 26.1 billion by selling
its downstream’s assets so that it could focus solely on upstream, particularly offshore
fields (Pereira et al. 2021).
Policymaking and legislation often hamper advances in Brazil’s energy sector,
constantly shifting from a more state-centered view to a more open market one
but rarely entirely focused on one agenda, which shows how the sector is affected
by internal political decisions (Pereira 2019). Some workers’ categories, such as
truck drivers, exhibited the great capacity to organize themselves to interfere with
the government decision-making process, as they did in 2018 when a nationwide
organized strike forced the government to pull back from a fuel price rise. The
subsequent crisis even provoked the dismissal of the president of Petrobras (Reis
Filho 2021).
Besides that, SA as a whole lacks a better-integrated infrastructure to supply all
the countries and promote energy integration among them, a long-term goal proposed
by SA multilateral institutes, but far from being built on, displaying a fragile local
capacity, relying almost on foreign investment. In general, it is believed that SA
integration is fundamental to the subcontinent’s independence from foreign powers
and socioeconomic development (Martin 2018). Da Silva and da Costa Feres (2021)
defends that this could be enabled by Brazilian leadership. Still, regional institutions,
like Unasur or Mercosur, which have, in theory, the necessary tools to stimulate
this process, have been weakened due to a lack of cooperation and construction of
unified objectives, resulting in each SA country prioritizing their own agenda. Arroyo
(2010) argues that ideological differences between SA’s executive leaders constantly
sabotage any evolution in the integration process, including the energy sector. Could
new energy demand from a net-zero carbon emissions world change this landscape?
Whatever the answer, it will certainly change Brazil’s energy geopolitics. Unknown
yet, it is if this will be a benefice or a hindrance.
Will Brazil Gain or Lose with the Energy Transition?
The debate around energy transition has gained momentum in developed countries, as
most recent reports from IEA are showing (IEA 2021b). Considered to be an emergent
country and not a member of OCDE (as most associate members of IEA usually are),
Brazil does not have an official policy regarding energy transition yet, but it does
have some guidelines in its “Plano Nacional de Energia 2050” (National Energy Plan
2050), a report from EPE. According to it, energy transition is the main concern of
Brazil’s strategy regarding the long planning of the energy sector. Those guidelines
are centered on natural gas (that is, considering it an energy transition element),
climate change and the electrification process. Also, ethanol-fueled vehicles play a
significant role in expanding the use of sugarcane and other biofuels (EPE 2020).
So, what defines the scenarios for Brazil? Our criteria aim to explain what aspects
constitute positives or negatives views. We emphasize all scenarios, considering that
the low-carbon energy transition will be successful until 2050. For the purposes of
simplification, we based all assumptions about internal energy demand and energy
imports and exports to follow the same trajectory stipulated by EPE’s 2050 forecast
named “Challenge of Expansion.” This includes the following notions: (1) Brazil will
have enough reserves; (2) not necessarily this potential is going to be fully explored;
(3) the internal demand is increasing 2.2% per year, meaning internal production or
imports must rise to attend it; and (4) energy exports destinies will not be same in
destination and volume as in 2020, mainly to China, USA and EU, as those countries
certainly will change on their own and new markets could arise.
Oil exports and products in Brazil’s energy market are two key elements that shape
its current dynamic. But this would change in all hypothetical futures. Overland
et al. (2019) created an index that evaluates the gains and losses a country will suffer
after a full energy transition process. Their criteria include fossil fuel dependency
and reserves, renewable energy sources, governance, and conflicts. These factors
cover geographical aspects of energy sources. In most of their scenarios, Brazil is
presented as a loser due to large oil production, oil exportation and poor performance
on governance. They also considered that fossil fuels might not be fully explored in
time to weigh too much on its economy, creating a vacuum for its renewable potential
to fulfill. In that case, Brazil emerges as one of the winners, as its lack of geopolitical
conflicts and abundant renewable energy sources tips the scale in its favor.
As much as we appreciated this ground-breaking work and its main conceptions,
it is a general index for many countries, and it is embedded in generalist terms
like “developed” and “developing” countries, showing their bias from a northerner
perspective. Thus, this chapter aspires to analyze Brazil on its own. The nation has the
potential to become a great power (at least on a regional scale for Latin America). So
far, however, has failed to surpass its dependency on an agro-exportation economy,
which could be considered an indication of resource curse (Jordan 2013). Therefore,
we also consider during our analyses if the energy transition can allow Brazil an
opportunity to use its energy potential as a soft power tool, persuading its neighbors
and southerners countries to follow its lead.
Energy security nowadays not only implies attending its energy demand and using
energy as a national strategic concern but also emitting as few as possible greenhouse
gases (GHG), viewed as a priority for developing countries that provoked the most
impact on a global climate scale. A country that reduces its emissions while managing
to extract economic benefits through this process will gain leverage and prestige.
Therefore, reaching this goal may become a qualifier for a country’s status worldwide,
whereas failing to achieve it can have negative diplomatic results.
Possible Scenarios for Brazil
Four distinct scenarios are conceived based on methodologies used by international

energy agencies (EIA 2021; WEC 2021; IEA 2021b), previous works (Overland et al.
2019; Muñoz et al. 2015; Brand and Missaoui, 2014) and one from Petrobras itself
(2018). Two of them are considered positive, and the remaining two are negative.
They are named after musical styles (another common practice in defining energy
Table 3.2 Main criteria of the scenarios

Scenarios/criteria Investments in Oil and gas Energy integration Degree of
renewables development with SA importance to
environmental
issues
Bossa Nova Very high Moderate Moderately High
advances
Samba High High Greatly advances Ideal
Technobrega Insufficient High Slightly advances Less than ideal
Punk Rock Very low Very high Stagnate Very low
scenarios) that were formed in Brazil culture, some with influences from its main
cultural legacies and foreign styles that made an impact on Brazil’s cultural land-
scape (while probably showing the personal author preference): Bossa Nova, Samba,
Technobrega and Punk Rock.
Table 3.2 shows the main scenarios alongside criteria that energy planning in
Brazil can prioritize or not for the next decades. We considered how much would be
spent on renewables, determining how far its technologies and share of the energy
supply mix will expand. Then, we determine how the O&G sector will develop, as a
temptation to explore the offshore reserves to their fullest could be stimulated. Energy
integration with SA is also considered, stipulating how far this process can advance.
Finally, the last criteria is the degree of importance given to environmental issues
following global expectations and climate deals. Table 3.3 then lists the outcomes
for each scenario, considering strategies that Brazilian governments can make in the
next decades to deal with the energy transition and how it will impact Brazil’s energy
geopolitics (BEG).
Bossa Nova scenario is where Brazil successfully applies specific policies to
adapt to the low-carbon energy transition, making its mix much more complex and
diverse. This includes incentives for renewables, investment in digitalization and
modernization of infrastructure. At the same time, although complex, the system
functions smoothly (hence why it is named Bossa Nova, which is the complex style
that combines jazz and samba elements), allowing Brazil to secure its energy demand
even if it raises considerably. In some hypothetical cases, it could be possible to
achieve better results if the demand drops thanks to increases in energy efficiency.
For this to come true, at least electric cars must be consolidated. At the same time, the
ground for future innovations like hydrogen would already be in motion, meaning
that Brazil is keeping pace with the world’s most sociotechnical advanced countries.
This would result in reaching lower levels of GHG emissions sooner than 2050.
On an international level, it makes the country a beacon for energy sustainability
since its usage of fossil fuels is reduced considerably, except natural gas, which
will rise if new legislation regarding this hydrocarbon is successful in cementing it
as the major component of its energy supply mix. In turn, this means that Brazil
would have a shorter window of opportunity to explore and sell abroad its Pre-
Salt reserves until, at best, the decade of 2040, when most analysts believe peak
Table 3.3 Outcomes in each scenario due to their respective strategies adopted, as shown on Table
3.2, especially its effects on Brazil Energy Geopolitics (BEG)
Scenario Outcome Strategy adopted Impacts for BEG
Bossa Nova Brazil benefits the Diversification of energy More integration with SA;
most from the energy mix; sovereignty funds for less dependency on
transition oil revenue; adoption of imports; self-sustainability
environmental deals and in hydrocarbons due to
energy efficiency practices; lowers demands; oil
energy integration with SA exports gradually decrease;
energy security stable
Samba Brazil takes some Investment in carbon Oil and natural gas become
advantages from the capture and storage, relevant to Brazil’s
energy transition amplification of natural gas international trade, but its
market; a consolidation as a eventual downturn has a
reliable oil exporter, usage small impact due to
of renewables is increased investments in new
thanks to more capital sources; a large degree of
destined for it sovereignty would be
preserved; energy security
preserved
Tecnobrega Brazil suffers E&P oil sector remains the Lack of diversification
setbacks from the priority; expenditure on pulls back investments
energy transition renewables does not rise; from majors; newer
logistics and transport still technologies are restricted
rely too much on oil to metropolitan areas;
products energy security is
somewhat compromised
Punk Rock Brazil loses the most Oil is no longer needed on Main energy assets are sold
due to the energy a large scale; no official to obtain some revenue for
transition policy is prepared for this; investments; Brazil is a
electric grid is not updated; study case of resource
natural gas market fails to course; energy rationing is
accomplish its goals, frequent; carbon emission
renewables and low-carbon remains high, making the
technologies are not country a diplomatic
pursued pariah; energy security is
precarious
oil demand will occur. Sovereignty funds, which Brazil’s already created, can help
generate enough funds for those strategies while also helping the country overcome
its socioeconomic inequities, reaching the main objective they were created for it.
Finally, although admittedly too optimistic, this scenario may create the conditions
to grant Brazil enough soft power to lead an energy integration in SA, helping with
regional geopolitics ambitions.
Samba scenario is where Brazil finds its own path, based on its experience with
renewables, exploring new sources like solar and wind to a deeper degree (as in the
previous scenario), maintaining and expanding its energy mix grip on renewables
dominance. Fossil fuels still have a high demand due to Brazil’s logistics reliance
on roads and trucks, but biofuels and NG advances can minimize this. Eventually,
electric cars will flood Brazil’s market and maybe with local companies’ production.
Still, this technology will have a slow start in a market dominated by traditional
internal combustion vehicles. New legislation must pass in the following decades
to make this possible, as well as economic incentives for its implementation. Then,
net-zero goals could still be achievable by 2050, meaning that in this scenario Brazil
could fit with the multilateral agenda.
Here, Brazil impacts less on the broader international arena and focuses more
on domestic policy and traditional SA allies, mainly Mercosur associates Argentine,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. Bolivia would probably keep a close relation with Brazil
thanks to their bilateral commerce. In this scenario, Brazil can help its closest trade
partners use their resources to promote industrialization and economic diversification
(like lithium reserves promoting electric car batteries and other industrial end-uses
for NG). But this would also mean that hydrocarbon investments are necessary since
they are essential to SA countries’ economies. Further integration with other regional
countries does not evolve as Brazil does not develop a bigger soft power. They pursue
their own agenda with the help of OCDE countries and China. Oil from the Pre-Salt is
still expected to be exported in large quantities, but this is achieved while respecting
multilateral agreements such as the Paris Agreement, even at the expense of not
selling as much hydrocarbon as desirable.
Common strategies should take place on those two positive outcomes: a greater
diversification of its energy mix and pushing forward sources that make the least
environmental impact. In turn, this should enable the country to reduce GHC emis-
sions and preserve its ecosystems. Combining this with fulfilling its demand with
guarantees energy security, this is an essential step toward becoming a bigger player
on the world’s geopolitical stage. This means less fragility to decisions from major
energy geopolitics players like Saudi Arabia and Russia and the autonomy to pursue
an independent path as much as possible. Also, in both scenarios, the governance
aspect is relatively stable and predictable, not causing major interferences, although
some policies will probably cause internal controversies.
Our first negative outcome scenario, named Tecnobrega (that mix local and
regional styles with synthesized sounds and eletronic music), is where Brazil does not
adopt new strategies and policies related to renewables and low-carbon technologies.
Tempted by short-term oil profits, offshore upstream is the area with more invest-
ments and international attraction until it fades away as global oil demand plunges.
Renewables and other technologies still receive some investments, but since hydro-
carbons had taken a bigger share, those would be insufficient to proper modernize
Brazil’s energy sector. In turn, due to a lack of preservation of its falling national
industrial sector, the urging for imports of manufactured products, like electric car
batteries, will keep on rising.
Since they have a bigger aggregated value, Brazil’ economic balance suffers a
negative downturn. Then, Brazil vast oil reserves could become a stranded asset. As
the national economy becomes more fragile, so does Brazil influence over the rest
of SA, which then becomes an area of dispute among global powers interested in
securing more resources for themselves. Rare-earth minerals, like lithium, have big
reserves in Bolivia, Chile and Argentine. Although it may sound far-fetched, this
area could become relevant to the emerging energy geopolitics as the Persian Gulf
is current due to its hydrocarbon reserves.
The Tecnobrega scenario still can have alarming consequences for the energy
sector, as the Brazilian’ state and companies would lack the capacity to properly
manage the resources, opening too much for major enterprises. While those could
generate an internal market with better options and prices for consumers, this would
compromise Brazil’s energy security and ability to use energy as a strategic tool. It
means no influence on other SA nations and probably no further advances in energy
integration of the subcontinent. Some metropolitan areas, like São Paulo, might be
integrated with new technical advances, like electric cars replacing oil-fueled ones,
reshaping their sociotechnic landscape. However, there is no certainty that it would
become widespread equally throughout the territory in the short and medium term,
enhancing Brazil’s spatial and socioeconomic inequalities even more.
The last scenario is named Punk Rock. Here, Brazil fails on its own due to a lack
of vision and insistence on dated policies, making the international market view the
country as a non-viable option for investment, thus causing economic ruin if local
companies and the state do not manage to produce long-term benefits. Constant
interference from the government in management issues for populist purposes, like
fuel prices, may even jeopardize national companies’ plans to invest in it. Thus,
Brazil’s state planning would require more focus on preserving the current energy mix
to sustain its energy demand, lacking the necessary investments to improve energy
efficiency from renewables. The investments, both from the public and private sectors,
would diminish, but proportionally, the oil and gas sector receive more investment
as they are the more developed ones.
Therefore, the energy transition itself in Brazil would lag behind the rest of the
world, at least from the most powerful nations and major emerging countries. In this
case, Brazil is more dependent on fossil fuels and hydropower than others. In this
regard, no technological update of its electrical grid (which is still not fully territori-
ally integrated) could mean more energy blackouts and rationing. Brazil would then
be considered an international pariah, failing to achieve global goals of net-zero GHC
emissions by 2050. The possibility of Brazil being military invaded if the burning
of the amazon rainforest is not stopped seems far-fetched at this moment, but on in
the future could be used as a justification (Walt 2019). This also came at the price
of Brazil having no soft power in SA, which will, in turn, pursue other partners for
guidance and assistance in adapting to decarbonizing energy transition new reality.
What Will Be the Next Scenario?
Those scenarios might paint a picture too optimistic or too negative. Usually, the
most likely outcome is going to be something in between. As much as a successful
decarbonizing energy transition is desirable to happen in the next few decades, that
process still has a long and winding road ahead. Even countries associated with
clean energies will still have some degree of dependence on fossil fuels. For a more
realistic view of the future, one must analyze what Brazil expects for its energy
sector. So, we look back again on the EPE’s report (EPE 2020). Although energy
transition is an important concept explored in most sections, in our interpretation,
it seems that much is needed to be done to prepare the ground for catalyzing the
process. Domestic energy demand and exports are both expected to increase, and
energy transition sources are not yet able to replace or overlap with fossil fuels.
Speaking of them, fossil fuels will remain a major component of Brazil’s strategic
planning, in large parts, thanks to the offshore oil reserves. In that regard, the docu-
ment considers two possibilities that differ in how much oil will be produced and
sold abroad, the first called “stagnation” and the second “challenge of expansion.”
The latter is the one that predicts more output, both economic and energetic, from
hydrocarbons. However, even in the scenario when the production stagnates after
2030, its output will still be high. Pre-Salt oils also attract investment from major
oil companies, even those with a long-term focus on energy transition, like Equinor
(Pickl 2019).
Consequently, fossil fuels remain relevant and are keeping dominance over energy
geopolitics for the foreseeable future. Reports and overviews reached similar conclu-
sions, claiming that despite the future belonging to non-renewables, hydrocarbons’
consumption shall increase in quantity, even if it proportionally decreases. Petrobras
projected scenarios include one called “cardume,” which expects that natural gas will
take a leading role, as its causes less environmental impact than coal and petroleum,
meaning it can help with mitigation of global warming while dealing with a bigger
global energy demand, as it argues that an acceleration of renewables would mean a
slower economic growth from developing nations (Petrobras 2018).
However, the main question remains: Will Brazil gain or lose with the energy
transition? Brazil faces a dilemma surrounding the energy transition process head-
on, embracing its new technologies and respecting climate goals or slowing it down as
much as possible to extract short-term rewards from oil exploration? At first glance,
those goals seem contradictory, and even our scenarios deal with their problems. But
it is necessary to embrace both trajectories because in doing so, a principle of energy
security is respected: diversification. Brazil had done this previously in the past when
it was more dependable on oil imports and promoted solutions like biofuels. Offshore
oil reserves modified this to an extent, as it opened the possibility of turning into a
main oil producer and exporter. For some time, this became an internal obsession,
as nationalist views on energy issues conceived those reserves as a golden ticket.
However, international energy conjecture compels for another approach, and the
literature indicates that this notion is not only obsolete but prejudicial (Jordan 2013;
Machado e Silva and Costa 2019).
At this point, Brazil is indeed an established oil seller, with its main partners
being China, the USA, European Union and, to a lesser degree, countries from
Mercosur, mainly Argentina (MME Brasil, 2019). Therefore, its geopolitical path
lies within these groups of nations’ objectives for the energy transition. China is
now the main consumer of oil, its state-owned oil companies purchasing as many
fields as possible, securing sources from around the globe. Certainly, it’s the better
consumer for Brazil, with its growing demand, and Brazil can easily be a reliable
source for the Chinese. However, they are investing in energy transition technologies
to reduce their dependency on imports in the long term (Dong et al. 2021). When
China eventually demands less oil from Brazil, the effects will shake its economy to
its core (Pereira, 2020).
Initially, it was expected from Petrobras that the USA would be the main consumer
of Brazil’s oil (Pereira 2019). But the shale revolution in the past decade has turned
the former hyper-dependant oil importer USA into an energy powerhouse, capable
of almost self-sustaining its own gargantuan market and even projecting energy
exports, like GNL to the European Union—a tactic that cripples its rival Russia
(Bordoff and Houser 2014). The EU is emerging as leading the low-carbon economy
agenda, passing legislation, and proposing the most ambitious goals, whereas the
USA struggles with bipartisan politics, and China must guarantee its rising demand
(Losekann and Tavares 2019). While these two titans may use coercion to achieve
their geopolitical objectives, the EU will probably use energy transition as a soft
power instrument.
Thus, Brazil’s main geopolitical benefit can play on the geographic space, and
it can exert the most impact and influence in SA. Even though it is possible to sell
oil to other SA countries, some of them which have greater reserves than Brazil,
that would require other bilateral relations that goes beyond the simple exchange of
commodities, but to deep ties that can reshape those countries’ industries and society,
helping them escaping the route that leads into resource course and subjugation to
stronger global powers. With its end-uses for electrification and replacement of other
fossil fuels, natural gas could be the main driver that will help Brazil lead the way
through the energy transition. Then, we can gradually adapt to future realities. The
energy transition is inevitable, and it will happen sooner or later. If the right policies
and strategies are to be chosen, Brazil can enjoy a more successful outcome than
most nations, but the opposite could also be true as easily.
Conclusion
The present chapter brought an overview of how geopolitics is involved in energy

issues. This tendency will remain even when renewable sources and carbon-free
drive technologies take over from the current oil and NG age. As this transition
happens and energy geopolitics changes, countries’ capacity to adapt to this new
paradigm will determine their strength and relevance in energy geopolitics. Brazil, a
nation that aspires to use its energy potential to adjust and take advantage of this new
energy order, can either win or lose in a hypothetical future where energy transition
is successful until 2050, a year used as a common target for environmental goals.
By making four different scenarios, we concluded that Brazil must not fall into
the temptation of seeking short-term profits from its oil reserves, as not only this a
difficult market with other powerful sellers consolidated, but it would eventually lose
its current relevance in all scenarios. Bossa Nova and Samba scenarios demonstrated
that the development of renewables, careful usage of oil potential and investments
in diversification are essential to the country’s energy security. A nation with a long
history of commodity exportation as the main driver of its economy, Brazil’s energy
potential should be used to reverse this pattern. Sovereignty and development are
essential to be more than a nation with vast natural resources that powerful nations
seek to take advantage of, while Brazil fails to promote its power projection abroad,
even in neighbor partners. No change in this policy could lead to a similar situation
to our Technobrega and Punk Rock scenarios.
The subjects and themes discussed here are still fresh in academic debate, espe-
cially in Brazil. Energy geopolitics is normally focused on oil and natural gas, and
a methodological and epistemological expansion is very much needed in Brazilian
studies from different fields of expertise. We hope this can contribute to the emerging
discussion.
regulation. André dos Santos Alonso Pereira thank especially Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento
de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Capes) for the scholarship. Vinícius Silva thank especially Conselho
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico(CNPq), for the scholarship. Peyerl thanks
the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9, FAPESP. This work
was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior.
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Chapter 4
Democracy and Energy Justice: A Look
at the Brazilian Electricity Sector
Alex Azevedo dos Santos, Rodolfo Pereira Medeiros, Milena Megrè,

and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract Faced with the debate around energy transition, concepts have emerged
that aim to combine justice and democracy with energy innovation. The concepts
of energy democracy and energy justice are examples of these efforts. Although it
is considered a global issue, the production of such topics is still centred in Europe
and North America. Seeking to broaden the approach, this chapter addressed exam-
ples from the Brazilian electricity sector. Among the reasons for choosing, it to
be analysed, we considered that this sector is based on hydroelectricity and more
sustainable than the world average; however, it is loaded with social imbalances
and socio-environmental problems. Thus, the chapter reflected these concepts on
Brazilian hydroelectric plants, the access and cost of electricity for the population,
and exemplified by a recent blackout in the Amazon region. It was observed that
the construction models of these hydroelectric plants are rooted in the history of a
lack of low social responsibility in the use and occupation of space. The populations
of the Amazon states have suffered the impacts over time. The high costs, difficult
access, and the quality of electricity service have challenging to provide electricity
for all.
Keywords Energy democracy · Energy justice · Energy transition · Electricity

sector · Brazil
A. Azevedo dos Santos (B) · R. Pereira Medeiros · M. Megrè · D. Peyerl

e-mail: alexazevedo@usp.br
R. Pereira Medeiros
e-mail: medeiros.rodolfop@gmail.com
M. Megrè
e-mail: milenamegre@usp.br
D. Peyerl
D. Peyerl

58 A. Azevedo dos Santos et al.
Introduction
Energy democracy is a recent concept and an emergent social movement that links
social justice and equity with energy innovation, connecting energy infrastructural
changes with the possibility of deep political, economic, and social change (Burke
and Stephens 2017). This concept still does not have a consensual definition. Still,
it is commonly used in analyses and reflections about energy transition and who
controls the means of production and consumption of energy (Jenkins 2019).
Since 2010, the term has become more widespread, having started as a slogan used
by activists that demanded more significant participation in energy-related decision-
making and has been incorporated into policy documents and academic literature on
energy governance and energy transitions (Szulecki and Overland 2020).
The several interpretations of the term are justified by fragmented literature,
constructed by an interdisciplinary and eclectic team of scientists, such as human
geographers, sustainability and legal scholars, and political scientists, which do
energy-related research often focused on the national or local community level,
resulting in crucial differences in experience and outlook (Chilvers and Pallett 2018).
The rise of this issue is associated with the intensification of climate change,
whose energy sector is historically the leading emitter of greenhouse gasses (Burke
and Stephens 2017; Pedersen et al, 2021). It is known that there are vulnerable
populations that tend to suffer more from climate change, subject to extreme events
that can trigger major population collapses (IPCC 2014). Consequently, the need to
decarbonise the energy system to renewable sources has become one of the central
themes for science, policy, and public discourse worldwide (Araújo 2014; Markard
et al. 2012).
As fossil fuels still are at the world’s economic centrality, assessing how the decline
in their dependence will unfold is among the most contested areas of policy in the
coming decades (IEA 2021a; Boyer 2014; Arent et al. 2017; Stirling 2014). With
the necessary energy transition to renewable energy sources being a fundamental
political struggle, efforts to decarbonise these infrastructures will not be effective
without confronting and destabilising the dominant energy power systems (Burke
and Stephens 2018).
In this way, an effort that energy democracy advocates intend is to inspire a
reconfiguration of energy politics, realising opportunities for this restructuring of
socio-technical regimes (Miller et al. 2013). Through a set of theoretical princi-
ples, this movement seeks to create opportunities for destabilising power relations,
reversing the established context of social and environmental injustices of dispos-
sessed and marginalised people and replacing monopolised fossil fuel energy systems
with democratic and renewable structures (Angel 2016; Farrell 2016; Burke and
Stephens, 2017).
These principles are also very present in the concept of energy justice, which
is a term often used in conjunction with the idea of energy democracy (Jenkins
2019). These concepts have a similar genesis, emerging amid growing interest in
the fairness implications of energy consumption and the social impacts of energy
4 Democracy and Energy Justice: A Look at the Brazilian Electricity Sector 59
(Hall et al. 2013). Evolving from activist literature on the environment, society, and
climate, energy justice transposes principles of social justice to the energy sector,
aiming for energy to be provided to all individuals, in all areas, in a safe, accessible,
and sustainable way (Mccauley et al. 2013; Jenkins 2019).
Based on that, the objective of this book chapter is to seek historical and current
themes in the Brazilian electricity sector, which are directly associated with the
aforementioned social approaches. The study begins by reflecting on the main topics
addressed in energy democracy in the scientific literature. The related concept of
energy justice was also worked on, aiming to expand the analysis of the Brazilian
cases that will be presented later. Then, contextualisation of the theme in Brazil is
made, and a local theoretical deepening is sought through 3 current themes: (i) the
controversies surrounding hydroelectric plants, (ii) access and cost of electricity in
Brazil, and (iii) the blackout in the state of Amapá in 2021, in the Brazilian Amazon
region.
An Introduction About the Concept of Energy Democracy

and Related Terms
As already mentioned, the concept of energy democracy is relatively recent and

presents vast different interpretations. Some authors consider it a positive side as it
allows the concept to flow between scales, adhering to the local context and shaping
its own contours, making it possible to define a coherent agenda of actions for specific
cases (Pesch 2019; Creamer et al. 2018; Van Veelen 2018). For other authors, this
dynamism is not positive since the lack of a shared standard understanding prevents a
common agenda from being proposed between countries and institutions, considering
the challenge of the energy transition as a common theme for all, where well-defined
objectives, goals and indicators are needed (Delina 2018; Sørensen and Torfing 2005).
A survey carried out by Szulecki and Overland (2020) showed that the issue of
energy democracy is still recent and restricted to the academic world and that there is
a great predominance of productions originating from European and North American
institutions. However, although publications from these regions dominate, the study
found a clear conceptual division on the subject between these centres of scientific
production, in addition to the low research and production by the other continents
(Szulecki and Overland 2020), that is, the research on this topic is carried about
mostly by Western developed nations, whereas the developing and underdeveloped
nations have had little involvement in this debate.
In Europe, the concept is mostly related to the political system within the Green
Parties, and public policies with support from the private sector to meet the demands
related to the energy transition, whether they are infrastructure or financial demands
(Burke and Stephens 2017). In North America, it indicates the action of social move-
ments and complete autonomy of communities of users and producers of their own
energy projects regarding the state or companies (Burke and Stephens 2018).
Although with different types of action, these approaches that add social aspects
to energy infrastructure essentially face the dilemma of balancing urgency versus
justice (Kumar et al. 2021). For this, it is necessary to combine: (i) rapid transitions
to cleaner forms of energy; (ii) mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions; and iii. a rapid
energy access expansion and progress in human life, aiming at development, poverty
reduction, improvement of the quality of life, gender, and race equality (Kumar et al.
2021).
Given these objectives of an urgent and fair energy transition, this chapter delves
into examples from the Brazilian electricity sector to elaborate on specific local
difficulties, seeking a counterpoint to most publications focused on the global north.
Based on hydroelectric generation, the Brazilian electricity matrix is substan-
tially composed of cleaner sources than the world average, with 83% renewable and
17% non-renewable. In comparison, the world electricity matrix is made up of 27%
renewable and 73% non-renewable (EPE 2020). Thus, unlike most of the world’s
nations, Brazil’s energy sector is not the leading emitter of greenhouse gasses. The
main climate challenges are forest deforestation and land use, such as agriculture
activities (SEEG 2021).
Despite the promising data, the objective of this chapter is to reflect, within this
social approach associated with the energy issue and in the terms put by Kumar
et al. (2021), on the gaps in the Brazilian electricity sector concerning democracy
and energy justice. Therefore, it is necessary to contextualise the concept of energy
justice, closely associated with the present issues and the examples that will be
detailed.
Understanding the Concept of Energy Justice
Energy justice is a concept that has well-defined limits in the literature and has been
extensively explored in publications. According to Sovacool and Dworkin (2015, 2),
energy justice is “a global energy system that fairly disseminates both the benefits
and costs of energy services and which has representativeness and impartiality in
energy decision-making”.
Analytically, it presupposes a deepening of the vision of energy systems, planning
and uses, bringing ethical, moral and equity issues to the debate, which are not
explicit in our daily lives, or the reports presented. It touches on values and seeks to
answer more complex questions and problems that are not easily solved (Sovacool
and Dworkin, 2015).
The most common principles used within energy justice as a decision-making
tool within energy processes are availability, accessibility, due process, good gover-
nance, prudence, intergenerational and intragenerational equity and accountability
(Sovacool and Dworkin 2015). Its contribution aims to hold actors accountable for the
responsibilities related to problems in the energy area, whether related to enterprises,
political groups, countries, or even their own practices that are incoherent and support
such institutions or individuals (Heffron 2022). Perceptions about such aspects can
shape new personal behaviours, investment decisions, and trust (or mistrust) in energy
information and institutions (Sovacool 2016).
Heffron (2022) pointed out that the concept of energy justice must be at the
centre of the debate on energy transitions to have positive consequences for society.
Focusing on the processes already underway worldwide, the author shows surprise
at how the energy sector, one of the main ones responsible for environmental and
climate change problems, remains unexplored in the context of fair results for society
(Heffron 2022).
Seeking to reflect and point out examples that may be unfair or conducted in an
undemocratic way in the Brazilian energy sector, we address in the following pages
some cases that run through its entire chain: production, transmission, distribution,
and consumption. In this sense, we highlight the consequences of some events, try
to locate those responsible, indicate inequalities in treatment and care, and reflect on
the sustainability of our energy supply mix and the high values of tariffs imposed on
the entire population. These clippings aim to highlight Brazil’s social vulnerabilities
and contrast them with the electricity sector.
Democracy and Electricity in Brazil
The Brazilian experience with democracy before promulgating the current Federal
Constitution of 1988 was brief and troubling (Codato 2005). The interests of the
dominant classes in society have always been at the forefront of electoral processes
and, in one way or another, have given rise to ruptures and coups (Fernandes 2019).
In short, Brazil follows the trend of most countries in the global South, which
have democratic fragility with hybrid, authoritarian and imperfect political systems
(EIU—Democracy Index 2020).
Before the 1988 re-democratisation process, the last regime was a military dicta-
torship that lasted 21 years (Avritzer 2018). Therefore, democracy is still recent in
the country, and, despite having a democratic political regime with open elections
and consolidated institutions, its past and history still give it the characteristics of
a country with extreme socio-economic inequality with many agrarian and urban
conflicts; racial and gender violence (Avritzer 2018; Cerqueira 2021; Global Wealth
Report 2021).
During this dictatorship period, Brazil underwent a profound energy matrix diver-
sification (Freitas 2013). It was necessary to reconcile the high energy demand due to
growing industrialisation with the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 that shook the world’s
energy systems, forcing the entry of new sources (Oliveira 2018).
Thus, in addition to encouraging local energy sources, such as sugarcane alcohol,
5 of the 10 largest hydroelectric plants in Brazil emerged during the military dicta-
torship period (de Cerqueira Leite and Leal 2007, ANEEL n.d.). Although these
hydroelectric plants play a crucial role in a renewable Brazilian electricity matrix,
the construction and operation processes have left immeasurable and irreversible
social and environmental damages, showing errors and negligence of the projects,
such as the failure and neglect to encourage public participation and evaluate impacts
(de Queiroz and Motta-Veiga 2012).
Therefore, analysing the concept of energy democracy in the Brazilian reality and
all the complexity that permeates its recent and fragile democracy may be able to
reveal inequalities, authoritarianism, negligence, injustices, and other issues within
the energy processes seen as normative or usual (Bermann 2002).
For this reason, the next section of this chapter reflects, through examples, the
socio-environmental damage of hydroelectric plants, questioning the sustainability
of the Brazilian electricity matrix beyond the data.
Is the Brazilian Electrical Supply Mix Sustainable?
Although Brazil occupies a peripheral position in the world economy, it was one
of the first countries to adopt the use of electricity since the end of the nineteenth
century, taking advantage of technological partnerships with the USA and Europe
(Oliveira 2018). At the same time, making the most of abundant natural resources
such as wood and water, Brazil quickly adopted hydroelectric generation (Oliveira
2018). In 1920, 88.4% of the country’s electricity came from small hydroelectric
plants (Saes 2009). This generation served a consumption that was still incipient,
based on public lighting and some large urban centres (de Niemeyer Lamarão 2012).
The first large expansions of hydroelectric plants in Brazil are directly associated
with anti-democratic periods (Oliveira 2018). It was during Getúlio Vargas’ govern-
ment (1930–1945 and 1950–1954), which ruled the country for 18 years (8 years
in the dictatorial period), that regulatory, technical, legal, and research advances for
large water dams were created (Corrêa 2005). This governmental organisation was
used in the decades following the Vargas government, and there was an acceleration
in the construction of dams and hydroelectric plants (Corrêa 2005).
However, during the dictatorship period (1964–1985), a particular focus was given
to the construction of large hydroelectric dams, which reached great levels of expan-
sion (Moretto et al. 2012). During this period, 61 large hydroelectric plants were
constructed that increased the installed capacity of this source by almost 800%
(Oliveira 2018). This increase in demand was fundamental to meeting Brazil’s
growing industrialisation period and provided access to a residential electrification
jump from 45% in 1970 to 75% in 1985 (Oliveira 2018).
This expansion was not greater, possibly due to the growth of the environmental
issue from the mid-1970s (Moretto et al. 2012). This new approach generated the
first environmental laws in the country, and the disclosure of the socio-environmental
damages of Brazilian dams limited international funding for new projects (Oliveira
2018; Moretto et al. 2012).
Cases such as the construction of the Tucuruí and Balbina hydroelectric plants had
little responsibility in the use and occupation of space. These cases were notorious
in the first major environmental crisis in the electricity sector and directly favoured
creating environmental policy instruments (Moretto et al. 2012).
In summary, the Tucuruí plant, in northern Brazil, started construction in 1975,

after technical and economic feasibility studies, and would only have the first survey
of socio-environmental changes in 1977, with the works in progress (de Queiroz and
Motta-Veiga 2012). This construction generated a total flooded area of 3513 km2 ,
which was twice as much as predicted in the feasibility studies and generated enor-
mous impacts and conflicts (La Rovere and Mendes 2000). Consequently, the rural
and indigenous exodus was significant in several cities, and the lifestyle of popula-
tions based on fishing or rural and extractive activities was extinct or largely affected
by floods and the dams construction (La Rovere and Mendes 2000). Vulnerable
urban regions collapsed with the immigration movement, and the indemnification
processes for those directly involved became protracted legal battles (de Queiroz
and Motta-Veiga 2012).
The Balbina plant, built in the same period as Tucuruí and also in the Amazon
region, drew attention due to similar impacts due to the flooding of approximately
2500 km2 (Moretto et al. 2012). The Balbina dam is still the 3rd largest in the country;
however, its installed generation capacity is low in proportion to the reservoir, being
less than 3% of the installed capacity of Tucuruí, for example (Fearnside 2001,
ANEEL s.d.).
Inspired by the social movements that started in the 1970s, which questioned the
consequences of the economic development model for the population, the citizens
impacted by the Tucuruí, and especially Balbina hydroelectric dams, organised claim
agendas aiming to remain in their territory or some cases just compensation for the
flooded lands (Fearnside 2001; Santos 2004).
Thus, the combination of popular pressure, the tightening of environmental laws
and low foreign funding for these infrastructures slowed down the planning of new
hydroelectric plants in the 1980s and 1990s (Gonçalves 2009). These projects resur-
faced in 2000, mainly due to the favourable international economic environment
(Gonçalves 2009). This time, at least at the project level, greater social and envi-
ronmental responsibility was sought in the spatial planning of hydroelectric plants,
especially in regions with high socio-environmental sensitivity (Moretto et al. 2012).
However, as long as the potential water resources close to consumption centres
were exhausted, the country has been expanding its electricity grid limits (Corrêa Da
Silva et al. 2016. Thus, the Amazon territory has been considered the last remaining
region for constructing hydroelectric dams in Brazil (Moretto et al. 2012).
Despite this environmental reorientation, recent constructions call into question
the effectiveness of these plans (do Amaral Mello 2013). The most recent and
emblematic of these new projects is the Belo Monte dam (Fainguelernt 2016), which
was designed with the highest installed capacity among all Brazilian hydroelectric
plants. Belo Monte underwent a complex process, both because of its enormous socio-
environmental damage and the high costs, which increased considerably during the
construction period (de Pontes and do Carvalho 2020).
The plant has had severe socio-environmental impacts, such as the removal of
traditional and riverside communities, the flooding of large regions, and changing the
dynamics of rivers (De Oliveira 2020). In addition to socio-environmental tragedies,
Belo Monte was considered a financial and energy failure, and in situations of water
scarcity during drought periods, it delivered 0.5% of the promised energy (de Pontes
and do Carvalho 2020).
Although Amazon’s traditional populations, such as indigenous people and
caiçaras carry an immense amount of traditional local knowledge, they are often
disregarded in the planning and decision-making process (Doria et al. 2017; Athayde
2014). Thus, in the recent cases of Belo Monte, Santo Antônio and Jirau dams,
as in the old cases of Tucuruí and Balbina, seeking space in governance, various
indigenous communities and social movements formed alliances that strengthened
resistance against these projects (Mccormick 2006; Walker and Simmons 2018).
These populations developed community consultation protocols, initiating a self-
regulation movement through the International Labor Organization’s Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples Convention, which determines the right to prior consultation
for Indigenous people and traditional populations in projects, policies or activities
that may affect their territories and/or livelihoods (Garzón et al. 2016; De Oliveira
2018).
Such cases highlight a peculiarity of the Brazilian context, pointing out the inclu-
sion of indigenous communities as a fundamental aspect to be considered when
speaking of energy democracy for the country.
These manifestations, which were also reflected in other forms, such as the
occupation of the Belo Monte construction site by indigenous populations, mainly
Mundurukus, had as a premise seeking a voice in governance to take a stand against
the construction of dams and hydroelectric dams in the Amazon rivers (De Oliveira
2018).
In addition to the destruction of livelihoods and sacred sites for indigenous
and native people, the history of hydroelectric dams in local Brazilian populations
involves harm to human health through reduced water and sanitation quality, changes
in medical services, psychological impacts, displacement, changes in lifestyles, and
food security (de Queiroz and Motta-Veiga 2012; Gauthier and Moran 2018; Athayde
et al. 2019). The increase in the flow of people and workers to the dam sites also raises
other central issues, such as the increase in violence, sexually transmitted diseases,
and drug trafficking (Doria et al. 2017; Athayde et al. 2019).
In the new Amazon dams of Jirau, Santo Antônio and Belo Monte, not even the
promise of more jobs was met, as a recent study showed that promised jobs disap-
pear in approximately five years (Moran et al. 2018; de Oliveira 2018; Athayde et al.
2019). This is in line with the conclusions of other Brazilian studies on hydroelec-
tric plants, which show that economic growth is temporary and only occurs during
the construction phase (Moran et al. 2018). It is also already identifiable that this
economic growth usually does not generate improvements in other social develop-
ment indicators, such as social inequality, child labour, basic sanitation, and education
(de Faria et al. 2017).
Despite these huge local impacts and failures in hydroelectric generation plans,
Brazil still plans to build several plants following the same processes and methods
utilised before (EPE 2020). There are at least three new large hydroelectric plants
planned for the Amazon region, which would still require large transmission lines,
possibly on indigenous lands in conservation areas (Ferrante and Fearnside 2019).
Some projects planned are in neighbouring countries, whose construction would be

Brazilian, and the energy would be exported directly to the country (EPE 2020;
Ferrante and Fearnside 2019).
And since the focus of these projects is the export of energy to the regions with
the highest consumption, such as the South and Southeast of Brazil, it is crucial in
terms of justice and energy democracy that the populations of the northern states do
not even experience improvements in the supply of electricity (Fainguelernt 2016).
Thus, the next section of this chapter discusses issues of access and cost of electricity
in Brazil.
Access and Electricity Cost in Brazil
In 2015, during the Paris Conference (COP21), countries pledged to take action
against climate change by presenting individual mitigation strategies known as
National Determined Contributions (NDCs), which put pressure on all nations to
review their energy policies and gradually transition to more sustainable practices
(United Nations 2015).
The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were also created and included
in the Agenda 2030. As access and cost are fundamental issues for energy justice
and democracy, in these goals, special attention was given to energy-related issues,
such as SDG 7, whose mission statement is, according to the United Nations (2015),
ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all (van
Veelen and van der Horst 2018; United Nations 2015).
According to Brazilian data from Agenda 2030, the country has 99.8% of the
population with access to electricity, and it pledges to electrify the rest (42 thousand
people) by 2030 (IBGE 2019). However, there are controversies about this data
since the approach is based on formal residences, with other studies with different
data (IBGE 2019; IEMA 2019). In a recent survey covering indigenous populations,
quilombolas and settlers, it was concluded that only in the northern region of the
country (Amazon region), there are one million people without access to electricity
(IEMA 2019).
Although Brazil has made several governmental efforts to bring electricity to
remote populations, it was from the efforts of the Luz para todos (Light for All)
program that significant advances occurred in the country (Luís Ferreira and Barcellos
Silva 2021). The program started in 2003 with directed public policies aimed at
anticipating the universalisation of access in households and rural establishments,
which, under market conditions, would be in last place in the universalisation plans
(Leal and Alva 2021). The original goal of making two million connections was met
in 2009, however, as there were still many families without electricity, the program
was continued (Luís Ferreira and Barcellos Silva 2021). Prior to the introduction of
Luz para Todos in 2003, household electricity coverage was 93% (urban and rural),
with 97% access in urban areas and 70% in rural areas (IBGE 2002).
As already mentioned, the country’s main challenge for electrification is the legal
Amazon region (IEMA 2019). In this manner, to address the last mile of Brazil’s elec-
trification effort, in 2020, the Brazilian government launched the National Program
for Universal Access to Electricity in the Legal Amazon region, known as the “more
light for the Amazon” program (MLA), whose goal is to promote access to electricity
for the Brazilian population located in remote regions of the Legal Amazon states
(Luís Ferreira and Barcellos Silva 2021).
Regarding the cost of electricity in Brazil, the International Energy Agency study
concluded that the country has the 2nd most expensive tariff globally, behind only
Germany (IEA 2021b). The costly presence of fossil fuel-fired thermoelectric plants
and excessive government subsidies reflected as charges in the tariff are some of the
explanations for the high energy price (Carvalho and Amarante 2019).
Moreover, considering that Brazil is a developing country with great socio-
economic inequality, occupying the 87th position among the worlds’ per capita
GDPs, with $7010 annually, the rise in electricity prices has a great impact on family
incomes, especially on the most socioeconomically vulnerable (International Mone-
tary Fund 2021; IDEC 2021). A low-income family in Brazil, for example, spends
an average of 4.4% of its total income on electricity, more than twice spent on other
essential factors, such as home maintenance and education (IDEC 2021).
In the Brazilian case, although most of the energy comes from hydroelectric plants,
water scarcity and the still low share of renewable sources, such as wind and solar
energy, increase dependence on thermoelectric plants, which act as a safe source in
the intermittence of the others (Corrêa Da Silva et al. 2016).
Seeking an example that materialises the points highlighted, the chapter presents
a recent case that emphasises the precariousness of electricity in the northern region
of Brazil.
The Power Blackout in the State of Amapá—A Case Study
The State of Amapá is in the North region of Brazil and has more than 860 thousand
inhabitants distributed in 16 municipalities (IBGE 2020). Out of these, about 513,000
live in the capital, Macapá, which is located at the mouth of the Amazon River (IBGE
2020). Out of the 27 Brazilian federation units, it has the 3rd worst GDP and is within
the region with the lowest share of the national GDP (IBGE 2020).
As it is located near the Equator line and within the Amazon River Basin, it has
a hot and rainy climate throughout the year, which provides a vast river network
in its forested plains (Júnior et al. 2003). This river network is used as important
transportation since its road infrastructure is precarious, with long stretches without
asphalt and several points without water flow, where mud accumulates (Júnior et al.
2003).
The state of Amapá was the last to be integrated into the National Interconnected
System in 2015 (EPE 2019). Until then, the state was totally dissociated from the
national system and was self-sufficient in energy, served by thermoelectric plants

located in the state itself (EPE 2019).
Regarding the National Interconnected System, there is, respectively, a higher
density of transmission networks in the southeast, south, and northeast regions (EPE
2019). The midwest region, and mainly the north region, are rather neglected and
have few connections or are “end of the line”, which are dependent and served only
by one transmission line connected to the National Interconnected System (Carneiro
et al. 2021). In the long run, the National Interconnected System could be a robust
system and guarantee energy security for the whole country. However, it is still a
model under construction and does not serve all regions equally (Carneiro et al.
2021).
There is a strong environmental benefit in electrifying these isolated communities
since it would reduce the burning of diesel, currently used as an energy supply by
some of these peoples (Matiello et al. 2018). However, a significant operational
difficulty lies in building energy distribution networks in densely forested regions
with high construction, operation, and maintenance costs, which small populations
would share in the current model (Matiello et al. 2018).
The National Interconnected System was tested on 3 November 2020, when a
substation responsible for connecting a transmission line of the system to the State
of Amapá suffered a fire due to overheating, reaching two of its three transformers,
the third being stopped for maintenance for months (Cordeiro et al. 2021).
As it is the only connection point between the SIN and the distributors, the supply
of electricity to the entire state of Amapá was interrupted, and 89% of the population,
about 765 thousand people, were left without electricity service (Porto 2021). Only
three of the 16 municipalities were not affected because isolated systems supply them
(Porto 2021). The supply shortage remained unchanged for at least four days when
the state managed, on an emergency basis, to provide the electricity in a precarious
and rotating manner every three or four4 hours, depending on the region (Verino
and Santos 2021). The electricity service was only completely re-established on
November 25, that is, 22 days after the incident, when the affected equipment was
replaced and repaired (Verino and Santos 2021).
Throughout this period, living conditions in the region have become difficult. The
lack of electricity had an impact on various sectors of society and the economy,
affecting Internet and telephone services, ATMs and gas pumps, water supply
systems, lighting, and public safety, causing loss of food, refrigerated supplies, and
shortages of food and inputs in general (Souza and Chagas 2021).
Also, the municipal elections in the capital Macapá, which were scheduled for
November, had to be postponed to the following month (Porto 2021). The population,
uncomfortable with the whole situation, went to the streets to protest, blocking streets
and highways (Souza and Chagas 2021). Consequently, the state had to declare a
state of public calamity to make it possible to receive federal funds and accelerate
the purchase of inputs and generators that could mitigate the problem (Porto 2021).
The situation was especially serious since it occurred in the middle of the COVID-
19 pandemic, just when the population should be in social isolation and fully served
by electricity and water services, food supplies, and other essential services (Gomes
et al. 2021).
Transmission lines and transformers are responsible for the Macapá Lines Power
Transmitting (LMTE), operated by the private company Gemini Energy (Carvalho
and Carvalho 2021). This company recently (2019) acquired a concession from the
Spanish group Isolux, one that had gained in 2008 the right to operate the transmission
lines in the State of Amapá for 30 years, receiving from the federal government an
amount of 13.8 million dollars per year (Porto 2021).
While the population suffered from the consequences of the blackout, the state of
Amapá produced and exported energy from four hydroelectric dams to the richest
Brazilian regions (Miguel 2021). In the capital Macapá, after many days without
electricity, the population staged protests that were harshly oppressed by the police
(Benites 2020). When the energy rotation system returned, the first neighbourhoods
served were the wealthy ones, with the periphery remaining for long periods in the
darkness (Valfre 2020).
This disregard for this population shows that, despite the idea that access to elec-
tricity is a universal right, energy consumption is proportional to the income of
different sectors of the population, and in countries like Brazil, demand is strongly
concentrated in industrial and urban centres (Miguel et al. 2021). Hence, it is notice-
able that, in practice, the efforts to meet industry demand and economic growth are
a higher priority than providing universal service to the electrical needs of the entire
population (Miguel et al. 2021).
As these large centres also concentrate on the media corporations and the
economic and political apparatus, this region’s political agenda is self-centred
(Oliveira et al. 2017). In this way, the unattended population is made invisible, running
out of political or economic weight to reverse this situation (Steinbrenner 2007).
Thus, socio-economic inequalities are not expressed in the energy system perfor-
mance evaluations, and these evaluations end up reflecting the service provided to
the main consumer centres (Miguel et al. 2021).
Conclusion
The current challenge of the energy transition requires the revision of material and
immaterial systems for most just and democratic models. As a result, social science
concepts are intended to provide the energy field with resources to deal with its
complex issues and moral dilemmas.
The chapter sought to show that despite being considered more sustainable than
the world average by the percentage of renewables, the Brazilian electricity sector
presents critical weaknesses when we broaden the discussion with the concepts of
energy democracy and energy justice. The effort was also pertinent to aggregate
these issues beyond the usual production centres, which proved to be applicable to
the Brazilian reality.
Hydroelectric plants are the foundation for electricity generation in Brazil;

however, the chapter sought to demonstrate the association of large projects with
dictatorial periods, rooting models with low responsibility in the use and occupation
of space, which persist in some way to the present day. It has also become evident that
local populations have been denouncing injustices and demanding greater decision-
making participation for many decades, as evident in the Balbina and Tucuruí dams
cases, and currently on Belo Monte.
Although the Amazon region is considered the only remaining territory suitable
for constructing a hydroelectric dam in the country, the populations residing in this
region still lack access to quality energy at affordable prices, as showcased in the case
of Amapá. In addition, electrification is still a present obstacle for many citizens.
Aware that these issues involve technical, economic, and regulatory difficulties,
this chapter did not seek to propose structuring solutions to the problems mentioned
and dedicated itself, within the defined concepts, to highlighting some Brazilian
weaknesses that deserve more attention for improvement.
regulation. Peyerl thanks the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-
9, FAPESP. This work was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de
Nível Superior.
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Chapter 5
Social Acceptance and Perceptions
of Energy Transition Technologies
in Brazil
Anna Luisa Abreu Netto, Pedro Roberto Jacobi, and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract This work aims to analyse the social acceptance and perceptions of wind
energy, solar energy, and carbon capture and storage associated or not with bioen-
ergy in Brazil, technologies that can contribute to the energy transition. To investigate
social acceptance, we present a bibliographic review of the case studies investigating
acceptance of the cited technologies carried out in the country. The result showed
that the Brazilian studies analyse different aspects of acceptance, including environ-
mental, social, and economic impacts of the technologies and communication with
the community. Furthermore, territory-related issues have proven to be very rele-
vant in Brazil, emphasising the lack of land regularisation in the regions. Another
interesting finding was that only carbon, capture and storage studies investigated the
relation between climate change perception and technology acceptance, although this
aspect could be relevant to all transition technologies. Finally, gaps in the literature
and paths for further research on the subject were indicated, including case studies
about carbon capture and storage associated with bioenergy, research on existing
projects of solar photovoltaic, and social acceptance studies involving different stake-
holders such as representatives of non-governmental organisations, investors, public
authorities, and the media.
Keywords Energy transition · Social acceptance · Conflicts · Wind power · Solar

power · Carbon capture and storage · Brazil
A. L. Abreu Netto (B) · P. R. Jacobi · D. Peyerl

e-mail: annaluisanetto@usp.br
P. R. Jacobi
e-mail: prjacobi@gmail.com
D. Peyerl
D. Peyerl

76 A. L. Abreu Netto et al.
Introduction
One of the great challenges of our time, combating climate change, depends on a joint
effort to encourage technological changes and modifications in society’s behaviour
that lead to a lower emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). These changes are essential
to limit the increase in terrestrial temperature and avoid the effects of global warming,
such as rising sea levels, droughts, changes in the rain regime, floods, heat waves,
fire, and biodiversity loss (IPCC 2014). In this context, the energy transition to a
low-carbon energy supply mix is one of the most relevant strategies since, among
the sectors that emit GHG (IPCC 2006),1 the energy sector is the one that more
contributed, corresponding to 73% of GHGs emissions in 2020 (Climate Watch
2020).
In this energy transition scenario and technological changes, the social acceptance
of new technologies is a relevant issue for implementing new projects and decom-
missioning GHG emission sources. Projects with scientific support for their devel-
opment and approval of the population in a broad sense can be rejected, for example,
by the community living close to the venture. Thus, it is important to understand the
support of certain technologies from the perspective of several stakeholders, such
as the general population, local population, media, private sector, public sector, and
NGOs.
Understanding the underlying reasons for the opposition is fundamental for
improving practices and policies related to technology deployment. Some of the
factors discussed in the literature influencing people’s perception include the
following: perceived environmental impacts (e.g. Pinto et al. 2021; Seigo et al. 2014);
social and economic impacts, whether positive (e.g. job creation and improvement
of local infrastructure) or negative (e.g. risk for personal safety and harm to tourism
activities) (e.g. Tcvetkov et al. 2019; Rand and Hoen 2017); trust in risk manage-
ment and the stakeholders involved (e.g. Vallejos-Romero et al. 2020; Lizenich et al.
2020); effect on energy cost and consumer willingness to pay (e.g. Bochers et al.
2007; Sharpton et al. 2020).
Batel (2020) argues that there are three waves of research on the social acceptance
of renewable energy technology. The first wave (normative approaches) explains
public opposition to technologies as a “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) phenomenon,
which attributes to selfishness, ignorance, and irrationality of the opposing move-
ments that do not want the technologies close to their residency. The second wave
(criticism approaches), in short, aims to deconstruct the NIMBY explanation and
focus on understanding the underlying reasons for opposition and changing policy-
makers and developers’ practices. Finally, the third wave (critical approaches) adopts
a critical approach at the ideological, theoretical, and methodological levels and even
questions whether opposition to renewable energy technologies should be reduced
and overcome.
1The IPCC has standardized and classified potentially emitting activities in the following sectors:
energy, industrial processes, agriculture, land-use change and forestry and waste (IPCC, 2006).
5 Social Acceptance and Perceptions of Energy Transition Technologies … 77
In this chapter, some relevant technologies to incorporate the mix of sources that
drives energy transition in the world were selected for analysis. Firstly, the Brazilian
commitments for the energy sector defined in the Nationally Determined Contribu-
tion (NDC) were considered (Brasil 2016). The commitments focused mainly on
expanding renewable energies (having mentioned wind, solar, and biomass) in the
Brazilian energy mix and increasing the share of sustainable biofuels. The chapter
will focus on the wind and solar energy of these technologies.
The analysis will also include carbon capture and storage (CCS) and the asso-
ciation of this source with biomass and biofuels. Although the Brazilian NDC did
not mention CCS, this technology is considered by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2018) as a promising technology capable of removing
large quantities of CO2 from the atmosphere. When CCS is associated with bioenergy
(BECCS), it can generate negative emissions (e.g. Cox and Edwards 2019; Moreira
et al. 2016), increasing CCS potential to combat climate change.
Hydroelectricity is very representative of the Brazilian electric supply mix,
corresponding to 63.8% in 2020 (EPE 2021), and socioenvironmental aspects are
extremely important in the implementation of this source of energy in Brazil (Hess
and Fenrich 2017). However, hydroelectricity was specifically mentioned in the
Brazilian NDC as not belonging to the list of renewable technologies that will be
expanded to achieve 45% of the Brazilian energy supply mix by 2030. For this reason,
social acceptance and perceptions about hydroelectric power are not addressed in this
chapter.
For the development of the theme, the next section contains the description of
the steps followed to form an inventory of case studies of wind energy, solar energy,
and CCS in Brazil. Subsequent sections are divided accordingly to the technologies
analysed, in the following order: wind power, solar power, and CCS. Finally, in
the discussion and final remarks section, some relevant aspects are observed when
the studies are compared, and the gaps in Brazil’s social acceptance and perception
literature is addressed.
Case Studies Selection
An inventory of case studies containing primary data collection of the selected tech-
nologies was elaborated primarily from research on the Scopus website using the
name of the technology, the term “social acceptance”, and Brazil (e.g. solar energy
social acceptance Brazil), in March 2021, with no restriction on the date of publica-
tion of the article. The term “social acceptance” was substituted by “public percep-
tion” in the second round of research. The term public perception was added to the
investigation because it is one of the three most used keywords in CCS social accep-
tance research fronts, according to a bibliometric review carried out by Gaede and
Rowlands (2018) on the social acceptance literature for energy technology and fuels.
Only a few researches were found in these two rounds, as can be seen in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Search results on

Social acceptance Public perception
Scopus website
Solar energy 1 1
Wind energy 4 2
Carbon capture and 0 2
storage
This research resulted in only seven papers and not all of them with qualitative
or quantitative research. The number of the papers found does not correspond to the
sum of the articles in Table 5.1, as there are articles that appeared in multiple results.
For comparative purposes, a search on the Scopus website replacing Brazil with
Germany with the terms “wind energy social acceptance” was carried out, which
resulted in 23 search results (Brazil results were four) and also with the terms “carbon
capture storage public perception”, resulting in 14 results (Brazil results were 2).
The comparison highlights the scarcity of this type of research with Brazilian data,
which would be essential for a better view of social acceptance of these sources in
the country’s energy transition.
To increase the number of articles, non-systematic investigation on Google
Scholar and snowball research were carried out, analysing articles cited in the articles
primarily found. Then, case studies involving quantitative or/and qualitative research
on the topic were selected. Eight studies were found about social acceptance of wind
power, five about solar power, and three on CCS. For wind energy and solar energy,
only published scientific articles were considered. However, thesis, dissertations, and
reports were considered for CCS social acceptance analysis because only one article
was found on the subject.
In Fig. 5.1, the studies on social acceptance of the technologies covered in the
chapter are associated with the Brazilian state in which the case study was carried
out. The five case studies on the left side of the map did not target a specific location
in Brazil. The selected studies will be discussed in the following topics to deepen
the discussion on social acceptance of the selected technologies.
Wind Power Case Studies in Brazil
Wind power generation is rapidly expanding in Brazil, with its share in the electric
supply mix going from 0.4% (2.177 GWh), in 2010 (EPE 2011), to 9.2% (57.051
GWh), in 2020 (EPE 2021). The Brazilian territory has a sum of characteristics
that made this expansion possible (Galvão et al. 2020, 4): “extraordinary winds,
competitive generation costs and technical benefits of lower installation costs”. These
features are especially predominant in the northeast region, where most wind farms
are constructed, representing, in 2021, 88.4% of the installed wind power (ANEEL
2021).
Fig. 5.1 Case studies in Brazil of social acceptance and public perception of energy transition
technologies. Source Own elaboration
Wind power is the technology with the largest number of social acceptance
research in Brazil among the technologies selected for this study. Eight case studies
were identified. Brannstrom et al. (2017) reported the research on the Xavier commu-
nity and the city of Acaraú (state of Ceará), both located next to wind farms,
highlighting the conflict between local communities and wind farms entrepreneurs.
Goyareb et al. (2018) also focused on the wind power next to the Xavier community,
investigating through activities and interviews with the community, the planning and
licencing process and mitigation policies due to negative impacts. Diógenes et al.
(2019) interviewed 41 key stakeholders from the Brazilian wind energy sector about
barriers to onshore wind farm implementation. Frate et al. (2019) and Dantas et al.
(2019) investigated wind power acceptance by the local population living in the
Galinhos community (state of Rio Grande do Norte). Galvão et al. (2020) exam-
ined through direct observation of the Asa Branca and União dos Ventos wind farm
projects the connections between the implementation of wind farms, poverty, and
social sustainability. Traldi (2018) focused the research on the communities of João
Câmara (state of Rio Grande do Norte) and Caetité (state of Bahia), investigating
through a variety of methodological technics, including interviews with stakeholders,
the major socioeconomic, and territorial impacts of wind farms implementation. Sena
et al. (2016) carried out a quantitative analysis from 407 questionnaires answered
by Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Rio Grande do Norte
(Federal Institute of Education, Science, and Technology of Rio Grande do Norte)
students and teaching staff on social acceptance of wind and solar energy.
According to stakeholders from the wind energy sector interviewed by Diógenes
et al. (2019), social barriers to wind farms implementation are associated with local
communities; general consumers do not oppose this energy source. In this sense,
investigating acceptance of general population, Sena Ferreira and Braga (2016) found
an acceptance of 93.9% for wind power among respondents and a majority perception
that wind power either protects or has no impact on the environment (63.4%), while
the minority (35.6%) believes it slightly endangers environment (only 1% believe it
greatly endangers). Most respondents also believe wind power has a positive social
impact, developing the local population. This shows a very positive image from
the respondents (general population) towards wind power. The other discussed case
studies, carried out in populations affected by wind farms, demonstrate that the
relationship between the companies and the local population is more conflictual than
this study with the general population shows, matching the stakeholders’ vision about
social barriers of wind power found by Diógenes et al. (2019).
One of the issues causing conflicts between companies and the local population
is land ownership. Several north-eastern region territories lack land tenure security,
harming the communities who traditionally occupy these areas. Since one of the main
benefits of having wind farms in the territory is receiving rent for their installation on
private land, families without the title deed have difficulty obtaining this benefit. That
problem was observed in Galvão et al. (2020), Goyareb et al. (2018), Brannstrom
et al. (2017), and Traldi (2018) and influenced people’s perception of wind farms.
For instance, in Xavier community, although the families have been living on the
site for at least three generations, they did not receive rent for the use of the land by
wind farms developers, and the lease contract occurred between a private landowner
and the company (Goyareb et al. 2018). According to Traldi (2018), the existing
conflicts in some undocumented lands benefited companies from the wind sector,
which bought those lands at prices far below the market. Also, stakeholders inter-
viewed by Diógenes et al. (2019) also pointed out land regularisation as an important
institutional barrier to wind energy implementation.
The expectation and reality of these ventures’ economic advantages or disad-
vantages have influenced perceptions about the implementation of wind farms.
Regarding job creation in the region, the perception of the local population was
that the offer of employment existed mainly at the time of the construction of the
wind farms; in the maintenance phase, few vacancies are offered to local people,
resulting in a brief economic benefit for the region (Dantas et al. 2019; Galvão et al.
2020; Brannstrom et al. 2017; Frate et al. 2019; Traldi 2018). Some infrastructure
enhancement, especially road construction or improvement, was perceived by the
local population in Galinhos (Frate et al. 2019; Dantas et al. 2019), although part of
the population surveyed by Dantas et al. (2019) points out this new infrastructure
harm to the way of life of the population (e.g. facilitating social problems such as drug
trafficking). The built infrastructure is not always perceived as beneficial to the popu-
lation. In Xavier, the roads were built to provide access to the wind farms instead
of serving the population, preventing them from accessing previously frequented
areas (Brannstrom 2017; Goyareb et al. 2018). Traldi (2018) emphasised the rise
in urban real estate prices in municipalities next to the developments, consequently
raising rents and other living costs, culminating in some residents moving to neigh-
bour municipalities with lower rents. For Frate et al. (2019), people’s perspectives
on some aspects of the venture, such as who the beneficiaries of the venture are and
the degree of procedural justice, will influence their view of the project, and thus,
“different actors will use specific and contradictory aspects of justice concerns to
build their support or opposition to wind farms” (Frate et al. 2019, 193).
In this context, the research developed by Galvão et al. (2020) discusses the
incongruence between the natural wealth exploited in the semi-arid region and the
lack of human transformation, emancipation, and prosperity in the area where wind
farms are being built. Galvão et al. (2020) argue that in Asa Branca and União dos
Ventos wind farms, the installation of wind farms did not contribute to changing
the socioeconomic conditions of most of the population, especially regarding health,
education, and sustainable development of rural communities.
Five case studies investigating the local population mentioned concerns with envi-
ronmental impacts. The main problems include the suppression of native vegetation
(Dantas et al. 2019; Galvão et al. 2020); destruction or levelling of dunes (Brannstrom
et al. 2017; Goyareb et al. 2018; Dantas et al. 2019; Frate et al. 2019); burial of lakes
and river silting (Brannstrom et al. 2017; Goyareb et al. 2018; Dantas et al. 2019;
Frate et al. 2019); and harming of fauna, especially birds (Dantas et al. 2019; Galvão
et al. 2020). The concern with environmental impacts stems from the population’s
will to preserve the natural landscape and economic activities that depend on its
preservation, such as tourism and fishing (Brannstrom et al. 2017; Goyareb et al.
2018; Dantas et al. 2019; Frate et al. 2019).
Negative impacts caused by the project implementation may result in the local
population demanding compensatory measures. The need for compensation was
indicated by stakeholders interviewed by Diógenes, Claro, and Rodrigues (2019)
to improve local population acceptance, and it was a process experienced by the
Xavier community (Brannstrom et al. 2017; Goyareb et al. 2018). The negative
effects suffered by the population of Xavier included the loss of interdunal lakes,
which was a source of fish to the community, in addition to the erasure of the de facto
land ownership. Mitigation policies were negotiated and agreed on the “donation”
of R$540,000 to the construction of brick houses to the 22 families. This mitigation
policy also had indirect negative consequences, such as mistrust among families due
to housing construction, highlighting the importance of carefully considering the
chosen compensation measures (Goyareb et al. 2018).
How communication was carried out with the local population is also a recur-
ring theme in the studies. In this context, Goyareb et al. (2018) identified the proce-
dural injustices committed to implementing the project in Xavier, stemming from the
decide-announce-defend policy, which marginalises people from decision-making.
Galvão et al. (2020) describe the contact between the communities and companies’
representatives as superficial and indifference. Brannstrom et al. (2017) indicate that
the local population are treated as “invisible” in the planning and siting processes,
and Dantas et al. (2019) emphasise that this invisibilisation continues after imple-
mentation. Frate et al. (2019) suggest that procedural injustices in Galinhos appear
to support highly engaged opposition to wind farms. It is important to highlight that
all these studies were carried out in regions with a low human development index
(HDI), which may have influenced communication between the company and the
community.
Solar Power Case Studies in Brazil
In recent years, electric power generation through solar photovoltaic (PV) energy has
also grown in Brazil; however, centralised PV still represented only 1.8% (3.327 MW)
of installed power in 2021 (ABSOLAR 2021). In turn, the distributed generation of
PV (not accounted in the Brazilian energy supply mix) is more representative than
the centralised one, totalling 4.654 MW of installed power in the same year, with
470.156 systems connected to the network (74.9%—residential; 15.5%—commerce
and services; 7.0%—rural) (ABSOLAR 2021).
Five qualitative or quantitative studies were found on the social acceptance of
solar energy. Frate and Brannstrom (2017) interviewed 34 stakeholders, Garlet et al.
(2019) interviewed 12 professionals in the electric sector, and Queiroz et al. (2020)
carried out quantitative research with 146 managers of the energy sector. These three
works aimed to identify barriers (also drivers to a lesser extent) to PV expansion
in a specific region or in Brazil. The objective of Echegaray (2014) study, totalling
76 interviews, was to identify the beliefs and support of consumers and business
managers’ (not from the energy sector) for alternative energy, concentrating on solar.
Finally, Sena et al. (2016), quantitative research with 407 respondents, investigated
social awareness and acceptance of solar and wind power.
The first three articles, which deal with barriers to the expansion of solar energy in
Brazil, although not only focusing on aspects related to the social acceptance of stake-
holders, bring some interesting elements to the discussion. In Frate and Brannstrom
(2017), two findings stand out: (i) the respondents’ disagreement that “the loss of
habitat for arachnids, reptiles, mammals, and birds affects the sustainability of solar
electricity plants”, suggesting that respondents believed that biodiversity impacts
could be minimised or did not exist; and (ii) the importance that must be given
to socioenvironmental sustainability aspects for the expansion of this technology,
involving and informing the communities. In this sense, respondents recognised the
importance of the anti-dam protests movements in Brazil as a lesson to guide PV
developers and avoid a sociopolitical barriers. Garlet et al. (2019) findings also bring
appropriate diffusion of knowledge as an important social aspect to PV implementa-
tion, especially because when it comes to distributed generation, consumer culture is
essential to the adoption of the technology. In contrast, Queiroz et al. (2020) results,
measuring factors such as “social, cultural, and behavioural barrier”, associated with
awareness of PV and lack of attention in policy decisions, among other character-
istics, rejected the hypothesis that this barrier effects negatively solar implantation
and expansion.
Sena et al. (2016) and Echegaray (2014) addressed the issue of awareness. Sena
et al. (2016) findings demonstrated that 96.3% of respondents recognised solar power.
Echegaray (2014), when asking respondents to name two alternative forms of energy,
observed that they commonly thought of solar energy. However, many consumers
and, to a less extent, business elites, could not clearly distinguish thermal solar and
PV power, besides other misconceptions. Thus, according to Echegaray (2014, 128),
“awareness and favourability confront a number of myths and misconceptions, thus
creating a support gap between approval and actual mobilisation in favour of these
options”.
In Sena et al. (2016), respondents demonstrated a very positive attitude toward
PV, with more than 95% supporting the construction of new PV power plants in
Brazil and in Rio Grande do Norte. Most respondents also believed the impact of
the technology was positive or neutral in the environment, could reduce electricity
bills, and tend to develop the local population. A similar perception regarding the
environment was observed in Echegaray (2014), with consumers believing solar and
wind energy to have minimal impact on the environment and managers thinking that
the adoption of renewables could enhance their reputation.
Carbon Capture and Storage Case Studies in Brazil
Unlike wind and solar power, carbon capture and storage (CCS) is not a technology
to produce energy (see Chap. 9). This technology aims to remove large quantities of
CO2 from the atmosphere by capturing it in emitting sources and transporting it to be
stored in suitable locations, more commonly geological formations (IPCC 2005). In
the context of the energy transition, CCS can be combined, for example, with power
plants, providing energy security to the electrical network through a low-carbon
source (Heuberger et al. 2017), and with the production of bioenergy (BECCS),
among other emitting technologies in the energy mix (Moreira et al. 2016).
The CO2 injection in geological reservoirs for Enhanced Oil or Gas Recovery
(EOR/EGR), combined with CO2 storage after injection, is considered a CCS-EOR
project. Brazil is home to one of the largest CCS-EOR projects globally, the Petrobras
Santos Basin Pre-Salt Oil Field CCS facility, which captures CO2 from offshore
natural gas processing with the capacity of injecting 4.6 Mt per year (Global CCS
Institute 2020). There were also some small demonstration projects in Brazilian
fields, such as the Miranga field (Recôncavo Basin—state of Bahia) and the Porto
Batista field (state of Rio Grande do Sul) (Beck et al. 2011).
The association of CCS with the production of bioenergy (BECCS) is one of the
great hopes for achieving the goals of reducing the emission of GHG in the world
(IPCC 2018). BECCS combines the low emissions resulting from the life cycle and
energy production of some biomass feedstocks with the capture and storage of these
emissions. In Brazil, sugar cane is gaining special attention for implementing BECCS
technology because of the relatively pure CO2 steam arising from the fermentation of
part of the primary energy converted into ethanol, which enables negative emissions
when the CO2 is captured at this stage (Moreira et al. 2016).
Some attempts to implement CCS in the world were frustrated due, in part, to the
rejection of the technology by part of the population, as was the case in Barendrecht,
Netherlands (Terwel et al. 2012). Although awareness about CCS has grown in recent
decades, most studies still report a low level of awareness about the technology. Also,
if compared to renewable energy, studies have shown that renewables are better
perceived than the CCS (Tcvetkov et al. 2019).
Social acceptance research of CCS in Brazil, however, is scarce. Only three studies
were identified: Cunha et al. (2007), Lima (2018), and Netto et al. (2020). Cunha et al.
(2007) presented the results from a survey about CCS public perception distributed in
events about the theme to 994 people, targeting the scientific community’s perception.
The study carried out by Lima (2018) aimed to analyse the public perception of CCS
in the cities of Vitória and São Mateus (state of Espírito Santo), collecting 400
responses from a questionnaire in each city. Netto et al. (2020) published the paper
that analysed social factors driving CCS perception in the Recôncavo Basin (state
of Bahia) with a qualitative approach, interviewing 57 people living near potential
sites. It is important to highlight that these studies did not collect people’s opinions
about a project in the planning stage or already implemented. The questions were
hypothetical, asking mainly general questions about their perception of technology.
In these three studies, an important topic addressed was the respondents’ percep-
tion of climate change, which is very relevant due to the technology characteristics.
CCS has no economic value unless the CO2 is used before storage (for example,
EOR), which is why the importance of combating climate change must be very clear
so that the population supports the costs arising from implementing the technology.
In Lima (2018), around 88% of the respondents declared that climate change was
a matter of concern for them. In Cunha et al. (2007), 84.69% of people considered
the CCS’s contribution to the current debate on climate change at the national level
in our country to be important or very important. In the interviews conducted by
Netto et al. (2020), the respondents made no spontaneous connections between CCS
and climate change. However, when asked about the severity of climate change,
most people affirmed that it was a serious problem and that immediate actions were
necessary.
Because this is an emerging technology (Bäckstrand et al. 2011) unfamiliar to the
general public, one of the very common questions in CCS social acceptance surveys
is the level of public knowledge about the technology. Lima (2018) results showed
that the minority declared that they knew the technology and knew how to define it
(5%—São Mateus; 2%—Vitória), yet some of the definitions were mistaken. Due to
the experience of part of those interviewed by Netto et al. (2020) with the oil sector,
some people were aware of the possibility of injecting CO2 for EOR. However, no
one knew about the option of storing the gas for climate mitigation purposes.
Regarding technology support, Cunha et al. (2007) asked if CCS implementation
on a large scale was necessary to achieve profound reductions in CO2 emissions
from today to 2050 in the participant’s country, and globally, to which almost 72%
answered as “absolutely necessary” and 18.25% as “probably necessary”, showing
strong support to the technology. Lima found similar results, with 82% of São Mateus
and 81% Vitória’s respondents agreeing on CCS technology development in Brazil.
Netto et al. (2020) did not measure technology support but extracted some perceptions
about the technology, such as concerns for their personal safety and foreseen lack of
communication between the company storing CO2 and the population.
An important aspect of CCS support is the population’s opinion about the govern-
ment’s investment priority, the object of inquiry by Lima (2018). Among five areas
that should be enumerated by the respondents (health, transportation, public safety,
climate change, and employment generation), the first three occupied the first, second
and third position, respectively, in the two cities. Climate change occupied the fourth
position together with transportation in São Mateus. It occupied the fourth position
in Vitória, showing that climate change is not seen as a priority by the respondents
among these areas, climate change is not seen as a priority for the respondents.
According to the author, “despite public support in both cities for CCS development
in Brazil and government investments in technology, climate change is not a priority”
(Lima 2018, 103).
As CCS implies changes in the territory, the location where the implementation
will occur and the previous experiences of the communities with other similar projects
are fundamental factors for the acceptance of the technology. In the research devel-
oped by Netto et al. (2020), the ten communities researched lived in the surrounding
areas of oil fields, identified in the literature as potential storage sites for CCS. The
study showed that the previous experiences of these communities with this sector
influenced their perception of CCS, for example, regarding their expectations of
lack of communication with the communities about the technology implementation
and risks. After presenting the technology, the perceived risks indicate the need
for adequate contact with the communities, clarifying misconceptions such as the
concern with soil fertility after CO2 injection.
None of the identified research addressed social acceptance of CCS in the pre-salt
fields or BECCS in Brazil, despite the theme’s relevance to the country. CCS offshore
sites have encountered less opposition than onshore storage, which is why proximity
to projects has been considered a factor that influences social acceptance (Haug and
Stigson 2016). Future research on the CCS Project on the Petrobras Santos Basin
Pre-Salt Oil Field may unveil several issues, such as the existence of conflicts or
resistance to CCS in the region, the awareness of the people living nearby about
the project, and whether the issue of proximity is a factor for the acceptance of the
technology in Brazil.
While much of the factors influencing CCS perception relate to where the CO2
will be stored, the source from which the CO2 will be captured can also influence
perceptions. This discussion directly involves the deployment of BECCS. Dütschke
et al. (2016), for example, found that in Germany, CCS project with the CO2 source
from a biomass power or in the industry is rated more positively than if CO2 came
from a coal-fired power plant. Considering Brazil’s potential for the development
of BECCS, social acceptance surveys considering the emitting source of CO2 are
fundamental.
Discussion and Final Remarks
Although the research on the technologies was analysed separately, some observa-
tions can be made when comparing the sets of research found on the social acceptance
of each of the technologies.
Territory-related issues have proven very relevant in Brazil, especially for wind
energy and CCS. Communities traditionally settled in areas with little attraction for
farming activities, using communal lands, and without land title are conditions that
occur in several country regions. However, these regions may currently have great
potential for renewable energy. As the payment of rent or royalties usually depends
on proof of land ownership, land regularisation is a topic that needs to be observed
in the implementation of the technologies and whose discussion predominated in the
studies on wind energy, but which are pertinent to all three technologies highlighted.
In the case of solar photovoltaic (PV) energy, for example, when its production occurs
in large solar farms, land-related conflicts can also arise, as was the case reported by
Yenneti et al. (2016), in which Indian families from vulnerable communities were
dispossessed from their life-sustaining assets. Thus, this cross-cutting theme to all
three technologies needs further exploration, especially for solar energy and CCS.
It is important to note that none of the studies found focused on the NIMBY
concept, which associates the rejection of technology with the proximity of this
technology to people’s homes, without a greater depth on the issues behind this
rejection. The research, especially the case studies on wind energy, had a more critical
content and may be positioned, according to Batel’s (2020) classification described
in the introduction, in the second or third wave of research on social acceptance of
renewable energy. The research on solar energy had a less critical content among
the technologies investigated in this work because the focus of most studies was to
discuss barriers and drivers for the implementation of solar energy, analysing social
acceptance as a barrier to the performance of the technology, without a critical view
on the subject.
Another interesting point observed when comparing the discussions about the
technologies is that only the research on CCS analysed the relationship between
social acceptance of the technology and perception of climate change. Some studies
on solar PV and wind energy mentioned climate change only as contextualisation
on the existence of a global movement to increase renewable energy in the energy
supply mix, without verifying if the perception of climate change could affect the
perception of the technologies.
As for the gaps in the literature, it was observed that research on acceptance and
perception of wind energy are concentrated in only few Brazilian states. Although
these are states with much relevance in the wind energy scene, research on social
acceptance is also needed in other states, with different social, economic, and
environmental context, and which are also home to large wind projects.
Research on CCS has not focused on existing projects, as is the case with the pre-
salt CCS project, but on the possibility of projects being implemented in the regions
surveyed. Therefore, research on public perception of pre-salt CCS represents a gap
in the literature on the subject. In addition, research on social acceptance of BECCS
is of utmost importance to understand the stakeholders’ position on this technology.
Similarly, research on solar PV has not focused on specific cases existing projects.
Thus, research in this area is emphasised, especially on solar farm projects in Brazil.
Finally, it was observed that research on social acceptance needs to broaden

the list of stakeholders surveyed, including, for example, representatives of non-
governmental organisations, investors, public authorities, and the media. A broader
survey would give a better view of how stakeholders influence the implementation
and perception of the technologies.
Social acceptance studies on technologies relevant to energy transition in Brazil
are insufficient. The gaps pointed out are just some of the studies that still need to be
conducted in Brazil. As the studies have shown, socioenvironmental issues should not
be neglected, especially when it comes to technologies that are of great importance to
the Brazilian energy transition and, consequently, contribute to reducing the impact
of Brazilian climate emissions.
Acknowledgements Netto thank especially Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível

Superior (Capes) for the scholarship. Peyerl thanks the current financial support of grant Process
2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9, FAPESP and SHELL Brazil and São Paulo Research Foundation
(FAPESP) through the Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Innovation (RCGI) (FAPESP Proc.
2014/50279-4 and 2020/15230-5), hosted by the University of São Paulo, and the strategic impor-
tance of the support given by ANP through the Research & Development levy regulation. This work
was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil
(CAPES) – Finance Code 001.
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Chapter 6
Digitalization in the Brazilian Electricity
Sector
Stefania Gomes Relva, Maria Rogieri Pelissari, Vinicius Oliveira da Silva,

and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract This book chapter provides an overview of the digitalization process in the
electricity sector, highlighting its relation and contribution to the energy transition
to a low-carbon system and its current scenario in Brazil. First, we systematize the
main technologies related to digitalization. From this, we identify the segments of
the electricity sector in which these technologies can be applied to assist energy
transition. Then, we evaluate how these elements are evolving in the Brazilian elec-
tricity system through the investigation of government initiatives and the historical
(2008–2021) of Research and Development (R&D) projects. We found 263 projects
related to digitalization, which represents only around 10% of the total number of
projects. Digitization contributes to the energy transition by providing technologies
that optimize the generation and efficient energy use, allowing greater penetration
of renewables and better use of energy resources. However, for this, it is necessary
to restructure market and regulatory models. Although the Brazilian government
has been developing some plans and strategies for technologies such as the Internet
of Things, cyber security and overall digitalization issues, few practical structural
changes were identified. Thus, digitalization in the Brazilian electricity sector is still
in its infancy, with a need for initiatives to speed up reforms and to make the most
of the national renewable energy potential.
S. G. Relva (B) · V. O. da Silva

V. O. da Silva
M. R. Pelissari · D. Peyerl
e-mail: pelissari@alumni.usp.br
D. Peyerl
D. Peyerl

92 S. G. Relva et al.
Keywords Energy transition · Digitalization · Electricity system · Renewable

energy sources · Brazil
Introduction
The use of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) is crucial to attaining the decarboniza-
tion of the energy sector (Silvestre et al. 2018). Other measures, such as demand-side
management (DSM) programmes and increased efficiency in energy generation and
use are also needed to reduce the energy sector’s carbon footprint (Fattahi et al. 2020;
Ramamurthy and Jain 2017).
Both for a large penetration of RES and to improve energy efficiency and imple-
ment DMS, technologies such as big data analytics, cloud computing (Chou et al.
2016), smart meters and Internet of Things (IoT) (Ramamurthy and Jain 2017) are
necessary. These technologies, among other benefits, contribute to a greater flexibility
of energy systems (Silvestre et al. 2018), guaranteeing constant balance between
energy demand, which has an increasingly dynamic profile (Pfenninger et al. 2014),
and energy supply, which has an increasingly variable profile. Thus, digitalization is
one of the key strategies currently used to drive an energy transition to a low-carbon
future, mainly in the electricity sector (Rosetto and Reif 2021).
In terms of technology, digitalization is simply the process of converting analogue
data into digital form (Parviainen et al. 2017). However, this process allows a range
of technologies to be developed and implemented in different industries and business
models, changing the dynamics of operation, expansion, and commercialization of
production sectors. Yoo et al. (2010, 4) defined digitalization as: “the transformation
of existing socio-technical structures that were previously mediated by nondigital
artefacts or relationships into ones that are mediated by digitized artefacts and rela-
tionships with newly embedded digital capabilities”. Thus, the digitization of the
energy sector does not only concern the process of making information digital, but
also the process of transforming the dynamics of the sector’s functioning through
the incorporation of new models and strategies, such as business model innova-
tion (Loock 2020). Especially in the electricity sector, it is very likely that digi-
talization will profoundly change the market structure and transactions, the way the
infrastructure is used and the relationship of consumers with this system (EPE 2020).
This book chapter offers an overview of how the digitalization process can change
the dynamics of the electricity sector, contributing to the energy transition to a low-
carbon sector. Moreover, we evaluate how digitalization is being handled in the
Brazilian electricity sector. In section two, we delimit and conceptualize the leading
technologies related to the digitalization process. Section three presents the appli-
cable technologies in each stage of the electricity industry and their relationship
with energy transition. Section four offers the development stage of digitalization
in the Brazilian electricity sector. At last, section five shows the conclusions and
recommendations.
6 Digitalization in the Brazilian Electricity Sector 93
Digitalization and Energy Transition
Digitalization Technologies
Digitalization is the drive of Industry 4.0 (Silvestre et al. 2018). According to Chen
and Despeisse (2020), the key Industry 4.0 technologies are cyber physical systems
(CPS); IoT; cloud computing; big data analytics; virtual reality (VR)/augmented
reality (AR); intelligent robotics; industrial artificial intelligence (IAI); and additive
manufacturing (AM).
Silvestre et al. (2018) analysed the digitalization in power infrastructures. The
authors cite as main technologies: IoT; cloud computing; mobile; blockchain; and
information and communication technologies (ICT). In turn, a systematic review
prepared by Lu et al. (2019), about digitalization in Oil and Gas (O&G) sector
points out that the key technologies are: big data; industrial IoT; digital twin; wire-
less communication technologies; AR and wearable device; blockchain; autonomous
robot; 3D printing; cybersecurity; and system integration.
Besides the natural intersection between O&G and electricity sectors, the two
industries have a lot of similarities, such as natural resources exploration in remote
areas, the necessity of huge transport infrastructure, high-risk activities, the need to
guarantee long-term operation and energy supply security. Based on that, Table 6.1
presents a brief conceptualization of the key technologies defined by Lu et al. (2019)
and Silvestre et al. (2018), exemplifying some applications for the electricity sector.
Digitalization and the Energy Transition to a Low-Carbon

System
The technologies have been characterized individually in the previous section; it is

important to note that this separation does not exist in practice. For example, the appli-
cation of technologies such as IoT is only helpful if the data generated by “things” are
properly stored, processed, and used for something, like the application of algorithms
to optimize the operation of equipment. IRENA (2019) highlights the importance of
the interdependence and integration of these technologies and the need to implement
multiple technical, political, and regulatory requirements to insert blockchain into
the sector. In addition, several other support technologies were not specified, among
them, artificial intelligence and, more specifically, machine learning algorithms; these
technologies are essential so that, together with the elements presented, digitization
effectively generates an impact in the sector. Based on this first technical analysis,
we were able to systematize the parts of the electricity chain that digitalization can
be applied to and assist energy transition to a low-carbon system (see Fig. 6.1).
Energy flow management and forecast regard two main activities. First is the
ability to rapidly respond to energy flow variations and the management of prosumers.
Table 6.1 Main digitalization technologies for the electricity sector

Technology Conceptualization and Applications and implications
comments for the electricity sector
IoT/Industrial IoT The IoT definition given by the Smart meters are an early
Institute of Electrical and example of IoT, with its ability
Electronics Engineers (Minerva to deliver near real-time
et al. 2015, 74) is: “(…) a consumption data and connect
network that connects uniquely and/or disconnect customers,
identifiable ‘Things’ to the both without visiting the
Internet. The ‘Things’ have customer location
sensing/actuation and potential (Ramamurthy and Jain 2017)
programmability capabilities. Wind turbine manufacturers
Through the exploitation of offer a variety of services by
unique identification and measuring wind speed, wind
sensing, information about the direction, pitch angle, and other
‘Thing’ can be collected and parameters at each turbine and
the state of the ‘Thing’ can be transmitting it to an IoT hub for
changed from anywhere, optimizing the production of
anytime, by anything”. This the wind farm as a whole
communication also occurs (Ramamurthy and Jain 2017).
among ‘Things’, and among Overall, IoT has exponentially
‘Things’ and humans (Chui increased the information that
et al. 2010). The industrial IoT electricity companies can
is the application of IoT in access thanks to simple
industrial facilities. It integrates measurement and
sensors, mobile communication communication devices
technology, and intelligent installed in buildings, cars,
analysis technology into all electrical vehicle chargers, etc.
aspects of the industrial (Silvestre et al. 2018)
production process, so as to
collect, monitor and analyse
data (Lu et al. 2019)
(continued)
IoT, data analytics, cloud services, and AI technologies can improve dispatch deci-
sions, optimize operation models, minimize vulnerabilities, and increase operational
efficiency (Ghobakhloo and Fathi 2021). Besides that, technologies made possible
by IoT favours decentralized generation so that energy consumers can manage their
own energy consumption (Rajavuori and Huhta 2020) and own generation through
renewables, reducing energy transmission and distribution losses, thus contributing
to a low-carbon energy transition. The implementation of smart meters, by providing
a bidirectional flow of energy, propitiates better management of the consumption and
enables demand response, and it is one of the key variables for the decentralization
of the electrical system operation and the creation of new business opportunities of
energy in retail (EPE 2020). This also facilitates the use of electric vehicles as a
means of transport and residential energy storage resource, resulting in vehicle-to-
grid technology (V2G). AI applications facilitate the electrification of transportation
Table 6.1 (continued)

Cloud computing and big Big data is the set of big Big data analytics and cloud
data volumes of data that has a computing permeate most
variety of types (structured, digitization technologies. For
unstructured, or example, a smart metering
semi-structured), generated by infrastructure (IoT) installed in
multiple sensors in high a residential building: the
frequency (Chou et al. 2016). generated big data is then an
Cloud provides remote data input for dynamic
computing and storing for big multiobjective optimization
data and, together with big data models and data analytics
analysis, offers the capacity of through cloud computing to
analysing a significant amount generate energy consumption
of data for generating insight in patterns and alternative
real-time (Silvestre et al. 2018). energy-saving solutions; thus, it
Cloud computing is one of the is possible to identify consumer
most substantial innovations in usage patterns, facilitate energy
modern information and usage efficiency, and accurately
communication technology estimate future energy demands
because of its virtualized (Chou et al. 2016)
resources, parallel processing,
security, and data service
integration with scalable data
storage (Chou et al. 2016). It
enables the storing of the
amount of data generated by
IoT applications
(continued)
by automating the driving of individual vehicles and the operation of entire traffic
systems (Rajavuori and Huhta 2020).
The second activity of Energy flow management and forecast is related to
the data collection for energy generation and demand forecast. Cloud computing
and big data analysis linked to machine learning algorithms can provide a better
understanding of renewables profile and energy demand profile, optimizing energy
management, increasing the overall visibility and control over the energy production
and delivery operations (Ghobakhloo and Fathi 2021), which brings more security
to the energy system, making room for large RES penetration (Scharl and Praktiknjo
2019).
Regarding Construction and predictive maintenance, energy infrastructure
involves several supply chains. The use of digital twins and AM can optimize the
construction process, reducing material waste (Ruiz-Morales et al. 2017), there-
fore, reducing carbon footprint. Besides, power infrastructure predictive maintenance
benefits from IoT digital twins and autonomous robot technologies. Remote moni-
toring of infrastructure performance contributes to faster identification of failures.
The use of digital twins (Biagini et al. 2020) and artificial intelligence connected to

Wireless ICTs combine information and “When there is a generator trip,
communication/mobile/ICT communication technologies ICT can provide data about
and consist of hardware, which customers will be
software and services and affected (through a geographic
among all ICT technologies, information system [GIS] and a
mobile/wireless technologies customer information system),
have received the most how much energy should be
attention since the 1990s bought from neighbouring
(Zheng and Wang 2021). utilities versus from peaking
Compared with traditional generators and if there is need
communication technology, for repairs, what is the level of
wireless technology is a more the spare parts inventory”
cost-effective way of (Ramamurthy and Jain 2017,
communication and more p.8)
suitable for long-distance
equipment operation (Lu et al.
2019). Wireless technology can
be used to monitor extensive
transport infrastructure. (Lu
et al. 2019). In addition, with
the development of IoT, the
demand for intelligent sensors
is increasing, and wireless
technology can greatly improve
the transmission efficiency of
sensor data, especially for
monitoring (Lu et al. 2019).
Thus, modern ICT and wireless
communication is a
development requirement for
IoT
(continued)
big data analysis can also predict failures and autonomous robots speed up failures’
prevention and repair (Debenest et al. 2008). A more resilient and secure power
network also benefits large penetration of RES due to its robustness to assimilate
power variations.
In terms of Business, as the flow of energy becomes more dynamic, so does the
energy market structure. In this sense, smart markets can ensure efficient commer-
cialization according to customer preferences: computational intelligence supports
market participants by gathering as well as assessing information (Savvidis et al.
2019). Blockchain can also play an important role, with the potential to facilitate
distributed, peer-to-peer trading with reduced transaction costs, increased security
via cryptography, and prosumer choice (Ahl et al. 2020), which brings lower costs and
higher security for the system, enabling higher penetration of renewables and inter-
mittent sources. Machine learning techniques, used for energy pricing forecasts in the

Digital twin The digital twin is a The application of digital twin
comprehensive digital technology in the electricity
representation that can simulate industry mainly includes
the actual behaviour of an dynamic monitoring and
individual product (Haag and maintenance of power
Anderl 2018). It includes the generation equipment and
properties, conditions, and control counters and real-time
behaviour of the real-life object operational control of the
through models and data and is power grid (Huang et al. 2021).
developed alongside its Specifically, it includes the
physical twin and remains its following aspects, among
virtual counterpart across the others: (i) to build a new
entire product lifecycle (Haag generation of simulation
and Anderl 2018). Digital twin platforms, (ii) to improve
uses analytical techniques to calculation efficiency and
perform algorithm simulation accuracy, (iii) to improve the
and visualization procedures to electricity system’s defence
analyse data and provide capabilities under cascading
insights; it is often used for failures, extreme disaster
fault identification and weather or external damage
diagnosis of equipment (Lu conditions (Huang et al. 2021)
et al. 2019)
(continued)
medium and long terms (Weron 2014), can have a similar effect regarding leading to
a better comprehension of risks, lowering costs and consequently facilitating Power
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for new renewable projects.
On the other hand, the Security aspect is the key that enables both the digital and
energy transitions to occur at a safe pace. It ranges from the cybersecurity of energy
systems (Sun et al. 2018) and privacy in smart systems (Véliz and Grunewald 2018)
to geostrategic competition in energy technology (Bazilian et al. 2019). Considering
that Industry 4.0 is still in its infancy, a robust and efficient comprehension of possible
risks and learnings involved in the use of the mentioned technologies is necessary.
Thus, security comes not only as a prevention tool for avoiding data leakage, for
example, but also to leverage and potentialize their utilization and maximize their
value, leading to a more efficient transition. However, the dynamics of the ‘digital-
ization of security’ in the energy sector remains poorly understood (Rajavuori and
Huhta 2020).
Regarding the Environment, digital and communication technologies, together
with the process of cheapening measurement sensors, expand the possibility of
creating large interconnected networks of environmental data collected with capil-
larity (Kumar et al. 2015). It is important to highlight that power plants are already
important generators of environmental data, whether for economic and operational

AR and wearable device AR is a technique for Applications are mainly for
calculating the position and system maintenance. For VR,
angle of camera images in training for activities involving
real-time and adding risk and complexity are the
corresponding images, videos, most suitable use, such as:
and 3D models, integrating the operations in confined space,
real world and virtual high places, energized assets
information (Lu et al. 2019). (João et al. 2020)
The greatest use is the training AR can be applied in activities
of operators to become experts such as remote assistance in
before the actual operation, which expert instruction is
reducing the probability of given to an on-field operation
operational errors (Lu et al. withdraws and virtual
2019). The difference between representation into the activity
AR and virtual reality (VR) is (João et al. 2020)
while AR combines real and
virtual objects in an
environment, executing it in a
real-time, and provides real and
virtual object alignment, in a
VR application, there is a total
virtual scenario representation,
which can be a full user
immersion or a semi-immersive
case inside a dedicated room
(João et al. 2020)
(continued)
interests (e.g., obtaining wind data at the generation site to improve short-term gener-
ation forecasting models), or for safety reasons (e.g., monitoring sediment loads
upstream of a dam to ensure the structural safety of the dam) (Relva 2021).
Thus, the digitalization process can generate greater interconnection between
these two areas, both in the energy sector and in the environmental monitoring
systems. If there is an effort to cloud the environmental data collected by different
industries, better mapping of environmental conditions can be developed (Relva
2021). The application of artificial intelligence models to these data can allow
(i) a better understanding of the environmental and social dynamics; and (ii) the
development of better forecasting models (Relva 2021).
This leads us to the last aspect of Fig. 6.1, which is the Multisector integration.
Digitalization facilitates sharing of information and services, promoting a greater
integration among different economic sectors. In cities, the use of sensors, computing
and data pervades many urban domains and provisions, namely associated with
mobility and energy (Van Winden and De Carvalho 2017). Large electricity compa-
nies have been active in deploying smart city pilots in many cities to test new ways
to produce and distribute electricity. These pilots are often deployed in concrete

Autonomous robot Robots can operate across the Insertion and removal of
full range of infrastructure aircraft warning spheres on
inspection, maintenance and aerial power lines. Inspection
repair tasks working in the air, of aerials and underground
on the ground, in water and power lines and repair damage
underground (Richardson et al. cables. Monitoring dams and
2017). Thus, based on the reservoirs: finding fissures and
definition of autonomous given cracks in dams, accumulation
by Watson and Scheidt (2005), of debris in the bed, among
autonomous robots can be others (Lages and Oliveira
understood as robots capable of 2012)
changing their behaviour in
response to unanticipated
events during operation. This is
achieved mainly due to the
application of artificial
intelligence algorithms. This
technology is especially useful
for enabling more frequent
inspections on hard-access
locations, catching defects
early and preventing an
escalation of damage
(Richardson et al. 2017)
3D printing/additive AM, popularly called 3D Possible applications for the
manufacturing (AM) printing, is the process of electricity sector are the
making a three-dimensional fabrication of micro-reactors
solid object by adding (gas capture, gas separation,
layer-upon-layer material water purification, etc.), solar
starting from a digital computer concentrators, components for
model designed (Ruiz-Morales solid oxide fuel cells, and
et al. 2017). 3D printing allows microcell concentration PV
for increasing shape array (Ruiz-Morales et al.
complexity while reducing 2017)
waste material, capital cost and
design for manufacturing
(Ruiz-Morales et al. 2017)
(continued)
city neighbourhoods and often take the form of living labs. Companies, government
entities, knowledge institutes, and citizens are engaged in experimenting with new
solutions (Van Winden and De Carvalho 2017). Along with the arrival of the 5G era,
a massive increase in IoT devices is expected to enable greater integration among
sectors (Liu et al. 2021).
Besides that, through the digitalization of energy management, it is possible to
implement the hybridization of energy. Electricity can be easily transformed into

Cybersecurity As society’s reliance on digital In the electricity sector,
and data-driven technologies cybersecurity is a worry mainly
has grown, many conventional regarding data leakage; for
security paradigms have been example, using electric vehicles
refined, aiming at data control, as a battery to balance the
and the resilience of power system involves the
information systems. Therefore collection of user data, such as
security has also been digitized location, driving routes or
(Rajavuori and Huhta 2020) parking routines; this
information can reveal much
about a person’s private life
(Rajavuori and Huhta 2020)
System integration Several digital and Electricity systems are
communication technologies inherently interconnected,
have been used to operate most normally by a combination of
physical systems, from traffic advanced and legacy
to water supply (Rajavuori and technologies installed decades
Huhta 2020). Thus, ago (Rajavuori and Huhta
digitalization leads to the 2020). Although it is beneficial
interconnectivity of different and necessary for power flow
sectors, implying new management, this
cooperative alliances between interconnection makes
different industries (Canzler electrical systems especially
et al. 2017). This vulnerable to the far-reaching
interconnectivity and effects even of small incidents
technologies, added to the (Rajavuori and Huhta 2020)
cheapening of environmental
measurement sensors, also
amplify the possibilities for
creating large interconnected
networks of environmental data
collected with capillarity
(Kumar et al. 2015). System
integration also occurs inside
the same industry, helping the
cooperation between the
various parts of the supply
chain (Lu et al. 2019)
(continued)
every other form of energy, making it an ideal instrument for new PtX-processes (e.g.,
power-to-heat, power-to-chemical). The flexibility gained then promotes the coupling
of previously separate sectors (Scharl and Praktiknjo 2019). Thus, multisector
integration optimizes resource utilization and improves energy efficiency.

Blockchain A blockchain is a ledger of Companies such as Grid
blocks where each block Singularity, Solar Coin and
contains one or more Ethereum use the blockchain to
transactions (Silvestre et al. transact electricity (Extance
2018). It is a distributed 2015). Using the blockchain,
recording technology that uses microgrids can become more
decentralized, shared universal resilient with a commonly used
storage to record data of database for managing
cryptographic transactions transactions, both to electricity
(Silvestre et al. 2018) and financial payments (Green
and Newman 2017). Although
it is necessary to consider
technical issues, e.g., physical
connection and proximity
between generations and loads,
it does not indeed guarantee the
exchange of flows between
entities that are virtually
exchanging goods (Silvestre
et al. 2018)
Digitalization Initiatives for the Electricity Sector in Brazil
Governmental Initiatives
Linking the themes electricity sector and energy transition to a low-carbon system
in Brazil is tricky because the country already has a very clean power supply mix
(see Chap. 7). Indeed, an increase in emissions in the Brazilian electricity sector was
observed in the last years, caused by natural gas use increase (see Chap. 8). Thus,
the big challenge in Brazil is to keep the sector as clean and efficient as possible,
making the electrification of other more emitters sectors viable, and then reducing
overall energy emissions.
Based on that, we investigate what digitalization initiatives have been done in
Brazil to guarantee the continuous entry of renewables and the efficient use of energy.
At first, we can observe that the initiatives are recent in Brazil with few practical
applications.
Considering initiatives beyond the energy sector, we can highlight the Brazilian
Strategy for Digital Transformation, the Brazilian National Internet of Things Plan,
some legislation about cybersecurity and the Brazilian National Cyber Security
Strategy (E-Ciber).
The Brazilian Strategy for Digital Transformation was launched in 2018 by the
Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovations and Communications (MCTIC 2018).
The document resulting from this initiative presents a scenario assessment and a
Fig. 6.1 Electricity chain and digitalization process
long-term strategy for economic digitalization (MCTIC 2018). The energy sector is
pointed out as one of the industries linked to data-based economy and IoT initiatives.
Still, apart from that, no vital mention is made about the electricity sector.
The National Internet of Things Plan was also established in 2019 by the Federal
Government through Decree No. 9854 (Presidency of the Republic 2019), which is
intended to implement and develop the Internet of Things based on free competition
and free circulation of data, subject to the information security and personal data
protection guidelines. This plan can be considered highly applicable for the leverage
of IoT and its implementation in the electricity sector. The Analysis of National
Demand for IoT, published by the government (Ministry of Science n.d.) indicates
energy and water management as two of the main potential sectors for the use of IoT
sensors and smart meters. According to the document, the use of these technologies
in these sectors can reduce costs, decreases losses, increases the reliability of supply
systems and the life cycle of equipment, leading to greater penetration of distributed
generation. Despite its great potential, the authors did not find further documentation
regarding the evolution of the National Plan or related products and results.
Regarding regulation and cybersecurity, Brazil is still in its infancy, with many
incidents reported every year, but with an increasing development, moving from the
38th position in the Global Cybersecurity Index in 2017 (ITU 2017) to the 18th
in 2020 (ITU 2021). Still, Brazil has undergone a significant institutionalization of
its own national cybersecurity landscape. For instance, the General Law on Data
Protection was published in 2018 (Presidency of the Republic 2018), establishing
institutional arrangements for personal data protection. It was followed by Decrees
nº 9573 on the National Policy for Critical Infrastructure Security; Decree 9637,
which instituted the National Policy on Information Security; and Decree 10,222,
which approved the National Cyber Security Strategy.
Decree 10,222 was published in 2020 (Official Diary of the Union 2020), aiming
at a broader development and implementation of cyber security mechanisms in the
country in an integrated framework including different sectors between 2020 and
2023, implementing a culture of cybersecurity. The strategy includes identifying main
areas of interest and critical infrastructures, methods for developing and expanding
cybersecurity in the country (Official Diary of the Union 2020). Among other state-
ments, the Decree highlights: (i) there is a dissonance between the projects carried
out by public and private universities and the need for cyber security solutions on
the part of the productive sector; (ii) there is an urgent need for cooperation between
countries to mitigate threats such as cybercrimes, cyber-attacks on critical infras-
tructure, cyber espionage, mass data interception; and (iii) there are good managerial
initiatives in Brazil on cybersecurity; however, these are fragmented and punctual,
which makes it difficult for the convergence of efforts in the sector.
Despite the enormous importance of the National Cyber Security Strategy, the
authors did not find further developments and results, a part of the publication by
the Brazilian National Council of Energy Policy of a resolution in 2021 (CNPE nº
24/2021) determining guidelines for cybersecurity in the electricity sector. However,
the resolution presents only general guidelines for the electricity sector, such as:
“establish policies that promote the use of technological resources and continuous
improvements that mitigate the risks of cybernetic incidents” (Official Diary of the
Union 2021, 01).
In 2021, it was also launched the study “Use of new digital technologies to measure
energy consumption and energy efficiency levels in Brazil” (Lima et al. 2021) which
was the result of the Brazil-Germany Energy Partnership. The focus of the study is
to analyse the applicability of German initiatives in Brazil. The document highlights
that a single monthly reading still measures electricity consumption in Brazil carried
out manually and in person by employees of the distributors. This lack of demand-
profile data hampers the strategic investment decisions needed by the country to
ensure energy sector development (Lima et al. 2021).
The study concludes that three fundamental challenges are evident, in addition
to the technical and infrastructure networks ones: (i) the need for a bidirectional
measurement system between distributor and consumer and definition of who pays
for this investment, (ii) the need for the active participation of the customer, from
their understanding (education) about energy, consume and the costs, to the possi-
bilities of influence they can cause on the network through investments in self-
generation and reduction and/or displacement of consumption, and (iii) the need
for regulatory and legal modernization of the country’s energy distribution conces-
sion, to demand/encourage and monitor digitization across the entire energy business
chain. Besides that, the study also highlights the need for communications appa-
ratus and data storage, management, analysis, and indicators systems that are very
different from the system and operation existing in concessionaires today to enable
the implementation of modern demand-side management measures.
In 2019, the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) established an Elec-
tric Sector Modernization Working Group. This group aims to carry out a broad
diagnosis of the functioning of the electricity sector to understand what should
be implemented and integrated to enable its modernization and increase efficiency,
sustainability, and safety. From the topics included, the insertion of new technologies
is one of the most relevant and directly relates to the sector’s digitalization. From the
final report on the diagnosis and implementation of new technologies (EPE 2019),
Smart Grids, System Integration and Blockchain were the major focus.
Research and Development Initiatives
In Brazil, the companies operating under the government’s concession, permis-

sion, or authorization in distribution, transmission or power generation must apply
a minimum percentage of their net operating revenues in Research and Develop-
ment (R&D) projects. The companies must report the funded R&D projects to the
Brazilian National Electricity Agency (ANEEL) (Lages and de Oliveira 2012). In
2021, the Agency opened a public consultation (ANEEL 2019) on improving the
rules of Research, Development and Innovation Procedures. The idea is to foster the
development of innovation as a fundamental objective in the electricity sector from
projects developed by the companies, aiming at delivering practical results to society.
Implementing measures and proposals is expected to start in 2023, conditioned by
the consultation approval. This new improvement rules initiative reflects the neces-
sity of amplifying the capacity of R&D projects to promote innovation and practical
application in the electricity industry (ANEEL 2021a).
We investigate data provided in the ANEEL platform (ANEEL 2021b) to verify
how many R&D projects are directly linked to digitalization initiatives. From 2008
to 2021, there were 2623 projects registered in ANEEL system, excluding those
cancelled. We analysed the title of these projects, looking for keywords related
to the digitalization process. The keywords were defined based on technologies
discussed in item 2.1: smart; intelligence; IoT; digitalization; virtual; digital; 3D;
internet; cloud; big data; wireless; reality; autonomous; cybersecurity; blockchain,
and machine learning. We found 263 projects in which the title has at least one of the
keywords. We also analysed these projects’ descriptions to ensure they are related
Fig. 6.2 Total and digitalization R&D projects in ANEEL platform based on ANEEL (2021b)
to digitalization. This represents only around 10% of the total number of projects.
Figure 6.2 shows the historical evolution of projects.
In 2008, no digitalization project was found from the used criteria. In the rest
of the period, the share of digitalization projects varied between 8 and 14% of the
total, presenting certain stability over the historical series. Thus, it is impossible to
stand that there is a tendency to increase or decrease participation in these projects.
Figure 6.3 shows the theme classes of projects, and Fig. 6.4 shows the electricity
sector segment of the digitalization projects.
Most projects are related to the distribution segment. About 40 projects are linked
to smart grid analysis, which is the segment with more projects. From Fig. 6.3, it is
possible to note that digitalization analysis in R&D projects in Brazil is mainly related
to grid operation. The Brazilian National Energy Planning for 2050 (PNE 2050),
Fig. 6.3 Theme classes of digitalization projects based on ANEEL (2021b)

Fig. 6.4 Electricity sector segment of digitalization projects based on ANEEL (2021b)
launched in 2020 (EPE 2020), evaluates electricity sector segments’ digitalization

evolution. The document states that the transmission segment is the only one in an
advanced stage of digitalization. Generation, distribution, and consumption are still at
the initial stage. Brazilian has a vast explored hydropower potential linked to a large,
interconnected transmission system. This system is centrally operated by the National
System Operator (in Portuguese ONS) to preserve the hydrothermal dispatch model
and to take synergistic gains between the different hydrological regimes. Thus, ONS
operation depends on information from the transmission system to link generation
to load, which requires a high level of digitalization for quick and effective decision-
making. Besides that, although the transmission system is large, connecting almost
the entire national territory, it is not as branched as the distribution system, favouring
its digitization to occur faster.
Thus, although the distribution segment concentrates most of the digitization
projects, much still needs to be done. According to PNE 2050, the next step for the
distribution segment is complete automation to optimize the grid stability. Commer-
cialization is the segment that is receiving the least attention. It has the least number
of digitalization R&D projects and is not even being evaluated by the PNE 2050.
Conclusion
The digitization process contributes to the energy transition by providing technolo-

gies that optimize the generation and efficient energy use, allowing greater penetra-
tion of renewables and better use of energy resources through integrating different
sectors. However, as discussed in this chapter, the digitization process does require
not only the use of digital technologies but also the restructuring of the market and
regulatory models so that the use of these technologies is optimized, and the security
of the digitization process is guaranteed.
As presented, Brazil’s digitization of the electricity sector is still in its infancy.
There is a lack of initiatives concerning technological and regulatory development for
its further development. The participation of digitization in R&D projects is low and
has not increased over the years. Despite advances in the transmission segment, Brazil
has also not made significant progress in adapting market and regulatory models for
the digitalization process. Energy commercialization has not received much attention
either in R&D projects or in government initiatives. Even though there have been
recent government initiatives to update regulations (e.g., the Brazilian Strategy for
Digital Transformation, the National Internet of Things Plan, the National Cyber
Security Strategy, and others), these initiatives have not yet resulted in major concrete
structural changes.
Thus, it is important for Brazil to speed up reforms to make the best use of digitiza-
tion technologies, considering its vast potential for renewables and a highly complex
electricity sector that could deeply benefit from a digitization process. Considering
the global relevance of the energy transition process, the country can become an even
greater benchmark for the renewable electricity sector if it knows how to structure it
for digitization.
Acknowledgements Stefania Relva and Vinícius Silva thank especially Conselho Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, for the scholarship. This work was partially financed by
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior. Maria Rogieri Pelissari thanks the
financial support of grant Process 2019/07995-4 from the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP)
and the support from the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior—Brazil
(CAPES) (Code 001). All the authors thank the support of the RCGI—Research Centre for Gas
Innovation, hosted by the University of São Paulo (USP) and sponsored by FAPESP—São Paulo
Research Foundation (2014/50279-4 and 2020/15230-5) and Shell Brazil, and the strategic impor-
tance of the support given by ANP (Brazil’s National Oil, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency) through
the R&D levy regulation. Peyerl thanks the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-
8, 2018/26388-9, FAPESP. Stefania Relva acknowledges the friend and engineer Felipe Oucharski
who provide important reflections about the digitalization process in power engineering.
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Chapter 7
Regulatory Pathways
for the Decentralisation of the Brazilian
Electricity System
Marcella Mondragon and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract Traditional electricity systems were built upon largely predominant

centralised models. The growing energy demand and economic and environmental
factors have led to the decentralisation of the electricity mix. Distributed generation
is one of the main approaches to meeting a decentralised electricity system, and
this book chapter investigates if distributed generation can be a vector of decentral-
isation of the Brazilian electricity supply. To carry out the analysis, the regulatory
framework of the distributed generation market in Brazil based on the electricity
regulator’s (ANEEL) normative and government incentives from 2004 to the present
day is presented. The results revealed that former policies were responsible for the
growth of distributed generation in the electrical mix and also suggested that new
policies will be needed to ensure distributed generation’s growth sustainability in the
long term.
Keywords Energy transition · Decentralisation · Electricity systems · Distributed

generation · Energy regulation · Brazil
Introduction
In light of the global challenges of climate change, increasing greenhouse gas emis-
sions, air pollution, the depletion of natural resources and political instabilities, the
transition of energy systems has become a major challenge facing energy policy-
making in many countries (Tolmasquim et al. 2020). Decentralised power generation
is a key element of the energy transition process, resulting in new technologies and
M. Mondragon (B) · D. Peyerl

e-mail: marcella.m@usp.br
D. Peyerl
D. Peyerl
112 M. Mondragon and D. Peyerl
greater dynamism in the electricity sector (Relva et al. 2021). Also, a renewable-based
decentralised generation can reshape the fossil-based energy structure, reducing envi-
ronmental impacts and enlarging independence and societal dimension by entailing
a civic choice for a low-carbon future (Lilliestam and Hanger 2016). The tradi-
tional centralised generation requires a significant upfront investment and has already
been described as a source of disparity between supply and demand (Purohit 2009).
However, to take advantage of the relatively low initial investment and gradually scale
up the generation capacity of decentralised systems, energy planning must improve
their integration into electricity grids (Dagnachew et al. 2017).
In Brazil, the power system is based on centralised electricity generation, built
initially to take advantage of the country’s substantial hydro potential, and energy
auctions established a regulated procurement model to supply demand, secure
investments, and diversify technologies (Paim et al. 2019). Initially, hydro and
thermal power plants’ investment motivated the current hydrothermal dispatch
model. Renewable sources started taking place in 2002 with the Alternative Sources
Incentive Program (PROINFA) (Eletrobras 2002) and were later enhanced with the
Reserve Energy Auctions creation in 2008 (de Castro 2008). Only after 2012, wind
and solar power plants gain competitiveness in energy auctions (Tolmasquim et al.
2021). However, the growth rate of renewables was not enough to compensate for
the hydropower generation and prevent the current electricity crisis, which is the 3rd
crisis in the last 20 years and the 8th since 1924 (Hunt et al. 2018).
In general, centralised markets are less flexible. Although it was the backbone
of electricity expansion in Brazil, hydroelectricity dependence exposes the grid to a
huge vulnerability to climatic conditions (Paim et al. 2019). In a drought scenario,
the hydrothermal concept, besides increasing energy prices for all consumers due to
generation from expensive thermal power plants (supposed to operate only in partic-
ular demand needs), also risks the security of the power supply (Bastos et al. 2018).
Thus, after almost one century of facing cycling energy crises, a new decentralised
model suggests a paradigm shift in how energy is produced, delivered, and consumed.
When conceived based on renewable technologies, decentralised systems offer a
clean and resilient approach towards reaching sustainability (Adil and Ko 2016).
Also, as renewable sources penetrate the energy markets and become more afford-
able, society will gradually embrace decentralisation benefits such as offset capital-
intensive investments for network upgrades, local energy independence, social capital
motivation, and network security (Adil and Ko 2016).
Decentralisation can emerge in different ways, and this chapter focuses on devel-
oping a decentralised energy system through distributed generation (DG) due to its
growing representativeness worldwide (IRENA 2018). High penetration of DG units
into the distribution networks is a suitable alternative to shield against the impacts of
extreme weather events (Zhang et al. 2018), such as the frequent droughts affecting
hydro reservoirs in Brazil. Also, the opportunity for local investors to participate in
the generation expansion is a viable option to provide universal access to energy,
introduce renewable technologies, diversify power supply, and reduce the necessity
of future infrastructure investments (Abushamah et al. 2021; Batinge et al. 2019).
However, the energy planning shift from largely centralised models to including
7 Regulatory Pathways for the Decentralisation of the Brazilian … 113
multiple decentralised units implies adapting governance models and regulations

to ensure overall electricity system reliability, access, and affordability (Goldthau
2014). The systemic institutional transformation necessary to support the widespread
adoption of decentralised energy schemes is still being developed, and there is no
ideal role model to follow (Moroni et al. 2016).
Within this scenario, the chapter assesses the motivation behind decentralised
energy systems and outlines the recent regulatory changes regarding the DG market
in Brazil based on the electricity regulator’s (ANEEL) normative and government
incentives from 2004 to the present day. Also, it brings an overview of the discus-
sions regarding DG’s future legislation, enhanced after 2019. According to the main
ideas exposed by energy policymakers, this chapter aims to provide information
and contribute to the current debate regarding the future path of the Brazilian elec-
tricity system. The authors address this debate by answering the question: can DG
be a vector of decentralisation of the Brazilian electricity generation mix? For this,
section two will bring an overview of the electricity generation scenario in Brazil,
focused on the energy planning approach in the past decades, the current framework,
and the opportunities for DG development. Section three will explore DG evolution
in the world and the undergoing actions that were taken in Brazil to prepare the
system for energy decentralisation.
The Brazilian Electricity System and the Relevance

of Decentralisation
The organisational structure adopted by the Brazilian electricity sector began in the
early twentieth century with the development of isolated transmission and distribution
systems by private companies (Rego and Parente 2013). Following a political context
of progress through a national orientation, from the 1950s on, the electricity chain
was gradually controlled by the state and evolved into an integrated and connected
network of generation plants, transmission, and distribution lines (Andrade et al.
2020). This period is known as the “golden age” for both capitalism and the electricity
sector. It was a time when industry expanded in the function of economies of scale
(Andrade et al. 2020). Like most Latin American countries, Brazil’s development
strategies depended on foreign savings, especially through long-term foreign lending.
The shock of international interest rates between 1979 and 1982, enhanced by the
oil shock, led to increased external debt and chronic inflation rates in Brazil (Badeeb
et al. 2021) (see Chap. 3). In the late 1980s, investments in power generation were
restrained and put at risk the country’s energy supply (Sandhya and Chatterjee 2021).
In 1996, after the wave of electricity market liberalisation around the world and
a new political environment, the Brazilian electricity market went through its first
reform oriented towards privatisation (Daglish et al., 2021). At the time, power gener-
ation facilities urgently needed expansion to supply the increasing energy demand
(Tolmasquim et al. 2021). The reform set that electricity generation should become
a competitive activity at the risk of the independent producers, with prices set by the
market. To achieve this goal, ANEEL was created to regulate and supervise electricity
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale following the federal government’s
policies and guidelines (Andrade et al. 2020). However, the economic signal provided
by the spot market in a hydro system with big reservoirs and practically zero cost of
operation was too risky for investors who rely on it (Daglish et al. 2021).
In 2001, with an installed capacity much behind energy demand growth, a drought
period contributed to Brazil’s worst energy crisis leading to power rationing and
a new market design in 2004 (Rego and Parente 2013). Aiming for an accurate
investment environment and energy supply security, distribution companies were set
apart in a regulated market to procure energy through energy auctions with long-
term contracts to provide predictable revenue and support new projects financing
(Tolmasquim et al. 2021). On the other hand, generators, energy traders, and big
consumers could transact energy in the wholesale market (Tolmasquim et al. 2021).
The centralised characteristic remained in terms of both generation and transmission
units to preserve the hydrothermal dispatch model (Batlle et al. 2010). This means
that when energy planners forecast energy demand and indicate the need to expand
the system’s capacity, new centralised auctions take place to expand the system’s
capacity.
In theory, Brazil’s electricity centralised production and interconnected transmis-
sion should allow synergistic gains between the different hydrological regimes and
secure energy supply (Hunt et al. 2018). Still, the 2001 rationing was not the last
electricity crisis in the country. The systematic vulnerability of the Brazilian elec-
tricity sector was also noticed in 2015 (Leal et al. 2017) and 2021. Power supply
risk is frequently associated with drought impact on hydropower dams. However,
this is just a consequence of a series of structural gaps (Tolmasquim et al. 2021).
The substitution of hydro plants with big reservoirs (that worked as huge energy
batteries for the entire system) by smaller and variable sources (run-out-river and
wind power plants), in addition to projects delay and dated operational information,
created an optimistic (or unrealistic) operation forecast (Tolmasquim et al. 2021).
Although auctions seek to mitigate supply risks by using a qualification process and
performance bonds, there are still problems related to the structure and operation of
the electricity market that are hazards to the guarantee of supply (Tolmasquim et al.
2020).
The more diverse the energy generation sources, the more secure the electricity
sector becomes (Kosai and Unesaki 2020). The lack of diversity in the sources of
electricity supply poses a risk to generate stability and potential price volatility (Kosai
and Unesaki 2020). Although energy planners have indicated the diversification of
the Brazilian electricity grid in the following years, it is usually related to different
types of energy sources such as renewables and not diversification of how electricity
is produced (Bauknecht et al. 2020). In this manner, the decentralisation of the
electricity sector with the shift from electricity generation in large power plants
to DG sources is a strong candidate for the diversification of electricity sources
(Kozhageldi et al. 2022; Pereira and Marques 2020) and has great potential in Brazil
(Rigo et al. 2019). It can provide security by expanding generation capacity and a
more economical option to decrease the total cost of investments in the electricity
sector and reduce consumers’ carbon footprint (Abushamah et al. 2021).
Decentralised Energy Systems
Electricity systems worldwide evolved in step with centralised fossil-based

approaches to produce energy and constitute the original framework of modern
energy services (Brisbois 2020). Since the Paris Agreement, many countries have
implemented climate policies to accomplish their decarbonisation targets according
to the pledge of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) (Carvalho et al. 2020).
Most NDCs focus on changing the energy mix and modernisation the productive
structure as a strategy to mitigate emissions (Giacomelli Sobrinho et al. 2020). Thus,
as the electricity sector has a significant potential for decarbonisation due to the
decreasing costs of renewable technologies, the landscape of the electricity supply
portfolios in the world are evolving to decentralisation (Xu 2019).
Although recent advances in renewable energy technologies allowed widespread
decentralised electricity production, the idea behind decentralisation is not new. In
the early days of electricity, grids based on direct current, low voltage and distance
restrictions were constructed under a decentralised model (Adil and Ko 2016). Later,
technological evolution and the emergence of alternated current grids allowed for
electricity to be transported over longer distances, and economies of scale led to an
increase in the generated power output. Massive electricity systems were constructed,
consisting of huge transmission lines and large power plants, mainly operating from
fossil fuel sources (Pepermans et al. 2005). Now, changes in the world’s economic
and regulatory environment towards a low-carbon future are opportunities for a
decentralised energy system to meet the world’s energy needs.
Distributed Generation as a Decentralisation Vector
Even though there are different ways to achieve energy decentralisation, DG is the
core component of a decentralised electricity system (ESCAP 2014). Five major
factors impulsed the interest in DG in the past decade: (i) technology development;
(ii) constraints on the construction of new transmission lines, (iii) increased customer
demand for highly reliable electricity; (iv) electricity markets liberalisation and; (v)
concerns about climate change (EIA 2002). Regarding this last factor, the diffusion
of DG, especially from solar, has played a key role in achieving climate and energy
policy goals and nowadays is considered the main driver of net-zero energy transitions
(Doyob and Fisher 2021).
DG is defined as electricity produced close to the load source and is structured
in a decentralised and dispersed manner so that power is generated closer to the
consumer (Tolmasquim et al. 2020). Consumer generates his own energy, becoming
both the producer and consumer of electricity: the prosumer. Regarding connection
to the grid, DG systems are tied to the medium or low-voltage segments of the grid or
installed behind the metre at the consumer’s facilities (Pereira da Silva et al. 2019).
While most common projects take advantage of solar resource, they can be designed
from many technologies, such as engines, small turbines, and fuel cells, to operate
under various renewable sources (EIA 2002).
Apart from providing clean energy, DGs are gaining considerable attention to
upgrade the resilience of the distribution system (Sandhya and Chatterjee 2021). DG
offers many benefits to the grid, such as increasing energy stability, reducing depen-
dence on traditional transmission systems, allowing for additional energy production
at peak times, grid’s quality improvement, and gains for the local economy (Bayod-
Rújula 2009; Henriquez-Auba et al. 2021). In the end, all prosumers are beneficiated
from reducing electric bills (Andrade et al. 2020). Additionally, it is essential to
emphasise that on-site power production could also be used to sustain clean mobility
solutions (i.e. electric vehicles) and support smart energy systems for both living and
mobility needs (Zakariazadeh et al. 2014).
To promote DG, many countries implemented support policies in early 2000.
Designing market policies for the feed-in tariff (FIT) and quota obligation through
green certificates worked as key elements for encouraging DG projects (Amaral et al.
2016). Gross FIT policy was particularly used for solar resources in the European
Union. The major countries implementing this strategy are Germany, Austria, the
Czech Republic, Spain, France, Holland, Italy, Portugal, and Switzerland (García-
Álvarez et al. 2018). Gross FIT is based on a fixed-price contract determined by
the public authorities to remunerate all electricity produced. In a similar context, a
net metering system can be understood as a FIT policy, as it grants a reward (kWh
remuneration or credits for future consumption) for the net electricity injected into
the grid (García-Álvarez et al. 2018).
On the other hand, green certificates with quota systems are based on the obliga-
tion of producers, distributors, or consumers to maintain a renewable quota set by
the government and is a method used in Belgium, Poland, the UK, and Romania
(Sarasa-Maestro et al. 2013). In the USA, they are usually known as Renewable
Portfolio Standard (RPS). In this system, the market establishes the energy price,
and it is mainly implemented by tradable green certificates representing its environ-
mental benefit. This policy is well accepted by societies that do not want to absorb
costs in the electricity tariff since FIT mechanisms can subside a portion of tariffs
for DG producers (Sarasa-Maestro et al. 2013). Along with these market policies,
government tax incentives and support for investment are also used to encourage DG
projects (Amaral et al. 2016). Since the cost of capital is seen as the main barrier to
development, these measures ease access to credit and reduce the tax burden for the
initial capital.
Although the world is looking to increase DG participation in the electricity
grid, DG systems can enhance the electric system’s regulatory framework. Concerns
about the growing costs of support policies and the allocation of these costs among
prosumers and regular customers are issues faced in several countries (García-
Álvarez et al. 2018; de Doyle et al. 2021). This issue is particularly relevant when
considering that DG diffusion depends on both an adequate policy support frame-

work as well as on an electricity distribution grid able to operate with high shares of
variable DG. Thus, regulatory changes can be considered a necessary step in the path
to a distribution sector suitable to the new electricity sector technological paradigm,
characterised by the increasing decentralisation of electricity supply (Pereira da Silva
et al. 2019). The governance choices made by accountable authorities now will define
electricity systems for years to come. While there is widespread acceptance that the
future of energy will be decentralised, there are different views about how such a
system should be structured and governed (Brisbois 2020).
Despite these challenges, the International Energy Administration (IEA) estimates
that 179 GW of distributed solar were added globally in the last three years, led
by China and the USA (almost half of the new installed capacity) (EIA 2002). In
2020, solar DG increased by 15.5 GW, representing a 32.16% share among off-grid
and power plant capacities (IEA 2020). A similar share of 31.12% is seen for the
cumulative installed capacity, and with the development of advanced conceptual
models of operation of distributed energy systems, this participation will be even
larger (IEA 2020).
Distributed Generation Development in Brazil
The first DG concept in Brazil was created in 2004 with Decree 5.163 (Andrade
et al. 2020). At the time, DG was considered as the electricity production from any
authorised agent that directly connected the generation to the electric distribution
system, except hydropower plants above 30 MW and thermal plants (Brasil 2004).
DG projects were only connected to the grid if the distribution company directly
preceded a public call hiring process, and the total amount of electricity that the
distribution company could buy was limited to 10% of its load. Not surprisingly,
this first regulatory framework did not motivate investments in DG. At the time,
energy policy was still directed to large-scale dams for hydropower generation, and
the common idea that Brazil already had a low-carbon electricity mix postponed the
interest in a decentralised model (ANEEL 2010). Only after the international policy
diffusion for DG and public pressure of energy stakeholders in the country, ANEEL
open a formal process to discuss the possibilities for a more robust DG regulation
and access to the distribution grid in 2010 (ANEEL 2010). While climate change
was the driving force for DG policy in developed countries, diversifying the energy
supply mix and avoiding infrastructure costs were more pronounced causes in Brazil
and other Latin American countries (Gucciardi Garcez 2017).
In 2012, a new legal act (Normative Resolution no. 482 from ANEEL) estab-
lished ways for consumers to generate electricity for their own consumption using
hydropower, solar, wind, biomass, or qualified cogeneration. These sources were
chosen to align with existing incentivised sources under Federal Law 9.427/1996
(Gucciardi Garcez 2017). DG was then defined as a small-scale generation produced
by a consumer from 100 kW to 1 MW and delivered to the electricity distribution
company. Consumers could provide energy back to the grid via a net metering system
and use it within 36 months. Still, the 2012 regulation did not reflect a relevant change
for the DG scenario in Brazil (Amaral et al. 2016). In 2015, after a couple of years
of suffering from low rains and unfavourable reservoir levels, interest in alternate
options to generate electricity started to surge within energy planning studies (Paim
et al. 2019), and a revision of the DG act took place (Normative Resolution no. 687
from ANEEL) (Andrade et al. 2020). Now, when exporting net excess electricity to
the grid, consumers can use the produced energy within 60 months. Systems between
75 kW and 5 MW were eligible for net metering, where hydro plants could get up to
3 MW, and solar, wind, biomass, and qualified cogeneration could reach the 5 MW
capacity limit. In 2017, the Normative Resolution no. 786 from ANEEL stated that
all renewable sources and suitable cogeneration projects between 75 kW and 5 MW
are eligible for DG (ANEEL 2012).
As prosumers cannot sell the electricity surpluses from DG systems, it is unnec-
essary to register commercialisation contracts under the wholesale market (Andrade
et al. 2020). Instead, operating licences are issued to the consumer, and regulation
enables the exploitation of four “business models”: (i) local self-consumption; (ii)
remote self-consumption, i.e. the transferring of electricity generation to another
site owned by the same private individual or company; (iii) enterprise with multiple
consumer units, which allows DG in condominiums; and (iv) the shared generation,
through which legal or private individuals can create a cooperative (or a consor-
tium) and install a DG system, sharing the electricity generation (ANEEL 2012).
Thus, cooperative schemes can be used to leverage geographic diversity, enhance
the utility of local renewable energy, and minimise the upfront investment (Rosa
et al. 2021). Different business models have greatly evolved concerning economic
and environmental sustainability for consumers, besides diversification and new
opportunities for distributors and energy efficiency companies to aggregate value
on their services. However, it is essential that policymakers also provide means for
distribution companies to develop their network (Rosa et al. 2021).
The regulatory framework’s evolution helped DG projects grow and become a
protagonist in expanding the offer of electricity in Brazil. In 2020, the distributed
solar source surpassed the expansion of all centralised sources (EPE 2020). Imple-
menting a net metering system and clear rules offered a better environment for
investments in DG. However, advances in ANEEL legislation were not the only
actions to create this prosperous setting. Policies taken by the National Council for
Farming Policies (CONFAZ) had repercussions on taxation support for DG. When
the first DG regulation was created, taxes on electricity bills for prosumers were
calculated considering the total amount of consumption, regardless of the electricity
production (Andrade et al. 2020). From 2015 on, the State and Federal taxes Goods
and Services Circulation Tax (ICMS), Social Integration Program Tax (PSI), and the
Social Security Financial Contribution Tax (COFINS) were only calculated under
the net consumption (difference between the energy consumed from the grid and the
energy fed into the grid). The improvements on taxes for prosumers greatly impacted
DG projects, with a growth of 235% from the policy change in April 2015 to the end
of the same year (Amaral et al. 2016). In addition, specific financial loans for DG
were given by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and the national public
bank of Brazil, Caixa Econômica Federal, charging lower interest rates for citizens
to finance their projects. Also, in 2015, the DG Development Program for Electric
Energy (ProDG) was launched to stimulate DG growth in Brazil (Amaral et al. 2016).
Expanding lines of credit for industries in the productive chain of DG to improve
technologies, innovation, and human resource promotion were the program’s main
actions.
All these measures towards the growth of DG helped its progress in recent years.
More than 127 thousand consumers currently produce their own energy, with a total
capacity of around 1.6 GW, which represents 1% of the Brazilian electricity matrix
(EPE 2020). Still, DG is expected to see higher growth, especially considering that
Brazil has 84 million consumers connected to the grid and a high potential for solar
generation. There is also a large potential for DG in the Southeast region of the
country from biomass, such as residues from livestock, as well as sugarcane bagasse.
In addition, the South region has a great potential for wind generation, biogas from
pig farms and wastewater treatment plants, and biomass from agriculture residues
(Udaeta et al. 2019; Hunt et al. 2018). In opposition, there are still barriers to achieving
DG success, mainly associated with the country’s infrastructure condition, such as
the lack of national production of PV modules and expensive and slow logistics to
spread the PV system to distant cities (Rigo et al. 2019).
The Future of DG in the Brazilian Electricity Grid
For the past couple of years, political agents have been trying to deliberate DG devel-
opment and the necessary measures to allow its sustainable expansion (ANEEL
2016). However, DG holders pay a unitary tariff (R$/kWh) in the electricity bill.
Indeed, tariffs are divided into two portions: energy (commodity—R$/kWh) and
distribution service (infrastructure—R$/kW) (ANEEL 2016). The net metering
system allows the prosumer to compensate for its electricity generation considering
the unitary tariff (energy + service). Consequently, the more consumers install DG
units, the more expensive tariffs will get for the rest of the consumers. In a scenario
with a high share of DG, the traditional regulation model should adapt its compen-
sation schemes. Otherwise, it can lead to cost allocation distortions, demanding
regulatory adjustments that promote a better allocation of costs between users with
and without DG. This distortion has been the main topic of debate between ANEEL,
energy stakeholders and society (ANEEL 2021).
For this reason, in August 2021, the Chamber of Deputies approved Bill No.
5.829/2019, which establishes some changes in the DG framework. If approved by
Congress, net metering compensation will have to pay 50% of the service portion
of the tariff. There will be a 30-year transition period in which DG holders who
had requested access to the grid until March 2020 will still have a 100% discount
(Câmara 2019). Meanwhile, the service costs incurred by the distribution companies
will be funded by the Energy Development Account (CDE), which is an item placed
in all electricity bills for all the consumers in the country (Câmara 2019).
Other ongoing actions could impact the tariff structure for DG owners. The
Ministry of Mines and Energy study on the tariff structure modernisation for low-
voltage consumers, including binomial and hourly tariffs, is in the regulatory schedule
2021–2022 of ANEEL. However, there is still no prediction for changes. The Bill
Project 232/2016 is already approved in the Senate and is currently being processed
in the Chamber of Deputies. The project states that the binomial tariff must be imple-
mented within 60 months after the Bill approval. In applying a binomial tariff model,
some components of the tariffs would be charged regarding the demand (kW) instead
of the whole energy tariff (kWh), affecting DG projects’ attractiveness. This would
do away with cross-subsidies, where consumers without DG units effectively cover
the costs of access to the grid for the prosumers. While some consider it should
not be an obstacle for future projects, knowing that equipment prices are decreasing
fast (the cost of the photovoltaic module reduced by approximately 76% between
2012 and 2020) (Bezerra 2021), (de Doyle et al. 2021) shows that there is a statis-
tically significant reduction in economic viability for solar DG units when the new
regulation proposed is enacted.
Aside from the uncertainties, the Brazilian Energy Research Company (EPE)
developed five different scenarios for DG growth. Even in the worst case, the installed
capacity is expected to increase from 1.6 to 22.8 GW in the next 30 years, from which
97% will come from solar sources (EPE 2021). The latest energy planning study
from EPE (EPE 2020) acknowledges the benefits established by the insertion of DG;
however, they argue that uncertainties about DG adoption will demand new plan-
ning practices for the expansion and operation of the entire electricity grid. Further-
more, EPE undertakes that DG projects are already competitive without incentives or
support policies. In case of reduction of investments in DG, greater centralised gener-
ation will overcome to attend the necessary electricity demand and, as centralised
expansion tends to materialise through renewable sources such as wind and solar
photovoltaic, the generation portfolio would remain its renewable character (EPE
2020). Thus, it is noteworthy that decentralisation for energy policymakers in Brazil
is mainly motivated by an economic return, despite the many benefits exposed in this
chapter and the urgent need to diversify the Brazilian generation mix.
Conclusion
Energy planning in a transitioning world towards low-carbon politics and the growth
of renewables is a real challenge that meets underlying technological infrastructure
and its various dimensions, which can be organised in a centralised or decentralised
system. Although the DG market is still early in Brazil, regulation and governmental
policies were important drives to the growth of DG among the abundance of renew-
able resources and recent technological and cost improvements. Brazil is currently
facing the negative consequences of its centralised model, DG can, in fact, be a
vector of decentralisation of the Brazilian electricity generation mix. Besides, energy

decentralisation is an essential approach to enhancing the creation of jobs, exploring
environmental benefits through different geographical regions, and providing energy
access and grid security.
Still, the Brazilian government must consider some changes in the regulatory and
institutional framework aligning planning practices for DG expansion and opera-
tion of the electricity grid to ensure overall electricity system reliability and access.
Information, communication, and control infrastructures will be needed with the
increasing complexity of system management. In addition, as a sustainable solu-
tion to mitigate the cross-subsidies impacts without reducing economic viability
and investments, Brazilian policymakers stimulate mechanisms such as the energy
certificates applied in other countries.
and the strategic importance of the support given by ANP through the Research & Development
levy regulation. Mondragon thanks the financial support of grant Process 88887.637215/2021-00,
CAPES. Peyerl thanks the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9,
FAPESP.
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Chapter 8
Brazilian Natural Gas as a Low-Carbon
Energy Transition Resource
Lauron Arend, Yuri Freitas Marcondes da Silva, Stefania Gomes Relva,

and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract This chapter discusses the role of natural gas as an energy transition
resource to a low-carbon economy in Brazil. To this end, the country’s natural
gas infrastructure and market are analysed. The national energy plan produced
by the Brazilian Energy Research Enterprise (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, in
Portuguese) is also evaluated, mainly regarding the perspectives for demand and
consumption of natural gas in the country for the next decade. The production of
renewable versus non-renewable energy in Brazil is also discussed, seeking to iden-
tify how the increase in demand and natural gas production impacts this relation-
ship. The country has a perspective of increasing both production and demand for
natural gas for the next decade. However, market and infrastructure barriers have
been restraining the internal use of natural gas and increasing external dependence
because of the greater demand. This increase in natural gas demand has been caused
mainly by the electricity sector. It is justified by the need to obtain more energy and not
replace other, more carbon-intensive resources. In terms of production, the outlook is
Brazil becoming a growing producer of non-renewable energy because of increased
exploration of oil and gas fields. Finally, Brazilian natural gas can be understood as
L. Arend (B) · D. Peyerl

e-mail: lauronarend@yahoo.com.br
D. Peyerl
Y. F. M. da Silva
Department of Geography, Faculty of Philosophy, Languages and Human Sciences (FFLCH),
University of São Paulo, Av. Professor Lineu Prestes, n° 338, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: yurimarconde@gmail.com
S. Gomes Relva
D. Peyerl
126 L. Arend et al.
an element of the transition to a low-carbon economy from four perspectives (i) as a

guarantor of the security of electric supply in a context of increased participation of
variable renewables; (ii) as a substitute of more carbon-intensive resources, mainly
in the industry; (iii) as an energy source exported for international energy transition,
being used in countries whose energy supply mix has a high carbon footprint, and,
(iv) as input for hydrogen production.
Keywords Natural gas · Energy planning · Low-carbon energy transition · Brazil
Introduction
Climate change and the concerns about its effects have generated a commitment to
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, mainly CO2 (EPE 2020a). This restriction
causes impacts on the energy chain, forcing the global market to readjust and develop
clean and low-carbon energy systems to decarbonize a large part of the world energy
system (United Nations 2015). For this to occur, renewable energy sources need to
be increasingly developed. However, it is also important to use energy sources and
technologies capable of dealing with the intermittence of renewable sources (EPE
2020a).
Natural gas (NG) is considered the fossil energy source with the lowest carbon
emissions (Zhang et al. 2018). Therefore, NG has been seen as a possible transi-
tion fuel for a low-carbon economy. Besides the low emissions—compared to other
fossil fuels—this energy resource also has a well-established infrastructure in several
countries, affordable prices in the world market, and low costs for adapting industrial
facilities to substitute more carbon-intensive resources such as fuel oil in Brazil (EPE
2016).
In the past, NG used to be consumed only in the region where it was produced due
to high logistical costs (dos Santos 2019). However, the development of the liquefied
natural gas (LNG) market has provided a more flexible transport mode, enabling
long-distance trade and contributing to global liquidity and integration of NG markets
worldwide (Zhang et al. 2018). There are several international scenarios in which
NG plays a relevant role in boosting energy transitions (FGV 2019). According to
FGV (2019), NG already accounts for 24% of global primary energy.
In Brazil, the NG market has been developed for at least twenty years, with an
infrastructure of gas pipelines installed mainly along the coast and with an annual
increase in the production of this energy source mainly due to the exploration of
the pre-salt fields (Dassunção and Moutinho dos Santos 2015). Thus, this chapter
discusses whether NG can be considered an energy transition resource in the Brazilian
energy supply mix. For this, the Brazilian’ NG infrastructure and market are analysed,
plans and forecasts for the next decade of NG use and production are discussed, and
the need to release the large national gas reserves is evaluated.
This chapter is divided into five sections. In Section “Brief Remarks on Natural
Gas Development in Brazil”, the development of NG in Brazil is briefly discussed. In
Section “Supply and Demand for Natural Gas in Brazil”, Brazilian actual offers and
8 Brazilian Natural Gas as a Low-Carbon Energy Transition Resource 127
demands and the existing NG infrastructure are discussed. Section “The Future of
Natural Gas in Brazil presents the projections of the Brazilian Energy Research Enter-
prise (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, in Portuguese)—the governmental institution
responsible for indicative energy plans in Brazil (EPE)—the use and production of
NG for the next decade are presented. Section “Energy Transition in Brazil and the
Role of Natural Gas”, based on the discussions of previous sections and the possi-
bilities for the role of the NG as a transition element in the country, is identified and
discussed. Finally, in Section “Conclusions”, the conclusions are presented.
Brief Remarks on Natural Gas Development in Brazil
In Brazil, NG has a trajectory as long as oil if we consider the discovery of both

resources (Peyerl 2019; Fraga et al. 2020). However, the concentration of government
efforts in the search for reserves and expansion of the oil market relegated gas to a
secondary role in the country for most of the twentieth century, when the NG was
introduced with punctual and spaced experiences, as examples: in urban activities
and petrochemicals in Recôncavo Baiano—Bahia State and Rio de Janeiro—Rio
de Janeiro State (Barbosa and Peyerl 2020; Fraga et al. 2020). This scenario began
to change in the 1980s, with the first public policies focused on NG. The National
Plan for NG (PLANGAS), instituted in 1987, aimed to increase participation in the
Brazilian energy supply mix, establishing that by the year 2000, NG should represent
10% of the energy supply (Peyerl et al. 2020). Although the goal was not achieved,
the plan allowed unprecedented visibility of the NG issue in the country (Moutinho
dos Santos et al. 2002).
The Brazilian gas industry only started to develop effectively after the inauguration
of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline—GASBOL in 1999, when it was possible to
make gas available in large quantities for the national industry and generate electric
energy, providing the expansion of the market (EPE 2017). The pipeline was initially
designed to integrate the Bolivian gas fields with the Brazilian consumer market,
mainly aiming to meet industrial demand; however, the project’s scope was expanded
based on plans to intensify the use of natural gas in thermoelectric generation in Brazil
(EPE 2017).
Since the GASBOL development, the supply of NG in Brazil went through diver-
sification of sources, including Bolivian imports and domestic post-salt production,
pre-salt production, and the addition of the import player of LNG (Arend et al.
2019b). Regarding the demand, according to the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and
Energy, the use is primarily made up of industry (23.7%) and thermoelectric gener-
ation (34.7%) (EPE 2021a). Currently, the increase in NG consumption is mainly
related to the electricity generation sector. In 2018, NG already represented 8% of the
total installed capacity of the National Integrated System (EPE 2018a). In addition,
from 2011 to 2020, the NG went through a broad regulatory review that remains in
the process of establishment or progress in the National Congress (Costa et al. 2020).
128 L. Arend et al.
Therefore, the following section details the governmental perspectives for using and
producing NG in Brazil for the next decade.
Supply and Demand for Natural Gas in Brazil
The share of NG in the Brazilian energy supply mix is formed by the domestic
production of post-salt and pre-salt, by imports via the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline,
and by import in the LNG format from several countries such as Nigeria, Trinidad
and Tobago, the USA (Arend et al. 2019a, b). The NG imports through interna-
tional pipelines are carried out by the three pipelines operating in Brazil. GASBOL
supplies the national integrated network and is directed to the consumption of
various economic sectors in the south and southeast regions. The Lateral-Cuiabá
Gas Pipeline supplies the Governador Mário Covas Thermoelectric Power Plant
(MT) with 480 MW installed capacity. There is also a gas pipeline from Argentina,
which feeds the Uruguaiana Thermoelectric Power Plant (640 MW) in the State of
Rio Grande do Sul (EPE 2021b).
Regarding the Bolivian NG, after 20 years of its implementation, many companies,
in addition to Petrobras, are interested in the purchase, even if we consider the political
risk of Bolivia, which could lead to problems in supply (dos Santos 2019). However,
since NG has a high representation in Bolivia’s GDP (Gross domestic product), this
risk of shortage is low. The new NG supply contract was signed between Petrobras
and TBG at the end of 2021, effective from January 2022. A 4-year supply was agreed
upon (2022–2026), in a volume of up to 20 million m3 /day of NG, with the possibility
of private companies contracting the remaining 10 million m3 /day of NG from the
pipeline’s import capacity (EPBR 2021). GASBOL is currently in a new contracting
model phase of its capacity, which has been going through several public calls for
specific periods and volumes in which private companies have had the opportunity
to participate.
Regarding LNG imports by regasification terminals, there are five terminals in
Brazil. These terminals are located in Pecém (Ceará State), in Todos os Santos Bay
(Bahia State), in Guanabara Bay (Rio de Janeiro State), and in the State of Sergipe
(EPE 2021b). In the last one, the CELSE-SE terminal is directly connected to a ther-
moelectric power plant (TPP) Porto Sergipe I (1515 MW), which started operating
in 2020, being the first private LNG terminal in Brazil (GIIGNL 2021). The most
recent terminal to start operating is in Porto do Açu (Rio de Janeiro state), which
began to produce energy at the end of 2021. Other terminals are planned in Pará and
Santa Catarina states (EPE 2021b).
Concerning domestic production, data from ANP (2020) point out that in 2018,
Petrobras remained the concessionaire that produced the most NG: 73.5% of partic-
ipants in the total. In the same year, Brazil was in the 31st position in the world
ranking of NG producers: 32.4 billion of m3 of associated gas were produced, with
the state of Rio de Janeiro being the largest producer, representing 61.4% of national
production, regarding non-associated NG production, the volume was 8.5 billion of

m3 in 2018 (ANP 2020).
Regarding physical structures related to NG, until December 2018, the national
transport pipeline network had a total length of just over 9400 km (EPE 2020b).
In addition, Brazil has 29 NG Processing Units (NGPUs) (EPE 2020b). Figure 8.1
presents the current map configuration and those expected to operate in the short
term for the Brazilian NG supply chain infrastructure.
Furthermore, there are under construction, the NG Processing Pole of the Petro-
chemical Complex of Rio de Janeiro—COMPERJ; and the 83.2 km long gas pipeline
stretch Horizonte—Caucaia (Ceará state), which is part of the original project of the
Serra do Mel—Pecém—GASFOR II, located in the Northeast Region (EPE 2020b).
Fig. 8.1 Regasification terminals in operation and project in Brazil, with some of the anchor projects
highlighted, Thermoelectric Power Plants and gas pipelines (commissioned or not). Source Prepared
by Luís Guilherme L. Zacharias based on EPE (2018b, c, 2019b, c)
130 L. Arend et al.
Fig. 8.2 Potential offer of natural gas in the national integrated network. Source Prepared by the
authors based on EPE (2021b)
By mapping all the modes that make up the national NG supply chain, it is possible
to analyse the government’s projection of NG supply in Brazil for the next decade
(see Fig. 8.2). It is estimated that NG production will reach 175 million m3 /day, with
the need to import 70 million m3 /day, to meet the projected national consumption.
In this way, NG will represent 15% of the national energy supply mix (EPE 2021b).
According to EPE’s projections, the total supply of NG in the nationally inte-
grated grid for 2021–2030 will have relatively slow growth. Potential supply remains
practically stable over the first half of the study horizon, increasing between 2026
and 2030 due to higher volumes of associated and non-associated NG from offshore
production. Throughout the study horizon, there is an increase in the national produc-
tion of associated gas, mainly from the pre-salt, whose contribution reaches a level
above 65% of the national supply in 2024 and drops to around 45% in 2030 with
the increase in production from the SEAL Basin. In addition, to a reduction in NG
imports via pipelines, essentially from GASBOL (EPE 2021b). 2021–2030 projects
a gradual increase in the total supply of NG in the integrated grid, from around
150 million m3 /day in 2021 to approximately 180 million m3 /day in 2030, a 20%
magnification (EPE 2021b).
Regarding demand, EPE (2021b) separates into four categories:
i. thermoelectric demand, comprising the supply of TPP;
ii. non-thermoelectric demand comprising the industrial, residential, commercial,
and transport (compressed NG) sectors;
iii. refineries and nitrogen fertilizer factories (FAFENs); and
iv. system-use gas (consumed in compression stations and heaters in transport
pipelines).
160
140
Millions of m3/day
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Industrial, Residential, Commercial and Transport Demand
Natural Gas demand for use of systems
Demand for Refineries and FAFENs
Maximum Thermoelectric Demand
Total Demand
Fig. 8.3 National natural gas demand forecast for the next decade (2021–2030). Prepared by the
authors based on EPE (2021b)
Figure 8.3 presents the estimated demand by category until 2030.

The non-thermoelectric demand will have, according to the EPE projection, a
timid growth, going from about 50 to 70 million m3 /day; however, this will represent
a 10% drop in the share of total demand for NG as a result of increased thermoelectric
demand.
Thermoelectric demand has been an essential complement to hydroelectric gener-
ation since early 2000 (EPE 2021c). Recently, there have been changes in the NG
offer options for TPPs. The supply options for the electricity sector were restricted
to Petrobras for several years and now are being diversified, which led to the devel-
opment of different business models, such as the implementation of TPPs associated
with private LNG terminals, generation with Reservoir-to-wire onshore NG and more
recently, using pre-salt NG from independent producers (EPE 2020b). In EPE projec-
tions, the TPPs maximum demand shows a reduction of about 18% between 2023
and 2025 due to the termination of the existing UTEs contract, showing a resump-
tion from 2025 to 2030 associated with re-contracting or contracting new and more
efficient TPPs. It should be noted that this scenario may change if new demands
or complete isolated systems are connected to the integrated network through gas
pipelines or if there is a final investment decision for new large-scale projects (EPE
2019a).
The Future of Natural Gas in Brazil
According to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), in conjunction with the

Brazilian Association of Large Energy Consumers—ABRACE (CNI and ABRACE
2018), Brazilian consumption of NG grew by an average of 12.4% in the period from
132 L. Arend et al.
2011 to 2015. However, in this same period, the supply of NG from national reserves
was insufficient to meet demand, leading to average growth of imports in this period
of 15.8%. This scenario generated, in 2018, a dependence of about 50% on the total
supply of gas in the country, leading to questions from energy sector planners and
state and private operators about the risks that this import dependence would entail
for security, diversity and affordability of NG-dependent sectors in the country (CNI
and ABRACE 2018).
EPE (2021c) considers that the “New Gas Market” program, a new NG regulatory
framework, creates favourable market conditions, increasing NG supply and demand,
as shown in Fig. 8.4. In the Brazilian scenario, there are 37 NG TPPs, of which three
are powered by LNG, being TPP Santa Cruz (Rio de Janeiro state) with 500 MW,
TPP Luiz Oscar Rodrigues de Melo (Espirito Santo state) with 205 MW and more
recently TPP Porto do Sergipe I (Sergipe state) with 1550 MW. Porto do Sergipe I
is the first project implemented in Brazil where a large consumer, such as a UTE,
purchases NG directly from a supplier other than Petrobras and consumes it directly
at its unit without the need for interaction with another agent, neither for transport
or distribution (EPE 2021c).
The Ten Year Energy Expansion Plan 2031 (EPE 2021c) indicates a total of 60 GW
of expansion in electricity generation, with 28 GW of fossil fuels divided into 7 GW,
possibly coal and 21 GW, possibly LNG, with projects on the Brazilian coast, which
would represent a daily consumption of NG of approximately 210 MM m3 /day, far
beyond the current Brazilian capacity (EPE 2021c).
Thus, the expansion of gas use in Brazil is anchored by TPPs; however, this electric
sector demand can create the opportunity for a secondary market around the TPPs.
The NG network’s ampliation can promote the local distributor’s connection. Even in
Fig. 8.4 Projection of natural gas supply and demand in the National Integrated Network. Source
Prepared by the authors based on EPE (2021b)
the case of projects far from the existing pipeline networks, these can generate a new
network exclusive to their surroundings and, thus, develop the region with previously
unfeasible industrial and commercial opportunities. Figure 8.4 presents the balance
between NG supply and demand for the next decade, according to EPE’s projections.
The NG demand projection was calculated by adding the non-thermoelectric demand
projections to the thermoelectric demand projections.
Figure 8.4, compared to Fig. 8.2, shows that LNG will play an essential role
in meeting the increase in thermoelectric demand in Brazil. The diversity of the
Brazilian electrical supply mix has been encouraged by several authors for some
years, as mentioned by Moutinho dos Santos (2002), which points to the need to
make the supply of NG more flexible according to the particularities of Brazilian
gas consumption. And with that, adding new advantages to internal transport in the
country, using the operational flexibility of the LNG chain to meet mainly the NG
demand in the Northeast region of Brazil.
The non-conventional means of gas transport are a solution for NG supply flexi-
bilization in Brazil, such as the NG transportation by truck, cabotage ship or train,
these means of locomotion use Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) or LNG technology.
Although these modes of transport do not have the movement capacity of a conven-
tional gas pipeline, the interest in their development can be explained by several
factors, such as the lack of investment and the difficulties in constructing new gas.
These difficulties can be of a logistical scale (areas far away from the existing gas
pipeline network), commercial (regions with low consumption of NG) or geographic
(isolated locations). To get around these issues, investors in the gas market are looking
for alternative means of transport, guaranteeing the service of areas not served and
not targeted by gas pipelines (Fraga et al. 2020). However, according to Fraga et al.
(2020) and Liaw et al. (2020), these projects can still be considered modest given the
potential that these forms of NG movement present, some of these projects run into
difficulties, such as the lack of infrastructure, ranging from a railroad to a waterway,
in addition to roads that do not allow the transport of large loads via truck.
Despite the Brazilian logistical bottlenecks, we can highlight some national
projects for NG supply by trucks and cabotage ships, as in the case of the isolated
system operated by the company Eneva in the states of Maranhão and Amazonas
(Gomes 2019). The company plans to launch a project using trucks with cryogenic
tanks transporting LNG from the Azulão field in the state of Amazonas to the city
of Boa Vista in the state of Roraima to supply the 126 MW UTE Jaguatirica II (EPE
2010; Fraga et al. 2020). Since this project is not connected to the national electricity
grid, nor the large gas grid, it is considered an isolated system project, which is neces-
sary mainly in the northern region of Brazil. In this region of the country, we can
also highlight the Itacoatiara LNG regasification terminal project (Amazonas state),
which seeks to enable a gas movement system via cabotage vessels in the Amazon
region, aiming at supplying several cities and isolated villages, replacing the use of
diesel in electricity generation and the use of firewood in domestic cooking (EPE
2019c). Another project already under development since 2006 is Gemini, a joint
venture between state-owned Petrobras and the company White Martins, located in
the state of São Paulo, which transforms NG into LNG and distributes it to consumers
134 L. Arend et al.
in the region by trucks (Costa et al. 2020). This pioneering project in Brazil inno-
vated legal action by confronting many of the legislative principles related to NG
distribution concessions (Costa et al. 2020).
Energy Transition in Brazil and the Role of Natural Gas
This chapter showed that Brazil has come a long way to expand and consolidate its gas
market. The country has a perspective of increased production and demand for NG.
However, market and infrastructure barriers have been restraining the internal use of
NG, increasing external dependence because of the greater demand. This increase
in demand has been mainly linked to the electricity sector due to the reduction in
the proportional capacity of hydroelectric energy to supply the demand. According
to energy balance data (EPE 2021a), in 2020, 65.2% of the national electricity came
from water sources, and 10.5% came from solar and wind sources. In 2009, hydro-
electric energy represented 76.9% of the energy supplied, wind energy only 0.2%,
and solar energy 0% (EPE 2021a).
Figure 8.5 shows Brazil’s history of electricity production from renewable sources,
NG, and other non-renewable sources.
The share of non-renewable sources in the Brazilian electricity supply mix was
around 6% in the 1990s, reaching 27% in 2014. From 2012 onwards, NG has been
responsible for about 50% of non-renewable electricity generation in Brazil (EPE
2021a). It is important to note that specific policies to reduce the use of carbon-
intensive sources in the Brazilian energy mix have not been effective. In 2022, for
example, Law nº 14,299 was enacted (Presidência da República 2022), which extends
the contracting of the Jorge Lacerda coal-fired thermoelectric complex (857 MW)
in the state of Santa Catarina until 2040 (Marcondes et al. 2022). Therefore, even
700
Thousands of GWh
600
Electricity generation
500
400
300
200
100
0
Non-renewable (other sources) Non-renewable (NG) Renewable
Fig. 8.5 Electricity generation in Brazil based on BEN. Source Prepared by the authors based on
EPE (2021a)
Fig. 8.6 History of primary energy production in Brazil. Source Prepared by the authors based on
BEN (EPE 2021a)
though there is a reduction in the use of fuel oil since 2014,1 the increase in the use
of NG is mainly justified by the need to obtain more energy and not replace the use
of other more carbon-intensive resources.
Thus, this conjuncture of factors—greater demand for energy, reduction of the
relative capacity of hydroelectric generation to supply the demand and the increase
in the use of variable renewable sources—justifies the need to increase the use of NG
in the electricity supply mix as a resource to guarantee the supply security and not
as a substitute resource for more carbon-intensive sources. It is essential to highlight
that, in the Brazilian case, the increase in the use of NG increases the total emissions
of the electrical system since the country already has a clear electricity supply mix.
From the point of view of Brazil as an energy producer, what has been observed is
the increase in the generation of non-renewable primary energy, mainly through the
exploration of oil and gas fields discovered in recent decades. Figure 8.6 shows the
history of primary energy production in Brazil. From 2000 onwards, non-renewable
sources make up more than 50% of production.
Figure 8.7 clarifies that other non-renewable sources, such as coal and uranium,
have a very low share of energy production in Brazil. As shown in the previous section,
with the predictions of increasing production in the pre-salt layer, the perspective
is that Brazil will become a growing producer of non-renewable energy. It is also
important to note that new gas reserves were recently found in the northeast region
and that Brazil continues to hold several biddings for exploratory blocks (EPE 2020c).
Thus, in the coming years, Brazil will need to develop further its infrastructure linked
to the gas sector to meet the demands of the electricity sector and isolated systems
and provide a flow for a large number of resources that will be explored.
In this sense, besides supplying domestic demand, two other paths can be designed
for the destination of Brazilian gas production:
i. supplying the foreign market via LNG (Arend et al. 2022), contributing to the
energy transition at an international level; and,
1 According to data from the National Energy Balance.

136 L. Arend et al.
Fig. 8.7 Participation of oil and gas in the production of primary energy from non-renewable
sources in Brazil. Source Prepared by the authors based on EPE (2021a)
ii. the use of NG as an input to produce hydrogen.

NG can be an input for the production of (i) grey hydrogen, which is produced
without the use of carbon capture, utilisation and sequestration (CCUS) technologies;
(ii) blue hydrogen, which is produced using CCUS; and (iii) turquoise hydrogen,
which is produced by thermal cracking of methane, without generating CO2 (Ferreira
et al. 2021).
The grey hydrogen technological route is currently the most competitive and domi-
nant. Although the production of this class of hydrogen is not clean and may, in the
future, be surpassed by the production of green hydrogen (produced via water elec-
trolysis based on renewables), it is today the most competitive and can be seen as the
technological basis for the development of a low or zero-carbon economy (Ferreira
et al. 2021). In this sense, NG can be understood as the facilitator of the transition
to a phase dominated by green hydrogen (Ferreira et al. 2021) (see Chap. 10).
Conclusions
The projections defined by EPE point out the Brazilian NG market growth, mainly
in the electricity sector. In this sense, an energy supply mix with a greater share
of gas is expected, which will come from a portfolio of diversified sources. If the
country lacked a diversity of NG sources in the first decade of the twenty-first century,
today, there are at least four primary sources, national and imported. The national
NG still has several obstacles to commercialization and transport, which increases
the Brazilian dependence on imports of the resource. Thus, Brazil needs to develop
the NG sector infrastructure further so that it is possible to meet internal demands
and give vent to the increase in production.
Regarding energy demand, NG in Brazil can be seen as a transition fuel to a low-
carbon system from the point of view of promoting the security of electric supply
in the context of increasing participation of variable renewables. However, from

what has been observed so far, NG has not played a leading role in replacing more
polluting resources, at least not in the electricity sector. As the burning of NG does
not present residues of incomplete combustion or metallic and sulphur oxides, it is
less aggressive to the environment and becomes a less polluting option than other
fossil resources to overcome the water crisis in the national electricity supply mix
and to ensure the security of supply. Besides, the expansion of the infrastructure of
the NG sector, induced by this demand from the electricity sector, can create the
opportunity for a secondary market serving the industrial sector, which can lead to
the replacement of more polluting resources by NG in industries.
Regarding energy production, Brazil has increasingly positioned itself as a
producer of non-renewable energy and may increase its participation in the interna-
tional market in the coming years. In this sense, Brazilian NG can play an important
role in the global energy transition process, placing Brazil as an exporter of NG so
that it can be used as a replacement fuel in countries whose energy supply mix has
a high carbon footprint or as a major producer of hydrogen.
Nível Superior.
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Chapter 9
Possibilities for Carbon Capture,
Utilization, and Storage in Brazil
Maria Rogieri Pelissari, Stefania Gomes Relva, and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) alternatives have great rele-
vance for the decarbonization path of the energy transition and for the interna-
tional goal of net-zero emissions. The concept is related to the capture of CO2 from
stationary sources, treatment, transportation, utilization, and/or permanent storage.
These low-carbon technologies can help Brazil reduce carbon emissions, mainly
in the energy and industry sectors. Thus, the present chapter provides an overview
of CCUS and BECCUS technologies and discusses the current scenario and future
perspectives for their development in Brazil. For this, we analysed recent publica-
tions about CCUS and Bioenergy-CCUS (BECCUS) regarding the stages of capture,
transport, usage and storage in Brazil, and we also systematized the technology speci-
ficities amongst CCUS and BECCUS. Some of the main results are the huge potential
for associating BECCUS, considering Brazil’s large production of biofuels, mainly
bioethanol from sugarcane, and the advantages of capturing CO2 from fermentation
processes. The enhanced oil recovery, production of soft drinks, urea and methanol
industries, and low-carbon hydrogen production are listed as some of the main possi-
bilities for using the captured CO2 . Also, the Paraná and Santos Sedimentary Basins
were considered the most prospective for carbon storage, as they are located near
large-scale CO2 emission sources and have geologic favourability. Some of the main
challenges observed for projects developments in Brazil are (i) the absence of a regu-
latory framework; (ii) the lack of public policies and financial incentives to leverage
M. Rogieri Pelissari (B) · D. Peyerl

e-mail: maria.pelissari@alumni.usp.br
D. Peyerl
S. Gomes Relva
D. Peyerl
142 M. Rogieri Pelissari et al.
the commercial feasibility of CCUS projects; (iii) the assessment absence of water
availability without compromising its multiple uses; (iv) the absence of an integrated
pipeline grid to transport CO2; and (v) the need of a more mature characterization
of sedimentary basins for CO2 storage and long-term behaviour to guarantee safe
sequestration.
Keywords Energy transition, carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) ·

Decarbonization · BioEnergy-CCUS (BECCUS) · Brazil
Introduction
The increasing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), mainly from anthropogenic

sources, and their potential environmental impacts have been the focus of broad
discussions globally (IEA 2020, 2021; IPCC 2005). According to 2050 net-zero
scenarios from the IEA (2021), half of the fossil fuel use in 2050 will be in plants
equipped with CCUS, which will play an increasingly important role in reducing CO2
emissions, especially in heavy industries such as steel, cement and chemicals. CCUS
technologies are also one of the two main ways to produce low-carbon hydrogen,
and 40% of the increment of hydrogen generation should be related to fossil-based
production equipped with CCS (IEA 2020).
Technologies of CCUS can be summarized as final disposal or utilization process
for CO2 produced mainly from stationary sources, such as combustion of fossil fuels
for power and heat generation on thermoelectric complexes and heavy industries.
The CO2 produced must be captured, separated from other gases, compressed, and
transported to where it will be used or injected for permanent storage. When used
in industrial processes, CO2 is converted from a liability to an asset for the emitters
and users, aggregating value and becoming a resource (IPCC 2005). CCUS can also
contribute to achieving the net-zero emissions global target if coupled with bioenergy
plants (BECCUS) or direct air capture (DAC), removing CO2 from the atmosphere
and delivering negative emissions (IEA 2020). CCUS facilities can be implemented
in both new and existing plants.
However, CCUS is still an emerging technology, with currently 21 commercial
facilities in operation worldwide. Five BECCUS facilities represent a total capacity to
capture up to 40 Mt CO2 yearly (IEA 2020). Thus, there are still several challenges to
the broad implementation and development of CCUS and BECCUS, amongst them:
the high costs and energy demand for the capture process, a lack of a global and
well-established carbon market and regulatory framework to financing the projects
and assuring integrity (IEA 2020, 2021; Leung et al. 2014; Plasynski et al. 2009;
Smith and Porter 2018).
Despite these difficulties, some studies defend that the goals set in the Paris Agree-
ment (2015) cannot be achieved without implementing CCUS technologies (Global
CCS Institute 2017). Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted by
many countries in the scope of the Paris Agreement referenced CCUS technologies as
9 Possibilities for Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage in Brazil 143
one of the main goals to achieve improvements on decarbonization, such as Canada,

the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (Global CCS Institute 2020). This
also matches the growing number of corporations and industries across different
sectors adopting decarbonization and net-zero emissions targets (IEA 2020). Still,
CCUS and BECCUS technologies are directly related to the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, mainly numbers 8 (sustainable economic growth) and 13 (urgent action
to combat climate change).
Brazilian NDCs did not mention CCS technologies directly as a path for their
actions and goals (Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil 2015). Despite
this, they could be deployed together with other options to help in decreasing emis-
sions, as also stated by Carvalho et al. (2020) and Köberle et al. (2020). In 2018,
Brazil was the fourteenth country that emitted the most CO2 in the world (World
Bank 2018), with the greatest contributions, in 2019 related to land use (deforesta-
tion) (44%), agriculture (28%), energy (19%), and Industry (5%) (Albuquerque et al.
2020). Although Brazil has a clean power supply mix: fossil fuel generation repre-
sented only 15% of total generation in 2020 (EPE 2021b), there is a perspective for
the increase in emissions in the energy sector, mainly due to expansion programs for
natural gas (Campos et al. 2017; EPE 2021c).
Thus, even though Brazil has a strong clean energy generation profile, it is
important to verify whether technologies such as CCUS could be a mechanism for
reducing the country’s futures emissions and whether Brazil could establish itself as
a benchmark in the development of negative emissions production chains through
of BECCUS technologies. The country has a great potential for biofuels and fossil
hydrocarbon production, a strong role in the global oil market and a growing gas
market, together with presenting a high potential for decarbonization. The present
chapter aims to provide an overview of CCUS and BECCUS technologies and
discusses the current scenario and future perspectives for their development in Brazil.
An Overview of Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies
There is a suite of technologies being developed for the capture, transport, storage,
and utilization of CO2 . Several of them are still in lab tests, pilot plant, and demon-
stration phases (Bui et al. 2018a, b). Diverse industries are attractive for CO2 capture,
including oil and gas, cement, iron and steel, pulp and paper, and heat and power
(Skagestad et al. 2014).
Combining bioenergy with CCUS can include a variety of industrial and energy
technologies, such as biomass combustion for power production, biomass conversion
to liquid and gaseous fuels and biorefineries (Bui et al. 2018a, b), with the possibility
of delivering neutral or negative emissions. Still, several factors can make true carbon
negativity difficult, e.g., emissions from land use change, production, pre-treatment
and transport of biomass, conversion process and CCS process, but also the issue
of carbon debts, i.e., the amount of time required for carbon offsets to kick in (Bui
et al. 2018a, b). Technologies allowing for negative CO2 removal include ocean
fertilization, mineral carbonation, afforestation, and direct air capture (DAC) (Bui
et al. 2018a, b).
Regarding the feasibility of CCUS and BECCUS implementation, both have high
economic potential for performance in scenarios with financial incentives or high
carbon prices (IPCC 2005). The carbon capture stage represents the most expensive
process in the whole CCUS chain, accounting for up to 75% of the total costs (Leung
et al. 2014; Plasynski et al. 2009), mainly due to its energy-intensive character.
Thus, this is a critical point that should be considered for projects. Investments and
development of research for new methods and technologies are of upmost importance
to decrease costs and increase feasibility (IPCC 2005).
Some expectations in the area of CCUS development have not been realized due to
factors such as the lack of climate policy implementation in many parts of the world,
generating low incentives; CCUS price variation, reaching values even higher than
initially estimated; and the social barrier for public acceptance (Netto et al. 2020;
Kheshgi et al. 2012).
In this section, we summarize the main differences between CCUS and BECCUS
in the process of capture, transport, use and storage of carbon, highlighting the role
of these two chains in the energy transition process (see Table 9.1).
Emissions and Possibilities for CCUS and BECCUS in Brazil
Compared to the world, the Brazilian energy supply mix has huge participation of
renewable sources, approximately 48%, related to emissions of around 400 Mt CO2 -
eq in 2020 (EPE 2021b). As mentioned, in the electric sector, this participation is even
bigger. The biggest responsibility for the emissions in the energy sector in Brazil is
the transport sector, accounting for 45% of the energy sector emissions in 2020. The
transport sector in Brazil is highly dependent on highways. The country is a major
producer of biofuels, but fossil fuel consumption still domains the sector (Köberle
et al. 2020).
Regarding stationary sources, emissions are concentrated in Brazil’s Southern and
South-eastern and are primarily associated with power plants, biomass production,
steel and cement industry, and refineries (Rockett et al. 2011).
This section discusses the main possibilities and aspects presented for BECCUS
and CCUS in Brazil, focussing on the capture, transportation, utilization, and storage
phases.
Capture
Despite accounting for a small portion of total national CO2 emissions, the industry
sector presents a potential for CO2 capture, with the steel industry contributing to the
biggest share in emissions (around 43%), followed by the cement industry (20%),
Table 9.1 Summarization of CCUS and BECCUS technologies and main aspects
CCUS BECCUS
Capture Post-combustion: involves separating The technologies used to capture carbon
CO2 from flue gases produced from from the combustion of fossil fuels or
large-scale fossil fuel combustion like biomass are the same (post-, pre-, and
boilers, cement kilns, and industrial oxycombustion). The disadvantage for
furnaces (IPCC 2005). This is the BECCUS compared to conventional
cheapest method for obtaining high CO2 CCUS is that biomass typically has a
purity (Porter et al. 2017) lower energy generation efficiency (Bui
Pre-combustion: consist of gasifying et al. 2018b). Thus, the opportunities to
fuel and separating the CO2 prior to the improve energy efficiency in a biomass
combustion process, generating CO2 and electricity generation + CCUS system
hydrogen (Global CCS Institute 2012). include enhancing heat recovery and
This process has been used by oil, gas, using high-performance solvents for
and chemical to separate CO2 from gas CO2 capture (Bui et al. 2018b)
streams for decades. Carbon capture is Fermentation and gas effluents from
used primarily for Integrated diverse bioenergy systems: fermentation
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) is cheaper and easier than the
power plants (Global CCS Institute combustions process for carbon capture
2012). This option can also be the due to higher carbon concentrations on
cheapest one or related to high costs the effluents (Smeets and Faaij 2010).
depending on the purity of CO2 to be The effluent gas from sugar fermentation
obtained (Porter et al. 2017) for ethanol production is 99% pure in
Oxy-combustion: fuel is burned in an CO2 , which is very favourable for
oxygen-enriched environment (> 95%), carbon capture, only needing to be dried
resulting in stream emissions with to transport, giving it a competitive
higher concentrations of CO2 rather than character amongst other carbon sources
usual, being easier to capture but also (Smeets and Faaij 2010). Thus, the
high cost (IPCC 2005; Porter et al. 2017) carbon capture phase can be
comparatively much easier and cheaper.
Other sustainable sources for CO2
capture are anaerobic biogas digesters,
pulp mills in biorefineries, with CO2
contents up to 20%, in dry conditions;
and waste-to-energy plants, such as
landfills, where there is a very important
biogenic generation of CO2 from the
biodegradation of residues, which could
be captured with CH4 and separated for
different destinations (Bui et al. 2018a,
b)
CUS and BECCUS
(continued)
being the two stationary industrial activities with the highest potential for carbon
capture (SEEG 2020). Still, there are no such projects under development nor oper-
ation so far. Regarding the Oil and Gas Industry, there is also an important potential
for CCS, mainly in offshore reservoirs (Ciotta et al. 2021).

CCUS BECCUS
Transport By pipelines, ships, roads, trains or other ways according to distance and feasibility
(Singh et al. 2021): Distances < 300 km to the storage/usage site have greater
feasibilities (IPCC 2005; NETL 2014). The fluid behaviour needs to be known for
the compression and transportation process, which is a function of the stream’s
composition (Bui et al. 2018a, b). Thus, it is necessary to identify the levels and
types of impurities in the CO2 stream. CO2 captured from oxy-fuel combustion,
and IGCC power plants will need to consider the removal of non-condensables,
acid gas species, and other contaminants for compression and transportation (Porter
et al. 2015). Given the substantial energy demand by the compression stage, further
work is required to continue to find efficiencies (Bui et al. 2018a, b). It is of huge
importance the integrated analysis of costs, conditions, quality of reservoir sites,
distances and technologies in order to better access and define the best locations for
storing or using the captured CO2 (Singh et al. 2021). More than 6500 km of CO2
pipelines worldwide are associated with enhanced oil recovery (EOR) operation in
the United States and installed away from densely populated regions (Bui et al.
2018a, b). The deployment of CO2 pipelines closer to population centres has been
investigated to reduce uncertainties and costs (Bui et al. 2018a, b). The actual level
of CO2 purity required will be dictated by a combination of transport and storage
requirements and process economics (Porter et al. 2015). Thus, the purity level of
CO2 captured in the fermentation process is an advantage for compression and
transportation. On the other hand, pipelines infrastructure is more linked to the oil
and gas value chain
(continued)
Besides, Brazil is the second biggest world bioethanol producer (Renewable Fuels
Association 2020), based mainly on sugarcane fermentation, and is also the third-
largest world producer of bioelectricity (REN21 2021), mainly from solid biomass,
such as sugarcane bagasse and related residues. Most part of the ethanol and sugar
production in the country is located in the South-centre region of Brazil (Ketzer et al.
2016).
Thus, there is a great potential for BECCUS application in Brazil, mainly in the
sugarcane-ethanol sector. Restrepo-Valencia and Walter (2021) assessed possibilities
for BECCUS in Brazil and concluded that CCS coupled to fermentation in large plants
would be the most viable alternative. Rochedo et al. (2016) indicate that capture in
ethanol distilleries may occur at reduced costs and become viable, if considering an
additional revenue associated with the use of the captured CO2 for EOR in mature oil
fields in the country. The authors also state that capture costs are lower for petroleum
platforms and hydrogen generation units in oil refineries or ammonia plants.
However, as Lucena et al. (2014) addressed, carbon capture requires additional
water consumption and a concurrent generation of residues. In addition, according to
the authors, some regions in Brazil would not support the higher water demand that
carbon capture systems would eventually add. Therefore, to identify the potential
for carbon capture in Brazil, it is not enough to inventory the location of stationary
sources and the possible storage reservoirs. It is also necessary to carry out a complete

CCUS BECCUS
Utilization Production of manufactured goods, Actual applications of CO2 captured
synthetic fuels, chemical conversions, from biomass burning in the UK, for
refineries, mineral carbonation, EOR example, have to date been limited
(Al-Mamoori et al. 2017; Chauvy et al. largely to boosting yields in the
2019; Ghiat and Al-Ansari 2021). horticultural sector (Palmer and Carton
Specific uses must meet criteria 2021). The problem is whether CO2 use
according to demand, proximity, and as the basis for commodity production
favourability for implementation, e.g., can really be considered as long-term
chemical conversions and mineralization storage at all: if incorporated into
(Chauvy et al. 2019; Ghiat and sustainable construction materials, it
Al-Ansari 2021) remain locked up in the built
There are several research and environment for many decades at least;
innovation efforts to make the captured when used as a basis for producing
CO2 a future raw material for other synthetic animal feed or even synthetic
forms of commodity production, for fuels, however, it will not keep out of the
example the manufacture of footwear; atmosphere, neither will replace existing
the conversion of captured CO2 into a GHG emissions chains (Palmer and
sustainable alternative to conventional Carton 2021). These new uses for carbon
concrete, the production of synthetic fish can be decisive in determining whether
and animal feed; the recycling of BECCUS can offer negative emissions.
captured biogenic CO2 into synthetic Thus, for BECCUS today, there is an
alternatives to crude oil or gas (Palmer ambiguity about the boundaries between
and Carton 2021) achieving large-scale carbon dioxide
removal on the one hand and developing
a truly sustainable, “circular”
bioeconomy on the other (Palmer and
Carton 2021)
CCUS
Storage Injection of CO2 on geological reservoirs must be done in those ones that fit criteria
for long term and safe abatement. Main geological reservoirs are: depleted O&G
reservoirs, coal seams, saline aquifers, salt caverns, dark shale layers, and basalts
(Busch et al. 2008; IPCC 2005; Matter et al. 2016). Long-term storage efficiency
depends on sealing rocks and the interaction of CO2 with the reservoir (Alemu et al.
2011). CO2 density is also essential, and it should preferably be in its supercritical
state. CO2 impurities must be analysed for security purposes (Porter et al. 2015).
There are risks of gas migration and superficial leakage (Koornneef et al. 2011).
Thus, the reservoir must be sufficiently porous and permeable to withstand large
amounts of CO2 and be covered by low permeability sealing rocks to prevent the
vertical migration of these gases (Nordbotten and Celia 2011). Putting the
necessary infrastructures to achieve the safe, long-term storage of captured CO2 ,
especially at scale, remains a significant economic and policy challenge (Palmer
and Carton 2021) Therefore, while the storage and management of geological wells
is already part of the fossil fuel production chain, it is important to map the possible
geological reservoirs and their distance from biomass production and use units,
verifying the technical and financial feasibility of this logistics, as elaborated by
Singh et al. (2021) who evaluated the possible reservoirs in US for two CO2 capture
technologies from biomass power generation by post-combustion process and by
IGCC plants
survey of the environmental and economic conditions, including water availability

and transport issues.
Transport
For the transport of CO2 , Brazil does not have, so far, a developed pipeline framework
specific for this purpose, and so investments in the development of such infrastruc-
ture are of extreme relevance. Despite that, there are some local pipelines of small
distances, such as the case of the Bahia state, which has 70 km of pipelines constructed
to transport CO2 from industries to offshore reservoirs, where the gas is injected in
the Buracica Oil Field for EOR-CCS purposes, in a project developed by Petrobras
(Ketzer et al. 2016).
There is currently around 12,000 km of pipelines for gas transportation in Brazil
(ANP 2020), mainly located in coastal areas of the Southeast region. Currently,
Brazil also has more than 9600 km of pipelines under construction, with plans to
expansion also to the countryside, on which Ketzer et al. (2014) indicate a poten-
tial for CO2 transportation. However, it is important to notice that natural gas is
an important energy resource for Brazil, and still, the country faces challenges in
expanding the natural gas grid (Lucena et al. 2014). Thus, it can be expected that it
will be challenging to establish an institutional arrangement for the construction of
CO2 pipelines in the country since, unlike natural gas, CO2 is still an environmental
externality and not a marketable fuel (Lucena et al. 2014).
Besides that, there are different specificities from natural gas, oil, and CO2 that
should be taken into consideration for transporting, such as physical–chemical condi-
tions that should be adapted for each type of content, impacting all the pipeline
structure and composition, as discussed in Table 9.1. In this way, it is necessary
to formulate a national protocol or standard on the quality, composition, purity, and
main aspects related to the character of the CO2 to be transported in order to guarantee
the efficiency and safety of its transportation and integrity of the pipelines.
The development of a consolidated carbon market, using cap and trade, for
example (Grubb 2012), could be beneficial for the verbalization of CO2 grid in
Brazil, but this market is still in its infancy and on a voluntary basis (de Souza et al.
2013). It is also important to increase the Brazilian pipeline grid to cover a major area
of the country, linking CO2 emitters to storage and utilization areas and favouring the
implementation of CCUS projects. This would be especially important for BECCUS
development once the majority of bioenergy systems are in the countryside of the
Southeast Region. There is currently a lack of institutional discussions regarding this
possibility, with very few materials available under the national perspective, being a
topic to be further developed and studied.
Brazil has a general predominance of road transportation, so this could be a
cheaper and most immediate solution to support CO2 mobility, mainly on short
distances. Still, the balance of net emissions should be considered once trucks are
mostly fuelled with diesel, related to high emissions, which could compromise the
purpose of CO2 abatement.
Utilization
For the utilization in Brazil, EOR is currently the most common use for CO2 captured
in the O&G production (Ciotta et al. 2021). In addition, there is also an important
demand in the soft drink industry. According to Pacheco et al. (2019), methanol,
polycarbonates, formic acid and acetaldehyde are the most promising CO2 utilization
alternatives for local manufacture. The states of São Paulo, Paraná, Amazonas, Bahia,
Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa Catarina are the most promising regions in terms of
potential for CO2 utilization. More specifically, the state of São Paulo would have the
highest availability and demand for CO2 , being the most indicated for implementing
Carbon Capture and Utilization schemes (Pacheco et al. 2019).
Regarding the actual use of captured CO2 in Brazilian industries, we found the
news in the press reporting agreements such as the capture of CO2 in the alcohol
production plants: Vale (Onda Verde city in the state of São Paulo—70 t of CO2 /day),
and Penedo (Penedo city in the state of Alagoas—35 t of CO2 /day) and the selling
for the beverage industry in 2014 (Furtado 2014). Another piece of news was related
to the agreement, in 2002, between the Raudi company and the Regional Agricul-
tural Cooperative of Sugarcane Producers of Paraíso do Norte, which represented,
according to the news, the first agreement in Brazil for the transformation of captured
CO2 into sodium bicarbonate (NA2 CO3 ) (Medeiros 2002). However, we could not
assess whether these projects are still in operation since no official information about
them was found on these companies’ websites nor in Brazilian research papers.
Developing a regulated carbon market in the country is an essential tool for lever-
aging a broader utilization of CO2 . Turning it from an externality to a product with
commercial value can bring more opportunities and benefits for its usage.
Storage
Sedimentary basins are considered good prospects for CO2 storage once they gener-
ally contain great variability of lithologies and structures that may be favourable for
CO2 sequestration. In Brazil, there are 29 Sedimentary Basins with oil potential,
according to the Petroleum National Agency (ANP) (Petersohn 2018), from which
some are very large and barely explored, and some are at a mature stage for oil
production, such as the Recôncavo Basin. Some of these basins are close to the most
important regions in terms of CO2 emissions, in areas with intensive industrial and
urban activities (Pelissari 2021).
The most prospective basins are the Paraná, Santos, Campos and Recôncavo
Basins, which are the closest ones to stationary emissions bigger than 5000 kt CO2
(Rockett et al. 2011). According to Restrepo-Valencia and Walter (Restrepo-Valencia

and Walter 2021), 51% of the industrial plants located in the Centre-South of Brazil
are within a 300 km radius with potential storage areas for CO2 in Paraná Sedimentary
Basin. This basin also comprises the most important region for biofuel production
in Brazil (Pelissari and Tassinari 2020).
Currently, Brazil has one BECCUS facility under construction, with bioethanol
production coupled to CO2 capture and storage on rocks of the Paraná Sedimentary
Basin, in the state of Mato Grosso (Fueling Sustainability 2020). The first project for
CO2 storage and unconventional gas production in coal (enhanced coal bed methane)
in South America was also carried out in the Paraná basin in 2012 (Beck et al. 2011;
Santarosa et al. 2013). The pilot project was sponsored by Petrobras, but there were
no further developments.
The Santos and Campos Sedimentary Basins are offshore basins in the southern
region historically related to most of Brazil’s hydrocarbons’ production. This O&G
production on the Pre-Salt is related to huge amounts of associated CO2 . Injecting it
back into the reservoir is one of the adopted alternatives, consisting of the EOR-CCS
on these basins (Iglesias et al. 2014), which have the geological potential for CCS,
as assessed by Rockett et al. (2011). Currently, Petrobras is injecting CO2 in the pre-
salt offshore reservoir of the Santos Basin to enhance oil production. According to
Petrobrás (2021), it is expected that the Company will achieve the goal of reinjecting
around 40 million tons of CO2 on offshore basins by 2025 on CCUS-EOR projects.
Depleted offshore reservoirs are also an important prospect for CCS in Brazil, as
studied by Ciotta et al. (2021), mainly considering lower costs, greater availability
of technical studies and reuse of available infrastructure (Hannis et al. 2017).
The Recôncavo Basin is a mature basin in the Northeast Region of Brazil, related
to important historical productions of oil in sandstones reservoirs. It is also located
close to important stationary sources of CO2 (Rockett et al. 2011). Dino and Gallo
(2009) conducted research and pilot project of CCS on this basin, from a Petrobras
project, focussing on the opportunity of retrofitting the pre-existent injection wells on
the oil fields to develop and assess the CO2 storage technology, resulting in successful
storage of more than 600,000 tons of CO2 during 20 years of EOR-CCS.
Thus, based on the issues discussed Table 9.2 shows a systematization of the most
important aspects regarding capture, transportation, utilization, and storage of CO2
for CCUS and BECCUS projects in Brazil.
Legal, Economic, and Political Aspects
Some of the most important requisites for CCUS and BECCUS projects are: satisfy
geological conditions to guarantee safe and permanent storage; smart technologies
to capture and separate CO2 at minimum costs; the proximity of the emitting source
of CO2 to the reservoir to reduce costs with transportation; the existence of robust
legislation to regulate all the steps and to guarantee a continuum monitoring of the
reservoir, mainly after the end of the injection; financial incentives, from both the
Table 9.2 Summarization of main aspects and potentials of BECCUS and CCUS in Brazil
CCUS BECCUS
Capture Besides the capture from O&G Potential mainly from the
production, the main possibilities are sugarcane-ethanol sector, with CO2
post-combustion capture from stationary capture from sugarcane juice
sources, such as coal and gas fermentation plants, bio digestion of
thermoelectric generation plants, sugarcane vinasse and flue gases
refineries, and cement industries (Restrepo-Valencia and Walter 2021;
(Rochedo et al. 2016) Rochedo et al. 2016)
Transport Pipelines or roads, according to distances Construction of pipelines linking
and economic feasibility. The pipeline bioenergy systems to storage or
framework for natural gas transportation utilization areas; road transportation
could be adapted for CO2 . Expansion of could be a cheaper and easier
pipelines may be challenging (Lucena alternative, mainly for smaller
et al. 2014) distances
Utilization CO2 captured can be used for EOR on Potential to couple the carbon capture
O&G reservoirs (EOR-CCS). Important from sugarcane fermentation to use on
demand of CO2 from soft drink industries soft drinks, urea and NA2 CO2
and urea production (Rochedo et al. 2016) production, as the mentioned projects
are under operation. And also for
methanol, polycarbonates, formic acid
and acetaldehyde production
(Pacheco et al. 2019)
Storage When used for EOR, the CO2 is stored in Similar to CCUS, but special potential
the geological reservoir. Main potential from the Paraná Sedimentary Basin,
geological formations are in the Paraná, which occurs in the Southeast Region,
Santos, Campos and Recôncavo being the closest to the areas of
sedimentary basins. The injection site bioethanol and biofuels main
must be the closest as possible to the production in Brazil
capture site to avoid costs with CO2
transportation
governmental and private sectors, coupled to the existence of a consolidate carbon

credit market to bring feasibility for projects; and the public acceptance (IPCC 2005).
Moreover, given the high costs, to reach a viability level for the execution of
CCUS and BECCUS projects, there is a need for legal and logistic adaptation, as
well as the creation of incentive policies. Brazil does not yet have a specific policy or
legislation to encourage the implementation of BECCUS and CCUS technologies,
which is necessary to be developed, defining the responsible parts, obligations, and
penalties, including long-term monitoring after the end of carbon injection into the
reservoir. Besides, according to Netto et al. (2020) there is also a need to work on
the public acceptance and comprehension of CCUS in Brazil (see Chap. 5).
Still, there is currently an absence of a robust integrated carbon market in the
country. Despite, there is a voluntary and marginal one, which trades green certifi-
cates, such as I-RECS, related to renewable energy generation, emitted by the
Totum Institute, and CBIOS, decarbonization credits related to biofuels genera-
tion and adopted by the Brazilian National Biofuels Policy (RenovaBio) (Federal
Law 13576/2017). Also, there is a growing demand for such market and discus-
sions regarding its legal implementation are already under consideration in federal
instances (de Souza et al. 2013), but are at an infancy stage.
Although Brazilian NDCs do not consider BECCUS or CCUS, these processes
were mentioned in the Brazil Country Program for the Green Climate Fund—GCF
of 2018, and in the National Plan of Energy—2050 (EPE 2020) although without
extensive analysis or robust planning. They were considered technologies to be imple-
mented in the future, mainly associated with coal-fired power plants, which reveals
a perspective for future governmental investments on such. Besides, the national
goals related to the development of biofuel generation can leverage BECCUS imple-
mentation. Also, governmental discussions on the Hydrogen National Policy have
mentioned CCS and CCUS as main possibilities for hydrogen production in Brazil
(EPE 2021a). Finally, one of the most important producers of coal in the country,
the state of Santa Catarina, developed a public policy for Energy Transition, through
a bill (PL 0270.1/2021), that aims to provide sustainable alternatives for the coal
chain, mentioning CCS as one of the alternatives to be adopted, which reinforces its
importance for the country. However, the law related to this project was sanctioned
in 2022 (Law nº 14.299), and CCS is not mentioned in the final text (Official Diary
of the Union 2022).
Still, this policy could be important to leverage the implementation of CCUS in the
Power Sector in Brazil, and some published studies have already started to assess the
potential for CCS coupled to coal-based power plants, such as Pelissari (2021), who
defined potential geological reservoirs in the surroundings of the biggest coal-fired
power plant in Brazil.
Final Remarks
CO2 capture, utilization, and storage technologies have been gaining ground globally
in the last years, proving to be a potential alternative to sequester CO2 and reduce
its emissions. Considering that Brazil is committed to decreasing emissions, being
a signatory of the Paris Agreement and setting decarbonization goals on the NDCs,
technologies such as CCUS and BECCUS can be alternatives to be implemented to
decrease emissions.
In Brazil, CCUS projects have so far been mainly associated with EOR in offshore
basin reservoirs, with gas injection to stimulate the oil recovery rate, and only one
BECCUS project is under development. For storage in terrestrial reservoirs, although
several studies consider the potential, mainly in the Paraná basin, and there are even
pilot and development projects in this basin, the maturity of the studies to evaluate
the potential of geological units is still low. There is much to be done in order to better
characterize rocks and modelling to estimate CO2 storage capacity and behaviour.
There is also a potential to associate BECCUS/CCUS plants with hydrogen plants,
once there is a growing market for this source, but due to the current high costs and
lack of investments, it is still not largely feasible.
On the legal and economic aspects, there is also a gap to be covered, with the
need to develop a regulatory framework to define the responsibilities and penalties
related to all the value chain of BECCUS and CCUS projects, as well as fiscal and
political incentives to bring feasibility for such, such as a carbon credit market that
could bring competition and leverage actions for decarbonization in the country.
There are no expectations for the development of large commercial-scale
BECCUS/CCUS plants in the short term. We can conclude that some Brazilian
government documents consider CCUS and BECCUS technologies, but without
deepening the practical ways to effectively develop these projects in Brazil. On the
companies’ side, much of the investments and development are related to Petrobras,
which has been actively developing and using the injection of CO2 in its oil fields
since the 2000s (Beck et al. 2011).
Regarding research and development (R&D), during the process of investigating
Brazilian information on carbon capture projects and policies, we were able to iden-
tify important initiatives such as the ones promoted by Petrobras and by Shell, as
the FAPESP-Shell Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Innovation (RCGI), centred
in the University of São Paulo, which is currently developing multiple interdis-
ciplinary research projects mainly related to natural gas and CCUS technologies,
and the Brazilian Carbon Storage Research Centre (CEPAC), an interdisciplinary
centre for research and demonstration of carbon storage technologies, centred in the
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), which is no longer
active. There is also the CO2 Capture Laboratory in the National Institute for Space
Research (INPE), located in São Paulo state, focussing on developing new materials
for hydrocarbons combustion using a chemical looping process of the technologies
being developed for CO2 capture.
From what has been presented in this work, important topics should be taken as
the main challenges and needs to encourage and leverage a broader development of
CCUS and BECCUS technologies in Brazil, as summarized below. Some of them
are already part of R&D studies in Brazilian research centres, but it is important that
the government and private institutions also participate more actively in them:
● Investments in infrastructure for CO2 transportation, such as pipelines, connecting
emission hubs to the areas for carbon utilization and storage, together with the
development of a standard protocol for CO2 quality and conditions to guarantee
the integrity of pipelines during its transport;
● Investments in research for development and demonstration of technologies for
carbon capture and utilization, to increase the portfolio of possibilities and bring
down costs, creating a mapping of the CO2 usage possibilities;
● Assessment of hydro availability and feasibility for CCUS projects in different
regions of Brazil, considering its relevance due to huge amounts of water needed
for this activity and the safety assurance of multiple uses of water in the country;
● A more mature understanding of the potential and characteristics of sedimentary
basins and geological formations to become safe CO2 reservoirs, guaranteeing its
permanent abatement over time;
● A regulatory framework to support BECCUS/CCUS activities, defining the

responsible parts, obligations, and penalties, including long-term monitoring after
the end of carbon injection into the reservoir;
● A more active role from the State, acting on the creation of governmental policies
and projects to invest in the development of BECCUS/CCUS, support private
companies that want to invest in such and define the priorities and main paths;
● Fiscal incentives to increase the feasibility of BECCUS/CCUS projects, and finan-
cial instruments such as a Carbon Market and carbon taxation, obligate the emitters
to take actions to decrease their impact.
Acknowledgements Maria Rogieri Pelissari thanks the financial support of grant Process
2019/07995-4 from the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) and the support from the Coor-
denação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior—Brazil (CAPES) (Code 001). All the
authors thank the support of the RCGI—Research Centre for Gas Innovation, hosted by the Univer-
sity of São Paulo (USP) and sponsored by FAPESP—São Paulo Research Foundation (2014/50279-
4 and 2020/15230-5) and Shell Brazil, and the strategic importance of the support given by ANP
(Brazil’s National Oil, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency) through the R&D levy regulation. Stefania
Gomes Relva Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), for the
scholarship. Peyerl thanks the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-
Nível Superior.
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Chapter 10
Hydrogen: A Brazilian Outlook
Sabrina Macedo and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract Hydrogen is a clean energy carrier, capable of promoting green transition

among different sectors and storing variable renewable energy bringing security to
power supply. This book chapter aims to analyse hydrogen’s outlook in Brazil as
a vector to foster the green transition. In addition, previous actions and the poten-
tial perspectives of applying hydrogen technologies to generate and store energy are
analysed. Firstly, Brazil’s bases of hydrogen strategy were identified, bringing the
historical country’s initiatives to grow a hydrogen economy. Afterwards, a survey of
the Brazilian power sector and hydrogen production, storage and use perspectives
was conducted. Brazil has made efforts to evolve a hydrogen economy, including this
source in future energy planning. Still, some questions need to be settled to incor-
porate the new source, such as institutional and legal governance, regulating and
supervising the market, issues around safety conditions, certification of processes,
human resources, and fuel specification. Besides, Brazilian renewable potential can
be expanded through hydrogen cooperation for the national and global green transi-
tion. The work also recognizes which sectors would embrace green hydrogen beyond
the power sector as an option.
Keywords Energy transition · Green transition · Hydrogen economy · Brazil
Introduction
To limit global warming, the Paris Agreement is a landmark. Signed up on 4

December 2016, it brought together more than 190 nations into a common cause
S. Macedo (B) · D. Peyerl

e-mail: samacedo@usp.br
D. Peyerl
D. Peyerl
160 S. Macedo and D. Peyerl
to undertake efforts to combat climate change processes. By 2020, countries have

submitted their plans for climate action known as Nationally Determined Contri-
butions (NDCs) (UNFCCC 2015). In December 2020, Brazil also reaffirmed the
commitment to reducing total net greenhouse gas emissions by 37% in 2025 and
43% in 2030, compared to 2005 and even expressed the indicative objective of
achieving climate neutrality (net-zero emissions) in 2060 (Brazil 2020; MRE 2020).
In the energy sector, the country defined the commitment of reaching 45% of renew-
ables in the energy mix by 2030, including expanding the use of renewable energy
sources other than hydropower in the total energy mix to between 28 and 33% by
2030, increasing the use of non-fossil fuel energy sources domestically, increasing
the share of renewables (other than hydropower) in the power supply to at least 23%
by 2030, including by raising the share of wind, biomass, and solar, and achieving
10% efficiency gains in the electricity sector by 2030 (Brazil 2015) (see Chap. 13).
The years since the Paris Agreement entry into force have sparked low-carbon
solutions and new markets. Zero-carbon solutions are becoming competitive across
economic sectors, most evident in the power and transport division, having created
many new business opportunities for early movers (UNFCCC 2015). In addition,
the green transition aims for an economy with zero climate change and a sustainable
growth path grounded on renewable energies (Lamperti et al. 2020). Therefore, green
hydrogen has been seen as a promising fuel capable of achieving emission reduction
goals mainly because of its versatile, energy efficiency, low-polluting, and renewable
fuel (Najjar 2013). Besides, it can be used directly as a low or zero-carbon energy
source, depending on its production process. The commercial and most essential
industrial process to produce the purest form of hydrogen is water electrolysis, when
water molecules are split to give hydrogen and oxygen by circulating electricity
directly through it (Van Dinh et al. 2020). When the electricity for this process
comes from renewable sources, there is the production of green hydrogen. It is one
of the only zero-carbon options for hydrogen production (IRENA 2016). However,
green hydrogen production is highly expensive since it uses technologies that are
still emerging in the market and does not have scale production (IEA 2019). Green
hydrogen technology is expected to be deployed at such a large scale to reach all hard-
to-decarbonize sectors, boost demand, and scale up the production and supportive
policy framework required to achieve Paris Agreement objectives (Kovač et al. 2021).
In Brazil, the power sector is one of the sectors that can engage a green hydrogen
economy mainly because it is composed mostly of renewables. Once variable renew-
able energy has moved fast and is forecasted to grow around 4% by 2030 (EPE 2021;
MME 2021a, b, c), this will request technology that guarantees energy security and
reliability for the power grid. Hydrogen can allow the expansion of renewables, as
it has the potential to soften the variable production of energy from wind and solar
photovoltaic sources. The process of converting the power generated from renewable
sources to different types of energy carriers for use across multiple sectors or recon-
verted back into power can greatly increase the flexibility of the power grid (IRENA
2019a). Brazil’s solar and wind power potential is one of the greatest globally, likely
leading the hydrogen market (Chaves et al. 2021).
10 Hydrogen: A Brazilian Outlook 161
Hence, this chapter aims to analyse hydrogen’s outlook in Brazil as a vector to

foster the green transition. Previous actions and the potential perspectives of applying
hydrogen technologies to generate and store energy are analysed, following which
sectors would embrace green hydrogen beyond the power sector. From the standpoint
of existing renewable sources, can hydrogen support Brazil’s development towards
green transition?
This work drives issues such as energy security, views on climate change, its
impacts, and hydrogen solutions for moving to a carbon-neutral society. Yet, this
chapter consists of three parts: (i) bases of hydrogen strategy in Brazil, bringing up
movements that the country has started for the growth of a hydrogen economy; (ii)
Brazilian power sector and perspectives of hydrogen production and storage, going
through the challenges of converting electricity from renewables into green hydrogen
and store it, processes called power-to-hydrogen, to be reconverted back into power;
then, the analysis of the potential integration of renewables in the industry, energy,
and transport with power-to-x solutions (where green hydrogen can be stored and
further used or processed in many ways using green hydrogen) (Siemens 2021); (iii)
conclusion, given an overview of the matters above, connecting how it can contribute
to climate change.
Bases of Hydrogen Strategy in Brazil
In 2002, Brazil started developing its hydrogen strategy with the Brazilian Hydrogen
Program and Fuel Cell System (PROCAC), introduced by the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MCT). Later, in 2005, this program had a new denomination, changing
its name to the Science, Technology and Innovation Program for the Hydrogen
Economy (PROH2 ) (EPE 2021; Peyerl 2018). In 2003, The International Partner-
ship for the Hydrogen Economy was created, having Brazil among its partners,
aiming to foster international cooperation on hydrogen and fuel cell Research and
Development, common codes and standards, and information sharing on infrastruc-
ture development. Subsequently, in 2009, the organization changed its official title
to International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy (IPHE)
(IPHE 2021).
In 2005, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) coordinated the “Roadmap
for Structuring the Hydrogen Economy in Brazil”, an extensive report alongside
the MCT and dozens of Brazilian and international specialists. The roadmap estab-
lished some relevant subjects for guiding the national hydrogen strategy, including
the valorization of competitive advantages, such as ethanol (produced by steam
reform processes and direct oxidation in fuel cells); electrolysis of water (using
secondary electricity from hydroelectric plants), and other biomasses (besides sugar
cane, including biogas) (EPE 2021). There was also the recognition of the role of
natural gas in facilitating the transition to a phase dominated by green hydrogen.
Also, the roadmap pointed to a definition of a market expansion logic for hydrogen:
the distributed energy generation, energy production in isolated regions, and urban
buses. The document foresaw the release of a Government Program for the Produc-
tion and Use of Hydrogen in Brazil after 2007. However, discoveries of the Pre-
salt in 2006 implied a change in priorities in the energy policy agenda, and the
program was not launched (EPE 2021; Peyerl 2018). Although, several technolog-
ical projects associated with universities, research institutes, and companies have
developed hydrogen generation applications (EPE 2021). In addition, Brazil stands
out as a leader in hydrogen technology studies in Latin America due to the role that
institutions and universities have developed on the subject, for example, Unicamp’s
Hydrogen Laboratory; Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate Studies and Engi-
neering Research (COPPE)/Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, which structured
the Hydrogen Laboratory and the Reference Centre for Hydrogen Technology and
Economy, in partnership with Eletrobras Electric Energy Research Centre (CEPEL)
(EPE 2021; Peyerl 2018).
In 2010, the Centre of Management and Strategic Studies (CGEE), under
the Ministry of Science and Technology commissioning, launched the Energetic
Hydrogen in Brazil: Subsidies for Competitiveness Policies: 2010–2025 (CGEE
2019). The report presented the international and national scenario, made consid-
erations, and discussed bottlenecks and proposals on four themes: (1) hydrogen
economy, (2) hydrogen production, (3) development of hydrogen logistics, and
(4) hydrogen utilization systems. The document also brings the perception of vast
opportunities for Brazil (CGEE 2010; EPE 2021).
In mid-2019, the initiative Energy Big Push (EBP) Brazil was conducted by the
Centre for Management and Strategic Studies (CGEE) in partnership with the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and
the National Energy Research Company (EPE), having the International Energy
Agency (IEA) supporting the project. The initiative’s main objective is to promote
more and better public and private investments in clean energy, emphasizing inno-
vation and contributing to sustainable development (CGEE 2019). The study sought
to organize and systematize data to understand better the volumes, destinations,
and main characteristics of Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) in
the energy sector. The consolidated database made it possible to assess the profile of
hydrogen projects from 2013 to 2018. Figure 10.1 shows the public energy Research,
Design, and Development investments per year in hydrogen and fuel cells compared
to Brazil’s other power and storage technologies.
Also, referencing more international partnerships, the Brazil–Germany Chambers
of Commerce and Industry of the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro through
the Brazil–Germany Alliance for Green Hydrogen seek opportunities to broaden
the debate about trading hydrogen between both countries. This issue has emerged
as Germany, in June 2020, announced as part of its hydrogen policy to finance
investments in hydrogen plants in other countries to contribute to the consolidation
of a global hydrogen market for energy purposes. The German government plans to
invest 2 billion euros in partner countries’ financing projects through this national
strategy. For Brazil to be included in the German program, which will provide a
ten-year contract for the local production of green hydrogen, it is necessary to map
and present relevant projects by national companies that reinforce its importance in
140
120
Million R$
100
80
60
40
20
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Hydrogen and fuel cells Other power and storage technologies
Fig. 10.1 Public energy RD&D investments per year in hydrogen and other power and storage
technologies in Brazil based on (CGEE 2020)
this segment. With a history marked by significant commercial partnerships, Brazil

and Germany have the potential to create a very positive room for cooperation in this
market for both sides (BrasilAlemanha 2021).
On 16 December 2020, the MME approved the National Energy Plan 2050,
presenting discussions on energy transition, emphasizing the hydrogen economy’s
role in this process (EPE 2020a). As many renewable sources of electricity are inter-
mittent and several consumption sectors are unlikely to be served by electricity or
biofuels, hydrogen turns out to be a positive alternative. The document also draws
out issues such as disruptive technologies. It defines them as those capable of signif-
icantly altering the energy market. We have a few elements to foresee their insertion
in the energy supply mix and the resulting consequences, enlightening hydrogen as
a potentially disruptive technology (EPE 2020a).
In February 2021, the government of the state of Ceará, in partnership with
the Federation of Industries of Ceará (Fiec), Federal University of Ceará (UFC),
and Pecém Complex (CIPP S A), presented a project called The Green Hydrogen
Hub. A working group was established to bring together agents of institutions to
strengthen the green hydrogen chain in Ceará. A memorandum of understanding was
also signed with the Australian company Enegix Energy, which intends to install a
plant to produce green hydrogen in the Pecém Complex, with investments estimated
at US$5.4 billion (MME 2021a). In the same year, the National Energy Research
Company (EPE) publishes the Technical Note Basis for the Consolidation of the
Brazilian Hydrogen Strategy. The objective of this Technical Note is to address
conceptual and fundamental aspects for the construction of the Brazilian Hydrogen
Strategy. An overview of the hydrogen industry, its challenges, and opportunities
were presented, including documents on technological evolution, costs and national
strategies, and a survey of the history of initiatives in Brazil related to hydrogen (EPE
2021).
Among these events, The National Energy Policy Council (CNPE), in a meeting
held on April 2021, through Resolution nº 6, proposed the development of guidelines
for the National Hydrogen Program (MME 2021b). The program was published in
August 2021 and structured on six axes: (i) strengthening the scientific and techno-
logical bases; (ii) human resources training; (iii) energy planning, focusing on the role
of hydrogen in Brazil, started already with the PNE 2050; (iv) legal and regulatory-
normative framework; (v) market opening and growth and competitiveness; and vi)
international cooperation, which has already started (EPE 2020a; MME 2021c). It is
possible to see that Brazil has evolved a hydrogen economy. However, there is still
considerable work to be done. The following section will bring the perspectives of
green hydrogen in the country, showing its challenges and potential for expanding.
Brazilian Power Sector and Perspectives of Green Hydrogen

Production and Storage
Challenges and Opportunities of Power-to-Hydrogen
Power can be stored by being converted into hydrogen, a process called power-to-
hydrogen. Hydrogen is a free energy carrier that can be produced by many energy
sources (IRENA 2019c). It can be extracted from fossil fuels, biomass, and water.
Natural gas is currently the primary source of hydrogen production, accounting for
around three-quarters of the annual global dedicated hydrogen production, while
less than 0.1% of global dedicated hydrogen production today comes from water
electrolysis (IEA 2019). Green hydrogen is current high costly across its entire value
chain, from electrolysis to transport and fuel cells. The lack of existing infrastruc-
ture for transport and storage, the high-energy losses, and the lack of value for the
main benefit (e.g. lower GHG emissions) that green hydrogen can have contributed
substantially to high costs (IRENA 2020). Electricity input is the major cost of green
hydrogen production, and electrolysers’ efficiency and capital cost are in the second
place (IEA 2019; Longden et al. 2020). However, the declining costs for renewable
electricity, particularly from solar photovoltaic and wind, are growing interest in
electrolytic hydrogen.
In Brazil, renewables represent about 83% of the electricity mix (EPE 2020b).
Hydropower represents 59% of the installed capacity share, wind 9%, and solar
2%. (EPE 2021; MME 2021a, b, c). Brazil’s solar and wind power potential will
likely foster a strong hydrogen market (Chaves et al. 2021). Besides, another option
for Brazil to make green hydrogen production feasible is using turbine discharged
energy (a portion of water diverted to the spillway, that is, wasted) when considering
large hydroelectric plants (Nadaleti et al. 2019). Brazil has demonstrated hydrogen
production projects by electrolysis in the hydroelectric plants of Itaipu, Itumbiara,
and Porto Primavera (EPE 2020a).
Table 10.1 Water

Parameter Today 2030 year Long term
electrolysis parameters based
on (IEA 2019) Capex (USD/kWe_ 900 700 450
Efficiency (LHV) (%) 64 69 74
Annual OPEX (% Capex) 1.5 1.5 1.5
Stack lifetime (h) 95,000 95,000 100,000
On the IEA G20 hydrogen report (IEA 2019), hydrogen production by water
electrolysis presents a global average parameter as given in Table 10.1. Still, to reach
these numbers, it is considered a full load of hours of electricity, with a capacity factor
of around 5000 h/year and an electricity price in the long term of USD18/MWh to
USD63/MWh.
Brazil’s 2050 National Energy Plan outlines those electrolysers would be
produced in the country as an alternative to reduce costs through the nationaliza-
tion of inputs. The electrodes are based on nickel alloys when considering alkaline
electrolysis, which is an abundant raw material in Brazil. That could be a starting
point for the electrolysers manufactured in Brazil to become price competitive (EPE
2020a).
Natural hydrogen sources may also represent a new attractive primary carbon-free
energy resource. The São Francisco Basin, located in the Brazilian states of Minas
Gerais and Bahia, belongs to a shortlist of intra-cratonic basins where hydrogen
seepages have been discovered (Donzé et al. 2020). Some monitoring also points to
natural hydrogen in Ceará, Roraima, and Tocantins (EPE 2020a). Hydrogen explo-
ration requires combining the techniques and data used for conventional petroleum
and mining exploration. According to Moretti et al. (2021), exploration and produc-
tion of natural hydrogen are some of the most promising ways to get large quan-
tities of green hydrogen cheaper than the grey one produced from methane steam
reforming and green produced from electrolysis. However, exploration started in
various geological settings, and strategies and tools are under development (Moretti
et al. 2021).
Another abundant energy source in the country is biomass, according to the
National System Operator (ONS), which currently accounts for 8.3% of the Brazilian
supply mix (installed capacity). The bio-to-hydrogen technologies have opened new
perspectives for Brazil, especially for sugar and alcohol plants with a consoli-
dated industry and infrastructure that already produce ethanol, biogas, bio-waste,
and biodiesel on a large scale. Hytron, a Brazilian start-up founded by São Paulo
State Research Foundation (FAPESP), developed a container-mounted system that
produces hydrogen from ethanol, a route technically known as ethanol reforming.
Hytron also produces hydrogen from methane, biomethane, and water electrolysis
(Geraque 2021). Apart from water electrolysis, producing hydrogen by ethanol
reform and biomass gasification was also part of the roadmap for the structuring
of the PROH2 (AHK 2019).
On the scope of hydrogen storage and transportation, costs are also critical and
need to be scaled up at the implementation level to foster competitiveness in the use
of hydrogen. Hydrogen is usually stored and transported in compressed or liquid

gas due to its low density (Mayyas et al. 2020). Also, storage can be carried out
in salt caves and depleted gas or oil reservoirs, enabling large-scale and long-term
storage and having lower costs than tanks. Transmission and distribution can be
done through hydrogen blends in the natural gas pipelines. Still, this issue requires
studies on the gas limit that can be injected without prejudice to the network or the
final consumer, thus requiring regulation of the conditions for this mixture (Eliziário
et al. 2020). Some countries already have instituted limits on hydrogen blending
in natural gas networks. Germany presents a range from 2 to 8% depending on
certain conditions, France 6%, Spain 5%, and Australia 4% (IEA 2020). According
to The National Energy Research Company (EPE), the decision between central-
ized or distributed hydrogen production can circumvent the lack of a transport and
distribution network. Electrolysers or reformers can be installed close to the place of
consumption. However, the market must decide on the business model (EPE 2021).
As claimed by PNE 2050, it is highly recommended to evaluate the barriers related
to transport, storage, and supply infrastructure to define the necessary regulatory
improvements, such as the regulation of the mixture of hydrogen with natural gas
in the natural gas network, which would minimize the need to build infrastructure
and associated costs (EPE 2020a). According to IRENA (2019c), low investment is
needed to adapt natural gas infrastructure to transport hydrogen. For instance, the
German and European natural gas transmission networks can be gradually converted
to hydrogen operation with an investment of an estimated 10–15% of the cost of new
construction (Adam and Engelshove 2020). But blending hydrogen with other gases
means that pure hydrogen is no longer available for direct use in different applications,
e.g. fuel cell vehicles. So, it raises the matter that extracting pure hydrogen from
blended gas is possible. Still, it is expensive and complicated, so there is an economic
trade-off between the various hydrogen applications (IRENA 2019b). Regarding the
geological storage of hydrogen, PNE 2050 brings up that these issues can be set on
the scope of the definition of the regulatory framework for the storage of natural gas
(EPE 2020a).
In line with EPE (2021), Brazil has no institutional, legal, and regulatory frame-
work suitable for the energetic use of hydrogen. There are still questions concerning
institutional and legal governance, who will regulate and supervise the market, issues
around safety conditions, certification of processes, human resources, and fuel spec-
ification, among other matters. These issues will need to be addressed in the coming
years in Brazil and worldwide.
Potential Power-to-X Solutions Using Green Hydrogen
The process of converting the power generated from solar and wind sources to
different types of energy carriers for use across multiple sectors is called power-
to-x solutions (IRENA 2019c). Hydrogen is a clean energy carrier, and it can deliver
or store a massive amount of energy, allowing the transport of energy from one place
to another (EIA 2021). Siemens (2021) stated that in a fossil fuel-based economy,
promoting the green transition of different sectors to reach net-zero-carbon emissions
by mid-century will require a sector to provide renewable energy from the power
sector to support their transition. Hydrogen can integrate renewable electricity with
other energy use sectors (Bünger et al. 2016; IRENA 2019b; Siemens 2021). Thus,
sector coupling creates extra loads representing new markets for green hydrogen,
furthering the integration of high shares of renewables in the power system (Emonts
et al. 2019; IRENA 2019b).
Brazil’s 2050 National Energy Plan points out that hydrogen has the potential to
be applied in different sectors in the country, such as the power sector, transport, and
industry sectors such as ammonia production for fertilizer, iron, and steel plants. The
document draws attention to hydrogen storage’s role in offering additional power
in peak load times for instantaneous power balance, contributing significantly to
energy system resilience. Beyond that, green hydrogen has the potential to realize
long-term, seasonal power-to-power storage on a large scale (Brey 2020; Colbertaldo
et al. 2019). Re-electrification will be possible in hydrogen gas turbines, engines,
or fuel cells to provide security of electricity supply in periods of low renewable
energy supply or the dry season, as Brazil’s electricity supply is supported mainly
by hydropower plants (EPE 2020a; Siemens 2021).
The plan also shows that hydrogen tends to be considered in distributed generation
technologies as a behind-the-metre storage solution (McIlwaine et al. 2021), being
readily transformed into electrical energy used at residential or commercial levels or
even industrial and for recharging electric vehicles (EPE 2021; Guerra et al. 2019).
Regarding the transport sector, the Brazilian Hydrogen Bus Project represents
the starting point for developing a cleaner solution for urban public transport. In the
state of Rio de Janeiro, the hydrogen bus was the first project with 100% national
technology, launched in 2010 (Miranda and Carreira 2010). The vehicle, developed
by the COPPE, a unit of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in part-
nership with the Federation of Passenger Transport Companies of the State of Rio
de Janeiro (Fetranspor) and the municipal and state transport department, is consid-
ered the evolution of urban transportation. Another project was carried out in the
State of São Paulo, coordinated by the Metropolitan Company of Urban Transport
of São Paulo (EMTU/SP) and directed by the MME (Neves and Pinto 2013). In June
2015, three buses were delivered to the state of São Paulo and integrated into the
inter-municipal bus fleet (AHK 2019).
The missing of refuel stations is seen as a barrier to the use of hydrogen in trans-
portation. To overcome this issue, automakers in Brazil produce synthetic fuels based
on hydrogen and biomass to produce biodiesel. These projects are partially financed
and supported by the federal program Rota 2030. Furthermore, a Hydrotreated
Vegetable Oil (HVO) project is a bet for German companies like Bosch, BASF,
Mahler, and Mercedes looking for Brazil’s big truck and bus market (AHK 2019).
Hydrogen production from ethanol reform, biomass gasification, and biological
conversion are still in their early stages of development (Shahbaz et al. 2020). There
are already prototypes that use ethanol in solid oxide fuel cells in vehicles (da Silva
et al. 2021; Steil et al. 2017). In this case, Brazil, with its ethanol production and distri-
bution structure already established, could replace combustion engines with electric
motors, using energy generated by fuel cells, contributing to emission reduction. This
technology may represent an essential technological alternative for Brazil in the long
run, given its characteristics and relevant role in producing biofuels worldwide (EPE
2020a).
Although, with power-to-x solutions, renewable energies can also be used in far-
off places, sending power to other regions, states, or even foreign use. (Siemens
2021). It should also be noted that there is already an international hydrogen market;
however, this represents less than 10% of the total international hydrogen market
in economic value, but it is prospected to have a significant increase (EPE 2021).
According to 2017 Observatory of Economic Complexity data, the international trade
in hydrogen moved about USD11.75 billion. The biggest exporters were the USA
(USD2.22 billion), China (USD1.75 billion), Germany (USD1.33 billion), South
Korea (USD1.29 billion), and Norway (USD580 million). The largest importers were
China (USD2.78 billion), Japan (USD1.71 billion), Germany (USD921 million),
South Korea (USD789 million), and other Asian countries (USD800 million).
Brazil’s share was USD335 million in exports and USD61 million in imports
(EPE 2021). Currently, there is no considerable hydrogen production from renew-
able sources worldwide; however, this may change soon (Kakoulaki et al. 2021).
According to IEA (2019), international cooperation is vital to accelerate versa-
tile and clean hydrogen worldwide. Trade-in hydrogen will benefit from common
international standards. Countries with large renewable resources could drive major
economic benefits by becoming net exporters of green hydrogen in a global green
hydrogen economy (IRENA 2016).
Conclusion
Brazil has been establishing bases for its hydrogen strategy since 2002. However, in
the current year (2021), CNPE proposed developing the National Hydrogen Program
on a short-term agenda. This movement comes against the international progress
of existing global initiatives to set up technologies capable of achieving carbon-
zero emissions. At the same time, hydrogen has been seen as a vector of the green
transition. Despite not mentioning in its NDCs, hydrogen can help overcome some
energy challenges to promote the green transition of sectors to decrease emissions
and storage for variable renewable sources. In addition, it can bring the security of
supply and application in diverse sectors, including transport through power-to-x
solutions.
The fact that the country has been prospected by international companies and
institutions for implementing projects for hydrogen production has speeded up the
accomplishment of the Brazilian Hydrogen Program. It is noteworthy that Germany
is looking to deploy projects in potential countries (including Brazil) to import
the hydrogen produced. Combined with Brazil’s renewable potential, these circum-
stances bring up possibilities for the country to become a hydrogen exporting hub.
The Brazilian renewable potential can likely be expanded through hydrogen and
cooperation for internal and global green transition.
9, FAPESP. The authors thank the support of the Postgraduate Program in Energy of the Institute
of Energy and Environment of the University of São Paulo (PPGE IEE/USP) for all the learning
and structure provided. This work was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de
Pessoal de Nível Superior.
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Chapter 11
The Future of Diesel: Paths and New
Alternatives to Energy Security
and Sustainability
Luis Guilherme Larizzatti Zacharias, Luiza Di Beo Oliveira,

Victor Harano Alves, Xavier Guichet, and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract The freight and collective passenger transport sector is highly dependent
on diesel oil in Brazil, representing one of the main sources of emissions in the energy
sector. In this context, this chapter aims to discuss the role played by diesel in the
Brazilian transport scenario, outlining prospects for the adoption of new potential
fuels. As alternatives to diesel, biodiesel, liquefied natural gas, electricity, hydrogen,
and green diesel were chosen and analysed by six dimensions: regulatory, technolog-
ical, availability, infrastructure, economic and environmental. It was observed that
biodiesel, despite its consolidated production capacity, should not develop beyond the
percentage already expected due to technological and resource problems. Infrastruc-
ture investments necessary to adopt liquefied natural gas should be carried out in the
short term to promote the associated fleet. Green diesel has great potential because
of its similarity to fossil diesel; however, the lack of regulation has prevented its
development. The adoption of electromobility has great potential in the medium
term; however, incentive policies need to be adopted to offset the initial cost. It is
L. G. L. Zacharias (B) · D. Peyerl

e-mail: guizach@alumni.usp.br
D. Peyerl
L. D. B. Oliveira
Energy Planning Program, Centro de Tecnologia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Sala
211 Cidade Universitária Ilha do Fundão, Rio de Janeiro 21941-972, Brazil
e-mail: luizadibeo@ppe.ufrj.br
V. H. Alves
School of Economics, Management, Accounting and Actuarial Sciences (FEA/USP), University
of São Paulo, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: victor.harano@usp.br
X. Guichet
IFP Energies Nouvelles, 1-4 Avenue du Bois Préau, 92852 Rueil-Malmaison, France
e-mail: xavier.guichet@ifpen.fr
D. Peyerl
174 L. G. L. Zacharias et al.
observed that Brazil has several possibilities for diversifying the fuel supply mix,
thus contributing to an energy transition towards a low-carbon economy.
Keywords Diesel · Alternative fuels · Transport sector · Low-carbon economy ·

Brazil
Introduction
Diesel oil is a liquid fossil fuel derived from petroleum, composed of hydrocarbons
with chains of 8–16 carbons and, to a lesser extent, nitrogen, sulphur, and oxygen. It is
mainly used in diesel cycle engines (internal combustion and compression ignition)
such as trucks and buses (ANP 2021d). Furthermore, the diesel engine has been
widely adopted because it is a robust engine, more energy efficient, and more durable
than Otto engines. According to its characteristics, it is considered a great emitter of
pollutants when burned, releasing considerable amounts of greenhouse gases (GHG)
(ReşitoØlu et al. 2015).
In Brazil, the freight and collective passenger transport sector is completely depen-
dent on the availability of diesel fuel for its movement and, consequently, for the
transport of people, products, and services in the country. Approximately, 43% of all
fuel consumed in the transport sector is diesel oil (EPE 2020a). The price of goods is
directly influenced by the cost of transport associated with the price of this fuel, and
it is of national interest to guarantee an affordable price for the activities of this sector
(dos Santos Senna 2014). Petrobras, a mixed capital company with a state majority
stake, sets fuel prices in Brazil. Until mid-2017, prices were controlled and adjusted
according to government policy. With Petrobras adopting a new pricing policy in
2017, prices oscillated substantially, increasing prices for the final consumer. This
situation has caused recurrent threats of strikes in the oil and freight sector. For
example, in 2018, Brazil stopped due to a massive strike by truck drivers, generating
losses of billions for the country (MF and Kanczuk 2018). There were ten days of
stoppages, in which the country was becoming more and more under-supplied (Silva
et al. 2020). While very few cities are supplied by other means of transport such as
pipelines, cabotage, and railways, the stoppage of truck drivers is of great relevance
since fuels are transported to refuelling stations by them. The absence of a govern-
ment plan covering this issue has favoured the intensification of strikes. If the country
had a more diversified fuel supply mix, this situation could have been mitigated.
Recently, the National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) instituted the Fuel of the
Future Programme, which aims to develop and strengthen policies to encourage the
use of alternative energy sources for a low-carbon economy. The programme aims to
decarbonize our transport sector through sustainable and low-carbon intensity fuels,
as well as the application of national vehicle technology (MME 2021). In this context,
this chapter aims to discuss the role played by diesel oil in the Brazilian transport
scenario, outlining prospects for the adoption of new potential fuels. As alternatives
to diesel, biodiesel, liquefied natural gas, electricity, hydrogen, and green diesel
11 The Future of Diesel: Paths and New Alternatives to Energy Security … 175
were chosen and analysed by six dimensions: regulatory, technological, availability,

infrastructure, economic, and environmental. The reader is expected to understand
the potential and barriers of these fuels to diversify the energy supply mix towards
an energy transition to a low-carbon economy in Brazil.
The Diesel Oil Scenario
The Development of the Diesel Regime in Brazil
From the 1950s, Brazil invested in road transport as the main form of Brazilian
transport through political decisions. In this context, until the mid-1980s, diesel
was used as fuel in all types of road vehicles (light and heavy). However, because
of the 1973 oil crisis, which considerably raised the price of imported oil, the use
of diesel was limited. In 1976, Brazil imported about 87.9% of the oil consumed,
with high prices being a major problem for the country’s development (EPE 2020a).
Consequently, it was decided to subsidize the price of diesel and limit its use only to
productive means and freight transport. Thus, while ethanol had already been added
to gasoline since the 1920s in imported cars, diesel destined exclusively for trucks
and buses was the strategy adopted to reduce dependence on imported oil.
Furthermore, the diesel ban was encouraged at the time due to the incipient devel-
opment of technologies for the use and production of diesel oil: diesel engines were
noisy, had low performance, and the fuel had a high sulphur content, without prior
control of its emissions (do Carmo 2020). Thus, in 1976, through the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce Ordinance n. 346, the sale of diesel passenger cars in Brazil
was prohibited. This ordinance was subsequently updated through Ordinance No.
23 of 06/06/1994 of the National Traffic Council (CONTRAN), prohibiting diesel
oil consumption in domestic and imported passenger vehicles and mixed use with a
transport capacity of less than that 1000 kg. Figure 11.1 shows that although there
was a fleet of gasoline-powered buses in 1960, they were discontinued in 1976.
Figure 11.2 shows a rapid energy transition process in the country when gaso-
line trucks were surpassed by diesel trucks in 1970. Similarly, gasoline buses were
discontinued in 1976. This replacement was driven by the subsidy given to diesel,
making the use of this fuel economically advantageous. In 1979, due to the incentive
programme of the Proalcool (a policy of encouraging the production of ethanol as an
automotive fuel), trucks powered by ethanol appeared. However, the programme did
not prosper for many years, driven by the lack of planning that led to alcohol short-
ages due to high sugar prices and combined with falling oil prices in the international
market (Cortez 2015).
In 2019, while gasoline and ethanol represent, respectively, 25% and 20% of the
total energy consumption of the transport sector, diesel represents 42% (see Fig. 11.3).
Number of registered buses 35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
Year
Gasoline Ethanol Diesel
Fig. 11.1 Number of registered buses. Source Elaborated by the authors based on ANFAVEA
(2020)
180000
160000
Number of registered trucks
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
Year
Gasoline Ethanol Diesel
Fig. 11.2 Number of registered trucks. Source Elaborated by the authors based on ANFAVEA
(2020)
Dependence on Diesel Oil Imports
In Brazil, the downstream sector started consolidating through the incentives to build
refineries in the 1930s (dos Santos and Peyerl 2019). The late discovery and explo-
ration of a large quantity of petroleum in the country and the lack of technology
made the government invest in refineries, which generated resources to support the
oil exploration of the territory (Peyerl 2019, 2021). At the end of 2014, the refining
capacity was expanded with the construction of the Abreu e Lima Refinery (RNEST),
Fig. 11.3 Energy consumption in the transport sector (EPE 2020a)
the first large-scale unit since 1980. Capable of refining heavy oil, the production
of this refinery is aimed at the production of diesel, with a higher conversion rate
from crude oil to diesel (70%) and with a low sulphur content according to strict
international standards (Petrobras 2020d). In 2015, with the increase in oil produc-
tion due to the Pre-Salt exploration, Brazil achieved “volumetric self-sufficiency” in
oil. Currently, among the 17 existing refineries in Brazil, 16 produce diesel (ANP
2021c). Despite this, the country did not become self-sufficient in producing oil
products, importing a part of the diesel fuel consumed (Fig. 11.4). As demand
has increased, larger imports have been required, representing substantial expendi-
tures. Diesel represents about 40% of the country’s petroleum products production,
reaching 42.2 million m3 of diesel oil in 2020. That same year, diesel fuel sales
reached 57.5 million m3 (ANP 2021c). Thus, the difference needs to be imported to
meet national demand, representing a considerable deficit for the energy sector.
From a protectionist perspective, it would be advantageous for Brazil to be self-
sufficient in producing oil and oil products, as it would bring greater stability to the
Brazilian economy, protecting it from price fluctuations and crises in the international
oil market. In addition, the lack of investment in new refineries, the sale of existing
ones (Petrobras 2020c), and the change in Petrobras’ pricing policy have led the
country to a liberal economy without these potential immunities, oscillating diesel
prices for the final consumer.
14
12
10
10^6 m³
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Year
Imported Volume of Diesel Exported Volume of Diesel
Fig. 11.4 Imported and exported diesel volume. Source Elaborated by the authors based on ANP
(2020a)
New Oil Fuels Pricing Policy and Truckers’ Strike
Until 2017, the pricing policy of Petrobras was controlled by the state. Prices
remained frozen, changed only after internal decisions with the government, keeping
fuel prices stable. However, since then, Petrobras has adopted the Import Parity
Pricing Policy (PPI). This new price policy began to predict fuel readjustments more
frequently, including daily ones, reflecting oil variations in the international market,
in addition to the fluctuation of the dollar. Diesel prices started to oscillate consider-
ably, leading to unpredictable consumer prices. Figure 11.5 shows how the behaviour
of prices has changed with the change in pricing policy.
In 2018, there was an increase in diesel prices. In just one month, from April
22 to May 22, 2018, Petrobras readjusted gasoline and diesel prices in refineries
16 times (DIEESE 2018). This led to truckers’ dissatisfaction, triggering a trucker
strike across the country. The strike that demanded a reduction in diesel prices lasted
ten days, interrupting the circulation of trucks on roads throughout Brazil. The road
stoppage and roadblocks caused the unavailability of food, medicine, and services
across the country. In addition, the strike hampered the supply of liquid fuels, leaving
several gas stations short of gasoline and ethanol and with long lines for refuelling.
The Ministry of Finance estimated a loss of R$15.9 billion for the Brazilian economy,
with a drop-in industrial production and tax collection (MF and Kanczuk 2018).
Without an initial plan to respond to the strike and alleviate the freight transport
crisis, the federal government urgently created the National Policy for Minimum
Floors of Road Cargo Transport, intending to end the strike that had lasted for days.
It was initially instituted with the publication of Provisional Measure No. 832, of
27 May 2018, to promote reasonable freight conditions in the national territory to
provide adequate remuneration for the service provided (ANTT 2018). There is a
Fig. 11.5 Diesel price.1 Source Elaborated by the authors based on ANP (2021a)
strong relationship between Brazil’s dependence on cargo transport that uses diesel
as fuel in this scenario. This situation of energy insecurity ends up being aggravated
when we are also susceptible to international fuel prices.
Biodiesel Adoption in Brazil
Biodiesel Characterization and First Adoption in Brazil
The name biodiesel usually refers to the methyl esters of fatty acids, called fatty
acid methyl ester (FAME) (EPE 2020b). In Brazil, Resolution No. 45/2014 of the
National Petroleum Agency (ANP) defines biodiesel as follows: “fuel composed
of alkyl esters of long-chain carboxylic acids, produced from the transesterification
and/or esterification of fatty materials, fats of vegetable or animal origin” (ANP
2014). Although the ANP regulations restrict the name biodiesel to fatty acid esters,
there are other biofuels, such as green diesel, based on paraffinic hydrocarbons.
The Brazilian national project for the production and use of biodiesel (PNPB, in
Portuguese) was created in 2004. The main guidelines of the project are a sustainable
programme implementation, promoting family farmers’ inclusion, the performance
of social inclusion of family farmers, minimum price guarantee, supply quality, and
diversification of raw materials to strengthen regional potential (Brasil 2008).
Among the main challenges identified by the study group were setting quality stan-
dards, utilizing the biomass sub-products, the possibilities of differentiated taxation
1 Diesel S10 refers to the highest quality fuel with ten parts sulphur per million, while regular diesel
refers to fuel with 500 parts sulphur per million.
according to each region, and logistics problems related to biomass source, biodiesel
production, and distribution to the consumer centres. The opportunities found were
associated with Brazil’s biomass production capacity, fuel research experiments,
the availability of underused agricultural regions, the possibility of family farmers’
participation, and reducing dependence on diesel imports (Brasil 2008).
PNPB created the Social Fuel Seal (SCS, in Portuguese). The benefits and
advantages given to biodiesel developers who have this seal are tax discounts that
vary depending on the raw material used and the region of purchase. In addition,
producers, who have the SCS, have privileges in biodiesel auctions, as reported in
Section “Production, Commercialization, and Distribution of Biodiesel”.
The reception of the seal is subject to the acquisition of a minimum percentage
of raw materials from family farmers in the year of biodiesel production, the prior
signing of contracts for the purchase and sale of these raw materials, guarantee of
minimum prices, training, and technical assistance to family farmers.
Addition of Biodiesel to Diesel
The reduction of diesel dependence cited as one of the PNPB’s opportunities occurs
through the addition of biodiesel (B100) to diesel. This mixture started to appear
on an experimental basis in 2004 and, between 2005 and 2007, voluntarily, with an
addition of 2%.
Through law n° 11,097 of 2005, the addition of 5% became mandatory for eight
years, with an intermediate percentage of 2% in three years. Thus, in January 2008,
the percentage of biodiesel added to diesel increased to 2%, and in June of that
same year, it reached 3%. Participation grew by 1% in 2009 and 2010, reaching the
mandatory percentage three years before what was determined by law. For five and
a half years, the percentage stagnated at 5%.
The law n° 13,033 of 2014 established the new mandatory percentage of biodiesel
blending of 10%. This new legislation has as one of its justifications the alignment
of the use of biofuel with the National Energy Policy (Law No. 9.478 of 1997),
which, among its objectives, are protecting the environment and promoting energy
conservation; promoting development, expanding the labour market and valuable
energy resources; use alternative sources of energy, through the economical use of
available resources and applicable technologies; increase, on economic, social and
environmental bases, the participation of biofuels in the national energy matrix; guar-
antee the supply of biofuels throughout the national territory; promote the country’s
competitiveness in the international biofuels market; attract investments in infras-
tructure for transport and storage of biofuels; mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases
and pollutants in the energy and transport sectors, including the use of biofuels.
In 2016, Law no. 13.263, of 2016 changed the Law of 2014, defining the new
mandatory percentages of 8% for 2017, 9% for 2018, and 10% for 2019. The legisla-
tion also determined that after the engine tests and the tests that validated the use of
the mixture, the sale of Diesel B15 (B15 refers to diesel blended with 15% biodiesel)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
jan/09 jul/08 jul/09 jan/10 aug/14 nov/14 mar/17 mar/18 mar/19 mar/20
Biodiesel 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 10% 11% 12%
Diesel 98% 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 89% 88%
Fig. 11.6 Addition of biodiesel to diesel. Source Elaborated by the authors based on ANP (2020b)
in the national territory would be authorized. Following Brazilian legislation and

ANP resolutions, the historical percentage of biodiesel was represented in Fig. 11.6.
Production, Commercialization, and Distribution of Biodiesel
Since the start of the blending voluntarily in 2005, biodiesel production has grown,
as shown in Fig. 11.7.
However, contrary to what was initially proposed by the PNPB, the two main
raw materials for biodiesel in Brazil come from agribusiness and not from family
farming. Despite the partial success of the programme with family farming, it is
alleged that the most socially excluded farmers—and who were the focus of attention
of the formulators—are not benefiting from the programme, highlighting the limits of
7000
6000
5000
10 ³ m³
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Year
Biodiesel Production
Fig. 11.7 Biodiesel production. Source Elaborated by the authors based on ANP (2021b)
social inclusion PNPB. In other words, the market instruments created to encourage
the insertion of farmers in the poorest regions have not been sufficient to achieve this
purpose (Pedroti 2013). In 2019, soybean oil represented 61% of the production and
beef tallow, 10.3% (EPE 2020a).
The biodiesel production process occurs through transesterification, a chemical
reaction between the triglycerides present in oils, animal fats, and primary alcohol,
ethanol, or methanol. The alcohol used in Brazil is methanol, produced from natural
gas. Even though methanol is cheaper than ethanol, it is a toxic, flammable, and
non-renewable substance, which puts at risk the workers in the plants and reduces
the positive environmental impact of biodiesel. Another issue should be highlighted,
and biodiesel in greater proportions than diesel can cause the formation of deposits
in filters and injectors, with consequences on vehicle performance and an increase
in the frequency of oil and filter change. Thus, the instability of the biodiesel/diesel
mixture has been widely discussed and studied, and it is currently limited to 15%
of the biodiesel addition (EPE 2020b). In Brazil, biodiesel is sold through public
auctions organized by the ANP. Diesel refineries and importers participate in the
auctions to acquire biodiesel to meet the minimum percentages and voluntary use.
New Potential Fuels
In addition to biodiesel development policies, the energy transition in the Brazilian

transport sector is supported by plans and programmes aimed at a more balanced
transport sector. The National Energy Plan 2050, a document that establishes long-
term strategies for the Brazilian energy sector, indicates that there should be improve-
ments in energy efficiency, use of alternative sources, and an increase in non-
motorized modes of transport (EPE 2021b). It is also worth noting that freight and
collective passenger transport must still be carried out mainly by road. Within this
perspective, the document considers the following fuels/technologies as alternatives
on the horizon of the transport sector: flex-fuel vehicles (gasoline and ethanol), LNG,
CNG, biodiesel, green diesel, electric vehicles, and fuel cells for the utilization of
hydrogen. Flex-fuel and CNG vehicles do not qualify as potential diesel substitutes
due to autonomy, technical, and power issues (see Chap. 12).
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
LNG is obtained by cooling natural gas at cryogenic temperatures below −160 °C.
As a result of this process, natural gas in a liquid state has a volume 600 times lower
than its volume in a gaseous state, which facilitates its transport through vehicles and
vessels to places of difficult access and away from the pipeline infrastructure (EIA
2020).
LNG is widely used in electric power generation, industry, as fuel for vehicles,
and commercial and residential applications. Between 2000 and 2017, the LNG
market grew about 7% per year (da Silva et al. 2017), strongly influenced by natural
gas’s importance as a transition fuel for a cleaner energy supply mix (EPE 2018).
LNG is expected to make up nearly a quarter of the world’s natural gas supply
by 2050 and natural gas to be the only growing fossil fuel after 2030 (McKinsey &
Company 2021). In Brazil, the tax incentive given to vehicles powered by compressed
natural gas contributed significantly to expanding the fleet of gas-powered vehicles
in the mid-2000s (Cavalcanti 2005). Despite the cooling of the upward trend in
the growth of gas-powered vehicles, the understanding of technology has increased
among Brazilians, and gas-powered vehicles are no stranger to the Brazilian reality,
which can facilitate the adoption of this type of fuel. Modern legislation such as
the “Marco Legal do Gas Natural” will also help enter new players and develop
infrastructure that facilitates the deployment and adoption of LNG as a fuel on a
larger scale (CNI 2020; Salgado 2009).
Currently, Brazil has foreign investment incentives to develop the liquefied natural
gas market. In Brazil, the company Golar LNG has already installed a floating storage
and regasification terminal (FSRU) in the state of Sergipe to supply the Porto de
Sergipe I plant. One of the investment objectives is the exchange of diesel for the
direct use of LNG for trucks and commercial vehicles. In addition, the company
has partnered with Brazil’s largest liquid hydrocarbon distributor, BR distributor, to
supply LNG through its distribution network (Golar LNG 2020).
Electric and Hybrid Vehicles
The electrification of the freight transport sector by hybrid and plug-in electric vehi-
cles can help minimize the dependence on diesel oil while reducing atmospheric
emissions and noise pollution. The difference between these two vehicle types makes
each one more suitable for certain types of activities.
Electric vehicles are directly connected to the electric grid, which charges a battery
system that feeds the electric motor. This technology can be used as an alternative to
light trucks or urban freight vehicles to carry out freight within urban perimeters. In
this case, the vehicle range of about 200 km is sufficient to carry out deliveries and
return to the distribution centres where the batteries can be recharged (Gonçalves
et al. 2020).
The battery system is recharged in hybrid vehicles by an internal combustion
engine inserted in the vehicle. This technology is an interesting solution to increase
the energy efficiency of medium and heavy trucks that travel longer distances without
relying on major changes in the supply infrastructure (Gonçalves et al. 2020).
Although electrification is an interesting solution for freight transportation, several
regulatory, technological, and economic barriers are associated with this technology.
One of the most significant difficulties is the need to change vehicles (or at least
convert their engines), which does not occur in most of the alternatives analysed in
this chapter, such as green diesel. This barrier is significant in Brazil, where most
truck drivers are self-employed, and their trucks take an average of 18.4 years to
scrap (CNT 2019).
In addition, electric vehicles have a high price compared to internal combustion
vehicles, making it even more difficult for self-employed professionals and logistics
companies to replace technologies. Even with reducing maintenance and fuel costs,
which reduce the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) of these vehicles (Lebeau et al.
2013), it is still necessary to look for other ways for truck electrification to be possible
to reduce costs or increase revenues.
Two main ways of promoting this substitution can be highlighted. The first, which
can be aimed at both companies and self-employed professionals, is creating low-
interest credit lines for these technologies. The second, more interesting for fleet
owners, is vehicle-to-grid (V2G) regulation, which is still under discussion in Brazil.
The possibility of trucks returning energy into the grid and being paid for it can be
interesting since the peak hours of energy demand tend to be the same as major traffic
jams. Therefore, it would be interesting to stop vehicles in garages, helping the energy
distributor meet demand (EPE 2019). However, the Brazilian electricity regulatory
agency chose not to regulate this type of activity, highlighting three points: the current
stage of electric mobility in Brazil, which is still under development; the model and
sectoral regulation, which do not have enough elements to justify the interest in the
possibility of supplying energy to the grid; and the impossibility of classifying this
type of activity in the compensation system used by distributed microgeneration,
since this system only includes generation sources and does not include storage
sources (ANEEL 2018).
Hydrogen
Hydrogen can be obtained through different raw materials such as water (electrol-
ysis or thermochemical cycles), biomass, and liquid and gaseous biofuels (reform,
gasification, or biological processes) (EPE 2021a; IEA 2015). Although there is still
no definitive label taxonomy in the literature for the origin of hydrogen produc-
tion, they can be prematurely defined as follows: “brown or black hydrogen” is that
produced from mineral coal without CCUS (carbon capture, use, and sequestration);
grey hydrogen is that produced from natural gas without CCUS; “Blue hydrogen” is
that produced from natural gas, but with CCUS; and green hydrogen is that produced
from renewable sources (wind and solar) through water electrolysis (EPE 2021a).
Green hydrogen has received major investments due to the urgency of decarboniza-
tion and energy transition of energy systems. However, the green option involves
high production costs. The lowest costs are associated with fossil fuels, such as
natural gas reform and coal gasification, while the most expensive route is through
electrolysis using renewable sources (IEA 2020b). However, it tends to fall in costs
and is considered competitive from 2030 for large vehicles such as trucks and buses
(Hydrogen Council 2020; IRENA 2019).
Brazil has already included its use in the government’s strategic plans. In partic-
ular, the strategies indicate several competitive paths for Brazil in several techno-
logical routes (production of hydrogen using ethanol, hydroelectricity, wind, solar,
natural gas, biogas, and other biomasses). The National Energy Policy Council
(CNPE) recently pointed to hydrogen as one of Brazil’s priority topics for technolog-
ical research and development. As for infrastructure, there are prospects of mixing
hydrogen in natural gas pipeline networks in percentages and with limited pressures
for transport and storage purposes as a better way to use natural gas pipelines and
to use significant volumes of hydrogen for energy purposes (EPE 2021a). However,
Brazil still does not have hydrogen refuelling infrastructure and credit lines that
promote the scrapping of diesel trucks and the switch to hydrogen-powered vehicles.
Fuel hydrogen has suitable characteristics to be used directly in internal combus-
tion engines (IC), without major changes in gasoline engines. It has a higher calorific
value (approximately 2.6 times more energy per unit of mass than gasoline), a rapid
burning speed, a high adequate octane number, no toxicity or potential for ozone
formation, and can be blended with alcohol (Balat 2008; Singh et al. 2015). However,
one of the biggest challenges in using hydrogen is its on-board storage. It takes large
volumes to store the same energy as gasoline due to its low density. Therefore, several
storage modes are studied as compressed gas, in the liquid form associated with metal
hydrides, cryogenic tanks, etc. (Balat 2008).
Green Diesel
Green diesel, commonly called renewable diesel or hydrotreated vegetable oil

(HVO), is a renewable fuel for diesel cycle combustion engines produced from
renewable raw materials (Petrobras 2020a). Green diesel is a type of biodiesel
(paraffinic hydrocarbon base) but obtained from other manufacturing processes:
hydrotreating vegetable oil, Fischer–Tropsch process, fermentation, or oligomer-
ization of ethyl/isobutyl alcohol. It is formed by a mixture of hydrocarbons with a
chemical composition similar to fossil fuel (drop-in biofuel2 ) (EPE 2020b). Unlike
biodiesel, green diesel has no problems in its use in conventional diesel engines and
can completely replace diesel fuel (Kalnes et al. 2007).
Currently, HVOs represent the third-largest biofuel in volume produced glob-
ally, and their production is growing faster than that observed in the ethanol and
conventional biodiesel industries. Between 2011 and 2018, conventional biodiesel
production increased by 1.7% per year on the European market, while HVO advanced
at a rate of 37.1% per year (EPE 2020b). Although Brazil does not yet have plants for
the production of green diesel, it has been interested in this technological option, with
experimental production carried out by Petrobras at the Presidente Getúlio Vargas
Refinery (REPAR) (Petrobras 2020a). This fuel must be used in a mixture of three
2Drop-in biofuels are defined as “liquid bio-hydrocarbons that are functionally equivalent to
petroleum fuels and are fully compatible with existing petroleum infrastructure” (Dyk et al. 2019).
fuels, mineral diesel, and conventional biodiesel. Production in Brazil can occur
from crude soybean oil being processed at existing oil plants, which guarantees a
reduction in installation, production, and logistics costs. The biggest barrier related
to the large-scale production of green diesel at oil refineries in Brazil is the lack of
regulation that defines the parameters and conditions for the commercialization of
this biofuel (Cremonez et al. 2021). It is worth noting the high energy consumption in
some technological routes can impact production and distribution costs (EPE 2020c).
The Potential Fuel Supply Mix
Table 11.1 summarizes the main characteristics of these fuels in the following dimen-
sions: regulatory, technological, infrastructure, availability, economic and environ-
mental. To characterize the implantation potential, the dimensions of each fuel are
painted according to the stages of development: initial, intermediate, and advanced.
Conclusion
The absence of strong policies to encourage the development and use of new fuels
in the freight and passenger transportation sectors keeps the Brazilian system highly
dependent on diesel. The country urgently needs to strengthen its energy security
by diversifying the fuel and technology possibilities. The development of FAME
biodiesel is promising but limited due to technological problems (clogging of filters
and injectors), in addition to the need to use a fossil derivative, methanol. Therefore,
the increase in the participation of biodiesel in the mixture with fossil diesel is
not expected. Fortunately, new fuels have been considered in future within national
energy planning.
LNG is the fuel with great potential in the present and short term, already attracting
multinational companies such as Golar LNG which intends to offer infrastructure and
LNG throughout Brazil. Electric and hybrid vehicles have the potential for captive
fleets, slow speed, and short distances in the medium term. However, their develop-
ment is linked to formulating incentive public policies, mainly financial. For example,
the city of Rio de Janeiro replaced some of the traditional waste collection vehi-
cles with electric ones. More prematurely, there are hydrogen-powered vehicles.
There are many prospects for using hydrogen. However, while the costs to produce
green hydrogen and its storage (fuel cells) are not competitive, it does not expect to
substantial development in the short and medium term in the country. Finally, with
the development of the legal and institutional framework, it is expected that green
diesel can be used in the medium term. The greater participation of green diesel in
the composition of commercialized diesel will depend on reducing production costs
since there are no technological obstacles to its use in diesel cycle engines.
Table 11.1 Matrix of fuel development
Aspect Biodiesel (FAME) Liquefied natural gas Electricity Hydrogen Green Diesel (HVO)
(LNG)
Regulatory Well-established Established regulations. Established regulations An adequate The absence of
regulation supported by Recent advances in for installing the charge institutional, legal, and regulation, with
government incentive natural gas legislation will station, but the regulation regulatory framework definitions of the
programmes have a major impact on for V2G is still under for hydrogen is still specifications, hinders
the legal modernization of discussion lacking the development of HVO
the sector, improving the
expansion of
infrastructure and the
entry of new players
Technology Its addition to mineral LNG trucks usually have to Disruptive technology, There are It is a drop-in fuel with no
diesel is limited because replace diesel engines with but with few well-established restriction for use in
it can deposit in the filters Otto engines (spark manufacturers. Battery processes to produce diesel cycle engines. The
and injectors. High needed) (SCANIA 2022). electric vehicles are hydrogen. However, existence of different
percentages of biodiesel As it has fewer impurities assumed to reach an hydrogen vehicle storage technological routes
can cause loss of vehicle than diesel oil, it reduces average driving range of is difficult. Increasing facilitates production
performance and increase the formation of deposits 350–400 km by 2030 energy density by volume (EPE 2020b)
the periodicity of oil and and corrosion (IEA 2020a) requires high pressures
filter changes for storage in the gaseous
state or cryogenics for
storage in the liquid state
(Singh et al. 2015)
11 The Future of Diesel: Paths and New Alternatives to Energy Security …
(continued)
187
188
(LNG)
Infrastructure Brazil has established an It can be distributed Light trucks: charge It can be distributed It can be distributed
infrastructure for the through the existing stations in distribution through existing through existing
mixing and transport of infrastructure network centres. Medium and pipelines. There is a pipelines. In addition, it is
biodiesel by road with low modifications. heavy trucks: hybrid prospect of mixing a chemically stable
Easy transport through technology without the hydrogen in natural gas product that does not
trucks and barges allows need for a charging pipeline networks in change throughout its
supply to regions away station. If electric trucks percentages and with logistics chain
from the pipeline network are needed to travel long limited pressures for
distances, there is a lack transportation and
of infrastructure on the storage purposes (EPE
highways 2021a)
Availability Brazil has enough raw Brazil has large reserves Brazil does not have Brazil does not have a Brazil does not have
material to produce of natural gas, having a credit lines that hydrogen refuelling plants to produce HVO
biodiesel (mainly soy) record in natural gas promote the scrapping infrastructure and
with a consolidated production in 2020. of diesel trucks and credit lines that
production structure. In Increased storage and switch to hybrid or promote the scrapping
addition, it has the liquefied capacity can also electric vehicles of diesel trucks and the
capacity to expand to increase LNG supply switch to
replace mineral diesel in hydrogen-powered
the commercialized vehicles
mixture
Economic Although biodiesel prices The cost depends on the Electric vehicles have a The lowest costs are Depending on the
are generally higher region and infrastructure higher initial cost, but associated with fossil technological route, it uses
than those for mineral used. Very advantageous in TCO is reduced when fuels, while the most energy-intensive processes
diesel, they are supported regions with wide supply. travelling long distances expensive route is to impact production costs
by government In some Brazilian states, through electrolysis and the final price (EPE
programmes that require such as Rio de Janeiro, using renewable sources. 2020c)
the addition of biodiesel there are tax incentives However, it tends to
L. G. L. Zacharias et al.
to mineral diesel decrease in costs and is

considered competitive
until 2030 for heavy
vehicles (BNEF 2020)
(continued)
(LNG)
Environmental It partially replaces diesel The cleanest of fossil fuels, Zero atmospheric The environmental HVO reduces about 70%
but is not 100% despite the lower potency, emissions during use potential depends on the of greenhouse gas
renewable due to the use has the lowest pollutant and considering that the source of hydrogen emissions compared to
of methanol. Most of it is emission rates among Brazilian electrical production, such as mineral diesel (derived
produced through soy oil, fossil fuels, being an supply mix is mainly brown, grey, blue, or from petroleum) and 15%
a crop with several excellent candidate for renewable, emissions in green hydrogen (coal, with biodiesel, for the
environmental impacts transition fuel (Tilagone the life cycle are also natural gas, and same vegetable oil of
et al. 2005) reduced. Furthermore, renewable sources, with origin (Petrobras 2020b)
electric vehicles do not or without carbon
generate noise, capture) (EPE 2021a)
contributing to the
reduction of noise
pollution (EPE 2019)
Bold: initial development, italic: intermediate development, bold italic: advanced development
11 The Future of Diesel: Paths and New Alternatives to Energy Security …
189
Therefore, it is observed that Brazil has several possibilities for diversifying the
fuel supply mix, capable of increasing energy security and ensuring availability and
affordable fuel. Brazil has experience conducting rapid energy transition processes,
as noted in the use of diesel exclusively for trucks and buses and the Pro-alcohol
programme that successfully replaces the fleet of gasoline and diesel vehicles with
alcohol-powered vehicles. The current driving force is urgent and sufficient for the
country to develop an energy transition towards a low-carbon economy. However,
more comprehensive and strategic studies are needed to identify the best paths for
safe and sustainable energy system improvement. Would it be better to invest in oil
production and refining infrastructure, or would it be better to privatize and direct
these resources to new energy sources? What are the best routes for the diversifica-
tion of the energy system? What will be the real fuel of the future? As in previous
transitions, the success of the transitions depends on the policies, technologies devel-
oped, and existing resources. It is expected that the government will induce this new
transition through new strategies, measures, and programmes adopted as the Fuel of
the Future Programme.
Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from Shell Brasil and
FAPESP, through the Research Centre for Gas Innovation hosted by the University of São Paulo
(Proc. 2014/50279-4). Peyerl and Zacharias thank especially the current financial support of grant
processes 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9, and 2020/02546-4 (São Paulo Research Foundation—
FAPESP). This work was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de
Nível Superior.
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Chapter 12
Trends and Prospects for Transport Fuel
Consumption in Brazil
Celso da Silveira Cachola, Ana Clara Antunes Costa de Andrade,

Letícia Schneid Lopes, Evandro Matheus Moretto, and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract According to the Nationally Determined Contributions, Brazil has

committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector and
pledged to increase the share of biofuels in its energy matrix by approximately 18%
in 2030. Thus, this chapter has two objectives: (i) to calculate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from Brazilian road transport between 1970 and 2020; and (ii) to predict the
Brazilian energy consumption of different fuels and GHG emissions for the 2020s.
In conclusion, Brazil tends to reach its Nationally Determined Contributions target,
increasing the use of biofuels in its energy matrix. Despite an optimistic scenario of
increased use of biofuels, it should be noted that the consumption of gasoline also
tends to grow, and greenhouse gas emissions tend to fall not significantly. Therefore,
a vigorous energy transition to a low-carbon matrix in Brazilian road transport is not
expected in the coming years.
Keywords Transport fuel consumption · Low-carbon transition · Road transport ·

Brazil
C. da S. Cachola (B) · A. C. A. C. de Andrade · D. Peyerl

e-mail: celsocachola@usp.br
A. C. A. C. de Andrade
e-mail: anaclara.antunes@usp.br
D. Peyerl
L. S. Lopes
Institute of Geosciences, University of São Paulo, Rua do Lago, n° 562, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: le_schneid@usp.br
E. M. Moretto
School of Arts and Humanities, University of São Paulo, Rua Arlindo Béttio, n° 1.000, São Paulo,
Brazil
e-mail: evandromm@usp.br
D. Peyerl
194 C. da S. Cachola et al.
Introduction
The transport sector fulfils the demand for mobility in the world society, facilitating
the movement of people and goods across the planet (CNT 2017; Salvi and Subrama-
nian 2015). This sector comprises different modes, namely: (i) road transport; (ii) rail
transport; (iii) air transport; (iv) maritime transport; (v) intermodal; and (vi) pipelines
(Mihlfeld & Associates 2019; Salvi and Subramanian 2015). In the world, among
the six modes, the most used and the which emits the most carbon is road (McBain
and Teter 2021), as it provides mobility and delivery in a versatile way. Through road
transport, “door-to-door” deliveries are made, i.e., the product leaves the factory and
can be easily delivered to the consumer’s home (Mihlfeld & Associates 2019; Salvi
and Subramanian 2015).
In 2018, Brazilian transport sector was responsible for 32.8% of energy consump-
tion in the country, a total of 84,073 ktoe (EPE 2019). The country followed the global
trend in that sector and the main mode used was road. In 2018, it accounted for about
93% of the energy consumption in the whole transport sector (EPE 2019). In 2016,
Brazilian road transport was the segment with the largest share of the freight trans-
port matrix (61%) and the main mode of passenger transport, regardless of distance
(CNT 2017). It was also the mode that employed the most and had the largest share
in the production of wealth in the transport sector (CNT 2017).
The primary sources of energy consumed in the Brazilian road mode in 2018 were
diesel oil (45.2%) and petrol (27.6%) (EPE 2020), showing a great dependence on
petroleum derivatives. For this reason, road transport between 1990 and 2015 (data
availability period) had the highest greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to
other modes of transport. It is noteworthy that emissions from road transport in Brazil
were greater than emissions from the energy, industrial, residential, agricultural,
commercial, and public sectors considering only emissions from energy consumption
(excluding emissions from industrial or agricultural processes) (MCTIC 2017).
GHG emissions are one of the most significant stakes on the current global envi-
ronmental agenda due to global warming concerns (Climate Chance Association
2018). In 2015, during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21), the Paris Agree-
ment was signed, and it aims to keep the planet warming at 1.5 °C, thus reducing GHG
emissions from signatory countries (Jayaraman 2015; Souza and Corazza 2017).
Through its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in the Paris Agreement,
Brazil has committed to reducing its GHG emissions from the transport sector by
promoting efficiency measures, improving transport infrastructure, and promoting
public transport in urban areas (Brazil 2015). The country also pledged to increase
the share of biofuels in its energy matrix by approximately 18% in 2030 and increase
the share of biodiesel in diesel oil sold in its territory (Brazil 2015).
Therefore, this chapter has two objectives: (i) to calculate GHG emissions from
Brazilian road transport between 1970 (the first year of availability of EPE energy
consumption data) and 2020; and (ii) to predict the energy consumption of different
fuels and GHG emissions in road transport for the 2020s. Thus, the guiding questions
of this research are: in the 2020s, can there be an increase in the consumption of
12 Trends and Prospects for Transport Fuel Consumption in Brazil 195
biofuels? In the coming years (2020–2030), could there be an energy transition to a

low-carbon supply mix in Brazilian road transport?
In addition to its introduction (Sect. 12.1), this chapter includes a contextualisation
of the overview of fuel consumption, showing the main plans adopted in the country,
measures, and possible fuels to be used in the future (Sect. 12.2). Section 12.3
addresses the methodology for calculating GHG emissions and predicting future fuel
consumption in the 2020s, and Sect. 12.4 shows its results. Section 12.5 includes the
discussion of the results found, and Sect. 12.6 addresses the final considerations and
answers to the guiding questions for this chapter.
The Fuel Consumption in Brazilian Road Transport
Vehicle Pollution Control Measures
The first measure created to control vehicle pollution in Brazil was the Programme
for the Control of Air Pollution by Motor Vehicles (PROCONVE), developed by the
federal government in 1986. PROCONVE aimed to reduce pollutant emissions from
new vehicles by implementing phases that gradually force the automobile industry to
reduce pollution emissions from new vehicles (Dullius et al. 2017). The programme
has contributed to reducing emissions of various pollutants, but the amount the vehi-
cles more than tripled between the programme’s creation and the first half of the
2010s, thus decreasing the beneficial effects of the measures (Carvalho 2011; de
Almeida D’Agosto 2015). In comparison, nowadays, a diesel vehicle emits less than
20% of the pollutants it used to 20 years ago (Carvalho 2011).
After about seven years of the start of PROCONVE, the National Environment
Council (CONAMA) established pollutant emission limits for motorcycles, thus
creating the Air Pollution Control Programme by Motorcycles and Similar Vehicles
(PROMOT), launched in 2003 (Carvalho 2011). But even with the implementation of
these programmes and the development of new technologies, inspection and mainte-
nance practices are required, to ensure the effectiveness of reducing vehicle emissions
(Cachola et al. 2021). It is also worth mentioning that PROCONVE and PROMOT
do not limit GHG emissions.
In the international context, the objective of reducing carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emis-
sions made governments adopt one-off measures to reduce transport emissions. In
2009, at the Conference of the Parties at Copenhagen (COP 15), Brazil has assumed
commitments that resulted in the stabilisation of GHG emissions. These commit-
ments involve the use of biofuels and research for energy alternatives (similar to
the Brazilian NDCs) (Asselt et al. 2010; MMA 2020). Thus, the Climate Change
National Policy (PNMC) was created in 2009, as a starting point to regulate global
warming mitigation actions in Brazil and serving as a climate change combat strategy
(da Motta 2010). The PNMC’s objective is to achieve certain targets for emission
Fig. 12.1 Evolution of fuels in the transport segment in Brazil1 based on EPE (2021)
reduction, and this policy establishes the development of sectoral mitigation and
adaptation plans at local, regional, and national levels (Brazil 2010).
Energy Sources for Transport
In 2011, 111.3 billion litres of fuel were distributed in Brazil, a 3.7% growth over the
previous year. Considering only diesel oil, petrol, ethanol, and vehicular natural gas
(VNG), commercialisation yielded USD128.80 billion (USD37.60 billion in taxes
only) (Dualibe 2012). In Brazilian road transport, as shown in Fig. 12.1, the main
fuels used are fossil fuels, such as diesel and petrol (de Almeida D’Agosto 2015).
Conventional Fuels
The development model consolidated throughout the last century is firmly based
on the use of fossil fuels to maintain economic activity levels, with transport being
a critical issue in development and essential activity for society (Ferreira 2011).
At the beginning of the twentieth century, petrol started to be commercialised in
Brazil along with the first automobiles, being imported mainly from international
companies, starting a process of external dependence in the supply of oil derivatives
(SINDICOM and Noel 2010).
1 Figure available in color format at: https://fuelconsumptionbr.herokuapp.com/.

Internal combustion engines, known as Otto-cycle engines, can work with

different fuels, such as ethanol and petrol. Still, the latter predominance is the most
expensive and polluting option, though more efficient. In the diesel cycle engine,
having diesel oil and biodiesel as fuels, diesel oil stands out due to its high energy
density and economic feasibility, and it is the most polluting. As a result, oil remained
the raw material of choice for these fuels, in line with the world demand and reserves,
expanding as a result of continuous technological progress over the past few years
(Daemme et al. 2014; National Research Council 2013; Pereira et al. 2005; Torres
et al. 2006).
Dependence on fossil fuels is still present in Brazilian society. In 2009, the trans-
port sector was the most significant influence on Brazilian households’ carbon foot-
print. The effect of transport GHG emissions on the carbon footprint of households
was substantial in all income groups due to the consumption of petrol by family
vehicles and diesel oil in public and freight transport (Cachola and Pacca 2021).
Natural Gas
Natural gas (NG) was discovered in Brazil in 1922 (Peyerl 2019), but the lack of tech-
nology and qualified labour added to the difficulty in inserting gas into the Brazilian
energy supply (Peyerl 2019). Thus, Brazil has started integrating NG into the energy
supply mix only after the oil crisis in the 1970s (Moutinho dos Santos and Peyerl
2019). Later, in 1987, the Ministry of Mines and Energy launched the National Gas
Plan (Plangás) through government plans aimed at replacing diesel oil (Moutinho
dos Santos et al. 2002). In terms of international influence, the construction of the
Bolivia–Brazil gas pipeline (Gasbol) was the main action in Brazil’s NG context.
Gasbol started its commercial operation in 1999, representing a significant step
towards diversification of the Brazilian energy supply mix, and intensifying the use
of NG (Filho 2002).
In recent years, NG has been noticed in studies and research, and, despite its fossil
origin, it serves as an element of the energy transition to renewable energies. In the
transport sector, its use is due to its combustion being less polluting when compared
to other fossil fuels. VNG can replace other fuels, such as petrol, which is more
harmful to human health and the environment (Leal et al. 2019; Mouette et al. 2019;
Moutinho dos Santos et al. 2002). According to Mouette et al. (2019), the use of
liquefied natural gas (LNG) to transport cargo in the countryside of the state of São
Paulo would enable a significant reduction in fuel costs and GHG emissions.
Ethanol
Ethanol has a positive energy balance, emitting less carbon into the atmosphere than
oil (Cortez 2016). Sugarcane ethanol also has several advantages over other fuels
(de Oliveira Sartori 2017). In Brazil, the primary source of alcohol production is
sugarcane. At the beginning of 1530, sugarcane was the main extracted product in the
country. However, the alcohol that originated from sugarcane began to be negotiated
only between the 1920s and the 1930s (de Moraes and Bacch 2014; Soares et al.
2009). In 1931, the federal government approved Decree 19.717, determinating the
addition of anhydrous alcohol (without water) to imported oil in the proportion of
up to 5%, aiming to use the surpluses of the national sugarcane production (Cortez
2016).
The growth in the use of ethanol took place with the National Alcohol Programme
(Proálcool), created by a government decree in November 1975. This Decree
was created to avoid increasing external dependence, mainly due to oil price
shocks. The value of oil price soared in 1973 (when the so-called first oil shock
occurred), contributing to the search for new forms of fuel (Carvalho 2011). Proál-
cool programme focused on increasing bioenergy production, replacing petroleum-
derived fuels, and becoming the pioneer in renewable energy in Brazil (SINDICOM
and Noel 2010).
Due to the significant instability of the supply and influenced by the sugar market,
Proálcool almost ended in the 1990s. To guarantee a minimum market for alcohol,
the government resumed the policy of mixing alcohol in petrol and using an environ-
mental justification as an incentive. Thus, the alcohol mixture reached 25% of the
total volume of petrol, which caused a reduction of about 18% in the CO2 emissions of
petrol-powered vehicles (Soares et al. 2009). Proálcool could be considered one of the
biggest biofuel programmes globally in terms of efficiency and socio-environmental
benefits (Oliveira and Zanin 2015).
In 2016, Brazil was one of the largest sugarcane producers in the world, producing
28 billion litres of ethanol in the 2015/2016 harvest, according to data from the
Sugarcane Industry Union (Unica) (Cortez 2016). This was due to factors intrinsic
to Brazil, such as the amount of arable land, great amount of solar radiation, diversity
of climate types and species, and new technologies (de Oliveira Sartori 2017).
Biodiesel
There are several ways to produce biodiesel. The main raw materials are vegetable
oils, such as palm oil, copaiba, peanuts, soybeans, cotton, avocado, and castor
beans; it is also possible to produce it using animal fats (de Almeida D’Agosto
2015). In Brazil, the biodiesel emergence occurred simultaneously with sugarcane
ethanol in the 1970s, but unlike alcohol, it remained restricted to academic research
without developments in its commercialisation. Only in 2003, biodiesel started to
gain more space through a decree (currently it was revoked by Decree No. 9784,
2019) that created an Interministerial Working Group, responsible for presenting
studies addressing the feasibility of using vegetable oil and proposing actions for its
development (Abramovay 2009; Férres 2012). Thus, through the studies, the reports’
conclusions pointed out that the incorporation of biodiesel into the Brazilian energy
supply mix is of paramount importance since its development would bring environ-
mental and economic advantages (Férres 2012). In 2004, the National Programme for
the Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB) was created as the first major programme
related to this kind of fuel. Therefore, biodiesel was defined as a mandatory fuel in
the country, mixed with oil diesel with a percentage of 2% in 2008, 4% in 2009,
5% in 2010, 6% in 2014, and 8% in 2017. Finally, according to Law 13.263/2016,
the content of biodiesel in diesel mixture would be 10% (Abramovay 2009; Férres
2012).
In Brazil, the main raw material to produce biodiesel is soy oil since it is the
primary vegetable oil produced in the country. However, there is a small percentage
of other types. Data from the Petroleum National Agency (ANP) (ANP 2018) shows
that in 2012, 81% of biodiesel production was made from soybean oil, 13% was
from animal fat, 4% from cotton oil, and the other 2% was another type of oil.
Comparatively, in 2018, the use of soy as a raw material fell to 70%, animal fat rose
and cotton oil fell to 16% and 1%, respectively, and other oils rose to 13%. Thus, it can
be observed that biodiesel production derives from several types of raw materials.
Soy is the main raw material for biodiesel production due to the entire structure
already found in Brazil and the low price for the final consumer (de Oliveira Costa
Viegas and Arantes, 2018).
Currently, the country presents a favourable scenario for the development of
biodiesel. For instance, in 2009, biodiesel production stood at about 3 million m3 ,
and in 2018, it virtually doubled, reaching about 5.5 million m3 (ANP 2019). The
biodiesel production from soy or animal fat tends to increase over time. Moreover,
its growth is due mainly to institutional reasons, since there are warrants for increas-
ingly adding biodiesel to diesel, mostly using the environmental justification. In 2017,
in Brazil, according to EPE (2019), emissions avoided using ethanol amounted to
47 million tonnes of CO2 e, and the use of biodiesel to about 10.4 million tonnes of
CO2 e. Biofuels are a concrete alternative, not only to guarantee self-sufficiency and
energy security but also to strengthen Brazil on the international stage (Azevedo and
Lima 2016).
Possible Fuels for Future
Currently, due to the environmental impacts resulting from GHG emissions from
fossil fuel use, other fuels are being increasingly researched (Odell 2004). In this
scenario, the theme of decarbonisation is developed. It is a concept on which the
insertion of new energy alternatives is based. They have a decreasing amount of
carbon in their composition, thus following the trend of reducing GHG emissions
(Rohrich 2008). However, even if the environmental concern influences the decision-
making regarding the use of energy, the concern that still prevails, for the most part,
is the influence of economic and technological factors (Goldemberg and Villanueva
2003; Holdren and Smith 2000).
Electric vehicles, another less polluting option that can be developed, are divided
into two main categories. Hybrid electric vehicles combine an internal combustion
engine with a generator, a battery, and one or more electric motors. The second cate-
gory is of pure electric vehicles, which are entirely powered by electricity provided
by batteries, fuel cells (FC), solar energy, or being directly connected to the electric
network, like trolleybuses (Castro and Ferreira 2010). In Brazil, electric cars may
become an important alternative, but it will be necessary to create opportunities for
its use for this to come to fruition. The Brazilian electric cars fleet is still early, but
their use on a large scale would bring strategic benefits in the long run. It is worth
mentioning that even in the case where electricity is generated from fossil fuels, such
as coal and NG, the electric car has the advantage of concentrating GHG emissions in
energy generating sources, which are subject to regulation for its mitigation (Baran
and Legey 2011).
In addition to electricity, another fuel that may be included in the energy supply
mix of road transport is hydrogen (H2 ). Brazil is a leader in H2 technologies in Latin
America (see Chap. 11). There are, however, many bottlenecks, such as deficiency
in the training of human resources, maintenance of equipment, competition with
foreign companies, etc. For H2 to become a consolidated technology in the country,
there is a long way to go (Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos 2010), there is no
expectation for the use of H2 as fuel until 2030 in Brazil (EPE 2021).
Biogas can be mentioned in the panorama of sources for mitigating GHG emis-
sions in road transport. Biogas is a mixture of CH4 , CO2 , and small amounts of other
gases produced by anaerobic digestion of organic matter in an oxygen-free environ-
ment. Worldwide, in 2020, 60% of online and developing plants injected biomethane
into the gas network distribution, with a further 20% providing fuel for vehicles. The
remainder provided CH4 for various local end uses (IEA 2020). The use of biogas
in vehicles can reduce pollutant emissions by up to 90% compared to petrol, and its
use prevents the release of CH4 into the atmosphere, thus reducing GHG emissions
in road transport. Biogas can also supply any VNG kit (CETESB 2017).
Structure of Emission and Predictive Model Calculation
Study Design
In this work, energy consumption data were used to quantify CO2 e emissions from
road transport between 1970 and 2019. The authors also elaborated a predictive model
of energy consumption (and emissions) for 2020–2030. Such a model was created
using the same data of the CO2 e emissions’ quantification but also adding economic
data. The base scenario considers the average GDP growth, and the optimistic
scenario considers a higher growth value of it.
National Energy Balance—BEN
The study used energy consumption data from the National Energy Balance (Balanço
Energético Nacional—BEN), made available from 1970 to 2019. The consumption
Table 12.1 CO2 e emissions (IPCC 2006 apud. Senai 2006)

Fuel CO2 (kg/TJ) CH4 (kg/TJ) N2 O (kg/TJ) CO2 e (kg/TJ)
Petrol 69,300 25.0 8.0 72,305
Diesel oil 74,100 3.9 3.9 75,390.9
Liquefied petroleum gas 63,100 62.0 0.2 64,464
Vehicular natural gas 56,100 92.0 3.0 58,962
Ethanol (bioethanol) 0 0 0 0
data for road transport are available in a unit of 103 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe)
and comprise the following energy sources: (i) NG; (ii) diesel oil; (iii) biodiesel; (iv)
gasoline; (v) anhydrous ethanol; and (vi) hydrated ethanol.
Emissions Analysis
To calculate emissions from road transport between 1970 and 2019, and the predictive
models from 2020 to 2030, the study by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2006) was used. Table 12.1 shows the emission factors for
each energy source.
It is worth noting that one kilogramme (kg) of methane (CH4 ) emission is equiv-
alent to 21 kg of CO2 e, and one kilogramme of nitrous oxide (N2 O) emission is
equivalent to 310 kg of CO2 e (IPCC 2006). As previously described, the BEN data
are available in 103 toe, so toe to terajoule (TJ) was converted. One toe is equivalent
to 42 gigajoules (GJ), that is, 0.042 TJ.
Regression
Energy consumption is causally related to the economy of a given country. In this

way, a regression model was elaborated for each fuel type available. Subsequently, a
predictive consumption model was developed between 2020 and 2030. The regres-
sion used in this work was the Multivariate Adaptive Regression Spline (MARS), a
form of regression developed by Jerome H. Friedman (Friedman 1991) in 1991.
In this work analysis, the two variables used were: (i) gross domestic product
(GDP) of Brazil (1970–2019) and (ii) the energy consumption in TJ for each fuel.
The energy consumption was the dependent variable, i.e., the variable to be foreseen.
The GDP was the independent variable, i.e., the variable used to predict the energy
consumption values. Moreover, the r-square was used to assess how well the model
accommodated the data, i.e., how well the model represents the reality in this research
methodology. The r-square varies between 0 and 1, with results closer to 1 showing
that the model accommodated the data in a better way (Bruce and Bruce 2019).
Predictive Model
Using MARS, a predictive model of energy consumption was created. In this model, a
basis scenario and an optimistic scenario were considered for GDP values. Moreover,
in these GDP values variation and inflation data were also considered, foreseen by
the Instituição Fiscal Independente in the Fiscal Monitoring Report, November 2019
(Instituição Fiscal Independente 2019). Finally, Python version 3.8.4 was used and
the pyearth package for creating the models.
Limitations
When writing this work, only the GDP data for 2020 had been released, so the emis-
sions for that year were prepared in a predictive manner. The impact of the COVID-19
pandemic was not considered in the predictive model, and it only finds gross GDP
as an independent variable, without considering other independent variables.
Emissions Values for 1970–2030 and Perspectives for Energy

Consumption for 2020–2030
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emissions from 1970 to 2019
Figure 12.2 shows the evolution of energy consumption and CO2 e emissions between
1970 and 2019. It is worth of note the gradual increase in energy and emissions
over the years. However, in recent years, there has been an oscillation in energy
consumption and a small drop in emission values. In 1970 was consumed about
477 thousand TJ in road transport, already in 2019 was consumed 3.3 million TJ.
In 1970 was emitted about 37 million tonnes of CO2 e, already in 2019 was emitted
about 178 million tonnes of CO2 e in the sector.
Predict Energy Consumption and Emissions from 2020 to 2030
Table 12.2 shows the r-square values of the regression models for each type of fuel.
The lowest values were found in the petrol and hydrated ethanol models. The other
models obtained r-squared > 0.95.
Figure 12.3 shows the graphs of the regression models. There is a tendency to
increase biofuels and NG, a modest increase in petrol, and a decrease in diesel oil.
It can be noted that the use of diesel oil decreases parallel to the rise in GDP values
(x axis), in the years corresponding to the study period. On the y-axis is the fuel
Fig. 12.2 Emissions of CO2 e from 1970 to 20192 based on EPE (2021)
Table 12.2 Values of

Fuel r-square
R-square
Natural gas 0.989
Diesel oil 0.995
Biodiesel 0.986
Petrol 0.857
Anhydrous ethanol 0.971
Hydrated ethanol 0.903
consumption in TJ. On the x-axis the forecast value of GDP in millions of reais. That
is, on the x-axis, for example, values of 8 M represent 8 trillion reais.
Figure 12.4 shows the evolution of CO2 e and fuels between 2020 and 2030 on
the basis and optimistic scenarios. Then, it is possible to note that there is a small
decrease in emissions in the basis scenario. On the left side of Fig. 12.4 can be
seen the forecast of CO2 e emissions between 2020 and 2030. In 2020 emissions are
expected to reach around 183 million tonnes of CO2 e, while in 2030, emissions are
expected to reach around of 177 million tonnes of CO2 e in the basis scenario and
about 176 million tonnes of CO2 e in the optimistic scenario. On the right side, the
forecast of energy consumption between 2020 and 2030 can be seen. In 2020, energy
consumption of about 3.33 million TJ in Brazilian road transport is expected. In 2030,
consumption of 3.8 million TJ is expected in the basis scenario and 3.9 million TJ
in the optimistic scenario.
Paths to Zero Emission in Brazilian Road Transport
Brazilian road transport is the main consumer of fossil fuels in the energy sector
(Sauer and Rodrigues 2016), and this consumption has been responsible for a gradual

Fig. 12.3 Fuel consumption and GDP in the 2020–2030 predictive model based on EPE (2021)
increase in GHG emissions since 1970 (see Fig. 12.2). Population in general and,
specifically, urban agglomerations tend to grow even more, driving an increase in
transport consumption. As a result, there is also an increase in GHG emissions
(Carvalho 2011). However, this growth can be mitigated by using biofuels instead of
fossils fuels. It can be noted that in the middle of the past decade, GHG emissions
did not follow the energy consumption in road mode (see Fig. 12.2). GHG emissions
had a greater drop than consumption, and this difference was due to the higher
Fig. 12.4 Fuel consumption from 2020 to 20303 based on EPE (2021)
consumption of biofuels in the Brazilian road transport energy supply mix (EPE
2020).
In a globally context, the world’s interest in biofuels has increased since the
2000s, due to concerns about the development of renewable and clean energy sources.
Biofuels demand also increased due to: (i) the increase in oil prices; (ii) the benefits
that the expansion of biofuels usage can bring to the agricultural sector; and (iii)
the need of GHG emissions reduction (Oliveira and Zanin 2015). After years of
biofuels usage, Brazil has proposed regulations for all biofuels, mainly ethanol and
biodiesel. Furthermore, the newest initiative in Brazil to promote cleaner fuels is the
National Biofuels Policy, or simply RenovaBio, created in 2017. This policy aims to
establish an incentive to expand the production of biofuels in the country based on
predictability, economic and social environmental sustainability, and compatibility
with the growth of the market (Grassi and Pereira 2019). As RenovaBio is put into
practice, an increase in biofuels usage is expected, reducing GHG emissions. The
policy also tends to be an important tool in the coming years, increasing biodiesel
consumption (as shown in Fig. 12.3).
NG can be considered a bridge to a low-carbon-energy supply mix despite being a
fossil fuel, and VNG proved to be a good alternative, economically and environmen-
tally, to replace the vehicular use of other fossil fuels (Khan et al. 2016). According
to the results shown in this chapter, NG consumption tends to grow in the 2020s and
could grow notably as NG can replace other fossil fuels, bringing energy security. In
contrast, except for biofuels, renewable fuels do not consolidate (Dutu 2016). NG can
also be a bridge to the use of H2 in FC, as it can play a significant role in generating
H2 (Ogden et al. 2018).
In addition to using biofuels and other alternative fuels to contribute to reducing
emissions, it is necessary to consider more sustainable urban mobility. In this
scenario, green mobility stands out, assuming great importance when positively influ-
encing sustainability. According to Cupolillo et al. (2017), it appears that individual
transport (cars or motorcycles), which corresponds to about 35% of vehicles in urban
centres, is responsible for 60% of CO2 emissions, while the share of public transport

varies from about 15–27%. In other words, it is necessary to rethink the means of
transport: to encourage public transport, the displacement through cycling, walking
(when possible), the implementation of a rail transport system, to invest in trolley-
buses (electric buses), and to plant more trees in urban centres, which can help with
temperature regulation and heat islands. The main measures to be taken are: (i) control
of emissions from motor vehicles, (ii) use of cleaner fuels, (iii) vehicle inspection,
(iv) investment in the public transport system, and (v) control and management of
urban traffic (Cupolillo et al. 2017).
All options pointed out can reduce the oil dependence and carbon emissions in
road transport. The main challenges are technological advances, the countries’ energy
security, the lack of standardisation and regulations that guarantee the quality, safety,
storage, and supply of those fuels, and finally, the lack of specific public policies
to encourage their production (Castro and Ferreira 2010). The search for energy
efficiency must be constant. For this reason, modern automobiles must consume less
fuel and emit less GHG. In the same way, regulations should also contribute by
demanding more from industries (National Research Council 2013).
There is a prospect showing that GHG emissions of Brazilian road transport in
the coming years will fall (from 178 million tonnes of CO2 e in 2019 to around
177 million in 2030, basis scenario, and around 176 million in 2030 in the optimistic
scenario), while energy consumption will increase (from 3.3 million TJ in 2019 to
around 3.9 million TJ in 2030, basis scenario, and around 4 million in 2030 in the
optimistic scenario). The prospect is due to the increase in the consumption of biofuels
(see Figs. 12.3 and 12.4). However, there are more factors that can contribute to
emission drops in road transport, such as increased engine efficiency, the introduction
of new technologies, the use of hybrid electric vehicles, or even the development of
more potent NG engines, and, finally, the use of H2 (Andress et al. 2011). Road
transport decarbonisation is considered a necessity and one of the main paths to
more sustainable development in Brazil and worldwide. Figure 12.5 shows the paths
for sustainable transport.
Conclusions
Brazil has pledged to limit its emissions in the energy sector by increasing the use of
biofuels and as can be seen in the results of this work, the trend for the coming years is
that there will be growth, thus reducing GHG emissions too. According to the results
shown in this chapter, the consumption of biofuels (biodiesel, anhydrous alcohol, and
hydrated alcohol) tends to increase in the 2020s, being a significant positive point.
This way, the country tends to reach its NDC target, increasing biofuels in its energy
supply.
Despite an encouraging scenario of increased use of biofuels, it should be noted
that the consumption of petrol also tends to grow in the 2020s, and GHG emissions
do not tend to fall significantly. Therefore, a vigorous energy transition to a low-
carbon matrix in Brazilian road transport is not expected in the coming years. To
Fig. 12.5 Paths to a sustainable transport
significantly reduce GHG emissions, it will be necessary to add other types of fuel
to the energy matrix of this model (including H2 ) and insert electric cars and biogas.
NG can also be used as a bridge to a less polluting matrix, as its emissions can be
lower than those of other fossil fuels.
An important point to be mentioned is the diversity of low-carbon alternatives,
adopting more than one form, such as hybrid cars (electric and ethanol). It is inter-
esting to have options, so there is no dependence on just one. Technology can also
help reduce GHG emissions in vehicles with efficiency improvement, and regulatory
policies must be developed and put into practice, since PROCONVE and PROMOT—
despite being great programmes for mitigating pollutants emissions—do not include
them in their scope targets for GHG emissions.
In addition to offering alternative fuels, for sustainable transport to be the norm
in Brazil, it is necessary to improve public transport, especially in large urban
centres, and encourage the use of active transport (walking and cycling), providing
adequate infrastructure for these activities. It is also worth noting that improving
public transport is one of the goals contained in the Brazilian NDC.
Acknowledgements All the authors gratefully acknowledge support from SHELL Brazil and
FAPESP through the Research Centre for Gas Innovation (RCGI) (FAPESP Proc. 2014/50279-
4), hosted by the University of São Paulo, and the strategic importance of the support given by
ANP through the Research & Development levy regulation. Peyerl expresses special thanks for
the current financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9, São Paulo Research
Foundation (FAPESP). Costa de Andrade is especially grateful for the current financial support of
Processes 2019/17996-8 and 2020/12521-9, through FAPESP. This work was partially financed by
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior.
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Chapter 13
How Can Renewable Natural Gas Boost
Sustainable Energy in Brazil?
Saulo Vieira da Silva Filho, Mariana Oliveira Barbosa, and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract The high populational density and poor or absent waste management
strategies in developing economies make the deployment of waste-to-energy tech-
niques a feasible strategy. A large portion of the Brazilian household domestic waste,
for example, is inadequately destined, generating impacts on soils, water resources
and increased emissions of greenhouse gases. Currently, Brazil produces around 1.83
billion cubic meters of biogas per year, but its full potential is yet to be explored totally.
The country can minimize its energy vulnerability and increase the sustainability of
its energy production by applying circular economy principles and waste-to-energy.
This chapter seeks to unravel the potential for biogas production from household
organic waste in Brazil, presenting an assessment of the potential of energy genera-
tion from Municipal Solid Waste and the promising localizations for implementing
biogas plants. As a result, the country’s potential for renewable methane amounts
to about 9 MM m3 /day. The coastal and southeastern areas have a larger potential
to convert household waste into energy due to the higher population concentration.
The latter can also increase the energy production reliability in the northeastern
and southeastern regions, supporting operators to circumvent seasonally renewable
sources. The scenario for biogas in Brazil is positive. However, the country still needs
consolidation of its public policies to incentivize the biogas insertion into its energy
matrix and entrepreneurship toward the smarter handling of wastes.
Keywords Renewable natural gas · Circular economy · Waste-to-energy · Brazil
S. Vieira da Silva Filho (B) · M. O. Barbosa · D. Peyerl

e-mail: saulo.vsfh@gmail.com; saulo.vieira.filho@alumni.usp.br
M. O. Barbosa
e-mail: mariana.oliveira.barbosa@alumni.usp.br
D. Peyerl
D. Peyerl
212 S. Vieira da Silva Filho et al.
Introduction
Humankind has accelerated the consumption of natural resources and production

of wastes, altering the landscape, cutting down forests and raising greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG) at unprecedented rates (Crutzen 2006). The fast-changing natural
processes concern scholars and practitioners on how the future will affect life and
economic prosperity. The paradoxical challenge of the twenty-first century arises:
thriving in the economy with the minimum possible impact on the environment.
Through the necessity of changes in how humankind uses natural resources, including
energy, many worldwide actions have been taken in the last decades.
In Brazil, the high amount of waste generated from agriculture or sanitation emits
a large amount of GHG. The use of organic wastes to produce energy can help
decarbonize the energy mix and diversify resources at a time of changes in the
Brazilian hydrological landscape. Wastes are also ultimately mishandled in a large
portion of the country and generate other environmental problems such as soil and
water contamination. Besides being an effective solution to enhance the waste-to-
energy (WtE) of the country, deploying wastes to produce energy is favored by the
high populational density in some specific regions of the country, which also have a
larger concentration of produced organic waste and viability of the ventures.
This book chapter seeks to unravel the Brazilian potential for biogas production
from household organic waste, presenting an assessment of the potential of energy
generation from Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) and the promising localizations for
implementing biogas plants. The guiding question to answer this objective is the
same as the title of this chapter: How can renewable natural gas boost sustainable
energy in Brazil?
Answering this question, concepts such as circular economy (CE) and its princi-
ples connected to the WSW are part of the theoretical referential. In this book’s
chapter, CE is analyzed as a promising framing for renewable and sustainable
energy production in Brazil, focusing on the waste-to-energy (WtE) state-of-the-art
to achieve the recycling of organic nutrients and decrease GHG emissions through
the decarbonization of gas.
Literature Review
The CE aims to add value to waste to increase resource use efficiency and achieve a
better balance and harmony between the economy, environment and society (Ghis-
ellini et al. 2016). Besides rethinking our production and consumption standards, CE
can generate new forms of income distribution.
CE has come out as a principle related to ecological and environmental economics
and industrial ecology that today aims to achieve cleaner production standards,
increase the use of renewable materials and technologies, foment the adoption of
transparent policies and increase production and consumption awareness (Ghisellini
13 How Can Renewable Natural Gas Boost Sustainable Energy in Brazil? 213
et al. 2016). Although CE was not meant to complement Sustainable Development

(SD), it has also been used as an operationalization for businesses to implement
SD at the micro, meso and macro levels (Geissdoerfer et al. 2017; Kirchherr et al.
2017). In short, CE aims to disrupt the ‘end-of-life’ concept so that the circularity
of a variety of materials can be improved and the use of inputs can be reduced.
CE can also improve the energy efficiency of the whole production chain by using
wastes to produce energy. That enables the decentralization of energy production
while enhancing the value of materials and reducing GHG emissions.
CE has been understood as an aspect that should be used for environmental protec-
tion and orient policies to achieve more sustainable production and consumption
models (Ghisellini et al. 2016). For being increasingly debated in the industry, it has
been mainly depicted as a strategy to achieve long-term economic prosperity and
environmental quality (Kirchherr et al. 2017). Part of that is because the industry is
efficient at creating solutions, and its innovation capacity is fundamental to CE (Pan
et al. 2015). A bottom-up perspective, in which CE goals and framing are well estab-
lished, can easily recognize individual needs and characteristics of economic sectors
and incorporate entrepreneurial values well aligned with the CE global conceptual
models and principles. Nevertheless, policy and decision-makers must uphold CE
core values to guide innovations seeking new alternatives to add value to products
that aim to close the production loop. Therefore, the natural process to achieve a
sustainable transition to a CE would be to have well-established policies, programs
and definitions to support technological innovation for energy production.
Recycling should not be understood as a unique strategy in circular systems but
as one of the pillars of CE development. Academia and industry have indeed given
more attention to developing cleaner technologies and recycling strategies rather
than reuse (Ghisellini et al. 2016). Still, some limitations of recycling are: (i) itself
cannot ensure a theoretically closed-loop, (ii) bulkier materials are not valuable
enough to break even the prices of their recycling, (iii) the quality degradation of
most materials and (iv) the intensive energy consumption (Allwood 2014). Despite
envisioning an infinite loop where goods turn back to raw materials is attractive,
knowing the technical limitations of recycling and incorporating both reuse and
reduction to CE is fundamental to a newer and more widely accepted conceptual
definition of CE (Kirchherr et al. 2017).
The solutions associated with the CE in the productive chain of several materials
and services foster impacts in the energy sector. However, just as the CE approach
involves social, economic and environmental issues, sustainable solutions for the
energy sector also seek a result that strikes a balance between them (Blum et al.
2020). CE can decrease energy consumption and decarbonize some sectors when
applied to energy production. Alternatives that focus on using waste to produce
energy have a high potential to decentralize its production, distribute income and
increase energy security.
Along with the outgrowing consumption of energy, authorities aim at expanding
the use of renewable resources to reduce or control GHG emissions. A great chal-
lenge in this sector is the construction of photovoltaic modules, wind turbines and
batteries, or even the expansion of energy crops (Gielen et al. 2019). Despite being
cleaner, these renewable alternatives can rely on extracting minerals and fossil fuels
to build facilities, production maintenance and energy storage. These must be mini-
mized without depleting resources, in addition to evaluating business models and
the alternatives that CE can afford (Mulvaney et al. 2021). Solutions that foment
CE can achieve more sustainable energy production and better handle the applica-
tion of energy transition principles. Good examples that dealt with this integration
concentrated on increasing the life cycle of products or elements while focusing on
technologies and practices that reduce GHG:
i. The capture of CO2 emitted by industries and transformed into elements such
as methanol, which also has an energy value (Sankaran 2020);
ii. Recycling of photovoltaic panels, since this is one of the main bottlenecks for
thinking about the future expansion of solar energy in the energy mix (Kim and
Park 2018);
iii. Electrification from the secondary use of batteries (Su and Urban 2021) and;
iv. Production of biofuels from organic waste (Pan et al. 2015).
Beyond improving energy security and diversifying the energy mix, according to
(Baležentis et al. 2019), developing a bioeconomy is one of the main strategies to
reduce GHG emissions and mitigate climate change. As stated in Guo et al. (2015),
the bioenergy captured by land plants is 3–4 times larger than the world’s energy
demand. The recoverable portion of these energy crops, understood by (Haberl et al.
2013) as those outside croplands, infrastructure, wilderness and denser forests, may
have come to deliver, according to the same authors, approximately 190 EJ year−1 ,
about 35% of the world’s demand for energy in 2013 (Guo et al. 2015; Haberl et al.
2013).
Nevertheless, the bioeconomy itself is not enough to achieve a restoration cycle, as
the use of chemical fertilizers based on nitrogen, potassium and phosphorous requires
the exploration of additional nutrients and the input of a large amount of energy that
should be taken into account within the context of a CE (Sherwood 2020). There is
an insufficient nutrient recirculation achieved by using manure, straw and sewage
sludge. At the same time, a cradle-to-grave approach applied to energy crops can
accelerate resource depletion by being strongly dependent on the fertilizers derived
from mineral reserves and natural gas (Sattari et al. 2016; Sherwood 2020). It can also
generate a huge loss of value in the production chain, eutrophication of inland and
coastal areas (Huang et al. 2017) and, ultimately, environmental pollution (Eltarabily
et al. 2017).
In addition to that, as there is limited available land and space for energy crops
(Pan et al. 2015), land and water supply conflicts and threats to biodiversity can
emerge from biomass fuel production (e.g., biodiesel and bioethanol) if biomass
is to be used as the main strategy to grow the renewables’ share while replacing
fossil fuels (Nevzorova and Kutcherov 2019; Sherwood 2020). As shown in Schyns
and Vanham (2019), the amount of water used to produce energy from wood in
Europe can largely affect biodiversity and water supply. In addition, the declining
water supply can ultimately limit wood production and green water flows biomass
production allocation.
According to Sherwood (2020), biomass production for materials and chemicals

should be a viable option only when the food market is satisfied. As our society grows
not only the energy demand but also the consumption of goods and generation of
wastes, in the context of pursuing a CE and renewable energy, using organic wastes
to produce energy is a feasible option, as it not only supports reducing fossil fuels
share but also finds value in waste and create new forms of income (Mak et al.
2020; Malinauskaite et al. 2017; Nizami et al. 2017). With a WtE approach, wastes
from agriculture, households, animals and industry can be converted into various
types of bioenergy products (Pan et al. 2015). That way, what has been treated as
a growingly expensive problem can be converted into a profitable, sustainable and
circular activity.
In developing countries, more than 90% of waste is dumped in open sites or land-
fills, which ultimately causes various diseases and environmental problems (Nizami
et al. 2017). WtE is an option that can solve energy supply and waste management
issues by increasing energy security while reducing reliance on energy imports, GHG
emissions, and the contamination of water and soil due to the mismanagement of
residues and high landfill costs (Ncube et al. 2021; Nizami et al. 2017). That option
would not only achieve a sounding water–energy nexus (Pan et al. 2015), but it would
also work food security as an important variable in energy production. The reuse of
wastes to produce energy can increase the offer of land to food crops and reduce the
reliance on mineral and gas reservoirs to produce fertilizers. It can also reduce the
water footprint in renewable energy production and create new businesses and forms
of income.
The organic fraction of wastes, which varies between 50 and 62% (Nizami et al.
2017), can be used to produce energy with biological, thermo-chemical, chemical
and physical processes (Nizami et al. 2017; Pan et al. 2015). The type of residue and
strategy dictates the appropriate technology for biorefineries. Examples of WtE tech-
nologies are anaerobic digestion, fermentation, combustion and incineration, trans-
esterification, bioelectrochemical, gasification, pyrolysis and hydrothermal liquefac-
tion. A thorough review of the sustainable technologies of WtE is provided in Trabold
and Babbitt (2018). Anaerobic digestion for biogas production is a technology that
can turn back organic wastes into energy and biofertilizers and reduce GHG emis-
sions by avoiding methane release (Ericsson et al. 2020; Flesch, Desjardins, and
Worth 2011). In addition, an appropriate operationalization of biodigesters plays
a fundamental role in achieving these advantages and avoiding exceeding fugitive
emissions (Flesch et al. 2011; Rodhe et al. 2015). Hijazi et al. (2016) highlight some
measures that can minimize, mainly, the effects of global warming and resource
consumption, such as:
• Selection of energy crops with high organic matter per unit area;
• Installation of a flare to discharge biogas when there is no consumption or storage
available;
• Protection of the storage tank; and
• Monitoring the biogas leakages; and others.
The productivity chain from organic waste management to biogas generation

counts on several processes and circumstances that interfere with the final products.
The conditions of the environment are important for bacterial anaerobic digestion and
must be controlled according to its oxygen concentration, temperature, pH, nutrient
availability and presence of inhibitors (such as H2 S) (Kothari et al. 2014). Other
parameters concern the operational aspects of the biodigester and the type of organic
waste that the system carries. They are (i) the relationship between the wet/dry solid
load (which controls the need for different types of pre-treatment and the process
efficiency); (ii) the volumetric organic load and the retention time in the biodigester;
(iii) the biogas productivity and yield and (iv) the optimal agitation for the high
contact between organic matter and bacteria without damaging them (FNR 2013).
Table 13.1 summarizes some studies that describe the composition of organic wastes:
Biogas is a potential source for thermoelectric generation. The process of its
transformation into electrical energy begins with the conversion of chemical energy
contained in its molecules into mechanical energy by controlled combustion (ratio
of the mixture between air and fuel). This mechanical energy activates an alternator
that converts it into electrical energy. For instance, Mensah et al. (2021) evaluated
the electric generation of biogas from sewage treatment in Benin and showed that the
biogas potential is equivalent to 2% of the total imported energy. Ribeiro et al. (2016)
investigated biogas production from the anaerobic digestion of poultry in the interior
of Minas Gerais state, reaching the projected power capacity of 1277 TWh/year.
Rios and Kaltschmitt (2016) found that electricity generation from waste is a viable
option in Mexico by calculating its theoretical, technical and economic potential.
Table 13.1 Inputs used for biogas generation

Inputs References
Municipal solid waste (MSW) Food waste Zhang et al. (2014)
Organic waste Rajendran et al.
(2014)—Sweden
Sewage sludge Demirbas et al. (2016)—Saudi
Arabia, Kiselev et al.
(2019)—Russia, Bachmann
(2015), Bien et al. (2007),
Paolini et al. (2018)—Italy
Agricultural by-products and Sugar cane Contreras et al. (2009)—Cuba,
waste Parsaee et al. (2019)—Vinasse
Mix Kapoor et al. (2020)
Livestock manure Swine manure González-Fernández et al.
(2008)
Mix Agricultural waste and cow Almomani and Bhosale (2020)
dungs
Swine/poultry manure and Borowski et al. (2014)
sewage sludge
Besides, biogas has several end uses, such as thermal energy generation, cogen-
eration and biomethane production. In turn, biomethane can be used as fuel for
vehicles or to produce green hydrogen (see Chaps. 11 and 12). Moreover, industries
can demand biogas as fuel or raw material (SGA 2008). Ncube et al. (2021) compare
two of the end uses of biogas from organic waste separated through anaerobic diges-
tion to assess environmental impacts in Canada. The first scenario has the option of
cogeneration in a system that combines heat and electricity generation. The second
option involves the production of biomethane through the treatment, mainly scrub-
bing, of the previously produced biogas. Thus, the study assessed that this practice
reduces environmental impacts and that the destination of cogeneration contributes
more (Ncube et al. 2021). The transformation from biogas to biomethane with the
installation and operation of a waste power plant can break even the costs faster
(Rajendran et al. 2014).
How Can Renewable Natural Gas Boost Sustainable Energy

in Brazil?
The Brazilian electricity matrix is highly reliant on the hydrologic cycle. The increas-
ingly recurrent droughts in the Paraná Basin (Coelho et al. 2016; Nobre et al. 2016)
have made the population highly vulnerable to water and energy scarcity. Dams inflow
have not been enough to compensate for losses and demand. Electricity access is also
currently jeopardized by the increased prices and probability of power rationing and
blackouts, which already occurred in 2001. The electricity and transportation sectors
that make broad use of bioethanol are also indirectly subject to droughts, as they
require a large volume of blue water to irrigate fields. According to the last edition of
Panorama of Solid Waste in Brazil (2020), there has been an increase in municipal
solid waste (MSW) in Brazil by more than 10 M tons per year in the last decade.
However, there has been no great improvement concerning the deposition of this
waste. In Brazil, around 40.5% of waste still has inadequate disposal in controlled
landfills and dumps. In the Midwest, north and northeast regions, this percentage
exceeds 80% (ABRELPE 2020). This type of disposal generates problems, both in
terms of health and the contamination of soils, aquifers and GHG emissions. The
cost to remedy all these impacts is equivalent to USD 1 billion per year (ABRELPE
2020). There is a clear need to apply circular solutions to handling waste in the
country, and deploying waste to produce biogas has been a feasible alternative in
other portions of the world (DEFR 2011; Gu et al. 2016; Schütte 2017; SGA 2008).
According to ABiogás (Brazilian Biogas Association), the biogas production in
Brazil corresponds to only 2% of the national potential, equivalent to 82.58 billion
cubic meters per year (CIBIOGÁS 2021). However, biogas production and installa-
tion of new biogas plants have been exponential during the last decades and has the
support of the Brazilian government (see Chap. 14). Out of the 675 plants, 638 are for
energy purposes and vary between small (< 500,000–1,000,000 N m3 /year), medium
(1,000,001–5,000,000 N m3 /year) and large (more than 5,000,001 N m3 /year). The

larger ones are responsible for 79% of the total production amount (CIBIOGÁS
2021). Concerning the substrate, there are 57 (9%) biogas plants loaded with MSW
(and sewage) that correspond to 73% of current production (CIBIOGÁS 2021). On
the other hand, the energy application of biogas has a large volumetric predominance
of electricity in Brazil (73%), followed by the production of biomethane (19%) and
thermal energy (8%). Between 2004 and 2015, nine thermoelectric plants powered
by biogas from landfills were installed with a total installed capacity of 86.3 MW.
Most of them are concentrated in the southeast region (Nascimento et al. 2019).
Using MSW as an alternative fuel is a strategy that can reduce the impacts of
waste while generating energy and recycling nutrients. It can also be used as a
strategy to decentralize energy production and increase energy security in Brazil.
The potential for methane from household biowaste and the projected amount of
electricity generated from renewable methane in Brazil can be computed by applying
coefficients and equations that enable the conversion of units (Höhn et al. 2014).
Firstly, the household waste production rate in Brazil was gathered (ABRELPE
2020). Secondly, the volume of methane that can be generated from household waste
using anaerobic digestion was computed through:
CH4 = POSW ∗ TS ∗ VS-TS ∗ [CH4 ]
where biowaste from households has a concentration of around 400 m3 of CH4 per
ton of volatile solids ([CH4 ]), TS, the percentage of total solids, is 27%, and the ratio
between volatile solids and total solids, VS-TS, is 90% (VS-TS), and the percentage
of organic solid waste (POSW) of 55% (Höhn et al. 2014).
Thirdly, the theoretical electric generation (E) was computed as follows:
E = C ∗ CH4 ∗ RT
where the running time (RT) is 8000 h per year and C, the methane calorific value,
is 10 KWh per m3 (Höhn et al. 2014). Only those municipalities whose population
density is higher than 20 inhabitants per km2 were considered when estimating E.
The estimated daily capacity of renewable methane from households waste is
9 MM m3 /day. As shown in Fig. 13.1, the coastal and southeastern areas have a
larger potential to convert household waste into energy due to the higher population
concentration. These areas have advantages due to the gas pipeline network and the
auction system implemented, in which part of the pipeline’s capacity is offered to
producers. For instance, GASBOL (Brazil-Bolivia pipeline) has recently auctioned
more than 10 MM m3 of its daily transportation capacity (Barbosa and Peyerl 2020).
Both the transportation and electric sectors can benefit from the distribution of renew-
able methane. For the electricity sector, renewable methane from households can
generate 33 GWh per year (EPE 2019). Furthermore, the distribution of methane for
different end uses can reach decarbonization levels and other sectors (Blanco et al.
2018).
Fig. 13.1 Annual potential of renewable methane from biowaste household
In the center and north, there are regions that, despite not being close to gas
pipelines, can benefit in other ways from the production of renewable methane. These
regions might often be sparsely populated, may not have waste collection companies
and suffer from high instability in electricity supply due to long wiring and poor
maintenance. Renewable methane can also mitigate the high energy vulnerability
of small livelihoods in the countryside. That can be supported with public–private–
social partnerships to provide renewable energy and offer energy to remote locations,
where wastes can be digested and electricity generated locally. That would promote
democratization and decarbonization of energy production by decentralizing facil-
ities for energy production. Usually, a large portion of these livelihoods’ labor is
connected to the field, meaning that they are potential regions where the per capita
rate of biowaste production can be higher than the national average, and they may
have fertilizer use as a constraint to food production. Applying circular principles, in
that case, would also foster organic fertilizers production and give more autonomy
and resilience to communities.
Renewable methane can also increase the reliability of the National Interconnected
System in regions that have a high percentage of renewables in their matrix. For
instance, around 40% of the north-eastern installed capacity is due to wind energy
and more than 60% of the southeastern capacity for hydroelectric power (SIGA-
ANEEL 2021). Due to the natural seasonality and the increasingly recurrent droughts,
there is a need to implement other strategies aimed at energy production. Biogas
and biomethane production has environmental, social and economic attributes that
make this source a great opportunity for the coming years. Finally, according to
Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LFCS) that evaluates the life-cycle analysis, biogas
consumption has negative GHG emissions. It can generate some carbon credits, a
market tool that represents assets issued by certifying companies on the mitigation
of emissions and can be sold to companies that need or choose to participate in the
voluntary market. It has received great attention since its insertion (3rd Conference of
the Parties, 1995), and it was highlighted at the last UNFCCC Conference of Parties
(26th Conference of the Parties, 2021).
Policy Implications
Implementing practices to transform waste into energy also involves government

attitudes and public policies. According to Pan et al. (2015), huge attention must be
paid to different phases to add value to waste.
In Germany, the high incentives to explore alternatives to fossil fuels, the opera-
tionalization of biomethane as natural gas (e.g., transport in NG pipelines) and the
definition of producer remuneration are some of the items that made the country
the greatest potential for biogas production (mainly from agricultural and livestock
waste) (Schütte 2017). Another promising case is Sweden, where the participation
of biogas in its energy mix is relatively high (SGA 2008). The historical factors
indeed helped in the biogas development (e.g., the oil crisis in the 1970s), but the
country has also gained an advantage through the (i) stimulus of the use of renewable
sources throughout the European Union; (ii) the application of biological treatment
and banishment of organic waste deposition in landfills in 2005; and (iii) the financial
aid for building biogas plants through the administration of the Swedish government
(Scarlat et al. 2018; SGA 2008). The UK, where the government has also aimed to
reduce waste and increase renewable energy sources’ share, has incentivized biodi-
gesters to handle organic waste (e.g., renewables obligation, feed-in tariffs and renew-
able heat incentive) (DEFR 2011). China, since the 1960s, has fomented domestic
biogas, and later, rural production. Gu et al. mention a great expansion potential
for biogas in the industrial sector in the coming years, as long as some barriers are
overcome, such as technology development, public policies and opening for third
parties to enter the sector (Gu et al. 2016; Schütte 2017).
The Energy Research Office (EPE) annual report shows the prospects for
expanding the energy sector for the next ten years. The last-launched Decennial
Energy Plan (PDE 2030) presents the perspectives for the next decade. For the first
time, municipal solid waste management appears as a possible source of electricity
generation in the scenario built for Brazil, which would increase the capacity by
60 MW. However, this generation comes from incineration, not anaerobic digestion
(EPE 2021). Between 2004 and 2015, nine thermoelectric power plants were installed
using biogas from landfills with a total installed capacity of 86.3 MW. Most of them
are concentrated in the southeast region (Nascimento et al. 2019).
Public policies can vary in stimulating different parts of the biogas chain
(Gustafsson and Anderberg 2021; Pavan et al. 2021). Some of these possibilities
are: offering incentives through subsidies and technological development; boosting

consumption through certificates; establishing GHG emission restrictions; access to
information and; preventing or restricting the deposition of organic waste in landfills
(Pavan et al. 2021). In Brazil, in the 1970s, the first biogas plants were built from
agro-industrial residues commercially due to uncertainties caused by the oil crisis
(Freitas et al. 2019). However, the initiatives were not enough to remain a poten-
tial market in the country. In 2006, there was another promising moment, mainly
due to the Clean Development Mechanism created along with the Kyoto Protocol.
However, many of the projects aimed to burn biogas through flares and not its energy
use. In 2011, the fall in carbon market prices resulted in a disincentive to continue
and expand these projects (Pavan et al. 2021).
Nonetheless, in the last decade, some policies came into force, which should
stimulate the sector: (a) National Solid Waste Policy, in 2010; (b) the launch of the
Probiogas Program with the German government and (c) in 2014, the first auction
focused on biogas projects (Quadros et al. 2016); (d) RENOVABio; and (e) New
Regulatory Framework for Basic Sanitation, which redefined a new date for the end
of landfills with a defined date for large cities and another for small cities. Other
areas that need an advance, punctuated by Quadros et al. (2016) are: the incentive
to electricity-producing agents and the demand for biomethane. In the 2021 Gas
Law, these had an advance through the statement of manipulating biomethane in the
same way as natural gas: (i) resume assessments on tax issues; (ii) technological
development; (iii) dissemination of information and technical maintenance training;
(iv) observation of this opportunity as an alternative to the decentralization of the
energy market (Brasil 2021).
The advantages of decentralized generation are reducing costs of high voltage
transmission grid, while distributed generation connected to distribution networks or
the consumers become present; decreasing concentration of technical, political and
economic decisions in large centers (Di Silvestre et al. 2018); reductions in trans-
mission losses; opportunity to use biogas for power generation, and, consequently,
minimize the emission of GHG; improvement of the management of energy produc-
tion to meet local needs (World Alliance for Decentralized Energy 2006). It allows
regions with technical barriers (isolated and remote systems) to access electricity
and other forms of energy.
Conclusions
In Brazil, there is a huge potential for generating renewable methane that can improve
the Brazilian energy system’s reliability, accessibility and decarbonization. In this
chapter, the protagonist was the production of biogas from Municipal Solid Waste.
This technological route for electricity, thermal or mechanical energy has a wide
variety of advantages: environmental (reduction of emissions and waste disposal in
inappropriate places), social (job generation) and economic (valuing waste). As a
result, the theoretical total of renewable methane calculated for Brazil was around
9 MM m3 /day.
In order to develop the maturation of this capital-intensive market and answer the
question of this chapter, it is necessary to consolidate public policies, as shown in
Sect. 13.4, as has occurred in other countries, to encourage the insertion of biogas into
the Brazilian energy matrix. Therefore, some of the highlights for this are actions that
promote the collection, disposal and energy reuse of waste, valuing environmental
aspects (as well as RenovaBio) by using life-cycle analyses, and regulating the carbon
credit market.
Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) through the Research Centre for Greenhouse Gas Innova-
tion (RCGI) (FAPESP Proc. 2014/50279-4 and 2020/15230-5), hosted by the University of São
Paulo, and the strategic importance of the support given by ANP through the Research & Develop-
ment levy regulation. Peyerl and Barbosa thank the financial support of grant Process 2017/18208-
8, 2018/26388-9, 19/0455-3, (FAPESP). This work was partially financed by Coordenação de
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Chapter 14
The Main Challenges of the Brazilian
Energy Governance for the Mitigation
and Adaptation to Climate Change
Leonardo Yoshiaki Kamigauti, Ana Luiza Fontenelle, Felipe Coutinho,

Ana Maria Heuminski de Ávila, and Drielli Peyerl
Abstract Given the importance of the energy sector and the necessity for an urgent
energy transition worldwide, this research identifies the main challenges of Brazilian
energy governance to mitigate and adapt to climate change effectively. Through the
climate action perspective, the study analyzes the Brazilian Decennial Energy Plan-
ning documents from 2009 to 2019. The tools used are the SWOT and GUT, both
commonly applied to assess scenarios and support decision-making. The most crit-
ical challenge identified is the political instability inside and outside Brazil regarding
climate action, besides the other six challenges. The conclusions highlight that the
challenges prevented the Brazilian governance from being aligned with the interna-
tional climate action. In brief, the identified issues culminate in an underappreciation
of Brazil’s enormous potential renewable sources.
L. Y. Kamigauti (B)
Department of Atmospheric Sciences, Institute of Astronomy, Geophysics and Atmospheric
Sciences, University of São Paulo, R. Matão 1226, São Paulo 05508-090, Brazil
e-mail: leonardo.kamigauti@usp.br
A. L. Fontenelle
Division of Water Resources Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Lund University, P.O. Box 118,
221 00 Lund, Sweden
e-mail: Analuizafontenelle@gmail.com
School of Mechanical Engineering, University of Campinas, Av. Mendeleyev 200,
Campinas 13083-860, Brazil
F. Coutinho
Mackenzie Presbyterian University, Rua da Consolação, 930 Consolação, São Paulo, Brazil
e-mail: fcoutinho2002@gmail.com
A. M. H. de Ávila
Center for Meteorological and Climatic Research Applied to Agriculture, University of Campinas,
Av. Dr. André Tosello, 209, Campinas 13083-970, Brazil
e-mail: avila@cpa.unicamp.br
D. Peyerl
228 L. Y. Kamigauti et al.
Keywords Climate change · Governance · Energy planning · Brazil · Energy

systems
Introduction
The growing concern about climate change triggers challenges and opportunities for
a sustainable energy transition that requires a transformation in the energy sector and
society (Dobravec et al. 2021). To face the challenges of this energy transition, it is
necessary to ensure the environmental, economic, and social costs, risks, and benefits
that can be considered sustainable (Chen et al. 2019; Sareen and Haarstad 2018).
Therefore, sustainable development can be an opportunity to mitigate the impacts
of climate change (Neofytou et al. 2020). In addition, the international climatic
agreements have been representative of governments to meet CO2 reduction targets,
climate change adaptation, and a more sustainable world by adopting alternative
energy sources. However, these agreements alone do not guarantee that the proposed
climate goals will be achieved, even when they are distant from reality, especially in
developing countries (Relva et al. 2021).
Furthermore, global efforts toward a sustainable energy transition have
contributed to rethinking the necessity of robust and audacious strategies in gover-
nance, mainly to mitigate and adapt to climate change (Chen et al. 2019; Shah
2006). Besides, the role of the local governments and other stakeholders is essen-
tial to achieving sustainable development, managing the transition pathways, and
improving resilience to the communities (Staden 2017). Similarly, governance
systems and energy planning have influenced the speed and direction of the energy
transition (Loorbach et al. 2008). However, the main governance systems barriers
focus on policy integration and enforcement (Lange et al. 2018). Therefore, the
governance system and the energy planning and management need to be integrated
to achieve global decarbonization targets.
In 2020, the energy sector (electricity, heat, and transport) was responsible for
73.2% of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Ritchie and Roser 2020). Imme-
diately, actions, such as implementing the Nationally Determinate Contributions
(NDC) through the signatories’ countries of the Paris Agreement, have demon-
strated commitment to mitigation and adaptation to climate change. For instance,
the Brazilian Government stated intentions to mitigate GHG in the energy sector
following this international context. Besides, conciliating different actors such as the
oil and gas industry and renewable energy market adds complexity to this challenge.
Fulfilling this gap is fundamental to promoting the Brazilian sustainable energy tran-
sition in the following few years. Therefore, this research aims to evaluate and discuss
how international and national climate actions are guiding Brazilian energy planning
and governance from 2009 to 2019. Although it is not a normative document, the
Brazilian Decennial Energy Planning (PDEs) have shown necessary actions and
efforts, especially indicating the financial resource allocation. Therefore, this anal-
ysis provides the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of energy planning
14 The Main Challenges of the Brazilian Energy Governance … 229
and indicates which actions must be enhanced to contribute to climate action. In addi-
tion, the research also scrutinizes the gravity, urgency, and tendency of the Brazilian
actions in the energy sector to suggest where the efforts could concentrate in the
following years.
Climate Action and Sustainable Development
International Context
As the climate change worsens, climate policies must support the energy transi-
tion. Since the Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the United Nations (U.N.) has
promoted environmental and climate discussions through the creation of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Some of the most
important results of the UNFCCC are the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Copenhagen
Accord (COP-15, 2009), and, more recently, the Paris Agreement (2015).
The current agreement was established in 2015 during the Conference of Parties
in Paris. The main goal of the Paris Agreement is to strengthen global climate
action, demanding mitigation and adaptation strategies (UNFCCC 2015a). In total,
194 countries and the European Union (E.U.) signed the Paris Agreement and 190
(including E.U.) ratified it until 2021 (UNFCCC 2015a). Brazil was one of the first
countries to sign (April 22, 2016) and ratify the agreement (September 21, 2016). The
core of the agreement is the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), which are
efforts to reduce GHG emissions and promote adaptation and resilience (UNFCCC
2015b).
Also, in 2015, another important document was launched. The U.N. organized the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) to amplify and consol-
idate the work of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (U.N. 2015). The
agenda is divided into 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 Targets,
aiming to integrate people, planet, and prosperity through partnership to promote
peace. Among all the SDGs, SDG 7 (clean and affordable energy) and SDG 13
(climate action) are directly connected to the energy transition. The Paris Agreement
and the 2030 Agenda are complementary to decreasing climate change impacts and
providing a sustainable future.
In summary, the international agreements mentioned above seek a global effort to
mitigate climate change. However, the reality of each country makes this a challenge.
National aspects need to be carefully analyzed, observing each country’s actions to
contribute to climate change issues at the global level.
Brazilian Context
In 2009, some of the first Brazilian strategies to promote climate action were moti-
vated by COP-15. Law nº 12114 (December 9, 2009) created the National Climate
Change Fund, and Law nº 12187 (December 29, 2009) defined the Brazilian National
Climate Change Policy (PNMC in Portuguese) (Law N° 12114—National Climate
Change Fund 2009; Law No 12187—National Climate Change Plan 2009). It started
as a goal to reduce GHG emissions by 38.9% by 2020. It is essential to note that
in 2019, the Brazilian GHG emissions were 14% higher than in 2009 (Observatório
do Clima 2021). Regarding energy transition, these policies determine the growth
of renewable sources participation in the electricity mix supply and increase energy
efficiency (Law No 12187—National Climate Change Plan 2009). The commitments
should guide Brazilian policies related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Aligned with the Paris Agreement, the Brazilian NDCs aim to decrease GHG emis-
sions to 37% until 2025 and 43% until 2030, using as reference the year 2005 (Paris
Agreement Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution—NDC 2020). It is crucial
to note that the GHG emissions in the year before the Paris Agreement (2014) were
already 43% lower than the emissions in 2005, according to the available documents
(MCTI 2016). This value was recently revised with new methodologies as 25%
(Observatório do Clima 2021). Figure 14.1 shows the emissions history in Brazil
since 2005.
Besides, the country intends to adopt further measures that are consistent with the
2 °C temperature goal. Box 14.1 shows the Brazilian NDC statements regarding the
energy sector.
3000
2500
Million of tCO2e
2000
1500
1000
500
Waste Industrial Processes

Energy Agricultural
Change in Land Use and Forests
Fig. 14.1 GHG emissions history in Brazil. Source Produced by the author with data from
Observatório do Clima (2021)
(…) increasing the share of sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy mix to
approximately 18% by 2030, by expanding biofuel consumption, increasing
ethanol supply, including by increasing the share of advanced biofuels (second
generation), and increasing the share of biodiesel in the diesel mix; in the energy
sector, achieving 45% of renewables in the energy mix by 2030, including:
● expanding the use of renewable energy sources other than hydropower in
the total energy mix to between 28 and 33% by 2030;
● expanding the use of non-fossil fuel energy sources domestically, increasing
the share of renewables (other than hydropower) in the power supply to at
least 23% by 2030, including by raising the share of wind, biomass and
solar; and
● achieving 10% efficiency gains in the electricity sector by 2030
Box 14.1 Brazilian NDC statements regarding the energy sector. Source Paris
Agreement Brazil’s Nationally Determined Contribution—NDC (2020)
Complementing the mitigation actions, the Brazilian National Adaptation to
Climate Change Plan (PNA) was launched on May 10, 2016, through Ordinance
nº 150. PNA aims to reduce national vulnerability to climate change and manage
its impacts (Plano Nacional de Adaptação à Mudança Do Clima 2015). Brazil also
internalized the 2030 Agenda as a framework for sustainable development. The
169 Targets were reviewed and adapted to Brazilian context in the ODS—Metas
Nacionais dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável in 2018 (IPEA 2018).
When the international climate action strengthened after the COP-15, Brazilian
energy planning started incorporating these climate discourses in the PDEs. However,
it is necessary to understand how climate actions effectively guide planning. The
implementation has various potential threats and weaknesses, such as economic
interest, political changes, and energy security. Therefore, this research analyzed the
PDEs from the perspective of international climate action.
Methodology
This research approaches the question “How international and national climate
actions are guiding the Brazilian energy planning and governance?” as a manner
to analyze the database of all published Brazilian Decennial Energy Plans from 2009
to 2019. The PDEs analyses emphasized GHG emissions and energy supply mix
using the SWOT and GUT analyses (Fig. 14.2).
The SWOT analysis (explained below) allowed us to summarize the document’s
main internal factors directly related to the PDEs and external aspects of concern
such as political and economic. The GUT analysis (explained below) was applied
to the negative internal and external factors identified by SWOT analysis. The GUT
Fig. 14.2 Methodologic procedures
analysis ranks the issues in order of importance based on their current state and
escalation over time.
SWOT Analysis
The SWOT analysis is a strategic planning tool that analyzes internal factors as
strengths (S) and weaknesses (W) and external factors as opportunities (O) and threats
(T) (Humphrey 2005). The analysis produces a matrix that shows those perspectives
in a summarized table, making it tangible for decision-making and strategic planning
(Gürel and Tat 2017). The analysis is made in an iterative discussion. The first iteration
is an aggregation of broad factors by the impression of each author. The subsequent
ones are the refinement of each factor toward a concise list of representatives, assertive
and coherent factors, via debates and discussions.
The analysis was applied to the 12 PDE’s individually and focused on the introduc-
tion, GHG emissions, conclusion subsections of the environmental impact analysis,
and summary for policymakers’ chapters, guided by the climate action perspective.
We extended the analysis to other relevant chapters in the PDEs when necessary.
Then, the results were aggregated in three SWOT matrices by period: before COP-
15 (PDE’s 2015, 2016, and 2017) (EPE 2006, 2007, 2008), between COP-15 and
Paris Agreement (PDE’s 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2024) (EPE 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2015) and after Paris Agreement (PDE’s 2026, 2027, and 2029) (EPE 2017,
2018, 2020b). All the identified external factors are related to the planned perspective
in 10 years.
GUT Analysis: Priority Analysis
The GUT analysis is a tool that defines prioritization considering the process of
aging (Kepner and Tregoe 1981). It is part of the Kepner–Tregoe decision-making
analysis that allows qualitative information to be converted into quantitative (Kepner
and Tregoe 1981). The GUT analysis was employed to address the weakness and
threats (issues) identified by the SWOT analysis considering its temporal evolution
in the period, guided by literature review and the authors’ knowledge. The GUT is
based on scoring three distinctive attributes: gravity (G), urgency (U), and tendency
(T) (Table 14.1). Gravity refers to the weight of the analyzed difficulty, studying the
result that can arise in the medium and long term. Urgency refers to the amount of
time needed to solve problems. Tendency refers to the possibility of the problem
growing over time. The process comprises a series of iterations where the authors
discuss each characteristic of the issues and reanalyzes them relative to each other to
assert a rank of importance. The process stops only when there is a consensus among
the authors. Table 14.1 shows the initial criteria of the process before the iterations.
The final numeric values are relative and nonlinear (i.e., an issue with ten points is
more important than an issue with five; however, it is not necessarily two times more
important).
Table 14.1 Reference of the criteria used in the GUT analysis

Points Gravity Urgency Tendency
5 Extremely serious problem Immediate intervention Situation will get worse if
nothing is done
4 Very serious problem Urgent situation Situation will worsen in
the short term
3 Serious problem Must be resolved as soon as Situation will worsen in
possible the medium term
2 Problem with little severity Can wait Situation will worsen in
the long term
1 No severity Not urgent Won’t change
The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats

of the Brazilian Energy Planning
Following, we discuss the results obtained through SWOT and GUT analyses. The
SWOT strengths and weaknesses regard the planned actions, not the effective ones.
Figure 14.3 shows a timeline with important events discussed below.
The first PDE was launched in May 2006; therefore, between this date till COP-
15, three PDEs were launched (PDEs 2015, 2016, and 2017). The SWOT analysis
regarding this period is given in Table 14.2.
Regarding opportunities, the environmental and climate discussions played an
essential role in the international agenda in the analyzed period, motivated by
the Earth Summit (1992), Kyoto Protocol (1997), and pushed by the Stern Review
(2006). The discussions already pointed to the urgent necessity to decrease global
GHG emissions related to the energy sector to mitigate climate change via a clean
energy transition.
In the Brazilian context, the international agenda was not an effective motivation
to improve the share of renewable sources in the energy sector. Thus, the main threat
found is that there was a lack of governmental pressure under the justification
of the Brazilian energy supply mix being considered clean in comparison with the
global standard due to the high use of renewable energy sources (e.g., PDE 2016, 55;
PDE 2017, 410), with 48.4% of renewable sources in Brazilian energy supply mix
(EPE 2021) compared with 13% in the rest of the world (IEA 2021). However, it
Fig. 14.3 Timeline of significant events to the analyzed periods (before COP-15, PDE’s 2015,
2016, and 2017; between COP-15 and Paris Agreement, PDE’s 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2024;
and after Paris Agreement, PDE’s 2026, 2027, and 2029)
Table 14.2 SWOT before COP-15 regarding PDEs 2015, 2016, and 2017
Strengths Weaknesses
Increase in investment in R&D of renewable Massive investments in fossil fuels production
sources, such as sugarcane-based fuels and due to Pre-Salt discovery
wind energy
R&D in energy efficiency Increase in natural gas use in thermal power
plants
Decrease of oil participation in thermal power
plants
Opportunities Threats
Environmental and climate discussions played Lack of governmental pressure to increase the
an essential role in the international agenda share of renewables on the energy supply mix
is important to note that, regardless of the period analyzed, PDE documents always
highlight the clean level of the Brazilian supply mix compared to the global standard.
The main driver to change in the energy supply mix in Brazil in the early 2000s was a
severe energy crisis in 2001, known as Crise do Apagão (Blackout Crisis). This crisis
highlighted the energy vulnerability, especially in the electric sector, due to the high
use of hydropower generation, lack of investment, droughts, and economic growth
(Goldenberg and Prado 2003). To avoid new crises, the Brazilian Government created
a series of initiatives, for instance, the PROINFA (Program for Alternative Sources of
Electric Energy) in 2002 (Law No 10438—PROINFA 2002). This program promotes
the increase of non-traditional renewable sources in the electric supply mix, such as
wind energy, biomass, and small hydropower plants.
As strengths, the SWOT analysis captures the increase in investment in R&D of
renewable sources, such as sugarcane-based fuels and wind energy, supported by
PROINFA (e.g., PDE 2016, 141) aligned with the R&D in energy efficiency (e.g.,
PDE 2015, 76; PDE 2016, 135). Besides, the focus on biomass production influences
the decrease of oil derivatives in thermal power plants by 10% on average in
the period. PROINFA contributed to the Brazilian energy supply diversification,
improving the participation of other renewable sources by 2.9% on average in the
period.
As for weaknesses, we identify the increase in natural gas use, present in all
periods, commented below (on last SWOT) to avoid repetition, and a massive
production investment in fossil fuels, influenced by the Pre-Salt oil reservoir
discovery (2006). Pre-Salt exploration changed Brazil’s status from oil importer to
exporter. The government promised only to export the oil and derivatives produced
in the reservoir (to protect the internal market/energy supply mix). However, it was
considered a weak statement as it is highly dependent on the external oil market
(Pires and Schechtman 2009). In other words, the internal use of the oil produced
by the Pre-Salt was more interesting than export due to the low external price. The
Great Recession (2008–2009) was marked by a massive drop in oil prices, and the
PDE 2017, which was produced in the same period, demonstrates a planned increase
of oil-related sources’ participation in the energy supply mix of 3.2%, much higher
Table 14.3 SWOT between COP-15 and the Paris Agreement regarding PDEs 2019, 2020, 2021,
2022, and 2024
Increase in investments in other renewable PDEs present inconsistent statements about the
sources in the planned energy supply mix importance of the energy supply mix in the GHG
reductions
Expected investments in renewable sources as a
whole lost space to non-renewable
Strengthening the climate debate Lack of governmental pressure to increase the
share of renewables on the energy supply mix
Definition of the NDCs Crise do apagão
Creation of PNMC Increase in fossil fuel production
than the previous PDEs (0.2% and 0% increase from PDE 2016 and PDE 2015,
respectively). Table 14.3 shows the SWOT analysis for the period between COP-15
and Paris Agreement.
In 2009, COP-15 strengthened the climate debate worldwide and the signa-
tories’ countries defined the NDCs. In the Brazilian context, the NDCs based the
PNMC creation in the same year and influenced the energy planning since it is used
as reference and guidelines in all PDEs during this period. For instance, PDE 2019
cites the PNMC to support a higher importance of the GHG mitigation measures in
energy demanding process (PDE 2019, p. 292), PDE 2021 has the goal to reduce
GHG emissions by energy production and use following the COP-15 and PNMC
(PDE 2021, p. 320), and PDE 2024 presents objective measures to reach the reduc-
tion goal implemented in the planning. Box 14.1 summarizes the NDCs regarding
the energy sector. Besides, the PNMC states a series of principles and actions to be
considered and adopted in all public policies and governmental programs (Law n°
12187, December 29, 2009) (Law No 12187—National Climate Change Plan 2009).
However, critical aspects of PNMC were vetoed on the same day of its creation.
Among others, the commitment to energy transition to a 100% clean energy supply
mix and the prevention of contingency in budget execution were vetoed based on
the comparison of the Brazilian energy supply mix emission with other countries
(Message n° 1123, December 29, 2009) (Brazil 2009).
The PDEs were cited in the regulation of the PNMC as one of the main strategic
plans to be based on the stated principles (Decree nº 7390, December 9, 2010, arti-
cles 3º and 5º; PDE 2020, 285) (Decree No 7390 2010). However, the PDEs present
inconsistent statements about the importance of the energy supply mix in the
GHG reductions. The main reason is the direct comparison with the land-use change
(LUC) and other countries. In Brazil, LUC was the main responsible for GHG emis-
sions (58% of Brazilian emissions in 2015; PDE 2019, Table 197). The PDEs stated
the decrease of the planned LUC emissions over time would mean a “greater impor-
tance” of the energy sector regarding GHG emissions (e.g., PDE 2019, 292; PDE
2022, 319), due to its expected growth (the energy sector was responsible for 37%
of Brazilian GHG emissions in 2012 and LUC was responsible for 15%; MCTIC
2020). Nevertheless, this importance is contested in the same document by showing
that the Brazilian energy sector planned and effected GHG emissions would be small
compared to countries like the USA and China.
The PDEs in this period expected an increase in both fossil fuels production and
renewable sources. The first is motivated by the Pre-Salt discovery and the second by
the climate discussion and the energy vulnerability due to the Crise do Apagão. There
was indeed an overall increase in fossil fuel production in the period grounded in
the funding of over 224 billion USD to the mega capitalization of Petrobras in 2010
to accelerate its development (PETROBRAS 2010). The 2014 oil crash did not stop
this increase when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
dropped oil prices in response to the intensive exploitation of shale oil and gas in the
USA and Canada (Stocker et al. 2018, 4).
In the period between COP-15 and the Paris Agreement, the PDE also planned
an overall increase in investments in other renewable sources in the planned
energy supply mix from 3.7 to 8.1% of the total investments in the energy sector.
The main increase was wind energy, which had several projects approved between
2009 and 2010, pushed by political interest and companies such as Siemens and
Odebrecht (Viola and Franchini 2014). However, the PDEs in this period have
dropped the planned investments in sugar cane fuels from 21.5 to 16.9%. The result
was that expected investments in renewable sources as a whole lost space to non-
renewable (primary oil), from 47.8 to 45.2% of total investments in the period. Table
14.4 shows the SWOT analysis for the period after Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement started to change the dynamic about addressing climate
action globally, strengthening the international climate action pressure. It
impacted the Brazilian context, influencing the PDEs, integrating the NDCs
(Box 14.1) in the planning. The NDCs are mentioned in the texts at least 30 times
per document, especially in the “Introduction”, “Socio-Environmental Analysis”,
Table 14.4 SWOT after the Paris Agreement regarding PDEs 2026, 2027, and 2029
Decrease of gasoline usage due to increase of Increase in natural gas and oil productions due
biofuels the exploration of Pre-Salt
Climate change impacts analysis is considered, Increase in natural gas use
especially in renewable resources
Increase of renewable resources, especially, Numerical uncertainties of future scenarios are
non-conventional not provided, especially climate change related
Partial integration of the energy planning and Lack of GHG emissions inventory of the
the NDCs energy supply mix during the period
Strengthening of international climate pressure Political instability inside and outside Brazil
regarding climate action
RenovaBio policy New Gas Market
and “Results Consolidation” chapters (e.g., PDE 2029, 265). The electric sector and
biofuels are the main subjects of the mentions. Remarkably, the PDEs in the period
cite the Brazilian biofuels policy (RenovaBio, Law nº 13576, December 26, 2017)
(Law No 13576—RenovaBio 2017), which states about amplification of the use of
biofuels, especially targets related to decarbonization and planning general action to
promote better usage of these fuels—such as ethanol.
Although the Paris Agreement is fundamental to climate action, its implementa-
tion largely depends on political factors such as guide policies and the interest of
different stakeholders (Doukas et al. 2018). For instance, globally, Donald Trump’s
administration between 2017 and 2021 in the United States of America (USA) was
marked by massive actions against the environment and international climate action.
The most important was the US withdrawal from the Paris agreement, announced
in June 2017, and officialized in November 2020 (Selby 2019; Tollefson 2017).
However, the action was never officialized (Abessa et al. 2019). Formerly, the transi-
tion from Dilma Roussef’s administration to Michael Temer’s in 2016 administration
was marked by impeachment and the clear intent to change various policies in the
course. It was followed by the replacement of some directors of the state-owned
enterprise that makes the PDEs (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, EPE) and the
changes in the document itself and the availability of some usually public data. The
most important regarding climate action was removing the GHG emissions inven-
tory (e.g., PDE 2026, 239). Therefore, the political instability inside and outside
Brazil regarding climate action is a threat to consider.
The analysis accessed four strengths and four weaknesses regarding the PDEs in
the period. The PDEs insert the analysis of climate change impact, especially in
hydropower generation (e.g., PDE 2026, 94). There is an increase of conventional
and non-conventional renewable sources of 4% over ten years (planned), repre-
senting up to 12% of the total energy share. The conventional and non-conventional
renewable sources are the only source with a planned increase in the energy share
for the period. Most of the electric demand is provided by renewable resources.
For instance, PDE 2029 shows the use of renewable resources in nearly 80% of the
installed electric capacity in its period, with a planned increase of the renewables
(excluding decentralized generation and small hydropower centrals, PDE 2029, 71).
It is planned to increase fossil fuel production and natural gas use. Oil production
was estimated to rise from 2.6 (2016) to 5.2 (2026) millions of barrels per day (50%
increase) in PDE 2026 and from 3.2 (2020) to 5.5 (2029) millions of barrels per
day (58% increase) in PDE 2029. Natural gas production should also rise from 104
(2016) to 253 (2029) million m3 per day (PDE 2026, 152; PDE 2029, 153). However,
the projected increase of fossil fuel production did not reflect in its consumption due
to the expected decrease in oil consumption that overcame the rise of natural gas
consumption. A notable factor that led to this was the decrease in gasoline usage
due to increased biofuels (e.g., PDE 2029, 204). Regarding natural gas usage, its
increase is supported by energy planning and other policies. The PDEs mention the
New Gas Market (Decree n° 9934; July 24, 2019) (e.g., PDE 2029, 188) as an essen-
tial factor of influence. Natural gas was depicted as a clean alternative to oil (e.g.,
PDE 2026, 238; PDE 2029, 265), even if natural gas only emits 27% less than oil
and 44% less than coal in thermal power plants in CO2 per Joule (U.S. DOE 2016).
Under the lens of climate action, we classify it as a threat. Because the New Gas
Market is expected to lower the natural gas price, making it more competitive against
renewable sources, potentially hampering its investments (Gürsan and de Gooyert
2021) (see Chap. 8).
Finally, documents in this period mention the lack of the numerical uncertainties
of future scenarios as a matter of concern. This point is fundamental to governance,
especially climate change related because it can directly impact renewable sources,
for instance, the water supply to hydropower generation and the atmospheric circula-
tion to wind energy. The PDEs address it using “what-if” scenarios in some analysis
but recognize the need for robust uncertainties (PDE 2026, 13; PDE 2029, 8).
The Important Challenges
The GUT analysis brings a temporal perspective that complements the SWOTs
regarding their gravity, urgency, and tendency. Its score reveals relative importance
in the list of problems to address. The calculated GUT score is not a direct quantita-
tive indicator of this importance. However, it is a tool to rank the issues and support
the decision-making process and, therefore, the governance of the energy sector. We
estimated the relative risks of the weaknesses and threats identified in the SWOT
analysis in this analysis. Table 14.5 summarizes the items analyzed.
The most essential issues detected in the GUT analysis are strongly related to the
energy sector governance. Also, even those points related to more practical aspects
are governed by the decision-makers, making governance a central theme in the
analysis. We discuss the most important aspects and the expected implications if
they are not addressed.
Table 14.5 GUT matrix

Rank SWOT Gravity Urgency Tendency GxUxT
1 Political instability inside and outside Brazil 5 5 4 100
regarding climate action
2 PDEs present inconsistent statements about the 4 5 4 80
importance of the energy supply mix in the
GHG reductions
3 Increase in fossil fuel production 5 3 5 75
4 Numerical uncertainties of future scenarios are 4 4 4 64
not provided, especially climate change related
5 Increase in natural gas use 3 4 5 60
6 New Gas Market 3 4 5 60
7 Lack of GHG emissions inventory of the 2 3 3 18
energy supply mix during the period
The international climate actions directly impacted the Brazilian energy planning
via PMNC. It is noteworthy that all PDEs cited the PNMC, COP-15, and Paris
Agreement as guidelines in their respective period of influence. PNMC focused on
the LUC emissions reduction due to the historical influence of this sector as the
leading GHG emitter in Brazil (MCTIC 2020). In the energy sector, it is important to
highlight that the Brazilian energy supply mix relies largely on renewable sources,
with 77% of installed electric capacity in 2005 (Executive summary of PDE 2015,
34) and 83% in 2020 (EPE 2020a). In brief, this leads to planning that uses the
international climate action to valorize clean sources and simultaneously uses the
lack of commitment of the energy sector to justify the emissions of fossil fuel sources.
Therefore, we attribute a high gravity and urgency to this issue. We also attribute a
high tendency as the contradictory narrative supports the continuity of the issue.
The political instability regarding climate action inside and outside Brazil is
a key of energy planning governance. The Brazilian Government influences the
energy market via regulatory agencies (e.g., Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica,
ANEEL), public companies (e.g., Eletrobras), and direct economic incentives (e.g.,
PROINFA and RenovaBio). Energy planning is based on a medium- and long-term
vision, making it susceptible to harm by quick changes in the government orientation,
especially by the executive power elected every four years in Brazil. Regarding
climate action, some of the main instruments to support the medium- and long-term
planning are the international agreements such as the Paris Agreement. However, the
adequate pressure created by these agreements is dependent on international politics
and therefore is susceptible to harm by their instabilities.
The fossil fuel usage in the electric matrix transitioned over the PDEs from coal
and oil to natural gas, comparatively cleaner but not renewable. The fossil fuel
production in Brazil rose consistently in the period (ANP 2021) by exploiting
mainly the Santos and Campos Pre-Salt basins. The Pre-Salt discovery changed the
perspectives of the Brazilian oil since 2007, and its exploration was heavily regulated
in favor of Brazilian economic security. However, the fossil fuel regulations have been
relaxed over the years, encouraged by political and economic episodes such as the
Great Recession. Since most of the production was destined to be exported, the impact
on the energy supply mix related to CO2 emissions could not be directly apportioned,
suggesting a lesser impact on climate. This scenario does not contribute to gover-
nance toward climate action, especially with political instabilities. We attribute a high
gravity and tendency to this issue as it connects directly to GHG emissions, and there
is a clear trend of increase. However, the urgency is medium due to economic factors.
Fossil fuel exportation generates an important income and is a political instrument
to Brazil. Thus, it is necessary to take a slow and cautious approach to this issue to
minimize harm to the economy.
The PDEs present methodological issues as they do not properly approach the
uncertainties of future scenarios, especially climate change. This is recognized
and discussed in PDEs after the Paris Agreement and addressed by implementing
“what-if” scenarios. The urgency and tendency of this issue have been aggravated
by climate change due to the high dependence on hydroelectricity. The main conse-
quence is worsening the energy security illustrated by the 2021 water and energy
crisis. In addition, the PDEs before 2016 presented a GHG emissions inventory,
which is a fundamental indicator to track the progress of the sector in the interna-
tional commitments of the Paris Agreement. The lack of the inventory after 2016
does not imply that the emissions were not accounted for; however, it is directly
against the “disclosure of information with public interest, regardless of requests”
guideline of the information transparency policy (Law n° 12527, article 3°, item II,
November 18, 2011, translated by the authors) (Law N° 12527 2011). The difficulty
accessing this data motivates initiatives from non-governmental organizations (e.g.,
Observatório do Clima) to democratize this information.
The increase in natural gas use is a general trend over the years (ANP 2020)
supported by the rise of fossil fuel production and national incentives as the mentioned
New Gas Market. We identify a high tendency because of the supporting scenario
and the existing trend. The medium gravity is because natural gas is a cleaner alter-
native to oil and coal, and it has been pointed as the transitional fuel to a renewable
energy supply. However, we identified a high urgency in this matter because natural
gas is not currently employed with the goal of a cleaner energy supply in mind and
can also be a serious obstacle in the path toward climate actions by offering a cheaper
alternative to renewable sources as mentioned earlier (Furlan and Mortarino 2021).
Final Remarks
In retrospect, there is a long path between international climate action and Brazilian
energy governance. The COP-15 and Paris Agreement directly impacted energy
planning because Brazil pointed to the energy sector as a key sector to accomplish
its commitment (right after the land-use change). Other international climate actions
did not impact energy planning explicitly due to the lack of formal commitment.
There is a series of factors to consider. Brazil was a global reference for an
energetically clean country because most of its electrical sources were hydropower.
However, Brazil did not accomplish the commitment of reduction of GHGs emissions
in COP-15 and made a commitment to just maintain the emissions in Paris Agreement
(considering the emissions inventory available at the time). This leads to a lack of
governmental pressure to increase the share of renewable sources in the energy supply
mix and other challenges.
We conclude that the Brazilian energy governance had not effectively followed the
international climate action due to the identified challenges. These issues culminate
in an underappreciation of the enormous potential renewable sources. The path to
climate mitigation and adaptation is full of challenges, some already in the process
of resolution, some affected by practical and economic hindrances.
We recommend that the energy sector governance incorporates long-term plans
oriented toward climate action, even if eventual increases in GHG emissions are
required in its middle. Ideally, the planning must be applied effectively in the
governance, resilient against potential political instabilities, and not dependent on
governmental pressure.
Acknowledgements This work was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de

Pessoal de Nível Superior—Brasil (CAPES) by providing the scholarship to Ana Fontenelle, and
Rylanneive Teixeira, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq),
by providing the scholarship to Leonardo Kamigauti. Peyerl thanks the current financial support
of grant Process 2017/18208-8 and 2018/26388-9, São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP).
Mariana Ciotta thanks especially Coordenação de Aper-feiçoamento Pessoal de Nível Superior
(CAPES), for the scholarship. All the authors gratefully acknowledge support from SHELL Brazil
and FAPESP through the Research Centre for Gas Innovation (RCGI) (FAPESP Proc. 2014/50279-
4 and 2020/02546-4), hosted by the University of São Paulo, and the strategic importance of the
support given by ANP. This work was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de
Pessoal de Nível Superior—Brasil (CAPES). Finally, the authors thank the essential help of Lucas
A. S. Filho.
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Chapter 15
Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic
on the Brazilian Energy Sector
Mariana Ciotta, Drielli Peyerl, and Luis Guilherme Larizzatti Zacharias
Abstract This work investigates the Brazilian energy sector between 2018 and 2021
from the perspective of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has affected the
energy sector by widely changing consumption and behaviour patterns. This study
is based on four layers of analysis: energy consumption, social isolation, green-
house gas emissions, and household income data. This work correlates with how the
pandemic affected the Brazilian energy scenario and whether it is possible to discuss
consumption reduction and energy justice in the face of these factors. Thus, under-
standing the Brazilian context as a whole is sought in light of questions about reducing
consumption, climate perspectives and decision-makers’ position and influence on
the Brazilian energy sector. The results show a clear decrease in consumption for
most fuels and sectors investigated. However, part of this decrease seems to be only
pent-up demand and has unplanned, unsustainable origins, not correlated with the
concept of energy justice. The observations of this study also address the perspective
of climate resilience, given the challenges of dealing with the new paradigms of the
global energy sector.
Keywords Energy transition · Covid-19 · Energy sector · Energy justice · Climate

resilience · Brazil
M. Ciotta (B) · D. Peyerl · L. G. L. Zacharias

e-mail: mariana.ciotta@usp.br
D. Peyerl
L. G. L. Zacharias
e-mail: guizach@usp.br
D. Peyerl
246 M. Ciotta et al.
Introduction
The World Health Organization declared in March 2020 that COVID-19 is a

pandemic, and since then, the world economy has been affected profoundly (Sohrabi
et al. 2020). While the pandemic’s effects on national health and economic systems
tend to be mentioned in the media, the implications of the disease for the energy
sector and climate issues are rarely mentioned (Sovacool et al. 2020). The relevance
of thinking about the energy sector from the perspective of the recent pandemic
and climate change is that the former serves as a test of resilience to the impacts
and changing patterns expected by the latter (Chen et al. 2021; Jin 2020). When
looking at pre-pandemic patterns in the energy sector, by year-end 2019, oil supply
and demand conditions indicated some stability, exemplified by the Brent oil price,
which had its lowest variability in five years (EPE 2020f). However, the arrival of
the pandemic in early 2020 brought consequences for the energy sector that are not
yet fully understood, such as changes in energy use and mobility patterns.
The pandemic has been testing the resilience of the structure of energy sectors
in the face of unexpected events, which is particularly relevant in a scenario of
growing concern over climate change and its effects on the energy universe. COVID-
19 can act as an external force causing changes in systems, just as were the oil
shocks, economic crises, resource scarcity, and among others (de Mello Delgado
et al. 2021; Sovacool et al. 2020). The destabilization of paradigms or regimes allows
the reconfiguration of the energy system, establishing windows of opportunity for
redirecting the modes of production and energy consumption (Renewable Energy
Agency 2020). The elucidative nature of the context gives the importance of this
type of analysis: the conditions caused by the pandemic allow us to analyse situations
of stress in the system. The pandemic changed the path traced by energy planning
and the energy market (Chen et al. 2021; EPE 2020f). How are decision-makers
managing the energy system in the face of unexpected and complex changes in energy
consumption? Within this crisis, is the government managing to meet the current
energy demand of the population? What lessons can we learn from the pandemic to
plan a more resilient system? Can the COVID-19 pandemic help us face a future of
climate change with greater preparedness? Furthermore, we present the discussion
of the data concerning the conceptualization of energy justice in the body of the work
based on significant references in the area.
Brazil is the case study of this book chapter. The aim is to investigate how the
pandemic has affected the Brazilian energy sector between 2020 and 2021 (2018
and 2019 as a basis for comparison), bringing an overview and discussing pertinent
issues in the energy context in the country. The pandemic-energy nexus was analysed
from four perspectives: social isolation, household income, energy consumption, and
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Based on the results, the impacts and existing
relationships will be discussed from the perspective of energy justice and climate
resilience. The analysis used in this work relies on four levels of data, considering
the time before and during the pandemic: (i) Power sector consumption from reports
made available by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), Energy Research
15 Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Brazilian Energy Sector 247
Company (EPE), and National Electric System Operator (ONS), (ii) GHG emissions
were taken from the System for GHG, and Removals Estimates (SEEG) and recent
publications from research institutes such as the National Institute for Space Research
(INPE), (iii) Isolation data obtained from reports available by Google and In loco
and (iv) Income data from the National Sample Survey of Households (PNAD) was
conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
COVID-19 and the Energy Sector in Brazil
Social Distancing Data
The importance of studying data on social isolation stems from the impact this
measure has on mobility and, therefore, on the energy consumption associated with
various types of transport. The country’s social distancing measures varied between
Brazilian states and municipalities (Aquino et al. 2020). It means that the different
results of this isolation are felt differently across the Brazilian territory (i.e. changes
in energy consumption patterns and emissions). However, we approach estrangement
from a national perspective, commenting where necessary on local variations (Inloco
2021).
The isolation data from Brazil during the pandemic of COVID-19 were drawn
from three key sources: the reports made available by Google, comments from official
Brazilian government websites, and the InLoco website. It can be seen from the data
on isolation (started in February 2020 and discontinued in March 2021) that only in
March 2020 did social isolation exceeds the 60% mark (Fig. 15.1) (Inloco 2021). The
latest data published by Google indicates that in March 2021, a reduction in mobility
was noticed throughout Brazil in retail and leisure (− 24%), parks (− 31%), public
transport stations (− 16%) and workplaces (− 4%), with the only regions with an
increase in traffic being markets and pharmacies (+ 26%) and residential areas (+ 9%)
(Google 2021).
Data shows that, although variable, a certain level of isolation remains constant
in the country for the period and may intensify depending on government measures
and the death toll from the pandemic. Observing these social distancing levels is
important as changes may cause trade-offs between intense residential energy uses
and decreased transport/commercial use.
Emission Data
Brazil is the sixth-largest emitter of GHG on the planet, but with a unique profile,
in which land accounts for more than two-thirds of the emissions (Table 15.1)
(SEEG 2020). The pandemic potentially can reduce GHG emissions in Brazil, with
Fig. 15.1 Social isolation index, data from Inloco (2021)
reductions in the sectors linked to industry and waste, offsetting or neutralizing the
increase in emissions from livestock (SEEG 2020). However, the trend is that Brazil’s
GHG emissions in 2020 will increase compared to 2019 (SEEG 2020) because the
main source of emissions, land-use change (44% of emissions in 2018), is rapidly
expanding due to deforestation in the Amazon, and it continues to advance despite
the pandemic (SEEG 2020).
In the energy sector, a large part of the emissions is associated with fossil fuels. In
2018, 21% of Brazil’s GHG emissions came from this sector, with 49% corresponding
to fossil fuel burning in transport, 15% industrial energy consumption, 13% fuel
production activities and 12% electricity generation (SEEG 2020). The Brazilian
energy sector emitted, on average, 78.8 kg of CO2 to produce 1 MWh, a low rate
when compared with countries in the European Union, the United States and China
Table 15.1 Participation of sectors in Brazil’s GHG emissions (2018) and assessment of the impact
of pandemic COVID19 emissions, data collected from SEEG (2020)
Sector Emissions % of total Potential impact of Emissions
(tCO2 e emissions—2018 COVID on trajectory trend in
GWP)—2018 emissions 2020
Energy 427,919,097 21 Reduction Potential
reduction
Industrial 101,233,912 5 Reduction Potential
processes reduction
Agriculture 492,166,292 25 Potential increase Increase
Waste 92,892,835 5 Potential reduction Stable
Land use 845,912,581 44 Non-conclusive Increase
change
Total 1,939,121,718 100 Potential reduction Increase
(EPE 2021a). In 2020, for each ton of oil equivalent (toe) released, Brazil emits
1.42 tCO2eq /toe, which is equivalent to 72% of what the European Union emits
(1.97–1.42 tCO2eq /toe), 64% of what the United States emits (2.21–1.42 tCO2eq /toe)
and 47% of what China emits (2.89–1.42 tCO2eq /toe) (EPE 2021a).
In 2020, the total anthropic emissions associated with the Brazilian energy matrix
reached 398.3 MtCO2eq , with most of it (179.8 MtCO2eq ) generated in the trans-
portation sector (EPE 2021a). In this way, the impact of social isolation brings about
a great change in emissions linked to the energy sector because fewer mobility
results in less use of oil and its oil products. Considering the electricity sector in
2020, Brazil emits 99.6 kgCO2eq /MWh, about 1/2 of the value emitted by the Euro-
pean Union (322.8 kgCO2eq /MWh), 1/4 of what is emitted by the American electric
sector (417.7 kgCO2eq /MWh) and 1/7 of the emissions of the Chinese electric sector
(684.9 kgCO2eq /MWh) (EPE 2021a).
Income Data
Brazil has been in economic difficulties for some time, with its GDP having fallen
by 3.55% in 2015 and 3.31% in 2016. The average economic growth between 2017
and 2019 was 1.09% (Garcia et al. 2021; IBGE 2019). The main income indicator
in Brazil is the salary mass, measured by the IBGE’s continuous PNAD. The salary
mass corresponds to the sum of the wages and incomes of all Brazilians in the most
diverse social occupations (i.e. self-employed, informal, public employees) (IBGE
2021).
Data from the Continuous PNAD, measured by the IBGE, in the quarter from
July to September 2020, show that Brazil reached 14.6% unemployment, totalling
14.1 million people without occupation (Fig. 15.2). This is the highest level since
January 2012, when the survey was implemented (IBGE 2021). Unemployment at
such a high level has a strong impact on income, as indicated by official indicators.
Also, unemployment was already a trend observed in recent years, even before the
pandemic. The wage bill in Brazil fell by 9%, from R$219.8 billion in 2019 to
R$199.4 billion in 2020 in the same comparable quarter, the lowest level since the
PNAD survey was implemented in Brazil (IBGE 2021).
The permanence or lack of COVID emergency wages provided by the government
has relevant impacts on Brazilians’ income and, therefore, on their living standards
(Garcia et al. 2021; Levy and Menezes 2021). Greater purchasing power can result
in greater energy consumption and, therefore, more emissions. At the same time,
lower purchasing power can mean lower quality energy (i.e. paraffin and firewood
for cooking), ultimately resulting in higher emissions.
Fig. 15.2 Unemployment rate, by age, from Q1 2012 to Q4 2020. Data from IBGE (2021)
Power Sector Consumption
Perspectives of the Brazilian energy sector during the pandemic can be observed from
various aspects: demand, supply, electricity sector, fossil fuels, and among others.
This topic aims to comment on general aspects of the energy sector, focusing on
consumption and its patterns of variation. The onset of the pandemic has already
shown changes in Brazilian electricity consumption: the first quarter of 2020 saw a
0.9% reduction in electricity consumption compared to 2019 figures (EPE 2020a).
The three consumption classes-residential, industrial, and commercial—showed falls
of 0.3, 0.4 and 2.2% in the quarter (EPE 2020a). In the second quarter of 2020, elec-
tricity consumption in Brazil retracted by 8.3% compared to the same period of 2019
(EPE 2020b). In terms of classes, the largest drop was observed in the commercial
sector (− 21.5%), followed by the industrial sector (− 11.8%). In comparison, the
residential sector recorded a growth of 2.8% in the period analysed (EPE 2020b).
From July to September 2020, electricity consumption grew by 0.9% compared
to the same period of the previous year. There was a growth of 7.4% in the residential
sector and 2.1% in the industrial sector, while the commercial class continued to fall
(− 10.6%) on the same comparison basis (EPE 2012, 2020c). In the last quarter of
2020, it is noted that electricity consumption grew by 1.5% against the same period
of 2019. However, when analysing these data by sector, there are distinct behaviours:
the residential and industrial sectors grew by 7.0% and 3.2%, respectively, while the
commercial class showed a drop of 8.6% (ANP 2020; EPE 2020d). From January
to March 2021, average energy consumption grew by 3% compared to last year’s
same quarter (EPE 2020e). Breaking it down by class and comparing it with the
previous quarter, commercial consumption fell by 4%. In contrast, the residential
and industrial followed the growth trend observed in recent quarters, expanding by
5% and 7.2%, respectively (EPE 2020e).
Concerning the consumption of oil products in the Brazilian demand for fuel
during the period of social isolation in 2020, data from the National Agency of
Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP) indicate a drop in sales of aviation
kerosene, QAV (− 85%), C gasoline (− 29%), and B-oil diesel (− 14%) made in
April 2020, compared to the same period in 2019. On the other hand, sales of liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) increased by 4% in the same month (ANP 2020). Also, data
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) point out that the
marketing of ethanol decreased by 37% in April (Ministério da Agricultura Pecuária
e Abastecimento 2020). Figures 15.3 and 15.4 present the electricity consumption in
the grid, residential, industrial, and commercial and fuel sales of gasoline, ethanol,
diesel, and aviation kerosene.
4,30,00,000 1,40,00,000
4,10,00,000 1,30,00,000
MWh
MWh
3,90,00,000 2018 1,20,00,000 2018
3,70,00,000 2019 1,10,00,000 2019
3,50,00,000 1,00,00,000
2020 2020
Jul
Aug
Oct
Jul
Aug
Oct
Jan
Apr
Feb
May
Jun
Sep
Nov
Dec
Jan
Apr
Feb
May
Jun
Sep
Nov
Dec
Mar
Mar
Month Month
(a) (b)
1,60,00,000 92,00,000
1,50,00,000 82,00,000
MWh
MWh
1,40,00,000 2018 72,00,000 2018

1,30,00,000 2019 62,00,000 2019
1,20,00,000 52,00,000
2020 2020
Aug
Oct
Jan
Apr
Feb
May
Jun
Jul
Sep
Nov
Dec
Jan
Apr
Jun
Jul
Aug
Oct
Feb
May
Sep
Nov
Dec
Mar
Mar
Month Month
(c) (d)
Fig. 15.3 a Electricity consumption in the grid (total), data from EPE (2020f), b residential
consumption, data from EPE (2020f), c industrial consumption, data from EPE (2020f) and d
commercial consumption, data from EPE (2020f)
4000 2500
3500
2000
3000
2500 1500
10³ m³
10³ m³
2000 2018 2018

1500 1000
2019 2019
1000
2020 500 2020
500
0 0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month Month
(a) (b)
6000 800
5000
600
4000
10³ m³
10³ m³
2018 400 2018

3000
2000 2019 2019
200
1000 2020 2020
0
0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month
Month
(c) (d)
Fig. 15.4 a Gasoline sales (EPE 2020f), b ethanol hydrated sales, c diesel sales, and d aviation
kerosene sales, data from EPE (2020f)
The data from the National Energy Balance for 2019 and 2020 allow changes in the
sector to be assessed (EPE 2020a, 2021a). In 2019, the transport sector surpassed the
industrial sector in energy consumption in Brazil, accounting for 32.7% and 30.4%,
respectively (EPE 2020a). This position was maintained in 2020, with transport
accounting for 32.2% of energy and industry for 31.1% (EPE 2021a). However, the
overall scenario was a 2% reduction in energy use in 2020 compared to 2019, going
from 259.9 to 524.6 Mtoe, and the services sector was the one that presented the
greatest decline (EPE 2021a). The impact of the pandemic on industries was most
intense in April and May 2020, and electricity consumption even varied negatively
by double-digit rates (EPE 2021a).
Meanwhile, energy consumption in transport has been reduced by 6.4% compared
to 2019. The big highlight is aviation paraffin, with a drop of 42.8% and an increase
of 8.4% in biodiesel (EPE 2021a). The impact of the pandemic on energy consump-
tion in homes and businesses is due to social isolation measures and the closure of
businesses, especially in the first months of the health crisis. Residential consump-
tion grew by 3.4% year-over-year in 2019, with natural gas consumption increasing
by 8.4% (EPE 2021a). In the second quarter of 2020, a reduction of 7.7 and 11.2%
were observed in the trade and services sector (EPE 2021a).
When comparing the pandemic data with the expected growth values in the 10-
year energy expansion plan for 2021, a discrepancy between the predicted values
and the values obtained in reality can be seen (EPE 2012). The pandemic, therefore,
causes a rupture in the usual energy planning.
Reflections on the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Energy consumption within the residential, industrial, commercial, and rural sectors
is related to the population’s size, consumption profile, growth rate, and purchasing
power. It means that countries with growing populations must be especially attentive
to expanding their energy supply mix, which implies real questions about the limits
of energy expansion based on the availability of natural resources (Fiorino 2017;
Kocsis 2018). Two crucial discussions at the interface between household income
and natural resource availability come into play: consumption reduction and energy
justice. The decreased energy consumption is associated not only with the knowledge
that the Earth has finite natural resources. But, it also embraces the idea of energy
demand as a conception that connects various fields of knowledge such as social
practices, geography, historical moment, and material possibilities (Goggins et al.
2019; Jensen et al. 2018, 2019). The concept of energy justice, on the other hand, is
more linked to issues of unequal access to energy resulting from social inequalities
and associated factors (Heffron and McCauley 2017; Jenkins et al. 2016; Sovacool
and Dworkin 2015).
The idea of energy justice emerges from the discussion of the social science
agenda that seeks to apply concepts of justice to energy policy, energy production,
energy consumption, energy security and climate change (Carley and Konisky 2020;
Jenkins et al. 2016, 2018; McCauley and Heffron 2018). Energy justice issues are
widely connected with climate justice debates and the concept of just energy transi-
tion (Jasanoff 2018; Milanez and Fonseca 2012). The challenges of reducing GHG
emissions result in a gradual replacement of fossil fuel use and make it imperative to
discuss access to clean and affordable energy (Healy and Barry 2017; McCauley et al.
2019). As demonstrated above, bringing these two lines of discussion to Brazilian
reality requires analysing the national energy supply mix considering technical and
social aspects.
The major challenge in analysing the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the
electricity sector comes from the lack of historical perspective to say whether these
effects are temporary or will remain long-lasting. Although it is possible to discuss
this scenario in terms of pent-up demand, it is impossible to fully contemplate the
temporal duration of the pandemic since it is the result of various factors, and, likely,
it will never totally disappear, becoming endemic (Hunter 2020). Another important
aspect is to observe how the variables studied influence each other and make it
possible to check the Brazilian energy scenario.
In the short term, the pandemic is reflected in the impact on energy demand and
CO2 emissions in several countries (Carvalho et al. 2021). These effects are not
homogeneous, depending on social class, gender, type of employment, and other
aspects that shape the relationship of urbanization spaces (Carvalho et al. 2021).
Still, considering the short term, the impact on mobility is extremely evident due
to changes in public and private transport (Kuzemko et al. 2020). Therefore, the
use of petroleum products and biofuels reduced consumption, with the impact being
associated especially with social isolation and reduced mobility (EPE 2020g). With
the slowdown in the transport sector, the oil and gas chain was impacted in Brazil
and worldwide (Renewable Energy Agency 2020).
An important aspect to understand is whether the pandemic causes a rupture
of previous processes (such as the increased use of fossil fuels in the supply mix
and impoverishment of the population) or just an acceleration (Jiang et al. 2021).
This process can be different from country to country, reiterating the different state
approaches observed in dealing with the pandemic. The degree of isolation and
mobility restriction, proposals that depend on federal, state, and municipal policy
spheres cause a greater or lesser effect of changing consumption patterns. It is
extremely complicated to discuss post-pandemic perspectives as the pandemic was
not yet over in 2021. Different paths may be traced depending on political choices
regarding the pandemic and the energy sector. Variables such as a fully vaccinated
population can change the isolation scenario and current living standards, depending
on political actors and input availability.
A relevant concept that needs to be articulated in the discussion is the idea of
energy justice. In a world that considers today’s transformations, energy planning
must consider the principles of energy justice (Heffron and McCauley 2018; Sovacool
et al. 2017). These principles consider not only the technical or technological sphere
of the energy universe but also an ethical layer that considers the dilemmas of allowing
different populations to have access to energy adequately, not disregarding trade-
offs of environmental protection and various social inequalities (Salter et al. 2018;
Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). Therefore, the concept of just transition is articulated.
COVID-19 can spotlight this situation by revealing the vulnerabilities of the energy
system (Ranjbari et al. 2021; Sovacool et al. 2020). The pandemic may bring about
structural changes and changes in mentality. For the first time in the twenty-first
century, a global emergency is perceived that invokes profound changes in human
behaviour (Moya et al. 2020; Winter et al. 2020). In this sense, the discussion about
the possibility of talking about reducing consumption in the face of an unfavourable
economic reality comes into play. The consumption changes in the Brazilian scenario
do not seem to arise from a behavioural change thinking about climate change, but
they also seem to tend to return to previous patterns even in the face of difficulties
(i.e., drop in population income) (Khanna et al. 2021; van de Ven et al. 2018). Perhaps
this discussion can only gain weight in a scenario where the pandemic continues for
a long time. It is possible to argue that long-term impoverishment and the need for
isolation will eventually change consumption patterns.
The most current data on the Brazilian scenario is difficult to read: even though
some fuels continue to rise, such as biodiesel, the EPE’s expectation for the fuel
market is that the pandemic will affect Otto cycle fuel sales in 2020 and will present
effects in the short term (EPE 2020g). In 2021, there is a trend towards recovery in the
Otto fuel market, although not fully restored to pre-pandemic levels (EPE 2021a).
Renewable energy also indicates that it could accelerate Brazil’s GDP compared
to other energy types (Magazzino et al. 2021). This is made even more uncer-
tain by the uncertainty about the pandemic’s temporal continuity. In the long run,
Pent-up demand can end up becoming a reduction in consumption. Furthermore,
in 2018, while developed countries such as Iceland, Norway, Canada, and Sweden
consumed, respectively, 54.6 MWh/capita, 24.1 MWh/capita, 15.4 MWh/capita and
13.3 MWh/capita, Brazil still consumed only 2.6 MWh/capita, reinforcing the idea
of a Brazilian pent-up demand (IEA 2018). It is clear, however, that it is necessary
to consider that these countries have colder climates and therefore have high energy
consumption with heating.
Also, the Brazilian context cannot be excluded from what happens in other coun-
tries in the face of the pandemic. Although they have different social contexts and
approaches, what is observed in Europe, Asia, and the United States can teach valu-
able lessons for the Brazilian energy sector (Chien et al. 2021; Wang and Zhang 2021;
Werth et al. 2021). Most European countries faced a fall in energy consumption in
the first months of the pandemic (Werth et al. 2021).
Consumption has also been reduced in China, and in the first months of the
pandemic, it was possible to notice an increase in air quality (Wang and Zhang 2021).
The experience of the United States, with less government restrictive measures, also
sees a reduction in energy consumption in the first months of the pandemic but soon
returns to the previous dynamics (Gillingham et al. 2020; Wang and Han 2021).
However, the origin of these reductions differs from that expected in an optimal
reduction scenario, which focuses on behavioural and structural changes in the energy
system (Gillingham et al. 2020).
Finally, it is important to argue that even if there were a reduction in energy
consumption in Brazil, this reduction would not follow the concept of energy justice.
A change that results in impoverishing the country’s population disagrees with social
justice criteria and can also lead to other damages, such as increased emissions asso-
ciated with cheaper and lower quality fuels (Ciotta and Peyerl 2021). The reduction
of desirable consumption starts with knowledge about energy choices, which is not
observed in the country. It is not possible to infer about the durability of this reduction
because it is still nebulous the pandemic’s paths. Above all, it is not possible to say
that this reduction occurs following the concepts of energy justice.
Final Considerations
Although it is impossible to answer all questions fully, a few points can be clarified.
Is the energy consumption reduction observed enough to say that the pandemic of
COVID-19 has intensified a trend of permanently reduced energy consumption in
Brazil? Given that the current consumption reduction seems to be linked to pent-up
demand and reduced population purchasing power, we believe it is impossible to talk
about “consumption reduction” in terms of a just energy transition.
How are decision-makers managing the energy system in the face of unex-
pected and complex changes in energy consumption? Globally, the approaches were
diverse, which is also verifiable in the Brazilian internal dynamics, where states took
different attitudes towards the pandemic. The countries that presented more restric-
tive measures also presented more impacting results in reducing energy consumption
and emissions. However, these measures are not sustainable in the long term, making
it necessary to think about intervening in structural changes in the energy sector and
communication about behavioural changes.
Within this crisis, is the government managing to meet the current energy demand
of the population? Approaches vary from country to country according to their possi-
bilities for action, government guidelines and economic inequalities. In the case of
Brazil, the federal sphere ended up being very absent in decision-making, and each
state had relevance in its internal decisions, resulting in very different experiences
even within the same country.
What lessons can we learn from the pandemic to plan a more resilient system?
Among the possible lessons, one can mention the understanding of a more refined
sense of urgency regarding the need for preparation, collective organization and
social education about extreme situations and their impacts.
Can the COVID-19 pandemic help us face a future of climate change with greater
preparedness? The pandemic teaches us the importance of having a robust and
resilient energy system to deal with risky situations by putting us in front of an
extreme and little-known case. Climate change tends to increase the likelihood of
extreme events. If the Brazilian energy system is rethought in the face of this logic,
only decisions in the social and political sphere can tell. However, this is a lesson
that, if incorporated into the Brazilian energy context, may result in a less uncertain
future for the sector and ensures that those in vulnerable conditions suffer less from
extreme changes.
Acknowledgements Peyerl and Zacharias thank the current financial support of grant Process
2017/18208-8, 2018/26388-9 and 2020/02546-4, São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP).
Mariana Ciotta thank especially Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento Pessoal de Nível Superior
(CAPES), for the scholarship. All the authors gratefully acknowledge support from SHELL Brazil
and FAPESP through the Research Centre for Gas Innovation (RCGI) (FAPESP Proc. 2014/50279-
4 and 2020/02546-4), hosted by the University of São Paulo, and the strategic importance of the
support given by ANP. This work was partially financed by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de
Pessoal de Nível Superior—Brasil (CAPES).
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Energy Transition in Brazil (Drielli Peyerl, Stefania Relva

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The Latin American Studies Book Series

Energy Transition in Brazil

ISSN 2366-3421 ISSN 2366-343X (electronic)

June 2022 Prof. Dr. Julio Romano Meneghini

of successful global energy transition toward low-carbon future. Chapters 4 and 5

1 Energy Transition: Changing the Brazilian Landscape Over

8 Brazilian Natural Gas as a Low-Carbon Energy Transition

Drielli Peyerl, Stefania Gomes Relva, and Vinícius Oliveira da Silva

Abstract The energy transition associated with historical context requires us to

Keywords Energy transition · History · Natural resources · Brazil

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 1

The Demand and Exploration of Brazilian Energy Resources

The Transformation of the Landscape: Opening Roads

Diesel imported (Liters) Diesel exported (Liters)

Brazil After the Oil Crisis: Moving Away from Oil

country was highly dependent on imported oil supplies to fuel an industrialization

● The creation of the Programa de Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia

Final Remarks: What Does the Energy Transition

Vinicius Oliveira da Silva, André dos Santos Alonso Pereira,

V. O. da Silva (B) · S. G. Relva

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 17

Keywords Energy transition · Bibliometric review · Knowledge mapping · Brazil

Energy transition (ET), as a prominent theme, is in vogue in global discussions

Mapping Brazilian Energy Transition Knowledge

Brazilian Energy Transition for Whom, Where and When

The bibliographic survey from Research #1 identified 6,191 records, of which 92

Fig. 2.2 Network of international collaboration nodes of researchers

Fig. 2.3 Network of nodes after the application of geographic screening

Knowledge Growth of Energy Transition Applied to Brazil

Number of acumulated publicatins

Fig. 2.4 Evolution of the number of records published annually

Table 2.1 Main research

citations, investigating, from the sociotechnical point of view, the emergence of PV

An Analysis of the Research Area and Main Journals of ET

Table 2.2 Main journal of the analyzed records

Content Producing Regions and Countries

The 42 records are produced by researchers from institutions allocated in 24 countries

Table 2.3 Main publishers of the analyzed records

Table 2.4 Regions of the institutions linked to the records

Institutions, Funding Agencies, and Authors

collaboration of researchers from different institutions to produce research and subse-

Table 2.6 Main institutions

Table 2.7 Main funding agencies

replace coal-fired thermoelectric plants, as a decarburization solution for the elec-

Table 2.8 Main authors

Energy Transition Knowledge Evolution in the Brazilian

Fig. 2.5 Keywords node network

Fig. 2.6 Map of the two largest keyword co-citation clusters

In order to improve the institutional environment for Brazilian Energy Transition

applied to locations with different socioeconomic and environmental profiles in

André dos Santos Alonso Pereira, Vinicius Oliveira da Silva,

A. S. A. Pereira (B) · E. M. dos Santos · D. Peyerl

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 37

Keywords Energy transition · Geopolitics · Brazil · Hydrocarbons · Renewables

general well-being. At last, a discussion is made to instigate and contribute to a

Energy Geopolitics: A Brief Overview

Energy as a Source of Power and Conflict

Oil Hegemon and Slow Decline

Energy Transition as a Soft Power Instrument

Brazil’s Role in Energy Geopolitics

Internal Scenario: The Brazilian Energy Supply Mix

Table 3.1 Brazil energy

Energy’s Role in Brazil’s International Relations

Brazil’s Main Geopolitical Assets and Structural Gaps