FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA

Introduction to Law Case Digests

2016
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 FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA
Introduction to Law Case Digests

Angara vs Electoral Commission Ochoso vs Alano

Antonio vs Sayman Vda. De Monje Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs CA
Atlantic Erectors vs Herbal Cove Realty Corp Padillo vs CA
Cayetano vs Monsod People vs CA
Young Men’s Christian Association vs Remington Steel People vs Derilo
Co vs CA Pespi-Cola products vs Pagdanganan
Cojuanco, Jr. vs Pascual-Lopez Regala vs Sandiganbayan
Corpuz vs People Republic vs Yu
De Castro vs JBC Roxas vs De Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice Santiago III vs Enriquez, Jr
Fabian vs Desierto Santos vs CA
Fermin vs People Sebastian vs Calis
Firestone Ceramics vs CA Ting vs Velez-Ting
Francisco, Jr vs Nagmamalasakit na mga mananaggol Ulep vs Legal Clinic, Inc.
In re: Cunanan, et al. Villa vs Sandiganbayan
In the Matter of the charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice del
Castillo
Kilosbayan Foundation vs Ermita
Lim vs Vera Cruz
Lopez vs Roxas
Ocampo vs Arcaya-Chua

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Introduction to Law Case Digests

Angara vs. Electoral Commission ISSUE:

Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
G.R. No. 45081 election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
July. 15. 1936
Justice Laurel
HELD
Did the Electoral Commission act in excess of its jurisdiction
FACTS:
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
-Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office
jurisdiction in acknowledging the protest filed against the election of the
as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government.
petitioner in spite of the resolution of the National Assembly.
-On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election
protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take recognition of the protest
-On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner
an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission
Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in
of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the
any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the
Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as
consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before
the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
December 9, 1935.
-Citing the resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however The Electoral Commission, being the sole judge of all contests relating to
denied his motion. the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification

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Introduction to Law Case Digests
to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
government.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly.
PETITION DENIED
Spouses Antonio v. Julita Sayman Vda. De Monje
G.R. No. 149624
FACTS:
Assailed in the present petition are the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) concerning two cases: Civil Case No. 007-125 and
Civil Case No. 506.
Civil Case 007-125
Whether the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square meter portion of Lot
No. 1 being contested by respondents is valid
Civil Case No. 506
Whether petitioners were deprived of possession of the remaining 8,403
square meter portion of Lot No. 1 which was validly sold to them and
whether they are entitled to an accounting of the proceeds of the copra
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harvested from their property which was supposedly appropriated by
respondents.
On December 16, 1994, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order
dismissing herein petitioners' complaint on the ground of res judicata
On May 4, 2001, CA rendered its presently assailed Decision affirming
the judgment of the RTC and dismissing the appeal of herein petitioners
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the principle of res judicata with
respect to Civil Case No. 007-125 and Civil Case No. 506
HELD:
Yes.
Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res
judicata states that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit.
Res judicata applies by two ways: (1) bar by prior judgment, and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment.
Bar by Prior judgment when there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved.
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Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has
been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a
former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction
In the present case, there is identity of parties in Civil Case No. 007-125
and Civil Case No. 506. As to the issues, the issue raised in Civil Case
No. 007-125 is whether the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square meter
portion of Lot No. 1 being contested by respondents is valid. On the other
hand, in Civil Case No. 506, the issues are whether petitioners were
deprived of possession of the remaining 8,403 square meter portion of Lot
No. 1 which was validly sold to them and whether they are entitled to an
accounting of the proceeds of the copra harvested from their property
which was supposedly appropriated by respondents
Hence, there is no res judicata in the present case.
Atlantic Erectors, Inc vs. Herbal Cove Realty
Corporation
G.R. No. 148568
March 20. 2003
Justice Panganiban
FACTS
- On June 20, 1996, Herbal Cove Realty (HCR) and Atlantic
Erectors Inc (AEI) entered into a Construction Contract whereby
the former agreed to construct four (4) units of townhouses]
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designated as 16-A, 16-B, 17-A and 17-B and one (1) single
detached unit for an original contract price of P15,726,745.19
which was later adjusted to P16,726,745.19 as a result of
additional works. The contract period is 180 days commencing on
July 7, 1996 and to terminate on January 7, 1997. AEI claimed that
the said period was not followed due to reasons attributable to
HCR namely: suspension orders, additional works, force majeure,
and unjustifiable acts of omission or delay on their part. HCR,
however, denied such claims and instead pointed to AEI as having
exceeded the 180 day contract period aggravated by defective
workmanship and utilization of materials which are not in
compliance with specifications.
- On November 21. 1997, AEI filed a case against HCR for relief
through various sums of money.
- On the same day, AEI filed a notice of Lis Pendens for annotation
of the pendency of Civil Case No. 97-707 on certain Transfer
Certificates of Titles. On April 24. 1998, HCR filed a Motion to
cancel notice of Lis Pendens, arguing that AEI’s action is a purely
personal one to collect a sum of money. The trial court allowed the
notice of Lis Pendens to push through, saying it only served as a
warning that litigation was occurring over the properties. HCR then
filed to the CA.
- The Court of Appeals, granted HCR’s motion to cancel the notice
of Lis Pendens. The failure to allege and claim the contractor’s lien
did not warrant the continued annotation on the property titles of
HCR.
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ISSUES
1. Whether or not money claims representing cost of materials for
and labor on the houses constructed on a property are a proper lien
for annotation of lis pendens on the property title.
2. Whether or not the trial court after having declared itself without
jurisdiction to try the case, may still decide on the substantial issue
of the case.
HELD
1. Proper Basis for a Notice of Lis Pendens
NO. The money claims are not a proper basis for a notice of Lis Pendens.
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may
be availed of are as follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real
estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any other court proceedings that
directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use or the
occupation thereof. The money claim cannot be characterized as an
action that involves the enforcement of a lien or an encumberance. Clearly
then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights
of the debtor, the following claims, mortgages and liens shall be preferred,
and shall constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or real right:
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(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well
as of architects, engineers and contractors, engaged in the construction,
reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said
buildings, canals or other works;
(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction,
reconstruction, or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said
buildings, canals or other works.
Therefore, the enforcement of the lien thereunder is not applicable here,
because petitioner's Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing
requirements. Nowhere does it show that respondent's property was
subject to the claims of other creditors or was insufficient to pay for all
concurring debts. Moreover, the Complaint did not pertain to insolvency
proceedings or to any other action in which the adjudication of claims of
preferred creditors could be ascertained. Such notice is rendered
nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action which in this
case it is.
2. Jurisdiction of the trial court
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which governs appeals
from regional trial courts, expressly provides that RTCs lose jurisdiction
over a case when an appeal is filed. The rule reads:
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. -- A party's appeal by notice
of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of
appeal in due time.
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"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of
the time to appeal of the other parties”.
On the basis of the foregoing rule, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case only on August 31, 1998, when petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal.
Thus, any order issued by the RTC prior to that date should be considered
valid, because the court still had jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, it
still had the authority or jurisdiction to issue the July 30, 1998 Order
canceling the Notice of Lis Pendens. On the other hand, the November 4,
1998Order that set aside the July 30, 1998 Order and reinstated that
Notice should be considered without force and effect, because it was
issued by the trial court after it had already lost jurisdiction.
PETITION DENIED. THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS IS NOT
PROPER.
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991
FACTS
 Christian Monsod (respondent) was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC
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 Renato Cayetano (petitioner) opposed the nomination because
allegedly, Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
 Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC, the latter took his oath of
office and on the same day assumed office.
 Cayetano challenges the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments by filing a case praying that said
confirmation be declared null and void
 Christian Monsod background:
o Graduated UP Law
o Passed bar exam in 1960, grade of 86.55%
o After graduating and passing the bar, started working in the
law office of his father
o During stint in the World Bank, he worked as an operations
officer for about 2 years in Costa Rica and Panama which
involved getting acquainted with laws of member-
countries, negotiating loans, coordinating legal, economic
and project work of the Bank.
o Upon returning to the PH in 1970, worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate and
since 1986 rendered services to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer
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o Former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman

(1987) of NAMFREL
 Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec.
o In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill.
o Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of
its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for
which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of Representative.
ISSUE/S
Whether Monsod is engaged in the practice of law for ten years and
therefore possess the required qualification to be nominated as Chairman
of the COMELEC
HELD
YES
RATIO
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into

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Introduction to Law Case Digests
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
CHINESE YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS REMINGTON STEEL
CORPORATION
FACTS:
Respondent leased ground floor units 964 and 966 and second
floor unit 963 of a building owned by the Petitioner in Benavidez St.,
Binondo, Manila.
On February 27, 1997, Petitioner formally terminated the lease
over second floor unit 963 and gave Respondent until March 31, 1997 to
vacate the premises.
On March 24, Respondent filed with the MTC-Manila a case for
the Fixing of Lease Period over Unit 963 docketed as Civil Case No.
154969-CV.
On April 8, 1997, Petitioner filed in the same Court an action for
Unlawful Detainer involving the same unit 963 against Respondent
docketed as Civil Case No. 155083-CV.
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MTC Branch 26 consolidated the two cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 154969-CV, Respondent
filed a Petition for Consignation of Rentals on the ground that Petitioner
refused to receive rentals for ground floor units 964 and 966 and assigned
to Branch 24 of MTC-Manila.
On July 23, 1998, Respondent filed a Formal Surrender of the
Leased Premises, opting to surrender possession of Units 964 and 966
effective July 1, 1998 and tendering two checks to cover all past rentals.
On June 25, 1998, Petitioner filed a NO Objection to the turnover
of Units 964 and 966, thus on July 9, 1998, MeTC Branch 24 ordered the
consignation case closed.
However, Respondent continued to use Units 964 and 966 as
passageway to second floor unit 963 and kept the premises padlocked
and failed to give the keys to the premises to the Petitioner.
On August 11, 1998, MeTC Branch 26 renderd a decision in Civil
Case Nos. 154969-CV and 155083-CV extending for three years from
finality of decision the lease period on second floor unit 963 and dismissed
Petitioner’s complaint for ejectment.
On August 21, 1998, Respondent filed in MeTC Branch 26 a
Motion to Constitute a Passageway alleging it had no means of ingress
and egress to second floor unit 963. The issue on passageway was not
resolved by MeTC-Branch 26, for it had to forward the records of the case
to Branch 30, RTC Branch 30 in connection with the appeals taken by the
parties from its decision, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 99-93836 and 99-
93837.
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On March 15, 2000, RTC Branch 30, acting as an appellate court,
rendered a decision in civil case nos. 99-93836 and 99-93837 granting
Respondent a longer extension period of5 years for second floor unit 963
and ordering Petitioner a two-meter passageway between units 964 and
966.
Dissatisfied with the decision, Petitioner filed an appeal with the
CA, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 58957. On Sept 9, 2003, the CA held
that the MeTC had authority to fix an extension of the lease period.
In the meantime that CA-GR SP No. 58957 was pending,
Petitioner filed in MeTC Manila two separate complaints for unlawful
detainer Respondent from ground floor units 964 and 966, docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 168629-CV and 168628-CV, respectively. Civil Case No.
168629-CV was raffled to Branch 20 while Civil Case No.168628-CV was
raffled to Branch 17. The two cases were consolidated upon Respondent
motion but was reversed and cancelled upon Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, hence the cases were tried separately.
Both Branches of MeTC separately ordered Respondent to vacate
the premises and to pay reasonable rent and attorney’s fees to Petitioner.
Respondent separately appealed both decisions to the RTC-
Manila. Its appeal from MeTC-Branch 20 was assigned to RTC Branch
40 and docketed as Civil Case No. 01-102435, while the appeal from
MeTC Branch 17 was assigned to RTC Branch 25 and docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-107655. Both Branches separately reversed the respective
decisions of the MeTC Branches and dismissed the two complaints for
unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed separate Motion for Reconsideration
which were denied.
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Petitioner then filed separate petitions for review in the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 74292 and 88599.
On January 16, 2003, issued a Resolution dismissing outright
the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 74292 involving unit 964 on
the ground that the signatory (William Golangco) to the Verification and
Certification on Non-Forum Shopping failed to show his proof of authority
to file the petition for review.
On February 10, 2003, Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration appending therein the Secretary’s Certificate dated
December 26, 2002 executed by Petitioner’s Corporate Secretary
attesting to a December 13, 2002 Resolution of the Board of Directors
authorizing signatory (William Golangco) to prepare and file the petition
for review.
On July 29, 2003, CA denied the Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration citing the case of Spouses Melo v. Court of Appeals,
which underscored the mandatory nature of the requirement that the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should be annexed to, or
simultaneously filed with the petition, and that subsequent compliance
therewith cannot excuse a party’s failure to comply in the first instance.
ISSUE:
Is the failure of the petitioner to submit the authority of the affiant
who have signed for the petitioner corporation and the subsequent
submission of the secretary’s certificate did not cure the said defect
in the Certification against Forum Shopping?
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HELD:
The Supreme Court granted the Petition and reversed the resolutions of
the CA dated January 16, 2003 and July 29, 2003.
The Court distinguished between non-compliance with the requirements
for Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping. As to
verification, non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective; hence the court may order its correction if
verification is lacking. On the other hand, the lack of certification of non-
forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after
the filing of the petition.
The Court opined that the CAs reliance on Melo case was misplaced
because that case involved a total failure to append to the petition a
verification and certification of non-forum shopping unlike in the present
case where Petitioner merely failed to submit proof of authority of the
signatory to sign the same.
Co vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100776
October 28, 1993
Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel
– and in payment for his share of the expenses of the salvage operations
therein stipulated – petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizen's Bank,
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postdated November 30, 1983, in the sum of 361, 528.00 Php. The check
was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later with
the bank saying that it was a “CLOSED ACCOUNT.”
A criminal complaint for the violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(BP 22) was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's
Conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced tos uffer a term
of imprisonment of 60 days and to indemnify the salvage company in the
sum of PHP 361,528.00
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals which later affirmed the
decision of the lower court. This is a petition for certiorari from the appellee
under the grounds that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is not covered by BP 22 or the Anti –
Bouncing Check Law. As at the time, Circular No. 4, dated December 15
1981, of the Ministry of Justice was in effect which provides that :
2.3.4. Where is issuance of bouncing check is neither
estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Where the check is
issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure
the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not,
the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
This Circular though was later reversed in an administrative
circular subsequently issued on August 8, 1984.
Issue:
Whether or not Co is guilty of violating BP 22 at the time of the
issuance of his check?
Held:
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No. While the RTC here relied on the decision of the case Que v.
People which was promulgated on September 21, 1987; pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." At the time of the issuance of the check on September, 1983,
some four years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People
on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as
a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense.
The new circular, which made also aforementioned act of
delivering a bouncing check a punishable offense, was also made almost
one year after when Albino Co handed the “bouncing” check to
complainant on September, 1983.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that “Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided,” this declaration is
echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: “Penal laws shall have,
a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal.”
The rationale against retroactivity is easily explainable; the
retroactive application of law usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs obligations of contract and is thus
unconstitutional
Note that this is also a criminal action, thus all doubts in as a
general doctrine must also be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court
sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should
override the principle of prospectivity or the principle that the law generally
looks forward and not backward, and its clear implications negating
criminal liability.
The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the RTC are
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thus reversed and set aside with the criminal prosecution against the
accused being dismissed.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR vs. ATTY.
LEO J. PALMA Adm.
Case No. 2474 September 15, 2004 Facts Cojuangco and Atty. Palma
met sometime in the 70’s. Cojuanco was a client of Angara Concepcion
Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and Atty. Palma was the lawyer
assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns,
Cojuangco decided to hire Atty. Palma as his personal counsel. On June
22, 1982, without the knowledge of Cojuangco’s family, Atty. Palma
married Lisa, the 22-year-old daughter of Eduardo Cojuangco whom he
tutored, in Hongkong. It was only the next day that Atty. Palma informed
Cojuangco and assured him that "everything is legal." Cojuangco was
shocked, knowing fully well that Atty. Palma was married to Elizabeth
Hermosisima and has three children. Upon investigation, Cojuangco
found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions.
Immediately, Cojuangco sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa
to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was
persuaded. Cojuangco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Palma, alleging as grounds "deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct."
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Palma should be disbarred
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Held:
Yes, the Court ruled Atty. Palma’s action constitutes gross immoral
conduct. A gross immoral conduct, the Court said, is a conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
Thus, Atty. Palma’s act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a
“bachelor” so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. In particular,
adds the Court, "he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Moreover,
the circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and
abuse of confidence. It was his closeness to the Cojuangco family as well
as the latter’s complete trust in him that made possible his intimate
relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be the legal
affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his daughter.
Moreover, he availed of the resources of Cojuangco by securing a plane
ticket from their own office in order to marry the latter’s daughter in
Hongkong. He did this without Cojuangco’s knowledge.
The Court stressed again the principle that law profession does not
prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
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citizen at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even his
private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good
name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be
the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. Atty. Palma
cannot rely on Cojuangco’s admission that he is a good lawyer, because
professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member
of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is that they ” shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This is founded on the lawyers’
primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states: "CANON
1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes." The above responsibility is
enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath which every lawyer in thecountry has to
take before he is allowed to practice. In sum, respondent committed
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JBC
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
PONENTE: BERSAMIN
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Introduction to Law Case Digests
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on
May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. On
December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor requested that the
process of nominations be commenced immediately, an then the JBC, in
its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its
existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG
contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
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days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to
Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of
the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy
has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course,
whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared,
in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy
in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are
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Introduction to Law Case Digests
seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section
4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend
the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section
4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
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the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court. The 90-day limitation fixed in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite
mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be
defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that
Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was "couched in stronger
negative language Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously
of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that
Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately
situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only
to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
TAKE NOTE:
>The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and The -Philippine Star.
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> The Valenzuela case was reversed by this Court.

HELD

Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice 1. No

2. No
3. Yes
G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999
RATIO

FACTS
1. The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the Supreme Court
 Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177).
 The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order for the
execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any repeal or
modification as to the implementation of RA 8177.
 Such action by the court was questioned since it already rendered
a final judgment on the case.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a
final judgment
2. Whether the grant of the TRO has in effect granted reprieve which
is an executive function (and therefore the Supreme Court, being
the Judiciary, cannot do such)
3. Whether the TRO should now be lifted
of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment –
finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers over the case.
The Supreme Court does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with
a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or
amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of
judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision but
retains its power to execute and enforce it. There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former
continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while the latter
terminates after the final judgment is rendered or after the
judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may transpire
which may render the execution unjust or impossible.

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Introduction to Law Case Digests
2. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the
"decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." Public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority
of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and
these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance,
a death convict who become insane after his final conviction
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cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of
such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial
power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be
denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by
reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of
such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But
by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of
its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of
the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the
right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws
have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to
suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been
upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the
President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore
to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
3. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been
grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by
vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance
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Introduction to Law Case Digests
of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked
several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on
January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of
Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or
review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1)
that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency
be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be
reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2)
Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S.
Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the
death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the
repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib
Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are
demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in
its traditional recess and would only resume session on January
18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the
Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 at 10. a.m. to
deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly
had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to
be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in
Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere
speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good
reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's
allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that
petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and
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were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was
also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress
and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members
whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The
present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that
enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal
Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt
that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was
hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was
set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as
Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's
majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious
stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The
suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the
constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress,
unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of
the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the
Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of
the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will
preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As
life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and
the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed
the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his
counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations
demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its
citizens.
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The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its
desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether
Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public
respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that
negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or
amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening
events as follows:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he
will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving
heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they
are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law
only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No.
629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution
expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject
any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the
reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary
and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust
all means under the law to immediately implement the death
penalty law."
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In addition, the President has stated that he will not request
Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence
of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments,
the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and
humanitarian purpose.
Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742
September 16, 1998
FACTS
 Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and
president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
which was engaged in the construction business
 Respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
 PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, persuaded the
petitioner into having an amorous relationship with him. Their affair
lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent
gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for the
corporation’s problems.
 Because of misunderstandings, petitioner tried to end their
relationship but the respondent refused and employed acts of
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harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, Rules of Court
1995.
 As to Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
 The complaint sought the dismissal of the respondent for violation that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of Section 19, RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
Section 36 of PD No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with preventive advice and consent," petitioner said that section 27 of R.A. 6770
suspension. The charges referred to may be under the category does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by
of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct. providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari
under Rules of Court 45, then what may be raised therein are
 In 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution
already of which this Court has jurisdiction.
finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering
his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under  But in relation to the foregoing, the private respondent observed
the law. His resolution was approved by the Director and Assistant that the revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from
Ombudsman. But the case was transferred to Deputy quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for
Ombudsman Guerrero who exonerated private respondent from review on certiorari under Rule 45.
the administrative charges and this decision was deemed as final
and executory.
 Petitioner argues that Section 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) provides that all administrative decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE
 She submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority
under the law to restrict the right of appeal allowed by RA 6770, Whether Section 27 of RA 6770 contravenes Art. VI- Sec 30
nor to limit the power of review of this Court. She found it
necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus), because of the HELD
YES

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RATIO Furthermore, the legislative background of RA 6770 shows that the

Conference Committee Report was aware of the provisions of Section 30,
Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall
Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara,
be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as a co-author and the principal sponsor of the bill admitted that the said
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that
provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on
Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, was effected in
Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter.
spite of that constitutional prohibition.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription
in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The constitutional prohibition was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under
its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the Court.
The very provision cited by the petitioner does not include quasi-judicial
agencies such as the OMB. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be
brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments
and final orders of the courts. Appeals from judgments and final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review which was precisely formulated
and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies.
unconstitutional, and appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals.
DISPOSITION
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together
with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or
issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of
no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of
Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the
Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43.

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Fermin v. People
Facts: Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief
of Gossip Tabloid.
The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is
improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that she
is evading her conviction in an estafa case here in the Philippines for she
and husband Eddie Gutierrez have more problems/cases to confront
there. This was said to be due to their, especially Annabelle's, using fellow
Filipinos’ money, failure to remit proceeds to the manufacturing company
of the cookware they were selling and not being on good terms with the
latter.
Annabelle and Eddie filed libel cases against Fermin and Tugas before
RTC of QC, Br. 218. The RTC found Fermin and Tugas guilty of libel. The
CA acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation but Fermin's
conviction was affirmed.
Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition. She
argues that she had no knowledge and participation in the publication of
the article, that the article is not libelous and is covered by the freedom of
the press.
Issue/s: Whether or not Cristy Fermin is guilty of libel
Held: YES. Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication is
not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as “author,
editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication. Petitioner was
not only the “publisher,” but also the “president” and “chairperson.”
Petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had
actual knowledge and participation.
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The elements of libel were present.
1. Evident imputation of the crime of malversation (converting money
for personal use), of vices or defects for being fugitives from the
law (evading prosecution in America) and of being a wastrel
2. Attribution made publicly. Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide
circulation.
3. The victims were identified and identifiable.
4. The article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
a. Malice in law - the article was malicious in itself; the
imputations were false.
b. Malice in fact - there was motive to talk ill against
complainants during the electoral campaign as Fermin is a
close friend of Eddie's opponent in the Congressional race.
While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities
in the entertainment business, media people do not have the unbridled
license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing
fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in
print, about their personal lives.
Note: CA erred in acquitting Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But the
SC cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas
because with his acquittal by the CA as that would run afoul of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127022
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Introduction to Law Case Digests
June 28, 2000
FACTS
 Consolidated cases: Petitioners are Firestone Ceramics, et al. and
Republic of the Philippines, et al.
 Petitoners’ case was decided upon by Third Division. Petitioners
filed Motions for Reconsideration. Petitioners seek to refer their
case to the Court En Banc pending said Motion for
Reconsideration.
 Cases involve a vast tract of land (99 hectares) presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which was adjudicated
to private individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction
 The validity of the disposition of the land to private persons is what
is in question in this case since the validity of the decision, the
original certificate of title and transfer certificates of title issued
pursuant to the decision hinges on the classification of the subject
area at the time it was so adjudicated
 Said decision does not indicate the classification of the land in
question when private respondents obtained their decree of
registration
ISSUES
Whether cases can be referred to the Court En Banc pending a Motion
for Reconsideration in one of its divisions
HELD
YES
RATIO
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 Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated Feb 7, 1989, as
amended by Resolution of November 18, 1993, the following are
considered en banc cases:
o Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order,
or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
o Criminal case in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty;
o Cases raising novel questions of law
o Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls
o Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and
Commission on Audit
o Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of
a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of
a lawyer or either the suspension of any of them for a
period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding
P10,000 or both;
o Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court
en banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
o Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court
en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the court en banc; and
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o All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
merit its attention
In the case of Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. CA, the Court conceded that
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En
it is not infallible. Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does not
Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without
blindly adhere to such error, and the parties adversely affected thereby
implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and
are not precluded from seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for
fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the
reconsideration. In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than
cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be
anything else, is of paramount importance.
concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting
strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable
opinion of the majority of its actual membership — that, indeed, subject
In this case, there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners’
cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the
Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases for the
whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this
consideration of the Court. A pleading was presented but when the same
highest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions
was first brought to its attention, the Court opined that since the Third
in interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence,
Division had not yet acted on subject motions to refer the cases to the
rules and Resolutions of the Court — to the end that public interest be
Banc, it was then premature for the Court to resolve the consulta.
duly safeguarded and rule of law be observed.
However, the Court succinctly cautioned that the action of the Third
Division on the matter would just be tentative.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised,
let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as
Considering that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court has been
government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their
cited to support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these
pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En
consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit
Banc.
the attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the
prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the
Court en banc to hear and resolve their pending motion for
reconsideration is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the Court
constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to warrant the

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Introduction to Law Case Digests
Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc.
G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003
Justice Carpio Morales
FACTS
-On November 28. 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives (HR) adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. This superseded the
previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On July 22 2002, HR adopted a Resolution that
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the SC of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
-On June 2 2003, ex-president Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (1st complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.,
7 Associate Justices of the SC for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."
This was in relation to the controversy regarding the disbursement
of money from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
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-This was endorsed by the House of Representatives, and referred
to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
-The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that
the 1st impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but the
complaint was then voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003
for being insufficient in substance.
-On the next day, 4 months and 3 weeks after the 1st impeachment
complaint, the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
and the 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the Sec Gen of
the House by HR against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. This was based
on alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives and various petitions, that contend that the filing
of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates
the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year." Thus arose
the instant petition of the case at hand.
ISSUE/S
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1. The threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of
judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
2. Whether or not the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution; and
3. Whether or not the resolution thereof is a political question –
has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD
1. Judicial Review-YES, its power extends to impeachment
proceedings.
The applicable provision is Article XI, section 3 which states that:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
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be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
From this we can see that, judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings. Petitioners plead for the court to exercise the
power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
The court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of
the government in Section 1, Article 8 of 1987 Constitution which states
that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power is the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
There is no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system
of checks and balances. The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments.
2. Validity of second impeachment complaint- No, it is not
constitutional.
The filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide
Jr. with the HR falls within the 1 year bar.The initiation takes place by the
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act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon.
This is seen in Section 3 (5) of Article XI: Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period
The first impeachment complaint was filed by ex- President Estrada
against Chief Justice Davide, Jr., with 7 associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, The second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one year period.
3. Whether or Not the resolution thereof is a political question –
has resulted in a political crisis.
- Possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason
for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases.
- Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their
action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
-It becomes an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this
Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate.
- The claim that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is without basis in fact and in law.
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PETITION DENIED. THE SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT IS
BARRED
In Re: Cunanan
GR No. L-6784
March 18, 1954
Diokno, J.
FACTS:
In 1953, the Congress passed Republic Act No. 972, known as “Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953.
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, a candidate is
deemed passed if he obtains a general average of 75% in all subjects w/o
falling below 50% in any subject. Nevertheless, considering the varying
difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were
graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who
had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947,
70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per
cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured
in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced
the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 percent effective
since 1946.
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The president vetoed Senate Bill No. 12 but approved Senate Bill No. 371,
which substantially embodied the vetoed bill.
The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than
50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade
of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that
subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the
general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional?
HELD:
The court held that RA 972 is unconstitutional but a part of Sec. 1 is
constitutional.
As per Section 1 of RA 972, the provision pertaining to the years 1946 –
1951 was declared unconstitutional based on the following grounds:
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a. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who
flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due
to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
b. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court
on the petitions of the said candidates;
c. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore,
in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment
of the court on who can practice law; and
d. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class
legislation.
As to the provision pertaining to the years 1953 – 1955, they were
declared in force and in effect. Due to the fact that the court could not
muster enough votes to declare it void. In addition, it does not adversely
affect the previous resolutions issued by the court as it was issued in 1952
and will take effect in 1953 and it is also within the power of the congress
to alter, supplement, or modify the rules of admission to the practice of
law.
And as per section 2 of RA 972, it is declared unconstitutional on the
ground that it is not embraced in the title of the act. The title only refers to
the years 1946 to 1955, while section 2 refers to a permanent system for
an indefinite time.
In addition, Article 2 is not embraced in the title of the law, and being
inseparable to Article 1, the entire law is void.
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In The Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.,
Against Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillio
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
February 8, 2011
Facts:
The Malaya Lolas received an adverse decision in the case Vinuya vs
Romulo decided by the Supreme Court on April 28, 2010. The Malaya
Lolas sought the annulment of said decision due to the alleged irregularity
in the writing of the text of the decision. Allegedly, the ponente of said
case, Justice Mariano del Castillo copied verbatim portions of the decision
laid down in said case from three works by three foreign authors without
acknowledging said authors hence an overt act of plagiarism which is
highly reprehensible.
Plagiarism as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary is the “deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own.”
Issue:
Whether or not plagiarism is applicable to decisions promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
Held:
No. It has been a long standing practice in this jurisdiction not to cite or
acknowledge the originators of passages and views found in the Supreme
Court’s decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that
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have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts
and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than 100 years
of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as
plagiarism.
As put by one author (this time acknowledged by the Court), Joyce
C. George from her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases
from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or
language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus
judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve
the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies
to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is
not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing
is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not
subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
Further, as found by the Supreme Court, the omission of the
acknowledgment by Justice del Castillo of the three foreign authors arose
from a clerical error. It was shown before the Supreme Court that the
researcher who finalized the draft written by Justice del Castillo
accidentally deleted the citations/acknowledgements; that in all, there is
still an intent to acknowledge and not take such passages as that of
Justice del Castillo’s own.
Kilosbayan Foundation vs Ermita
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FACTS:
Petitioners, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation,
are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public
and civic causes aimed at protecting people’s rights to self-governance.
After Executive Secretary Ermita’s announcement, in representation of
the President, regarding the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, the petitioners filed a petition to set such
appointment aside. It is alleged that Gregory Ong is disqualified to
become a member of the Supreme Court for not being a natural-born
citizen. The petitioners alleged that Ong is a Chinese citizen as indicated
in his birth certificate where it is also indicated that at the time of his birth,
both his parents were also Chinese citizens. They asserted that birth
certificates should prevail over Ong’s new Identification certicate issued
by the Bureau of Immigration.
On the other hand, Respondent Executive Sec. Ermita contended that the
petitioner has no standing to file the said petition. It was also contended
that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and
they have referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of
the issue regarding Ong’s citizenship. Furthermore, respondent Gregory
Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen after a series of
changes in nationalities with respect to his parents and ancestors.
ISSUES:
WON the petitioners have locus standi?
WON the respondent is a natural-born citizen
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RULING:
On the issue of locus standi, the Court held that, yes, petitioners as
people’s organizations and tax payers have standing as the issue involved
is of utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a
member of the Supreme Court.
On the second issue, the Court took judicial notice of Ong’s petition to be
admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the
Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is a Filipino citizen, and that he
became a citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen
and being an 11-yr old minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that he was allowed to take his oath as a lawyer.
It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother
were merely naturalized along with his father. Moreover, substantial
change in an entry in the civil register, such as citizenship status, cannot
be made without a judicial order through a petition filed in copurt under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Lastly, the Court ruled that Respondent
Ong has the burden of proving in court his citizenship through proper
proceedings; until this is done, he cannot accept an appointment to the
SC.
Lim vs. Vera Cruz
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G.R. No. 143646
Apr. 4, 2001
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez
Lis Pendens – pending suit
Notice of Lis Pendens
- Filed for the purpose of warning all persons that the title to a
certain property is in litigation and that if they purchase the same,
they are in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment.
- Intended to be a warning to the whole world that one who buys the
property does so at his own risk.
- Necessary in order to save innocent third persons from any
involvement in any future litigation concerning the property.
FACTS
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by the
petitioner against the respondents before the RTC of Malolos.
Petitioner alleged the following:
 That he has been in possession since 1960 of a 200 square meter
portion of Lot 4204 situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan
covered by TCT No. 191498 in the names of the Aldabas;
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 On Jan. 11, 1983, Rosary Aldaba sold to petitioner said 200
square meter portion, which is included in the former’s 1/8 share
in Lot 4204;
 That a complaint for ejectment was filed against petitioner by
Henry Lim, who claims to be the owner of the property occupied
by him, being a portion of the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-16375 registered in his name;
 That judgment was rendered against petitioner in the ejectment
case, which he elevated to the appellate court, and that upon
investigation, it was discovered that TCT No. T-16375 in the name
of the Aldabas was obtained in bad faith, by fraud and/or clever
machination.
Respondents, however, maintained that their title is valid and legal.
Petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of
TCT T-16375.
A motion to cancel notice notice of lis pendens was filed by respondent
on the grounds that said notice was designed solely to molest them/or it
is not necessary to protect petitioner’s rights which was opposed by
petitioner insisting that the notice of lis pendens was recorded in order to
protect his right over the property covered by TCT No. T-16375 and to
avoid sale of property pending the execution of the judgment in the case.
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RTC: Plaintiffs unregistered deed of sale, cannot, therefore, be accorded
more weight than the certificate of title in defendant’s name which is proof
of ownership over the entire 5,432 square meter property.
Cancelled the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
16375 upon the posting by respondents of an indemnity bond of
P2,000,000. Petitioner’s MR denied.
CA: RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of
lis pendens.
Petitioner’s contention: The cancellation of the notice of lis pendens by
the trial court is justified because the respondent had it registered for the
sole purpose of molesting them and that it is not necessary to protect his
rights.
ISSUE/S
WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. (NO)
HELD/RATIO
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.
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Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice
of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing of
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the
pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties
designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for
the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Sec. 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Sec. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it
is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon
verified petition of the party who caused registration thereof.
Therefore, only the particular property subject of litigation is covered by
the notice of lis pendens. In this case, only the 200 square meter portion
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of the entire area is embraced by the notice of lis pendens. Thus, the ruling
of the trial court that the notice of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
dispossession and restriction of petitioner’s right of dominion over the
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within
entire 5,432 square meter lot covered by TCT 16375 in their names is
the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the
therefore an erroneous conclusion.
defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose
would be rendered meaningless if petitioners are allowed to file a bond,
regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice.
2 grounds of cancelling a notice of lis pendens:
1.) After a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party; or The law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens
2.) It is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient bond by the party on
it to be recorded. whose title said notice is annotated.

The trial court justified its cancellation by holding that the respondent’s
Indeed, there is nothing in the records indicating that the notice of lis
unregistered deed of sale cannot be accorded more weight than
pendens is for the purpose of molesting herein petitioners or that it is
petitioner’s certificate of title.
necessary to protect the rights of respondent.

However, there is nothing in the Rules which requires the party seeking
Petition is DENIED. Assailed Decisions of CA is AFFIRMED.
annotation to show that the land belongs to him. There is no requirement
that the party applying for the annotation of notice must prove his right or
interest over the property sought to be annotated.
Fernando Lopez vs. Gerardo Roxas
Hence, even on the basis of unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis
pendens may be annotated on the title. And that such annotation cannot
be considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title. G.R. No. L-25716
July 28, 1966
The cancellation of the notice of lis pendens is, therefore, not in order.

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CONCEPCION, C.J.
Facts:
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice
President in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed
his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was
created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:
“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines.”
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez
assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from
proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional
for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is
composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any
decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there
may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before
the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
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Held:
Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new
function to the Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution
allowed Congress to determine which body should decide controversies
relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did
not create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution,
“the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts
as may be established by law”
The Supreme Court emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the
judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited
judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our political system, and the
entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution
confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members of the
Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House
Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the
courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The
proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining
such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for
violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear
and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on
appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall
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have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793
merely added the court’s jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by
Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the
functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election
contests is essentially judicial.
WHEREFORE, the petition herein is hereby DISMISSED and the writs
therein prayed for DENIEDaccordingly. The aforesaid motion is,
moreover, DENIED. With costs against the petitioner. It is SO ORDERED.
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua
A.M. OCA I.P.I. 07-2630-RTJ
April 23, 2010
FACTS:
The following are consolidated cases stemmed from the administrative
complaints filed against Judge Evelyn Arcaya-Chua.
OCAMPO CASE
Petitioner Francisco Ocampo charged respondent with harassment,
grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
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manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
On November 27, 2006, Francisco’s wife, Milan filed a petition for sole
custody of their minor daugthers, Francesca and Fatima. During the
hearing, respondent judge issued an order enjoining Francisco from
taking their children out of the country without the court’s permission and
directing him to allow his wife visitation rights.
Francisco then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they are not
residents of Makati but are residents of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He
presented testimonial and documentary evidence proving the same. And
in March 22, 2007, the Respondent denied the motion to dismiss despite
the fact that Milan never presented any evidence to controvert evidence
provided by Francisco.
On April 3, 2007, respondent judge issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO), requiring Francisco Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor
daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife’s residence in 1211 West
Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, and to provide
monthly support of 50,000.
Francisco questions the issuance of the order based on the fact that the
period to file his answer has not yet expired and he was directed to give
monthly support of 50,000 to his wife and daughter, even though his wife
alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of
any factual findings as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of
the recipient.
Francisco further alleged that respondent judge caused the
implementation of the TPO overzealously, even designating a special
sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday at 6AM.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge committed harassment, grave abuse of
authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
HELD:
No, respondent did not commit any of the offenses. The court held that
the case should be dismissed in absence of substantial evidence that
respondent Judge is liable for the charge of harassment, grave abuse of
authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Respondent Judge pointed out that the issuance of the TPO was
anchored under section 5 of RA 9262, the Anti–Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of2004. The court also took into account the
provisions of Article 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which gives the
mother the right to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children
and her right to keep them in her company.
Respondent judge asserted that she was not overzealous in causing the
implementation of the TPO because the law itself mandates that the court
order the immediate personal service of the TPO. In addition, respondent
was not privy to the date, time, and manner of the implementation of the
by the sheriff.
CHANG TAN/RCBC CASE
The office of the court administrator (OCA) received reports regarding the
rampant selling of TPOs in the RTC-Makati branch 144, which was the
sala presided by Judge Arcaya-Chua.
On May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO granting the custody of
the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to Albert Chang Tan, and directing
Stephanie Pulliam to stay away from the home and office of Chang Tan
as well as the school of the subject minor.
On May 8, 2007, the sheriff was not able to fully implement the TPO,
Chang Tan insisted for a break open order to be issued in order for the
sheriff to enter the premises of Pulliam’s house to search for the child and
bring her to court.
Respondent Judge issued the break open order on the same day. OCA
claimed that even though it was not shown that respondent Judge
received money, she was still remiss in issuing the TPO immediately.
In a separate case, Judge Galapate-Laguilles took a leave of absence on
April 20, 2007 and respondent Judge took over her cases. In one case,
RCVBC v. Moreno, the hearing was set on May 9, 2007 but respondent
Judge rescheduled the hearing to April 23, 2007. OCA questioned the
rescheduling and the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in favor of RCBC on the ground that there was no real urgency
warranting the application of the preliminary attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
issuing the TPO to Albert Chang
HELD:

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Yes, respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in issuing
the TPO to Albert Chang.
The court held that a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his
wife under RA 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their children
Act of 2004.
The court held that respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct on the
ground that the monthly reports issued by respondent Judge reported
zero or lesser number of marriages solemnized by her compared with
the marriage certificates that were seized. In addition, out of the total
1,975 marriage certificates only 166 were paid.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093

JUDICIAL AUDIT CASE
FACTS:
A judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC-
MAKATI branch 144, which was president by Judge Arcaya-Chua.
The guards on duty caught Salvador Indicio, Jr., utility worker 1 of
Branch 144, disposing a plastic bag. The plastic bag contained copies of
marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua numbering
to hundreds.
Respondent Judge was charged in connection with 1,975 copies of
marriage certificates from January 2004 to April 2007 for the following
acts:
1) For allegedly ordering Indicio to dispose of the copies
2) For the unpaid marriage solemnization fees amounting to
542,700 with regard to 1,809 marriages.
3) For failing to reflecting said marriages in the monthly report
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct
HELD:
Sylvia Santos filed a complaint against Judge Arcaya-Chua for serious
misconduct and dishonesty.
Santos, an aunt of respondent judge’s husband, alleged that in the first
week of September 2002, she asked respondent to help her friend,
Emerita Muñoz, in her case. Santos claims that respondent allegedly
asked for 100,000 in order for her to be able to help in Muñoz’s case.
During the preliminary conference, complainant manifested her desire to
move the dismissal of her complaint against respondent. Santos stated
that she and respondent have resolved the matter.
The court dismissed the case but also ordered complainant Santos to
show cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an
unfounded verified complaint. Santos replied by stating that everything
she has complained about was the truth but she decided to forgive
respondent. Hence, her motion to dismiss the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct
HELD:
The court held that respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct.

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Introduction to Law Case Digests

Based on the findings of Justice Salvador, there is substantial evidence by a security aide to be having sex with Jose's driver. Word circulate of
that respondent judge committed said offense. Justice Salvador gave such infidelity and when Jose confronted Bona about it, the latter admitted
weight to the complainant’s testimony that the money was returned by having a relationship with said driver.
respondent.
Respondent also admitted that on September 2002, she and the Thus, Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
complainant had a meeting but claims that it was for a different purpose. the ground of Bona's psychological incapcity to fulfill the essential
Respondent’s husband also testified that Muñoz was introduced to them obligations of marriage. Jose and his two military aides testified on Bona's
by the complainant. infidelity. A psychiatrist testified that after conducting several tests, she
reached the conclusion that Bona was suffering from histrionic personality
disorder which she described as “her personality was that she had an
excessive emotion and attention seeking behavior and therefore could not
Ochoso vs. Alano develop sympathy in feelings and had difficulty in maintaining emotional
G.R. No. 181881 intimacy.” The psychiatrist stated that her disorder was traceable to her
family history, having for a father a gamble and womanizer and a mother
January 26, 2011 who was a battered wife. Finally, the psychiatrist said that there was no
possibility of a cure since Bona did not have insight of what was
Leonardo De Casto, J
happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality. The Solicitor-
General opposed the petition stating that it did not come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
FACTS:

ISSUE:
Jose, a young lieutenant in the AFP, met and married Bonain
Basilan in 1973. In 1976, they found an abandoned and neglected one-
year old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa. During the marriage, Jose was often
incapacitated and unable to comply with essential marital obligations?
assigned to various parts of the Philippines as a member of the AFP. Bona
did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of
Basilan. It appears however that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at
the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of HELD:
the country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona was even caught

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 FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA
Introduction to Law Case Digests
No. The petition for nullity hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides “a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
In the landmark case of Santos v. CA, it was held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Further, after the court had laid down the three basic requirements
of psychological incapacity in Santos. In Republic v. CA and Molina, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code were laid down: (1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable,
whether absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse; (5) Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71, 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
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Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; and
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
Next, in Marcos vs. Marcos, it was held that the foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated, in fact the root cause may be
medically or clinically identified, and that what is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition.
In the case at bar, the evidence presented were the testimonies of
Jose, his military aides and the psychiatrist. But this is inadequate in
proving that her “defects” were already present at the inception of, or prior
to, the marriage. Only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose supported
the allegation that Bona’s sexual promiscuity already existed prior to the
marriage. The psychiatrist’s testimony on Bona’s histrionic personality
disorder did not meet the standard of evidence required in determining
psychological incapacity as her findings did not emanate from a personal
interview with Bona herself and merely relied on her interview with Jose
and his other witnesses.
This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the
information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in
the absence of sufficient corroboration. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual
infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period
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Introduction to Law Case Digests

of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered
marriage. by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner and against
the respondent.

It is stressed that Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce

law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest Petitioner, a government- owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) by
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party the Indian government, and Respondent, a private corporation created
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
under the laws of the Philippines, entered into a contract on February 26,
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
4,300 metric tons of oil well cement in exchange for the amount
$477,300.00 by opening a letter of credit procured by the petitioner. The
oil well cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA and Pacific
the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta,
Cement Company, Inc.
India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private
G.R. No. 114323 respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point
July 23, 1998 destination. Negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed
that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil
Ponente: MARTINEZ, J. well cement with Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's designated
port. However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to
the petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the private
FACTS:
respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
Clause 161 of their contract.

1 completion/abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the persons appointed
Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes, relating
to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and by Member of the Commission at the time of dispute. It will be no objection to any such
as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other question, claim, right or thing appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal
whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties as
specification, instruction or these conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference.
or failure to execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the

Service ∙ Sacrifice ∙ Excellence 39

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Introduction to Law Case Digests

On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved HELD:
the dispute in petitioner's favor awarding reimbursement and damages
which totaled US$ 899,603.77. Petitioner filed a Application before the
Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun for the execution of the Minor issue:
Commission’s decision (Malhotra’s decision) praying that the decision of
the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. The foreign court
According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the
meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance
considering the company of the words in which it is found or with which it
therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by
is associated, or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed
the foreign court. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a complaint with Branch
by reference to associated words.
30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement
of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
The absence of a comma between the words "supply order/contract" and
plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of cause of action; and (3)
"design" indicates that the former cannot be taken separately but should
plaintiffs claim or demand has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise
be viewed in conjunction with the words "design, drawing, specification,
extinguished. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-corporation for want
instruction or these conditions". It is thus clear that to fall within the
of jurisdiction of the arbitrator’s resolution. The Court of Appeals affirmed
purview of this phrase, the "claim, right or thing whatsoever" must arise
the dismissal of the complaint ruling that the arbitrator did not have
out of or relate to the design, drawing, specification, or instruction of the
jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court
supply order/contract.
could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award.

Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract
ISSUE/s:
should not be read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the
contrary, interpreted in the light of the other related provisions. The whole
and every part of a contract must be considered in fixing the meaning of
W/N the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner
any of its harmonious whole.
and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

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 FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA
Introduction to Law Case Digests
Relevant Issue:
As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper
No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a categorical declaration
that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator
as contained in the latter's Award Paper which contained an exhaustive
discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the parties, and the
arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed
to have been incorporated into the foreign court's judgment the appellate
court was in error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic decision
containing literally, only the dispositive portion".
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v.
Permskul, this Court held that the following memorandum decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
A similar pronouncement in the earlier case of Romero v. Court of
Appeals, where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals adopted the
findings and disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations which ruled:
“For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt by
way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo
spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision.”
Service ∙ Sacrifice ∙ Excellence
Padillo v. CA
Facts: Veronica Padillo alleged that she is the owner of a 251 square
meter parcel of land with improvements in Quezon City, which she bought
from Marina de Vera-Quicho and Margarita de Vera. She blames Tomas
Averia and Beato Casilang for unlawful refusal to turn over the property in
her favor. Thus, she claims for declaratory relief and damages.
Casilang denied the charges. He insisted that he already vacated the
subject property, and thus, the case against him should be dismissed.
Averia counters with a motion to dismiss, on the ground of a previous
decided case against de Vera-Quicho.
Prior to the institution of the case by Padillo, there were already 3 cases
which involved the same subject property.
 Case 1 – which ordered de Vera-Quicho to transfer said property
in favor of Averia
 Case 2 – where the Register of Deeds was ordered to register the
deed of sale between Padillo and De Vera .
 Case 3 – a complaint for recission for recission of the deed of sale
The resolution to the motion to dismiss on this current case was deferred
until the resolution of Case 3 and Case 2 (there were a lot of appeals).
However, the motion to dismiss was denied by the Trial court while Case
2 was pending. The CA reversed the decision and ordered suspension of
this current case in the Trial Court until the final termination of Case 2.
After Case 2 was terminated, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Padillo. The
CA revered again the ruling, on the grounds of res judicata. Hence, she
elevated the case to the SC.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing
the case based on res judicata
41
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Introduction to Law Case Digests
Held: NO. Res Judicata is applicable when (1) the former judgment is final
(2) rendered by the court having competent jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties (3) the judgment is based on the merits and (4)
there must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
Res Judicata is not applicable to this case due to the principle Law of the
Case. Law of the case is defined as the opinion delivered on a formal
appeal. Once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between
same parties in same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
or not correct on general principles. The law of the case on the matter of
pendency of Case 2 to bar this current case has already been settled.
Case 2 already became final because no appeal was filed in the CA. Even
if erroneous, it has become the law of the case.
The court denies the monetary award asked by Padillo. The prayed
damages were highly conjectural and speculative. It was not proved. The
rule is that actual, compensatory and consequential damages must be
proved. Only the amount of unrealized income will be given.
In addition, the award of moral and exemplary damages has no sound
basis. There was no proof of bad faith and malice on the part of Averia in
instituting the case against Padillo. The law cannot impose a penalty on
the right to litigate. With respect to attorney’s fees, the award is exception
rather than the rule. It is not awarded everytime a party prevails in a suit.
It is only awarded in the instances specified in Art 2208 of the Civil Code.
Attorney’s fees as part of damages are not the same as attorney’s fees in
the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. In addition, it should be
reasonable. Thus the award of P 107,000 attorneyy’s fees by the CA is
reduced to P25,000.
People vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118882
Service ∙ Sacrifice ∙ Excellence
September 26, 1996
Justice Melo
FACTS
- This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied
the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina
of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal
Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39, respectively, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People of the
Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"
- As of this date however all the respondents, Cristeta Reyes &
Rogen Doctora, Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro & Jane C. Go and
Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro who are prisoners at Tacloban City
jail, have not filed their respective comments as to the case. The
submission of which however would have benefited all of them
because it would lead to a speedy disposition of the case.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Judge Pedro Espina, , can be considered to adequately
possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both
the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense
HELD
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Introduction to Law Case Digests
NO. This is because he had previously handled a previous decision in
Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary
investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein
respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go. Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go
serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to doubt his
impartiality in handling the criminal cases. It would have been more
prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing
the criminal cases.
In Javier vs.Commission on Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), it was said
that: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
PETITION GRANTED. CASE IS RAFFLED TO ANOTHER BRANCH OF
THE TACLOBAN CITY RTC
People v. Derilo
Facts: Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro
Cofuentes and one John Doe were charged with the crime of murder. Of
the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was
apprehended and brought within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his
arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the information was translated
in the Waray dialect with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded not
guilty. However, by the time the People had formally finished presenting
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its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte,
manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea
of not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a
re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder. Appellant does not deny
his participation in the commission of the crime. Consequently, a re-
arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder. Appellant does not deny
his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his brief pitifully
consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the modification of the death
penalty imposed by the lower court to life imprisonment.
Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed
in the country, Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on
certain heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the
Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially
enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993.
This is now the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case
at bar.
Issue: Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed
to the accused instead of death penalty
Held: YES. The Supreme Court said that for failure of the prosecution to
prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue
of the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo
is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 in
consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.
It is elementary law that to establish evident premeditation, these must be
proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
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Introduction to Law Case Digests

determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act rather than destroying it.
and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he
desired to hearken to its warnings. There being no proof presented by the
prosecution, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
cannot be presumed.
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Even if there is no need to prove the presence of aggravating
circumstances alleged in an information or complaint when the accused
Incorporated vs. Pagdanganan
pleads guilty to the charge, the developmental growth of our procedural
rules did not stop there. With the advent of the revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the
FACTS
course that trial courts should follow in capital cases where the accused
pleads guilty, was introduced into our remedial law with this provision:
Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) approved and supervised under-the-crown promotional
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence — When the
campaign entitled Number Fever sometime in 1992. It undertook to give
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
away cash prizes to holders of specially marked crowns and resealable
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
caps of PEPSI-COLA softdrink products, i.e., Pepsi, 7-Up, Mirinda and
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt
Mountain Dew.
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf.
On 25 May 1992, petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO announced the
notorious three-digit combination 349 as the winning number for the next
It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not
day, 26 May 1992. On the same night of the announcement, however,
made dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period before Sec. 19,
petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO learned of reports that numerous people
Article III of the 1987 Constitution can be applied by the courts. It cannot
were trying to redeem 349 bearing crowns and/or resealable caps with
be inferred, either from the wordings of the subject provision or from the
incorrect security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ. Upon verification
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence should
from the list of the 25 pre-selected winning three-digit numbers, petitioners
be brought to the Supreme Court for review within a certain time frame in
PCPPI and PEPSICO and the DTI learned that the three-digit combination
order that it can be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The fundamental
349 was indeed the winning combination for 26 May 1992 but the security
principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ do not correspond to that assigned to
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to
the winning number 349.
which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis
Respondent Pagdanganan demanded from petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO and the DTI the payment of the corresponding cash prize of

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Introduction to Law Case Digests
each of his 349 bearing crown, specifically, four 7-Up crowns and two
Mirinda crowns, each displaying the cash prize of P1,000,000.00 in
addition to one 7-Up crown showing the cash prize of P100,000.00.
Respondent filed Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC of Pasig
City but the case was dismissed. Their Motion for Reconsideration is also
denied and they appeal to the Court of Appeals that reversed and set
aside the decision of RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are estopped from raising STARE DECISIS.
HELD
NO, There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and
De Mesa, including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts
concerning the Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and
Lumahan are among those holding supposedly winning 349 Pepsi/7-
Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable caps. Said
crowns and/or resealable caps were not honored or allowed to be cashed
in by petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing to contain the correct
security code assigned to such winning combination. As a result, the
rejected crown and/or resealable cap holders filed separate complaints
for specific performance/ sum of money/ breach of contract, with
damages, all against petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is well
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit;
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
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With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial
pronouncements, it is quite evident that the appellate court committed
reversible error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory decisions
those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial
precedents in so far as the Pepsi/349 cases are concerned. For it is the
better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In
the case at bar, therefore, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling
that the correct security code is an essential, nay, critical, requirement in
order to become entitled to the amount printed on a 349 bearing crown
and/or resealable cap.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or
rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability
in the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties. This is
unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is even
said that such decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself
and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not
only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound
to enforce obedience thereto.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, First Division
G.R. No. 108113
Sept. 20, 1996
Kapunan, J.
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FACTS:
The matters raised in this case pertain to the complaint instituted by
Republic of the Philippines through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth.
PCGG filed a complaint wherein the defendants were Regala, Angara,
Cruz, Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta, Hayaduni and Roco, who
are all partners of Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala, and Cruz Law
offices (ACCRA Law firm). Public respondent claims that ACCRA law firm
performed legal services for its client, in the performance of which they
assisted in the organization and organization of certain companies
involved in the PCGG Case No. 33.
PCGG then filed a third amended complaint excluding Roco. The basis of
the exclusion was based on the fact that Roco will reveal the identity of
his clients.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers contended that the exclusion of Roco grants
him favourable treatment premised on his undertaking to divulge his
client’s identity. Petitioners refused to divulge their client’s identity due to
the fact that they are mandated as lawyers to uphold the at all times the
confidentiality of the information obtained from lawyer-client relationship.
PCGG, however, claims that the revelation of identity of the client is not
within the scope of the lawyer-client relationship, nor are the documents
it required.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the PCGG can compel petitioners to divulge their client’s
name?
HELD:
No, the court held that the PCGG cannot compel petitioners to
divulge their client’s name.
As a general rule in our and in US jurisdiction, a lawyer may not invoke
the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client
because of:
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party
should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is
entitled to know who his opponent is.
HOWEVER, there are some exceptions, which are the following:
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity
is privileged.
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3. Where the governments lawyers have no case against an
attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients
name is privileged.
In the instant case, the circumstances fall under two exceptions.
First, disclosure of the alleged client’s name would establish the client’s
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information.
Since the PCGG has established the link between the alleged criminal
offense and the legal advice sought, the PCGG’s request of the client’s
identity, documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship, and the
deeds of assignment executed will implicate client’s connection with the
issue of the case.
Furthermore, under the third exception, the revelation of the client’s name
would allow the prosecution make the necessary connection and build its
case, where none otherwise exist.
The prosecution’s case should be built upon evidence gathered from their
own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal
the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals the nature
of the transaction which may or may not be illegal.
LAWYER’S CONDUCT PART:
The lawyer-client relationship is more than that of a principal-agent and
lessor-lessee. It requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is very
delicate, exacting and of confidential character.
Service ∙ Sacrifice ∙ Excellence
Under section 24(b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of court, an attorney cannot,
without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney’s secretary,
tenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and
his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity.
Further, sec. 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of court provides that: it is the d
It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his clients business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
This duty is also mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's
fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor
or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
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remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client.
Republic v. Yu
Facts: In a previous case (Valdehueza v. Republic), the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of expropriation and held that Valdehueza cannot
recover possession of their land but may only demand a fair market
value.
In another case, Yu vs. Republic, the Court of Appeals invalidated
Valdehueza’s sale of the expropriated property to Ramon Yu and held
that Yu is not a purchaser in good faith. There being no appeal to this
decision, it became final and executory.
Ramon Yu then filed another complaint seeking the reversion of the
expropriated property. Republic denied Yu’s right to reacquire title on
ground of Res Judicata. Regional Trial Court dismissed Yu’s case, but
CA reversed it and remanded the case back to RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Yu’s case is barred by res judicata
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Held: YES. Republic argues that the case is barred by res judicata
because the decision in Yu vs. Republic held that Yu does not have a right
to assert ownership over the property, the sale being invalidated by the
CA. Further, the expropriation is absolute and unconditional that the fact
that the nearby lots were sold or reverted would not necessarily give Yu a
right to revert the expropriated property.
Yu argues that the case is not barred by res judicata because the
government essentially abandoned the properties, which constitutes a
new cause of action. Further, the determination of their right to reacquire
the property needs to be decided on a full-blown trial.
Court disagrees with Yu. The case is barred by res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment. There is res judicata when:
1. The previous judgment must be final
2. Rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction over both the subject
matter and persons
3. Must be a judgment on the merits
4. And there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.
While the first three are present, only the identity of causes of action is the
issue.
The court then differentiated “Conclusiveness of Judgment” and “Bar by
Prior Judgment.” There is Bar by prior judgment when there is identity of
parties, cause of action, and subject matter. There is conclusiveness of
judgment when even if there is NO identity of cause of action, the previous
judgment is conclusive on the subject matter raised therein.
Conclusiveness of judgment applies in this case. Given that Yu is raising
his right of ownership by virtue of the sale, he cannot again raise it
because the previous final judgment of the CA rendered the sale invalid.
Having no proper right to base his claim, Yu has no legal personality to
file the action of recovery of ownership. There being no legal personality,
Yu is not actually a real party in interest.
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Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Facts: The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National
Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the
Zuzuarreguis for parcels of land belonging to the latter situated in
Antipolo, Rizal. The said case was ordered archived.
About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the
Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them. This was sealed by a Letter-
Agreement which indicates that: The lawyers endeavor to secure the just
compensation with the National Housing Authority and other
governmental agencies at a price of ELEVEN PESOS (P11.00) or more
per square meter. Any lower amount shall not entitle us to any attorney’s
fees. At such price of P11.00 per square meter or more our contingent
fee[s] is THIRTY PERCENT (30%) of the just compensation. The lawyer’s
fees shall be in the proportion of the cash/bonds ratio of the just
compensation.
A Motion to Set Case for Hearing was filed by Attys. Roxas and Pastor
praying that the case be revived and be set for hearing by the court at the
earliest date available in its calendar.
The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. A Partial Decision was
rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at
P30.00 per square meter.
A Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui,
Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and Attys.
Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other. It confirms an
amendment to their agreement regarding the attorney’s fees. The
Zuzuarreguis confirmed and agreed that they are willing to accept as final
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and complete settlement for their 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a
price of SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of
THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4
Million), all payable in NHA Bonds. And that they also agree and confirm
to pay their lawyers and counsels the contingent attorney’s fees any and
all amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square
meter payable in NHA bonds.
A resolution was issued by the NHA stating that the Zuzuarregui property
would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter; that the
Zuzuarreguis would be paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of
funds; and that the yield on the bonds to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall
be based on the Central Bank rate at the time of payment.
The total amount in NHA bonds released by the NHA Legal Department
to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to
P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount
turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to
P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters
property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of
P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was
P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the
yield on the bonds.
A letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the
Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a
period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or
criminal action.
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Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter stated therein, among other
things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it
just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go to them.
A letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis through Antonio De Zuzuarregui,
Jr., to Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, informing the latter
that their services as counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the
expropriation proceedings filed by the NHA was being formally
terminated.
The Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages
before the RTC, Quezon City against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty.
Romeo G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis
demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them.
A Decision was rendered dismissing the Complaint. It further ordered
plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, to pay for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney’s fee and the cost of suit.
Upon appeal by the Zuzuarreguis a Decision was eventually promulgated
reversing and setting aside the ruling of RTC. Defendants-Appellees
Roxas and Pastor were ordered to return to plaintiffs-appellants the
amount of P12,596,696.425, the balance from the P17,073,122.70,
received as yield from NHA bonds after deducting the reasonable
attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,476,426.275.25 (P2.50 per square
meter of the 1,790,570.51 square meter)
Both parties filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the letter-agreement executed by the Zuzuarreguis,
and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, fixing the exact amount that must go to the
former, should stand as law between the parties
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Held: YES, but the amount must be reduced. It is basic that a contract is
the law between the parties. Obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with
in good faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the same are binding
as between the parties.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive
contingent fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule
that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned
by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz:
13. Contingent Fees. - A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by
law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,46 viz:
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness,
such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees
is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the
same is excessive and unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court partly states:
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SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance
of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice,
decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power
to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of
attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which
was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid
(including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an
amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering
that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as
it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably,
unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is,
therefore, in order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and
Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield
that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the
P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be
returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount
must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand,
and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata.
The Zuzuarreguis are entitled to the yield equal to 87.18% (17/19.5) of the
P19,583,878.00, while Attys. Roxas and Pastor are entitled to
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12.82%(2.5/19.5) of said amount. The amount corresponding to 87.17%
of P19,583,878.00 is P17,073,224.84. This is the yield that the
Zuzuarreguis are entitled to.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, are entitled to P2,510,653.16.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not
shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or actually
earned attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75 (P4,476,425.59 +
P2,510,653.16).
The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys.
Roxas and Pastor to the Zuzuarreguis. They can take this out from the
yield in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they have appropriated for
themselves.
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the
same for there was no direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se
prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when excessive
and unconscionable.
Santiago III vs Enriquez, Jr.
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J
Date: February 13, 2009
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J:
COMPLAINANT: Genaro Santiago III
RESPONDENT: Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
~ Chairperson, 13th Division, Court of Appeals
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FACTS:
1. The present case was filed by Santiago against Justice
Enriquez for gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and
gross incompetence in connection with his rendering of alleged
unjust judgment in a case entitled “ Santiago v, Republic”
In Santiago v. Republic:
-Santiago filed before RTC of QC a Petition for Reconstitution of
Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the
name of Pantaleon Santiago and Blas Fajardo.
-RTC granted the petition. Rep. of the Phils. through OSG
appealed the decision of CA.
-The case was raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sision of the appellate
court’s 13th Division of which respondent was Chairperson.
-On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her Report
which was used as basis for the Division’s consultation and
deliberation.
-On July 18, 2007, by letter addressed to Justice Gonzales-Sison
and Justice Veloso, respondent expressed his dissent from the
report of Justice Sison. Justice Veloso, in view of the letter,
wanted to take a second look on the decision.
-In view of his dissent, respondent requested the Raffle
Committee of the CA to designate 2 associate justices to
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complete the composition of Special Division of five (5). Raffle
Committee designated Justice Cruz and Justice Bersamin.
-Respondent’s Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority
opinion of the Special Division and the Report-opinion of Justice
Gonzales-Sison became the Dissenting Opinion as such the
special division reversed the decisions of the RTC.
In the Present Complaint
-Santiago filed a Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition
pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule 137. The appellate court denied
the motion (because of the pending administrative complaint)
-The allegations of the present complaint is that despite the
overwhelming evidence of Santiago, Associate Justice Enriquez
deliberately twisted the law and existing jurisprudence to grant the
appeal, to the extreme prejudice of Santiago.
-Associate Justice Enriquez branded the complaint as "a mere
nuisance", a "dirty tactic" in order to harass him for the purpose of
making him inhibit from handling the case
HELD: The complaint is bereft of merit.
-That Cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable, and
the appreciation of evidence and facts is erroneous, do not
necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative complaint
against a judge, unless the decision is tainted with fraud,
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malice or dishonesty or with deliberate intent to cause
injustice.
-The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative
complaint against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision
or order to the higher court for review and correction
An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy
where judicial recourse is still available unless the assailed order
or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonest.
The failure to interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render a
judge administratively liable.
-There is no showing that the decision is tainted with fraud, malice
or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to cause
injustice. Hence enter the Principle of JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
-The Principle of JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
~ insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from being
held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an
erroneous decision rendered in good faith. To hold otherwise
would render judicial office untenable.
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This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of
public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary.
This principle is of universal application and applies to all
grades of judicial officers from the highest judge of the
nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court.
-Further, that the filing of charges against a single member of a
division of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was
not rendered by respondent in his individual capacity. It was a
product of the consultations and deliberations by the Special
Division of five.
Lequel Santos V. Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. DATE] 112019
TOPIC: Article 36 of the Family Code
PONENTE: J. Vitug
FACTS:
 Lequel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army met Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos in Iloilo. They would later have a civil wedding
on September 20, 1986 in the Iloilo Municipal Trial Court.
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 The couple moved in with Julia’s parents and on July 18 1987 she
gave birth to boy. However, Lequel was experiencing tension with
Julia’s parents who always interefered in their marital life.
 On May 18 1988, Julia left for the United States of America because
she was contracted as a nurse. She left despite Lequel’s disapproval.
January 1, 1989, Julia called Lequel up after seven months of not
contacting him and told him that she would return home after the
expiration of her contract.
 Julia never went home and when Lequel was able to visit America
because of an AFP training program, he made earnest efforts to
locate her from April to August but he failed to find her.
 Hence, Lequel filed a complaint for “Voiding of marriage with under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Lequel argued that Julia’s failure to
maintain communications with him or to return home constitutes a
lack of affection. To not care about informing one’s husband for a
period of five years, is in Lequel’s argument, psychological
incapacity. Julia, through counsel argued that it was Lequel’s fault for
being irresponsible and incompetent. Julia also manifested that she
would neither appear nor submit to evidence.
 Lower court dismissed his complaint for lack of merit and the Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the behavior of Julia can be characterized as
Psychological incapacity.
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HELD: No, the petition is denied.
RATIO:
 Based on the numerous deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee, the usage of the phrase “Psychological incapacity”
under article 36 of the Family Code does not embrace all such
possible cases of psychoses. Article 36 cannot be interpreted
independently of the other precepts of law in the family code.
 Psychological incapacity refers to a mental and not physical
incapacity that truly causes a party to be incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to a marriage.
 Thus the intendment of the law is that it is used for only the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Such a psychological incapacity or disorder must
exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
 The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
 Justice Sempio-Diy suggested, based on the work of a Doctor
Veloso, that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
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incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Ting vs. Velez-Ting
G.R. No. 166562
March 31. 2009
Justice Nachura
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent
was already pregnant with their first child. At first, they resided at
Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City. When their second
child was born, the couple moved to Carmen’s family home in Cebu
City. In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board
examinations and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to
become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By
1980, Benjamin began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s
family, as member of its active staff, while Carmen worked as the
hospital’s Treasurer.
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The couple had six children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975;
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5,
1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on
July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter.
Carmen complained that her husband had a drinking and gambling
problem. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her
and force her to have sex with him. Because of his drinking habit,
Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he
often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass
the task to other anesthesiologists.
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity
consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
drinking;
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3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it
necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from
his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money
to pay the same; and
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and
refusal to give regular financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
said that hewould drink and gamble only for social reasons and for
leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances. As for his alleged failure to support his family financially,
Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as
practicing anesthesiologist. In his testimony, Benjamin also said that he
gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could
and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-
earned money on unnecessary things. He also pointed out that it was he
who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen
played mahjong with her friends twice a week.
Two psychiatrists were presented. Carmen presented Dr. Trinidad Onate
who concluded that Benjamin suffered from a personality disorder but
this was only concluded from a transcript of stenographic notes.
Benjamin presented Dr. Obra who concluded from the same notes and a
psychiatric evaluation that Benjamin suffered from no personality
disorder.
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The lower court declared the marriage null and void. The CA reversed
the trial court’s ruling. Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied
to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February
13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the
RTC. She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply
retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis.
Thus the case was brought to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized;
and
III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
HELD
On the issue of stare decisis.
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NO, it did not violate the rule. Stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument. Respondent’s argument
that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not
be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis
is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck
down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases,
we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit,
non respicit”. Meaning the law looks forward not backward.
On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36.
YES. In the case of Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te, we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, which forced all
cases involving psychological incapacity to be bound by it. It must be
realized that not all psychological incapacity cases are similar and they
must be viewed by their own merits as well.
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By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is
logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished
by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. But where, as in this case, the parties
had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be
presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether
to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
On the issue of psychological incapacity.
NO. Benjamin is not psychologically incapacitated. In this case,
respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the
time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and
gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to
prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
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parties null and void. However, we are not convinced that the opinions
provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that
petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, while
Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s
personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s
opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s
deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another
psychiatrist in South Africa (Dr. A.J.L. Pentz) who personally examined
Benjamin.
June 17, 1993
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
In 1984, Atty. Rogelio Nogales formed the legal clinic. It caters to clients
who cannot afford the services of big law firms.
Petitioner, Mauricio Ulep instituted a complain to order the respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the legal profession. The following are the
advertisements complained of by petitioner.

The totality of evidence adduced by respondent is insufficient to prove that SECRET MARRIAGE?
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the appellate THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
null and void ab initio.
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.
Bar Matter No. 553

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An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through
The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
Petitioner claims that the advertisements are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar.
Respondent however assert that they are not engaged in the practice of
law but in the rendering of “legal support services” through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that its advertisement should be allowed in
view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs
The State Bar of Arizona).
ISSUE:
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a. Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and whether it is
allowed
b. Whether or not the Legal clinic’s advertisement is valid
HELD:
a. The court held that the services offered by the Legal Clinic is
considered as practice of law but it is not allowed.
The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services
requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with
the law."
The contention that respondent only provides legal support
services is unacceptable because even though some of the
services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, respondent still gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers.
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b. With regard to the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The canons of the profession tells us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as
well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.
The Supreme Court noted that there are some exceptions to the
prohibition. The canons of profession allow the following:
1. Publication in a reputable law list, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons
2. The use of an ordinary simple professional card containing his
name, firm, address, telephone number, and special branch of
law practiced.
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3. Listing his name in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of a special branch of law
Villa v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Investigation of alleged anomalous transactions at the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), Mactan International Airport, led to the
filing in 1975 of criminal charges in the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City
against Casimiro David, administrative assistant at CAA, Mactan, and
chairman of the Bidding Committee; Estanislao Centeno, cash aide;
Fernando Dario, airport attendant; and Serafin Robles, janitor, for violation
of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (b) of R.A. 3019 in relation to the
Unnumbered Presidential Memorandum dated April 22, 1971, as well as
Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Section 1(x) of
Presidential Decree No. 6 dated September 27, 1972.
The case involved questionable payments made by the CAA Mactan to
Rocen Enterprises and Sprayway Corp., dealers in paper products and
printed matter, for the purchase of electrical items and the cost of their
installation, in the total amount of P299,175.00.
The decision of the trial court included findings that Arturo Jimenez;
Rodolfo Montayre, assistant airport general manager for operations;
Camilo Villa, chief, logistics section; Josefina Sucalit, technical inspector,
COA, assigned at CAA Mactan; Hereto Leonor, acting chief accountant;
and Manuel Bustamante, regional auditor of Region 7, COA, conspired
and were equally liable with the convicted accused.
Issue: Whether or not there is violation of Sec. 3(a) of the RA 3019.
Held: YES. Josefina Sucalit, who was sent by Jimenez to Manila to make
a canvass, inexplicably delivered an advertisement for Rocen Enterprises,
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which was not a reputable supplier of' the needed items. In her Travel
Report, she certified that she made a canvass from reputable suppliers.

These acts and omissions of Jimenez and Sucalit violated paragraph (a)
of Section 3 of R.A. 3019 in relation to the Unnumbered Presidential
Memorandum. They were persuaded, induced or influenced, and
persuaded, induced or influenced each other, to award the purchase of
electrical items to an entity which was not even a supplier of electrical
items in disregard of the Presidential Memorandum directing that
procurement of supplies by government offices should be from reputable
suppliers. Rocen was not a "reputable supplier" as it was dealing only in
paper products and printed matter at the time of the transaction in
question.

The circumstances of the case are sufficient to establish conspiracy

between Jimenez and Sucalit in violating the pertinent provisions of R.A.
3019 adverted to above. Direct evidence is not necessary to prove such
conspiracy, for as we held in People vs. Roa:

“A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a

necessity. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions
where concealment is highly probable; and to require direct testimony
would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny proper
protection to society.” (20 Am. Jur, 261)

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