Creativity and InnovationJOSS (101-200)

76 Creativity and Innovation
the passion and other important aspects of her life. Tis harmonious relation-
ship with the object of our passion applies to any activity we “romance” with,
including activities that require creativity. Moreover, Vallerand and his col-
laborators discovered that harmonious passion correlated most with positive
emotions and lack of negative emotions after the engagement; there were no
negative feelings when prevented from engagement with passion (St-Louis
& Vallerand, 2015). If Dr. Grohman were to be obsessively passionate about
teaching, the activity would start to control her behavior and choices – and
consequently her well-being. In more concrete terms, she may feel compelled
to engage in teaching-related activities at the expense of her health and per-
sonal life, but she cannot help but do what she feels needs to be done.
Te two types of passion seem to capture our imagination well, and we
can be quite eager to fnd examples of creative people with harmonious or
obsessive passion. But what if every creative person out there shows at times
harmonious and at times obsessive passion? Julia Moeller and her collabora-
tors asked a similar question (Moeller et al., 2015, 2017; Obschonka et al.,
2019; Newman et al., 2021) and discovered that people who are passionate
about an activity to a high degree can be at times harmoniously and at times
obsessively passionate about it. She observed that “the general degree of pas-
sion, rather than the distinction between harmonious and obsessive individu-
als, accounted for the inter-individual diferences in passion” (Moeller et al.,
2015, p. 131). Terefore, fnding an activity about which you are passionate,
and recognizing when you exhibit harmonious and obsessive passion, will lead
to better outcomes, such as creativity (and a healthy body and relationships).
How Can We Apply This to Education?

In the previous section, we discussed factors that research shows impact
creativity: mindset, motivation, and passion. Tere are educational impli-
cations of this research for teachers and for students. What can be done to
promote students’ growth mindsets, balance students’ intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation, and balance harmonious and obsessive passions in order to develop
and enhance their creativity? Although there is an entire literature devoted to
enhancing creativity (for example, see Scott et al., 2004, and Sawyer, 2013),
there are several suggestions that emerge from the literature summarized ear-
lier in this chapter.
First, consider the research on growth mindset and the importance of
believing skills can be developed. Tis research suggests that teachers could
show students examples of term projects, break them down into manage-
able parts, and provide feedback after each part. Our students complete
Why Do We Create? 77
multiple preparation tasks with feedback before working on the fnal project
(see Grohman, 2018). By doing so, we help our students to feel more com-
petent at each step and increase the likelihood that they feel that the chal-
lenge matches their skills, which makes them considerably less overwhelmed
(or bored). Te feedback also helps students to recognize that the task is not
restricted by current ability. Students can develop their skills and try new
approaches for the project. For example, we remind our students that there
are multiple ways to illustrate children’s books, and these do not have to be
drawings. Students should note whether they are thinking about a course/skill
with a fxed or growth mindset, and if fxed, try to change their mindset by
changing their thinking and study approach to the topic.
A second suggestion is based on the motivation research. Intrinsic moti-
vation is increased with autonomy. Terefore, creativity may be more likely
when students have choices and can include their own interests and prefer-
ences in assignments. Students can select topics that relate to their hobbies or
career goals. We ofer our students two choices for the creative project assign-
ment: (1) they can choose to write a poem or song lyrics, write a children’s
book or comic strip, or they can try a creative essay, and (2) they can select any
infuential artist, scientist, or inventor to include in the course project (many
students select someone who made a major contribution to their major domain
of study).
Finally, the passion research also ofers suggestions to teachers and stu-
dents. Teachers should show their passion! Many of our students write in our
evaluations that they become more interested in learning and practicing crea-
tivity when we share our passion. College is an exceptional opportunity to
explore and pursue passions. Students should take the time to explore their
interests and identify their passions by taking diferent courses, even courses
outside their majors and in subjects that they have no previous experience of
learning about. Students should also take time to recognize their priorities:
for example, although it is important to pursue passions, it is also important to
take care of health and relationships.
Conclusion
Let’s summarize what we know from research regarding the role of
mindset, motivation, and passion in why we create. Taking a growth mind-
set, wherein we seek to learn and develop our creativity skills, is important
toward taking risks in creativity and being more creative. Intrinsic motivation
is important for creativity, and it requires feeling autonomous and compe-
tent. Extrinsic factors can be helpful when they provide feedback regarding
performance and actually reward creative work. And fnally, fnding our pas-
sion, committing to it, and recognizing when we are showing harmonious and
obsessive passion can help us to be willing to spend the hours or years of hard
work to be creative in healthy ways.
Recommendations for Additional Resources

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Sawyer, K. (2013). Zig zag: Te surprising path to greater creativity. Jossey-Bass.
Vallerand, R. J. (2007). On the psychology of passion: In search of what makes
people’s lives most worth living. Canadian Psychology, 49(1), 1–13.
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HOT TOPIC 2
Creativity and
Mental Illness
So Many Studies, So Many
Scattered Conclusions
James C. Kaufman
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ Te relationship between creativity and mental illness is complex and
nuanced.
¥¥ Although there is evidence from highly eminent populations that
mental illness may be broadly associated with creative genius in spe-
cifc domains (such as the arts), the studies looking at everyday popu-
lations are inconsistent.
¥¥ Some subclinical disorders are associated with some types of creativity
(but not all); one possible reason is that creativity and mental illness
share certain commonalities.
¥¥ Many studies suggest everyday creativity is connected to positive men-
tal health.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-7 83
Many debates or hot topics within creativity research may spur intense dis-
cussions in the feld, but be of less interest to the general population. Whether
creativity is more domain-specifc or domain-general may spawn books (e.g.,
Kaufman et al., 2017), but may not necessarily inspire cocktail conversation.
Te relationship between creativity and mental illness, however, is a source
of great interest, both academically and casually. Creative people care a great
deal (Kaufman et al., 2006).
Te mad genius, from brooding poet to cackling scientist, is a com-
mon concept, but not necessarily accurate. Some of the best narratives are
great stories, but aren’t true. As much as it’s a great story, John F. Kennedy
never actually said he was a jelly donut, the Fiji mermaid wasn’t real, and
Paul McCartney is (as of this writing) still alive. Te creativity–mental illness
question isn’t about disproving a myth, but rather fguring out exactly what
question is being asked. Creativity is a multifaceted, enormous construct with
countless ways of being measured. Mental illness is an even bigger variable,
with volumes written simply to distinguish and label the thousands of possible
diagnoses (Kaufman, 2014; Silvia & Kaufman, 2010).
Interpreting how to even study the relationship between creativity and
mental illness can take many forms, yet most reviews lump everything
together. Consider four diferent fctional studies. Te frst examines biog-
raphies of creative people, and fnds that those who are considered the most
eminent are more likely to show symptoms of bipolar disorder than those who
are merely good. Te second gives divergent thinking tests and measures of
depression to college students, and fnds a positive correlation. Te third com-
pares mental patients and random people on their ability to draw pictures, and
fnds the patients’ art is rated as more creative. Te fourth asks children with
and without behavioral disorders to rate themselves on their own creativity,
and fnds the children with behavioral disorders think they are more creative.
I am purposely using mock studies instead of actual ones for the sake
of argument, but there are 30 comparable studies for each example provided
above. Te problem is that these disparate research lines are too often com-
bined and overextended to say that creativity is connected to mental illness. As
noted earlier, collecting these types of studies together does not make much
sense. It is comparable to reading that parrots can’t eat avocado, dogs can’t
eat grapes, rats can’t eat blue cheese, cats can’t eat onions, and horses can’t eat
potatoes … and then concluding that giving any food to an animal is a bad
idea (see Kaufman, 2016).
So what do we know? Te most frequently cited studies on creativity and
mental illness have countless faws and fundamental errors (Schlesinger, 2009).
Tat said, there are also numerous historiometric studies that use biographi-
cal information on eminent people to assess both creativity and evidence of
Creativity and Mental Illness 85
mental illness. It is difcult, if not impossible, to diagnose mental illness long

after someone’s death, but some basic indicators of illness can be determined
through research. Quite extensive work (Ludwig, 1995; Simonton, 2014a) has
established some connection between creative genius and higher levels of men-
tal illness than in less eminent populations. Further work has pointed broadly
to creators in the arts (Simonton, 2014b), more specifcally writing (McKay &
Kaufman, 2014), and even more specifcally to female poets (Kaufman, 2001),
as being more likely to show signs of mental illness than those in other areas.
Another (large) cluster of studies analyzes creativity and subclinical dis-
orders – in other words, people who have some traits associated with disor-
ders but who are completely functional. It is common to fnd connections, but
methodology and nuance play a large role in how to interpret these studies. For
example, Taylor’s (2017) meta-analysis of creativity and mood disorders found
some evidence of a (weak) connection, but it varied greatly by method, meas-
urement, type of mood disorder, and creative domain; Acar and Sen (2013)
found comparable variance in a meta-analysis of creativity and schizotypy.
What are some possible reasons why creativity and mental illness might
be related? A popular theory is Carson’s (2011, 2019) shared vulnerability
model. She proposed three traits that creativity and mental illness share: latent
inhibition (being unable to flter out irrelevant information), a preference for
new things, and hyperconnectivity (when diferent areas in the brain not usu-
ally connected are linked, which can cause senses to overlap). What moder-
ates these shared traits, infuencing whether someone with this profle is more
likely to be creative or have mental health issues? Carson argued that two
protective factors are a strong working memory and high intelligence.
Why is so much of the discussion speculative when there are so many
studies out there, some dating back to the 19th century? One reason is that
we can’t conduct the ideal study, which would be to gather a huge number of
people and randomly assign them to have diferent mental illnesses, upbring-
ings, opportunities for creativity, social interactions, and traumas. Every fve
years you would have them all complete an enormous array of tests; you would
measure their creativity in their career, everyday life, and hobbies; and for
those people who became well-known, you would continue to assess the impact
of their work hundreds of years after their death. Alas, this study would be
unethical, time-consuming, and physically impossible.
In discussing the creativity–mental illness question, it is also important to
not overlook the opposite side – namely, that creativity can be a huge part of
positive mental health. Te benefts of creativity can be found in many areas.
Engaging in creative activities can help people alleviate burdens (Goncalo
et al., 2015), relax after a hard day (Eschleman et al., 2014), and even fnd
meaning in life (Kaufman, 2018). In times of crisis, people can use creativity
to build their resiliency and help recover from major trauma (Forgeard, 2013).
Further, expressive writing (Pennebaker, 1997) and visual art (Drake &
Winner, 2012) have both been empirically found to be helpful as parts of a
therapeutic process.
What is there to take away from the muddled research? Tere is enough
evidence to believe there is some type of connection between creative genius and
some mental health issues. Tere are also undoubtedly nuanced, domain-specifc,
and illness-specifc connections, some of which have been well-studied and oth-
ers that may become clearer in time. However, creativity also interacts in a posi-
tive way with mental health. From the existing research, I would be hard-pressed
to say anything more defnitive, and you should be highly skeptical of anyone
who claims the debate has been settled. Anything further would require extrapo-
lating big-C research to little-c populations or assuming one type of popula-
tion, measure, diagnosis, or methodology is more generalizable than it actually
is. Such speculation is ultimately dangerous. I am personally much more excited
to follow research on how creativity can be used to help people (e.g., Forgeard &
Kaufman, 2016) than in trying to place negative labels on creators.

Carson, S. H. (2019). Creativity and mental illness. In J. C. Kaufman & R. J.
Sternberg (Eds.), Te Cambridge handbook of creativity (2nd ed., pp. 296–
318). Cambridge University Press.
Kaufman, J. C. (2014). Creativity and mental illness. Cambridge University
Press.
Schlesinger, J. (2009). Creative mythconceptions: A closer look at the evidence
for “mad genius” hypothesis. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the
Arts, 3, 62–72.
Simonton, D. K. (2014). Te mad–genius paradox: Can creative people be
more mentally healthy but highly creative people more mentally ill?
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 470–480.
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between creativity and schizotypy. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and
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Creativity and Mental Illness 87
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model. Te Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 56, 144–153.
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Sternberg (Eds.), Te Cambridge handbook of creativity (2nd ed., pp. 296–
Drake, J. E., & Winner, E. (2012). Confronting sadness through art–making:
Distraction is more benefcial than venting. Psychology of Aesthetics,
Creativity, and the Arts, 6, 251–266.
Eschleman, K. J., Madsen, J., Alarcon, G. M., & Barelka, A. (2014).
Benefting from creative activity: Te positive relationships between
creative activity, recovery experiences, and performance-related outcomes.
Journal Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 87, 579–598.
Forgeard, M. J. (2013). Perceiving benefts after adversity: Te relationship
between self-reported posttraumatic growth and creativity. Psychology of
Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 7, 245–264.
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creativity, and innovation, and why? A review. Psychology of Aesthetics,
Goncalo, J. A., Vincent, L. C., & Krause, V. (2015). Te liberating consequences
of creative work: How a creative outlet lifts the physical burden of secrecy.
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and future. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13, 734–749.
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Creativity and endorsement of the “Mad Genius” stereotype. Imagination,
Cognition, and Personality, 26, 149–161.
Kaufman, J. C., Glăveanu, V., & Baer, J. (Eds.) (2017). Cambridge handbook of
creativity across domains. Cambridge University Press.
Ludwig, A. M. (1995). Te price of greatness. Guilford Press.
McKay, A. S., & Kaufman, J. C. (2014). Literary geniuses: Teir life, work,
and death. In D. K. Simonton (Ed.), Cambridge handbook of genius (pp.
473–487). Cambridge University Press.
Pennebaker, J. W. (1997). Writing about emotional experiences as a therapeutic
process. Psychological Science, 8, 162–166.
Schlesinger, J. (2009). Creative mythconceptions: A closer look at the evidence

for “mad genius” hypothesis. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the
Arts, 3, 62–72.
Silvia, P. J., & Kaufman, J. C. (2010). Creativity and mental illness. In J. C.
Kaufman & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of creativity (pp.
381–394). Cambridge University Press.
Simonton, D. K. (2014a). Te mad–genius paradox: Can creative people
be more mentally healthy but highly creative people more mentally ill?
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 470–480.
Simonton, D. K. (2014b). More method in the mad–genius controversy: A
historiometric study of 204 historic creators. Psychology of Aesthetics,
Taylor, C. L. (2017). Creativity and mood disorder: A systematic review and
meta-analysis. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12, 1040–1076.
HOT TOPIC 3
Neuroscience
of Creativity
Oshin Vartanian
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ Creativity involves the dynamic interplay of brain systems that sup-
port associative and executive modes of thinking.
¥¥ Functional connectivity between the default network and the executive
control network characterizes creative cognition – switching between
them is regulated by the salience network.
¥¥ Te neural architecture of creativity appears to be componential,
including both domain-general and domain-specifc aspects.
¥¥ More and less creative adults difer in their brain function even when
they are not engaged in a creative task, suggesting that developmental
diferences might have given rise to a pattern of brain function that
facilitates the emergence of creativity.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-8 89
Have you ever thought about whether the functioning or structure of

your brain has anything to do with how creative you are? If you have, you are
not alone. In fact, interest in the role of biological factors in creativity has a
long history in science, and represents an example of the larger nature versus
nurture debate: To what extent is our creativity determined by our biology,
including our genetic makeup, rather than our environment, including our
upbringing, education, and other experiences? Scientifc exploration of this
question can be traced back to Sir Francis Galton’s seminal book Hereditary
Genius, published in 1869. In that book, Galton examined whether genius was
a biologically transmitted trait, and whether it ran in families. You can forgive
him for thinking that, given that he likely spent Christmas with his grand-
father, Erasmus Darwin, his cousin, Charles Darwin, Charles’ scientifcally
eminent sons, Francis the botanist, Leonard the eugenicist, and Sir George
the physicist, as well as the latter’s son, Sir Charles Galton Darwin, the physi-
cist. Still, he was in need of a mechanism to explain how it was that genius
could run in a family. For this he used Lamarckianism, according to which
organs that assist an organism are strengthened and passed on to their of-
spring, or else they atrophy through disuse. If Lamarckianism were true, then
it would mean that the exercise of biologically based capacities that underlie
genius in one generation would be strengthened and passed on to the next
generation, increasing the likelihood that they too would exhibit high-level
creativity. Wouldn’t that be nice?
Te problem with Lamarckianism is that it is false. We now know that
creativity is most likely an emergenic trait, meaning that it is expressed if, and
only if, a number of independent subtraits or abilities are all simultaneously
present (Lykken et al., 1992; Martindale, 1999; Waller et al., 1993). What
this means is that if any one of those necessary subtraits is not present (e.g.,
motivation, intelligence, ego strength, etc.), then the person is unlikely to
exhibit the trait or ability. Emergenesis also applies to the genetic bases of cre-
ativity: Even though 30–60 percent of the variance in most personality traits
and cognitive abilities can be accounted for genetically (Plomin et al., 1994),
and members of a given family possess genetic similarities, it is unlikely that
they will possess all the necessary characteristics for the expression of creative
behavior (Vartanian, 2011a). Tis explains why genius is rare, and why it does
not run in families.
Over the last two decades, most of the focus on the biological bases of
creativity and genius has shifted from genes to the brain. Specifcally, scien-
tists working in the discipline referred to as the neuroscience of creativity are
concerned with understanding the ways in which variations in brain function
and structure contribute to the emergence of creativity, including high-level
creativity and genius (Abraham, 2018; Jung & Vartanian, 2018; Vartanian
Neuroscience of Creativity 91
et al., 2013). Most of the research has been conducted using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), which is a method for measuring brain acti-
vation indirectly. Specifcally, when neurons in a particular region of the brain
need to work harder to satisfy task demands, their metabolic demands are
greater. In order to satisfy those greater metabolic demands, more blood is
supplied to those regions to deliver the necessary oxygen for cellular function.
Te fMRI scanner measures changes in the magnetic feld that occur when
oxygen is dispensed to those regions, providing a proxy signal for how hard
they are working.
Te earliest fMRI and other modern neuro-imaging studies investigating
the workings of the creative brain began to appear around the beginning of
this century. Tose early studies were primarily examples of “brain mapping,”
in which the main focus was to locate a brain region that underlies a spe-
cifc mental activity, in this case creativity. In addition, the researchers used
many diferent types of tasks to assess creativity, including divergent thinking,
drawing, fnding pragmatic links between incoherent sentences, and solving
anagrams and insight tasks. Not surprisingly, the results across studies did not
seem consistent, painting a very heterogeneous picture of the neural bases of
creativity.
However, a very useful tool available to neuroscientists that can separate
the chaf from the wheat is meta-analysis – an analytic approach that can iso-
late regions that are activated consistently across studies regardless of vari-
ations in participants, tasks, and neuro-imaging modalities. Gonen-Yaacovi
et al. (2013) conducted such a meta-analysis based on 34 neuro-imaging
studies that had been published to date, revealing some important insights.
Teir analysis showed that the entire brain appears to be involved in creativ-
ity. However, looking more closely at the data, their analysis revealed a high
degree of process-specifcity in the results: Specifc regions of the brain appear
to switch on and of depending on the type of creativity at hand. A very simi-
lar picture emerged from another meta-analysis by Boccia et al. (2015) based
on 45 neuro-imaging studies, showing that there are dissociable patterns of
brain activation depending on whether creativity occurs in the musical, verbal,
or visuospatial domains. Tis prompted the authors to conclude that “creativ-
ity relies on multi-componential neural networks and that diferent creativity
domains depend on diferent brain regions” (p. 1).
Tis inference is consistent with componential views of creativity and prob-
lem-solving, according to which higher-order cognitive abilities are decom-
posable into sub-processes (e.g., memory, attention, etc.) (Amabile, 2012;
Sternberg, 1980), and regions of the brain that exhibit functional specifcity
in relation to those sub-processes can combine dynamically to support their
emergence (Vartanian, 2012). Note that fundamentally, such a componential
process is also consistent with an emergenic model of creativity, according to

which all the necessary sub-processes that support a particular ability must be
present to support its emergence.
Research on the neuroscience of creativity turned an important corner
when neuroscientists shifted their focus from isolated regions in the brain
to the interaction of large-scale networks (see Zabelina & Andrews-Hanna,
2016). A “network” represents a set of brain regions that exhibit similar pat-
terns of fMRI activity fuctuations and can therefore be grouped together.
A number of such large-scale networks have now been identifed, enabling
neuroscientists to study their functional dynamics in support of creativity.
Interestingly, it turns out that creativity across a large number of settings,
including musical improvisation (Pinho et al., 2016), poetry composition (Liu
et al., 2015), drawing (Ellamil et al., 2012), and divergent thinking (Beaty
et al., 2015), is supported by dynamic coupling between two networks: Te
default (mode) network and the executive control network (reviewed in Beaty
et al., 2016).
Te default network supports internally generated cognition, meaning
cognition that is not driven by responding to external stimuli. It is engaged
when we are mind wandering, daydreaming, and thinking about the self. In
contrast, the executive control network is engaged when we exercise cognitive
control over our behavior and thinking. In most cases, these two seemingly
contradictory networks do not support the same type of cognition. It is easy to
see why, because they appear to support opposite modes of thought. Creativity
represents a unique instance when these two networks that are typically neg-
atively correlated in fact work together to support the emergence of useful
novelty.
Here, the dynamics of thought are key (Christof et al., 2016). Specifcally,
it appears that in all the cases listed above, the early phase of creative cognition
engages the default network, when a person is likely producing novel thought
content. In turn, the later phase of creative cognition engages the executive
control network, when the person is likely selecting a fnal response or action
to fulfll task demands. Tere are also data to suggest that in cases where the
production of novelty is paramount, the executive network could in fact be
deactivated to facilitate the free fow of ideas, as was observed for jazz improvi-
sation (Limb & Braun, 2008).
Importantly, a third large-scale network, referred to as the salience net-
work, which is involved in directing attention to relevant stimuli in the envi-
ronment, has been found to regulate switching between the default network
and the executive control network. Indeed, recent work has shown that the
joint dynamic coupling involving the default, executive control, and salience
networks can predict not only engagement in creativity, but also the creative
quality of generated ideas (Beaty et al., 2018), extending the utility of the
network-based approach to the products of the creative process.
Finally, there data to show that there is functional connectivity between
the default network and the executive control network when people are actu-
ally being creative, but also that this functional connectivity exists even when
they are at rest, meaning when they are not engaged in creative cognition
(Beaty et al., 2014). A similar picture has emerged from electrophysiological
studies of insight, where it has been found that there is greater activity in the
right anterior temporal lobe in people who are more likely to solve problems
with insight when they are at rest (Kounios & Jung-Beeman, 2009). Te right
anterior temporal lobe underlies semantic memory, and the involvement of
this region is consistent with the view that solution of problems with insight
is facilitated by the formation of remote or loose associations between ideas.
Te fact that these functionally relevant areas exhibit diferential activity and
connectivity at rest is signifcant because resting-state activity is fairly stable
and has a genetic basis, suggesting that fundamental properties of the nervous
system can have far-reaching infuence over components of creative thinking
(Vartanian, 2011b).
Te evidence presented above is broadly consistent with Campbell’s (1960)
classic two-step model for creative cognition, according to which creativity
arises as a function of “blind variation” (when novel ideas are produced in the
mind) followed by “selective retention” (when those ideas are sifted through
for selecting the best solution) (see also Simonton, 2010). Given the pres-
ence of functional connectivity evidence in support of this process, it is now
important to ask whether there are data that can shed light on the causal links
between the networks. Vartanian et al. (2018) used dynamic causal mode-
ling to test two competing hypotheses based on fMRI data collected in the
course of engagement in a divergent thinking task: Are the data consistent
with a model wherein the prefrontal cortex exerts unidirectional control over
the temporal and parietal lobes (i.e., implying that the output of the default
network is regulated by the executive control system before responding), or is
it the case that there is bidirectional control in the form of successive, iterative
feedback loops until eventually a response is generated? Te data were over-
whelmingly supportive of the former model, meaning that there was a single
generation–selection sequence. However, it is possible that if the task itself
were more complex (e.g., creative writing), then the pattern might resemble a
bidirectional, cyclical, iterative process – a possibility that has yet to be tested.
Examining this body of work, there are three take-away messages. First,
the data strongly support the idea that creative cognition rests on both asso-
ciative as well as executive processes. To be creative appears to necessitate
a dynamic and fexible interplay between these two modes of thought, and
the neural systems that support them. Second, the neural infrastructure of
creativity appears to be componential, dynamically reconfgured to support
diferent types of creativity. Within this componential infrastructure there
are both domain-general as well as domain-specifc parts. In other words,
some neural structures are activated generally across many diferent creativity
tasks (e.g., prefrontal cortex), whereas others are activated specifcally for those
tasks that draw on them (e.g., motor cortex for musical improvisation). Tird,
there are neural diferences between creative and non-creative people, not only
when they are thinking creatively, but also when they are not. Tis suggests
that developmental diferences might arise in brain structure and function
that could facilitate the emergence of creativity in adulthood. Although there
are still many outstanding issues that need to be worked out in this burgeon-
ing discipline, there is reason to be optimistic that our understanding of the
psychology of creativity will be enhanced by improved understanding of its
neurological bases.

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CHAPTER 5
Cognition and
Creative Thought
Cynthia Sifonis and Thomas B. Ward
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ Te Creative Cognition Approach assumes everyone has the abil-
ity to be creative, and that creativity involves applying normal cog-
nitive processes to normal knowledge structures and occurs during
problem-solving.
¥¥ Creative imagery is often used during creative problem-solving.
Re-representing the problem as an image frees individuals from the
constraints of the task, enabling insight.
¥¥ Mental set and design fxation can result from viewing fawed exam-
ples prior to generating ideas. Tis can be avoided by not viewing
examples or by viewing examples with unusual features or correlations
between features.
¥¥ Conceptual expansion involves basing new ideas on existing knowl-
edge. Although ideas based on specifc instances of a category may be
practical, more creative solutions result from thinking abstractly rather
than retrieving specifc examples from memory.
¥¥ Combining existing ideas or concepts is a useful way to generate new
ideas. It is possible to increase the creativity of such combinations by
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-9 97
combining dissimilar ideas/concepts, but it does make it more difcult

to generate a workable combination
¥¥ Many creative solutions have been attributed to modifying and apply-
ing a solution to a previous problem that is very diferent from the
current problem being worked on.
Te creative process has been of longstanding interest to psychologists and

educators. Nearly 100 years ago, Graham Wallas (1926) described a model
of creative thought that included stages of preparation, incubation, illumina-
tion, and verifcation. Te model states that creative discoveries emerge from
initially working consciously on a problem (preparation), temporarily with-
drawing from those eforts on reaching an impasse (incubation), achieving an
insight by noticing some clue (illumination), and returning to deliberate efort
to confrm the validity of the insight (verifcation).
Wallas’ model is well suited to anecdotal accounts of creative insights,
such as Archimedes’ realizing he could determine if King Hiero’s crown was
pure gold by using displacement to measure its volume. Charged with the
task of assessing its purity, and based on existing knowledge (preparation),
Archimedes knew that the crown’s weight would have to be appropriate to its
volume, but he was at an impasse in knowing how to determine the volume of
the irregularly shaped object. While bathing (incubating) and noticing water
sloshing over the edge as he immersed himself, Archimedes had the insight
(illumination) that the crown’s volume could be measured by how much liquid
it displaced.
Wallas’ model has been an inspiration to generations of scholars who have
sought to more clearly understand the nature of the creative process. A con-
temporary version is the cognitive approach to creativity – sometimes called
the creative cognition approach. Te modern cognitive approach to creativity
extends Wallas’ eforts in two important ways. First, because it is frmly rooted
in experimental cognitive psychology, it bases conclusions on controlled lab-
oratory studies rather than strictly on personal observation, anecdotes, and
reasoning. It doesn’t negate the value of anecdotes and reasoning, but claims
that to advance our understanding, we need to empirically study phenomena
under precisely controlled situations. In a related way, it seeks to more pre-
cisely defne the processes involved, focusing on well-studied operations, such
as memory retrieval, mental imagery, conceptual combination, metaphor, and
analogical transfer.
Te creative cognition approach proposes that anybody has the ability to
be creative. In fact, simply to function efectively in our world we are forced
to be creative – often on a daily basis. Whenever our existing knowledge can’t
provide us with a plan of action for a situation, whenever we fnd ourselves in
Cognition and Creative Thought 99
a problematic situation and have to go beyond what we already know, we have

to be creative. Te cognitive view of creativity further proposes that we can
achieve creative outcomes by applying the “normal” types of cognitive pro-
cesses mentioned earlier to “normal” knowledge structures such as schemas,
categories, and episodic memory in order to generate novel products, ideas, or
actions. So, in this sense, the cognitive view of creativity examines psychologi-
cal creativity.
Another assumption of the cognitive view of creativity is that creativ-
ity occurs during problem-solving. Tis may seem strange to some people,
because when we think of creative individuals, we think of artists, poets, and
actors. What, then, does this type of creativity have to do with problem-solv-
ing? Problem-solving is essential to creativity because in every case of creativ-
ity, the person being creative is solving some sort of problem. Poets need to
solve the problems of expressing feeling and creating an image or scene in the
mind of the viewer within the constraints of the poem. Painters are solving the
problems of design, balance, and expression when painting. Similarly, actors
need to choose the mannerisms, expressions, and behaviors that best convey
their interpretation of the characters they portray. In each of these cases, the
creative individual (be it poet, actor, or painter) is developing creative solutions
within a particular domain. When creativity is viewed as developing a creative
solution to a particular problem, then we can see that scientists are also crea-
tive, because they need to create experiments to test hypotheses or theories to
explain the data.
Te assumptions of the cognitive view of creativity lead to certain predic-
tions. Creative problem-solving should exhibit the same sorts of characteristics
that are seen in normal problem-solving. Te cognitive processes that enable
normal problem-solving are also operating during creative problem-solving.
Te knowledge structures used during creative problem-solving should be the
same as those used during normal problem-solving, and this also applies to
how those knowledge structures are applied to the problem.
Te reason for this focus on problem-solving is to illustrate how issues
relevant to problem-solving in general are applied to creative problem-solving.
Te work discussed in this chapter will focus primarily on the creative cogni-
tion work frst put forward by Finke, Ward, and Smith in their 1992 book
Creative Cognition: Teories, Research and Applications. Te preceding discus-
sion about the importance of problem-solving for creative work should facili-
tate a better understanding of the manner in which the paradigms used to
study issues in cognitive psychology are applied to studying creative cognition.
Tis is seen primarily in the way in which the work of Finke et al. (1992) adapts
and extends more traditional work in cognitive psychology. For example,
Finke’s cognitive psychology research focused on the characteristics of mental
imagery (Finke, 1986), which he then adapted to study creative imagery.

Smith’s cognitive psychology research examined how recently encountered
stimuli could adversely afect the ability to retrieve information from memory
(Smith, 1979). Tis work was adapted to examine the processes underlying
insight and fxation in creative problem-solving (Smith & Blankenship, 1989;
Webb et al., 2016). Ward’s cognitive psychology research examined concept
formation and how those concepts were represented in semantic memory
(Ward, 1993; Ward & Becker, 1992), and this research was adapted to exam-
ine conceptual expansion (Ward, 1994). Other researchers examining creative
cognition have done the same thing by adapting their more traditional creative
cognition work to examine the manner in which normal cognitive processes
and knowledge structures afect creative problem-solving (Costello & Keane,
2000; Marsh et al., 1996; Sifonis et al., 2006; Wiley, 1998, George & Wiley,
2019; Wilkenfeld & Ward, 2001).
Finke et al.’s (1992) application of cognitive paradigms to examine crea-
tive cognition was organized around the Geneplore model of creativity.
“Geneplore” stands for “Generate and Explore,” and is a heuristic model of
creative functioning. It is a broadly descriptive model rather than an explana-
tory theory, and consists of two phases. In the initial phase, the inventor gen-
erates preinventive structures that are then explored and interpreted during
the second phase. Any given creative product can be seen as the result of a
cycling between the generation of ideas, modifcation of those starting points,
and regeneration of new or altered ideas.
Idea generation is made possible through a variety of common genera-
tive processes, including memory retrieval, mental imagery, and analogy.
Exploratory processes include the search for novel or desired attributes in the
ideas, metaphorical implications of the ideas, and the search for the proposed
function of the ideas. Consequently, creative thinking can be characterized
in terms of how generative and exploratory processes can be employed or
combined.
Tese generation and exploratory processes operate on mental structures.
Te mental structures could include existing knowledge such as what we know
about restaurants, previous solutions to problems, and what we ate at lunch
today. Tese structures also include the preinventive structures formed during
the generation stage that are explored in the exploration stage during creative
cognition. Preinventive structures are generated in the frst stage of creative
thought. Tese structures are called preinventive because they are not com-
plete ideas in their own right. However, they show some promise of yielding
a solution to a problem, and are then further explored in the second stage of
the model. An example of Geneplore in action can be found in the reports
of Kekule’s insight into the molecular structure of benzene. Kekule reported
that he was daydreaming in front of the fre after a long day working on the
problem. As he was dreaming, he imagined strings of objects that looked like
snakes swirling around each other (generative process). One of those “snakes”
spun around and grabbed its own tail, forming a circle (preinventive struc-
ture). Tis resulted in the creative insight that the molecular structure of ben-
zene was a ring, which Kekule explored and verifed the following day.
Because the same basic cognitive processes are involved in creative think-
ing as are involved in noncreative thinking, the creative cognition approach
predicts that creative and noncreative thinking fall on a continuum. Where
one falls on the continuum depends on the extent to which generative pro-
cesses, exploratory processes, and preinventive structures are involved which
give rise to emergent features. Te more these types of experiences are involved
in the creative process, the more creative the thinking.
Similarly, the creativity of the idea itself ranges on a continuum (Boden,
1991). At one extreme is psychological or P-creativity, in which the idea is
creative to the individual, but might actually be a common solution to that
type of problem. At the other end is historical or H-creativity. Sometimes
people generate psychologically creative ideas that are also historically crea-
tive. Te creative cognition approach assumes that the same types of processes
give rise to both. Diferences in creativity are a matter of the extent to which
the Geneplore processes are engaged in. Tese creativity diferences are also
afected by a wide variety of non-cognitive factors that also infuence creativ-
ity, such as motivation, experience, culture, and society.
Creative Imagery
Many creative individuals report using mental imagery as a basis for their
ideas, including scientists, artists, musicians, and writers (see Benson & Park,
2013; Finke, 1990; LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al.,
1993; Shepard, 1978). A notable case is Albert Einstein, one of the greatest
thinkers of the 20th century, who reportedly often thought in mental pictures
rather than words, and achieved insights by considering images such as an
observer riding a light beam or alongside it.
Te creative cognition approach seeks to use such anecdotal accounts and
fnd ways to operationalize the processes describe in them so that the phe-
nomena of interest can be studied in the laboratory. Finke extended cognitive
psychology research to determine whether people could use visual imagery
to combine and transform basic forms to generate useful insights, solutions,
and innovations. As mentioned earlier, many eminent creators have attrib-
uted their creative insights to mental imagery by representing the problems
they are working on visually (e.g., Kekule imagining molecular structure as a

snake, Watson and Crick imagining diferent confgurations of DNA). Tey
often attribute the success of this technique to breaking the inherent con-
straints in the way they are thinking about the task by re-representing the
problem visually (Shepard, 1974). Interestingly, Shepard (1974) justifed the
importance of studying mental imagery by noting the ubiquity of reports in
which breakthrough thinking resulted from representing the problem visu-
ally. Te research examining mental imagery that was spurred by this call to
action resulted in our current understanding of the processes and representa-
tion of mental imagery in general. For example, Finke et al. (1989) examined
whether participants could “discover” novel patterns in mentally rotated or
transformed images. Tis is essentially the process by which many creative
insights are arrived at by creative individuals. Finke et al. (1989) demonstrated
that participants given simple shapes to imagine (e.g., the letter “D”, the num-
ber “4”) could perform mental transformations on those shapes to reveal a
novel pattern. Te transformations took the following form: “Imagine a capi-
tal ‘D’. Rotate it 90 degrees to the left so the straight line is on the bottom.
Imagine the capital letter ‘J’ and place it underneath the rotated ‘D’”. If you
performed these operations and “saw” an umbrella, your observation would
have been counted as an accurate identifcation of the transformed images in
their experiments. However, Finke noted that these experiments and others of
a similar nature had one major faw. Participants always made a series of trans-
formations under the direction of the experimenter that were guaranteed to
result in identifable patterns. Te retrospective reports of creative individuals
suggest they perform transformations and rotations on mental images in the
hopes of discovering novel, unexpected patterns that will help them to solve
the problem they are working on. Tus, Finke and Slayton (1988) examined
whether it was possible for “normal” individuals to discover novel patterns
through mental transformation/rotation on their own.
Finke and Slayton (1988) adapted the mental transformation paradigm
employed by Finke et al. (1989) by giving participants three simple forms (e.g.,
a circle, the letter “J”, a horizontal line) and having them mentally assemble
the forms for two minutes as they tried to make a fgure that could be easily
recognized and named without a lengthy description. Once they did this, the
fgures were rated by judges in terms of creativity and the correspondence of
the fgure with the name it was given. If the drawn fgure was creative and
corresponded very well with the name given to it, that fgure was rated as a
“creative pattern.”
Te results of this study demonstrated that 38.1–44.3 percent of the pat-
terns participants generated were recognizable and 15 percent of those recog-
nizable patterns were judged as being highly creative. Finke and Slayton (1988)
also noted that the creative patterns arose from either the creative arrangement
of the shapes used to make up the pattern or creative interpretations of the
resulting combination. Tis is a good example of the interplay between gen-
erative and exploratory processes – an idea which Finke (1990) further exam-
ined by having participants arrange a set of complex shapes (e.g., wires, cones)
and varying the number of constraints they had to work within. Tis research
difered from the previous work in that the objects participants created had to
belong to one of eight categories – furniture, personal item, scientifc instru-
ment, appliance, transportation, utensil, toy, or weapon. Te created objects
were then rated on a 1–5 scale in terms of how practical and how original
they were. In the one constraint condition, participants were either allowed
to pick three shapes, but were provided with the category of the invention or
they were provided with the three shapes and allowed to pick the category of
invention. In the two-constraint condition, participants were provided with
the three shapes they were supposed to work with and told what category of
item they had to create before they arranged the shapes. In these conditions,
participants were mainly engaged in creatively arranging the shapes to gen-
erate their novel product. In the most restrictive three-constraint condition,
participants were given the three shapes they were supposed to work with and
told to create an object with those three shapes. Only after the invention had
been created were they told the category of invention. Consequently, in this
condition the creativity resulted from the creative interpretation of the object,
rather than the creative arrangement of the shapes. Even though the number
of inventions rated as practical stayed the same across all three conditions, the
originality of those products increased as the number of constraints increased.
Tis could be interpreted as evidence that increasing the constraints of the
task actually increases the creativity of a product. It could also be interpreted
as the creative interpretation of a product (or task or problem) being at least as
important to the perceived creativity of a product as the creative arrangement
of elements in the product.
Mental Set and Design Fixation

We normally think that considering other people’s ideas is useful for help-
ing us to solve our own problems. If we can get an idea of how other people
have accomplished some goal, it stands to reason that we might be better able
to achieve our own goal. Interestingly, though, exposing ourselves to examples
of previous solutions to problems can backfre if there are faws in those solu-
tions. Consider work done by Jansson and Smith (1991). Tey had engineering
students and design professionals develop ideas for practical products, such as
spill-proof cofee cups and measuring devices for blind people, after viewing
examples of others’ designs. Te interesting result was that they tended to incor-
porate aspects of those other solutions into their own designs. Unfortunately,
this included design faws, such as straws incorporated into a spill-proof cup,
which would not allow the passage of air over the beverage to cool it before the
burning hot liquid reached the unsuspecting consumer’s tongue.
Tis type of fxation, the type that is caused by examples experienced
immediately prior to a creativity task, is not limited to specialists in engi-
neering design, but seems to be more general. Just like mental set in normal
problem-solving is believed to be caused by the context in which the problem-
solving occurs, the “conformity efect” of copying even inappropriate elements
of a design into a novel product is caused by experiencing examples of poten-
tial solutions to a problem immediately before engaging in a creative genera-
tion task. When this happens, there is a strong tendency for people to conform
to the examples by including features of those examples in their novel products
(Smith et al., 1993). A common paradigm used to examine how the conform-
ity efect afects creative idea generation is to have participants create as many
novel examples of a category of items (e.g., toys, animals) as possible. Te
instructions given to participants emphasize both novelty and quantity. For
example, Smith et al. (1993) had participants generate novel examples of ani-
mals and toys. Ten, before creating their examples, some participants were
shown representative examples of those two categories. Tese examples all
shared three features, such as the three example animals all having four legs, a
tail, and antennae. Participants were told not to duplicate the examples or their
features. Te other participants were not shown any examples. Participants
then created novel category members which were then examined for the
shared features of the examples. Despite these instructions, participants who
saw examples, such as those in the Smith et al. (1993) study, were much more
likely to conform to the features they saw in the examples than participants
who did not view those examples. Tis conformity efect is fairly robust, being
demonstrated across a wide variety of categories, including generating solu-
tions to a problem (Bink et al., 1999; Marsh et al., 1997) and creating novel
non-words (Landau & Lehr, 2004; Marsh et al., 1996). Several factors have
been shown to increase the conformity efect, including increasing the number
of examples sharing the same feature, and delaying the time between seeing
examples and creating novel instances (Marshet al., 1996). When designing
new products, explicitly pointing out problematic elements of the design and
telling participants why they are problematic still fails to prevent participants
from incorporating those elements into their novel designs.
So how do we escape the efects of these examples? Simply educating peo-
ple about the conformity efect, indicating the problematic features of design
examples, and telling them not to use those features is not enough to elimi-
nate this efect (Chrysikou & Weisburg, 2005, Storm & Hickman, 2015).
Neither is telling people to be more creative (Landau et al., 2002). What
does seem to help reduce, but not eliminate, the efect is providing detailed
explanations about what the problematic elements of the examples are and
exactly how participants are supposed to avoid incorporating them into their
designs (Chrysikou & Weisburg, 2005). Telling them that their work will
be checked by someone in authority to make sure they didn’t copy the fea-
tures also decreases conformity (Landau et al., 2002). However, the concern
is that these authoritative approaches also run the risk of reducing creativity.
Actually requiring the incorporation of a particular feature into the product
(e.g., a shape into a drawing or a letter into a word) does reduce the conformity
efect. So does the requirement to include an unusual feature in the product
(George & Wiley, 2019; Landau & Leynes, 2004; McCafrey, 2012).
Because the conformity efect is pernicious, even some of the better inter-
ventions only mildly reduce the efect. Recently, researchers have attempted
to apply metacognition to avoid conformity in problem-solving (Storm &
Hickman, 2015). Metacognition is the ability to refect on your own cognitive
processes, and is broken down into three components: metacognitive knowl-
edge, metacognitive experience, and metacognitive monitoring and control
(Flavell, 1976; Li & Cau, 2019). Te hope is that having participants refect
on their cognitive processes will allow them to break free of mental set (Li &
Cau, 2019; Storm & Hickman, 2015). Ideally, metacognition should facilitate
better decision-making and problem-solving through the use of the aware-
ness of processing fuency. Unfortunately, processing fuency often makes
participants overconfdent about in their ability to solve a problem. Storm
and Hickman, (2015) had participants engage in a Compound Remote Task
(CRT) with the expectation that they could solve CRT problems after being
exposed to fxation associates. Specifcally, they were hoping that participants
would learn how to avoid fxation by providing them with incorrect associ-
ates over time. Across fve experiments, participants were told to avoid using
one of the practice examples of a CRT associate. When asked the degree to
which the example CRT associate would solve the problem, participants had
high confdence that the practice example would facilitate their ability to solve
the CRT task. Even when researchers told the participants that the practice
example of a CRT associate would never be a solution in a CRT item, par-
ticipants were still strongly confdent that the example would facilitate solv-
ing the CRT item. As a result, Li & Cao (2019) concluded that further work
on metacognition needs to focus more on the role of metacognition during
problem-solving as well as identifying diferent components of metacognition
that afect creativity diferently.
Perhaps the best way of dealing with the conformity efect is to make it
work for you by seeking out examples that are more conducive to creativity.
For instance, examples that have unusual features (e.g., words with numbers
for letters) or unusual correlations between features (e.g., antennae and claws
for animals) do result in conformity to those properties, but the perceived
creativity of the resulting products is increased (Landau & Lehr, 2004; Marsh
et al., 1996). In addition, when the presented examples are ones that have been
rated as highly creative, the resulting products also tend to be more creative
(Yi et al., 2015). Likewise, when the examples are designed to challenge peo-
ple’s culturally linked, basic assumptions (e.g., that drawings are supposed to
be realistic), their own products beneft from increased creativity. So seeking
inspiration from others’ ideas can be a valuable approach to boosting your own
creativity as long as you carefully consider what might be fawed and what
might be truly, originally useful about those ideas.
Conceptual Expansion
As we have shown, information can be activated when we see examples
of previous problem solutions, but even without being primed that way, some
parts of what we know are just more readily accessible than others. And those
things that come to mind readily infuence our creative thinking. Tis can be
very helpful to give us a start on developing a new idea, but it can also con-
strain us. On the positive side, many inventions were made possible because
inventors were able to build on their knowledge of the ideas of others that
came before them, including Edison’s light bulb and Eli Whitney’s cotton
gin (see, e.g., Basala, 1988; Friedel et al., 1987). On the negative side, new
products can include features of old ones that are harmful, such as the out-
side seating for conductors that was carried over from designers’ knowledge of
stagecoaches to the earliest railway passenger cars and may have contributed
to some conductors’ deaths (White, 1978).
Research examining conceptual expansion looks at how we use what we
already know to come up with new examples of a category. If you were asked
to design a new type of swing, you would probably use what you know about
swings to generate the new example. If you had been asked to generate a new
kind of alien animal, you would probably use what you know about Earth
animals to do so. Just as inventors retrieve what they know about specifc
prior inventions, you would very likely pull from memory specifc instances
of things you already know as a starting point. Tis exemplifes the research
conducted by Ward (1994) that demonstrates how our original ideas are con-
strained by our existing knowledge.
Before continuing reading, create a mental image of an alien animal.

Draw it if you wish. Be as creative as you can be. Now examine your drawing.
Is your alien bilaterally symmetric (the same on both sides)? Does it have legs
and/or arms? Does your alien have sense organs such as eyes, ears, a nose, and
a mouth? If so, are those senses in the head, and are the eyes above the mouth?
If the answer is “yes” to these questions, don’t feel bad. It is only because your
existing knowledge of animals on Earth constrained the features of the alien
animal you imagined
In a task similar to the one you engaged in, Ward (1994) asked partici-
pants to generate an animal from an alien planet. What he discovered was
that 94 percent of those alien animals were bilaterally symmetric, 97 percent
had standard sense organs such as eyes and ears and standard appendages
such as legs and arms. More often than not, the alien animals also preserved
the structural relationships between features, such as the sense organs being
placed in the head, which was above the body, and the eyes being above
the nose, which was above the mouth. Just so you don’t think that this is
simply because undergraduate college students are unoriginal, Ward (1994)
found that science fction authors also demonstrated this efect. An analysis
of paintings of otherwise unusual science fction creatures showed that the
bulk of them were symmetric and had legs and eyes. Similarly, even a cursory
look at science fction movies reveals the tendency for exotic aliens to have
many Earth animal features. Writers and movie producers are motivated to
be creative, yet they, too, are constrained by their existing knowledge. Tis
efect isn’t just limited to aliens, we also conform to what we know when we
create other novel members of a category such as tools and fruits (Ward et al.,
2002).
Ward’s explanation for this phenomenon was that we tend to retrieve the
frst category member we think of when we are asked to create a new exam-
ple of a category (e.g., we think of “dog” when asked to create a new type of
animal). Te category animal that frst comes to mind is usually the most
typical category member. Ward says that the reason we use this typical animal
member is because generating new ideas is difcult. Tis causes many people
to take the path of least resistance and use the frst category example they
can think of because this is the easiest approach to take to a difcult task.
Tere is a way around this, though. If there was a way to get people to think
about a category without thinking about specifc examples of that category,
their creations might be more creative. So Ward et al. (2004) examined this
hypothesis. He told half of the participants in his study to imagine an animal
on a planet very diferent from our own. Te other half of the participants he
asked to think about the various functions an animal needs to survive, such
as protection, feeding, movement, and reproduction. What he found was that
the participants who focused on function created more original aliens than
those who were given just the category name.
Tis line of research also helps to show how memory retrieval can afect
diferent aspects of creative outcomes, such as their novelty and usefulness.
Ward (2008) had students develop ideas for new sports. As in studies using
domains of animals, fruit, and tools, he found that those who retrieved abstract
information developed sports that were higher in originality, but he also found
that their sports were rated as less playable. So retrieving your knowledge at
higher, more abstract levels can help you make ideas that are diferent than
those that have come before, but it may come at a cost to their practicality. If
the goal is to have a workable solution, retrieving more specifc kinds of infor-
mation (such as particular yet more uncommon sports) might be more helpful.
Recent conceptual expansion research includes examination of brain
structures and the role they play in conceptual expansion. Recent fMRI
research verifed that specifc brain areas involving access, storage, and rela-
tional integration of conceptual knowledge were activated when engaging in
conceptual expansion. It was also noted that there were individual diferences
in performance/creation, with the high-creativity group activating more brain
areas than the low-creativity group when engaging in conceptual expansion
(Abraham et al., 2018).
Conceptual Combination
Conceptual combination is also a very useful way to generate new ideas, in
a variety of domains, including science, literature, and music (see, e.g., Ramm
& Halford, 2012; Rothenberg, 1979; Tagard, 1984; Ward, 2001). Te infor-
mation combined can be simple concepts, larger theories, and even artistic or
musical genres. Consider, for example, the interesting efects of combining
electronic and folk music styles, as in folktronica.
Traditional cognitive psychology research on conceptual combination
focuses on the comprehension of novel noun–noun phrases (e.g., “game date”).
Tis is actually a tricky research question, because there is often more than
one interpretation of the combination and that interpretation is often more
than the intersection of the two nouns (e.g., a “game date” is more than the set
of things “games” and “dates” have in common). It is also interesting because
combinations with similar constituents (“computer dog” and “apartment dog”)
can have very diferent interpretations.
Hampton (1987) proposed that the conceptual combination takes the set
of features of both nouns. Te combination inherits the salient attributes of
both sets subject to certain constraints, as follows: (1) features that are necessary
for one of the constituents will be included in the combination, and (2) fea-
tures that are impossible for one of the constituents will not be included in the
combination. One of the interesting things that happens during conceptual
combination, where creativity is concerned, is that it is possible for emergent
features to become part of the interpretation. An emergent feature is a feature
that is not (strongly) associated with either of the nouns in the combination.
Work by Wilkenfeld and Ward (2001) indicates that emergent features are
more likely when the nouns in a noun–noun combination are dissimilar from
each other (e.g., motorcycle harp) rather than similar to each other (e.g., apple
pear).
Perhaps the reason why emergent features are more likely with dissimilar
combinations is because one needs to engage in creative problem-solving when
trying to interpret the combinations involving dissimilar nouns/concepts.
Perhaps it is this exact thing that results in added value when combining dis-
similar things to create something new. It is certainly is a strategy suggested in
many creativity-enhancing techniques and put to use by creative individuals.
Most of the time these techniques use a random process to combine disparate
elements. For example, some techniques suggest taking the idea you are work-
ing with and pairing it with the frst object you see outside your window. Te
creativity often comes from the purposeful exploration of this combination.
As with what we discussed about the conformity efect, successfully com-
bining concepts that are quite dissimilar to each other often results in crea-
tive products. However, it is quite difcult to combine disparate concepts. In
fact, Poincaré discussed conceptual combination and creativity. Poincaré was
a mathematician, a theoretical physicist, and a philosopher of science. He was
deeply interested in the creative process and made detailed observations of
his own creative processes. He believed that mathematical creation comes
from useful combinations of elements, and that the way one can distinguish
the useful combinations from the poor ones is through the use of analogy (to
similar approaches or elements that have worked in the past). He noted that
the greater the disparity between the elements in the combination, the more
likely it was to be a more creative solution. However, the disparity between the
elements also increased the likelihood that the combination would result in a
totally unworkable solution.
Empirical research backs the idea that discrepancy between the items
to be combined could pose problems for developing workable ideas. Mobley
et al. (1992) asked participants to come up with concepts that could explain
grouping together exemplars from each of three distinct categories. For some
problems, the three starting categories were closely related, and in others they
were not. When the component objects were more dissimilar, people gener-
ated more original outcomes, but the outcomes were also judged to be of lower
quality. So the need to integrate discrepant pieces of information provided

a boost to originality, though not necessarily to overall quality. Just as with
retrieval of category knowledge, then, the specifcs of how the process is used
can have diferent efects on the two key aspects of creative ideas: their origi-
nality and their usefulness.
Analogy and Creativity

Like conceptual combination, analogy is also frequently used by crea-
tive individuals (including Poincaré) for creative problem-solving. Analogy is
interesting in that it is a very basic cognitive problem-solving process that can
result in some amazingly creative solutions. It is particularly useful for solv-
ing ill-defned problems – the types of problems that require creative prob-
lem-solving methods. Innovators and scientists, including Kepler (orbits of
the planets), Henry Ford (assembly line), Darwin (evolution through natural
selection), Hiram Maxim (silencer), and Philo Farnsworth (frst working tel-
evision system), have identifed an analogy as the source of their breakthrough
ideas or innovations.
Engaging in analogical problem-solving involves two domains of knowl-
edge and at least three analogical processes. Te two domains of knowledge
are referred to as the source and target domains. Te target domain is the prob-
lem currently being worked on. For example, when motorcycles were frst
developed, it wasn’t possible to travel far or to run errands on one because
there was no way, short of a backpack, to carry items on the vehicle. In this
example, the target domain is motorcycles. Te source domain is the knowledge
of some other domain – perhaps one in which a solution to a problem similar
to the target problem has been reached. Te three analogical problem-solving
processes are retrieval, mapping, and transfer/inference.
Te frst step in using analogy for problem-solving is retrieval from memory
of information to use as the source domain. Te information being retrieved
from memory ranges on a continuum from being conceptually similar to the
target domain to being conceptually distant (just like the conceptual combina-
tions described in the previous section). Retrospective accounts by innovators
suggest that analogically driven solutions to their problems frequently involve
source and target domains that are conceptually distant from each other.
Te next process in analogical problem-solving is to establish one-to-one
correspondences between the source and target domains. Tis is known as
mapping. When comparing a motorcycle to a horse, you would map the horse’s
front legs to the motorcycle’s front tire and the horse’s rear legs to the motor-
cycle’s rear tire. You would note that the rider of the horse sits on a saddle,
whereas the rider of the motorcycle sits on a seat. You would also notice that
the saddle is between the front and rear legs of the horse, just like the seat is
between the front and rear motorcycle tires.
Te fnal process is inference/transfer. Once you have established corre-
spondences between the source and target domains, it is possible to identify
diferences between them. It is these diferences that can potentially suggest
how to solve the problem in the target domain. Tis happens when you notice
something in the source domain (the saddlebags behind the saddle for car-
rying things) that is missing in the target domain (the motorcycle is missing
the saddlebag). You transfer the knowledge from the source to the target,
and then adapt the solution to the specifcs of the target domain (e.g., sad-
dlebags could be hung across the motorcycle’s rear fender to carry supplies). It
is the inference/transfer stage that is associated with creative insights during
problem-solving. Insight is often experienced as a sudden epiphany – an Aha
experience – and is believed to result from a sudden restructuring of the repre-
sentation of the source domain that allows the solution to the target problem
to be identifed (Finke et al., 1992; Lv, 2015).
Te frst studies examining analogy in creative problem-solving used ill-
defned insight problems such as Dunker’s (1945) radiation problem. One of
the functions of this initial research was to verify existing anecdotal evidence
that analogy contributed signifcantly to scientifc insight and problem-solving
through the use of distant analogies (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Since then, much
of analogy research focused more on the basic processes of analogy (especially
retrieval) and less on how analogical problem-solving enables highly creative
solutions to problems. Consequently, little is known about the role these basic
processes play in facilitating creativity. Tere are exceptions, though. Dahl and
Moreau (2002) empirically examined the use of analogy to aid in developing
novel products. In their experiment, they had experienced product designers
develop a system for eating food in an automobile. Tey recorded the designer’s
use of analogy in the development process. Tey found that the creativity of the
product developed was positively correlated with the number and conceptual
distance of analogies used during product development. Te greater the number
of analogies used by the designers, the more creative the resulting product. Te
greater the conceptual distance between the source and target domains of the
analogies used by the designers, the greater the creativity of the product they
developed. Te manner in which Dahl and Moreau (2002) examined the rela-
tionship between conceptual distance and creativity is typical for research of this
nature. Tey examined the correlation between conceptual distance and creativ-
ity. In this and similar studies, the problem-solver retrieved the source domain
from memory to solve the problem. In comparison, Sifonis (2003) experimen-
tally examined the relationship between the conceptual distance between the
source and target domains and the creativity of the resulting solution to the
problem. Rather than having participants retrieve the source domain from
memory, Sifonis provided participants with a source domain. Te target domain
her participants were working with was solving the parking problem on campus.
Tis problem was chosen because participants were familiar with the problem
and deeply invested in generating solutions to it.
Tere has been some debate about the usefulness of near versus distant
source domains (see, e.g., Christensen & Schunn, 2007; Dunbar, 1997), and
the source domains Sifonis provided to participants difered in terms of the
conceptual distance of the “parking on campus” target domain. Some were
given the conceptually similar domain of parking at a mall. A second group
was provided with a more distant domain that was still transportation-ori-
ented – parking downtown. Te third group was told to use the source domain
of an amusement park, and the fourth group was asked to use the most distant
source domain of “Darwin’s Teory of Evolution.” Participants mapped the
source and target domains onto each other to generate solutions which were
then rated in terms of practicality and originality. Te results showed that a
source domain similar to the target domain (parking at a mall), led to the most
practical solutions. Te most original solutions were generated when using the
moderately distant source domain of an amusement park. Tis supports the
idea that more conceptually distant domains lead to more creative solutions …
up to a point. Perhaps when the source domain is excessively distant from the
target domain, creative and workable solutions are rare.
Perhaps an even more interesting component of this research involved
the types of solutions generated by mapping the diferent source domains
onto the target domain. It appears that the specifc source domain used to
solve the target problem afected the types of solutions that were generated.
For example, those using a mall as the source domain were more likely than
those using other source domains to generate the parking solution of having
the police enforce parking rules. Tose working with the downtown parking
source domain were more likely than the other participants to suggest solu-
tions involving parking determined by need (e.g., more handicapped park-
ing near the building; majors get to park closer to the department building).
Tose working with the amusement park source domain generated more solu-
tions involving the addition of conveniences/safety (e.g., food vendors in the
parking lot, protection from cars). Not surprisingly, participants working with
Darwin’s Teory as their source domain were more likely to provide solutions
that reduced the commuter population on campus.
Tese results suggest that the source domain constrains which aspects
of the knowledge structure are explored to generate solutions to the target
domain problem. Tis is consistent with prior analogical reasoning research
(Keane, 1996; Spellman & Holyoak, 1996) and leads to an important take-
away message. Tere are many diferent solutions to a problem. When using
analogy, the source domain exerts a strong infuence on the target domain
solution. Tis means that there are many diferent source domains that could
be applied to a problem, leading to many potential solutions to that prob-
lem (Scotney et al., 2020). However, it doesn’t necessarily mean that solutions
using one source domain are inherently better than those generated using a
diferent source domain. As long as the mapping and transfer processes are
engaged in thoroughly and methodically, it is possible for those diferent solu-
tions to be equally efective and equally creative for solving the problem.
Summary
Creative cognition ofers a way to understand creativity in terms of the
nuts and bolts of creative thinking from which new and useful ideas originate.
By considering basic mental operations we’re all capable of, it also provides
some guidance about how people can increase their chances of coming up with
creative products. It is clear that it is not just the processes, but also the way
they are implemented that matters. Generating mental images can spark new
ideas, but it may be helpful to simply “mentally doodle” without a particular
problem in mind, and only then try to use knowledge to see how the result
can be applied in a given domain. Exposure to examples of other solutions can
help or hurt, depending on whether those examples have faws or unusual but
useful characteristics. Retrieving specifc ideas from memory can limit origi-
nality, but it can also help with the practicality of new ideas. Combinations
of previous ideas can help, especially if those ideas are moderately discrepant.
Analogies can help, and the distance between the source and target domains
can afect the outcome. So, in being creative, not only is it helpful to use ordi-
nary processes, it is important to be aware of how we’re using those processes,
and to capitalize on the strengths of those processes.

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2015.02.002
HOT TOPIC 4
Insight: Developing
Creative Thinkers with
Ahas and Uh-Ohs?
Gillian Hill
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ Insight moments as mini-c creative experiences see the beginning of
a developmental journey in creative thinking with Aha and Uh-oh
moments playing a part in problem-solving that may be applied in the
classroom in approaches such as problem-based learning.
¥¥ Ideas and knowledge that arrive through insight moments ofer the
promise of “added value” by being better remembered, seeing a new
understanding unfold from the moment, and potentially provid-
ing motivation for students to seek out and persevere with future
problem-solving.
¥¥ We could adapt some of the tasks and approaches that research psy-
chologists have used to elicit insight in the laboratory, for example
word puzzles, tabletop games, and magic trick solving. Tese may be
useful to give low-stakes experiences that students can then apply and
refect on in solving opportunities aforded in class.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-10 119

In 2017, Mark Zuckerberg gave the commencement address at Harvard

with a focus on creativity and innovation. Tucked within his speech was the
line: “Te idea of a single eureka moment is a dangerous lie.” Now, I am fairly
sure Zuckerberg was not claiming to be an academic expert on creativity, nor
specifcally insight research. Tose who are provided an immediate rebuttal
to this idea (see an excellent New York Times article by John Kounios listed in
the recommended reading for this chapter). As such, the question of whether
eureka exists is not the “hot topic” of discussion here. Insight moments do exist,
and as Kounios (2017) highlights, have been widely researched over the last
century, where they have proven to be sudden and new ideas or understand-
ing accompanied by an Aha or Uh-oh moment (Hill & Kemp, 2018a). So,
setting aside this debate, my thoughts were drawn toward Zuckerberg’s audi-
ence that day: A group of lauded, highly educated people, with the ceremony
representing to many the pinnacle of educational attainment. I wondered how
many from the student group, or their professors also listening in, had ever
really thought about insight or eureka at all? Certainly, to me the most interest-
ing thing was perhaps a misunderstanding or simplifcation of what eureka or
insight moments are and perhaps a lot of (false) assumptions specifcally about
their role in creativity. As such, this chapter aims to explore what research
tells us (and is continuing to explore) about eureka moments, these famous and
infamous creative insight moments of epiphany. It will aim to think specifcally
about these in the context of learning and education by asking the following:
1. Why are insight moments of interest in the classroom?
2. Why might we be specifcally interested in insight moments rather
than creativity or problem-solving in general?
3. How can we help students to have more insight moments?
Why Are Insight Moments of

Interest in the Classroom?
It is likely that many teachers may also disagree with any discounting
of eureka, given they often use such insight moments as indicators of learn-
ing in their students (Liljedahl, 2016; Lindström & Gulz, 2008; Weiss &
Helskog, 2020). Tere are various external signals of the internal mental clicks
and fashes that students may show, with distinct exclamations (e.g. “Aha – I
see”), facial expressions, or behaviors. Tese accompany an inner feeling of
“Aha” – a combination of pleasure, suddenness, surprise, and possibly of hav-
ing overcome an impasse (Danek et al., 2014b). Insight is transformative: once
thought, the creative idea cannot be unthought (Jarman, 2014; Öllinger &
Knoblich, 2009). A click of insight not only represents a sudden association
of previously unconnected components, but allows all the possibilities of that
connection to unfold with relatively little need to verify things (Bowden &
Insight 121
Jung-Beeman, 2003; Danek et al., 2014). Tese moments may often represent
a sought-out shift in understanding and even attitude in a student (Liljedahl,
2016; Singh, 2011). If such shifts could be elicited, captured, or replicated,
perhaps as threshold concepts, then there might be a way to arm learners with
a prepared mind to experience such moments (Meyer & Land, 2006).
A useful model in thinking about insight is provided by Kaufman and
Beghetto (2009), which separates creativity into four diferent levels of
achievement. Tis labels eminent creative achievements such as Archimides’
archetypal eureka moment as big-C, but recognizes that a lot of creativity does
not ft into this category. Most of us will not reach a level of eminence to show
big-C in our lifetime! To be fair to Zuckerberg, I suspect this is kind of the
point he was trying to make, too, suggesting that other forms of creativity are
more achievable for individuals to aspire to, rather than waiting for a big-C
eureka to hit out of the blue. Accordingly, the other types of creativity they
describe, pro-c, little-c and mini-c, may be more pertinent in our considera-
tion of insight moments in this chapter.
In fact, big-C creativity does not appear from nowhere, rather it builds on
knowledge and creativity at these other levels. A nice example of this is the
creative endeavor of Vijay Kakkar, who pioneered the use of anticoagulants
Figure HT4.1 Learning an insight facial expression. There is actually very

little research into how insight moments are experienced or develop
through childhood.
in post-operative treatment (Plucker, 2019). He was surprised by the unex-

plained deaths of some of his patients following surgery, which was something
everyone just accepted as “one of those things.” But Kakkar set about solving
this problem, with his solution now estimated to save around 300,000 deaths
each year. However, Kakka initially saw this as a bit of a hobby, an aside
from his “day job” as a surgeon that perhaps fts the label of little-c, although
most think of little-c everyday creativity more along the lines of activities
such as crafting, painting, etc. Might pro-c, then, where people professionally
engage in creative pursuits, ft better here? Again, other professionals, such as
designers, artists, and perhaps entrepreneurs like Zuckerberg, may more read-
ily spring to mind. However, undeniably Kakkar’s creativity saw him solv-
ing a problem in his professional life, albeit one he was not initially paid or
acknowledged for by the wider medical community. His work only moved to
big-C status as the efectiveness of his solution was recognized and adopted,
fnally seeing his persistence suitably rewarded and eminence recognized.
Here we see a developmental trajectory, as creativity progresses from little-
c through pro-c to big-C. Mini-c, then, paves the way for this progression. It
is creativity that occurs within individuals, whose ideas are novel and useful to
them (Plucker et al., 2004). Mini-c insights will often be about something that
is already widely known, so will not be novel using the classifcations of big-C,
pro-c, or little-c. But they are new and salient to the individual, and as such are
seen as examples of creativity. Mini-c insight moments are therefore relatively
small-scale, personal epiphanies that occur suddenly, are accompanied by the
feeling of emotion (e.g., Aha or Uh-oh), and constitute a moment of learning
(Hill & Kemp, 2018a). Tese are the insight moments of the classroom, which
can form the foundations of future creative thinking at the other levels.
But Why Specifically Insight Moments, Rather

Than Creativity or Problem-Solving in General?
After all, ideas can build and knowledge can be assimilated without
insight moments, gradually through search-type processes (Bowden & Jung-
Beeman, 2003). First, information gained through insight sees a memory
advantage compared to those where a solution is found through gradual search
techniques (Danek et al., 2014; Danek & Wiley, 2020). For the most part, it
seems that the level of certainty seen when solutions arrive through insight
persists to make these ideas better remembered in the future. In addition to
occurring as a solution, insight moments can also occur as Uh-oh moments,
where we become aware of a problem suddenly and for the frst time (Hill &
Kemp, 2018a). Models of creativity highlight how problem-fnding is a key
feature in creative thinking (see Sifonis and Ward’s Chapter 5 in this volume).
Insight 123
As we saw earlier, it was Kakkar’s identifcation of the problem, which many

had overlooked, that led him to set about solving it. Tis suggests that insight
moments have a role in helping students to identify problems, as well as in
providing accurate solutions and facilitating the memory of this new knowl-
edge, for example through problem-based learning (Hmelo-Silver, 2004).
A further fascinating answer to this question comes from a suggestion
that scientists, STEM professionals like Kakkar, are insight-seekers. Maryam
Mirzakhani, winner of the Fields Medal,1 outlined her experience of insight
moments in mathematics as follows: “Te most rewarding part is the ‘Aha’
moment, the excitement of discovery and enjoyment of understanding some-
thing new, the feeling of being on top of a hill, and having a clear view” (CMI,
2008, p. 12). Further support for this intriguing idea comes from research
within the cryptic crossword community. One at frst might imagine that those
engaged in word-play puzzles may come from professions such as writers and
other literary-based creative felds. On the contrary, Friedlander and Fine (2018)
showed that by far the largest profession represented in the solving community
had careers in STEM. Furthermore, a key reason why people engaged in solv-
ing was pursuit of the PDM – the “penny dropping moment.” So strong is this
community’s afliation with Aha moments, they have developed their own ver-
nacular to describe them – PDMs! Here we see that not only do pro-c scientists
employ and seek out creative problem-solving in their work lives, but many seek
out further opportunities to experience insight in their choice of hobby.
Perhaps our insight-seeking scientists are capitalizing on the fact that
rewarding Aha moments provide motivation in the future to continue their
solving attempts when things get tough. Previous experience of successful
solving shows the solver that perseverance is ultimately benefcial, with the
Aha experience helping to make this moment stand out due to the pleasurable
feeling (Gopnik, 2000; Oh et al., 2020). Recent neuroscientifc work sup-
ports this idea by showing that underlying brain processes in insight are akin
to other rewarding experiences (Becker et al., 2020; Kizilirmak et al., 2019;
Oh et al., 2020; Tik et al., 2018), with some popular media provocatively
going as far as to claim that “crosswords [are] better than sex!” (Allen, 2018).
Tis suggests that Aha moments are something that might be sought out,
and reward solvers to stick with their solving eforts in the future. Tere is
an exciting additional possibility, then (but as yet without defnitive research
support), seeing benefts of insight that extend beyond the immediate learning
or problem-solving episode. We might use these powerful insight moments to
help motivate future problem-solving activities, and think about this in con-
texts such as the classroom or lecture theatre, particularly in terms of mini-c.
1 Te Fields Medal is seen as the equivalent to a Nobel Prize, and is one of the highest forms of
acknowledgment for a mathematician.
124
Insight in the Laboratory

The range of laboratory-based tasks that have been shown to elicit insight moments may provide a promising avenue to adapt for classroom activities .
These highlight how eureka is not specific to a single domain, so it’s not just science and math! Try out some of these yourself. The solutions can be
found on page xx
Riddles and Puzzles Word-Based Problems
1. Connect all the dots using only four straight lines. 2. What word, when paired with each of the words below results in a
compound word or phrase?
river→note→account
.3. What well-known phrase or saying does the following represent?

Right iiiiiiii
Creativity and Innovation
Puzzle 2 is a RAT (no, not a small animal, but the Remote Association
Test; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003), which provides lots of
opportunities to solve through insight. These are quite hard, given they
were developed for adult participants.
Puzzle 3 is a Rebus puzzle (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008), also

called “wordies,” which use words but also position as their basis. Again,
these are developed for adults, but could be adapted for a younger
Figure HT4.2 audience.
The nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930) is a classic insight problem, and these
riddles or puzzles only give a one-off solving opportunity. Also, as you’ll see if
you check out the solutions, many of these have found their way out of the
laboratory, meaning that many of the solutions are quite widely known.
Match-stick Math Connect 4
4. Move one stick to make this sum work.
Figure HT4.3
Different puzzles can involve moving different sticks . The use of roman
numerals for numbers above three would expand the possible puzzle bank
(Knoblich et al., 1999).
Story Telling
Figure HT4.4
Frank Loesche developed Dira (Loesche et al., 2018), a computer-based version
of the card game Dixit (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dixit_(card_game). He
found that it reliably produced insight moments. In this game, a story is told Adults playing this table-top game have been shown to experience
based on one of a selection of cards. The insight moments come when players both Ahas and Uh-ohs (Hill & Kemp, 2018a). Having simple rules and
identify which card and why. being affordable and easy to clean (plus there being of free online
versions), it is ideal for classroom use (the photo shows some of my
Magic Tricks students in a problem-solving class).
Amory Danek showed that people have insight moments when trying to work
out how a magic trick is done (Danek et al., 2014). Have a try yourself by visiting
Amory’s website (www.amorydanek.de/research/). This introduces aspects of
drama and performance, as the magician seeks to trick the audience.
Insight
125
So How Can We Help Students to

Have More Insight Moments?
In reality, it’s hard to elicit insight on demand. For example, Peter Liljedahl
(2016) set out to elicit classroom insight, building on his work identifying the
value of Aha moments in undergraduate mathematics students. However, things
were not as straightforward as anticipated, and he found barriers in typical class-
rooms that seemed to block insight moments. Subsequent exploration suggested
the need to frst establish “thinking classrooms” (p. 362) in order to give students
tools, such as a prepared mind and willingness to both explore and be comfortable
with impasse (and so incubation), that may be central to creative problem-solving.
Some of the games and tasks used by insight researchers may be useful
tools in a journey toward a thinking classroom. For example, playing games
and explicitly refecting on Aha and Uh-oh experiences may help to open
students’ minds to diferent ways of solving problems. Moreover, because it is
suggested that experiencing insight motivates future problem-solving behav-
ior, games could provide low-stakes opportunities to generate Aha and Uh-oh
moments. However, a word of caution here: Currently, little work has been
done to explore the use of insight tasks beyond the laboratory, so we do not
know how this might apply in other contexts, for example the classroom .
Work that has shown promise in eliciting insight moments in the classroom
is outlined by Vandana Singh (2011). She gave her students a NASA or New
Scientist article at the beginning of a topic to read and answer some basic ques-
tions about, but crucially links were not made to the upcoming material they were
about to study. At the end of the topic, students were invited to re-read the arti-
cle, with many visibly experiencing insight moments as they made connections
back to their class content. Tis provided a personal demonstration of changed
understanding, and highlighted how physics theory could be used in an applied
context. In these examples, it can be seen that the students initially experienced
uncertainty and a feeling of not knowing and impasse that is often uncomfort-
able. Subsequently returning to the articles and experiencing the consequent Aha
moments enabled them to gain confdence and perhaps be more comfortable
with initial uncertainty. Furthermore, explicit discussions of the creative problem-
solving process could be incorporated in such tasks to aid students’ refections.
What Does This Mean for Other Students

Who Might Not Have an Insight Moment?
An encouraging fnding here is that it seems that you do not have to
have generated the answer yourself in order to experience an Aha moment.
Insight 127
Several studies have found that when solutions are given to solvers who have
yet to fnd the answer or are stuck in their solving attempts, they still often
experience an Aha (Kizilirmak et al, 2016; Webb et al., 2019). Terefore,
those sharing an answer with their class or a teacher providing feedback of
answers may elicit mini-c Aha moments in others, and so see benefts via
a vicarious Aha. For instance, providing or discussing problems and subse-
quent solutions may generate some early insight experiences for students and
help to motivate future solving attempts. A cautionary note here again is
that of course these are laboratory-generated fndings, which we as yet can-
not say for certain operate in the same way in the classroom or in younger
age groups.
A further consideration is that some students may not experience
insight at all. Linda Ovington (Ovington et al. 2018) found that an intrigu-
ing 20 percent of participants in her large-scale study of adults in Australia
reported never having experienced an insight moment. Tis corroborates
some of my own (unpublished) qualitative work conducted before Ovington’s
work was published. I recruited participants for a diary study to follow their
insight experiences over the course of a week, but many reported having
none at all. For me, this was somewhat of an Uh-oh moment. Was it that
they truly had not had insights at all, or had they forgotten to complete their
diary? In follow-up interviews, they explained to me that despite looking
out for these moments, they did not experience any, and crucially, they felt
that they never had. Terefore, some caution should be applied in expecting
all to experience or beneft from Aha moments until further work is done
with this group of people. In fact, it could be alienating to describe insight
moments as if they are a universally experienced phenomenon if you are one
of this group.
So, to conclude, Gopnik (2000) suggests that “it is not that children are
little scientists but that scientists are big children” (p. 303). Trough a focus
on these “big children,” our pro-c STEM professionals, we have identifed
the part mini-c insights may play when working with children. As seen in
the laboratory-based insight tasks, however, insight moments occur across
domains, so are not exclusive to STEM subjects. Not only can Ahas and
Uh-ohs play important roles in classroom problem-solving and topic-based
learning, they may also provide foundational experiences in the develop-
ment of creative thinkers. By exposing children to, and getting them to
refect on, experiences of insight moments, we may be able to help grow
motivated and resilient problem-solvers. So, fnally and in direct response
to Zuckerberg, “Eureka moments aren’t a dangerous lie – they are real, but
complicated!”

Danek, A. H., & Salvi, C. (2020). Moment of truth: Why Aha! experiences
are correct. Te Journal of Creative Behavior, 54(2), 484–486. https://doi
.org/10.1002/jocb.380
Kounios, J. (2017, June 10) Eureka? Yes, Eureka! Te New York Times
https://w w w.nytimes.com /2017/06/10/opinion /sunday/eureka-yes
-eureka.html
Watson, G (2020, May 4) Why solving puzzles feels so satisfying, especially
during a quarantine. Te Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost
.com /lifest yle /wellness /why -solving-puzzles -feels -so -satisfying
-especially-during-a-quarantine/2020/05/03/b87ac636-8bda-11ea-9dfd
-990f9dcc71fc_story.html
Webb, M. E., Little, D. R., & Cropper, S. J. (2018). Once more with feeling:
Normative data for the aha experience in insight and noninsight problems.
Behavior Research Methods, 50(5), 2035–2056. https://doi.org/10.3758/
s13428-017-0972-9
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Solutions to Insight Puzzles

1. Nine-dot problem:
Figure HT4.5
2. RAT problem: River

3. Rebus problem: “Right before the eyes’”
4.
Figure HT4.6
CHAPTER 6
A Pragmatic View
of Teaching and
Measuring Creativity
Inside Digital
Media Design
Matthew J. Worwood
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ Design thinking’s emphasis on the end-user makes it more suit-
able for designing disciplines compared to other forms of creative
problem-solving.
¥¥ Teaching creativity inside design thinking requires teaching practi-
tioners to consider the infuence of audience members who exist inside
and outside the classroom environment.
¥¥ Students must learn how to diferentiate feedback from audience
groups that exist inside the classroom environment and consider their
limitations in efectively judging the likelihood of an outcome’s suc-
cess in the real world.
¥¥ Te 4C framework for creativity provides a pragmatic approach to
exploring diferent ways to evaluate outcomes when teaching creativ-
ity in Digital Media Design (DMD).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-11 133

Teaching for high-stakes creativity in Digital Media Design is a chal-

lenge. Students view outcomes based on how they perceive them inside their
environment. Existing knowledge of a discipline and comparisons with fel-
low students contribute to these views. Likewise, feedback from an instructor,
who is often the fgure who will cast overall judgment, is another infuence
that shapes student perceptions of an outcome. Sociocultural perspectives of
learning provide theoretical frameworks to consider these infuences (Gee,
2008; Vygotsky, 1978); however, they don’t always provide explicit strategies
on how to shift student views of an outcome in support of teaching a design-
based approach to creative problem-solving (CPS). Terefore, it is important
to consider ways to challenge existing thinking around creativity and facilitate
conversations that challenge stereotypes (e.g., outside-the-box thinking) and
other perspectives of thinking that associate creativity with creative people and
a thing exclusive to the arts (Plucker & Dow, 2010, 2016). Tis chapter con-
siders the following three themes as they relate to the teaching of creativity in
Digital Media Design:
¥¥ Design thinking as a design-based approach to CPS
¥¥ Te infuence of audience inside a classroom environment
¥¥ Using the 4C framework to appreciate diferent views of creativity.
Digital Media Design

In many ways, discussion on the teaching of creativity in Digital Media
Design is like conversations related to the teaching of creativity in engi-
neering or industrial design (Agogué et al., 2015; Cropley, 2016; Cropley
& Kaufman, 2019; Hargrove, 2012). Te emergence of new technologies
accompanied by innovative applications in society provide novel experiences
in how we interact with digital content. Terefore, like engineering profes-
sionals, digital media practitioners are routinely tasked with producing tech-
nological solutions to address novel problems (Cropley, 2016). However, there
are also potential diferences for this emerging sub-domain as well; DMD
addresses communication challenges related to the design and distribution
of visual information using technology. Terefore, it attracts expertise from
the fne arts (e.g., graphic design), business (e.g., marketing), computer sci-
ence, communication, and education (e.g., education technology). Tis intro-
duces a unique blend of expertise that creates potential tension between those
who may come from a home discipline that prioritizes aesthetics and others
who may focus more on prioritizing functionality. Tis situation raises excit-
ing questions related to the teaching of creativity inside design disciplines
(Cropley & Kaufman, 2018).
Design Thinking and Creativity 135
A Design-Based Approach to
Creative Problem-Solving
Tanks to established approaches in CPS (Mumford et al., 1991; Puccio,
2011), educators and scholar-practitioners can now explore diferent ways to
teach and promote this methodology inside their curriculum. Tis includes
situating CPS stages inside specifc disciplines (Mumford, 2017) and working
to facilitate deeper thinking around the actions that contribute to the crea-
tive process. Tis includes increased attention toward the environmental fac-
tors that may infuence student decision-making when working to design and
develop technological solutions in response to class assignments. Tis particu-
lar focus aligns CPS application with emerging sociocultural perspectives on
creativity that emphasize interactions that take place inside the environment
and their impact on the process (Glaveanu, 2013; Glaveanu et al., 2020).
Design thinking shares a similar profle with CPS methods; however,
it places more emphasis on human-centered design (Wolcott et al., 2020;
Worwood & Plucker, 2018; Worwood, 2020). Under these conditions, infor-
mation gathered about the end-user is placed at the forefront of idea genera-
tion, selection, and evaluation (Wolcott et al., 2020). Furthermore, real-world
application of design thinking is dedicated to the development of high-stakes
outcomes that address complex problems in felds such as architecture and
urban planning (Rowe, 1987), education and health care (Wolcott et al., 2020),
software development (IBM Design Tinking), and other forms of general
product design in industry. Although a potential discussion could examine
the intricacies of CPS and design thinking, the overall concepts in both meth-
ods represent a domain-general process to support deliberate creative produc-
tion (Worwood & Plucker, 2018). From this perspective, design thinking
shares the same objective as CPS – an intent to produce a creative outcome
in response to an ill-defned problem (Darbellay et al., 2018, Mumford 2017;
Puccio et al., 2011). However, design thinking’s emphasis on human-cen-
tered design requires practitioners to research and identify the needs of those
impacted by the problem to consider solutions based on audience and context.
Furthermore, its focus on the production of innovative products in society
and industry provides opportunities to engage DMD students in client-facing
real-world learning experiences. Although some visual designers may gravi-
tate toward aesthetics, applying design thinking increases attention on func-
tionality, as outcomes are measured based on addressing the context of the
users and their needs within this context. Terefore, DMD students engaged
in design thinking are tasked with using a collection of various design skills to
produce visually engaging content to solve a real-world problem. Furthermore,
as students interact with audience members during the process, they learn how
to apply user preferences during future iterations. Tis makes design thinking
more applicable to design disciplines that value iterative design than tradi-
tional CPS methodology.
Teaching Creativity Inside Design Thinking

Scholarly defnitions of creativity emphasize novelty and usefulness
(Mumford et al., 1991; Puccio et al., 2011). Tese two items are often consid-
ered in the environmental context for which the outcome is produced (Plucker
et al., 2004). Sociocultural perspectives of creativity discuss the importance
of the audience who inhabit such an environment (Glaveanu, 2013); these are
the people who cast judgment on the outcome based on their perception (and
use) of the product, service, or idea. Furthermore, these people are also infu-
ential during creative production, as practitioners make decisions based on
information and assumptions about what they think the audience values most
(Glaveanu, 2013). When applying this concept of creativity to design thinking,
we equate the value of new content based on whether it adequately addressed
the problem it was designed to address. Tis statement aligns with our under-
standing of creativity based on the following two assumptions: the technologi-
cal solution is perceived as new to the audience targeted in the design process,
and most importantly, they value the solution because it positively impacts the
problem they experience. However, when enacting this perspective of creativity
inside the classroom, DMD students are tasked with identifying an audience
that sometimes does not exist inside their environment. Tis makes students
vulnerable to making assumptions based on what they think they know about
their intended audience, while also drifting toward the perceived preferences
of an instructor who typically casts the fnal judgment when issuing the overall
grade. Under these conditions, the importance of the end-user is potentially
diluted in exchange for appealing to an alternative audience that physically
exists in the classroom. Furthermore, this situation may exchange intended
views of creativity most applicable to the teaching of design thinking for views
more relevant to artistic endeavors that prioritize ideas based on originality
and subjective expression. Tese alternative views are important to the learning
experience, but this chapter advocates the need to position these views as dif-
ferent than evaluating an outcome based on its success in addressing a problem.
Students should not leave a DMD classroom with the pretense that producing
a visually appealing product or proposing an original idea meets the criteria for
successful implementation of a technological solution in society.
Te variations in how designers and artists approach problems expand
beyond the identifed themes for this chapter. However, Glaveanu et al. (2013)
highlight many similarities during the production of the outcome, but also
diferences that include how designers respond to the pressures of a client,
while also viewing outcomes from the bases of both functionality and poten-
tial to address the problem (Michlewski, 2008). Applying my experience as
a professor of Digital Media, DMD students often fall into three catego-
ries: those who approach problems and view outcomes artistically, those who
approach problems and view outcomes as a designer, and those who have the
capacity to shift their approach based on the context and situation. Given the
importance of designing visually engaging content, but content that addresses
the needs of the end-user, the latter are ideal DMD students. Using a design-
based approach to CPS helps facilitate and shift views of creativity when
working inside design thinking. Likewise, it helps teach students how to fnd
and clarify problems to guide creative production and identify what views
of creativity to prioritize when working to distribute the solution (Marcy
& Mumford, 2007). Applying sociocultural perspectives of creativity, these
views are infuenced by the audience that exists inside the student’s environ-
ment, and this audience will naturally infuence actions taken during creative
production (Glaveanu, 2013). Consequently, facilitating views of creativity
inside design thinking, including fnding problems and evaluating solutions,
requires thinking for the individuals and groups interacting with the student
during the creative process.
The Audience
As we explore the importance of the end-user while teaching for creativ-
ity inside design thinking, it is helpful to consider diferent components that
make up an audience. Sawyer (2006) identifes connoisseurs as the experts
with the most knowledge and practice in their domain, followed by amateurs,
who have less knowledge than connoisseurs, but still have enough experience
to participate and ofer infuential insight. Te fnal component of an audi-
ence is presented as the general public. Interestingly, Sawyer (2006) does not
discuss their knowledge, but distinguishes this group by representing those
with little infuence during the design and distribution of the outcome. In his
description, Sawyer utilizes flm as an example of how the quantity of people
engaged by the product indicates its success. If a flm is watched by one mil-
lion people and another flm is watched by ten million people, the latter is
deemed more successful. Terefore, although domain experts may have an
alternative view about the production, the number of people engaged in the
fnal product is considered indicative of creativity from at least one perspec-
tive. Although the numerical value of engagement will naturally vary by the
size of the potential audience, the concept remains the same – members of
the general public represent a group diferent to those that might exist inside
a classroom environment. When viewed from this perspective, there are two
groups to consider when engaging DMD students in digital media projects:
the experts or semi-experts who cast judgment based on the product’s rela-
tionship inside the discipline, and those who judge the product based on con-
textual factors applicable to the intended audience (i.e., the general public).
Determining what component of an audience to target is a crucial fac-
tor to consider when exploring how to view creativity inside design thinking.
As expressed in the research, investigations into creativity evaluation typi-
cally focus on measuring creativity through divergent thinking tests (Runco
& Acar, 2012) or opinions held by domain experts (Baer et al., 2016; Kaufman
et al., 2010). Te former is perceived as evaluating the individual, while the
latter considers the outcome (Sawyer, 2012). Debates continue in these prac-
tices, which seem infuenced based on the diferent ways to view creativity as
it occurs inside an environment. However, under current conditions of the
education system, outcomes produced in a classroom environment require
some level of judgment (Plucker & Makel, 2010). Given the diferent ways
to measure creativity, it is understandable why challenges exist in terms of
what views of creativity to promote when working to evaluate creativity inside
design thinking, particularly if students and instructors in this feld gravitate
toward diferent preferences and approaches during creative production.
As presented in Figure 6.1, fellow DMD students represent a group with
similar knowledge of the domain (i.e., the amateurs), while instructors and
industry professionals are considered experts and therefore in a better position
to ofer overall judgment of an outcome. However, the intended audience of
the outcome (if they are members of the public) may or may not physically
exist inside a classroom environment. Tis introduces an interesting dilemma
when presenting the concept of creativity when teaching DMD students about
design thinking. Do we defer overall judgment of an untested technological
solution to a single instructor who will issue a grade? Do we invite industry
professionals or real-world clients to ofer judgment based on what they think
will be most successful in the real world? How might these choices infuence
a student’s priorities during creative production? And fnally, in what ways
might these actions infuence what views of creativity a student chooses to
prioritize when engaged in design thinking in the classroom?
Tese questions emphasize a crucial part of teaching for creativity in
design disciplines. More importantly, they provide an opportunity to consider
the diferent ways to present creativity to DMD students engaged in crea-
tive production. As already presented in this chapter, those engaged in design
thinking do so with the intention to produce a new and useful outcome in
response to an initial problem (e.g., mental health during COVID). Terefore,
creativity inside design thinking should consider how the outcome interacts
Figure 6.1 Building upon Sawyer’s (2006) grouping of audience members,

this figure shows how members of the general public may or may not
exist inside the classroom environment.
with the intended audience inside the context where the problem exists (i.e.,
the general public). Tis view does not necessarily alienate other perspectives
of creativity, but it does focus attention on the desired outcome that initiated
the process – to solve a problem. Without some type of engagement with
the intended audience, the student (and instructor) lacks the capacity to ofer
conclusive judgment of the outcome from the audience’s perspective. To deny
students this experience dilutes the teaching of design thinking inside DMD.
Furthermore, absent this opportunity, students may turn toward preconceived
views of creativity that prioritize the outcome’s relationship to themselves or
progress inside the discipline. Although these perspectives of an outcome
serve creativity, they fail to address the overall objective of design thinking
and the development of a technological solution. For example, a digital game
with the objective to change behavioral attitudes toward recycling on campus
is viewed based on its relationship to existing game theory, as opposed to
whether it led to an increase in recycling; a social media campaign launched
to raise money for a local charity is evaluated based on its content and strategy,
rather than its engagement and money raised; and an animation produced
to inform the public about the importance of social distancing during the
pandemic is evaluated for design aesthetics, as opposed to its success in com-

municating this important information. An assumption in these examples is
the existence of a preference for design aesthetics or views of creativity inside
a single discipline. However, these assumptions are supported by the concept
of an i-shaped student, as proposed by Cropley (2016). Tese types of students
are taught to prioritize domain knowledge with little application toward using
these skills to solve real-world problems, whereas t-shaped students develop
key domain-specifc skills, accompanied by knowledge on how to use these
skills to develop creative solutions. Terefore, design thinking must stress
views of creativity from the perspective of an outcomes impact in the environ-
ment where the problem exists, and how the intended audience values that
outcome within the specifcs of the context.
4C Model of Creativity
Kaufman and Beghetto’s 4C Model of creativity provides an overall
framework to develop an understanding for the various ways to view creativity
inside design thinking. Mini-c outcomes consider views from the perspective
of the student; this includes new discoveries recognized and valued by the
individual (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007), and these can include new ideas and
perspectives of the problem; however, the infuence of the outcome inside the
environment is limited to the student or group of students participating in the
process. As they progress ideas forward, they begin to engage in everyday acts
of creativity that address problems encountered during creative production
(Kaufmann & Beghetto, 2009). Tese outcomes contribute as little-c, as they
are available for others to recognize and appreciate inside the environment.
Tis chapter recognizes the importance of mini-c and little-c perspectives,
as they are an important aspect of the learning process. Tey represent learn-
ing inside the domain, and provide an important foundation to build upon
as individuals or groups progress toward higher-stake outcomes valued by a
wider audience. However, students must recognize the diference between an
outcome they consider new and useful, an outcome considered new and useful
related to the learning of domain-specifc skills, and fnally an outcome val-
ued based on its impact on the intended problem. Tese diferences represent
views of creativity that can vary as a consequence of contextual factors that
infuence how creativity is measured inside a DMD classroom. Te instruc-
tor’s potential view of creativity is infuential in this process.
As we look toward an outcome valued by an intended audience, we begin to
consider big-C and pro-c outcomes; the impact of both these outcomes expands
beyond the individual, as they begin to produce systematic changes beyond the
four walls of the classroom. Big-C outcomes are considered those with signif-
cant impacts that endure the test of time (Kaufmann & Beghetto, 2009). Tese
outcomes are reserved for elite pioneers, such as Ada Lovelace, Shakespeare,
or Martin Luther King, whereas pro-c outcomes are more applicable to teach-
ing creativity inside design thinking, as they consider the systematic changes
produced inside an existing context. These outcomes are presented as high-
stakes creativity, as their novelty and usefulness expand outside the view of a
classroom or discipline. Rather than prioritizing the views of colleagues and
instructors, students learn to recognize that the overall success of an outcome
is ultimately determined by the changes experienced or enacted by the end-
user. A more pragmatic way to facilitate this type of discussion is to consider
ways to express these views as questions (see Table 6.1). This approach can
help facilitate a reflective learning experience that challenges a singular view
of an outcome inside the classroom environment. Furthermore, research sug-
gests that engaging design students in this type of metacognitive practice can
help improve outcomes when teaching students about creative problem-solving
techniques (Hargrove, 2012; Hargrove & Nietfeld, 2014; Xiaoyu et al., 2019).
The questions presented under mini-c offer opportunities to engage stu-
dents in reflective tasks to support learning (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007),
while little-c questions help facilitate the type of feedback and critique com-
mon in design and fine arts curriculum. These social interactions typically take
place inside the classroom environment or as part of a juried exhibition. Like
Table 6.1
4C Model of Creativity
mini-c little-c pro-c big-C
What do I think of What do others in What does the How will your
my idea? your class think of intended audience outcome be viewed
your outcome? think of your by the audience
What do I think of outcome? 50 years from now?
my outcome? How new is your
outcome compared How new is your What impact will it
How do I value my to what has been outcome compared continue to have on
outcome? produced in the to what already the audience after
classroom before? exists for the this time?
What is new about audience?
my outcome when What value do What influences
compared to past others think your What value does will your outcome
work I’ve produced? outcome offers? your outcome offer have had on future
to the audience? innovations?
What discoveries What is the
have I made by relationship What impact does
engaging in this between your your outcome have
process? outcome and on the problem it
expectations was designed to
that exist in the address?
curriculum?
mini-c questions, they support learning and progress easily observed by oth-
ers. However, the learning experience from this view considers outcomes as
they exist inside the discipline (e.g., color choice); to be clear, this is an impor-
tant aspect of the creative process. Te development of domain-specifc skills
is a requirement for future creativity inside a discipline. However, returning
to the concept of a t-shaped professional, there is value in facilitating DMD
student thinking toward the questions that represent pro-c and big-C creativ-
ity. Although there are obvious challenges when addressing big-C questions,
pro-c questions are observable when systems exist to evaluate outcomes from
the perspective of the intended audience. Specifcally, they encourage students
to consider how they may engage with their intended audience to measure
the impact of a technological solution. Tis approach aligns with the core
principles of design thinking by gathering and using information about the
situation from the perspective of the end-user. However, the constraints of a
semester and the confnes of a classroom environment create barriers to the
teaching of this aspect of design thinking. Despite this, using the 4C frame-
work to explore ways to evaluate ideas and consider diferent ways to value an
outcome may introduce new ways to view creativity inside design thinking.
For example, a student may learn to recognize a preference for visual appeal
over functionality as a mini-c outcome, while feedback on the use of a font,
color scheme, or animation technique is recognized as a little-c outcome when
viewed inside the discipline. Most importantly, students recognize that absent
real-world information, it is difcult to determine the impact of their out-
come from the perspective of pro-c, which places value on how much impact
the outcome has on the intended audience. Design thinking in DMD is a
process to support the design and development of a technological solution,
and within this approach students must understand the diference between
what they think they’ve achieved and what they know they’ve achieved. All
views are valuable, but if our intent is to produce students with the capacity
to successfully apply domain-specifc skills to address real-world problems,
they must recognize the diferences. Terefore, I advocate for the teaching of
creativity inside design thinking as a new and useful outcome as measured by
its impact on a real-world situation. Te 4C Model serves as a tool to promote
this perspective.
Discussion
Some may not appreciate the value of Design Tinking, particularly
in situations when there is high regard for the teaching of domain-general
skills routinely taught in established disciplines (e.g., computer arts, graphic
design). As a result, singular views of creativity may have a priority inside the
curriculum. However, this chapter presents DMD as a discipline tasked with
developing technological solutions to novel problems that involve the visual
communication of information. Consequently, teaching students how to view
creativity inside design thinking is crucial for learning how to apply domain-
specifc knowledge to real-world problems impacting society. Te 4C frame-
work ofers a way to facilitate refective discussion of ideas and outcomes that
emerge during creative production inside DMD. Initial research in this area
suggests that students may have the capacity to distinguish between difer-
ent levels of creativity using the 4C framework (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2013;
Puente-Diaz et al., 2016; Puryear, 2016). Tis capacity can serve the develop-
ment of creative metacognitive skills that serve CPS (Kaufman et al., 2016),
therefore these questions may provide opportunities to support further inves-
tigation of this topic.
Finally, this approach doesn’t undermine a particular view of creativity,
but rather helps students to consider the context of feedback received inside a
classroom environment. Even if students are unable to evaluate outcomes at
the pro-c level, knowing they exist challenges them to recognize the limita-
tion of creativity judgments inside the classroom. And most importantly, it
sets more realistic expectations for real-world creative problem-solving in the
future. Tis supports sociocultural perspectives of creativity that highlight the
infuence of an audience during the creative process. Terefore, making stu-
dents more aware of these diferent views of creativity can assist in choosing
appropriate actions for assignments when responding to information received
inside a classroom environment.
As we look to address big challenges of the 21st century, we must encour-
age more of our students to recognize the goals of high-stakes creativity when
engaged in deliberate problem-solving. Consider the goals outlined in the
Paris Agreement that set CO2 reduction targets by 2050. Countries commit-
ted to these goals are now engaged in massive problem-solving as they work
to produce alternative forms of energy by designing solutions to the challenges
that exist to address this efort. Although we might celebrate and cheer on new
ideas, the value of outcomes within this context is ultimately judged on how
far they move us toward meeting the goals of this agreement. It is a mammoth
undertaking that requires mastery of domain-specifc skills; however, mastery
alone is not enough to enact change in the real world. Students must learn to
set measurable goals when challenged to address a real-world problem, and
unless they have obtained data to evaluate whether they’ve met those goals,
their capacity to evaluate the newness and usefulness of their outcome will
remain limited. Today’s students engaged in design thinking are the future
professionals tasked with addressing big problems facing our society. It is the
responsibility of everyone to highlight the diferences between high-stakes

creativity and other forms of creativity more easily discussed and evaluated
inside a single discipline or classroom environment.

Cropley, D. (2016). Nurturing creativity in the engineering classroom. In R.
Beghetto & J. Kaufman (Eds.), Nurturing creativity in the classroom (pp.
212–226). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316212899.014
Kaufman J. C., & Beghetto, R. A. (2009). Beyond big and little: Te four C
model of creativity. Review of General Psychology, 13, 1–12. doi:10.1037/
a0013688
Kaufman, J. C., Beghetto, R. A., & Watson, C. (2016). Creative metacognition
and self-ratings of creative performance: A 4-C perspective. Learning and
Individual Diferences, 51, 394–399. doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2015.05.004
Plucker, J. A., & Makel, M. C. (2010). Assessment of creativity. In J. C. Kaufman
& R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Te Cambridge handbook of creativity (pp. 48–73).
Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511763205.005
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HOT TOPIC 5
Creative Efficiency
More Ideas, Better, Faster!
Stuart Goldsmith
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ When dealing with creativity, efciency needn’t be a dirty word.
¥¥ Comedians assemble their own unique toolkits to create their material.
¥¥ Don’t interrupt your fow state for editing, research, rumination, or
anything else.
¥¥ We create environments in which to fail safely.
¥¥ Te mini-crises provoked by the presence of an audience inspire crea-
tive connections.
¥¥ Be intentional about collating your own toolkit, analyzing the cir-
cumstances under which you are most creative, and recreating those
circumstances.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-12 149

I’ve never heard anyone in the comedy industry use the phrase “creative
efciency,” perhaps because the two words seem disjointed from one another.
Tere’s naturally a friction between the idea of a heroically chaotic creative
mind plucking glistening new ideas from the ether and the somewhat clinical
notion that one can perform that task to order, or to even a measurable extent.
I was brought up to believe that there were “Arts” people and “Sciences”
people, and that to identify as the former meant renouncing the latter. But
creativity is not a mysterious, amorphous thing that is damaged if we talk
about it. On the contrary, professionally creative people think about it a lot
in an efort to improve their personal creativity. Comedy critics love to quote
E. B. White on how dissecting the frog of comedy kills it stone dead, but the
funniest people in the world analyze their art constantly, and only become
finty when working out their percentage of the door.
As a stand-up comedian, and interviewer of same, I’m drawn to the idea
of minting jokes out of thin air, of making something exist where before there
was nothing. Despite all my warrior-poet ideals, however, even I have to accept
that I’m really just smashing two pre-existing ideas together to create a third.
Sometimes those ideas are relatively mundane, such as a horse walking into a
bar and being asked, “Why the long face?” Sometimes they’re more nuanced,
like Mitch Hedberg observing that having to participate in your dreams is
exhausting, and that he’d rather dream about simply watching himself sleep.
If one aspect of our job is to launch a thousand ideas headlong into a thousand
more, and simply curate the “best” collisions into a set, can’t there be a way to
do so efciently?
Most of the guests on my Comedian’s Comedian podcast protest at frst that
they don’t really have a system or a toolkit, and then when probed go on to lay
out a completely unique way of recording their ideas, pulling them apart with
diferent tools and notions, and reshaping them anew. Sometimes the best
ideas fall out of the sky perfectly made, but this seems to happen a lot more
often when the engine of your creative brain is getting revved up on a regular
basis.
I’m fascinated by the idea that if a system exists, then it must be possible
to improve it – this may be motivated by not wanting to dread the blank page
for the rest of my professional life.
Some comics today will turn over an hour of new material every year or
two, with variations determined by work ethic, by whether their domestic
or international circuit is large enough to sustain touring the same gear, and
by the rate at which they expend it on TV and social media. In the UK, the
apparent career high-stakes of the annual Edinburgh Fringe Festival ensure
that to be taken seriously as an aspiring newcomer, three entirely new shows
in three respective years is the (pre-pandemic) norm. It certainly makes for an
Creative Efficiency 151
environment bursting with creativity. To refne an hour worthy of actual per-

formance in front of actual human beings, one would normally need to have
written at least two hours or more to discard along the way.
I’ve collected some tips and tricks from my colleagues on how to produce
quality work under pressure. I’m writing this essay right now against a ten-
minute timer, partly to keep me focused, and partly because I can perpetually
tell myself that if I just do ten minutes today, then I’ll have made some progress
and then I’ll be less reticent to keep going on it tomorrow. Much like a career
in stand-up, actually starting is half the battle.
I’ll try not to edit any part of it until I’ve fnished a draft, lest I get bogged
down in altering words or spelling mistakes when my goal should be to pour
out as many of my thoughts as possible, to achieve a state of fow, before I
inevitably grind back to a halt.
I never do any research for a joke mid-fow, as anything I might need is
on the internet, which is literally designed by people in labs to distract me. If
I need to think of the just-unusual-enough name of a small bird to improve
a punchline, that name will have to wait until later. Te alternative is that
suddenly my timer will beep and catch me 20 clicks deep into articles about
birds, nesting, plastic, climate change, Greta Tunberg and sou’westers, with
no work to show for it. Te “you” that zips along bursting with new ideas that
you can’t get down fast enough and the “you” that can’t believe you can ever
have another original thought cannot conceive of each other’s existence.
Flow is precious, but vulnerable, and distraction is death.
Rules like these are useful not only for the quality of the work, and for
getting it to exist in some plastic form in the frst place, but also for attempting
to maintain a happy life as a creative. I know very many comics who have to
continually “art” their way out of their anxiety and depression, and frankly I
get enough of that at home.
One of the most useful tips I ever learnt was adapted from a Cognitive
Behavioral Terapy technique. When writing, if you have an automatic self-
critical thought like “I’ve run out of ideas” or “Everything successful I wrote
before this moment was down to luck, and actually I’m a fraud and a hack,
a failure of an artist, no better than someone who watermarks other people’s
memes and passes them of,” then you simply underline “run out” or “fraud” in
the back of your exercise book and make one tally mark underneath it. Having
registered the negative thought, you’re free to move on and write, instead of
endlessly ruminating upon it. Tis also lets you maintain your precious fow –
when you’re in the zone, don’t stop for anything.
A peculiar thing about comedy is that we get to employ our creative tech-
niques not just in the writing-room, cofeeshop or gutter, but also live in front
of an audience. By far the most useful skill to develop as a comic is the ability
to “write onstage.” As well as some sort of artistic transcendence, this is also

thrillingly efcient, and perhaps a viable counterattack to the tentacles of
“Homework Forever.”
In the case of master-craftspeople like Dave Chappelle, this looks like a
performer completely unafraid of silence, working through their thoughts out
loud, teasing and probing the audience until they work their thumbs into the
perfect place in our soft tissue and we surrender the laugh. More frequently,
it’s a series of “new material” shows, where the presence of the audience means
that acts magically overreach the weakish punchline they thought of on the
journey to the gig and their “comic’s super-brain” (as described by UK comic
Marcus Brigstocke) kicks in to rewrite it on the fy.
You need them to be there! Just as you’ll tell a more natural and funnier
version of a mishap on your journey to work in front of a friend you’d like to
impress than you would after a hundred rewrites in an ofce, the eyes of the
crowd somehow activate your primal story-improver.
I’m not suggesting that every comic is better on the fy than when prepar-
ing their material, but that sometimes the perfect word that elevates a good bit
into a great bit can only be reached in the moment.
If that happens to you more than once, then it would make sense to try to
recreate those conditions elsewhere. If you’re an anecdotalist, you might have
more luck rifng up your stories in exactly the right bar with exactly the right
friend than typing them out. If you’re a one-liner act, then texting various
iterations of a new gag back and forth with someone similarly minded, might
be better than cudgeling your brains alone. Be intentional about every perfor-
mance or every sharing being an opportunity for new changes and variations.
Even if you’re insistent on writing your 20-minute set out longhand before
it sees a stage, you’ll still need a safe place in which to fail so that you can
refne the work. It isn’t uncommon to discover on frst telling that your perfect
punchline is met with silence, but the crowd is doubled over laughing at the
preamble you’d assumed was just a means of getting to the gag.
Comics the world over attend new material nights so that they can dis-
cover whether the new gear is actually good-quality. If sufciently famous,
they might need to appear unbilled so that the laughter of their super-fans
doesn’t produce a false positive result. It may also have something to do with
tax.
Leaning into this on tour, I perform an hour of my touring material frst,
then after an interval I frame the second half of the show as “scafolding.” Tis
is me messing about with scrappy, half-formed ideas read from index cards,
and improvised around, being very upfront about the fact that after this “scaf-
folding” has eventually fallen away, then the “rocket” can fy away, all shiny
and new, to impress a totally diferent group of “other people.”
Creative Efficiency 153
Distressingly, the second half is almost always funnier and more honest
than the hour of supposedly fnished material in the frst. Why wouldn’t it be?
I’m not following a script, I’m smashing the stuf together live, and wading
through the occasional lows makes the highs that much more enjoyable to
watch. Walking out onstage with ten index cards containing 20 half-ideas and
a decent closer has the super-brain vibrating at peak levels.
“Writing on stage” isn’t about trusting that a combination of luck and
blind panic will somehow do the job for you; or if it is, it isn’t just that.
Being able to re-direct your self-critical thoughts mid-performance is an
important part of any artist’s life, especially if the performance is also the
moment of creation. I’ve seen comics convince a tough crowd that they’re fan-
tastic simply by telling them so with confdence; I’ve seen others condemn
themselves to a silent grave by over-acknowledging their own mistakes.
Creativity fows when you tread a line between appropriate self-compas-
sion and just the right amount of crisis. If the problem is too great and your
creativity cannot overcome it in the moment, you shut down, you fop, you
bomb; every success story has a series of these undignifed collapses behind
it. Even the experts remain vulnerable to the occasional duf gig, otherwise
they’re counterfeiting risk and not truly embodying it. Te greats have simply
learnt to be comfortable being uncomfortable.
Comedians listen back to their gigs to spot the weaker material; some
even save time by looking at the waveform of their recording to identify the
quiet moments. Tere’s no reason at all why we can’t use the same diligence
to investigate when we’re at our most creative, recreate those conditions, and
make work not just faster, but more efcient.
Tere is no one way to be creatively efcient, but that doesn’t mean you
can’t cultivate your one way. Artists steal, tweak, embroider, and collage from
other people, other industries, and other disciplines. If you’re working with
others, whether in the workplace or classroom, encourage those around you
to play freely and to observe for themselves the moments when they most feel
the fow. Encourage them to be creative in their approach to their creativity!

Te Comedian’s Comedian podcast: www.comedianscomedian.com
CHAPTER 7
Creative Productivity
across the Life Span
Dean Keith Simonton
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ Almost two centuries of empirical research has frmly established the
relation between age and creative productivity.
¥¥ Most typically, creative output frst increases rapidly to a peak some-
where in the late thirties or early forties, and thereafter slowly declines.
¥¥ However, the specifc shape of this age curve depends on the specifc
domain of creativity. In some domains the peak comes early, while in
others the peak comes much later, with a much less drastic post-peak
decline.
¥¥ Researchers must distinguish between quantity and quality of output,
quantity representing pure productivity and quality representing actual
creativity. Tis distinction is manifested in the location of a creator’s
three career landmarks: the frst, best, and last major work.
¥¥ It is also important to recognize substantial individual diferences in
the career trajectory. Te most highly creative persons produce their
frst major work at a younger age than most, maintain a high rate of
output throughout their career, and produce their last major work at
an older age than most – and thus exhibit much longer careers than
“one-hit wonders.”
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-13 155

When did the scientifc study of creativity begin? What was the topic
addressed by that very frst investigation? Te answers to these two questions
are surprising. First, the scientifc study of creativity began with publication of
Quételet’s (1835/1968) A Treatise on Man and the Development of His Faculties.
Although this mathematician was most concerned with establishing the nor-
mal (bell-shaped) distribution in the social sciences, he was also interested in
intellectual development. Second, and in line with this latter interest, Quételet
conducted the very frst scientifc study of how creative productivity changes
across the life span – thus making the age–productivity relationship the oldest
topic in creativity research!
I have a long-term afection for this topic as well. In fact, the frst paper
I had accepted for publication concerned this very same question (Simonton,
1975). And I have continued publishing on this issue for the past 40 years (e.g.,
Simonton, 2015b). Nor am I the only creativity researcher so engaged. Many
other investigators have also tackled this topic (e.g., Dennis, 1966; Lehman,
1953; Raskin, 1936). Hence, this question has accumulated more than a cen-
tury of empirical research (Simonton, 1988, 2012). Better yet, the empirical
fndings are actually cumulative! Tat is, certain central results have been rep-
licated again and again. Accordingly, I can write this chapter knowing that
the same fndings will probably hold up for centuries to come. So what are
these robust results?
Empirical Findings
In this section, I provide an overview of the following results: (a) the typi-
cal age curve, (b) the interdisciplinary contrasts in that curve, (c) the place-
ment of three career landmarks, and (d) individual diferences in the career
trajectory.
The Typical Age Curve

Suppose we collect a sample of highly creative people in a given domain.
Ten we compile an inventory of all of the creative products and the ages in
which they created those products. Te products could be anything: scientifc
publications, patents, philosophical treatises, novels, plays, poems, paintings,
sculptures, architectural designs, flms, music compositions, etc. We then tab-
ulate the number of products created in each age period. Te result will come
very close to the age–productivity curve shown in Figure 7.1. On average, the
career will start in the twenties, exhibit a rapid rise to a peak where the output
rate maximizes, and thereafter a gradual decline sets in. Happily, the decline
Productivity across the Life Span 157
15
10
Productivity
0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Chronological Age
Figure 7.1 The typical relation between creative productivity and

chronological age (Simonton, 2012). This figure was created specially for
this chapter.
doesn’t usually go all the way to zero. Even an octogenarian creator can still be
generating creative ideas – such as Giuseppe Verdi, who composed his greatest
comic opera, Falstaf, when he was 80 years old. In fact, the expectation is that
the output rate at age 80 will still be about half that at age 40, when productiv-
ity maximizes. Older creators may be metaphorically “over the hill,” but they
haven’t yet reached the bottom of the hill. Indeed, their creativity compares
favorably with the young whippersnappers in the frst decade of their own
careers (Simonton, 2012).
It must be emphasized that the curve shown in Figure 7.1 represents only
a statistical average, an average computed across multiple creators. Like all
averages, any particular creative person may show exceptions on either side
of the curve. For instance, a recent study of the patents of Tomas Edison –
arguably the most prolifc inventor who ever lived – showed that he almost
ceased applying for patent protection in his mid-forties, when he should still
have been going strong (Simonton, 2015b). Te reason for this is that he ran
into problems with the enforcement of his patent rights, which led him to stop
applying for protection for a period. He still was producing the inventions, but
he was keeping them as trade secrets.
What happened to Edison was certainly idiosyncratic to him. Other

inventors of his day did not respond the same way. Nonetheless, other depar-
tures from the typical curve shown in Figure 7.1 are more systematic – shared
by many creators, rather than just one. An important example follows.
Interdisciplinary Contrasts
Creative disciplines can difer dramatically in the predicted age–produc-
tivity curve (Simonton, 2012). Some disciplines will tend to show a much ear-
lier peak and a much more precipitous decline. Other disciplines are prone to
display a much later peak, followed by a decline so minimal that it is often
difcult to speak of any age decrement at all. An example of the former are dis-
ciplines like lyric poetry and pure mathematics. It is no accident that one of the
most prestigious awards a mathematician can receive – the Fields Medal, often
called the “Nobel of Mathematics” – cannot be bestowed upon anybody whose
work appeared after age 40! Tus, poor Andrew Wiles, who was considered for
the Fields because of his breakthrough proof of Fermat’s Last Teorem, failed
to receive the award. A faw was found in his original demonstration which he
was not able to correct before he turned 41! It was probably disciplines like this
one that inspired Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to say, “if you haven’t cut your
name on the door of fame by the time you’ve reached 40, you might just as well
put up your jackknife” (quoted in Lehman, 1953a, pp. 185–186).
Even so, sometimes 40 is yet too old! Teoretical physics underwent two
major revolutions in the early part of the 20th century – the quantum and
relativity theories. Te physicists who participated in these developments were
so young that their work was sometimes referred to as Knabenphysiks, which is
German for “boys’ physics.” Tus, Albert Einstein, a conspicuous participant
in both revolutions, once said that a “person who has not yet made his great
contribution to science before the age of thirty will never do so” (quoted in
Brodetsky, 1942, p. 699). An even more dramatic statement was advanced by
Paul Dirac, who got the Nobel for his work in quantum theory:
Age is, of course, a fever chill

that every physicist must fear.
He’s better dead than living still
when once he’s past his thirtieth year.
(quoted in Jungk, 1958, p. 27)
Naturally, Einstein and Dirac did their revolutionary work before reach-
ing age 30: Both were 26 years old!
What about disciplines where the peak appears much later in life, and the
decline is more gentile, if not absent altogether? Te best examples are found
in the humanistic disciplines, such as history, philosophy, and other scholarly

domains (Simonton, 2012). Here, a premium is placed on the accumulation
of knowledge and even wisdom, which will likely take so much time that the
peak cannot appear until much later. One of the greatest philosophers in the
history of Western thought, Immanuel Kant, did not begin producing his
most original ideas until he was in his late ffties!
An economist has recently proposed that the career trajectories of crea-
tors can be divided into two types (Galenson, 2005). On the one hand are the
“young geniuses” (or “fnders”), who engage in conceptual creativity, arriving at
bold concepts early, applying them quickly, and then fading out fast. On the
other hand are the “old masters” (or “seekers”), who engage in experimental
creativity, learning gradually from experience, getting slowly better and bet-
ter until they attain their acme toward the very end of their careers. Among
artists, Pablo Picasso is said to be a conceptualist, Paul Cézanne an experi-
mentalist. Similarly, just as poets may be either conceptual or experimental in
orientation (e.g., T. S. Eliot versus Robert Frost), so may novelists follow either
path (e.g., F. Scott Fitzgerald versus Mark Twain; see Simonton, 2007b).
Te take-home message is that the curve shown in Figure 7.1 represents
our best guess for the career trajectory. If we know about the discipline and
the creator’s approach to creativity in that discipline, the curve can be more
precisely defned.
Career Landmarks
We have so far ignored a critical issue. Some early researchers defned
the age–productivity relation by tabulating every single work produced (e.g.,
Dennis, 1966), whereas others tended to count the truly great works (e.g.,
Lehman, 1953). Creative individuals will produce lots of creative products,
but not all are equally creative, and some might not be creative at all. Charles
Darwin put forward a theory of biological inheritance – his theory of pangen-
esis – that was an unmitigated disaster. Even a literary genius as great as
William Shakespeare could create inferior plays and poems (Simonton, 2009).
Among the plays, at the top stands Hamlet, at the low point is Timon of Athens,
which was created only about fve years later. Tus, rather than examine total
output, researchers can focus on “career landmarks” (Simonton, 1991a, 1991b,
1992, 1997; cf. Raskin, 1936; Zusne, 1976). Tese are major products that
together defne the beginning, peak, and termination of the most creative
period of a creator’s career. Tus, the frst career landmark is the age at which
creators produced their very frst signifcant work – signifcant in the sense
that the product continues to be considered a creative contribution to the dis-
cipline. Te last career landmark is the age at which creators produced their
very last signifcant work. Productivity may continue after that fnal work, but
those later works contribute nothing to the creator’s reputation. Between these
two landmarks is the age at which creators produce their single best work –
the creator’s masterpiece that essentially anchors their posthumous reputation.
For example, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the Fifth Symphony of
Ludwig van Beethoven, the work that begins with the famous duh-duh-duh-
dah theme indicating “fate knocking at the door,” represents his single most
high-impact work (Simonton, 2015a). Even people who have no interest what-
soever in classical music will recognize those four notes.
So our question now is how these three career landmarks relate to the
curve shown in Figure 7.1, assuming that that curve represents total produc-
tivity (quantity) rather than creativity (quality). Empirical research shows the
following (Simonton, 1991a, 1991b, 1997). First, and perhaps most obviously,
the middle career landmark, the single best work, tends to appear very close
to or a little after the peak for maximum output rate (cf. Sinatra et al., 2016).
Hence, given the curve in Figure 7.1, the optimal prediction is that the best
work would emerge in the early forties, on the average. For example, a study of
120 top classical composers found that the middle career landmark occurred
at age 40, which was very close to the peak for maximum output, namely,
39 years old (Simonton, 2016). In line with these statistics, Beethoven’s Fifth
Symphony was completed when he was 38 years old.
What about the remaining two landmarks – the frst and the last? Here,
the principle is not that diferent from what was said in the previous para-
graph: productivity infuences creativity. In the case of the frst landmark, the
faster creators accumulate products, regardless of quality, the sooner they will
fnally produce their frst truly notable work. By the same token, the more
prolifc creators are toward the end of their careers, the later will emerge their
last genuinely major work. Before the frst landmark, creators will contribute
juvenilia and other immature works, whereas after the last landmark, creators
will produce works that add nothing to their lifetime achievement. Probably
the last interval of the career is the most tragic. Einstein was selected “man of
the century” by Time magazine, yet people often forget that he devoted the last
part of his career to devising a unifed feld theory that was an ultimate failure.
Earlier, I pointed out that the curve in Figure 7.1 varies across disciplines.
Sometimes the acceleration to the peak is very fast and the post-peak decline
very rapid. Other times the peaks arrive much more slowly, and the age decre-
ment afterwards is much more modest. Given what was argued in the previous
two paragraphs, the developmental location of the three career landmarks must
refect the underlying curve for total output. Tis implication has been verifed
in empirical research (Simonton, 1997). An excellent example is found in a
study of more than 2,000 eminent scientists and inventors (Simonton, 1991a).
Te results are shown in Figure 7.2. No matter which career landmark we
Figure 7.2 Mean chronological ages for the three career landmarks for
eight disciplines of scientific and technological achievement. The fig-
ure is based on data reported in Simonton (1991a), but the graph itself
is reproduced from Simonton (2004). A contribution was defined as a
discovery or invention that had a lasting impact on the history of the
discipline.
examine, substantial interdisciplinary contrasts are found. Hence, for math-

ematicians, the frst major work tends to appear around age 27, whereas for
medicine, that career landmark does not emerge until around age 32 – a fve-
year diference. With respect to the second career landmark, the best work,
the chemists summit earliest, with an expected peak at 38, while for the geo-
sciences this career landmark appears about fve years later, at age 43. Lastly, in
the case of the last career landmark, the chemists appear to run out of steam the
earliest, with an average of 51 years of age, but in the geosciences the last major
work does not appear until around age 58 – a seven-year diference.
All told, it is not even possible to make predictions about when creators
will produce their frst, best, and last major contribution without frst knowing
the discipline in which they are creating.
Individual Differences
In the previous subsection, I introduced the concept of the three career
landmarks and showed how the developmental placement of these landmarks
is contingent on the creative discipline. It turns out that even more compli-
cations must be introduced. Tese complexities all result from individual
diferences among creators rather than interdisciplinary contrasts. Two are
especially important (Simonton, 2012).
First, creative individuals vary immensely in lifetime creative produc-
tivity. Te most prolifc will produce dozens, even hundreds, of works over
the course of their careers, a large number of these counting as masterpieces,
whereas the least prolifc will more often stake their fame on a single work.
Te latter are the so-called “one-hit wonders” (Kozbelt, 2008). How does this
variation in output afect the developmental location of the three career land-
marks? In the case of the middle landmark, the age at production of best work,
the response is easy: Tere’s no substantial diference. On average, if the best
work appears at 40 for the most prolifc, it will most likely appear at 40 for
the least prolifc. Yet it gets more interesting for the frst and last landmarks
(Simonton, 1991a, 1991b, 1997). For the most prolifc creators, the frst career
landmark occurs much earlier and the last career landmark occurs much later
– lengthening the total time when they are making creative contributions. For
the least productive creators, the frst career landmark appears much later and
the last career landmark appears much earlier. Indeed, in the extreme case of
the one-hit wonders, the frst, middle, and last major contribution are one and
the same work! All three landmarks take place at the same age.
Second, creators can vary in the age at which they start producing works,
whether creative or not (Simonton, 1991a, 1997). Tat is, some are early
bloomers, who got an early start, and others are late bloomers, who got a
late start. One of the main reasons for this variation is that creators difer
regarding when they discover their creative domain. Te composer Wolfgang
Amadeus Mozart might have launched his career as a musical prodigy, already
composing as a child, but other creators get a much later start. Grandma
Moses, the famous folk artist, waited until her late seventies before she began
her career as a serious painter. Happily for her, she lived until she was 101, so
she could still have a career as long as Mozart’s, who died in his mid-thirties.
Moreover, because the trajectory for creative productivity is actually a function
of career age rather than chronological age, creators who get a late start will
have the peak of their career shifted to later years. For example, the composer
Anton Bruckner didn’t dedicate himself to writing symphonies until he was
in his forties, which meant that his frst career landmark did not emerge until
his early ffties, and his greatest symphonies did not appear until he was in
his sixties. Bruckner was still going strong when he died at age 72, leaving
an unfnished Ninth Symphony that, by default, must be considered his last

career landmark.
Signifcantly, the above pair of individual diferences not only operate
independently of each other, but also independently of the interdisciplinary
contrasts discussed earlier. For instance, lyric poets generally start producing
at a young age, but not all do, and regardless of the age at career onset, some
poets may be far more prolifc than others who are closer to one-hit wonders.
We are thus led to a fnely diferentiated picture of alternative career trajec-
tories. To illustrate, Figure 7.3 shows the fourfold typology that results if we
hold the discipline constant (i.e., all creators are active in the same discipline
so that only the two individual diference variables operate).
Figure 7.3 Fourfold typology of career trajectories and landmarks based

on the distinctions between high- and low-creative and between early
and late bloomers. The predicted locations of the three career landmarks
are indicated by letters, where f = first major contribution, b = best con-
tribution, and l = last major contribution. The figure is reproduced from
Simonton (2002).
On the left side of the fgure appear two curves for highly prolifc creators,
the top graph showing the curve for early bloomers who start productivity
at age 20, the bottom graph showing the curve for late bloomers who start
productivity at age 30. Here, the frst (f), best (b), and last (l) career land-
marks have about the same separation regardless of when creative productivity
began. In either case, the best work appears about a decade after the frst major
work, and the last major work appears more than two decades after the best
work. On the right side, we again see two graphs representing early versus
late bloomers, but this time the creators are assumed to be less prolifc. As a
consequence, the three landmarks are more scrunched together. As mentioned
earlier, in the extreme case of the one-hit wonders, the three landmarks would
collapse into a single developmental event.
It should be manifest by now that if the fourfold typology is combined
with interdisciplinary contrasts, we obtain an even more refned conception
of possible trajectories for creative productivity across the life span. Indeed,
this framework has been converted into a complex mathematical model that
makes specifc predictions regarding the developmental placement of the
three landmarks as a function of discipline, productivity, and age at career
onset (Simonton, 1991a, 1997). Tese predictions have been confrmed for
both artistic and scientifc creators (Simonton, 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 2007a).
Conclusion
As might be expected for a topic that has attracted empirical research
since 1835, we know a great deal about how creative productivity changes
across the life span. Furthermore, this brief chapter could only touch upon the
main points (cf. Simonton, 2012). Hence, you should consider this chapter a
mere introduction to a topic enjoying great intrinsic interest and importance.
Although I have placed the most emphasis on the scientifc fndings, it’s
worth noting that these results are not without practical applications. Such
applications operate at diferent levels – the societal and the individual.
At the societal level, many institutions, educational and otherwise, exhibit
biases about the relation between age and creativity that provide the basis for
prejudice and discrimination. For example, when I applied to graduate school,
some applications explicitly asserted that nobody would be admitted who was
40 or over. Even when this ageist bias is no longer explicit, it’s likely to remain
implicit in admissions to this day – operating under the false assumption that
such an applicant would already be “over the hill” before even fnishing the
graduate program. Yet, as seen earlier, nothing prevents someone from becom-
ing a late bloomer who attains their career peak much later in life. After all,
the curves are primarily a function of career age, not chronological age. An
even more unfortunate manifestation of ageism operates at the other end of
the career course, when mandatory retirement forces creative individuals to
lose the resources necessary to continue their creativity (Stroebe, 2010). Yet,
as has also been shown, late-career output is a function of many factors that
can enable even elders to exhibit creativity comparable to younger members
of their domain. Indeed, as is evident in Figure 7.3, highly creative persons in
the latter part of their careers can exceed less-creative persons at the peak of
their careers.
At the individual level, the results graphed in Figures 7.1–7.3 provide the
baseline expectations for alternative career trajectories, such as early versus
late bloomers or scientists working in diferent disciplines. When might you
expect to have your frst success? At what age would you produce your best
work? How old could you be when your creativity runs dry? At the same time,
it must be recognized that these graphs represent only statistical averages
which allow for considerable variation around the expectation. For instance,
as noted earlier, eminent chemists tend to generate their last major contribu-
tion at the youngest age of all scientifc disciplines, with an average of 51 years
old (Simonton, 1991b). Yet the range around that mean is substantial, from
age 22 to age 102 – fully 80 years! Tis range partly refects the fact that some
chemists may bloom early and others late, but it also results from the fact that
those chemists who maintain prolifc output into old age are more likely to
produce their last major work at an older age as well (see Figure 7.3). In fact,
sometimes the individual can get a secondary burst of output that results in a
small but noticeable secondary peak late in life (Haefele, 1962).
For my part, I have found the research on this question ever more fasci-
nating as I fnd myself slowly sliding down the post-peak portion of the age
curve! Fortunately, I know I haven’t yet hit the zero point. Otherwise, this
chapter would not have been written!
Thought Questions
1. Do you have a favorite creative interest, such as music, art, or flm?
Can you identify the major creators in that domain? Assuming they
have already produced their frst major work – how else would you
know about them? – who do you think has already produced their
best single work? Is there anybody you believe is already past their last
major work? Are there any one-hit wonders?
2. Some recent research suggests that the post-peak decline seen in
Figure 7.1 has become less pronounced for recent creators, especially
in the sciences (Stroebe, 2010). What do you think might account

for this change? How might scientists today be able to maintain their
creative productivity at higher output rates than was true in previous
centuries?
3. Sometimes, the age decrement seen in the latter part of the career has
been used to argue for forced early retirement. Out with the old, and
in with the young! Do you think this argument is justifed by the facts
presented in this chapter? What factors must be considered to make
such an argument?
4. Although Figure 7.1 was specifcally devised to predict how creative
productivity changes across the life span, it is possible that it might
apply to other achievement domains as well. Possibilities include poli-
tics, business, sports, music performance, and chess. What alterations
in the fgure would have to be made to make it useful for one of these
domains?

Jones, B. F., Reedy, E. J., & Weinberg, B. A. (2014). Age and scientifc genius.
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HOT TOPIC 6
Development
of Creativity
Different Phases for
Different Ages
Sandra W. Russ
Key Take-Aways
¥¥ Te development and expression of creativity take diferent forms at
diferent stages of the life course.
¥¥ Childhood and adolescence are times for the development of creative
processes within the individual that set the stage for adult creativity.
¥¥ Adulthood is a time for creative production in one’s chosen domain.
¥¥ Later life and retirement are times for using one’s creativity to meet the
challenges of aging and to enhance pleasure through creative activities.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003233923-14 169

How Does Creativity Begin? How Does It Develop? How Can We

Help It Develop?
What happens to the creativity we observe in children? Will a creative
child become a creative adult who contributes to a feld? What helps an adult
fulfll their creative potential? Tese are difcult questions to answer because
there are so many variables that determine one’s life course. However, there
is a consensus among creativity researchers about the abilities and processes
within the individual that enable creative expression and production of cre-
ative works. Tese creative abilities and characteristics are similar for both
children and adults. Terefore, if we can help a child develop their creative
processes, these abilities should continue into adulthood.
Te development of creativity and the expression of creativity take difer-
ent forms throughout the life course. Te development of the underlying pro-
cesses that contribute to creativity occurs in childhood and into the adolescent
years. Tese years are especially important for setting the stage for creative
production in adulthood. In adulthood, there is a shift from developing crea-
tive processes to expressing creativity in work. Creativity in the workplace is
dependent upon the climate in that setting as well as individual diferences
in creative processes. In later life, after retirement, there is again a shift from
expressing creativity in one’s chosen profession to meeting life’s challenges
and using creative expression to enhance pleasure in daily life.
Creative Potential in Children

Tere are a number of creative processes that enable an individual to gen-
erate an original product that contributes to a feld. Tese cognitive, afec-
tive, and personality processes emerge and develop in childhood. Creativity
researchers agree that some important abilities for creativity include divergent
thinking (ability to generate a variety of ideas), broad associations, cognitive
fexibility in general, capacity to switch between wandering thoughts and crit-
ical thinking, access to afect in memories and thoughts, positive emotion, and
openness to experience (for a review, see Russ, 2014).
Tese abilities are developed during the early years, from three to ten years
of age. Children must learn to balance creative thinking with the conventional
demands of parents, schools, and society. Creative production is the crea-
tion of a product that is original, of good quality, and appropriate to the task
(Sternberg et al., 2002). Creative processes within the individual that con-
tribute to creative production are cognitive processes, afective processes, and
personality processes. Cognitive processes such as divergent thinking, cogni-
tive fexibility, recombining of images and memories, remote associations, and
Development of Creativity 171
insight abilities are examples of cognitive processes associated with creativity

(Runco, 2007). Afective components such as openness to positive and nega-
tive afect and afect-laden ideation and memories are also associated with
creativity, as is intrinsic motivation (Russ, 2014). Openness to experience is
a key personality process associated with creativity. All of these processes are
components of creativity that are present and can be measured in children.
Much of the research on creativity in children has focused on the funda-
mental component of divergent thinking. Divergent thinking is a valid indica-
tor of creative potential. Divergent thinking is the ability to generate a variety
of ideas or solutions to a problem. Guilford (1950) identifed divergent thinking
as being unique to creative thinking. Divergent thinking is thinking that goes
of in diferent directions. Research on divergent thinking has found associa-
tions with a number of creativity measures in children. For example, children
who were good divergent thinkers told more creative stories (Fehr & Russ,
2016). In addition, divergent thinking ability is relatively stable throughout
childhood (Runco, 2007) and is predictive of adult creativity (Plucker, 1999).
By observing and measuring creative processes in children, we can learn
about the developmental trajectory of each and the moderating variables that
efect their development. (Barbot et al., 2016). Much of the research on the
developmental trajectory of divergent thinking has found contradictory results.
Moderators such as type of task and culture are factors to take into account.
A single clear developmental trajectory does not emerge. Rather, results are
mixed, with some studies fnding evidence for a fourth grade slump, others
fnding evidence for a seventh grade slump, and others fnding a mini-plateau
occurring around fourth grade. Moderators account for the diferences in
these studies. Values and customs held by the families that make up the sam-
ples and those held by the particular school, classroom, and teacher oversee-
ing the students’ development shape the child’s approach to problem-fnding,
problem-solving, collaboration, innovation, and risk-taking (for a review, see
Lee & Russ, in press).
In addition, diferent child populations may have diferent developmental
trajectories of creative processes. For example, gifted and talented children do
not show a slump in divergent thinking (Subotnik et al., in press).
Pretend Play
Pretend play is a common form of creative activity during these early
years that includes many of the components of creativity. In pretend play,
where children make things up from scratch, transform objects such as
LEGO bricks into rocket ships and people, and act out stories with emo-
tion and fantasy, we can observe the fundamental components of creativity.
Pretend play occurs in various forms from the age of two through the ages of
nine or ten. Pretend play is the expression self-generated thought, so impor-

tant in creative production. Te child is generating ideas, using objects to
represent diferent things, using symbolism and imagination, and organizing
ideas into a narrative that makes sense. Afect is frequently involved in the
imagery, and the story and needs to be integrated into the play. Te child goes
back and forth between spontaneous idea generation and more controlled
logic of the story. In addition, for most children, having fun and experienc-
ing joy as well as deep immersion in the activity is part of the play experi-
ence. Pretend play ability is associated with creativity in other creativity tasks
in many research studies. For example, preschool children and elementary
school children who have more imagination and emotion expressed in pre-
tend play have higher divergent thinking scores, tell more creative stories,
and can think of more ways to cope with problems in everyday life (Fehr &
Russ, 2016; Russ, 2014; Russ & Schafer, 2006). A key question is whether
engaging in pretend play actually helps creativity develop in the child. Tere
have been a few well-controlled studies with children that have found that
engaging in pretend play fosters aspects of creative thinking (Hofmann &
Russ, 2016; Tibodeau et al., 2016). Ideally, we would have short guided play
sessions in the classroom several times a week to encourage children to use
their imagination in play.
Tere have been a number of observations of the development of children’s
play, and a few research studies. Te general conclusion is that children’s play
becomes more complex with age. Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkof (2003) concluded
that the type of play varies as a function of age. From three to nine months,
children explore and try to ft novel objects into their world. Until two years of
age, children learn the typical use of common objects. Around two years, the
ability to pretend starts to develop. Objects can represent something else and
can be used in a way diferent from the usual way. For example, a banana can
be a telephone. At age three and four, children begin to think symbolically.
Objects can represent other objects. A red block can be a fretruck.
Tere have not been many studies that have investigated the progression
of pretend play or of the components of pretend play. Tompson and Goldstein
(2019), in a review of the literature, concluded that pretend play develops in
complexity with age. Tey stressed the need for studying the progression of
sub-components of pretend play. Tey proposed that sub-components should
follow a developmental progression, such as object substitution, attribution
of pretend properties, social interactions within pretend, role enactment, and
pretense-related meta-communication. Tey also called for the use of stand-
ardized play measures in diferent studies.
Delvecchio et al. (2016) carried out a large study of 300 Italian children
aged four to nine years. Tey used the Afect in Play Scale-Preschool version
(APS-P; Kaugars & Russ, 2009), with minor adaptations for the older chil-
dren. Tey found that older children had more organized play with a more
sophisticated plot, a more complex story, more novelty, and use of fantasy ele-
ments outside of daily experience. Tey also found more frequency of and more
variety of afect expression in the narrative in older children. When looking
at the factor structure of the play, they found a similar two-factor model, one
cognitive and one afective, with younger and older children. Tis two-factor
model is similar to those of Russ (2014) with smaller samples. Tese fndings
are important because even though pretend play becomes more complex with
age, the factor structure of components of play remains the same. In addition,
as we saw in the review of play and creativity, individual diferences in pretend
play are associated with measures of creativity in both preschool and elemen-
tary school children.
Marcelo (2016) carried out a longitudinal study with 250 children in a
racially diverse US sample. She administered the APS-P to children at four,
six, and eight years of age. Her results were similar to the cross-sectional study
of Delvecchio et al. (2016). Te older eight--year-olds had better imagination
and organization of the story and more complexity than they had when they
were younger. However, the afect expression in play did not increase with age.
In the Italian sample, afect did increase with age. It is possible that cultural
diferences accounted for this fnding. Marcelo also found a similar two-factor
structure across childhood for both boys and girls and across race/ethnicity.
Tere was a cognitive factor and an afective factor. Marcelo concluded that
the same play constructs are captured by the APS-P over time across gender,
race/ethnicity, and poverty status.
Recommendations for Teachers and Parents

Lee and Russ (in press) recommend the following for fostering creativity
in children:
¥¥ Encourage exploration of diferent domains of activities so the child
can fnd what areas they are interested in, enjoy, and in which they
have some talent. Elementary school should be a time for exploration.
¥¥ Encourage pretend play if that is an activity the child enjoys.
¥¥ Foster an environment in which the child feels safe expressing uncon-
ventional ideas, in school and at home.

¥¥ Reinforce and enjoy acts of everyday creativity.
¥¥ Help children develop a variety of processes important in creativity.
¥¥ Find ways to help the child deal with failure.
¥¥ Be sensitive to the developmental level of the child within a domain.
Keep in mind principles of optimal challenge and frustration.

¥¥ Research should focus on child-rearing practices and classroom envi-

ronments that facilitate the development of creativity in children.
¥¥ Longitudinal research is especially important in understanding the all
of the processes involved in the development of creativity.
Tere are a number of safe venues where children can be free to express
themselves in nonconventional ways. Pretend play, theater, videogames, art,
and music are all safe areas where children can experiment and engage in free
associations. Children who participate in these activities are, in essence, prac-
ticing with creative thought. Tey are also experiencing the joy and pleasure
involved in creative work, Hopefully, these joyful experiences will motivate
children to continue engaging in creative activities as adults.
Creativity in Adolescents
Many of the processes that develop during childhood continue to develop
in adolescence. Adolescence should be a time of trying new things and experi-
menting with diferent activities and discovering one’s talents. Adolescents
begin to specialize in their creative pursuits, be they music, science, engineer-
ing, art, sports, or forms of fction. Baer (2016) has stressed the importance of
domain-specifcity in creativity. Tat is, one develops creative ability in specifc
domains of music, art, science, etc. Diferent domains require diferent crea-
tive processes and training, and practice should develop within the domain.
Kleibeuker et al. (2016) found diferent developmental trajectories for
insight, verbal divergent thinking, and visuospatial divergent thinking dur-
ing adolescence. Tey reviewed the neurological changes during this period
that focus on novelty and adaptation. Hofmann and Hills (in press) stress
the importance of the adolescent period as a time of susceptibility to train-
ing efects. Tey point out that schools should take advantage of this critical
period to foster creative abilities.
Creativity in Adults
Adulthood involves a focus on work and career. Pro-c includes creative
acts that follow years of immersion in a feld that then makes a contribution to
a domain (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009), therefore making it a focus of adult
creativity. In some instances, the contribution might be major big-C creativity.
In order to make a signifcant contribution to a domain, one must frst
master the knowledge base in that domain. A painter needs to know the basics
of painting and then refne them to become an expert. A scientist must know
the content and methods of the feld before true creative work can occur. Ten,
it is important to go deeply into the area. Rocke (2010) discussed the impor-
tance of deep immersion in a scientifc feld, which enables new combinations
of ideas to emerge. Gruber (1981), in his study of creative people, theorized
that a deep understanding of a domain enabled multiple perspectives to be
considered and a re-combining of ideas that resulted in creative work.
Many research studies have explored techniques to facilitate creativity in
adults and workplace climates that foster creativity. For a review of the com-
plexity of the interaction of variables within an organization that infuence
creativity, see Reiter-Palmon (in press).
Creativity also occurs in everyday life. Karwowski and Wisniewska (in
press) present a framework for creativity in adulthood that includes crea-
tive adaptations to challenges of adulthood. Tey speak of the developmen-
tal changes that occur during diferent phases of adulthood, and the need to
transform the environment and also the self. Not only is creative problem-
solving necessary for meeting the challenges of daily life, but the creative
identity of the self is transformed. Tey state that the creative life path begins
in childhood. Children must meet many developmental challenges and face
these developmental milestones with creative problem-solving and also with
internal change and maturation. Creative acts and meeting developmental
challenges shape an identity and contribute to self-development.
Creativity in Later Life

Kahana et al. (in press) suggest that in later life, it is the expression of
creativity that is important, rather than the development of creativity or pro-
duction of creative products. Tey discuss creative expression in diferent ven-
ues (art, music, fower arranging) that is related to well-being in older adults.
Finding areas of expression is important for the well-being of the older indi-
vidual – for example, returning to an earlier hobby or talent in which the indi-
vidual found joy as young person or developing a new talent such as learning
to play the guitar. Life after retirement is an opportunity to explore both new
and old areas of expression.
Kahana et al. (in press) also stress that aging requires creative problem-
solving. Tere are many physical and emotional challenges that require adap-
tation and problem-solving. An older person who is fexible and can generate
solutions to problems should be resilient in dealing with these challenges.
Creative problem-solving in everyday life becomes essential for all of us as we
move into senior years.

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76 Creativity and Innovation

How Can We Apply This to Education?

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gifted. Roeper Review, 17(3), 197. https://doi-org.libproxy.utdallas.edu/10

Examining the malleability of creative mindsets. Psychology of Aesthetics,

Renzulli, J. S., Koehler, J. L., & Fogarty, E. A. (2006). Operation Houndstooth

mental illness. It is difcult, if not impossible, to diagnose mental illness long

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combining dissimilar ideas/concepts, but it does make it more difcult

Te creative process has been of longstanding interest to psychologists and

a problematic situation and have to go beyond what we already know, we have

imagery (Finke, 1986), which he then adapted to study creative imagery.

they are working on visually (e.g., Kekule imagining molecular structure as a

Mental Set and Design Fixation

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quality. So the need to integrate discrepant pieces of information provided

Analogy and Creativity

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Wiley, J. (1998) Expertise as mental set: Te efects of domain knowledge in

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In 2017, Mark Zuckerberg gave the commencement address at Harvard

Why Are Insight Moments of

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Teaching for high-stakes creativity in Digital Media Design is a chal-

¥¥ Te infuence of audience inside a classroom environment

¥¥ Using the 4C framework to appreciate diferent views of creativity.

Digital Media Design

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environment bursting with creativity. To refne an hour worthy of actual per-

to “write onstage.” As well as some sort of artistic transcendence, this is also

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The Typical Age Curve