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False Memory

Chapter · January 2010

DOI: 10.1002/0470018860.s00536

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Cara Laney Elizabeth F Loftus

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 Falsememory
CaraLaneyandElizabeth
F.Loftus

Themalleability
of memory
Human memory can hold an amazingamount of information, but it is far
morethan a merestoragedevicefor recordsof experiences. Memoryis a setof
dynamicprocesses. Theseprocesses work very well most of the time, but are
also susceptibleto distortion (see Schacter2001). In particular,they are
susceptibleto externalsuggestions. Thesesuggestionscan take many forms,
including post-eventinformation like leadingquestions(Loftus and Palmer
1974)and conversations with co-witnesses (Wright,Selfand Justice,2000). In
somecases, suggestionscanevenleadpeopleto remembercomplete,detailed
eventsthat neverhappened(Loftusand Pickrell1995).
Although appealingasa metaphor,memorydoesnot actuallyfunction like
'tape'
a video recorder. There is no accuratebit of that we can find by
rewinding our minds to the right point in time. Rather,to remembersome-
thing - evenan eventfrom one'sown personalpast - one must engagein a
processof reconstruction,of putting togetherdifferent tracesto createa new
memory. Someof thesetracescontain unique bits of the original event,but
other tracesreflectassumptionsabouthow things areor were,or information
learnedsincethe eventtook place.
The'misinformationeffect'occurswhenmisleadinginformationpresented
after an eventis incorporatedinto an individual'smemory for the event(see
Davis and Loftus 2006;Loftus 2005).In studiesof the misinformation effect,
subjectswitnessan eventlike a mock crime or stagedvideo,and then a subset
of subjectsareexposedto misleadinginformation in the form of a narrativeor
conversation with a'co-witness' (who actually saw a slightly different event).
At a subsequentmemorytest,the misledsubjects'memoriesarelessaccurate
event(e.g.Loftus,
than controlsubjects'memoriesfor the originallywitnessed
Miller and Burns L978; Loftus and Palmer 1974; Takarang1 Parker and
Garry 2006;Wright et a\.2000).In thesestudiessubjectshaveremembered
ffi caraLaney
andElizabeth
F.Loftus

stop signs as yield signs, the Eiffel Tower as the Leaning Tower of Pisa,
unmade beds as made, and criminal accomplicesor broken glassthat were
not there at all. These studies are particularly relevant to real-world eye-
witnessesbecausethere is substantialevidencethat real eyewitnesses are likely
to talk to one another (e.g.Patersonand Kemp 2006),and that police officers
and lawyersdo ask leadingquestions(e.g.Powell,Fisherand Wright 2005).
In a relatedline of work employing the Deese-Roediger-McDermottpara-
digm (afterDeeseL959;Roedigerand McDermott l996),subjectslearn lists of
words that are all related to a critical, but not presented,word. For example,
the list might include words like'nap', 'bed', 'pillow', and'snooze',but not the
'sleep'.
critical word When subjectsare subsequentlytestedfor words from the
list, they are aslikely to rememberthe word 'sleep'as part of the list aswords
that were actually present.That is, they predictably, but falsely,remember the
critical word.

W8

The'recovered
memory'
debate
In spite of researchshowing that memory can be malleable,many clinicians
and some researchersseemto believethat some Qpes of memory are com-
pletely immune to distortion. They claim that some memories - particularly
memories for traumatic eventslike child sexual abuse- can be buried in the
subconsciousfor years or even decadesand then spring to consciousness,
untouched by time (e.g.Brown, Scheflinand Hammond 1998;Herman and
Schatzow1987;Terr 1991;seePoole et al. L995 for statisticsregarding the
commonness of these beliefs among therapists). That is, these traumatic
'repressed'
events can be when they are too painful to deal with and then
'recovered'
later, when remembering will be helpfi.rl rather than harmfi.rl.
'repression'
Though was a concept popularized by Freud (I5961L962) as
'seduction
part of his tfueory' (and though Freud himself later rejected this
theory), the idea is still hotly debatedtoday (e.g. Smith and Gleaves2006;
Takarangiet a\.2008).
Proponentsof memory repressionand recoveryarguethat demonstrat-
ing that memories for often trivial events can be changed saysvery little
about the accuracyof traumatic and personallyrelevantmemories.But as
we shall show, even traumatic memories are subjectto distortion. Before
describing this work, we explore arguments made by some clinicians for
the specialnessof traumatic memories, and their use of repressionas an
explanation.
ffi memory
2.6False

Terr (1991)arguedthat repeatedtraumaslike recurringchild sexualabuse

are likely to produce repressionbecauseabusedchildren develop skills that
allow them to dissociatefrom their experiencesof abuse.More recently,Freyd
(1996) added that this dissociativeresponseis particularly likely when the
perpetrator of the abuseis someoneon whom the abusevictim dependsfor
'betrayaltrauma', and argued
his or her survival.Ft"yd calledthis phenomenon
'is
that repression a natural and inevitable.reactionto childhood sexualabuse'
(Freyd t9g6,p. ). (SeeMcNally 2007for a thorough refutation of theseclaims.)
What is the evidencefor thesebeliefs about memory repression?Some
authorshaveclaimed that there are more than sixty studiesdemonstratingthe
validity of massiverepressionand recovery(seefor example,Brown, Scheflin
and Whitfield 1999).The majority of thesestudiesare retrospectivein nature.
They aska group of peoplewho saythat they were sexuallyabusedaschildren
whether there was a time in their lives when they did not rememberthe abuse.
For example,Briere and Conte (1993) asked a group of 450 patients, all
currently in treatment for child sexual abuse,whether there was a time in
their childhoods that they could not remembertheir abuse.A majority of
subjectsreplied affirmatively. While numerouswriters have usedthis result as
evidence for memory repression and recovery in no way is the finding
compelling proof of such cognitive mechanisms.In particular, for an affirma-
tive responseto this question to be evidenceof repression and recovery, it
would haveto mean that the personhad tried and failed to remember abuseat
some point in his or her past, and could remember that past attempted
remembering.But why would the person have tried to remember the abuse,
unlesshe or she alreadyknew that there had been abuse?And if the person
knew that there had been abuse,then how can he or shebe said to have fully
'Further reading') for a more
repressedit? See McNally (2003; listed in
thorough analysisof the misuseof thesestudies.
A few studies use prospective methodologies to provide evidence for
repression.One classicexampleis that of Williams (1994).Williams found a
group of 129 women that she knew had been abused(seventeenyearspre-
viously) - becauseshe had accessto hospital records documenting the
reported abuse. She interviewed these women and found that 49 of them
(38%) failed to report the specificdocumented caseof abuse' even when
questionedspecificallyabout sexual abuse.These results have been taken as
evidencethat these women - and many more like them - had successfully
repressedtheir memoriesof the abuse.But there are far more parsimonious
explanationsfor this 38olonon-reporting rate. For example, some of the
interviewedwomen had been as young as 10 months old when the specific
ffi caraLaney
andElizabeth
F'Loftus

instance of abuse occurred, so they should not be expectedto remember

anlthing from that period. In addition, 68%oof the women who 'forgot' the
specific caseof abuse nonethelessreported other instancesof abuse,which
suggeststhat the documented instance of abuse (which was often fondling)
mayhave simplybeen lessmemorablethan other, more traumatic instancesof
abuse. Finally, many of these women may have failed to report the abuse
becausethey did not want to be labelledas abused.As such,we arguethat the
38% of women who failed to report abusein Williams' study did not necessa-
rily represstheir memories for the abuse (and indeed, they did not even
necessarilyforget the abuse);instead,they simply failed to report the abuse.
Failureto discloseis not evidenceof repression(seeFemina,Yeagerand Lewis
1990).Failure to think about an event, and even failure to remember an event
do not constitute evidenceof repression;rather, other mechanisms,including
ordinary forgetting,provideperfectlyadequateexplanations(e.g.McNally 2003,
2007;Takarangiet a\.2008).Thereis alsoevidencethat peoplewith purported
recoveredmemoriesare more susceptible to memorydistortionin the Deese-
Roediger-McDermottparadigmdescribedabove (e.g.Geraertset al. 2A05).
Finally,it is worth noting that in a conceptualreplicationof Williams' study,
Goodmanet aI. (2003)found a much lowernon-disclosure rateof iust 8%.

ffi@

memories
False forbenign
andtraumatic
events
So, if these memories for traumatic events like sexual abusehave not actually
been repressedand recovered,then where have they come from? There is now
more than a decade'sworth of researchshowing that it is possibleto implant
wholly falsememoriesinto people'sminds. The first such study usedinforma-
tion collectedfrom subjects'parents.Subjectswere presentedwith three true
childhood events,and one mildly traumatic false evenl being lost in a shop-
ping mall (Loftus and Pickrell 1995). Over three interviews, approximately
25o/oof subjectscame to believethat they had indeed been lost in a mall as
young children, though their parents specificallydisconfirmed this. Subse-
quent studies using similar manipulations have convinced people that they
had unlikelyexperienceslike spillingpunchon the bride'sparentsat a family
wedding and potentially traumatic experienceslike being hospitalizedover-
night, being attackedby a dog, or having a seriousindoor or outdoor accident
(Hyman, Husband and Billings 1995;Porter, Yuille and Lehman 1999).The
false memories produced in these studies can be detailed, emotional, con-
sequentialand confidently held (seeLoftus and Bernstein2005).
 2.0Fatse
memory
W

Many r.r.ur.h.rs haveexplicitly soughtto replicatethe techniquestisedby

'memory recovery work' when implanting false
therapistsspecializingin
memories.For example,Scoboriaand colleagues (2002)found that subjects
weremoresusceptible to misleadinginformationwhenhypnotized.Garryand
colleagues (1996)useda guidedimaginationtechniqueto increasesubjects'
confidencein a variety of childhoodevents.Mazzoniand colleagues(1999)
useda dream interpretation paradigm to get subjectsto falselybelievethat
they had beenlost asyoung children.
In the last few years,researchershavedevelopedseveraladditional creative
proceduresfor implantingfalsememories.Wadeand colleagues (2002)digi-
tally manipulatedchildhood photos to convincetheir subjectsthat they had
beenon hot air balloonridesaschildren.Lindsayand colleagues (2004)used
genuinechildhoodclassphotosto lend credibilityto a contemporaneous false
'slimed'a teacher'sdeskand got into trouble for it.
event,that subjectshad
Braunand colleagues (2002)usedmock advertisements to convincesubjects
that they had interactedwith Bugs Bunny at Disneyland - an impossible
event, as Bugs is a Warner Brothers character,and thus would never be
encounteredat a Disneythemepark. Bernsteinand colleagues(2005)used
falsecomputer feedbackto convincesubjectsthat they had becomeill after
eating dill pickles or hard-boiled eggs as children, and found that they
reportedlessdesireto eat the offendingfoodsnow. Seamonand colleagues
(2006)took subjectson a walk aroundcampusand had them perform some
tasks,watch experimentersperform some tasks, and imagine performing
some tasks.Two weeks later, subjectsrememberedperforming tasks that
they had only imagined performing, including, incredibly, proposing mar-
rrageto a Pepsimachine.

Conclusion
Someauthors arguethat falsememoriescreatedin the sterility and ethical
limitations of a researchlaboratory setting are insufficiently similar to the
highly emotionalcircumstances reflectedin recoveredmemoriesof abuse.Yet
thereis evidenceto suggestthat peoplecanbevery emotionalaboutmemories
that mustbe false.McNally and colleagues (200+)measuredthe physiological
responses of a groupof peoplewhosetraumaticmemoriesarealmostcertainly
'abductees'.They found that these individuals were as
false:spacealien
emotionalabout their abductionmemoriesasthey were about genuinetrau-
mas in their lives.
 GaraLaneyandElizabeth
F.Lottus
W

At the broadestlevels,falsememoryresearchtells us that evenemotional,

detailed, meaningful and confidently held memories may not accurately
reflectreality.

FURTHERREADING
ffi

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McNally,R.J.(2003)Remembering Trauma.Cambridge,MA: Universityof HarvardPress.
Wright,D.8., Ost,|. andFrench,C.C. (2006)Tenyearsafter:whatweknownowthatwedidn't
know thenaboutrecovered andfalsememories.Psychologist,19:352-5.

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