Professional Documents
Culture Documents
net/publication/249731261
CITATIONS READS
188 3,697
1 author:
Piero Ignazi
University of Bologna
75 PUBLICATIONS 1,983 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
All content following this page was uploaded by Piero Ignazi on 07 April 2016.
REPORT
•
ABSTRACT
Is there a crisis of party in the 1990s? As Peter Mair underlined a decade ago,
parties are facing a challenge per se, which affects their 'role for the expres-
sion of interests, as "active intermediaries" between the citizen and the
government' (Mair, 1984: 171). However, the 'vulnerability' of parties has
been related by the same author more to organizational backwardness and
weakness (with a close association between the two but no causal link)
549
550
If this is true for party identification, it may be equally true for electoral
choice. Voting behaviour has frequently been superimposed on party
identification as a factor controlling the state of health of parties. More pre-
cisely, electoral volatility has been considered a further indicator of party
decline. However, as Schlesinger has clearly stated: 'If we would recapture
the reality of party we must exclude the voter. Voters are choosers among
the parties, not components of them' (1984: 377). The emphasis on the elec-
toral dimension obscures the organizational dimension.
The assessment of an hypothetical weakening of party organization
depends on what party organization means and what party decline means
(Selle and Svasand, 1991: 474). Our understanding is that party strength is
unrelated to electoral volatility and party identification but linked, in some
way, to the number of party members. However, it is almost common sense
that membership is a very primitive measure of partisan organizational
strength. In his seminal work on this point, Janda (1983) suggested a series
of variables (complexity, centralization of power, coherence, involvement)
but no systematic use of these measures has been made (for different and
stimulating attempts see Offerle, 1991; Deschouwer 1992). Even Katz and
Mair's (1992) voluminous study on party organization, while full of indi-
cators, does not specify what the strength of the organization is. The same
absence of empirical tests applies to the typological analysis of Panebianco
(1988), who does not suggest any operationalization of his schema. In fact,
following Panebianco, we could compare strongly and weakly institutional-
ized parties by looking at their degree of autonomy from the external
environment and their systemness (the internal structural coherence of the
organization). But it is quite difficult to extrapolate measures of organiz-
ational complexity. Therefore, the tyranny of data forces researchers to turn
to the easiest and apparently more comparable information (number of
members), yet this approach does not add much to our understanding. What
is needed is a combined measure of number of party members, number and
strength of flanking organizations, number of party activists, number of
elected officials, amount of autonomously collected resources, number of
controlled source of information, number of controlled 'Quangos' (the
Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organizations), and so on, but this
problem is far beyond the present work.
In sum, the three indicators of party strength we have considered have
provided unsatisfactory answers to the party decline hypothesis: the first one
(membership size), which provides an unambiguous, while incomplete,
measure of strength, has no clear trend; the other two (party identification
and volatility), while showing a downturn (at least for party identification),
are questionable measures of party strength.
A different approach to the problem investigates party functions. Three
functions are particularly relevant for our analysis: the structuring of the
vote, the selection of political personnel and the role of policy formation.
The first function is the only one left to the exclusive competence of the party.
551
Such a role may be endangered by political actors who enter the electoral
arena without a 'traditional' party organization - where traditional means
not only the classic mass model but also the almost established New Poli-
tics/left-libertarian model. In fact, New Politics parties advocate a different
party organization, allowing more grassroots participation and more voice,
without fully sponsoring the ultimate consequence of their Rousseauian
ideal of direct democracy, i.e. party denial.
The challengers to the party could be defined as 'non-partisan parties':
charismatic-like movements where a leader, without a partisan organiz-
ational structure which provides for a clear decision-making process or
members' recruitment/participation, attains a dramatic success. The most
relevant example is the Gaullists' erruption at the beginning of the V Repub-
lic (Charlot, 1971), while the most recent case is the spectacular rise of
Berlusconi's Forza Italia in the 1994 Italian elections (McCarthy, 1995);
other examples are, on a smaller scale, Glistrup's FRP in Denmark in 1973,
the Anders Lange party in Norway in 1973 and the ephemeral New Democ-
racy in Sweden in 1991, and Roussem in Belgium in 1991. In all these cases
no formal organization existed before or beyond the leader: the party is
'insignificant' vis-a-vis the leader. It is not a question of personalization of
politics or the influence of mass media. It is a challenge to party per se. Not
surprisingly, all the above-mentioned movements express distrust for party,
seen as a dividing tool of the national community, as an obstacle to the ful-
filment of the general commonwealth. Therefore new political actors, led by
appealing/populist/charismatic leaders (in ascending order of potential
destructiveness of party organization) may challenge the monopoly of the
traditional party over the vote-structuring function.
The appointment of portfolios by parties is a relevant indicator of 'party-
ness of government' (Katz, 1986) and therefore of the importance of party.
Parties still playa crucial role in recruiting the political elite. Three-quarters
of the ministries of 14 European democracies come from the parliament
(Blondel, 1991: 192). The presence of non-MPs in government is concen-
trated in a few countries: the Netherlands, France, Norway and Finland.
Recently Italy has been in the highest position with 44 percent of indepen-
dent ministries in the Ciampi government (May 1992-Jan. 1994) and up to
the amazing 100 percent in Dini's government (Jan. 1995-Jan. 1996).
The recruitment of MPs is another way of looking at the degree of parti-
san control: where the number of independents increases, the party loses part
of its monopoly over this function. However, even if the number of self-
declared independents increases (see Appleton, 1995 for the French case),
they are obliged to link themselves to a party for election: the personal vote
in Europe is in fact irrelevant (Gallangher et aI., 1995: 53). On the other
hand, this tendency demonstrates that it is no longer indispensable to follow
the internal cursus honorum to achieve the highest and most rewarding pos-
itions. However, the introduction of many independents in the party lists
could indicate, rather than an enfeeblement of the party, a high degree of
552
Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Sciences Po on April 5, 2016
THE RISE OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES
control of the party leadership over the middle-level elites which have to
postpone to another election their legitimate desire to compete for an office.
The third aspect of party function, policy formation, points directly to the
'redundancy' (Daalder, 1992) of parties. Parties are challenged by 'alterna-
tive organizations' in their linkage function (Lawson and Merkl, 1988) The
challenge does not come from partisan organizations differently organized
but from organizations that do not want to enter the electoral arena but
nevertheless perform the function of aggregation of demands. The 'expan-
sion of state agencies and specialized interest groups' (Daalder, 1992: 283)
has shrunk the role of parties in mediating and articulating the demands.
This interpretation of the evolution of contemporary societies sees the party
as an obsolete instrument, a remnant of the past. The demands are better
channelled by different, non-partisan organizations. Such a neocorporatist
approach does not consider parties as 'dividing tools' to be eliminated, as the
classical corporatist theorists meant: it just regards parties as redundant and
somewhat backward.
In sum, what is the current meaning of the decline or crisis of party? First,
in terms of organization, the loss of strength and appeal is empirically veri-
fiable by membership size, number and strength of party identifiers and level
of volatility. However, none of these measures are substantively satisfactory
because: (a) in the case of membership, the information is superficial, rough
and sometimes unreliable, while what is needed (in accordance with Janda's
suggestion) is a multi-dimensional index of organizational strength; and (b)
in the case of the other two indicators, they do not refer to the party organiz-
ation as they measure different properties. Moreover, it is doubtful that
parties are facing a decline in their organizational strength. Second, in terms
of functions, it is less doubtful that parties are confronted with rising diffi-
culties in performing their traditional functions. The challenge addresses
mainly their channelling performance - the capacity to voice the popular will
- both for structural reasons (party structure is no longer satisfactory for
mobilized citizens) and for agenda-setting (some crucial issues are not dealt
with by traditional parties, or by parties at all).
Taking for granted that the crisis of party is mainly related to the unful-
filment of functions traditionally performed by parties - in particular the
expressive one - what outcome has this impasse produced?
The safety valve to the supposed gloomy trend of party decline has been
identified by many analysts in the new parties which arose in the 1980s, the
left-libertarian or the ecologists (see Dalton, 1988, 1991 for a synthetic
overview on the point), In a way, the new parties have performed the func-
tion of diversifying the genus to strengthen the species. The role of the new
parties is relevant not only because they transfused fresh blood into the party
553
Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Sciences Po on April 5, 2016
IGNAZI
system, providing new channels of expression always in the party realm, and
therefore pushing aside the attack of non-partisan organizations, but
because they offered a new role to the members. Leaving aside, for a
moment, the aspect of issues, New Politics parties emerged to respond to a
need for more participation and for a different way of making politics
(Muller-Rommel, 1989; Pogunkte, 1989). Dissatisfaction with the 'tra-
ditional' internal mechanisms of the mass parties, with their bureaucratiza-
tion, with the unresponsiveness of their leaders, with the insignificant role of
individual members, with the absence of a sense of community, all pushed a
portion of active, young, well-educated citizens to look for a different locus
for expressing their wills. The demand for more instruments, more channels
and more means of participating by a citizenry animated by the civic virtue
of democratically influencing the decision-making process is at the basis of
the development of these new parties.
In reality, not all the 'traditional' means of participation have been proved
and considered useful by the activists and, cycle after cycle, some have acti-
vated different, unconventional forms of participation. In the early-mid-
1970s, the number of people who were inclined to use unconventional and
even non-legal acts 4 comprised more than one-third of the population
(Barnes and Kaase, 1979). The availability of such a protest potential set the
condition for the later development of new social movements. The crucial
point, then, is to ascertain whether the protest concerned the means, i.e.
parties, or the ends, i.e. the democratic system as such.
The puzzle has not been disentangled by the literature but the prevailing
view points to a widespread acceptance of the democratic system even by the
new social movements and the left-libertarian parties (Dalton, 1988; Ingle-
hart, 1990; Kitschelt, 1993). The failure to secure their demands and the dis-
satisfaction/inefficacy of the classical means of expression have 'forced' them
to by-pass the traditional parties. The New Politics parties demanded,
together with libertarian and equalitarian issues, more efficacy and/or more
effectiveness of the system, not a radical change of the 'rules of the game'.
The protest pointed to more democracy, freedom and means of expression,
and to less order, hierarchy and authority. They argued for a new form of
democracy, not for something different from democracy. Therefore, with the
exclusion of those protestors influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology (or by
a surrogate of it), which by definition wanted to overcome democracy, the
social movements' leaders aimed mainly at a better functioning of democ-
racy, with an emphasis on direct democracy.
Coming back to the question of the role of party membership, it is not the
decline in party strength that paved the way for new parties, but the decline
in the role of party members. The perceived lack of internal democracy (once
again since the imperial SPD),5 the frustration with the feeling of insignifi-
cance in the complex, rigid, 'bureaucratic' structure, the weakening of col-
lective and symbolic incentives, linked to the declining of ideological
competition and to the waning of clear-cut identities, the ritualist emphasis
554
555
more dramatic effect should be shown. Second, and more important, the
decline of parties for the unfulfilment of the channelling function is based on
the premise that a demand for participation is spreading around the western
countries. But this is not the case. The limited interest in politics (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 1994) indicates that the opposite is true.
And finally, other parties which did not care at all for a more participatory
internal structure also emerged in the 1980s: the extreme right parties.
All the analysts of new movements and value change state that the structural
changes in western countries are the primum mobile for the rise of the New
Politics parties. Inglehart, for one, bases his seminal work on value change
on clearly stated structural factors: the post-war socio-economic transform-
ations - prosperity thus (internal) security - have allowed different value pri-
orities. These new attitudes have then been taken on by newcomers in the
political arena, the New Politics parties. However, if this is true, why, at the
same time and in the same societies (that is, given the same conditions) does
a different kind of party, on the other side of the political spectrum, develop?
Why have postindustrial societies generated or revived, in the 1980s, totally
diverging parties, such as the extreme right ones? (Ignazi, 1992). Apparently,
the same factors that have explained the rise of new social movements and
left-libertarian parties - structural changes in the society - have led to very
different outcomes. The extreme right parties are in fact the (unaccounted)
outcome of the same process. The structural explanation per se does not
account for the variation in the effects of socio-economic changes. Only if
one considers a non-structural element, values, does the different path
becomes clear. What makes the difference is thus the value system.
The question should be reformulated as an investigation of the reason why
a certain value system seemed to be the necessary outcome of postindus-
trialism. Expressed differently, socialization in an environment of 'material
saturation and security' plus unprecedented higher education, exposure to
mass media and mobility - Inglehart's 'socialization hypothesis' (1985: 103)
- should have produced a new value priority which goes under the post-
material label. A line of explanation comes from the advocates of the post-
industrial society who underlined that 'the decline of the imprint of the
machine and of its rhythms on the character of work', implied by the growth
of the service sector, and the loss of the centrality of 'labour conflicts as the
crucial and potentially destructive conflict' (Bell, 1973: 160ff) would have
broken traditional attitudes and behaviours, leaving to the individual an
unforeseeable freedom of choice. 7 Self-affirmation in a period of affluence
and faith in a better future nurtured the youth revolution of the late 1960s.
The modernization critique of that period, which inveighed against 'funda-
mental aspects of modern life such as commercialization, industrialization,
556
Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Sciences Po on April 5, 2016
THE RISE OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES
557
General societal trends have shaken the role and the centrality of parties, and
these changes have fostered the development of new parties. Let us analyse
more closely the opportunity structures which favoured the rise of one
corner of the novelty, the extreme right parties in the 1980s. Two main levels
of analysis can be distinguished: the first, more specific, regards the cultural-
political setting; the second, more general, refers to the 'crisis of legitimacy'
in western society.
Starting from the latter level, it could be stated that left-libertarian parties
themselves profited from this crisis (or rather from the perception of such a
crisis). But their answer, consciously or not, propitiated the recovery of the
system. They overcame the defaults of democracy both at the system and the
intra-party level by offering, in the first stages, a 'different' type of party
organization and a higher participatory involvement. On the other hand,
extreme right parties do not support the system, either with unconventional
participation or direct action, or by expressing confidence; their anti-system
connotation pushes them to delegitimize the 'fundamentals' of democracy.
Therefore, while a crisis of legitimacy (emphasized well beyond its reality)
had fostered both offspring of the malaise, a deepening of such crises would
fuel the anti-system parties rather than the 'reformist' ones. This is why the
crisis of legitimacy is more relevant for the fate of the extreme right.
On the cultural-political level the crucial factor concerns the development
of a new, right-wing cultural mood - neoconservatism. At the elite-intellec-
tuallevel, neoconservatism emerged as a reaction against the post-war con-
sensus on the Keynesian political economy of the 'collectivist age' and the
costs of the welfare system. In order to overcome the overloading burden of
state provision, neoconservatism advocated the revival of laissez-faire, free
market, individual entrepreneurship, privatization of the public sector and
cuts in the welfare system. This new set of attitudes towards the economic
sphere was accompanied by the revitalization of traditional values (order,
hierarchy, patriotism, family, authority, morality), partly redefined in
response to the postmaterialist agenda (Girvin, 1988: 10). The neoconser-
vatism offered a non-materialist answer to the New Politics: it opposed the
postmaterialists not in the name of more 'material security' but on the same
ground (Flanagan, 1987). This set of attitudes was adopted by many 'con-
servative,g parties, such as, at different times, the French Gaullists and the
UDF, the British Tories and the German CDU-CSU. Such a conservative shift
(see Klingemann, 1995), therefore, favoured a radicalization of the political
conflict. The agenda of the 'conservative' parties became, in the early 1980s,
quite radical- compared to the preceding decades - and, even if in certain
cases it was abandoned when those parties came back to power (as in the
German and French cases), they nevertheless paved the way to new and/or
newly formulated issues. But when the 'conservative' parties abandoned the
more radical stands on certain issues (such as aggressive nationalism, social
558
559
560
Concluding Remarks
The crisis of party has been interpreted as the crisis of a certain type of party.
Following Katz and Mair's (1995) hypothesis, the interpenetration between
party and state has reduced the former to a brokerage function; therefore, the
function of representation has been shrunk. The alternative to this fate was
traced in the New Politics party which reaffirmed the importance of chan-
nelling, adopting organizational changes that should have assured a different,
more rewarding role to the member (and the citizenry in general). However,
an unexpected alternative, which emerged with a certain time-lag compared
to the Green parties, has been produced by the same postindustrial setting.
'The new protesters of the right', as Katz and Mair (1995: 25) say, 'see them-
selves as representing a challenge to the cartel party, a challenge which may
well be fuelled by the actions of the cartel parties themselves, and which, in
the longer term, may therefore help to legitimate their protest'. The two
authors conclude that these protest parties 'do not represent a challenge to
party; their protest, after all is organized by party' (1995: 24). This is true but,
if we identify the 'protest party' with the extreme right, their ideology is pro-
foundly hostile to party per se; their cultural references bring a genetic code
which considers the party a 'faction', a dividing tool (lgnazi, 1996). To accept
a party means to accept pluralism; but the cultural heritage and belief of
extreme right parties, either imbued with fascism or with less defined sets of
values, are essentially monist. In this view, the party is just a transient means
to the seizure of power. The deepening of the crisis of party might therefore
foster the more coherent anti-party parties, i.e. the extreme right ones.
The same societal changes have produced both left-libertarian parties and
extreme right parties. The extreme right parties born in the 1980s denied any
clear reference to fascism and any linkage with the traditional neofascist
parties: they attained a certain success because, instead of reviving the fascist
mythology, either they represented issues that were not treated by the tra-
ditional parties or they offered a different, more radical answer to old issues.
A new type of an old political family thus entered the European party system:
the postindustrial extreme right party. The answer to postmaterialism has
taken an unforeseen direction.
Notes
I wish to thank Luciano Bardi, Kay Lawson and the two anonymous referees for their
insightful comments. A very preliminary version of this paper was presented at the
561
References
Andersen, Jorgen, G. and Tor Bjorklund (1990) 'Structural Changes and New Cleav-
ages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway', Acta Sociologica 33: 195-217.
Appleton, Andrew 11995) 'Parties under Pressure: Challenge to "Established" French
Parties', West European Politics 18: 52-77.
562
Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Sciences Po on April 5, 2016
THE RISE OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES
Bardi, Luciano (1992) 'The Empirical Study of Party Membership Change', paper
presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Limerick.
Barnes, Samuel H. and Max Kaase (1979) Political Action: Mass Participation in Five
Western Democracies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Bell, Daniel (1973) The Coming of Postindustrial Societies. New York: Basic Books.
Betz, Hans-George (1994) Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe. New
York: St Martin's Press.
Birembaum, Guy (1992) Le Front National en politique. Paris: Balland.
Blondel,Jean (1991) 'Are Ministries "Representative" or "Manager", "Amateur" or
"Specialist"? Similarities and Differences across Western Europe', in Hans-Dieter
Klingemann, Richard Stoss and Bernard Wessel (eds) Politische Klasse un politis-
che Institutionen, pp. 187-207. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Brand, Karl W. (1990) 'Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements: Waves of Cul-
tural Criticism and Mobilization Cycles of New Middle-class Radicalism', in
Russell Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (eds) Challenging the Political Order, pp.
23-42. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Charlot, Jean (1971) Le phenomene gaulliste. Paris: Fayard.
Commission of the European Communities (1994) Eurobarometer Trend Variables
1974-1994. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
Daalder, Hans (1992) 'A Crisis of Party?', Scandinauian Political Studies 15: 269-88.
Dalton, Russell J. (1988) Citizens Politics in Western Democracies. Chatham, NY:
Chatham House.
Dalton, Russell J. (1991) 'Responsiveness of Parties and Party Systems to the New
Politics', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Stoss and Bernard Wessel (eds) Poli-
tische Klasse un politische Institutionen, pp. 39-56. Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag.
Dalton, Russell, Scott Flanagan and Lewis Beck, eds (1984) Electoral Change in
Advanced Industrial Democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Deschouwer, Kris (1992) 'The Survival of the Fittest: Measuring Adaptation and
Change of Political Parties', paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Work-
shops, Limerick.
Flanagan, Scott C. (1987) 'Value Change in Industrial Society', American Political
Science Review 81: 1303-19.
Gallangher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair (1995) Representative Govern-
ment in Modern Europe. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Girvin, Brian, ed. (1988) The Transformation of Contemporary Conseruatism.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Harding, Stephen, David Phillips and Michael Fogarty (1988) Contrasting Values in
Western Europe. London: Macmillan.
Harmel, Robert and Rachel Gibson (1995) 'Right-Libertarian Parties and the "New
Values": A Re-examination', Scandinavian Political Studies 18: 97-118.
Huber, J. D. (1989) 'Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring
Ideology', European Journal of Political Research 17: 599-621.
Ignazi, Piero (1992) 'The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence
of Extreme Right-wing Parties', European Journal of Political Research 22: 3-34.
Ignazi, Piero (1993) 'Istituzioni politiche e partiti liherali nell'Europa occidentale', in
D. da Empoli (ed.) Le Vie della Liberta: Illiheralismo come teoria e come politica
negli anni novanta, pp. 108-12. Rome: Fondazione Luigi Einaudi.
Ignazi, Piero (1994a) L'estrema destra ill Europa. Bologna: II Mulino.
563
Ignazi, Piero (1994b) 'The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey', paper presented at
the XVI IPSA World Congress, Berlin.
Ignazi, Piero (1994c) Postfascisti? Dal Movimento sociale ad Alleanza nazionale.
Bologna: II Mulino.
Ignazi, Piero (1996) 'The Intellectual Basis of Right-wing Anti-Partysm', European
Journal of Political Research 29: 279-96.
Inglehart, Ronald (1985) 'New Perspectives on Value Change', Comparative Politi-
cal Studies 17: 485-532.
Inglehart, Ronald (1990) Culture Shift. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Janda, Kenneth (1983) 'Cross-National Measures of Party Organizations and
Organizational Theory', European Journal of Political Research 11: 319-32.
Kaase, Max (1988) 'Political Alienation and Protest', in Mattei Dogan (ed.) Com-
paring Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy, pp. 114-42. Boulder, CO:
Westview.
Katz, Richard (1986) 'Party Governments: A Rationalistic Conception', in Frank G.
Castles and Rudolf Wildemann (eds) The Future of Party Government, vol.1.
Berlin: De Gruyter.
Katz, Richard and Peter Mair, eds (1992) Party Organization 1960-1990: A Data
Handbook. London: Sage.
Katz, Richard and Peter Mair (1995) 'Changing Models of Party Organization and
Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', Party Politics 1: 5-28.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1989) The Logics of Party Formation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1990) 'New Social Movements and the Decline of Party Organiz-
ations', in Russell Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (eds) Challenging the Political
Order, pp. 179-208. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1993) 'Social Movements, Political Parties and Democratic
Theory', The Annals of the American Academy for the Political and Social Sciences
528: 13-29.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (1995) 'Party Positions and Voter Orientations', in Hans-
Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (eds) Citizens and the State, pp. 183-205.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koole, Ruud (1994) 'The Vulnerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Nether-
lands', in Richard Katz and Peter Mair (eds) How Parties Organize, pp. 278-303.
London: Sage.
Lazar, Marc (1992) Maison rouges. Paris: Aubier.
Lawson, Kay and Peter Merkl (1988) 'Alternative Organizations: Environmental,
Supplementary, Communitarian and Antiauthoritarian', in Kay Lawson and Peter
H. Merkl (eds) When Parties Fail, pp. 3-12. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Mair, Peter (1984) 'Party Politics in Contemporary Europe: A Challenge to Party',
West European Politics 7: 170-83.
Mair, Peter (1989) 'Continuity, Change and the Vulnerability of Party', West Euro-
pean Politics 12: 169-86.
Mair, Peter (1994) 'Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State', in
Richard Katz and Peter Mair (eds) How Parties Organize, pp. 1-22. London:
Sage.
Mair, Peter (1995) 'Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privelege', West
European Politics 18: 40-57.
564
Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Sciences Po on April 5, 2016
THE RISE OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES
565
Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Sciences Po on April 5, 2016
IGNAZI
566