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WP78 Korinek Stiglitz - v5
WP78 Korinek Stiglitz - v5
Anton Korinek
The Brookings Institution
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University
Abstract
This paper argues that the traditional canonical model of macroeconomic stabilization—which placed the main
burden of stabilization on monetary policy—is outdated and urgently needs to be replaced. Since the Great
Financial Crisis of 2008/09, the main tool of central bankers, the short-term interest rate, has more often been
constrained by the zero lower bound than not. Moreover, recent events have highlighted that monetary policy is
too blunt to target specific drivers of inflation such as supply chain disruptions, labor market shortages, or shocks
to energy prices. However, they can be targeted by fiscal measures. Fiscal policy should therefore play a more
prominent role and complement monetary policy in macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover, fiscal policy can also
account for the pervasive macroeconomic externalities that generate economic inefficiencies and hold the
economy back from reaching its full potential, for example by mitigating risks, lessening the need for
precautionary savings, and reducing capital market imperfections. All of these can positively affect both the
supply and demand side of the economy in targeted and welfare enhancing ways.
Anton Korinek is a Rubenstein Fellow at Brookings and a Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia.
Joseph Stiglitz is a University Professor at Columbia University and the Chief Economist of the Roosevelt
Institute. Email addresses: AKorinek@brookings.edu and jes322@columbia.edu. They would like to thank
Eduardo Dávila, Martin Guzman, Kinda Hachem, Eric Leeper, and David Wessel for helpful comments.
The authors have received funding from the Institute for New Economic Thinking and The Hewlett Foundation.
The authors did not receive financial support from any firm or person for this article or, other than the
aforementioned, from any firm or person with a financial or political interest in this article. The authors are not
currently an officer, director, or board member of any organization with a financial or political interest in this
article. The Brookings Institution is financed through the support of a diverse array of foundations, corporations,
governments, individuals, as well as an endowment. A list of donors can be found in our annual reports
published online here. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in this report are solely those of its
author(s) and are not influenced by any donation.
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1. The proposed fiscal policy has a further advantage, particularly in the eyes of those worried about the size of the national debt
and deficit, that both will shrink.
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For much of the past few decades, macroeconomic policy has leaned too heavily on the canonical model of
macroeconomic stabilization policy of the late 20th century, heavily influenced by the tenets of
neoliberalism. Part of this model was that fiscal policy was viewed as either too slow or too ineffective for
macroeconomic stabilization. It was seen as too slow to react because major fiscal reforms frequently took
many months to enact and even longer to implement—although the quick response to both the Great
Financial Crisis of 2008 and the pandemic have proven this wrong. It was seen as ineffective because of a
misguided application of “Ricardian equivalence” results that were inappropriately interpreted as
suggesting that fiscal policy is ineffective since extra spending by government will be completely undone
by consumers who will feel compelled to increase their savings by an equivalent amount. (The theoretical
results are about the timing of taxation and hold only under highly restrictive and unrealistic
assumptions; there is ample empirical evidence that they do not hold in practice). As a result, active fiscal
policy was only used as a measure of last resort—mainly for stimulus in extraordinary crisis situations.
Monetary policy was also viewed as both more neutral and more fine-tuned than fiscal policy. It was
considered more neutral than fiscal policy because it does not explicitly pick its targets—interest rate
policy reaches all borrowers and “gets in all the cracks,” as observed by Jeremy Stein in 2013. Monetary
policy was considered more fine-tuned because interest rates were reviewed and updated according to a
regular schedule that ensures that monetary policy is adjusted to the state of the economy—the FOMC
holds eight regularly scheduled meetings per year and schedules emergency meetings when necessary.
In many ways, the consensus has shifted, and we now think the opposite—monetary policy is
frequently out of powder and thus ineffective, and fiscal policy is the instrument that is left. (To be sure,
there are also other public policies that are macroeconomically relevant in specific circumstances and that
have sometimes been given insufficient attention, such as debt restructuring in the aftermath of real
estate bubbles and financial crises, or public health measures in the wake of pandemics.) Moreover, we
will argue that even when monetary policy is unconstrained, it is desirable for macroeconomic
...
2. The Inflation Reduction Act of August 2022 included some provisions that modestly reduced aggregate demand, and some that
addressed (again modestly) supply side issues, thus reducing inflationary pressures from both the demand and supply side.
President Biden's original Build Back Better proposals included several additional supply side measures, including some that
would affect labor force participation.
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The consensus view on monetary policy was ill-advised for several reasons, and many of the problems are
related to overly simplistic models of the economy that were extended beyond the context for which they
were designed.
First, the most effective instrument of monetary policy—the short-term interest rate—is rather blunt.
It is a single instrument to affect aggregate demand in the economy in broad strokes, but it cannot be fine-
tuned to which sectors of the economy are over-heated or in need of stimulus. But rather than being a
“neutral” instrument that affects everyone in the economy equally, monetary policy affects interest-
sensitive sectors such as housing and other real estate much more strongly than other sectors. At times,
this gives rise to serious distortions—for example, when overall demand is weak and the economy needs
stimulus, expansive monetary policy may inflate bubbles such as the housing bubble of the early 2000s.
These effects are not present and cannot be analyzed in simple models that do not sufficiently account for
the sectoral structure of the economy, such as the basic textbook New Keynesian models that we teach to
graduate students. However, they are nonetheless real. Less conventional instruments such as
quantitative easing may be somewhat more targeted (e.g., by purchasing mortgage bonds rather than
Treasuries), but were not able to adequately resolve demand shortages.
Second, a stark difference between fiscal and monetary policy is that monetary policy affects
aggregate demand more through investment whereas fiscal policy, particularly that related to the overall
size of the fiscal deficit, operates comparatively more through (private and public) consumption—
investment is inherently about the intertemporal trade-offs that monetary policy targets. As a result,
monetary policy affects not only the demand side but also the supply side of the economy. In particular,
restrictive monetary policy reduces investment in future productive capacity, potentially exacerbating
future inflationary pressures. While many investments impact inflation only in the medium term, some
have effects within the same time horizon over which monetary policy operates (generally viewed as up to
18 months). Investments in converting commercial real estate into housing could affect the supply of
housing relatively quickly; so too, investments in fracking could affect energy markets in the U.S. Even
supply effects that lie further in the future may affect present inflation by influencing expectations.
Perhaps most importantly in the current situation, when there are supply constraints, restrictive
monetary policy reduces incentives for investments to mitigate the constraints, which may compound
inflationary pressures in the economy. Going forward, tackling climate change and transforming our
economy to become greener will require large investments that will be handicapped if interest rates are
too high. In short, policymakers need to take note of the comparative effects on investment versus
consumption when deciding on the fiscal-monetary policy mix.
Third, the canonical consensus view was built on a misguided view of how monetary policy works.
According to the simplest New Keynesian textbook models, monetary policy works mainly via substitution
effects, i.e., lower interest rates make it more desirable to consume and invest today because you earn less
if you save. Income effects are by design absent, since the textbook model focuses on a representative
agent. In practice, the intertemporal substitution effects of interest rates play a far smaller role in resource
allocations than simple textbook models suggest. As monetary policy practitioners have long known, most
of the real effects of monetary policy occur through other transmission channels—monetary policy affects
financial conditions and asset prices, for example via the bank lending channel and the balance sheet
channel, by driving market liquidity and by influencing the extent of credit rationing or availability.
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3. Dias and Duarte find that the elasticity of rents to identified monetary policy shocks is about one half within a year and three
quarters after 30 months. Given the large weight of rents in the CPI basket, a one percentage point hike in interest rates raises
consumer price inflation by about a quarter point.
4. Over the medium term, higher interest rates reduce housing supply, putting upward pressure on rents, and the implied
increased capital gains for homeowners may contribute to lock-in effects, especially for middle to upper income individuals.
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All models represent simplifications of reality. One must be careful, though, in the choice of
simplifications and the lessons that one derives. Some models are useful teaching devices and instructive
for showcasing specific economic forces at work, but dangerous when taken literally in a policy context.
We have already noted one instance: using an aggregate production function eliminates the possibility of
sectoral distortions and leads one to focus on intertemporal distortions—even when the former may be far
more important than the latter. Similarly, assuming that the central distortion in the economy is nominal
wage rigidities leads to a natural policy prescription: increase labor market flexibility—that is, allow wages
to fall when there are demand shortages, which may further depress aggregate demand in recessions and
exacerbate macroeconomic volatility.5 As a third example: treating government expenditure as a single
variable, “G,” ignores the multiple ways that well-designed fiscal policy can be used to address the
multiplicity of macroeconomic problems simultaneously. Finally, real rigidities, limitations in the ability
of reallocating labor and capital across sectors or even between uses within a sector, can have first order
effects on productivity, and give rise to large macroeconomic externalities, as we explain more fully
6
below.
A long-time criticism of the canonical consensus model was its implication that policies that enhance
price stability would lead to real stability—which is, after all, what is of real concern. But more generally,
this is true neither in theory (using a broader range of models) nor in practice. For example, as already
emphasized by Irving Fisher, small amounts of inflation can be very useful in the recovery from financial
crises that involve high levels of nominal debts.
...
5. Aside from its macroeconomic effects, cutting wages is a particularly problematic policy prescription in an era where a central
economic, political, and social problem is inequality.
6. For example, these rigidities have been put forward as key drivers of both the Great Depression and the Great Recession.
7. Although central banks engaged in quantitative easing during those periods, they were not able to provide the amount of
stimulus that would have been needed to restore macroeconomic equilibrium.
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The current post-pandemic job market appears tight and has given rise to shortages—not necessarily
because aggregate demand is that robust, but because the labor force has contracted. In fact, the labor
force in the U.S. economy is still below its peak in December 2019, despite the population growth that has
9
occurred in the intervening two and a half years (which in turn was lower than anticipated then, both
because of lower migration and the large number of pandemic-related deaths). By mitigating these
pressures, a worker who re-enters the labor market now—or an additional immigrant—would confer
significant benefits to the macroeconomy.
...
8. We note, however, that the resulting increase in cash balances have not been spent down (except to make unusually high tax
payments associated with capital gains). Moreover, countries that spent more on fiscal support do not seem to have
significantly different levels of inflation from those that spent less. Furthermore, the sectors that were particularly affected by
inflation are not the ones where inflation would been expected if overheated demand was the underlying driver of inflation. Not
spending excessive cash balances in the short run is consistent with consumption smoothing and is especially to be expected
given the continuing high levels of uncertainty.
9. The working age population has thus shrunk relative to what was anticipated, but so has labor force participation, resulting in
an employment/working age population ratio that is significantly lower than pre-pandemic, and an employment/population ratio
that is even further below pre-pandemic levels.
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LS LS
A A
MC MC
L L
Figure 1: Amplification of labor market shocks under wage rigidities
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The post-pandemic economy is also plagued by pandemic-related supply bottlenecks and supply chain
disruptions that have pushed up inflation in the affected sectors. Box 2 presents a simple analytic model
that illustrates how supply shortages may give rise to consumer price inflation and an associated decline
in real wages.
Supply bottlenecks were particularly visible in the automotive industry, in which acute shortages of
chips—which typically make up just a tiny fraction of the overall value of a car—even led to the idling of
factories, wasting the productive capacity of large numbers of workers and significant amounts of capital.
By mitigating the bottleneck, a chipmaker who reallocates their production from a sector with less severe
shortages—or from a sector with a less important macroeconomic role, say iPhones or TV screens—to the
car industry would generate large positive effects on the macroeconomy—benefits that are not fully
reflected in the price of chips because individual chipmakers and automakers do not consider the
macroeconomic benefits of relieving supply shortages when they contract with each other. Adjusting
production processes takes time, and given that most firms have uncontingent long-term contracts, the
speed of reallocation of production processes is inefficient from a macroeconomic perspective. If
government can shift resources to relieve the supply bottlenecks, it would have the macroeconomic
benefits of lower inflation and fewer idled factories. Proposition 2 in Box 1 on aggregate demand
externalities spells out these results more formally within the model we develop there. More generally, the
market prices of chips and other goods for which we face shortages do not correctly reflect these
macroeconomic externalities and do not signal the scarcity and social value that they generate.
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MC
B
A
MC
D
D
MR
MR
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Another factor that may play a role in exacerbating inflationary pressures is the increase in industry
concentration and the associated rise in market power. Although this is a phenomenon that has played out
slowly over the past two decades, as documented, e.g., by Thomas Philippon, the pandemic and the
...
10. These market imperfections include incomplete contracts—e.g., uncontingent long-term contracts—and incomplete risk
markets; it would have been impossible for automakers to specify all eventualities in their contracts with chipmakers, and to
agree in advance how to adjust the prices and quantities of chips delivered as a function of the specific circumstances that
materialized, e.g., how chip deliveries should respond to a pandemic. Moreover, they also include insufficient provisions related
to the breach of contracts if suppliers cannot meet their promised deliveries. Furthermore, they are exacerbated by agency
problems—managers have incentives to focus excessively on the short term and forego risk-mitigating investments, e.g.,
adopting just-in-time production processes that cut out slack that would be useful in unforeseen circumstances, or becoming
dependent on a single energy supplier that is politically unreliable, as much of Europe did, with severe macroeconomic
consequences when disruptions arise. Finally, they are also exacerbated by collective moral hazard problems—the notion that
government will help and provide bailouts in case a large aggregate shock such as a pandemic hits the economy.
11. This may not be the only reason, however, that the market does not provide the desired risk mitigation—several of the points
listed in the previous footnote also apply here.
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12. The supply shock helps the two oligopolists coordinate, in a way that would (at least under current antitrust laws) have been
otherwise difficult. To be sure, the oligopolists would have been even better off if they had been able to coordinate on the
monopoly equilibrium—but in practice, such coordination is particularly difficult with firm heterogeneity.
13. Part of the sluggish wage growth over the past two years is explained by workers receiving greater amenity value from their
work because of the availability of remote work.
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MR
MFP
p
𝑝1 𝑝1′
Figure 3: Effects of higher interest rates on pricing in customer relationship model
In Box 3, we lay out a simple model in the spirit of Phelps and Winter, who described an economy in
which firms have to trade off the potential gain today from raising prices against the risk of losing
customers and the value of profits foregone in the future. In the model, an increase in interest rates leads
firms to discount future profits more highly and raise prices today, as captured by Proposition 1.
Moreover, greater uncertainty may reduce the weight that firms place on retaining customers by keeping
prices low even further, generating additional inflation, as captured in Proposition 2. Although these
effects reflect only one of several forces that determine firms’ pricing strategies, and many effects go in the
opposite direction, they point out that the effects of monetary policy on inflation can be varied. Similar
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One challenge to using fiscal policy to address macroeconomic externalities comes from a political
economy problem: policymakers are frequently concerned that temporary fiscal spending programs will
become permanent; for example, because they create a constituency that will lobby for them. As a result,
programs that were originally enacted for macroeconomic stabilization reasons—which are by their very
nature intended to be short-term—could permanently increase spending in an inefficient and wasteful
manner. Conversely, however, attempts to avoid the described political economy dynamics may lead to
insufficient spending on socially useful temporary policies. Moreover, concerns that temporary cuts will
become permanent reductions in fiscal spending give rise to insufficient willingness to postpone or reduce
fiscal spending in periods of overheating—even if this may be beneficial for the macroeconomy.
At present, even though it would be desirable to reallocate some fiscal spending to relax supply
constraints in specific sectors to reduce overall inflationary pressures, this is made more difficult by the
described political economy challenges. Likewise, there would be significant macroeconomic benefits to a
temporary tax cut on gas—with a provision that the tax will be automatically reinstated, and the
temporary revenue shortfall undone, once crude oil prices decline sufficiently. Such provisions require
trust that the future commitments will be honored. Still, it would be useful to have legislation that
explicitly makes interventions contingent on the state of the world, with a provision that undoing the
commitments would only be possible via legislative action, which imposes political hurdles. As an
example, it might be desirable for the gas tax to be set to stabilize gas prices (increasing gradually over
time to reflect general inflation and the desire to curb gas consumption because of climate change), with
the gas tax thus serving two functions, collecting revenues and stabilizing prices. The government is in a
better position to absorb risk than are low-income individuals.
There are also political economy challenges for monetary policy. The distinction between fiscal and
monetary policy in general—and when it comes to addressing macroeconomic externalities in particular—
is less clear than it seems at first sight. For example, if intertemporal substitution effects are indeed
central to the transmission of monetary policy, then unconventional fiscal policies consisting of a path of
increasing of consumption taxes and decreasing labor taxes, together with investment tax credits and tax
cuts on capital income, can achieve the same results. Moreover, many monetary policy actions, such as
purchasing mortgage bonds or government bonds in the peripheral eurozone, also contain fiscal elements
by steering the allocation of credit.
Given an appropriate legal framework, monetary authorities could exert significant positive effects on
credit allocations when there are macroeconomic externalities. This is certainly true for the liquidity
interventions that central banks routinely conduct during financial crises—and that mitigate what would
otherwise be enormous macroeconomic externalities. Monetary policy could further expand this role by
providing differential access to funds or differential interest rates. Many governments implicitly or
explicitly do this, e.g., in assigning risk weights or mandating credit allocations such as those associated
with the Community Reinvestment Act. Policies where risk weights do not fully accord with social risks
are de facto implicit subsidies; this is the case, for instance, of current practices in the U.S. which do not
fully account for climate risk, almost surely providing an implicit subsidy for fossil fuels and real estate
investments in more climate-affected areas. Still, many central bankers are skeptical of the approach,
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Given that the U.S. dollar is the anchor of the international monetary system, the U.S. policy mix between
fiscal and monetary policy also has global ramifications. The international spillover effects of fiscal and
monetary policy differ significantly. As the U.S. raises interest rates, it generates negative spillovers for
many other countries by increasing their borrowing costs and by strengthening the dollar—while doing
little to curtail the global prices of oil and food. In doing so, the increase in U.S. interest rates stokes
inflation in other countries, whose currencies have depreciated.
By contrast, fiscal measures that untangle the supply side of the economy would generate positive
international spillovers by reducing inflationary pressures worldwide and curtailing the need for interest
rate hikes. This creates the risk that the U.S. may put too much emphasis on monetary policy from the
perspective of the international monetary system, with potential adverse spillbacks on the U.S. economy.
4. Conclusions
The global economy is facing macroeconomic imbalances and inflation that are less transitory than was
hoped a year ago. While economists continue to debate the relative importance of the factors contributing
to it, the more immediate question is how to respond—and what kind of models are likely to be most
useful in structuring the best response. This paper suggests that the old role assignment between fiscal
and monetary policy based on the canonical consensus on macroeconomic stabilization needs to be
revised— the role of fiscal policy has already grown significantly over the past 15 years, but frequently in a
haphazard manner. We argue that fiscal policy should be assigned a greater role in a more systematic
fashion. In tandem, since an important element in current inflation is supply side problems in specific
sectors, macroeconomic models need to analyze these effects at a sufficient level of disaggregation to be
useful for policymakers.
Market failures and the associated macroeconomic externalities are a critical factor underlying the
current macroeconomic dislocations, and both fiscal and monetary policy should therefore be sensitive to
these market failures. Well-crafted and targeted fiscal policies can be an important part of the policy
response to aggregate demand imbalances. In particular, in the present environment, fiscal policies
should be directed at relieving labor market shortages, supply constraints, and the adverse distributional
effects of inflation and the possible attendant economic slowdown. As we noted above, even if excess
demand is judged to be an important contributor to inflationary pressures, a well-tailored fiscal policy
response—modestly increasing taxes on high-earners and delaying non-urgent fiscal expenditures—is
likely to be better than relying exclusively on monetary policy, which is blunt, risks curtailing investments
that might actually alleviate the supply shortages and has other undesirable side effects.
...
14. The standard argument for independence focuses on the importance of commitment, but recent macroeconomic events have
highlighted the importance of flexibility in the face of deep uncertainty. A further concern is that it would require efforts to
forestall arbitrage between sectors with differential access to funds. But even with such arbitrage, there may be benefits from at
least some differentiation.
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