PETITIONER: KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA AND NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.

RESPONDENTS: MINORU KITAMURA

SUMMARY: Respondent Kitamura was hired by petitioner Hasegawa and Nippon, through an
Independent Contractor Agreement executed in Japan, to provide professional services for a couple of
infrastructure projects between petitioner Nippon and the Philippine Government. Eventually
respondent Kitamura was terminated, so respondent Kitamura filed a civil case for specific performance
and damages against petitioner Nippon in the RTC of Lipa City for improper termination. Petitioner
Nippon claims that based on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, and the “state of the
most significant relationship rule, the RTC of Lipa City does not have jurisdiction over the case and thus
petitioner Nippon filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction

Issue: W/N the jurisdiction of RTC of Lipa City can be assailed based on the principles asserted by
petitioner Nippon.

No. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction in the Philippines is
determined by the laws of the Philippines. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal
cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
Petitioner Nippon is not claiming that there is no law granting the RTC of Lipa City the jurisdiction to
hear the case at hand. Rather, petitioner Nippon is asserting principles pertaining to the second phase of
judicial resolution of conflict problems, which is the choosing of which law to apply to the dispute.
Indeed, these choice-of-law principles determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the
substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction,
choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. Forum non conveniens is also
not a proper ground to dismiss a case because first it is not a ground under the rules and second it
requires factual determination and thus better suited as a defense.

DOCTRINE: Since the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, and the “state of the most
significant relationship rule,” refer to which law is applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
second phase of judicialresolution of conflicts problems, the choice of law. Thus, such principles/choice-
of-law rules cannot be use to assail the jurisdiction of a court
 WILLIAMF.GEMPERLE,plaintiff-appellant, vs.

HELENSCHENKERandPAULSCHENKERasherhusband,defendants-appellees.

Facts:

Paul Schenker, acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker filed a complaint with
theCourtof FirstInstanceof Rizal againsthereinplaintiffWilliam F.Gemperle fortheenforcementof
Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading
Co., Inc.and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital
stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages.

Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some
allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said
case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit
of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of
bringing him "into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman",
Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the recovery of damages,
attorney's fees, and costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract
in writing the said defamatory expressions".

In due course, thereafter, the lower court, dismissed the case. A reconsideration was file but the
same was denied. Thus, Gemperle interposed the present appeal.

Issue:WON thelowercourthadacquiredjurisdictionoverthepersonofSchenker. Ruling:

Yes.

While admittedly, Schenker, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually
served with summons in the Philippines. Nevertheless, we hold that the lower court had acquired
jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs.
Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her
husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her
aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue,
andhad actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent
him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is
consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, is hereby, reversed, and the case remanded
tothe lower court for proceedings, with the costs of this instance defendants-appellees. It is
soordered.
Section 6.Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him. (7a)

Section 7.Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. (8a)
PETITIONERS: PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BPIINTERNATIONAL FINANCE LIMITED, and
ATHONA HOLDINGS, N.V.

RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC, VENTURA O. DUCAT,
PRECIOSO R. PERLAS, and WILLIAM H. CRAIG

SUMMARY: Ducat obtained $2.5M loans from Ayala and PHILSEC. Respondent 1488, Inc. assumed
Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488 executed a Warranty Deed, by which the latter
sold a parcel of land to ATHONA for $2.8M [$2.5M loaned by PHILSEC and Ayala to ATHONA, $300k paid
by promissory note (PN)]. PN became due and demandable and ATHONA failed to pay, thus 1488 sued
ATHONA, PHILSEC and Ayala in the US. While the civil case was pending in the US, PHILSEC, Ayala (now
BPI-IFL) and ATHONA filed a complaint for sum of money with damages and writ of preliminary
attachment before the RTC of Makati, alleging that private respondents committed fraud by selling the
property at a price 400 times more than its true value ($800k), thus demanding the excess payment
($1.7M). On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the real and
personal properties of private respondents. However, upon motion by the latter, it dismissed the case
on the ground of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens, and also held that it was without jurisdiction
over 1488 and Daic because they were non-residents and the action was not an action in rem or quasi in
rem, so that extraterritorial service of summons was ineffective. CA affirmed the ruling. Hence, this case.

Issue (related to the topic in the syllabus) is whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over 1488
and Daic (president) through extraterritorial service.

Yes. This is an action in personam and summons was served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, Sec. 17
(now Sec. 15) on extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a non-resident defendant
may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines. It is not disputed that the properties, real and
personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to service of summons under the Order of
the trial court dated April 20, 1987. DOCTRINES: Rule 14 SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. - When the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status
of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Vicenta Pantaleon

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Honorato Asuncion

SUMMARY: Pantaleon instituted an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija against Asuncion for the recovery of
P2,000, with interest, and attorney’s fees. The summons originally issued was returned since Asuncion
was residing in B-24 Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. An alias summons was then issued and served on said
place but the same was return unserved since Asuncion had already left the said place. On Pantaleon's
motion, the CFI ordered that Asuncion be summoned by publication which was then published on Mar.
21 and 28, and Apr. 4, 1955 in the "Examiner", alleged newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ecija.
Having failed to appear or answer the complaint within the period stated in the summons, Asuncion was
declared in default on July 12, 1955. Thereafter, on Sept. 8, 1955, the CFI rendered judgment in favor of
Pantaleon. 46 days after, Asuncion filed a petition for relief from order of July 12 and from judgment of
Sept. 8, 1955 upon the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. The CFI denied Asuncion’s petition
for relief. Hence, the current petition. Asuncion claims that summons by publication had not been made
in conformity with the ROC since the copy of the summons and the order for the publication were not
deposited "in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by ordinary mail to his last
known address", in violation of Rule 7, Sec. 21, of ROC

The issue is whether or not the CFI of Nueva Ecija acquired jurisdiction over the person of Asuncion. NO.
Sec. 21, Rule 7 of ROC is unqualified. It prescribes the "proof of service by publication" regardless of
whether the defendant is a resident of the Philippines or not. Sec. 16 must be read in relation to Sec. 21,
which complements it. Thus, the SC conceive of no reason why copy of the summons and of the order
for its publication should be mailed to non-resident defendants, but not to resident defendants.
Considering that strict compliance with the terms of the statute is necessary to confer jurisdiction
through service by publication, the conclusion is inescapable that the CFI had no authority whatsoever
to issue the order of July 12, declaring Asuncion in default and to render the decision of Sept. 8, 1955,
and that both are null and void ab initio. *doctrine* In other words, summons by publication cannot—
consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights— confer upon the court jurisdiction over
said defendant

. DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like
in this case, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court
PETITIONER: Pedro T. Santos

RESPONDENTS: PNOC Exploration Corporation

SUMMARY: PNOC filed a complaint for sum of money, seeking to collect P698,502.10 representing
Santos’ unpaid balance may be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention
thereof. Personal service of summons failed because Santos could not be located. Hence, on PNOC’s
motion, the court allowed service of summons by publication. PNOC caused the publication of the
summons on Remate, a newspaper of general circulation, submitted the affidavit of publication of
Remate’s advertising manager and affidavit of service of PNOC’s employee that he sent a copy of the
summons by registered mail to Santos’ last known address. Despite these, Santos failed to file his
answer within the prescribed period. PNOC moved that the case be set for reception of its evidence ex
parte with the court granted. The case was submitted for decision. Santos filed an Omnibus MR and to
Admit Attached Answer. He sought reconsideration of the order of the court alleging the affidavit of
service failed ot comply with the rules. He also claimed denial of due process as he was no notified of
the order. PNOC opposed and insisted that it complied with the rules on service by publication. Also,
pursuant to the order in question, Santos was already deemed in default for failure to file an answer.
The lower court denied Santos’ MR. The CA ruled that the trial court did not err in both orders.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the lower court’s orders (despite the grounds raised in Fact 12) –

NO. Even even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. (Please read
the whole digest and not just the summary box to see the grounds used by Santos in his MR, and how
the court ruled on each matter)

DOCTRINE: RULE 14, SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. (emphasis supplied)