Table of Contents

(1) DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III....................................................2

(2) MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG v. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION
Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE
GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the
Commission on Elections..........................................................................................................7
(3) Funa v. COA Chair, Villar................................................................................................10
(4) GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER........12
 Page 2 of 14

(1) DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III

G.R. No. 191672; November 25, 2014

TOPIC: Constitutional Commission

DOCTRINE:

1. The independence of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is explicitly mandated under
Section 1,Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Additionally, Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution prohibits its Members, during their tenure, from holding any other
office or employment.
2. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
3. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the
active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although their
respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of
the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the
Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and
its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on certiorariby the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution. To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987
Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution
certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen
their integrity
4. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
5. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law orby the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to
be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
6. Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or
Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must
be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office,
entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.
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FACTS:

1. On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque as

Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s
appointment on February 3, 2010.
2. On February 22, 2010,President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864).
3. On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned
citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864,
as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO
292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of
Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and
HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution.
4. Petitioner posits that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
violate the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from
holding any other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that
a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-
related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original
charters, and their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulation.
5. In their Comment, respondents maintain that Duque’s membership in the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is constitutional. They explain that
EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title IA, Book V of EO 292 preserve the
independence of the CSC considering that GOCCs with original charters such as the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are excluded from the supervision and control
that secretaries and heads exercise over the departments to which these GOCCs are
attached. Ultimately, these GOCCs are exempted from the executive control of the
President.
6. As to the matter of conflict of interest, respondents point out that Duque is just one
member of the CSC, or of the Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF,
such that matters resolved by these bodies may be resolved with or without Duque’s
participation. Respondents submit that the prohibition against holding any other office or
employment under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover
positions held without additional compensation in ex officio capacities. Relying on the
pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, they assert that since the
1987 Constitution, which provides a stricter prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices by executive officials, allows them to hold positions in ex officio capacities, the
same rule is applicable to members of the Constitutional Commissions. Moreover, the
mandatory tenor of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 clearly indicates
that the CSC Chairman’s membership in the governing bodies mentioned therein merely
imposes additional duties and functions as an incident and necessary consequence of his
appointment as CSC Chairman.
7. Respondents insist that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292,
as well as the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, are consistent with
each other. While the charters of these GOCCs do not provide that CSC Chairman shall
be a member of their respective governing Boards, there islikewise no prohibition
 Page 4 of 14

mentioned under said charters.20 EO 864, issued in conformity with Section 14, Chapter
3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, could not have impliedly amended the charters of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF because the former relates to the law on the CSC
while the latter involve the creation and incorporation of the respective GOCCs.21 As
their subject matters differ from each other, the enactment of the subsequent law is not
deemed to repeal or amend the charters of the GOCCs, being considered prior laws.

ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of
the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices
for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?

RULING:

1. YES AND NO
2. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
3. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable
to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article
VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
4. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the
control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch, hence when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from
his position as CSC Chairman.
5. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex
officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
6. Requisites of judicial review
a. there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
b. the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;
c. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
d. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
7. Here, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) only disputes the locus standi of
petitioner who has filed this suit in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and
lawyer.
8. Requirement for the Review of a Moot and Academic Case:
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a. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public
interest;
c. the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
d. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
9. The situation now obtaining definitely falls under the requirements for the review of a
moot and academic case. For the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future, the Court
will not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review, the cessation of the
controversy notwithstanding. We proceed to resolve the substantive issue concerning the
constitutionality of Duque’s ex officio designation as member of the Board of Directors
or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
10. Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e.,
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants),
Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2),
Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his
tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
11. The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act
done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member
of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment.
12. The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
13. In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a
Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid,
binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the
office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the
dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State.
Duque's official actions covered by this clarification extend but are not limited to the
issuance of Board resolutions and memoranda approving appointments to positions in the
concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on compensation and
employee benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of the
GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF.
14. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
a. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court UPHOLDS
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292; ANNULS AND VOIDS Executive Order No. 864
dated February 22, 2010 and the designation of Hon. Francisco T. Duque III as a
Member of the Board of Directors/Trustees of the Government Service Insurance
System; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation; Employees Compensation
Commission; and Home Development Mutual Fund in an ex officio capacity in
 Page 6 of 14

relation to his appointment as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission for

being UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE of Sections 1 and 2, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Francisco T. Duque III
was a de facto officer during his tenure as Director/Trustee of the Government
Service Insurance System; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation; Employees
Compensation Commission; and Home Development Mutual Fund.
 Page 7 of 14

(2) MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG v. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,

RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J.
CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge,
Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 149036; April 2, 2002

TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

DOCTRINE:

1. The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution

applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-
passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such
new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven
years.
2. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad
interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired
term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start
and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power
of the Commission on Appointments

FACTS:

1. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo COMELEC

Chairman for a term of seven years. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the
position of COMELEC Chairman. The Office of the President submitted to the
Commission on Appointments the ad interim appointments for confirmation. However,
the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments.
2. President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointment of Benipayo to the same positions
and for the same term of seven years. They took their oaths of office for a second time.
The Office of the President transmitted the appointment to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.
3. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their
appointments. Thus, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. The Office of the
President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on
Appointments. They took their oaths of office anew.
4. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo reassigned the petitioner, the Director
IV of the EID, to the Law Department.
 Page 8 of 14

5. Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold
office of the respondents.
6. Petitioner also argues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first
assumption of office by the respondents are constitutional, the renewal of their ad interim
appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the
prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
7. Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed because this will
violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments.
Petitioner asserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed
office, which is the situation of the repsondents if their ad interim appointments are
deemed permanent in character.

ISSUE: Whether or not the renewal of ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of
office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

1. NO. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is
one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as
required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.
2. Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment
can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.
3. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim
appointments of by-passed appointees.
4. The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-
passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such
new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven
years.
5. Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without
reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four situations where this provision will
apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such
person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman,
because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is
 Page 9 of 14

where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before
his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a
member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will
result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where
the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned,
and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed,
whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a
reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
6. The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than
seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in
his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired
term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the
second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers
to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven
years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation.
7. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad
interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired
term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start
and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power
of the Commission on Appointments.
8. The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such
person completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can
apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President’s power to
make ad interim appointments.
 Page 10 of 14

(3) Funa v. COA Chair, Villar

G.R. No. 192791; April 24, 2012

DOCTRINES:

1. Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution:

2. The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment.
3. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
4. Jurisprudence tells us that the word “reappointment” means a second appointment to one
and the same office; Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the
commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute an appointment, or a
second appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment.
5. Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a
public official, the appointing authority is without authority to specify in the appointment
a term shorter or longer than what the law provides—if the vacancy calls for a full seven-
year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a promotional
appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years.
6. The explicit command of the Constitution is that the “Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be appointed by the President xxx for a term of seven years [and] appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
7. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the
term of the departing chairman.

FACTS:

1. This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Dennis A. B. Funa challenging
the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit.
2. On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Guillermo N.
Carague as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years,
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to
end on February 2, 2008.
3. On February 7, 2004, President Macapagal Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the
third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until
February 2, 2011.
4. Following Carague’s retirement on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar
as COA Commissioner, Villar was appointed as COA Chairman on April 18, 2008. He
was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until
 Page 11 of 14

the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011.
5. Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven
(7) years which is yet to lapse. His term of office as chairman is up to February 2, 2015
or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA Chairman is

unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. Yes, the appointment of Villar as COA Chairman is unconstitutional because according

to Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, “The Chairman and Commissioners [on
Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the
other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The appointment
of Villar, from Commissioner to Chairman, was not a reappointment.
2. Jurisprudence tells us that the word “reappointment” means a second appointment to one
and the same office. Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the
commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute an appointment, or a
second appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment. However, the vacancy in the
position of COA chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted
from the expiration of his 7year term. Therefore, there in no unexpired portion of the
Carague’s term. Thus the next appointed COA chairman should serve a 7-year term.
3. However, in this case, Villar has already served four years as commissioner, serving as
COA chairman for full 7-year term as COA chairman would unduly extend his term
beyond the 7 years fixed by the constitution.
4. Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a
public official, the appointing authority is without authority to specify in the appointment
a term shorter or longer than what the law provides—if the vacancy calls for a full seven-
year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a promotional
appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years. The explicit command of the
Constitution is that the “Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years and appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
5. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the
term of the departing chairman terms of office and appointments had already expired.
6. Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A.
Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N.
Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.
Page 12 of 14
 Page 13 of 14

(4) GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G. R. No. 180989; February 7, 2012

DOCTRINE:

1. There is nothing in the said Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, that
requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in
Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain
government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal
control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt
measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
2. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the
COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit
and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application.19 Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly
enlarged by this Court.

FACTS:

1. On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit
of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular affirmed
the state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or
utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage
through illegal or improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and
effectiveness in the operations of government.
2. After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave
irregularities and anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were uncovered.
Hence, on 31 March 1986, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre-
audit of selected government transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to be an
effective, although temporary, remedy against the said anomalies.
3. Two years later, or on 22 July 2011, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002, which lifted the
pre-audit of government transactions implemented by Circular No. 2009002. In its
assessment, subsequent developments had shown heightened vigilance of government
agencies in safeguarding their resources.
4. On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges
that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular,
considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by
COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the
P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550- million call center laboratory
project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

ISSUE: Whether the COA’s power includes the duty to conduct pre-audit
 Page 14 of 14

RULING:

1. Petitioner’s allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision.

2. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a
pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit
is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and
only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a
situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to
correct the deficiencies.
3. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the
COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit
and examination.
4. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation,
only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.
5. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED.