1. WAEC v.

OSHIONEBO

(2006) LPELR-7739(CA)

Principle

LABOUR LAW - RESIGNATION

- Position of the law as regards resignation from employment

"?The bone of contention is, whether the plaintiff/respondent's letter of 8th July, 1997 per which he said he gave
the mandatory three months notice of his intention to voluntarily retire from service which he claimed, he served
on the appropriate officer of the defendant/appellant and who acknowledge the receipt of the original by orders
the respondent's copy on that day would suffice in putting an end to his employment at against the letter of the
defendant/appellant dated 7th July, 1997 ref No.LP/2318 served on the respondent/plaintiff notifying him of the
termination of his (respondent/plaintiff) employment with his employer which letter he said was served on him
on the 15th of July, 1997. I here pause to discuss the law relating to notice of resignation, the law is that a notice
of resignation is effective not from the date of the letter, nor from the date of any purported acceptance, but from
the date on which the letter was received by the employer or his agent. Tendering of a letter or resignation
carries with it the right to leave the service automatically without any benefit subject to his paying any of his
indebtedness to his employer. While giving notice of retirement carries with it the right to be paid a pension or
gratuity; but it does not confer the right to withdraw from the service immediately and automatically. See (1)
Benson v. Onitiri (1960) 5 ES.C. 69, (2) Osu v. PA.N. Ltd. (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.731) 627 and (3) Yesufu v.
Gov. of Edo State & Ors. (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.731) 517." Per PIUS OLAYIWOLA ADEREMI, JCA (Pp 11 -
12 Paras D - E)

2. Benson vs. Onitiri (1960) 1 NSCC 52, Ademola, and CJF (as he then was) at page 60 held thus: "That there is
a common law right to resign unless there is reason to show that the holder of the office cannot..." At page 61 he
went on to say that: "......... That correct approach, in my view, is that there is a right to resign an office unless
there is a reason or reasons to show that a man cannot resign."

3. UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL & ANOR v. BASSEY

(2008) LPELR-8553(CA)

Principle

LABOUR LAW - RESIGNATION

- Position of the law as regards resignation from employment

"In respect of Sub-issue (1), the appellants contended strenuously that the respondent lacked the competence to
sue having earlier resigned her appointment with the appellants before her eventual dismissal. Now, where an
employee is placed on suspension, he or she cannot resign and if he or she applies for resignation, it will not be
allowed. In this case, the appellants were correct to refuse the respondent from resigning because it was a pre-
emptive action. The word "Suspension" was considered in Esiaga vs. University of Calabar (supra) at page 236 -
237, where Pats Achalonu, JSC, (of blessed memory) said: "The word suspension cannot be construed to mean
"terminate", "extinguish", or "bring to an end". It means, "To cause to abate for a while or halt midway but not
to bring to an end". It always connotes a state of affairs that should wait until a certain event takes place..." It is
in evidence that the respondent was suspended and an Investigating Panel was constituted or set up to
investigate the allegation against the respondent. There is clear evidence that the respondent was invited and
interviewed by the Panel. In the circumstances, can the respondent resign her appointment before the result of
the Panel is known? The answer must be in the negative and I say a resounding NO she cannot.

4. ZUBAIRU & ANOR v. MOHAMMED & ORS

(2009) LPELR-5124(CA)

Principle

LABOUR LAW - RESIGNATION

- Position of the law as regards resignation from employment

"The legal position is that resignation from employment is by giving the required length of notice or payment in
lieu of notice. Resignation dates back from the date the notice is received. There is absolute power to resign and
no discretion to refuse to accept the notice of resignation.

5. EDUN v. AFUAPE & ORS

(2023) LPELR-60018(CA)

Principle

LABOUR LAW - RESIGNATION

- When does resignation take effect

"The question is without Exhibit C, can the Court say the 1st Respondent was still on employee when labour law
say at the point of resignation, the employee is deemed to have resigned? See IBRAHIM V. ABDALLAH &
ORS (2019) LPELR-48984(SC), the apex Court succinctly stated thus: "On the issue that the Cross-
Respondent/Appellant as Plaintiff had no locus standi to institute this suit at the Federal High Court because he
is still a public officer working with the Nigeria Customs service as Assistant Superintendent of Customs (1)
contrary to Section 66(f) of the Constitution, the evidence before me is that the Cross-Respondent exhibited his
letter of resignation and acknowledgement of same, which suffices to preponderate evidence in his favour that
he had duly resigned his appointment from the date it was received as endorsed thereon. Besides, apart from the
pay slip which the Cross-Appellant relies on, there is no rebuttal to such evidence and claim. Resignation need
not be formally accepted before it took effect. See Per KALGO, J.S.C, in YESUFU v. GOVERNOR OF EDO
STATE & ORS (2001) LPELR-3526(SC). A notice of resignation is effective, not from the date of the letter or
from the date of the purported acceptance, but from the date the letter was received by the employer or his
agent. See W.A.E.C. V. OSHIONEBO (2006) 12 NWLR (PT. 994) 258. Resignation takes effect from the date
notice is received by the employer or its agent, Resignation dates from the date notice was received. There is
absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept notice." Per ABBA AJI, J.S.C. See also YESUFU
v. GOVERNOR OF EDO STATE & ORS (2001) LPELR-3526(SC), WAEC v. OSHIONEBO (2006) LPELR-
7739(CA), DANTIYE v. APC & ORS (2020) LPELR-51037(CA)." Per YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR,
JCA (Pp 41 - 42 Paras A - D)

6. Dr. Ebele Felix v. Nigerian Institute of Management (NICN/LA/321/2014) delivered 4th July 2017 by Justice
B. B. Kanyip PhD (now President) of the National Industrial Court is of utmost importance here. In that case,
my lord Justice Kanyip held as follows:

“Resignation with immediate effect by an employee carries with [it] three legal effects: the right to leave service
automatically; the employee’s forfeiture of any benefit; and the employee paying any indebtedness to his
employer. The justification for having to allow the resigning employee to leave immediately and automatically
is the fact that [he/she] thereby forfeits [any] benefit he/she may be entitled to as well as the duty to pay off all
indebtedness that [he/she] may [have] towards the employer; as such, the forfeiture of benefits inures as
contractual consideration for the immediate and automatic separation of contractual relationship as per the
employment in issue. So it cannot be that an employee who resigns with immediate effect is allowed to also
benefit from such immediate separation by claiming benefits from the employer.”

7. It is apothegmatic to state that the law is an ass, but I do not think that the law has sunk that low in its
asininity for the Notice of Cross-Appeal to be said to be incompetent in the circumstances of this matter as
contended by the Cross-Respondent. The days when the whirligig of technicality rendered justice grotesque are
long gone. The Courts have successfully worked their way in the mass exodus from the Egypt of undue
technicality and arrived at the promised land of substantial justice. The Cross-Respondent’s preliminary
objection is a quest to scuttle the hearing and determination of the merits of the cross-appeal by resort to undue
technicality. It invites the Court to embark on the retrogressive step to the foregone days of resort to undue
technicality. I decline that invitation with all the strength I can muster. See generally AFOLABI vs.
ADEKUNLE (1983) 2 SCNLR 141, NNEJI vs. CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 81) 184 and BANKOLE vs.
DENAPO (2019) LPELR (46444) 1 at 20. In a summation, the Notice of Cross-Appeal is competent; there is no
merit in the preliminary objection, and it is hereby dismissed. We segue to consider the merits of the cross-
appeal.

Omoooooo!!!!!

8. FBN MERCHANT BANK LTD v. OWOTEMU

(2023) LPELR-60451(CA)
“In WAEC VS Oshionebo 2006 12 NWLR (Pt 994) 258 CA, it was held that a notice of resignation is effective
not from the date of the letter, or from the date of any purported acceptance, but from the date in which the letter
was received by the employer or his agent and that tendering of a letter of resignation by an employee carries
with it the right to leave the service automatically without any benefit subject to the employees paying any of his
indebtedness to his employer. Similarly in the case of Mr. Beloved Patrick Anokwunu Vs Omatek Ventures Plc
& Anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/140/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on the 16th March,
2016, Justice B.B. Kanyip held as follows:
‘Resignation with immediate effect by an employee carries with it three legal effects.
The right to leave service automatically; the employees forfeiture of any benefit, and the employee paying any
indebtedness to his employer. The justification for having to allow the resigning employee to leave immediately
and automatically is the fact that he/she thereby forfeit any benefits she/he may be entitled to as well as the duty
to pay off all indebtedness that he/she may have towards the employer; as such, the forfeiture of benefits inures
as contractual consideration for the immediate and automatic separation of contractual relationship as per the
employment in issue. So it cannot be that an employee who resigns with immediate effect is allowed to also
benefit from such immediate separation by claiming benefits from the employer’
In the light of the above decision, the use of the word ‘effective immediately’ in Exhibit AO 012 by the claimant
means his separation from the defendant is automatic, abrupt and indeed immediate. He therefore forfeits all his
benefits accordingly under the contract except the contributory scheme which from evidence including that of
the defendant is akin to pension.”

So, the reasoning of the lower Court is that because the Cross-Appellant resigned, he forfeited all benefits under
the contract except his dues under the contributory scheme.

It is an established principle of law arising from the logic of reasoning that where there has been a
misconception as to the decision reached or arrived at by a Court in a matter, any argument flowing from that
misconception will undoubtedly be fallacious since it will be based on a wrong premise. See UDENGWU vs.
UZUEGBU (2003) 13 NWLR (PT 836) 136 at 152, LADEJOBI vs. OGUNTAYO (2004) 7 SC (PT. 1) 159 at
169, CHUKWUKELO vs. FIDELITY BANK (2020) LPELR (51632) 1 at 25-26 and ALIU vs. THE
STATE (2021) LPELR (53354) 1 at 15-16. It is on account of not having read the judgment of the lower Court
as a whole that the Cross-Appellant labours under the misconception, and consequently submitted that
the lower Court held that an employee is entitled to all his benefits and entitlements upon the determination of a
contract. No. The lower Court was explicit that an employee who resigns and brings the relationship to
an “automatic, abrupt and indeed immediate” end, forfeits all his benefits. This is a loud and clear
pronouncement by the lower Court on what reliefs the Cross Appellant is entitled to. It is even more resounding
when the lower Court held: “He therefore forfeits all his benefits accordingly under the contract except the
contributory scheme…” This issue is resolved against the Cross-Appellant.

9. An employee who resigns with immediate effect will forfeit all his employee’s benefits except
earned salary, if any. For clarity, where a contract of employment requires an employee to give notice
of resignation to the employer for a specific period and the employee abruptly ends the contract, the
employee will forfeit all claimable benefits except accrued outstanding salaries. The foregoing is
consistent with decision in the case of W.A.E.C. v. Oshionebo (supra), where the Court of Appeal
made the pronouncement that an employee’s notice of resignation with immediate effect carries with
it the right to leave the service immediately and forfeit any employee’s benefits.
It is worthy to note that the ability to distinguish between employee’s benefits and earned salaries in
an employment litigation is key to determining the scope of claims an employee who resigns with
immediate effect can make from the employer. Please note that employee benefits are non-salary
compensation that can vary from one organization to another, often indirect and non-cash payments
within a remuneration package. In this sense, earned salary would not qualify as benefit, as benefits
are add-ons to salary. So, resignation with immediate effect cannot affect or disentitle an employee to
his earned salary.