Asian Studies Review

March 2011, Vol. 35, pp. 43–62

Confucian China and Jeffersonian

America: Beyond Liberal Democracy

PETER CHANG*
Monash University

Abstract: This paper begins by reviewing the ancient Chinese worldview, one imbued
with cultural particularism wherein the Middle Kingdom identified itself as the
centre of the universe. I then distinguish the ways in which historically the Confucian
East and Christian West have respectively exerted cultural hegemony. I next
analyse China’s rebuffing of liberal democracy, and how the CCP’s retention of one-
party rule has generated concerns about its legitimacy. I conclude by showing that
China and America each possess moral traditions – specifically Confucianism and
Jeffersonian Deism – that have overlapping outlooks. Both maintain a worldview
that disavows extremism. Based on this broader philosophical-religious analysis, I
argue that contentions over liberal democracy notwithstanding, China and America
share moral ideals vital for confronting some of today’s exigencies.
Keywords: China, America, Confucianism, Jeffersonian Deism, liberal
democracy, comparative philosophy and religion, religious extremism, secular
modernity

Introduction
This study examines the Sino-US relationship from a comparative philosophical-
religious perspective. It places the ongoing dispute about liberal democracy within
the context of Eastern and Western worldviews, and argues that contentions over
democratic procedures notwithstanding, they share moral ideals vital for confront-
ing some of today’s exigencies. I begin by reviewing the ancient Chinese worldview,
one imbued with cultural particularism wherein the Middle Kingdom identified itself
as the centre of the universe. I then distinguish the ways in which historically the
East and West have respectively exerted cultural hegemony. The Confucian East, I
show, has had a strategy of passive inducement. This contrasts with the Christian
West’s proactive approach of overt conversion. In the third section I analyse China’s
rebuffing of liberal democracy, and why and how the Chinese Communist Party’s

*Correspondence Address: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, Victoria, 3800, Australia.
Email: peter.chang@monash.edu

ISSN 1035-7823 print/ISSN 1467-8403 online/11/010043-20 Ó 2011 Asian Studies Association of Australia
DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2011.552100
44 Peter Chang

retention of one-party rule has generated concerns about its legitimacy. I conclude
by showing that China and America each possess moral traditions – specifically
Confucianism and Jeffersonian Deism – that have overlapping outlooks. Both
maintain a moderate worldview that disavows extremism. Each espouses an order
grounded on civic virtues intended to militate against religious radicalism, and each
retains a reverence for the sacred, which has a remedial effect on secular modernity’s
excesses. Based on this broader philosophical-religious analysis, China and America
both possess a moral ethos that enables them to tackle contemporary crises.

The Ancient Chinese Worldview: All-Under-Heaven and the Centre of the Universe
A centrepiece of the classical Confucian worldview is its universalistic aspiration; the
Emperor is to preside over a terrestrial domain wherein all people across the four
seas should coexist in harmony. When this vision was first conceptualised, it was a
revolutionary ideal that transcended the then Han-centric parochialism. It was
described by Karl Jaspers as the ‘‘Axial Age moment’’, when ancient great
civilisations in diverse locations – including Ancient Greece, the Middle East and
India – at around the same time all propounded a similar utopian vision of a
common humanity (Jasper, 1953). Similarly, at this time, the Confucian sages
envisioned an inclusive order in which all people would stand as moral equals under
Heaven. This would become a key Confucian credo: that each person, by virtue of
being human, is endowed with the natural potential to nurture virtues that would
conform to the Heavenly principles. For this reason, every human being is deemed
sanctified and entitled to human dignity (Roetz, 1993).
That is the idealised vision; reality is another matter. The Chinese people have not
always lived up to the Confucian principle of racial impartiality, even in times of
relative peace and prosperity (Dikotter, 1992). In moments of national crisis, ignoble
instincts become more pervasive. During the Mongol Yuan (1271–1368AD) and
Manchu Qing (1644–1911AD) eras, Han demonisation of these foreign conquerors
was barely contained (Dikotter, 1992). In the lead-up to the Republic of China’s
founding in 1911, Han particularism was invoked widely to rally the masses against
the occupying colonial powers (Leibold, 2006). To the extent that Confucianism is
the avowed ideology, such chauvinisms are hypocritical lapses. However, not all
prejudices are practical failures; embedded in Chinese historical and popular
thought are crude mythologies and Han racist theories (Dikotter, 1992; 1996). As
Dikotter’s work shows, the Chinese world is stained with rabid ethnocentrism, in
practice and conviction. Indeed, in recent years, any perceived slight from the West
has been likely to stir up Han-centric nationalist passions (Gries, 1999; Zhao, 2005).
The evidence clearly indicts the Han people as having a history of racism, which is a
grave deviation from the ancient Chinese sages’ noble aspirations. Even so, because
for most of China’s dynastic history Confucianism has been the state ideology, its
idealistic ethos has been the aspirational benchmark for Chinese inter-racial
conduct. Hence, past and present failings notwithstanding, it has been Confucian
China’s unequivocal moral quest to establish an inclusive society in which all people,
regardless of ethnicity, can live in harmony.
In the Middle Kingdom, while all humans were considered equal insofar as they
were all endowed with an innate moral potential, not every human civilisation was
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 45

accorded equal status. The Confucian elites discriminated against customs and
norms deemed inferior to, and incompatible with, the Heavenly scheme. Herein, I
submit, lies the realm of civilisational conflict: philosophical schools and religious
traditions hold views that compete with and contradict each other’s sacred precepts.
During the ‘‘Hundred Schools of Thought’’ era (770–221BC), China was a mosaic
of diverse intellectual movements such as Mohism, Legalism and Daoism. These
Chinese philosophies advanced different pathways towards the Dao, the pan-
Chinese religious aspiration that loosely translates as the quest for the harmonious
coexistence of all things. Although they vied for the masses’ hearts and minds, it was
influence among the rulers that they wanted most (deBary, 1960). The Legalists, for
example, deemed that the most efficient means to maintain order was through the
draconian enforcement of a reward and punishment scheme. Their Machiavellian
worldview found favour with Qin Hsi Huang, who successfully, albeit ruthlessly,
unified China under the Qin banner (221–206BC). After the Qin’s brief and brutal
Legalist regime, the Han dynasty opted for the nobler Confucian ideal of ethical
kingship. Henceforth Confucianism was to reign supreme at virtually all Chinese
Imperial courts, a tenure that lasted until the early twentieth century. With
Confucianism dominant, other schools of thought languished. Legalism never
regained its prominence, existing only on the sidelines of China’s political thought.
Daoism retained a crucial place in the Chinese religious landscape by submitting to
the Confucian hierarchy (Kohn, 2001). Nevertheless, the Confucian-centred world is
not without plurality. At the Imperial palace, Confucian bureaucrats shared the
court with Daoist priests, astrologers, alchemists and others. In the commoners’
domain, the Confucian way of life was supplemented by folk religions, mysticism,
shamanism and the like. But there was no delusion about whose authority prevailed
when conflict arose; as first among equals, the Confucians set the overarching moral
tone and the rest had to conform (Shaughnessy, 2005).
Confucian condescension was also brought to bear on cultures outside the
Chinese world. From the Middle Kingdom’s perspective, the roaming nomads of the
steppes lacked the refined manners of a sedentary lifestyle, and so needed to adopt
the propriety of a ritualised society (Harrell, 1995). Indeed, even when subjugated
militarily by the superior Mongol and Manchu horsemen, Confucian China retained
its cultural dominance. Rather than China submitting to the victors’ ways, it was the
invaders who, over time, adopted Chinese conventions and beliefs (Franke, 1994;
Crossley, 1996).
Confucianism’s encounter with the world’s great religions is likewise marked by a
sense of superiority. Chinese Buddhism today is truly indigenised, yet its early
migration from India was fraught with hostility. For example, towards the end of
the Tang dynasty (618–907AD), the rapidly flourishing Buddhist monastic movement
was circumscribed because of a perceived threat to the Imperial state. Buddhism
eventually prevailed, however, through its painstaking grassroots inculcation and
careful existence in the Confucian-dominated kingdom (Chen, 1964). Islam’s
entrance into China during the first millennium also entailed a drawn-out process of
careful adaptation. Muslims are still required to operate in conformity with the
Confucian-defined public order (Lipman, 1997). In the seventeenth century, Jesuits
were received at the Imperial court, and commanded respectful curiosity from the
ruling intelligentsia. All the same, they were seen by the Confucian literati as just one
46 Peter Chang

group among many culturally inferior visitors (Mungello, 2005). Numerous other
foreign traditions entered the Middle Kingdom. Some, like the Nestorians, faded
away, leaving no living legacy, while others such as Buddhism, Islam, and
Christianity, survived by showing deference to the Confucian Imperial order.
At this juncture it is necessary to revisit the race issue. The preceding historical
survey has sought to distinguish racial discrimination from cultural discrimination,
and is based on the assumption that the Confucians discriminated against culture
but not against race. In reality, however, such a distinction is often difficult to find.
The Confucian censuring of Tibetan Buddhism is an apt example, being a case
where a belief system is dominated by one ethnic group. Contemporary Chinese
criticisms of Tibetan Buddhism are synonymous with censure of the Tibetan
people. Attacks on Tibetan Buddhist institutional practices, such as serfdom, are
linked directly to contempt for the Tibetan people (Sautman, 2006). The same
applies to ethnic groups that are predominantly members of a single faith, the
Muslim Uighurs being a case in point. The Imperial Confucian reproof of Islam,
in the context of the province of Xinjiang, could easily assume a racial dimension
perceived as a collective assault on the Uighur ethnic community (Gladney, 2003).
In these circumstances, criticisms of culture and race are seemingly inseparable.
Yet from the Confucian perspective it should not be the case. Even if Confucians
are patronising about Tibetan Buddhists’ religious norms, ideally they should
regard the Tibetan individual as their moral equal. That is to say, they may
disparage a practice (Tibetan Buddhist belief) as erroneous, but should not blame
the wrongdoer’s (Tibetan person’s) intrinsic nature. Humans, as the Confucian
philosopher Mencius explained, are born naturally the same. But, Mencius went
on to argue, people do diverge subsequently under the effects of culture (Mencius
6A:15). In Mencius’ view, human moral weakness is not innate; when people err, it
is due to mores and customs. Moreover, they do retain the capacity for moral
recovery. Thus, Tibetan Buddhists’ putative cultural ‘‘flaws’’ aside, the Confucians
believe the Tibetan individual retains an innate moral capacity for self-
rectification, and for this reason deserves a dignified regard.
Here, a couple of further clarifications are warranted. First, the above argument
may seem like hair-splitting, and merely an attempt to find a theoretical excuse for
the reality of prejudice. Admittedly, condemning the wrong committed without
condemning the wrong-doer is a nuance rarely achieved in practice. But some
historical examples have illustrated the underlying Confucian belief that all people,
regardless of race, possess innate moral potential that is worthy of sage-hood.
Despite Confucianism’s patronising attitude towards both Islam and Christianity,
the Hui Muslim Admiral Zheng He (1371–1435AD) and the Italian Jesuit Matteo
Ricci (1552–1610AD), on account of their respective personal qualities, were both
accepted into the Confucian ruling class (Jensen, 1997; Mungello, 2005). More
broadly, the Confucian merit-based political order was intended to transcend not
only kinship and class, but also ethnicity.1 Theoretically, any person, Han or
otherwise, who passed the Confucian civil examination qualified to become an
Imperial bureaucrat. However, induction of non-Han into China’s elite intellectual,
moral and political inner circle was the exception rather than the norm.
Nevertheless, exceptions did occur and attest to the potential of the Confucian
universal vision of a common humanity.
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 47

This leads to a second point of clarification. Confucianism accepts that all people,
whether Han, Tibetan, Uighur or whatever, possess the innate ability to become
sages. That said, the Chinese are also convinced of the superiority of the Confucian
way. This means that in order to nurture and actualise human moral potential,
people must embark on a self-cultivation program and/or embrace a religious
tradition that conforms to, or at least does not violate, Confucian precepts. Thus,
even though the egalitarian doctrine of human nature is affirmed, Confucianism’s
sense of cultural supremacy remains. No people or moral traditions can contravene
core Confucian values.
The Confucian tradition’s confidence in its cultural preeminence is evident
throughout Chinese history. Yet from a comparative religion perspective, it has two
important liberal attributes. The first pertains to the abovementioned Axial Age
feature. Like Christianity, Confucian universalism opens its membership to all
ethnicities. This is in contrast to exclusivist religious traditions such as Shintoism
and Judaism, where affiliation is defined by bloodline (Underwood, 1934; Dimont,
2004). The second feature relates to the Confucian tolerance of other religions. Like
Christianity, Confucianism regards other traditions as inferior. However, unlike
Christianity, Confucianism allows people to hold additional religious beliefs. It is
customary for a Chinese to adopt hyphenated religious identities such as Daoist-
Buddhist-Confucian, or Christian-Confucian (Ching, 1977). This is in contrast to,
for example, Christianity’s demand for undivided allegiance. A convert to
Christianity must renounce the old entirely and embrace the new exclusively. In
the Chinese case, a person can follow Confucian philosophy without denouncing
other belief systems. This is not an ecumenical alliance of equals, as the Confucians
assert their supreme authority when conflict arises. Still, they are not totalistic
insofar as full conversion is not mandatory, and people are allowed to maintain a
diverse religiosity (Berthrong, 1994; Ching, 1977).
To sum up, while universality and inclusiveness confer upon Confucianism certain
liberal traits, Confucians see themselves as culturally superior, as first among equals.
The ancient Chinese believed that Heaven intended humans to coexist in harmony
on earth. And the Confucian world has room for multi-religious collaboration to
bring about this ideal. Even so, in the final analysis, Confucians are certain that they
possess the superior way to actualise the Dao. For this reason, all people and moral
traditions must conform to, or at least not violate, the Confucian order.

Competition between East and West

As Imperial China expanded, it left Confucian cultural imprints on the conquered.
China is not alone in having such imperialistic tendencies. Throughout history,
various world empires have exerted similar civilising effects upon those deemed
barbaric. Christian churches have always taken to heart Jesus’ ‘‘Great Commission’’
to proclaim the Gospel to the world. Eighteenth-century Western colonial expansion
was motivated in part by the Christian determination to save the souls of the
heathen. When civilisations imbued with a sense of cultural particularism meet,
skirmishes should be expected. While these encounters are often framed in terms of
hard-power conflict, there are also crucial contests on the plane of soft power. The
world’s major cultural forces compete, through ideas and values, for global
48 Peter Chang

dominance. The contemporary Western world’s unwavering advocacy of liberal

democracy is a prime example.
The United States of America sees itself as the standard-bearer of Western
civilisation. The Americans articulate an ideal that for much of the twentieth century
commanded the world’s centre stage. In the preamble to the US Declaration of
Independence are these words:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

America’s founding fathers envisioned a nation guided by the principles of equality

and liberty, wherein all people, regardless of race and creed, could coexist in
harmony. Admittedly, it was not until the 1960s civil rights movement that these
egalitarian aspirations began to be realised. Some would argue that the US has yet
to put the race issue to rest, even as a black President governs from the White House
(Steele, 2008). These failures notwithstanding, America, like Confucian China, holds
to an impartial social order for all people. Like the Chinese, the Americans believe
they have crafted a superior means to achieve a just and free society. They have
institutionalised a government that is, in the words of their nation’s founding
principles, of, for, and, most importantly, by, the people. The last component of this
founding principle represents liberal democracy’s core tenet: the citizenry’s right to
greater self-governance. These accomplishments instilled in the American psyche a
profound sense of historical exceptionalism – the ‘‘new Jerusalem’’ that is to shine a
bright light as the ‘‘Beacon on the Hill’’, to spread equality and liberty to the world
(Tiryakian, 1993). More recently, this confidence has been expressed via the
pronouncement that the attainment of American-style democracy means the end of
history; humanity’s long quest for the perfect way being over (Fukuyama, 1992).
The ancient Chinese were no less sure of their Confucian ideals. However, there
are differences in how the East and the West have historically exerted their cultural
superiority. I shall begin by examining the contemporary political deployment of
Confucianism. In recent years, Beijing has embarked on a high-profile campaign to
establish a global network of Confucius Institutes as a way to project China’s soft
power (Paradise, 2009). On the surface, this looks like a demonstration of
assertiveness; yet Beijing’s behaviour belies a more defensive position. Confucianism
is mostly invoked in the context of repelling the West and defending what China
regards as her prerogative to reform the nation with ‘‘Chinese characteristics’’. In
contrast to the Western presumption of the universal utility of liberal democracy,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has issued no declaration that Confucianism
is the model for a new global order; nor has it displayed any overt ambition to
transform the world in the Confucian mould (Gills, 2006). If anything, Beijing’s
tactic has been to defend each nation-state’s right to self-determination and to plead
for diversity. In China’s international engagement, relations between China and
Africa, for example, reflect this stance. Even as Chinese commercial interests have
expanded and multiplied, China has maintained a non-interference policy in foreign
countries’ domestic affairs. Many in the West have been irked by China’s
indiscriminate dealings with some African dictatorships, and its seeming indifference
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 49

to the civil and humanitarian plight of many Africans. If Chinese civilisation is

founded on supposedly superior moral principles, why is the PRC reluctant to apply
more pressure to its African trading partners? More broadly, why is there no explicit
Confucian-China attempt to compete with Western liberal democracy for global
soft-power dominance?
One explanation for China’s current defensive posture may be linked to its lack of
confidence. For a good part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Chinese self-
esteem was low. Imperial China, contented and conceited for much of its long
history, was finally awakened to its backwardness with the arrival of superior
Western powers. Confucianism became the scapegoat for the defeat and humiliation
China suffered. A great deal of soul-searching followed. Doubt abounded as to
whether the allegedly exceptional Sinic civilisation was compatible with modernity
and scientific progress (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006). Unsurprisingly, the Chinese
Communist leadership jettisoned feudalistic traditions to embrace new, modern
Marxism. Since the reform era that began in 1978, people have asked whether the
PRC’s problematic experiment with Communism has run its course. Many concur
that Beijing is faced with the urgent task of updating its political ideology and
governmental infrastructure to cope with increasingly complex domestic exigencies
and global challenges (Shambaugh, 2008). The CCP is exploring various avenues,
including reviving the once-vilified Confucianism. The leadership has touted the
Confucian notion of a harmonious world, and defended its communitarian ethos
(Ai, 2009). But these reforms remain mainly in the realm of rhetoric; there are not
yet any concrete proposals for fundamental government restructuring. By most
accounts, China is still in recovery mode, with no viable comprehensive substitute
for Marxism in sight (Shambaugh, 2008). Though the eventual outcome of China’s
political reform remains uncertain, one thing seems clear: Beijing does not take
readily to the West lecturing it, especially on liberal democracy. For this reason,
Confucianism is invoked chiefly to ward off what China regards as Western
interference in its domestic affairs.
The above review provides some explanation for China’s current non-intrusive
foreign policy. Infuriated by the West’s meddling, it is no surprise that Beijing has
largely stayed clear of other nations’ domestic issues. Another reason is that China
simply does not (yet) have a credible ‘‘Chinese political model’’ to offer as an
alternative to Western liberal democracy (Huang and Sheng, 2006; Shambaugh,
2008). In many ways, China is in a discovery phase, studying various options,
deciding whether to upgrade or phase out the Marxist socialist model. Thus, for the
moment, China’s Confucian project is primarily a defensive endeavour not intended
to compete with the West for global supremacy.
That said, China is transforming rapidly, and today’s tentativeness could swiftly
be supplanted by renewed confidence. Should that happen, a revitalised Confucian
China could present a more assertive cultural challenge to the West. And given
historical precedents, the Chinese soft-power projection could assume a form
different from that used by the West. In general, the West’s modus operandi has been
proactive – to take its model to all mankind. Today, democratic values are promoted
vigorously across the globe; some wars have even been waged and justified in the
name of liberty and equality. China may well seek to transform the world, but it may
do so in a less overt way.
50 Peter Chang

Although Confucians have engaged in aggressive civilising efforts in some

instances, as was the case with the nomadic pastoral societies, this approach was
aimed mainly at those who impinged directly upon or adjoined the Middle
Kingdom, or threatened the Empire. Beyond these interventions, China’s cultural
imperialism was usually less confrontational. It operated via the tributary system,
and was directed primarily at Korea, Japan and Vietnam and the other Southeast
Asian states (Fairbank, 1942). Tributary states paid homage to the Chinese
Emperor; in return the suzerain power of these states established trade ties and in
some cases formed a protectorate alliance. Under the tributary system, Imperial
China did not occupy territory or impose political-cultural norms, and the tributary
kingdoms retained a considerable degree of autonomy and sovereignty (Kang,
2009).
Nevertheless, China’s power was exerted regionally rather than globally. Zheng
He’s maritime expeditions were the exception. From 1405, this Ming admiral
commanded a series of voyages towards the West, eventually reaching Africa’s
eastern shores. Although tributary ties were formalised with Southeast Asian
sovereignties such as the Malacca sultanate, records show that Zheng He’s main
objective was commerce, with no overt ambition for outright political-cultural
domination.2 The Ming mission lasted just under three decades. In 1433, with the
admiral’s death, the Ming armada was summoned back to port and the fleet retired
(Holmes, 2007). China’s Imperial concerns were once again confined to domestic
and regional affairs, especially on its northern borders.
If Confucian China considered itself culturally superior, why did it tolerate
diversity rather than demand full conformity from its tributary subjects? And if the
Middle Kingdom sat at the centre of the universe, why were there no great efforts to
propagate the Confucian ethos to the ends of the earth? It is salutary to re-state the
key points made in the first part of this study; the Chinese harmonious order is not a
constellation of equals. The Confucian takes central command in this assemblage of
diverse actors. The fact that China’s superiority is presumed, yet its power not
always imposed, speaks to the classical Confucian idealistic approach to moral
cultivation.
It is the Confucian preference, particularly of the Mencius school, to bring about
moral change through inner conversion rather than external compulsion (Bloom,
1997). At the level of statecraft, this translated into the doctrine of the exemplary
ruler in which Imperial China’s dominance was to be projected outwards via
superior virtue rather than military prowess (Analects 12:19). The ancient
Confucians were convinced that when the Emperor reigned benignly, the minor
kingdoms would be won over, without coercion, to the way of the Middle Kingdom.
This idealistic belief in the transformative power of benevolent kingship is one
reason that China’s rulers were not more assertive in forcing cultural conformity on
their client states.
Another cornerstone of the Confucian moral project was the concentric circle
doctrine. The ancient Chinese moral ambition was universal, yet for the Confucian,
to attain global preeminence the process must begin locally. In order to influence the
world, the transformation had to commence within the individual and from the
home. This strategy led to an unintended trait in the Chinese world – namely,
parochialism. As a general rule, attention to the internal undermines external
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 51

commitment. Moreover, in light of the aforementioned Confucian idealism, the

Chinese obsession with moral perfection at home detracted from their obligations
abroad. That is to say, they are inclined to become preoccupied with domestic
matters and feel that until these are resolved there is no moral justification for
becoming engaged in other people’s affairs.
Indeed, Confucianism’s famous critique of the Mohist invocation of universal
love emphasises this view. Mo Tzu argues that to secure harmony in the Middle
Kingdom, one must at the same time make the calculated move to placate the
roaming tribes on the steppe. The Confucians faulted Mo Tzu on two counts. First,
the Mohist approach contravenes the concentric circle principle, attempting to settle
faraway problems without reconciling matters at home. Indeed, the Confucians
blamed the Mohists for practising an ‘‘ethics without father’’, an implicit accusation
of their failure to fulfil basic familial duties such as filial piety. This leads to the
second criticism, of the hollowness of Mo Tzu’s moral endeavour. The universal love
the Mohists espoused is seen to be guided by strategic self-interest rather than
sincere benevolence. For the Confucians, the Mohists’ attempt to appease the
frontier tribes through utilitarian goodwill would prove ineffectual and yield
superficial outcomes at best (Chan, 1963). Thus, Confucian idealism, compounded
by localism, is one possible explanation for the ancient Chinese world’s insularity
and at times seeming indifference to the outside world.
Different strategies notwithstanding, the Christian West and Confucian East are
set to compete for global influence. As noted, Beijing at present is on a defensive
footing, and does not pose a direct cultural challenge to America’s preeminence.
Nonetheless, the PRC’s rising economic clout, developing military prowess, and
continuing resistance to liberal democracy are causing some consternation in the
West. Indeed, there is a growing apprehension that the current international order,
essentially founded on Western liberal democratic principles, could be undermined
by an increasingly powerful yet authoritarian China.

The China Model

In spite of the PRC’s astounding economic transformation, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) one-party regime remains opaque, especially from the perspective of the
Western world. The Chinese state’s heavy-handed silencing of dissent, and harsh
treatment of its own citizens for various reasons, affects China’s credibility abroad
(Chang, 2001). Beijing is not insensitive to its unfavourable standing overseas and is
working to enhance its international image. To that end, the Chinese leadership has
initiated wide-ranging political reforms, to strengthen domestic governance and
improve the PRC’s global status. I will present an overview of two areas of vital
change – namely, institutionalisation of leadership and strengthening of the rule of
law.
Modelled after the Leninist state, political authority in the PRC is invested in an
inner circle of men, headed by a paramount leader. This narrow concentration of
power, without alternative centres to counterbalance it, renders the system
vulnerable to the tyranny of the ‘‘personality cult’’, as demonstrated by the Cultural
Revolution of the 1960s. After 1978, the CCP vowed never again to allow a repeat of
personality-cult rule. Accordingly, it institutionalised a ‘‘collective leadership’’,
52 Peter Chang

setting the terms and age limits for politburo members, designed to curb ‘‘strongman
dictatorship’’ and to ensure a more predictable transfer of leadership (Jing, 2008;
Miller, 2008). At the provincial level, the central government installed safeguards
against party cadres’ abuse of authority, such as the rotation of governors to prevent
the accrual of local power (Jing, 2008). In some provinces, China has also
experimented with open democratic elections for township and county-level leaders.
Another arena of significant reform is in law and order. In the past decade,
considerable resources have been invested in strengthening the rule of law (deLisle,
2008). The result has been an emerging body of sophisticated statutes, mainly in the
economic and business fields, and to a lesser extent in the criminal, civil and
bioethical domains (Potter, 2004). While Chinese in essence, studies indicate that
these reforms incorporate significant borrowings from and adaptation of interna-
tional norms and the Western legal tradition (Potter, 2001; deLisle, 2008).
Additionally, the PRC legal workforce’s credentials have improved. China’s lawyers
and judges today are better trained and qualified to meet the challenges of an ever
more sophisticated and litigious Chinese society (Lo, 2005).
Institutionalised leadership and enhanced legislation have strengthened discipline
in CCP ranks and bolstered public law enforcement. Clearly, this is significant
progress. But China’s political reform continues to fall short of Western
expectations. And the strongest criticism is levelled at the CCP’s retention of one-
party rule (Nathan, 2008). Aside from denying universal suffrage, it raises concerns
regarding effective institutional checks and balances. Under the present closed
political system, there is no real separation of powers in the CCP-PRC party-state.
Lacking autonomous external overseers – that is, a credible opposition – there are
doubts as to whether the CCP can truly police itself and the country. This leads to
another critical fault-line: the PRC’s claim to support the rule of law. For some
critics, the legal developments achieved thus far have merely reinforced Beijing’s
‘‘rule by law’’ (deLisle, 2008). China is not yet a land where the rule of law reigns
supreme. As the dominant authority, and with no legal avenue available to challenge
its power, the CCP is able to rewrite the law of the land at will. With no equal
competing power – for instance, an independent judiciary – qualms remain as to
whether the CCP can be truly disinterested (Findlay, 1999). For this reason,
perceptions persist in the West of China as a country governed by opaque, arbitrary
standards (Potter, 2004).
The CCP’s grip on power has spawned various prognoses for the future. There are
grounds for querying Confucianism’s compatibility with aspects of Western-style
liberal democracy. For instance, the Confucian hierarchical order, with its emphasis
on harmony, may stifle liberal democracy’s favoured method of conflict resolution –
that is, open dissent and free debate (deBary and Tu, 1998). Moreover,
Confucianism’s communitarian culture, where the collective good tends to take
precedence over the individual, could limit the scope of individual rights and liberty
(Bell, 2000). Be that as it may, there is no basis for arguing that Confucianism is
intrinsically averse to a multi-party political system. In East Asian jurisdictions such
as Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and Japan, where the Confucian ethos prevails, an
open political contest for national leadership has been successfully implemented for
some time (Marsh, 1999). Thus, while a penchant for conformity may inhibit
discord, and could cause some Asian democracies such as Singapore to hold a less
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 53

than liberal stance, it does not render Confucianism essentially incongruent with
competitive elections.
Political rather than cultural factors are the more plausible explanation for the
CCP’s reluctance to contemplate the prospect of potential rivals. One argument is
that the members of the CCP, at least the upper echelon, regard themselves as
China’s sole, rightful rulers. This is especially true with regard to the PRC’s
founding members, who as revolutionary heroes felt entitled to preside over China
exclusively (Miller, 2008). However, as the CCP top brass goes through generational
change, this sense of entitlement derived from personal bonds with the revolutionary
struggle will wane. Over time, younger CCP leaders, like the upcoming fifth
generation, may be more open to outside competition for the right to govern China
(Cheng, 2008; Miller, 2008).
Risk aversion is perhaps the strongest reason for the CCP’s current stance.
China’s rapid economic development has generated many internal challenges, and
the emerging world power is fragile in critical areas: the widening rich-poor gap; the
rural-urban divide; an ageing population; the Tibet and Xinjiang ethnic conflicts;
and environmental crisis (Shirk, 2007). There is genuine concern among the ruling
elite that a hasty political transformation could unravel the current economic
miracle and engender social unrest. For this reason, the ‘‘Asian values’’ maxim,
propounded in the 1990s, continues to hold sway in China – namely, prioritise
economic rights over civil liberties; eliminate poverty and broaden the middle-class
base; and proceed incrementally with democratisation (Peerenboom, 2007). Once
derided by Western analysts, this line of argument is gaining acceptance largely due
to some recent empirical support. Singapore provides the strongest case. The island-
state’s living standard is today one of Asia’s highest. Though still relatively
authoritarian, this Asian Tiger’s public space is widening and its civil society is
displaying a new vibrancy (Peerenboom, 2007). By comparison, developing nations
such as the Philippines and Thailand, which have recently embraced liberal
democracy, have struggled to overcome poverty, while basic law and order remains
an ongoing concern (Croissant, 2004). In other situations – Iraq and Afghanistan,
for example – the rushed imposition of liberal democratic norms has caused weak
states to descend into further chaos (Diamond, 2005). These mixed records have led
scholars to concede that one-size-fits-all democracy, particularly of the Western
liberal form, does not, after all, fit all. Cognisant of these less-than-successful
democratisation processes, and wary of domestic fragility, the CCP leadership
believes there is reason to proceed with caution in implementing its democratic
reforms, and to defer any plan for a multi-party political system (Yu, 2008; Yang,
2009).
To critics, China’s slow-paced democratisation process is a misjudgment. Faced
with mounting challenges from an increasingly complex Chinese society, Beijing
should hasten rather than slow its political liberalisation. Without a robust civil
society, they argue, there are doubts as to whether the PRC can truly confront its
endemic corruption, widening wealth disparity, and worsening environmental crises
(Chang, 2001; Pei, 2008). The current strong economic growth is providing the CCP
regime with some legitimacy and keeping the lid on discontent. However,
circumstances could become unfavourable and the existing political and govern-
mental infrastructure could prove ill-equipped to cope with such a contingency
54 Peter Chang

(Fewsmith, 2008; McGregor, 2010). On the world stage, the PRC authoritarian one-
party state remains at odds with an international order governed along liberal
democratic principles. As China becomes more integrated into the global system,
anxiety abounds as to whether Beijing can be counted on as a responsible
stakeholder and international partner (Huang, 2006; Lampton, 2007). Some recent
reports suggest that the CCP regime is responding more readily to international
expectations. For example, while still not in step with the West, the PRC is assuming
a generally cooperative stance in hotspots such as Iran and North Korea. Even so,
on the whole the Western perception of China remains one of guarded suspicion at
best. Concern persists as to whether the existing international order under Western
leadership would survive if an autocratic China took on a more dominant position
(Ikenberry, 2008; Jing, 2008).
China today is projecting her soft power on/across various fronts (Gill, 2006).
Beijing, however, is on the defensive politically, resisting pressure for greater reform.
The slow pace of political liberalisation is a critical concern, with possible dire
ramifications for the CCP’s national legitimacy and, not least, the PRC’s
international credibility. Undoubtedly, China’s retention of autocratic one-party
rule will for the foreseeable future remain a point of tension in the Sino-US
relationship.

The Moderate Worldview

America’s founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson in particular, trace their moral and
intellectual lineage to the Deists (Holmes, 2006). Deism, an offshoot of
Christianity, was a reactionary movement that rose out of seventeenth-century
England’s religious-civil war. These admirers of the ancient Stoics were appalled
by the atrocities committed in God’s name, and attributed the violence to the
Church privileging Christian special revelation over general revelation. The
former are extra-rational divine insights revealed exclusively to Christians, while
the latter are reason-guided precepts revealed in nature that are discernible to all
humankind. In the Deists’ assessment, beliefs founded on special revelation are
inherently subjective. They are the root cause of religious vindictiveness and
intolerance as Christians imposed these dogmas on each other and on non-
Christians.
The moral order, according to the Deists, should be grounded on universal
ethical principles. Reason is the means of deciphering moral laws enshrined in
nature for the purpose of human governance. Accordingly, the Deists rejected
certain special revelation-inspired Christian beliefs. The Trinity is one example; a
mystical doctrine that was the cause of considerable ecclesiastical and political
violence, even deaths, within the English establishment. By according primacy to
natural law, the Deists sought to widen the communal tent to embrace all,
regardless of creed, and so end the dreadful religious excesses of the seventeenth
century. The poet Alexander Pope gave voice to a common Deist sentiment of
the time:

Nature and Nature’s law lay hid in night.

God said: ‘‘Let Newton be’’, and all was light. (quoted in Waring, 1967)
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 55

Having their origins in the late sixteenth century, the Deists took some time to
evolve before emerging as an identifiable movement in the late seventeenth century.
Even then, they did not become an organised religious order. In fact, the Deists’
precise identities remain somewhat murky.3 Their unorthodox viewpoint forced
them into a pseudo-underground existence. Historically, the Deists’ standing in
seventeenth-century England was ambiguous. The Church of England, for instance,
was critical of what it perceived as the Deist paring down of religion. To be sure,
Deism did not engender the same outright hostility as did atheism, but it nonetheless
existed under a cloud of ecclesiastical suspicion (Gay, 1968).
English political elites were more sympathetic, not least because some in their
ranks were, if not Deists, persuaded by certain Deist arguments. Of these, John
Locke is of paramount significance. The Deistic theme is palpable in Locke’s major
writings such as Letters Concerning Toleration, The Reasonableness of Christianity
and Two Treatises of Government. Through these works, Locke translated the
Deists’ moral vision into political reality. They provided the conceptual framework
that led to landmark legislation in England, of which the 1689 Bill of Rights –
enacted to protect, among other things, individual freedom of conscience – is one
example.
Jefferson’s indebtedness to Deism and Locke is clear. Both the United States’
Declaration of Independence and its Constitution bear the Deist and Locke imprint.
Of particular importance is the doctrine of the separation of church and state. It
gave America its distinctive feature, a social-political order grounded on civic
principles, with theology no longer the ultimate authority in public affairs (Butler,
2000). Laws were passed to protect freedom of religion, whereby diverse groups such
as the Non-Conformists, Puritans and Baptists, having fled persecution at home,
now enjoyed liberty of belief in the New World. Undoubtedly, modern America is
founded upon a Deist-inspired Jeffersonian worldview, one that seeks to transcend
sectarianism through civil governance. By and large, Americans have rallied around
the US Constitution, pledging allegiance to a set of non-sectarian civic virtues that
Robert Bellah calls America’s ‘‘civil religion’’ (Bellah, 2005).
Confucianism’s status as a religion is the subject of ongoing debate. This is mainly
due to the bland Confucian depiction of the transcendent, referred to simply as
Heaven. In addition, the Confucian sages are preoccupied primarily with this-
worldly affairs. The following student-teacher exchange recorded in the Analects
provides an example:

Zilu asked how to serve the spirits and gods. The Master said: ‘‘You are not
yet able to serve men, how could you serve the spirits?’’

Zilu said: ‘‘May I ask you about death?’’ The Master said: ‘‘You do not yet
know life, how could you know death?’’ (Analects 11:12) (Watson, 2007, p. 73).

In classical Confucianism there is a disdain for other-worldly matters and undue

speculation into the metaphysical. Though not dismissive of the supernatural, the
Confucian priority is to maintain a harmonious social order anchored chiefly in
general moral principles rather than religious creeds (Hucker, 1975). Precedence is
accorded to the mundane here-and-now rather than the ethereal hereafter. To be
56 Peter Chang

sure, Imperial China had provision for religiosity; believers were allowed to practise
various beliefs. However, practitioners also had to abide by the Confucian civic
ideals of moral behaviour, such as the duty of filial piety (Ching, 1977).
Confucian China and Jeffersonian America are two worldviews that privilege the
civil order. In the past, America’s elevation of general revelation and China’s
emphasis on the ‘‘this-worldly’’ realm were critical in containing religiously-inspired
violence. In America it was to avert a repeat of seventeenth-century English religious
warfare (Butler, 2000). In China’s case, the earthly emphasis was needed to curb
recurring religious-motivated unrest such as the White Lotus uprising, the Taiping
rebellion, and the Boxer rebellion (Katz, 2007). Thus, historically, in both Confucian
China and Jeffersonian America there were apprehensions about religiously
stimulated crises and a corresponding accent on the temporal order. The prioritising
of civic virtues has obvious contemporary significance.
The separation of church and state remains a cornerstone of the contemporary
American social-political order. To be clear, it is not an impermeable partition, and
the dividing line is a point of contention. American religious constituents, some with
fundamentalist tendencies, do exert considerable sway on the political process
(Phillips, 2006). Even so, the founding father’s exhortation to civility in matters of
belief remains effective and has kept the mainstream US body politic free of
religiously-perpetrated violence.4
In the PRC, the case for restraint on religious matters is harder to justify,
complicated by the Communists’ historical bias against religion. Since 1978, there
has been a greater space for practitioners of various faiths, yet China’s human rights
record on religious freedom remains a subject of international censure (DuBois,
2010). Beijing may have legitimate worries about ethno-religious violence emanating
from within, or from across its border, but these concerns are undermined by the
government’s overly harsh reactions to the alleged threat from some religious
groups. At this time, the plea for restraint could arguably be directed at the CCP
regime’s policing of domestic religious activities. That said, the PRC’s tough stance
on religion is less contentious in the international arena and from the perspective of
the relationships between nation-states.
The current Western-led international order is governed by reason-guided norms;
nation-states interact on the basis of rational principles (Hurd, 2004). Yet keeping
religion out of global politics is no guarantee of a world free of conflict; secular
states do instigate and wage war.5 But to open nation-state discourse to non-
rational, other-worldly criteria would undoubtedly complicate international
diplomacy and risk religion-induced clashes. As it is, the world is under the threat
of religious militancy, perpetrated by state and non-state actors alike. In this regard,
the PRC’s secular and Confucian earthly emphases are congruent with existing
expectations of international behaviour. Likewise, the Jeffersonian Deistic stress on
reasonableness is a check on theology’s influence on America’s foreign policy. These
are significant in two ways. Despite other incompatibilities with the West, China
agrees with America on trying to minimise religion’s impact on international
governance. More importantly, if guided by Confucianism and Jeffersonian Deism,
China and America are unlikely to instigate war in the name of religion. And the
Sino-US relationship is less likely to be engulfed by a religion-inspired clash of
civilisations.
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 57

The respective moral traditions of China and America – namely, Confucianism

and Jeffersonian Deism – both subscribe to a worldview that renounces religious
radicalism. In an age where unchecked religious zeal remains a potent danger, the
Chinese and American forebears’ non-sectarian civic-mindedness has critical import.
Confucian China and Jeffersonian America, I submit, broadly share a moral
temperament that is vital to offset present-day threats such as religious extremism.
Though wary of unrestrained religiosity, Confucian China and Jeffersonian
America are not totally this-worldly. Both Confucianism and Deism seek to account
for the mundane without disregarding the transcendent. Unlike an atheist state,
Jeffersonian America maintains a judicious reverence for the supernatural sphere
(Sanford, 1984). After all, the US Declaration of Independence plainly affirms
the ‘‘Creator’’ as author of human equality and liberty.6 For all their fixations on the
terrestrial order, Chinese dynasties were in essence founded upon respect for the
celestial realm.7 As an illustration, the Imperial calendar was organised around
elaborate festivities to commemorate the Heavens (Hucker, 1975). Thus, Confucian
China and Jeffersonian America are not disenchanted civilisations, as deference to
the divine remains in both. Their retained spirituality, I submit, has a critical role in
tempering contemporary secular-modernity dominance.
The PRC’s rapid economic growth has improved the material well-being of its
citizens but left many Chinese spiritually impoverished. With Marxism on the
decline, there is acknowledgment that China may be entering an ideological and
moral vacuum. Materialism, consumerism, and blatant greed have become the ethos
of many in China (Ci, 2009). Beijing is mindful of the ominous social consequences
that may follow. Despite the aforementioned tight rein on religion, the CCP is in fact
turning to China’s ancient traditions as one source of moral remedy. There is a
resurgence of religiosity in China, although the freedom allowed remains restrictive
by Western standards (Overmyer, 2003). Be that as it may, it is within this confined
space that Confucianism, together with other religious traditions, is being revived to
loosen materialism’s grip on modern China.
In the West, though the ‘‘death of religion’’ thesis is widely disputed, there is less
contention over the domination of modernity. For critics, the root of today’s global
predicament is seen as the excesses of modernity (Gedicks, 2004). Driven by
instrumental rationality, humankind has embarked on the pursuit of material wealth
that has hollowed out humanity’s soul and devastated the natural world. The
response is a call for a return to the pre-Enlightenment cultural heritage. Not
unexpectedly, this back-to-the-roots process is contentious. In the US, it is
compounded by an increasingly multi-cultural and multi-religious landscape. To
begin with, Jeffersonian Deism and the aforementioned status of the ‘‘civil religion’’
as a bona fide moral authority are questioned by some (Anthony, 1982). Yet efforts
by conservative Christians to restore public morality are not universally appreciated
either. There is serious discord over the appropriate religious response to secular
modernity. Nonetheless, there is agreement, at least in the moral establishments in
America, that some spiritual renewal is needed to supplement or supplant
modernity’s thin morality.
Beyond the social-moral predicament, the new millennium is also plagued by
a worsening environmental crisis. Modernisation and industrialisation have exacted
a tremendous environmental cost. While sceptics persist, mainstream scientific
58 Peter Chang

opinion warns that the current rate of human activity is environmentally

unsustainable. Efforts to avert further degradation call for all-encompassing
responses – that is, the political courage to reconcile competing demands for
human welfare alongside nature’s well-being. On the scientific-technological front,
there is an imperative to speed the development of the efficient use of resources
and alternative forms of energy. While these multi-disciplinary endeavours
are vital, others diagnose the problem as ultimately a moral crisis. On the
basis of instrumental rationality, the natural world has been treated as a mere
means to satisfy humankind’s insatiable appetites in a world that has lost
reverence for nature’s sanctity. For this reason, the solution to nature’s woes
must entail a spiritual transformation of the existing mechanised and materialistic
worldview.
It needs to be said that the religion-ecology relationship is not without
controversy. Christianity, for example, is blamed for an anthropocentrism that
has justified the human subjugation of nature (White, 1967). Eastern religions
espouse a more symbiotic anthropocosmic vision, yet scholars point out that the
Asian environmental record is no better than that of the West (Tuan, 1967). Even so,
the argument about religion’s efficacy remains. Advocates believe that if nurtured
appropriately, religiosity could enhance the human emotional bond with nature.
Christian churches, for example, are reaffirming a God-centred, stewardship-guided
human relationship with nature as a way to rekindle a sacred reverence for creation
(Stackhouse, 1991). In the East, Confucian-Daoist-Buddhist resources are being
retrieved to reawaken the traditional Chinese veneration for the earth (Tucker, 1991;
Tu, 2002). In America, the environmental/nature movement shares Jefferson’s
Deistic pedigree. Transcendentalists such as Henry Thoreau and Ralph Waldo
Emerson, inspired indirectly by Eastern spirituality, pioneered a way of life that is
more compatible with nature. Thus, faced with an ailing ecosystem, the religious
communities of China and America are advancing a spiritual response to what they
perceive as modernity’s relentless exploitation of the natural world (McDaniel,
2007).
To recap, though wary of religious fanaticism, Confucian China and Jeffersonian
America retain a due deference for the sacred. In today’s world dominated by
secular modernity, Eastern and Western traditional spiritualities have utility.
Chinese and American religious resources are being mobilised to deal with, among
other things, their respective deteriorating social-moral conditions, to confront the
common threat of the global environmental crisis. Thus, in China and America, I
submit, there are moral traditions that share a reverence for the sacred that is critical
to addressing the other adversary of our time – namely, secular modernity.

Conclusion
China and America are representatives of great civilisations imbued with cultural
particularism and historical exceptionalism. Not surprisingly, the 21st-century Sino-
US relationship is strained with rivalry. China’s rebuff of liberal democracy is
perceived as a challenge that could undermine the Western-dominated global order.
Nevertheless, the East-West relationship need not be framed wholly in adversarial
terms. As presented, Confucian China and Jeffersonian America share moderate
 Confucian China and Jeffersonian America: Philosophies for Sino–US Coexistence 59

philosophical-religious temperaments that have efficacy as checks against religious

extremism and modernity’s excesses.
There is one other common ideal – namely, Confucian China and Jeffersonian
America’s vision of one humanity. This ideal is important because race relations are
still a critical global concern, not least in China and America. In fact, I argue,
xenophobia is a serious threat to East-West relations. On either side of the East-
West divide there are radicals ready to incite racial fear. As described above, the
Chinese world is vulnerable to Han-centric prejudices. Indeed, Chinese and
American relations could fall captive to racial enmity and ethnocentric nationalism
(Zhao, 2005; Gries, 1999). Therefore, the Confucian and Jeffersonian utopian
visions of universal kinship have moral pertinence today. They serve to exhort
Chinese and Americans, leaders and citizens alike, to stay faithful to their forebears’
ideals and to resist the baser instincts of ethnocentrism.
In conclusion, the Sino-US relationship is undoubtedly complex at many levels,
with China’s lack of political reform being a chief concern. Yet from the
philosophical-religious ‘‘big picture’’ perspective, vital core values and interests
link Confucian China and Jeffersonian America. Both civilisations affirm a vision of
a common humanity and seek a moderate pathway towards that universal goal,
rejecting religious extremism and the excesses of secular modernity. Thus, when set
within this broader context of moral ideals, I submit that the liberal democracy
argument over universal suffrage and multi-party political systems, serious as it is, is
not an all-out clash of civilisational values. In fact, I argue, it is a disagreement over
the means to achieve Confucian China and Jeffersonian America’s common
aspiration – namely, the harmonious coexistence of all people.

Notes
1. Imperial China’s merit-based social-political system intended to ensure open access. Nevertheless,
this was not available to women. In this regard, the Confucians, notwithstanding their
meritocratic doctrine, sustained a world order that was paternalistic and patriarchal.
2. Zheng He’s expedition may have been guided by commercial diplomacy, but the Ming rulers were
by no means uniformly benevolent. On the contrary, they are infamous for their despotic
domestic rule. See Johnston (1995).
3. Among those assigned the Deist label were Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Charles Blount, Matthew
Tindel, John Toland and Anthony Collins.
4. America is not immune from religious violence. The Oklahoma bombing in 1995 and various
attacks on abortion clinics in recent decades show that the freedom espoused can be abused. Yet,
for now, America remains relatively safe from home-grown religious extremism.
5. North Korea is a prime example – a totalitarian secular state whose behaviour borders on the
irrational.
6. For additional readings on America’s religious roots see Bellah (2005) and Wald and Calhoun-
Brown (2006).
7. The Confucian tradition is not homogeneous. Neo-Confucianism, for example, exhibits a
proclivity for the metaphysical. Though in the main this-worldly, there are strands within the
Confucian tradition that display other-worldly tendencies.

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