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How (should) public authorities report on state-owned enterprises for

financial sustainability and cutback management—a new quality model

Article in Public Money & Management · February 2014

DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2014.887519

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 International
Review of
Administrative
Article Sciences
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Administrative Sciences
0(0) 1–21
Clearing the fog for an overall ! The Author(s) 2017
view on state-owned-enterprises: Reprints and permissions:
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quality of aggregate holdings DOI: 10.1177/0020852316681445
journals.sagepub.com/home/ras
reporting by public administrations
in 12 countries
Ulf Papenfuß
Zeppelin University, Germany

Lars Steinhauer
Leipzig University, Germany

Benjamin Friedländer
Leipzig University, Germany

Abstract
In the context of current debates on sustainable public service provision, austerity,
debts and cutback management, the governance and management of and in state-
owned enterprises is a crucial issue. An aggregate holdings report is an important
tool for public administrations to provide accountability and the necessary overall
view on the institutional service provision structures of core administration and
state-owned enterprises. On the basis of a developed quality index with 175 test
criteria, this study analyses the diffusion of aggregate holdings reports in 17 countries
and the quality of 12 existing reports at the national level. First, the study provides a
conceptual contribution for assessing aggregate holdings reports and future research on
the issues of the model categories. Second, for an empirical contribution, the analysis
enhances our state of knowledge on aggregate holdings report diffusion and quality
patterns. Findings show that, in many cases, public administrations do not meet
the requirements from theory and practice. Newer Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development and European Union members reach comparably
higher quality scores. This comparative study offers new insights that can enhance
the sustainable public management and control of state-owned enterprises.

Corresponding author:
Ulf Papenfuß, Zeppelin University, Chair for Public Management & Public Policy, Am Seemoser Horn 20,
88045, Friedrichshafen, Germany.
Email: ulf.papenfuss@zu.de
2 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

Points for practitioners

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s OECD Guidelines on
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, which were published after an intensive
consultation process in 2005 and revised in 2015, demand public authorities to develop
aggregate holdings reports that cover all SOEs, and make them a key disclosure tool
directed to the general public and politicians. This study develops a quality model for
assessing the quality of aggregate holdings reports. The model can also answer ques-
tions that are often raised in reform debates, such as ‘Which is the best aggregate
holdings report?’ or ‘Which aggregate holdings report can I use as a reference to further
develop my own aggregate holdings report?’. The model is a conceptual contribution
and the empirical results can be used for international bench-learning. They are also
useful for international organisations such as the European Union, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, International Monetary
Fund, Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accounting and development aid/cooper-
ation agencies in each country. The results of this study indicate that policymakers at
the national and international levels should give more emphasis to the diffusion and
quality of aggregate holdings reports and should reflect on establishing and revising legal
obligations for aggregate holdings reports because the recommendations of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development guidelines, as a soft-law
approach, are often not put into practice.

Keywords
aggregate holdings report, public corporate governance, quality, state-owned
enterprises

Introduction
Reforms in the provision of public services with new institutional arrangements
have made state-owned enterprises (SOEs) increasingly relevant in many countries.
Studies for different countries demonstrate the significant role of SOEs in terms of
their economic relevance and for providing public services (Bruton et al., 2015;
Millward, 2011). For public management research and for the big societal issues
such as sustainability, debt crises, cutback management and citizen engagement,
the governance and integrated management of core administration and SOEs is a
crucial issue (Askim, 2007; Haque, 1999; Kwon et al., 2013; OECD, 2015; Osborne,
2014). The changes in the institutional arrangements of public service provision
have led to new requirements in accountability and transparency. Governance
deficits have raised discussions in various countries about the control and trans-
parency of SOEs (Bach and Jann, 2010; Grossi et al., 2015; Massey, 2009; OECD,
2015; Verhoest et al., 2012; Veselý, 2013; Whincop, 2005). The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) requires public admin-
istrations to publish an annual aggregate holdings report (AHR) on SOEs
Papenfuß et al. 3

(OECD, 2015: s. VI, C). An AHR is the necessary basis for citizens to obtain a
systematical overview (OECD, 2015; Verhoest et al., 2012). For these reasons, it is
necessary and rewarding to examine how public authorities report on the perform-
ance, debts/credits and governance of their SOEs (Grossi et al., 2015; OECD,
2015). Despite this relevance, studies on this issue are sparsely available, and inter-
nationally comparative studies are especially missing. By now, there has only been
one publication which assesses AHRs at the local level in three countries based on a
first-quality model with 75 criteria (Papenfuß, 2014).
The aim of this study is to assess the diffusion and quality of AHRs in 17
countries at the national level. For this, a new model with 175 criteria is developed
as a conceptual contribution for assessing the quality of AHRs. After a section with
definitions, the study derives requirements for AHRs from theory and practice.
In the following, the empirical design is described and findings are presented.
The study concludes with key results, implications for practitioners and needs
for further research.

Definition and relevance of SOEs and AHRs

SOEs are defined as enterprises where the public authority has significant control
through full, majority or significant minority ownership (OECD, 2015). According
to some categorisations, SOEs are classified as type 2 (i.e. non-departmental public
bodies) or type 3 agencies (e.g. public corporations), in contrast to type 1 agencies
(i.e. next steps agencies) (Van Thiel, 2012). This study assesses the reporting on
agency types 2 and 3.
Worldwide, SOEs represent approximately 10% of global gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) (Bruton et al., 2015). For Germany, empirical studies show that 50% of
the employees in the public sector work not in the core administration, but in SOEs
and comparable public organisations. SOEs undertake more than half of the public
sector’s investments and the debt ratio of SOEs is often even higher than that of the
core administration (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008, 2013). For other countries,
studies show similar tendencies (Millward, 2011).
The OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises,
which were published in 2005 and revised in 2015, state that:

The ownership entity should develop aggregate reporting that covers all SOEs and
make it a key disclosure tool directed to the general public, the legislature and the
media. This reporting should be developed in a way that allows all readers to obtain a
clear view of the overall performance and evolution of the SOEs. In addition, aggre-
gate reporting is also instrumental for the ownership entity in deepening its under-
standing of SOE performance and in clarifying its own policy. (OECD, 2015: s. VI, C)

The guidelines represent internationally agreed standards for exercising the state
ownership function that should be obeyed by governments (OECD, 2015). For
public administration and policymaking, an AHR has to provide a complete
4 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

overview of the enterprise portfolio and single SOEs in order to organise service
provision in an overall, outcome-oriented and sustainable way, as well as to iden-
tify future potentials. For citizens, straightforward access to the information in
AHRs would offer better information opportunities about the service provision
that they are paying for. This could even foster and support the democratic process
in debates on tasks provided by SOEs.

Theory perspectives and conceptualisation of AHR diffusion

and quality
Theoretical perspectives on the diffusion of AHRs
For this study, diffusion is understood as the public availability of AHRs on the
public administrations’ websites. For explaining the diffusion of public manage-
ment reforms and instruments, neo-institutionalism is a common theoretical
approach (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Lægreid et al., 2007). DiMaggio and
Powell (1983) identify three types of isomorphism that explain a possible similarity
of organisations: coercive isomorphism, which results from political or legitimation
pressure; mimetic isomorphism as a result of uncertainty; and normative isomorph-
ism associated with professionalisation. For this study, these theoretical types can
help to discuss the findings on the diffusion and quality of AHRs and to reflect on
whether the empirical data show form(s) of isomorphism or not.
Since OECD and European Union (EU) guidelines and directives should or
have to be adopted by member states, there could be a tendency for coercive iso-
morphism in the form of political or legitimate pressures. Furthermore, it is also of
relevance whether legal obligations, the economic situation (national debt and
GDP per capita) or population size determine AHR implementation. Due to the
economic relevance of SOEs, countries with a high national debt could insist more
on the transparency of SOEs and thus publish AHRs more frequently. Regarding
legal obligations, it is relevant whether soft laws are sufficient to meet the require-
ments or whether hard laws are necessary. Moreover, it is rewarding to consider
GDP and population size since interesting and significant developments occurred
in other contexts in countries with different GDP and population size.

Conceptualisation and derivation of the quality model

Quality is a latent construct and therefore has to be operationalised for specific
contexts. In line with scientific literature, we define the quality of AHRs as properly
fulfilling theoretical and practical requirements and fitness for use by practitioners
(Bovaird and Löffler, 2003; Crosby, 1992; ISO, 2015: 3.6.2; Juran, 1988). The
quality model developed for this study consists of 13 categories with 175 criteria
(see Appendix 1). The criteria of the quality model on AHRs are derived from
the concept of accountability, theoretical requirements and practitioners’ demands
(see Figure 1).
Papenfuß et al. 5

Figure 1. Derivation of quality model categories and criteria for AHRs.

An AHR is a valuable tool for enabling and enhancing the accountability and
transparency of SOEs for citizens (Bernier, 2015; Bovens, 2007). Fostering the
accountability of SOEs is especially important for preventing loss of control by
the core administration, which can result from SOEs becoming more autonomous
(OECD, 2015; Schillemans, 2008; Whincop, 2005).
In the perspective of agency theory, task delegation to different public sector
organisations leads to increased information asymmetries between principals, such
as the public administration, and agents, such as the SOEs, where possible oppor-
tunistic behaviour of the agent can appear (Hodges et al., 1996; Whincop, 2005).
An AHR therefore has to minimise neuralgic information asymmetries between
6 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

those actors (Van Slyke, 2007; Whincop, 2005). AHRs need to provide carefully
targeted information in those areas where the monitoring of SOEs is difficult and
opportunistic behaviour is particularly likely to appear. All principals must have
access to necessary information without high efforts, loss, delay or distortion.
Stewardship theory places higher values on mutual alignment with overall
objectives and assumes the collective, cooperative and pro-organisational behav-
iour of actors. Intrinsic motivation, trustworthiness and information exchange are
underlying motives for action (Van Slyke, 2007). In view of this theory, AHRs are
necessary to develop trust between actors through transparent communication and
reporting (Van Slyke, 2007). This could be achieved by disclosing information on
strategic, operative and outcome goals, as well as information on public purpose
fulfilment.
Property rights theory demands clear responsibilities, rights and obligations of
the relevant actors of SOEs to be displayed in AHRs (Demsetz, 1967; Klein et al.,
2012). In this perspective, AHRs must clearly show which actors have which
property rights. This includes information on clear responsibility structures for
controlling and reporting on SOEs but also the responsibilities of individual
persons and committees within the management board and supervisory body.
Therefore, AHRs should include information on board member names and mean-
ingful information on compensation. In the perspective of the stakeholder theory,
all stakeholders need to be adequately informed about SOEs (Bryson, 2004;
Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
In addition to those theoretical requirements, the quality model criteria have
also been derived from relevant requirements from international organisations such
as the OECD, EU and World Bank, as well as from scientific literature.

General information/organisation chart and summary table. Among others, the OECD,
the European Commission and the World Bank require aggregate and individual
information on SOEs to be disclosed. Direct and indirect holdings with majority
interest and capital shares, balance sheet totals, and turnover and employee infor-
mation should be displayed in organisation charts and tables (Bovens, 2007;
European Commission, 2011; OECD, 2015; Whincop, 2005; World Bank, 2014).

Financial ratios and relationships between the public authority and SOEs. Financial,
operational and non-financial results of SOEs, as well as costs to fulfil the public
purpose, should be disclosed. In particular, this includes balance sheet totals, total
investments, expected liabilities and several other relevant financial ratios. In add-
ition, financial relationships between the public administration and SOEs have to
be transparent (OECD, 2015; Whincop, 2005; Wong, 2004; World Bank, 2014).

Personnel/staff. SOEs’ staff structure and gender-equality aspects, like representation

of women on boards and further management levels, as well as in the whole staff,
should be disclosed (Bovens, 2007; European Commission, 2012; European
Parliament and the Council, 2006a, 2014a).
Papenfuß et al. 7

Corporate goals and public service provision ratios. Regarding corporate goals, strategic,
operative and especially outcome goals, as well as the public purpose of the SOEs,
should be stated. AHRs should also disclose service provision ratios and sustain-
ability and environment-related information (Christensen and Yoshimi, 2000;
European Parliament and the Council, 2014a; Jung, 2014; OECD, 2015; Schedler
and Proeller, 2010; Wong, 2004; World Bank, 2014).

Management board and supervisory body information. Disclosed information should

include names and detailed statements on compensation structures. Furthermore,
board/body member qualifications, selection process and board diversity should be
explained (European Commission, 2009, 2011; OECD, 2015; Tricker, 2012).

Audit information. Regarding international discussions on the audit of SOEs, it is

also especially important that AHRs disclose the names of audit companies, the
cost for audit and potential parallel consulting by the auditor, and for how many
years the company has conducted the audit (European Parliament and the Council,
2006b, 2014b; OECD, 2015; Tricker, 2012).

Research approach and methodology

The model derived from the previously discussed requirements consists of 175
criteria in 13 categories (see Table 1 and Appendix 1). It can be fulfilled without
exceeding three pages of tables and few written information.1 Every criterion has
been appraised for relevance and discussed with practitioners. Criteria that did not
meet the relevance appraisal have been deleted from the final model.
A criterion was coded as ‘fulfilled’ if at least 70% of the respective SOEs within
an AHR fulfilled this criterion. This limit of 70% was both necessary and useful.
For instance, if information on one criterion was missing for only one of 30 SOEs,
this single SOE should not be decisive in the quality assessment of the whole AHR
concerning this criterion. The limit of 70% ensured that the information was avail-
able for more than half of the SOEs, but also left enough space for single SOEs that
were in the AHR without information.
All criteria have been derived from theoretical and practical requirements. The
importance of a single criterion depends on the information purpose and perspec-
tive of different user groups. For this reason, all criteria are treated equally import-
ant. Therefore, this study uses an unweighted disclosure index approach and scores
the criteria on a dichotomous basis (1 point if criterion is fulfilled; no point if
criterion is not fulfilled).
In the model, not all categories contain the same number of criteria for the
following reasons. An analysis of the scientific literature and discussions in the
administrative and political spheres shows that there are many more requirements
and demands for the theme of some categories than for other categories (Bruton
et al., 2015; OECD, 2015; Whincop, 2005). This should also be represented by the
number of criteria in the different categories. Furthermore, the model enables
 8

Table 1. Overview of the quality scores of AHRs.

Notes: AT – Austria; CH – Switzerland; DE – Germany; EE – Estonia; FR – France; IL – Israel; LT – Lithuania; NL – Netherlands; NO – Norway; PT – Portugal;
SE – Sweden; UK – United Kingdom. No AHRs could be identified for Australia, Belgium, Greece, Spain and the US. * For UK: whole-of-government accounts.
** For France: government as shareholder report.
International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)
Papenfuß et al. 9

differentiated category analysis according to the information needs and aims of

different user groups. For example, users who look at which service needs are
fulfilled by SOEs or could be provided by private actors or if the same service is
provided several times by different companies might put different emphasis on
individual criteria and categories than users with a focus on national debt or
gender equality.
In the study, the quality model is used to assess the quality of publicly available
AHRs in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Estonia, France, Israel,
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK
and the US. The sample is composed according to older and newer OECD and EU
membership and complemented by the US and Australia as model and reform
pioneers. Moreover, the sample considers the reform or development state of the
respective public administrations to allow for the benchmarking of relevant public
administrations with a long tradition and newer ones. The focus is on the national
level since the national government has a special responsibility in this field and can
in some countries be seen as a role model for other government levels.
Furthermore, in an international comparative study with many countries, govern-
ment structures and responsibilities, as well as the structures of national reporting
systems on SOEs, are more comparable at the national level than at the local or
regional level.
The AHRs are identified on the webpage of the coordinating public adminis-
tration. In case no English reports are available, reports in the native language are
analysed with the help of native speakers. If no AHR could be identified, the public
administrations were contacted in order to receive the documents. The study also
examines if there are laws or soft laws such as public corporate governance codes
(PCGCs) that demand the publishing of an AHR (German Federation, 2009;
Grossi et al., 2015; OECD, 2015; Tricker, 2012).

Empirical results
For 12 of the 17 analysed countries, AHRs are available on the public adminis-
tration websites. In many cases, not only the current, but also the reports of pre-
vious years, are accessible (e.g. Israel, Norway and Portugal).
Regarding the quality of AHRs, the results of the 12 available AHRs differ
between 10 and 84 out of 175 possible points, with a mean of 37.7 (standard
deviation of 21.2) (see Table 1). Even though none of the reports reaches the full
overall score, in some categories, such as corporate goals, financial relationships
between public administrations and SOEs, and the management board, some
reports fulfil most criteria. Overall, financial information is disclosed best, espe-
cially in the AHR of Estonia, which reaches 26 out of 43 points here. Information
on SOE personnel is disclosed least; some AHRs get 0 points in both dimensions.
Among the sample, very low fulfilment rates are reached in the category audit
(11.1%) and public service provision ratios (11.1%). However, there is great dis-
crepancy in the quality of AHRs concerning information on personnel, public
10 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

service provision and audit. Eastern European and Scandinavian countries have
the most points and Central European countries such as the UK and France obtain
the lowest scores. Some reports (Portugal, Israel and the UK) strongly concentrate
on aggregate (financial) information and score comparatively well here, whereas
information on individual SOEs is completely missing.
In most AHRs, the emphasis is clearly on financial figures. Often, the AHR
lacked the comparison of ratios and indicators over time (e.g. Estonia,
Switzerland). Table 1 also provides more insight into good practice examples in
different categories. Exemplary quality in the category ‘Management board’ is in
the AHRs of Norway and the Netherlands, and for ‘Public service provision ratios’
in the Estonian and Swiss reports. Various AHRs offer rewarding approaches in
different categories, such as the AHRs of Sweden and the Netherlands, which
contain company-specific sustainability standards and initiatives that have been
put in concrete terms and adjusted from general EU but also global reporting
initiative (GRI) requirements. Similar good example tendencies are the portrayal
of privatisation projects (Israel), owner goals (Switzerland), gender aspects and
comparisons (Sweden), and state grants (Portugal). Each criterion has at least
been reported once in the sample, which underlines the feasibility of the quality
model.
Laws for preparing and publishing AHRs could only be found for Austria,
Israel and Sweden. PCGCs that recommend AHRs could only be found for
Germany and Norway.

Discussion
Regarding diffusion, five out of 17 countries do not publish AHRs, which shows
that requirements to publish an AHR are not yet met in several cases. Among those
five countries are Spain and Greece, which have been facing serious national debt
crises and discussions about privatisation recently. However, especially for coun-
tries with great national debt and cutback debates, an AHR would be important to
obtain a better overall view on debts and the performance of a public authority.
For differences in GDP and population size, there is no clear pattern concerning
AHR quality.
The recommendations regarding AHR by the OECD and other organisations
are, in most countries, not yet adequately implemented in national laws. Among
the sample, countries with respective laws publish AHRs more often. However,
since there are also AHRs in countries without legal obligations (Estonia,
Lithuania, Norway and Germany) that reach comparable higher quality scores,
laws do not in all cases seem to be a necessary factor for the diffusion of AHRs, but
support the realisation of formulated transparency aims.
Regarding the quality of AHRs, in the perspective of agency theory, the findings
show that, in particular, neuralgic information asymmetries are not sufficiently
reduced in many countries. In many cases, it is not suitably possible for the prin-
cipals to observe the action of the agents with information in the AHRs.
Papenfuß et al. 11

Also, some principals in the multistage principal–agent chain do not act according
to agency theory requirements concerning information disclosure. With respect to
stewardship theory, the public administrations often do not make use of the chance
to develop trust in important fields. Regarding property rights theory, AHRs do
not sufficiently inform as to which actors have which property rights. According to
stakeholder theory, the information rights of relevant stakeholders are not ade-
quately implemented. As current AHRs have a strong focus on providing financial
figures and only disclose little information on public service provision and outcome
goals, they do not yet make use of the potential of AHRs to contribute to outcome
orientation (Proeller, 2007; Schedler and Proeller, 2010).
Looking at the overall quality scores, diverse structures and focuses of AHRs,
there is no isomorphism between the reports. However, regarding the results of
individual categories, there are some common patterns. This is most obvious for
financial figures, which have been reported comparably better and more homoge-
neously. There is also resemblance in the non-reporting of criteria, especially for
the public service provision ratios, audit and personnel information of individual
SOEs. Coercive isomorphism might be one explanation for the comparably good
results in the AHRs of Estonia and Lithuania. Political and legislative pressure
might arise from complying with high direct and indirect requirements for Estonia
regarding the entry into the EU or OECD for Lithuania.
Regarding potential determinants on the quality of AHRs, the quality differs
between countries with different national debt but there is no clear pattern for
differences in GDP and population size. Countries in the sample with only little
debt per capita, such as Estonia, Lithuania and Sweden, publish better reports.
Some limitations of the study have to be taken into account. Even though the
analysis of 12 AHRs already provides structural findings, many countries where
AHRs could be different are not included in the sample. Furthermore, the aim and
design of this study and the results do not allow for more detailed insights on the
determinants of the quality of AHRs.

Conclusions
Despite these limitations, the study provides a model for assessing the quality of
AHRs as a conceptual contribution, as well as empirical evidence on the diffusion
and quality of AHRs at the national level in 12 countries. Overall, despite individ-
ual examples that are worth following, the findings show that, in many cases, public
administrations do not meet the derived requirements. Administrations, citizens,
politicians and other relevant stakeholders often cannot get the necessary and
important overall view on SOEs that is crucial for prioritising and improving
decisions about the sustainable provision of public services and for cutback man-
agement. However, existing good practice examples enable bench-learning and
could give support to actors engaged in pushing for improvements.
For the scientific debate on sustainable public service provision, austerity, debts
and cutback management, the study provides a concrete model for assessing AHRs
12 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

and opportunities for future research on the issues of the model categories. For
instance, the category ‘Audit’ consists of crucial information that could be used for
research on this specific theme.
For policymakers at the national and international levels, the results indicate
that they should put more efforts into the diffusion and quality of AHRs. The
results show that laws are necessary to ensure the diffusion and quality of AHRs.
Researchers and policymakers should analyse how laws could be designed in order
to increase the diffusion and quality of AHRs.
Future studies should analyse determinants for the diffusion, quality and iso-
morphism/variation of AHRs in more detail. Longitudinal studies would help to
understand more about the development, underlying motives and drivers for imple-
menting AHRs. Studies should also investigate more countries and the local level
for an even broader international comparison.
For some countries with high scores, such as Lithuania, Estonia and Sweden, it
would be enriching for reforms in other countries to analyse how it was possible to
publish AHRs with comparable high quality. Furthermore, it should be analysed
how different decision-makers and stakeholder groups use AHRs and if the prep-
aration processes and/or the publication of the reports change the awareness and
action of decision-makers and citizens. Clearing the fog for an overall view on
SOEs and core administration with high-quality AHRs is relevant for the ‘big
issues’ of public administration, public management and public policymaking.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial
or not-for-profit sectors.

Note
1. The board structure varies among countries of the sample. In some countries (such as
Germany and Austria), SOEs are organised on the basis of the dual-board system. The
management board is responsible for managing the enterprise; the supervisory board
supervises and advises the members of the management board and should be involved
in decisions of fundamental importance. In other countries (such as the UK and
Australia), the one-tier system is used in which both functions are combined in one
board. The model of this study is applicable to both systems.

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Ulf Papenfuß is Professor of Public Management and Public Policy at Zeppelin

University, Friedrichshafen, Germany. His main research interests are public cor-
porate governance, the responsible management of and in state-owned enterprises
on all government levels, and the integrated management of core administration
and state-owned enterprises, agencies and non-profit organisations. His recent pub-
lications include articles in Public Money & Management, International Public
Sector Management Journal and International Review of Administrative Sciences.

Lars Steinhauer is Junior Research Fellow at Leipzig University, Leipzig,

Germany. His main research interests are public corporate governance and
human resources management and development in the public sector.

Benjamin Friedländer is Junior Research Fellow at Leipzig University, Leipzig,

Germany. His main research interest is the integrated management and coordina-
tion of public sector organisations.
 16

Appendix 1. Quality model for the analysis of AHRs.

No. Criteria No. Criteria

Dimension 1: Aggregate information about the investment portfolio

General information 31 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
1 Release date 32 Total profit transfer from SOE to public administration
2 Total number/legal forms of SOEs 33 . . . compared to last year
3 Changes in the holdings portfolio (e.g. privatisation, 34 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
re-municipalisation)
4 Date of acknowledgement by responsible political body 35 Total loans/guarantees to SOEs
5 Note on subsidiarity principle for private law SOEs 36 . . . compared to last year
Organisation chart and summary table 37 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
6 Organisational/summary table Overview of the SOE personnel/staff
7 . . . contains portions of the city 38 Total number of employees in SOEs
8 . . . contains height of share capital 39 . . . compared to last year
9 . . . contains in-house operations 40 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
10 . . . also includes indirect holdings 41 Comparison to the core administration
11 . . . majority-owned direct holdings marked 42 . . . compared to last year
12 . . . majority-owned indirect holdings marked 43 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
13 . . . contains all holdings (for summary table) 44 Total number of women in top management
14 . . . contains balance sheet totals of the respective SOEs 45 . . . compared to last year
(for summary table)
15 . . . contains the sales of the respective SOEs (for sum- 46 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
mary table)
(continued)
International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)
Appendix 1. Continued

No. Criteria No. Criteria

Papenfuß et al.

16 . . . contains the employee number of the respective 47 Total proportion of women in top management
SOEs (for summary table)
17 . . . contains the share capital of each SOE (for summary 48 . . . compared to last year
table)
18 . . . includes the shares of the city in the SOEs (for 49 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
summary table)
19 Overview of SOEs by business sectors 50 Total number of women on supervisory bodies
Overview of financial ratios 51 . . . compared to last year
20 Balance sheet totals of the SOEs 52 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
21 . . . compared to last year 53 Total proportion of women on supervisory bodies
22 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 54 . . . compared to last year
23 Total results (profit/loss offset) of all SOEs 55 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
24 . . . compared to last year 56 Total number of women on leading lower hierarchy
levels
25 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 57 . . . compared to last year
26 Total of SOEs investments 58 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
27 . . . compared to last year 59 Total proportion of women on leading lower-hierarchy
levels
28 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 60 . . . compared to last year
29 Total subsidies to SOEs 61 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
30 . . . compared to last year
(continued)
17
Appendix 1. Continued
18

No. Criteria No. Criteria

Dimension 2: Information on individual SOEs

SOE in general 120 . . . compared to last year
62 Contact details (phone or email) 121 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years
63 Link to website or notice that no website available Public service provision ratios
64 Note to the office, etc. that is exercising the share- 122 Overview of relevant key performance indicators
holder function/is represented at shareholder
meetings
65 All other shareholders and their respective shares in the 123 . . . compared to last year
SOE listed
66 Statement on compliance 124 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
Corporate goals Management board
67 Subject matter of the SOE 125 Name of all members
68 Public purpose explained 126 Total remuneration
69 Strategic and operational objectives 127 Individual remuneration for each member
70 Outcome goals 128 Fixed and variable remuneration listed or note that
there are no such components
71 . . . financial goal formalised (name of the key figures, not 129 Total pension plans for all members
the expression)
72 . . . output and outcome objectives formalised (name of 130 Pension plans per individual member
the key figures, not the expression)
Financial relationships between city and SOE Supervisory body
73 Cash inflow from public administration to SOE (grants, 131 Note on forming of supervisory board or waiver
franchise fees and guarantees) or explanation of no declared
inflows
74 . . . compared to last year 132 Name of all members
International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)

(continued)
Appendix 1. Continued

No. Criteria No. Criteria

75 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 133 Function of all members

Papenfuß et al.

76 Cash outflow from SOE to public administration (profit 134 Responsibilities and profession of all members
transfer, reflux in the household) or explanation of no
outflow
77 . . . compared to last year 135 Supervisory committees listed or absence declared
78 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 136 Indication whether compensation is paid or not
Financial ratios 137 Total remuneration
79 Annual result 138 Individual remuneration for each member
80 . . . compared to last year Personnel/staff
81 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 139 Number of all employees
82 EBIT 140 . . . compared to last year
83 . . . compared to last year 141 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
84 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 142 Number of part-time employees
85 ROI 143 . . . compared to last year
86 . . . compared to last year 144 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
87 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 145 Number of trainees/apprentices
88 Return on equity 146 . . . compared to last year
89 . . . compared to last year 147 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
90 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 148 Number of women in the total staff
91 Equity ratio 149 . . . compared to last year
92 . . . compared to last year 150 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
93 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 151 Proportion of women in the total staff
94 Provisions 152 . . . compared to last year
95 . . . compared to last year 153 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
19

(continued)
Appendix 1. Continued
20

No. Criteria No. Criteria

96 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 154 Number of women on the second hierarchical level
97 Pension provisions 155 . . . compared to last year
98 . . . compared to last year 156 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
99 . . . in comparison with min. 2 previous years 157 Proportion of women on the second hierarchical level
100 Borrowed capital 158 . . . compared to last year
101 . . . compared to last year 159 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
102 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years 160 Number of women at the third hierarchical level (or
declaration that no third level exists)
103 Leverage (borrowed capital to equity), alternatively debt 161 . . . compared to last year
ratio (borrowed capital to total capital)
104 . . . compared to last year 162 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
105 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years 163 Proportion of women at the third hierarchical level (or
declaration that no third level exists)
106 Investment rate 164 . . . compared to last year
107 . . . compared to last year 165 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
108 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years 166 Average age of total staff
109 Capitalisation ratio (fixed assets to balance sum) Audit
110 . . . compared to last year 167 Aggregated overview of all audit companies or exami-
ners (or declaration that there is no audit)
111 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years 168 Auditors listed for all SOEs (or declaration that there is
no audit)
112 Depreciation rate (depreciation of fixed assets) 169 Starting time of auditors’ work
113 . . . compared to last year 170 Total cost of the audit (or declaration that there is no
audit)
(continued)
International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)
 Appendix 1. Continued

No. Criteria No. Criteria

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114 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years 171 . . . compared to last year
Papenfuß et al.

115 Note on the use of annual result 172 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
116 Sum of all sponsoring activities 173 Separate disclosure of audit fees and consulting fees
117 . . . compared to last year 174 . . . compared to last year
118 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years 175 . . . compared to min. 2 previous years
119 Five greatest sponsoring activities with volumes and
beneficiaries
21