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    Norman Malcom - Dreaming-Routledge (1962)

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    ali veli

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    Blited by R. F. HOLLAND Mental Acts The Psychology of Perception ‘The Unconscious ‘The Concept of Motivation "The Idea of « Social Science Dreaming Free Action Bodily Sensations Sensationalism and Scientiie plana Action, Exmotion and Wal Rationality Moral Notions P.T, Geach D. W. Hamiyn Alasdair MacIntyre RS, Peters Peter Winch Norman Maleoim AL Molden David M Armastrong Peter Alexander Anthony Kenny Jonathan Bennett Sulu Kovest DREAMING ty NORMAN MALCOLM ang eam ingen sla trait mode ‘ce! wan mage prt even sant age 2 Sec mmecn igercisn Deonaetm, Ragu Xt (®) LonDox & KEGAN PAUL HUMANITIES PRESS iret published in 1090) ty Routledge & Regan Peal Ltd Broadieay House, 08°71 Carter Lane London, BCA Printed in Great Britain by Lance d Brylone Printers) Lid London, NIVA0 © 1980, 1902 by Norman Malooim oulside the U.S.A. Copyright in the USA. by Nerivan Malem No port ofthis bok ray be reproduced tn any form cithout the permission from ‘he publisher, except for the quotation of brief passeger in orticiom ‘Second impression (with some corrections) 1002 Third imprevvion 1001 Fourth impression YOO? con Asknombedgments Totrodaotion Asserting Mhat Ono is Asleep ‘Tadging That One is Aseep A Comparison of ‘I Am Aslop! and Am in Pan" ‘Two Objections ‘The Criteria of Sleep Phesomena Resembling Seep ‘Sound Asleep “Jedgments in Slop Applisalion to Other Montal Phenomena Drvsining as an Baoxption ‘The Concept of Dreaming ‘Tempora| Location and Duration of Dreams A Queer Phenomenon Continuity betwoen Drearas and Waking Lie Dreams and Soopers "The Principe of Ceherenoe Do Know Iam Awake? Appendix: Dreams and Paychitey Bibliography Index dose SRSESRRBNR ES oe 101 18 m4 121 14 138 ACKNOWLE ENTS Tam greatly indebted to many colleagues, both at Comell and other universities, for the criticism and the stimulation that they gave me when I was working ut the ideas that are contained in this monograph. Tam especially grateful to Dr. John Rawls, who read the whole of the typescript and made some valuable suggestions ; and also to Mr. R. F. Holland, who not ‘only went through the typescript but also did me the kindness of preparing the index. NORMAN MALCOLM Decernber 1958 Cornell University CHAPTER ONE Introduction ‘ANY philosophers and peychologists who have thought about the nature of dreams, have believed that a dream is hoth a form of mental xetivity and a conscious experience, Descartes held that a. human mind must be conscious at all times, this notion resulting from his supposed demonstration that the ‘essence’ or ‘principal attribute’ of mental substance is consciousness, and that so long as a mind ists there must exist ‘modes’ of that essence, ic. states of contolousness, mental occurrences and mental acts, He says in a letter: hed geod reason to assert that the human sal is always conecevs in any creamstances-—even ina mother's sromb. For whit mors osrtain or mote evident rane Could be required tha my proo! that the wul's nature oressene consist ts being consious, ust as the exence fm body consist ints boing extended A thing can never be deprived ofits own essence (Descartes (1), p. 366). According to Deseartes, a dream is a part of this continuous mental life. It consists of thoughts, feelings and impressions that one has when asleep. In Part 1V of the Discourse on the Method, spesking of the ‘illisons’ of dreams, be says that ‘all the sime thougiits and conceptions which we have while awake ‘may also come to us in sleep’ (Descartes (2), 1, p. 101). In the First Meditation he represents himself as at 1 2 Daeamixo first thinking thot surely i i certain that he is seated by a fire, but then as rejecting this in the following. remark: ‘But in thinking over this T remind myselt that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar iusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish ‘wakefulness from sleep that am lost in astonishment’ (Ibid, p. 146). Tn his reply to Hobbes’ eriticisms of the ‘Meditations, the assertion that he has often been eceived while asleep is repeated in the rhetorical (question: ‘For who denies that in his sleep a man may be deceived? (iBid., Il, p. 78). Descartes thinks not only that © man tight have thoughts end make judgments while sleeping, but also that if those thoughts are ‘clear and distinct” they are true, regardless of the fact that he is sleeping. In his reply to the Jesuit, Bourdin, he says: *.., everything which anyone clearly and distinctly pereeives is true, although that person in the meantime may doubt whether he is dreaming or awake, nay if you want it #0, even though he is really dreaming or is delirious (Ibid, 11, p. 267). In the Discourse he makes « similar comment: ‘For even if in sleep we had some very distinct idea such as a geometrician might have who discovered some new demonstration, the fact of being asleep would not militate against its truth’ (Ibid. 1, P. 105). He further remarks that ‘srhether we are amake or asleep, ye should never allow ourselves to be persuaded excepting by the evidence of our Reason’ (Ibid, pp. 195-106), implying that a person ‘ean eason, can be persuade}, and ean resist persuasion ‘hough all the while he is asleep. “The Adee that: to dream ts to be mentally active wiley and that dca ona expense ib not peculiar to Decsartes. Aristotle says thot "the sa ase Cancion’ tn slep, giving te wey of xample a dream that ‘some hject approaching la a than ora hore’ or that ‘the object is white or beauti- fit (Aritotle, 488). Kant ‘makes’ the following remarks ‘Tn deepest. sleep perhaps the greatest perfection of the mind might be exercised in rational Thought, For we hove no reason for acserting the oppesite except that we do not remember the idea when aiake, This reason, however, proves nothing” (Kant (1) p. 273). Moore, peatsing of ‘mental acts or beta of conscious says“ We conse to perforn them Gly while we are aslcep, without dreaming; and even In sleep, s0 long as we dream, we ate performing acts af eanscionsness (Moore (1), p. 8), Russell makes the following sxertion: "What, in dreams, we se and hear, we do in fact ace and hear, though, oming to th Anusial context, what we sce and hear gives ree 10 false beliefs. Similarly, what we remember in dreams ‘we do really remember: that is to say, the experience called “remembering” does eceur” (Russell (1) PP. nein, Freud remarks that ‘Obviously, the dream is the life ofthe mind during sleep». Freud (1), p. 79) and that ‘Dreams are the mode of reaction ofthe mind to stimuli acting upon it during slep’ (Ibid. p. 80). He thinks of dreams as ‘mental processes GUring steep" and undertakes to compare them with the mental processes of persons who are awake (Cf hid, pp. 8091). A contemporary psychologist ‘eelares that ‘Dreams are form, probably the most 4 pREAMiNe primitive form, of ieation in which experiences and uations of the day and of life are eprodueed on the tereen ofthe mind during sleep a8 images, usually in Visual form’ (Hadfield, p. 70). Quite recently. two philosophers. have explicitly esdored the Cartesian view of drexms, "To say that toe decanns fs to cay that one seen, ears, touches, Gey while asleep’. *...me should maintain, with Descartes, that if anyone dreams that he belioves, doubts, expects, desies, ete, then he really docs! (Wort Kalish, pp. 120-131), "People can really bulievesentenessto be true while they are dreaming” RAW AGI Gickining i areal cxpsricnse. And ‘ince ateams can be remembered, they must be con- feious expereness, Just os itis correct to say that a dreamer really dreams and docs not merely dream that he dreams, so iis correct to say that a dreamer in really avare of the contents of his dream and does tot merely dream that he is aware of them’ (bi. p. iis). tis no exaggeration to cay that itis the received opinion, among plilosophers and psychologists, that dkcame are ‘the activity of the mind during sleep” (adie, p, 17). E wish to examine this opinion, ASSERTING THAT ONE IS ASLEEP F Aristotle were right in seying that when @ man is asleep he ean assert that ‘an approaching object? is a man or a horse, one would think that nother thing he could do would be to assert that he himself is askcep. Tt will be useful to reflect om the sentence ‘I am asleep? and the supposed possiblity that, by uttering it, a person could claim that he is asleep. It is possible that the sentence ‘I am asleep’ should come from the lips of 2 sleeping person. In this sense he could “say” that he is asleep: but could he ‘assert (claim, maintain) that he is asleep? If so it would appear that you might find out that he is ‘esloop from his own testimony. This will strike everyone as absurd. If it was a question in a court of law whether a certain man had been asleep at such and such a time, the fact that he hed said the sentence ‘T ‘am asleep’ at that time would not be admitted as ‘affirmative evidence. In general we rely heavily on a man’s own testimony when itis a question whether he is hungry, depressed, or in love, Should we do the same when we want to know whether he is asloep? We may discount a young ‘man’s elaim to be in love on the ground that he is exaggerating or is not entirely sincere. Would similar ‘considerations make us diseount someone's claim that hhe is asleep? Should we wonder if he is perhaps 5 6 DREAMING ‘overstating the ease or even lying? Of course not. “He claims that he is asleep but I suspect he isnot telling the truth’, ‘He says that he is asleep and T believe him’, are both ridiculous sentences. Their absurdity brings out the point that we should not consider an, ‘utterance of the words ‘I am asleep’ as the making of ‘claim, and therefore not as cither a trustmorthy or ‘untrustworthy claim. In saying them to us a man ean neither lie nor tell the truth. If you say to someone, who looks as if he might be asleep, ‘Are you aslexp?”, his reply ‘Yes T am is playful nonsense Hypnotists often say to their subjects, "You are asleep now, aren't you", and it is hoped that the subject will say “Yes T am’. This docs not mean that ‘his words are taken as testimony but rather a3 showing {that he is responsive to the suggestions of the hypno- {iat, Thesame purpose would be served by the question, “You are siting down now, aren't your” (when the Subject is standing). In both eases the aifirmetive reply is useful not as testimony hut as showing that the hypnotist has succeeded in bringing the subject ‘under his inftuenee, It I say “He is sleepy’ of someone, T make an ‘assertion that entails the assertion he would make he said ‘T sm sleepy". There is not this relationship ‘between ‘Te is asleep’ and "I om asleep’. If someone Said the latter either he would be making no assertion at all or else be would be using his words in a different Sense, eg. to mean that he does not wish to be i ‘Lam asleep" does not have a use that is omogencous with the normal use of “He is asleep’. Here there is similarity between ‘I am asleep? and ‘Tam umeonscious’: neither sentence has a use that is ASSERTING THAT ONE IS ASLEEP T bomogencous with the normal use ofthe corresponding third person sentence. Tt would not occur to anyone to conclude that a man is asleep from his saying “Tam asleep’ any more than to conchide that he is uneon- ‘cious from his saying ‘Tam unconscious’, or to conclude that he is dead from his seying ‘T am dead He can say the words but he cannot assert that he is asleep, unconscious, or dead. If a man could assert that he is asleep, his assertion would involve a kind of self-contradiction, since from the fact that he made the assertion it would follow that it was false, If such an assertion wore possible then it could sometimes be frue. While actually asleep a man could assert that he was asleep. There is where the absurdity is located, “While asleep, he asserted that he was asleep’ is as senseless as ‘While unconscious, he asserted that he ‘wus unconscious’, or “While dead, he asserted that hhe was dead’. JUDGING THAT ONE IS ASLEEP 'T may be thought that my argument obtains 9 specious plausibility from a feature of the connota- tion of ‘assert’, namely, that to say that someone asserted so and so is to say that he declared it to another person. Admittedly a man who is asleep connot address another person, it may be said, because this would imply a peroeption of the presence of the other person, which would falsify the hypothe- sis that he is asleep." ‘Claim’ and ‘maintain’ have the same connotation, and so it is true that a sleeping man eannot assert or claim or maintain that he is asleep. But ‘judge’ does not have this connotation, People make many judgments that they do not express to anyone. From the fact, therefore, that one cannot make assertions while asleep, it does not follow that fone cannot make judgments. And indeed they are made during sleep. For example, St. Thomas says that ‘sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what and Kalih expity caotin che iteroting perder nw nn ts mel nes rath hence ot hve ree! Siosal ad autor poropns wile sep. After decent © ‘silent. hay pon teas " re aor veridcal "Peco al noes and mo tata! contents ‘rma nwo Ba ny all cou ever!” (nt& Kash wa JunoiNe THAT ONE IS ASLEEP 9 hie sees is @ dream...” (Aquinas, T, Q. 64 Art, a ‘fa man can make judgments during sleep then it ought to be possible for him to judge, among other things, that he is asleep. The view being considered is that this is @ possible judgment but not a possible ‘assertion. Is it possible that I should be able to say to. ‘myself something that is eignificant and pethaps even frac but that if I were to try to say this very same thing to others my statement would be logically absurd? Surely there is something dubious in the tussumption that there ean be a true judgment that feannot be communicated to others. T will not pursue this problem. Instead I will raise ‘the question of whether it ean be verified that someone understands how to use the sentence ‘T am asleep? to describe his own state. If there is that use of the sen tence it ought to make sense to verify that someone has or has not mastered it. An indication that someone understands the use of s sentence to describe some state of affairs might be the fact that he utters the sentenee sometimes when, and only when, that state Of aifairs does exist and utters the negation of the sentence sometimes when, and only when, that state of alfairs does not exist: for example, he says “The ‘vind is blowing hard’ sometimes when and only when the wind is blowing hard; and he says ‘the wind is not blowing hard’ sometimes when and only when the ‘wind is not blosting hard. In general such a correlation, is neither a necessary nor suficient condition for 54 Thoma man the esnasadiion that if » mam sllaglne leisy nc be wakon up he val regain aw i me aves ® 10 pREAMIXG understanding the ine of s sentence: itis posible tata prtcioeentence shouldbe unertood and eee eee eiired ft Cenerpow i enrreseg Ie es ete le pee int rae Seder (Pat your hand in Ui fire) shuld always be Aobeyed eventhough it is impose that all orders Should always be dhobeved Wittgenstein 94 Stl the oration woul, in some escunstaness, provide totear of taaestioting. God ye obtain eidenee, of this sort in The ease of the sentence “Tam mleep? Could we observe thet someone utters i sometines then and only wen] the night state of eer exits Tal when els indeedateep? And coud we ner trom this with some probe, that be understand fee wiped as of ted ate to deen cr sane Now how could one verity tht a men says ‘Tam asker! tohimell when be ls uslep? How crud one find out tate dil this even one? If he talked In Ie slp snying aloud arn ealep, thi would not tout eter for or aguas Ms andersanding ofthat festoomctce mar who [taking in hs sep not raze of what he paying. Here fam merely come Tenting on the idiomatic use of the expression “tkig in is skep. Wee do net allem i of someone ‘ho eware that el talking Tene ono that when fan eld ‘Tam ele he gave trie der ption of hs own sae, one woud have to kw thet he sid it wl asleep and that he seas aware of saying This an impose thing 6 non, berause whatever showed that he was sare of saying that sentence woul nso show that he ws not tee. The knowlege reed i penile becnae JUDGING THAT ONE 18 ASLEEP 17 it is self-contradictory. Can there, therefore, be ‘such a thing as knowing that another person under. Stands the supposed lure of the sentence ‘T am asleep’ to make a judgment about his own state? Tt may be thought that we could appeal to the sleeper’s testimony after he awakened. Suppose be told us that he had said ‘I am asleep’ while he was faskep. But this report would presuppose that he ‘already knew when to say ‘I am asleep’, and so it ‘could not be used to establish the point at issue with- ‘ut begging the question, That is to say, his elaim that hee said eertain words while asleep, implies that he was ‘scare of being asleep and so implies that he knows how toapply the sentence ‘Lam asleep’. If he does not, his report is worthless. If we have no way of establishing that he knows how to use the sentence other than by Appeal to his testimony, then we eannot appeal to his testimony. Te may be thought that from the fact that a person. could be taught and learn how to use the third person sentence ‘He is asleep’ we could safely conclude that fhe would know how to use the fist person sentence. ‘This conclusion would have no justification at all. The lise of the sentence “He is aslep’ is governed by criteria of the following sort: that the body of the person in question is relaxed, his eyes closed, his breathing steady: and that he is unresponsive to moderate sounds and happenings in his vicinity. It cannot be Supposed thot these criteria are to govern the use of te fist person sentence, How absurd it would be for someone to judge that he himself is asleep from the fact that his eyes are closed and that he does not react to various sonnds! fT am asleep’ were used to make 8 << TY 2 DREAMING judgment, this use would differ 50 greatly from that of ‘Hee is asicep’ that an understanding of the latter ‘would not argue an understanding of the former. ‘We are now in a position to see that the sentence Tam asleep" eannot be used to make a judgment. Let us remember that no one can know whether another person makes a correct use of the sentence ‘T ‘am asleep’ to describe his condition, since such knowledge would be self contradictory. Is it nonethe- less possible that he does make a correct use of it? Could not he himself know or at least beliove that he uses it correctly? Suppose that I say to myself ‘Tam asleep’ and believe that this sentence accurately oseribes my condition. I belies that it does—but does it?) What could this distinction mean here? How should 1 find out whether my condition is really that of being asleep? Obviously T eannot ask someone, for this act would itself prove that Tam not asleep, Could I upon avaking deseribe my previous eon- dition and inguire whether that condition is called “heing asleep?” This suggestion loses all plausibility if we ask what the nature of this deseription would be. For it could not mention facts about my bodily condition at the time (e.g. that my eyes were closed) since my having been aware of those things would entail that I was not then asleep. The description ‘ould have to be of some conscious experience. But having some conscious experience or other, no matter ‘what, Is not what is meant by being asleep, ic. the statement ‘Jones is asleep’ is not false because there ‘some experience or other that Jones does not have. for could I reason as follows: ‘They tell me that I was ‘asleep just now; so by remembering what my state pp vas shall be able to identify future states of mysel? 4s states of sleep’. For what is it exactly that [am ‘apposed to remember? Not some condition of my body: Teannot be supposed to identify in that way a present state of mine as sleep. Not some conscious experience, fo the eason already given. The memory of my state of seep tums out to be an unintelligible notion, since nothing can be plausibly suggested as he content of the memory Neither when awake nor when asleep, ean T discover what the correct use is of the sentonce “lam asle Tam left with my bli that I use it rightly. But this is not a elie in the sense in which a Deliet can he replaced by knowledge. Neither I nor anyone else ean find out whether the state of myself that T elaim to Aeseribe by the sentence “I_am asleep’ really is the state of being aslep. The possibility of finding this out must be rejected as a coneeptual absurdity. There ould be nothing whatever that would tend to show that L employ that seatence correctly. T have no conception of what it would mean to say that not only have T identified may state as thet of sleep but that my identification is furthermore right. As Wittgenstein remarks about a similar problem: “In the present case T have mo criterion of correctness, One mould lke to say: whatever i going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about “right” (Zoi, § 298), Anyone who thinks that a sleeping man ean judge Sha he ep wl nary eam that th jg ‘ent is true. Thea bove argument is intended to prove that the notions of truth ani falsity can have no meaningful application to one’s judgment that one is u DREAMING ssicep, and that therfore the sentence ‘Tam asleep? fannot have a correct wie (nor an inconeet one) to express. judgment of one's state. In the nate cf the case nothing could even tend. to prove that thie judgment wes true (or take), We do not have and fannot have any iden of what the diffrence between truth and falty would come to here. Which sto say thata judgment that ones asleep not an iteligile notion Thus the view is untenable tha although one anno aster that one is aleop one ean judge tat this fS'so. The sentence "Tam aslgp” cannot have a conect se to deere one's state and therefore i fot a vehicle for « possible judgment A COMPARISON OF “I AM AND ‘I AM IN PAIN’ ASLEEP" HE, point jst etablhed being. important, 1 seat fo eifres the angunent by comparing the sentences Lam asleep’ end am in pints Pe ean for this patcular comparisons that there iy an Incination to thick that these two sentences must have the same sort of we, namely to deserve states ‘tones: Ove dom nt find out tat one len pla by tmploying eriteron,Indce it mma no sense to ‘peak of fading out that one isin pin, when hin would imply that one was previously in pain but not vrare of it There i, however, eteion for deter bg whether somone ute the sentence Ta an corrp-andchn-anekey an” italigble fentence The behnviout and ereumstances of an iStant are the criginal erterion of his being in pain Ase grows and tens fo tal it will normally Come ‘ont that often hen his behaviour and. Secu ‘ance are thove ofa person in pain ho wil ny the words "It hurts, cr some, syoonymou one; and Rardly ever will hesny them wien ether is behaviour or ereumstances do tot satiny the orginal erteron ft pun, This development fills cur eiterion of i tndertonding thot words. Now tis. saying them Serves a ne etevon of his being in pa. We shal fe 6 DREAMING conehide sometimes that he is in pain from his mere sny-s0, even though his behaviour and circumstancet re nota paradigm of pain. He ean ell us that he is in pain, and we ean know that he is beeause he has told ts. This is possible because his verbal expression has been conjoined with certain behaviour (the natura}, primitive, behaviour of a person in pain) occurring in Certain circumstances (e.g. he has been hit or eut oF burned). (Wittgenstein, § 244). His saying ‘1 am in pain’ either to others of to himself, ean be a use of language only beeause a connection has already been established between those words and the outward ‘Phenomena that are the original eriterion of pain ‘Consider now the sentence ‘I am asleep’. With sleep, as with pain, there is an outward eriterion—thet is, Something that determines whether another person (not oneself) is asleep. ‘The original criterion of pain ‘we said, necessarily plays part inestablishing whether Someone understands the sentence ‘I am in pain’. Is the same thing possible with the sentence ‘Tam asleep!" No. For try to suppose that the saying of those words by someane was conjoined with the bodily state and the unresponsiveness that are a eriterion of Sleep. The question would be relevant: Was he aware fof saying ‘I am asleep?” We need an outward eriterion for determining this. Docs he show a degree of alert ness and knowledge of what he is doing that is normal in one who is awake? If the answer is affirmative, ‘then he is not asleep. If negative, then he was not aware of saying anything. In neither ease has the right Kind of connection been made between these ‘words and the fact they are supposed to describe, Tt ip a logical impossibility that there should be OE eoOEOo-.-mUDUt~t~COCOCOCOOC Saw asuene ayp ‘Tawny rary’ 17 criterion for saying that someone understands how to tise the sentence ‘T am asleep’ to describe his present state, This is equivalent to saying that the idea of Such @ use ie not intelligible, ‘Oceasionally someone uses the words ‘L am asleep” to mean something like “Go away! I am trying to sleep’. But the sentence ‘T am asleep’ cannot have a ‘use that és homogeneous with the normal use of the ‘declarative sentence ‘He is osleep’. If someone thinks that he does use the words in such a sense, then we see that it would be impossible for him to illustrate his use of the words or to teach it to others. IF he says, that he uses the sentence to deseribe a certain eon- dition of himself, he eannot say shat condition He eannot get around this difficulty by sayi you understand the meaning of "He is asleep". When. Tuse “I am asleep" to deseribe my own condition, T use it im that sme sense’, A connect sense between ‘I am asleep" and ‘Te is asleep’ is exactly shat cannot be established, since the fulfilment of the criterion of truth, relative to the third person sentence, can play no part in the fulilment of the citerion of understanding, relative to the first person fentence. That this ean play a part in the ease of the ‘corresponding ‘pain’ sentences is what permits a connection of sense to be established there. ‘Thus if enyone claims that be sometimes observes Iimself to be nsleep his elaim is necessarily uninteli- gible. He implies that what he observes could be described by the sentence ‘I am asleep’. To see the impossibility that the latter should have a descriptive use is to see the impossibility of the alleged observa: tion, Such a elaim would be no better than saying that, ee 18 parame: toncthing happens when he aslep, although be mot say ab all what the something Yeo antiy is calling i an ‘bservation’ “The proot that the sentence ‘T am asleep cannot have a goret ute asa present indicative, anon to proof that i cannot exprest«povribiliy. That one {i alep, or that perhopt one i, fs not anything one Gan tn Teoma gow cm wonder tthether J am atleep, as you can wonder whether Ta ext. In po eietnrtances ean 7 wonder whether Tarn asleep, ot be in doubt about it, anymore Un 1 Gon wonder or doubt whether I stil exit TWO OBJECTIONS YY contention that the indeative sentence "Tam asleep’ has no sense may appear to be challenged by the fact that ite negation Lam not asleep’ docshave sense. Ifthe later bas a significant use +0 must the former, it might be argued. But the general principle that would be assumed has many exceptions. Suppose that a teacher calls the roll every day and when a studeot’s name is called he is required to report his presence by saying "Here. When the teacher calle « ame without getting a response she writes the words ‘Not here” under the name in her roll bok. One day the class wit answers ‘Not here” and everyone laughs. ‘There isa provision forthe use of Here’ to report one's presence but of eourse no provirion for the we of ‘Not Jove to report one’s absence, The example presents an accurate analogy with our problem, ‘T_am asleep’ said by anyone, hag the same absurdity as. ‘Not haere seid by the pupil. Anyone who understands the tse of “Here cannot suppose that (Not here’ might be ‘x comect response to the ealling of his name, even if he said it to himself. Likewise anyone who understands the nowmal we fan not alg cnn thnk nt it would ever be right to say “I am asleep’ even to % ight to say “Lam asleep ‘Are You asleep?” has the grammatical form of a question but is not actually used as « question. If you 19 20 puzasans say it to someone your ‘question’ is answered in the negative if he makes any reply ot all, even the im- proper one ‘Lam asleep’. The purpose of the words Uhre you asleept’ is to find out whether he will respond, not to find out which response he will make. This purpose is served equally well by softly calling hi Dame; and that is not question. ‘The superficial fgrammar of the sentence ‘Are you asleep’ ean mislead ts into thinking that itis used in the same way that ‘Are you hungry?” is used. This can tempt us to think that ‘Tam asleep’ is a possible reply because the ‘question’ scems to request the one to whom it is ‘dddressed to report his present state. The use of the interrogative ‘Are you asleep", one could say, is not to inquire but to tert. It belongs with other tests such fs calling the person's name, or lightly touching him, for making some slight noise, the point of which is not to awaken him but to find out whether some reaction will occur which will show that he was aware of the sound or touch. ‘A different objection begins by mentioning the familiar fact that people sometimes wonder whether ‘they are dreaming. Has it not occurred to everyone at ‘some time or other to say ‘Am I dreaming?’ or rust be dreaming? Does this not show that some times we do wonder whether we are aslesp or even think we are? And does this not prove that the words "Tam asleep” have sense after all? The reply to this is that we should not be deceived by the look of those sentences but should consider their actual use. One says ‘Am I dreaming? Isn't this the same town that ‘ne drove through sn hour agot”; or “T must be dream- ing! I put my watch down here a second ago and now it wo onsEcTioNs a fs gone!’ ‘Am T dreaming?” and ‘I must be dreaming’ fre used as exclamations, expressing sharp surprise at some appearance of things. ‘Am T secing things?” and. can’t believe my ears!" have the same use. “Am I dreaming?” no more questions whether the speaker fs asleep than do these later sentences. When you say ‘Am 1 dreaming? Isn’t this the same town we drove ‘through before”, it would be nothing but a joke if your ‘eompsnion were to reply: ‘You are driving the ear so Tdon’t think you ean be asleep’. The reply is wildly lnrelevant, because you are expressing surprise that this own should look justlike the oneyou drove through ‘before, and possibly you are wondering whether it is ‘the same town and you have lost your way, but you are not wondering whether you are asleep. CHAPTER 81x THE CRITERIA OF SLEEP Co eee asleep whet should we look for? It would be things of this srt: that he is recumbent, his eyes are closed, his breathing regular, his body mainly inert, and that Ihe does not react to various sounds and movements in his vieinity to which he would normally reset if awake, If he was whistling, writing, staring at the Window, examining # map, oF conversing we should hot sty he was asleep. Our ordinary application of the word ‘asleep’ is not guided by any consideration fof what is going on in someone’s cranium, spinal ‘column or other inward parts, but rather by how his body is dispesed and by his behaviour or lack of it [Another thing we consider is how sleepy he looks and facts when estensibly waking up from ostensible sleep. ‘We expect him to be somewhat dazed or groggy and ‘not, for a few moments at least, able to perceive and take in things with normal aeuteness. In addition to the above, which we may call the criterion of behaviour, there is the criterion of his testimony, The latter is not applicable to animals and ‘human infants. Whether a baby or a cat is asleep docs not depend on what it will tell you later. But whether tn adult person is asleep now may be determined by his being or not being able to report, later on, varions 2 ‘THE CRITERIA oF SLEEP 28 sent happenings in his vieinity, e.. the barking of fe neighbour's dog. With adulis and okder children there are the two eriteria of behaviour and testimony; ‘with animals and human infants there is only the one aiterion of behaviour. The concept of sleep is not ‘exactly the same in the two enses. Tt is to be noted that the criterion of present inertness and unresponsiveness on the one hand, and the onterion of subsequent sleepy behaviour’ and subsequent testimony on the other, are criteria for propositions that differ in tense. Someone's present Tecumbent posture, inertness and unresponsiveness {the criterion for saying be ie asleep. His later sleepiness ‘and inability to give an secount of incidents that happened around him is e criterion for saying he wee asleep. Of course the two sorts of criteria are not independent, for if a person is asleep at the present time then it will be true to say later that he wee asleep at this time. A conflict between the two ‘riteria i possible just because it cannot be true to say now that x certain person is asleep and also true to say later that he was not asleep at this time. That there are to vteria which cin confit oes not mean, however, that the concept of sleep is self contradictory, any more than the fact that there ate ' plurality of eriteria for saying that one thing is oirg around another thing and the fact that they ean conilet (as they do in. William James's example of the dog end the squirrel) implies that the eoneept of a thing’s going around enother thing is sef-contradic- tory. Ttimny be thought there is really only one criterion of whether a person is asleep, namely, his subsequent. 2 sunpor: of thas ot might be said that — or te textemony of others) ne prowanp te: de eas aware of them when they sradecaior of law remy asbecp, which might later be ‘ugamss tn ice = Sir Sect that the criterion of wcetmom aus ot appiemtie: t2 animals and human vem aimr & aur bodily disposition feué enacmar t aewermame wether they are asleep cw sm Tintiennediy his can determine it, for it crowiié te ome aire 2 any Ghat we never know if'a pec ar a comp ade. I: seems most unlikely that wit aevoes as @ eReTion ior to speech should See treet Betta wees we-should have two Somalis Sifter: sees of “asleep”. Furthermore it is cam se geo Sut scomemnes bemg abie or not to Sect amma Shnggs Taet meer nearby at a certain Ten set Sheree cetemiom af tether be was asleep se Sat ee Thee appicetion af a criterion must be Sit oc thee ae aires ow negative esa. ‘Sow i mugte agape Sit a pense who was moving stat with oper

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