I.

Omnibus Election Code

ARTICLE IX
ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES AND CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
Section 63. Qualifications for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. - No person may
be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Section 64. Qualifications for Members of the Batasang Pambansa. - No person shall be
elected Member of the Batasang Pambansa as provincial, city or district representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter in the constituency in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than six months immediately
preceding the day of the election.
A sectoral representative shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, able to read and
write, a resident of the Philippines, able to read and write, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election, a bona fide
member of the sector he seeks to represent, and in the case of a representative of the
agricultural or industrial labor sector, shall be a registered voter, and on the day of the election
is at least twenty-five years of age.
The youth sectoral representative should at least be eighteen and not be more than twenty-five
years of age on the day of the election: Provided, however, That any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of twenty-five years during his term shall be entitled to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Section 65. Qualifications of elective local officials. - The qualifications for elective provincial,
city, municipal and barangay officials shall be those provided for in the Local Government Code.
Section 66. Candidates holding appointive office or positions. - Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 67. Candidates holding elective office. - Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party
is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Section 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if
it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute
or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
Section 70. Guest candidacy. - A political party may nominate and/or support candidates not
belonging to it.
Section 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. - The Commission and the courts shall
give
priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final
decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the
preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same
by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person
who was filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for
which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or
offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible
for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a
certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if
has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local
civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a
Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That
when there are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each
candidate, upon being made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname,
except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname stated in his certificate
of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one nickname or stage name by which
he is generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one
hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 75. Filing and distribution of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall
be filed on any day from the commencement of the election period but not later than the day
before the beginning of the campaign period: Provided, That in cases of postponement or failure
of election under Sections 5 and 6 hereof, no additional certificate of candidacy shall be
accepted except in cases of substitution of candidates as provided under Section 77 hereof.
The certificates of candidacy for President and Vice-President of the Philippines shall be filed in
ten legible copies with the Commission which shall order the printing of copies thereof for
distribution to all polling places. The certificates of candidacy for the other offices shall be filed in
duplicate with the offices herein below mentioned, together with a number of clearly legible
copies equal to twice the number of polling places in the province, city, district, municipality or
barangay, as the case may be:
(a) For representative in the Batasang Pambansa, with the Commission, the provincial election
supervisor, city election registrar in case of highly urbanized cities, or an officer designated by
the Commission having jurisdiction over the province, city or representative district who shall
send copies thereof to all polling places in the province, city or district;
(b) For provincial offices, with the provincial election supervisor of the province concerned who
shall send copies thereof to all polling places in the province;
(c) For city and municipal offices, with the city or municipal election registrar who shall send
copies thereof to all polling places in the city or municipality; and
(d) For punong barangay or kagawad ng sangguniang barangay, the certificates of candidacy
shall be filed in accordance with the provisions of Section 39 of Article VI of this Code.
The duly authorized receiving officer shall immediately send the original copy of all certificates
of candidacy received by him to the Commission.
Section 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission,
provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the
board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be
voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

II. SECTION 40, R.A. NO. 7160

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

III. RA NO. 10742 AKA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN REFORM ACT OF

2015

CHAPTER I
 INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of
2015”.

SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policies and Objectives. – The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building .and thus, promotes and protects their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being, inculcates in them patriotism, nationalism and other desirable
values, and encourages their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Towards this end, the State shall establish adequate, effective, responsive and enabling
mechanisms and support systems that will ensure the meaningful participation of the youth in
local governance and ^Ln nation-building.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following terms are hereby defined:

(a) Commission shall refer to the National Youth Commission created under Republic Act No.
8044;

(b) Local Chief Executive shall refer to the provincial governor, city and municipal mayor;

(c) Local Government Operations Officer shall refer to the duly designated head of the office of
the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) stationed in the concerned local
government unit;

(d) Local Sanggunian shall refer to the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod
and sangguniang bayan;

(e) Youth Affairs Provincial Officer shall refer to the person duly appointed or designated by the
Commission to serve as its agent in the province with the tasks provided for in this Act or as the
Commission may deem necessary;

(f) Youth shall refer to those persons whose ages range from fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years old
as defined in Republic Act No. 8044;

(g) Youth Organizations shall refer to those organizations whose membership/ composition are
the youth; and

(h) Youth-Serving Organizations shall refer to those registered organizations whose principal
programs, projects and activities are youth-oriented and youth-related.

CHAPTER II

THE KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN AND THE SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN

SEC. 4. Katipunan ng Kabataan. – There shall be in every barangay a Katipunan ng Kabataan

to be composed of all citizens of the Philippines residing in the barangay for at least six (6)
months, who are at least fifteen (15) but not more than thirty (30) years of age, and who are duly
registered in the list of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and/or the records of the
Sangguniang Kabataan secretary.

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. – The Katipunan ng Kabatan
shall:

(a) Elect the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson and members; and

(b) Serve as the highest policy-making body to decide on matters affecting the youth in the
barangay. As such, the Sangguniang Kabataan shall consult and secure the concurrence of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan in the formulation of all its, programs, plans and activities.

SEC. 6. Meetings of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. – The Katipunan ng Kabataan shall meet at
least once every six (6) months, or at the call of the chairperson of the Sangguniang Kabataan
or upon written petition of at least one-twentieth (1/20) of its members, to decide on important
issues affecting the youth of the barangay.

SEC. 7. Creation and Election of the Sangguniang Kabataan. – There shall be in every
barangay a Sangguniang Kabataan to be composed of a chairperson and seven (7) members
who shall be elected by the registered voters of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Sangguniang
Kabataan chairperson/shall, with the concurrence of the majority of the Sangguniang Kabataan
members, appoint from among the members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, a secretary and a
treasurer.

SEC. 8. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan. – The Sangguniang Kabataan
shall:

(a) In consultation and with the concurrence of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, and within three (3)
months from assumption to office, formulate a three (3)-year rolling plan, which shall be known
as the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan, which shall serve as basis in the
preparation of the Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program. This plan shall be aligned with
the Philippine Youth Development Plan (PYDP) and o^her Local Youth Development Plans in
every level, municipal, city and provincial as is relevant;

(b) Approve the annual budget which is the annual slice of the Annual Barangay Youth
Investment Program before the start of the succeeding fiscal year and, if the Sangguniang
Kabataan funds allow, a supplemental budget. Any changes in the annual budget shall be in
accordance with existing applicable budget rules and procedures;

(c) Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the objectives of the youth in the barangay in
accordance with the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan and the applicable
provisions of this Act;

(d) Initiate and implement, in coordination with any national government agency and/or any
private or nongovernment institution, programs and projects designed to promote general
welfare, development and empowerment of the youth;

(e) Hold fund-raising activities which are in line with the Comprehensive Barangay Youth
Development Plan, the proceeds of which shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general
fund of the Sangguniang Kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation thereof, the
specific purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first satisfied: Provided, further,
That any appropriation thereof shall be in accordance with existing applicable budget,
accounting and auditing rules and regulations;

(f) Create regular and special committees and such other bodies whose chairpersons and
members of which shall come from among the members of the Sangguniang Kabataan or from
among the members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, as it may deem necessary to effectively
carry out its programs and activities;

(g) Submit the annual and end-of-term program accomplishments and financial reports to the
Sangguniang Barangay and present the same during the Katipunan ng Kabataan assembly,
copy furnished the Office of the Local Government Operations Officer and Local Youth
Development Council (LYDC), all in accordance with the prescribed form by the DILG and the
Commission;

(h) Partner with the LYDC in planning and executing projects and programs of specific
advocacies like good governance, climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and
resiliency, youth employment and livelihood, health and anti-drug abuse, gender sensitivity, and
sports development;

(i) Adopt and implement a policy on full public disclosure of all its transactions and documents
involving public interest; and

(j) Exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance, or delegated by the Sangguniang Barangay or the Commission.

SEC. 9. Meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan. – (a) The Sangguniang Kabataan shall meet
regularly once a month on the date, time and place to be fixed by the said sanggunian. Special
meetings may be called by the chairperson or any four (4) of its members by giving written
notice of the date, time, place and agenda of the meeting, which can be sent either through
personal delivery, registered mail, fax or email, to all members, and must be received at least
one (1) day in advance. The Sangguniang Barangay and the Municipal or City Youth
Development Council shall be furnished with notices of regular and special meetings and the
minutes of the meetings thereafter.

(b) A majority of the members including the chairperson shall constitute a quorum.

SEC. 10. Qualifications. – An official of the Sangguniang Kabataan, either elective or appointee,
must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, a resident
of the barangay for not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, at
least eighteen (18) years but not more than twenty-four (24) years of age on the day of the
elections, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, must not be related within
the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national official or
to any incumbent elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality
where he or she seeks to be elected, and must not have been convicted by final judgment of
any crime involving moral turpitude.

SEC. 11. Term of Office. – (a) The chairperson and members of the Sangguniang Kabataan
shall hold office for a fixed term of three (3) years unless sooner removed for cause,
permanently incapacitated, have died or resigned from office.
(b) The Sangguniang Kabataan secretary and treasurer shall be coterminus with the appointing
authority unless sooner removed for cause, found to have failed from the discharge of his or her
duties, or has committed abuse of authority as stipulated in existing laws pertaining to the
conduct of public officials, through a majority vote of all the members of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan in a regular or special assembly called for the purpose.

(c) A Sangguniang Kabataan official who, during his or her term of office, shall have passed the
age of twenty-four (24) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for
which he or she was elected.

SEC. 12. Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson. – The chairperson of the Sangguniang

Kabataan shall automatically serve as an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay upon
assumption to office. As such, he or she shall exercise the same powers, discharge the same
duties and functions, and enjoy the same privileges as the regular Sangguniang Barangay
members; and shall be the chairperson of the Committee on Youth and Sports Development.
He or she shall be entitled to a pro-rata honoraria for every session of the Sangguniang
Barangay he or she has attended.

SEC. 13. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson. – The
Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson shall exercise such powers and discharge such duties as
follows:

(a) Call and preside over all meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and vote in case of a tie,
and assemblies of the Katipunan ng Kabataan except when one. (1) of the agenda to be
discussed in such assembly involves the disciplinary action against the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson, in which case, the highest ranking Sangguniang Kabataan member shall preside;

(b) Take the lead in the formulation of the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan
and in the preparation and implementation of the Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program;

(c) Ensure the implementation of policies, programs and projects as contained in the Annual
Barangay Youth Investment Programs, in coordination with the Sangguniang Barangay and the
Municipal or City Youth Development Council;

(d) Sign all required documents and warrants drawn from the Sangguniang Kabataan funds for
all expenditures in the implementation of the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development
Plan and Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program;

(e) Exercise general supervision over the affairs and activities of the Sangguniang Kabataan
and the Katipunan ng Kabataan as well as the official conduct of its members;

(f) With the concurrence of the Sangguniang Kabataan, appoint from among the members of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan a secretary and a treasurer;

(g) Coordinate with the Sangguniang Barangay and other youth organizations within his or her
barangay on youth-related programs and projects that they wish to initiate and implement; and

(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.
SEC. 14. Sangguniang Kabataan Secretary. – The Sangguniang Kabataan secretary shall:

(a) Keep all the records of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, including the list of its qualified
members, youth policies, studies, research and registry of youth and youth-serving
organizations in the barangay, if any;

(b) Prepare and keep all the minutes of all assemblies of the Katipunan ng Kabataan and of all
the meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan;

(c) Cause the posting, in the barangay bulletin board and in at least three (3) conspicuous
places within the jurisdiction of the barangay, and if possible including the use of traditional and
nontraditional media, and make available for any person with legal purpose, all resolutions
approved by the Sangguniang Kabataan, the annual and end-of-term reports of the programs
and projects implemented by the Sangguniang Kabataan, the Comprehensive Barangay Youth
Development Plan and Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program and the dissemination of
the same to concerned offices, institutions and individuals; and

(d) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson may prescribe or direct.

SEC. 15. Sangguniang Kabataan Treasurer. – The Sangguniang Kabataan treasurer shall:

(a) Take custody of all Sangguniang Kabataan property and funds;

(b) Collect and receive contributions, monies, materials, and all other resources intended for the
Sangguniang Kabataan and the Katipunan ng Kabataan;

(c) Serve as cosignatory in all withdrawals from the Sangguniang Kabataan funds and disburse
funds in accordance with the approved annual budget and supplemental budget, as the case
may be, of the Sangguniang Kabataan,

(d) Certify to the availability of the Sangguniang Kabataan funds whenever necessary;

(e) Submit to the Sangguniang Kabataan and to the Sangguniang Barangay certified and
detailed statements of actual income and expenditures at the end of every quarter and the
posting of the same in the barangay bulletin board and in at least three (3) conspicuous places
within the jurisdiction of the barangay, and if possible including the use of traditional and
nontraditional media;

(f) Render report during the regular Katipunan ng Kabataan assembly on the financial status of
the Sangguniang Kabataan; and

(g) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson may prescribe or direct.

SEC. 16. Privileges of Sangguniang Kabataan Officials. – (a) All Sangguniang Kabataan
officials in good standing, whether elected or appointed, shall, during their incumbency:
(1) Be exempt from payment of tuition and matriculation fees while enrolled in any public tertiary
school including state colleges and universities and those locally funded public educational
institutions within or nearest their area of jurisdiction. The National Government, through the
DILG, shall reimburse said college or university the amount of the tuition and matriculation fees;

(2) Be exempt from taking the National Service Training Program-Civic Welfare Training Service
(NSTP-CWTS) subjects. In lieu thereof, concerned Sangguniang Kabataan officials shall submit
written reports, preferably with photographs, or other documentations of their participation in the
implementation of programs, projects and activities as outlined in the Comprehensive Barangay
Investment Program. Absence of such reports and documentations or a finding to the contrary
upon verification of submitted reports, will disqualify the concerned Sangguniang Kabataan
officials from this privilege. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and the Commission
shall jointly promulgate the guidelines for the implementation of this provision;

(3) Be excused from attending their regular classes, if they are currently enrolled in any school,
while attending then- regular or special Sangguniang Kabataan meetings, and the Sangguniang
Barangay sessions, in case of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson. A certification of
attendance shall be issued by the Sangguniang Kabataan secretary, attested by the
Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson and duly noted by the Punong Barangay and shall be
submitted to the concerned faculty member and the dean of the educational institution as proof
of attendance. In the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan secretary, the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson shall issue the certification duly noted by the Punong Barangay. In the case of the
Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson, the barangay secretary shall issue the certification of
attendance duly noted by the Punong Barangay. Any person who shall falsely certify as to the
attendance of any Sangguniang Kabataan official shall be criminally and administratively liable;

(4) Be provided by the National Government with Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth) coverage; and

(5) Be entitled to receive actual travelling reimbursements as may be authorized by law, and
subject to the availability of funds: Provided, That, such travel is directly related to the
performance of their functions as Sangguniang Kabataan officials and is supported by duly
approved travel order by the Punong Barangay in the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson, or by the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson in the case of the other Sangguniang
Kabataan officials.

(6) The Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson shall have the same privileges enjoyed by other
Sangguniang Barangay officials under this Act subject to such requirements and limitations
provided herein.

SEC. 17. Persons in Authority – For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the Sangguniang
Kabataan chairperson and members in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority
in their jurisdictions.

SEC. 18. Suspension and Removal from Office. – Any elected official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan may, after due process, be suspended for not more than six (6) months or removed
from office by majority vote of all members of the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod which has jurisdiction in the barangay of the concerned Sangguniang Kabataan
official which shall be final and executory, on any of the following grounds:
(a) Absence from the regular meeting of the Sangguniang Kabataan without valid cause for two
(2) consecutive times or accumulated absences of four (4) within a period of twelve (12)
months;

(b) Failure to convene the regular assembly of the Katipunan ng Kabataan for two (2)
consecutive times;
(c) Failure to convene the regular Sangguniang Kabataan meetings for three (3) consecutive
months in the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson;

(d) Failure to formulate the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan and the Annual
Barangay Youth Investment Program, or approve the annual budget within the prescribed
period of time without justifiable reason;

(e) Failure to implement programs and projects outlined in the Annual Barangay Youth
Investment Program without justifiable reason;

(f) Four (4) consecutive absences during the regular Sangguniang Barangay sessions without
valid cause in the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson;

(g) Conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude; and violation of existing
laws against graft and corruption and other civil service laws, rules and regulations; and

(h) Failure in the discharge of his or her duty or has committed abuse of authority.

SEC. 19. Succession and Filling up of Vacancies. – (a) In case a Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently
incapacitated, is removed from office, the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding shall assume the office of the
chairperson for the unexpired portion of his or her term. In case said member refuses to assume
the position or fails to qualify, the Sangguniang Kabataan member obtaining the next highest
number of votes shall assume the position of the chairperson for the unexpired portion of the
term.

(b) After the vacancy shall have been filled, the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson shall, within
thirty (30) days, call for a special Katipunan ng Kabataan assembly to elect a Sangguniang
Kabataan member to complete the membership of said sanggunian: Provided, That, such
special assembly is coordinated with the Office of the Local Government Operations Officer and
the COMELEC of the municipality or city where the concerned barangay belongs Such
Sangguniang Kabataan member shall hold office for the unexpired portion of the term of the
vacant seat. For this purpose, any citizen of the Philippines residing in the said barangay for at
least six (6) months who attains the age of fifteen (15) years old at the time of the special
election and who registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan before the Sangguniang
Kabataan secretary shall be entitled to vote in the said special election.

(c) All other vacancies in the office of the Sangguniang Kabataan shall be filled in accordance
with the immediately preceding provision.

(d) In case of suspension of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson, the successor, as

determined in subsection (a) of this section, shall assume the position during the period of such
suspension.
SEC. 20. Sangguniang Kabataan Funds. – The Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be governed
by the following provisions:

(a) All the income of the barangay derived from whatever source shall accrue to its general fund
and shall, at the option of the barangay concerned, be kept as trust fund in the custody of the
city or municipal treasurer or be deposited in „ hank n refer ably government-owned, situated in
or nearest to its area of jurisdiction. Such funds shall be disbursed in accordance with the
provisions of this Act. Ten percent (10%) of the general fund of the barangay shall be set aside
for the Sangguniang Kabataap. The Sangguniang Barangay shall appropriate the Sangguniang
Kabataan funds in lump-sum which shall be disbursed solely for youth development and
empowerment purposes;

(b) The Sangguniang Kabataan shall have financial independence in its operations,
disbursements and encashment of their fund, income and expenditures. As such, the
Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be deposited in the name of the Sangguniang Kabataan of
the concerned barangay in a government-owned bank situated in or nearest to its area of
jurisdiction with the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson and the Sangguniang Kabataan
treasurer as the official signatories;

(c) All Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be allocated in an annual budget, and if the funds
allow, in a supplemental budget in accordance with the adopted Annual Barangay Investment
Program. Both the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan and Annual Barangay
Investment Program shall give priority to programs, projects and activities that will promote and
ensure the equitable access to quality education, environmental protection, climate change
adaptation, disaster risk reduction and resiliency, youth employment and livelihood, health and
anti-drug abuse, gender sensitivity, sports development, and capability building which
emphasizes leadership training; and

(d) The Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panlungsod shall, within sixty (60) days upon
receipt hereof, review the annual budget and supplements1 budget of the Sangguniang
Kabataan on their compliance in the immediately preceding provision and other existing laws,
rules and regulations. Noncompliance shall render said budgets inoperative either in whole or in
part. Failure on the part of the sanggunian to complete the review within the prescribed period
shall render the said annual budget deemed approved.

All Sangguniang Kabataan funds derived from any source shall be stated in its financial records
which shall be kept by the Sangguniang Kabataan treasurer, copy furnished the sangguniang
barangay, in simplified manner as may be prescribed by the Commission on Audit (COA). All
Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be subject to all existing accounting and auditing laws, rules
and regulations.

SEC. 21. Pederasyon ng Sangguniang Kabataan. – (a) There shall be an organization of the
Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan to be known as follows:

(1) In municipalities, Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan which shall be

composed of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairpersons of barangays in the municipality;

(2) In cities, the Panlungsod na Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan which shall be
composed of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairpersons of barangays in the city; and
(3) In provinces, Panlalawigang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan which shall be
composed of the convenors of the Pambayan and Panlungsod na Pederasyon ng mga
Sangguniang Kabataan.

(b) The Pederasyon ng njiga Sangguniang Kabataan shall, at all levels, elect from among
themselves a president, a vice president, a1 treasurer, a secretary and such other officers as
they may deem necessary. The concerned Local Government Operations Officer, in
coordination with the election officer, shall facilitate the conduct of the elections which shall be
held within fifteen (15) days from the Sangguniang Kabataan elections in case of the Pambayan
and Panlungsod na Pederasyon, and within thirty (30) days in case of the Panlalawigang
Pederasyon.

(c) The manner of election, suspension and removal of the officers of the Pederasyon at all
levels and the term of office of the other officers of the Pederasyon shall be governed by the
guidelines to be jointly issued by the DILG, the COMELEC and the Commission within sixty (60)
days upon the effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 22. Membership in the Sanggunian and Local Special Bodies. – (a) The duly elected
president of the Pederasyon ng Sangguniang Kabataan, at all levels, shall serve as ex
officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, respectively;

(b) He or she shall be the chairperson of the Committee on Youth and Sports Development in
the said Sanggunian, and a regular member of the Committees on Education, Environment,
Employment and Livelihood, Health and Anti-Drug Abuse, and Gender and Development,

(c) He or she shall serve as ex officio member of Local School Board, Local Council for the
Protection of Children Local Development Council, Local Health Board Local Tourism Council
and Local Peace and Order Council, and

(d) He or she shall convene the LYDC every three (3) months to conduct consultations with
youth organizations.

CHAPTER III

THE LOCAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (LYDC)

SEC. 23. Creation. – To ensure wide and multi-sectoral youth participation in local governance,
there shall be in every province, city and municipality a Local Youth Development Council
(LYDC) “which shall be called, Provincial Youth Development Council, City Youth Development
Council and Municipal Youth Development Council, respectively. The LYDC shall be composed
of representatives of youth and youth-serving organizations in the provincial, city, and municipal
level. The LYDC shall assist the planning and execution of projects and programs of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, and the Pederasyons in all levels.

SEC. 24. Local Youth Development Council Funds. – The LYDC shall be funded by their
respective Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

CHAPTER IV
 THE LOCAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT OFFICE

SEC. 25. Creation. – There shall be in every province, city and municipality a Youth
Development Office which shall be headed by a youth development officer with the rank of at
least division chief. Such may be put under the Office of the Local Chief Executive, the Office of
the Planning and Development, the Office of the Social Welfare, or in any other office deemed
appropriate by the local government unit. If the funds of the local government unit are sufficient,
it can be a separate department with divisions and units for policy and planning, administration
and finance, and programs and operations. In the event when the local government unit has
exceeded the prescribed personal services limitations, the local chief executive may designate
existing personnel whom he or she deems fit to serve this purpose until such time that the local
government unit can already create this office.

SEC. 26. Funding. – The local government unit shall incorporate in its annual budget such
amount as may be necessary for the operation and effective functioning of the Local Youth
Development Office.

CHAPTER V

CAPABILITY-BUILDING AND ORIENTATION TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING AND

EMPOWERMENT

SEC. 27. Mandatory and Continuing Training Programs. – For the purpose of emphasizing the
role of the youth in nation-building and molding them to become better citizens with the values
of patriotism, nationalism and honor as a Filipino, any Sangguniang Kabataan official, whether
elected or appointed, or any member of the LYDC must undergo the mandatory training
programs before he or she can assume office. During their incumbency, they must attend the
continuing training programs to be undertaken by the Commission in coordination with the
DILG. Deliberate failure to attend the said training programs shall constitute sufficient ground to
disqualify said Sangguniang Kabataan official or LYDC member or subject them to disciplinary
actions.

SEC. 28. Components of the Mandatory Training Programs. – The Commission and the DILG
with the assistance of the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP), the Local
Government Academy (LGA), the University of the’ Philippines-National College of Public
Administration and Governance (UP-NCPAG), and in consultation with youth stakeholders shall
jointly design and implement the mandatory and continuing training programs. The mandatory
training programs1 must include among others, the following components: (a)(1) The
Philippine .cultural history, political systems ethics and ideologies; (2) The Filipino as a nation
builder (3) The Filipino youth and its role in nation-building; and (b) capability building on
leadership, program and project development and sustainability, financial management, and
accountability and transparency.

SEC. 29. Training Fund – A training fund with an initial amount of fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) is hereby established and appropriated from any available source to be
managed by the Commission. Thereafter, such amount needed for this purpose shall be
included in the Annual General Appropriations Act.

CHAPTER VI
 LINGGO NG KABATAAN

SEC. 30. Observance of Linggo ng Kabataan. –

(a) Every barangay, municipality, city and province shall conduct an annual activity to be known
as the Linggo ng Kabataan on the week where the 12 th of August falls to coincide with the
International Youth Day. The Sangguniang Kabataan, in the case of barangay, and the
respective LYDC in cooperation with the Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan, in the
case of municipality, city and province, shall take the lead in this observance.

(b) The observance of the Linggo ng Kabataan shall include the election of the counterparts of
all local elective and appointive officials, as well as heads of national offices or agencies
stationed or assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit, among in-school
and community youth residing in the local government concerned from ages thirteen (13) to
seventeen (17). During said week, they shall hold office as boy and girl officials and shall
perform such duties *and conduct such activities as may be provided in the ordinance enacted
pursuant to this Chapter.

CHAPTER VII

REGISTRATION, ELECTION AND ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE

SEC. 31. Registration. – For purposes of the next regular Sangguniang Kabataan election under
this Act, the COMELEC shall set a special registration of the Katipunan ng Kabataan which shall
in no case be less than one (1) month and shall include Saturdays and Sundays. Subsequent
registration of the Katipunan ng Kabataan shall be governed by Republic Act No. 8189 including
the system of continuing registration.

SEC. 32. Date of Election. – The Sangguniang Kabataan elections shall be synchronized with
the barangay elections and subsequently every three (3) years thereafter.

CHAPTER VIII

FINAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 33. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall
be included in the Annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 34. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). – The Commission, the DILG, the
COMELEC, the Department of Budget and Management, the CHED, the Department of
Education, and the COA, in consultation with the local government leagues, and various youth
organizations and youth-serving organizations shall be tasked to come up, within sixty (60) days
upon approval of this Act, with the IRR needed for the implementation of this Act.

SEC. 35. Separability Clause. – If, for any reason or reasons, any part or provision of this Act
shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions not affected thereby shall
continue to be in full force and effect.
SEC. 36. Repealing Clause. – Sections 329, 423-439 of Republic Act No. 7160, also known as
“The Local Government Code of 1991”; Section 10(O) of Republic Act No. 8044, otherwise
known as “Youth In Nation-Building Act”; Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 9340, entitled
“An Act Amending Republic Act No. 9164, Resetting the Baranagay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, and for Other Purposed”; all other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders letters
of instruction, rules and regulations or portions thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 37. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of
its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

IV. CASES.
1) Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections
FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10
years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974.
She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then
based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical
condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US
to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24,
2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced
her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since
she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The
Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE
is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability
and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on
the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the
country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied
the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS
NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines.
Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her
candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

2) Maquiling v. Comelec (G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

Facts:
Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as citizen
of United States of America. Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted and he
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. On November 2009,
Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But prior from his
declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua, one of the
contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the Philippines, with
a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-American
and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has been using his
American passport even after renunciation of American citizenship. A division of the COMELEC
ruled against Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc stating that
continued use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile,
Maquiling petition that should be declared winner as he gained the second highest number of
votes.

Issue:
Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
one’s qualifications to run for public office.

Held:
Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify
one to run for an elective position which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded
by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to
one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right
of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce
their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full
and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. It is a continuing requirement that
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnando disqualified for any local elective
position as provided by express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code. Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility of the candidate. Otherwise, substantive
requirements set by the Constitution are nugatory.
Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of Jalosjos
v. COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced.
Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who garnered the highest votes
should be declared as winner.

3) Arnado v. Comelec, G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
was naturalized as a US citizen.

Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado
applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections.
However, his co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he continued to use
his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of
Renunciation.

While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein
Arnado garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.

COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.

Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the application
of the rule on succession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for public office by virtue of his
subsequent use of US passport, which effectively disavowed or recalled his 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation.

RULING:

Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, his 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing
said affidavit. Since then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not cured the
defect in his qualification.

Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he
filed his COC for the May 13, 2013 elections.

Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. This refers to dual allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted RA 9225
allowing natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
naturalization abroad to reacquire their Philippine citizenship and enjoy full civil and political
rights.

Hence, they may now run for public office provided they:

1. Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and

2. Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath, prior to or at the time of filing their COC.

4) Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015

Facts:
Caballero and Nanud were mayoral candidates in the 2013 elections. Nanud filed for
cancellation of Caballero’s certificate of candidacy alleging that Caballero is a Canadian citizen
and a nonresident of Batanes.
On May 3, the COMELEC cancelled Caballero’s COC, but on May 13, Caballero won
the 2013 elections. On December 12, COMELEC issued a writ of execution and Nanud took
oath of office.
Caballero argued that prior to the filing of his COC in October 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Canada on
September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to RA 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003).
Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section
5(2) of RA 9225.
Caballero also argued that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Batanes as he merely
left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back
to Uyugan during his vacation while working abroad.

Issue: W/N Caballero was a resident of Uyugan at least one year before the elections.

Held: Caballero failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement as provided in
Section 39 of RA 7160 or LGC.

RA 9255 treats citizenship independently of residence. It declares that natural-born

citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
under the conditions
RA 9225 does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of
which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public
office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.
Caballero’s naturalization in a foreign country may resulted in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Moreover, Caballero’s reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.

Doctrine:
“Residence” required in LGC refers to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new
domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

5) Frivaldo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996

Summary:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his
citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able
to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen. However, on the day that he got his
citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and
acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as
the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

Facts:
1. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the 1995
elections.

2. Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition... with the Comelec... praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled and Comelec
promulgated a Resolution granting the petition

3. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after...
elections. His candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections. Upon completion
of canvassing of votes, Frivaldo got the highest number of vote followed by Lee.

4. Lee filed (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon and accordingly at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor
of Sorsogon.

5. Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of proclamation of
Lee and for his own proclamation.

6. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he... took his oath of allegiance as
a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with
the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."

7. As such... there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor

8. Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution... holding that Lee, "not
having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-
elected governor; and that Frivaldo,... "having garnered the highest number of votes, and...
having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 725 (is... qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"... he
further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only
be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by
the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election if not when the certificate of
candidacy is filed

Issue:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal?
2. If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to
hold the Office of Governor?
3. If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

Held:
1. Yes, it is valid , PD 725 provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born
Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had
to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D.
725 they could now reacquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of
repatriation

Application: There is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo’s repatriation as having

become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all
questions about his possession of the nationality qualification — whether at the date of
proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate
of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

2. No, citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter
the elected official) registered as a voter.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code," (a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be
elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day."

Application:
After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another
item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law a "voter" must be a
citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter — much less a
validly registered one — if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration since he was
really STATELESS at the time he took oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless
in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

3. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold
him still ineligible due to his failure show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter
before the 1995 elections Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the
clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his
loyalty and dedication to this country. Therefore, petition filed by Frivaldo is dismissed. He is not
a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from serving as the Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the elected Vice-Governor.

6) Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the

respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

7) Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, 15 November 2001

FACTS:
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission
On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition3 to disqualify Villaber and to
cancel the latter's certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that
on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in
Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to
suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. 4
Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April23, 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 09017, 5
affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G. R. No. 106709. However, in
its Resolution6 of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On
February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory.7 Cagas also asserted that
Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible for
the office I seek to be elected " - which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel
the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE:
whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
HELD:

YES. The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides:

"Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

"The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon

the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified." (Emphasis ours)

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's
Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals."

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.19

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude.

8) Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 28 July 1999

Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995
election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null
and void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan
Alvez, Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,
Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served
three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May
1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition
for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper
remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost
three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after
petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.”
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot
be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It
has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned
by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents’
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-
1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear
intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full
term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a
term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding
him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption
of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the
COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to
resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

“Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.”

The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of
the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate
and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until
after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the

candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify
that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation.” (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)

9) Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, 08 January 2013

Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001
and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.

In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the
office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption
of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a
period of a little over one year and one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each
other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this
electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the
corresponding petition, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.

ISSUE #1: Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an
election protest, considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the
three consecutive term limit for elective local officials?

RULING: No. Abundo cannot plausibly claim,even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of
the mayor as a matterof right during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30,
2004 until May 8, 2006. Neither can heassert title to the same nor serve the functions ofthe said
elective office. The reason is that during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as
proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the
functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly
elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3)
years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007.

ISSUE #2: Under what instances are the consecutive terms not “involuntary broken or
interrupted”?

RULING: The instanceswherein such consecutive terms are not considered as having been
“involuntarily interrupted or broken” are as follows:

(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law;

(2) Recall Election;
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City;
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension; and
(5) Election Protest

10) Tallado v. Comelec (G.R. No. 246679, 10 September 2019)

FACTS: Tallado was the Governor for 3 terms (2010, 2013, and 2016). On 10/2/2015, the OMB
suspended him so Tallado made a timely appeal to the CA, which reduced his
suspension. On 9/13/2016, the OMB ordered his dismissal and Tallado appealed to the CA yet
again. Then on 1/11/2018, the OMB once again ordered his dismissal from service and Tallado
appealed to the CA. The COMELEC ruled that petitioner’s removal from office was only a
temporary vacancy.

ISSUE: For purposes of succession, did the twin-dismissal order of the Ombudsman create a
temporary vacancy in the Office of the Governor considering that timely appeals were made?

RULE: NO. Tallado’s dismissals resulted in permanent vacancy. Section 46 of the LGC
enumerates as resulting in a temporary vacancy in the office of the local chief executive leave of
absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office. Although Section 46 of the LGC specifically
states that the causes of a temporary vacancy are not limited to such
circumstances, what is evident is that the enumeration therein share something in common,
which is that there is a definite term to be re-assumed. However, the petitioner's dismissals,
even if still not final, were not akin to the instances enumerated in Section 46 of the LGC
because the loss of his title to the office denied to him the expectancy to re-assume his term.

11) Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, 13 November 2012

Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No.8844
considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or
whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the
official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections. During the
canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May
13, 2010, Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor.
However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct
for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the voting
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1

Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of
Bugasong. Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira
contends that she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the
MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.
Issue:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is
the application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters
indicate their choice of candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their
chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the
appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual elections.
If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official
ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered
stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all
disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of
candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to
be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of
the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or
material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral
functions ,election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited
contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).

In Fermin vs. COMELEC , this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section
68and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section
78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes. At this
point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with
a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting
indifferent eventualities. To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 or68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
effects.
While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section
78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC
because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she
is never considered a candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled
as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these
votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered
stray?
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a
final judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of the
nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona fide candidate) still
appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision to
cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on
May 13, 1998 or three days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for
mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of
later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes. These separate tallies
actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion
caused by a potential nuisance candidate.

But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet
final on election day, this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the
votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren
Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters
had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin
Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of
the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been
established that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were
informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate. In the
more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court
likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a
nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding
that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election
day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that
affects the voter’s will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is
not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin
Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate
having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the
day of election. Undeniably, however ,the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present
in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been
declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private
respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the recount.

Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On
the basis of Resolution No. 4116,the votes cast for him should not have been considered
stray but counted in favor of petitioner . COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for
nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of
petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect
to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns
the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced
with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as
stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay
on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While
political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name
of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.

The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be
implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the
names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the
HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable,
following the precedent in Bautista.
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution
No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system
to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial
distinctions between manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering
the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and
Martinez III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the
rules on appreciation of ballots apply only to elections where the names of candidates are
handwritten in the ballots.

The Court is not persuaded. In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially
in local elections, political rivals or operators benefited from the usually belated decisions
by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance
candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by
advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still,
election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames
of candidates for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute,
had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply shades the oval
corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1,2010, nine days before the elections, with
sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of
Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if COMELEC orders
the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the official
ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance
candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but
counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation
of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we
pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy
made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes
cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate. The possibility
of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the
ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting
system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of
the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no
longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-
ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral
experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance
candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the
very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.

12) Atty. Risos-Vidal v. Comelec and Estrada, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
FACTS: On Sep 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On Oct 2007, President Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada thereby restoring his civil and political right
upon which Estrada received and accepted. On Nov 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of
candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012
Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal, petitioner,
filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for
public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013
elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to
disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be
proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.

DECISION: Yes

RATIO DECIDENDI: Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of
the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term “civil and political rights”as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.” Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

13) Aratea vs. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 1 (2012)

FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates
for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections.

Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy
on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling

Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending
during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest
number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

However, DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant,
and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice
to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.

In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath
of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo
allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the
COMELEC.

Issue:
Who is qualified to hold the office of the mayor, Estela Antipolo, “the alleged second placer” or
Efren Aratea, the winning V-Mayor.

Held

Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All
votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections .

Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for
the position of Mayor.

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office.

On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective
public office.

A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office,
and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy
that he is eligible to so run.

14) Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 1 (2012)

On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her
place of birth and residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental (Brgy. Tugas). Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner
a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they
argued that she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because she was
in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous
domicile, Dapitan City. To support this claim, they presented as evidence the certification
from the Assessor’s Office of Baliangao that there was no tax declaration covering any real
property in the name of petitioner located at any place in the municipality and the
certification from the Civil Registrar of Baliangao that petitioner had no record of birth in the
civil registry of the municipality. The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected
municipal mayor. On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC disqualified petitioner from running for
the position of mayor in the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental on the ground
that petitioner never acquired a new domicile in Baliangao, because she failed to prove her
bodily presence at that place, her intention to remain there, and her intention never to
return to her domicile of origin.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is qualified to run for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental on the ground
that petitioner is a resident and a registered voter of the said place

HELD:
The petitioner is disqualified to run as mayor because she failed to comply with the one-
year residency requirement for local elective officials. Petitioner’s uncontroverted domicile
of origin is Dapitan City. The question is whether she was able to establish, through clear
and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections.

The approval of the application for registration of petitioner as voter only shows, at most,
that she had met the minimum residency requirement as a voter. This minimum
requirement is different from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of
running for public office. When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office,
residence is synonymous with domicile. Accordingly,Nuval v. Guray held as follows:

The term ‘residence’ as so used, is synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.

There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First,
residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there.
Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.

These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof. In the absence of
clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed
to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the
same time.

Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of
acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be
within at least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.

In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that
she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010
elections.

15) Quinto vs. COMELEC, 606 SCRA 258, December 1, 2009

Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369,
amending the previous act.
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC)
and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May
10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.-

a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active

members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered

resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.

SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed
on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last
day, which shall be until midnight.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.

ISSUES:

1. Do petitioners have locus standi?

2. Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal protection
clause?

HELD:

1. The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and
the compelling state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of
CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants
intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing
imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time,
crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if
only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication
of all, especially the constitutional, issues.

The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have
the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified
 voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the
rights of voters to choose their public officials.

The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the
petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that
they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the
provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the
assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it
cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners'
candidacy.

2. It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two
fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association.

Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections
4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not
germane to the purpose of the law. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the
Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as
opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the
provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Second, the provision is
directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.

16) Quinto vs. COMELEC, 613 SCRA 385, Feb. 22, 2010
This is a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Supreme Court in Quinto vs.
COMELEC, 1 December 2009.

ISSUES:

1. Do the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause?

2. Do the assailed provisions suffer from overbreadth?

HELD:

1. No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the
participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too
plain to be mistaken.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section
55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers
and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and
all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite
term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served
by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there
is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to

the purposes of the law.
 2. No. The view that the assailed provisions are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all appointive civil servants regardless of position obviously fails to
consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the
partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers
of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable
grasp on the reins of power."

[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an
emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason
enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials
without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or
the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.

Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus,
it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies
of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections.

17) Mendoza vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of
times:
a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to
1988
b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June
1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.

In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in
the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.

Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Roman’s
election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution.

Issue:
Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included
in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?

Held:

No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely
serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.

The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply,
providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If
involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish
his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for
purposes of applying the three-term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term
assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be
one term in reckoning the three-term limit.

In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the
elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official
following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set by
the Constitution.

The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of
the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during
which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall
election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had
previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-
2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position.

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation
would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange
his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against
the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who
received 97 percent of the votes cast. (Mendoza vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512. November
12, 2002)

18) Socrates vs. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457, Nov. 12, 2002

FACTS:

Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive
terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit
principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in
which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as
mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE:

WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD:

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is
that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth
term, The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the same office
following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall
election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because
of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R.
No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

19) Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004|

FACTS
 When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due
course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied
his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance
candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC noted that such
candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not nominated by a
political party or not supported by a registered political party with national constituency.”

Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for
public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was
indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most
qualified among all the presidential candidates” and supported the statement with his legal
qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and his
government platform.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy,
along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for
public service.

HELD

1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential

candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to
opportunities for public service. – NO

The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-self
executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does
not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the policies presented.

Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject to
limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without discrimination,
then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for
limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly
elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a “mockery” if
anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to
run.

Note:
Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy.
The Court however stated that it is not within their power to make such assessments.
 20) Timbol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206004 (Resolution), [February 24,
2015])

FACTS:
Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City for the May 13, 2013 elections. However,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9610 declaring Timbol a nuisance candidate and ordering the
removal of his name from the certified list of candidates, and Minute Resolution denying his
petition to have his name listed in the certified list of candidates and printed on the ballots for
the May 13, 2013 elections. Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer
Valencia, pursuant to the Subpoena issued upon him, for a clarificatory hearing. He contended
that he was not a nuisance candidate, that in fact he placed 8 th among all candidates who ran
for city councilor of Caloocan City, and that he had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.
Valencia recommended that Timbol’s name be removed from the list of nuisance candidates in
the COMELEC’s website and that his CoC be given due course. However, the recommendation
was never acted upon.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying Timbol’s Petition for inclusion in the
certified list of candidates
HELD:
YES.
Respondent’s power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to
the candidate’s opportunity to be heard.

- Under Art. II, Sec. 26 of the Constitution, “the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service.” This, however, does not guarantee a constitutional right
to run for or hold public office. To run for public office is a mere privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law, such as prohibition on nuisance candidates.
- Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts
which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.”

- To minimize logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their CoCs may be

denied due
course or cancelled by COMELEC, through motu proprio or upon verified petition of an
interested party, subject to an opportunity to be heard.
 - In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.

- COMELEC declared Timbol a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain
his bona fide intention to run for office. It issued Resolution No. 9610 when Timbol
appeared before Valencia in a clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective opportunity
to be heard.

- Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the defect in the
issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had he
been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute
Resolution, COMELEC denied Timbol’s petition on the sole ground that the printing of
ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013

- Although reprinting of ballots would indeed be costly, COMELEC should balance its duty
to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly and peaceful with the right
of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before
he/she is declared a nuisance candidate.

21) Rulloda v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154198, [January 20, 2003], 443
PHIL 649-656

Facts:
Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman
Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents
wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended
that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate
of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that
she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling:

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a

prohibition against said substitution cannot be said to exist.

Petitioner’s letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its
resolution denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality
of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the
way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed
to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.

22) Federico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199612, [January 22, 2013],
702 PHIL 68-92

DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 15 of RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections, the
Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the
conduct of the first national automated election: “the Comelec, which has the constitutional
mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,”

In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009
pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.

FACTS: Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates for the position of
municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal Party’s official mayoralty candidate.

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the
province of Batangas, died. On April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her
deceased husband.

Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and CONA as official
candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in lieu of Edna.

Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC was allegedly filed
after the deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678.

However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due course to the candidacy of Edna and
Petitioner.

However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots had already been printed, the name of
Edna was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of Sto. Tomas against Private Respondent. In
fact, Edna garnered the most votes for that election, beating Private Respodent for the position of
mayor. Eventually the board ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to Petitioner (who was the
replacement of Edna).

Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the proclamation of Petitioner Federico.

The COMELEC en banc eventually annulled the proclamation of Petitioner and proclaimed Private
Respondent Maligaya as mayor (Maligaya na sya). The COMELEC declared that Petitioner's
substitution of Edna was void because if was filed after the period for filing of COCs had lapsed.

Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme Court. He claimed that Comelec Resolution
No. 8678, which fixed a period for the filing of COCs and CONAs cannot prevail over the Omnibus
Election code, specifically Sec. 77 which provides that a party's replacement candidate of one who
withdraws, dies or is disqualified may be filed no later than mid-day of the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled Federico’s
proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground that his substitution as mayoralty candidate
was void.

HELD: No, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Comelec is empowered by law
to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national
automated election. RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections specifically allows
COMELEC to set deadlines for the filing of certificates of candidacy etc.

Under Sec. 15, “the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,”

In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009
pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.

Thus, the substitution of Petitioner was made out of time and was thus void.

23) Engle v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 215995, [January 19, 2016]

DOCTRINE:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation which is a ground for a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a
candidate’s COC refers to a material fact relating to the candidate’s qualification for office
such as one’s citizenship or residence.

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Babatngon, Province of Leyte in the May 13, 2013 Elections. Petitioner’s late husband, James
L. Engle, was originally the candidate for said contested position; however, he died of cardiogenic
shock on February 2, 2013. Due to this development, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on
February 22, 2013 as a substitute candidate for her deceased spouse.
In response, private respondent filed, a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner arguing in the main that the latter misrepresented that she is
qualified to substitute her husband, who was declared an independent candidate by the
COMELEC. It would appear that James L. Engle’s Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
(CONA) was signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) Leyte Chapter President,
Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez (Romualdez). However, Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the
COMELEC Law Department the authorization of Romualdez to sign the CONAs of Lakas- CMD
candidates in Babatngon as prescribed by Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Thus,
the COMELEC Law Department considered all Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were signed
by Romualdez as independent candidates.

Respondent’s contention:
Petitioner violated Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows the substitution of
an independent candidate.

Petitioner’s counter-argument:
[In petitioner's Verified Answer,[8] she countered that: (1) the ground relied upon in private
respondent's petition was not the ground contemplated by Section 1, Rule 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523; (2) the COMELEC did not issue an official declaration that petitioner's
husband was an independent candidate; and (3) James L. Engle's CONA was signed by an
authorized person acting on behalf of LAKAS-CMD.]

Petitioner posited that under Sec. 1, Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, the exclusive
ground for denial or cancellation of a COC is the falsity of a material representation contained
therein.

The petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner’s COC was still pending with the COMELEC
2nd Division when the May 13, 2013 Elections were held. James L. Engle’s name remained on the
ballot. On May 15, 2013, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly-
elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. Petitioner was credited with the 6,657 votes cast for her
husband as against private respondent’s 3,515 votes.

It was on July 5, 2013 that the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated its Resolution which denied
due course to and cancelled petitioner’s COC resulting in the annulment of petitioner’s previous
proclamation as duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the declaration of private
respondent as winner of the contested position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can validly substitute her husband James l. Engle after his unexpected
demise.

RULING:
Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a petition to deny due course to, or cancel
a COC may be filed on the exclusive ground of false material representation in said COC.
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation which is a ground for a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a
candidate’s COC refers to a material fact relating to the candidate’s qualification for office
such as one’s citizenship or residence.

However, private respondent failed to demonstrate that petitioner made a false statement regarding
her qualifications or concealed any disqualification for the office to warrant its cancellation under
Section 78. Verily, it was publicly known that James L. Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD. As far
as the party and his wife were concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of Lakas-CMD, may be
substituted as a candidate upon his death.

We held in Rulloda v. Commission on Elections that: Technicalities and procedural niceties in

election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Election contests
involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.
The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.

Applying these jurisprudential precedents, we find that the late submission of Romualdez’s
authority to sign the CONA of James L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere technicality that
cannot be used to defeat the will of the electorate in a fair and honest election.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Marcelina S. Engle is declared the
duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte during the May 13, 2013 Elections.