Amended Opening Brief NINTH CIRCUIT

Case: 22-35794, 09/29/2023, ID: 12801939, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 1 of 84
No. 22-35794
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN

Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATED COAST
GUARD, [DOE-1 PROVIDENCE ST. PETER HOSPITAL],
[DOE-2 STATE OF WASHINGTON], DOES 1–155, ET AL.
Appellees-Defendants
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
No. 2:21-cv-01276-RAJ
The Honorable Richard A. Jones
United States District Court Judge
APPELLANTS' AMENDED OPENING BRIEF
CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN

PO Box 38097
Phoenix, AZ 85069
(253) 588-8100
candidCarolyn@gmail.com
Retained Counsel
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………………...ii
STATUTORY [& REGULATORY] AUTHORITIES ………………...iii
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………….….…..1
BACKGROUND OF CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN (CSX) .....................1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT …………………………………….3
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & CASE OVERVIEW .......………….4
BRIEF SUMMARY .................................................................................5
CONDENSED TIMELINE ......................................................................8
STANDARD OF REVIEW …………………………………………...12
STANDING DEMONSTRATED .........................................................13
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH ARGUMENT & CASE LAW
I. ISSUE-1: DRUG VIOLATIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES

DEPT OF VETERANS FILED TIMELY......................................18
The issue is whether the lower court's improper handling of timely filed drug
violations against the U.S. Department of Veterans Administration, including the
illegal refilling and distribution of liquid-morphine, coupled with a lack of
accountability in pharmaceutical data records, necessitates a comprehensive review
to rectify concerns surrounding excessive drug prescription bad standard of
practices and substandard care in the treatment of a “mild” case of post-traumatic
stress and severe physical injuries within the Dept of Veterans.
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i
II. ISSUE -2: MOTION FOR DEFAULT - JOINDER…………….....................35

The issue presented is whether Doe-1 Providence complied with Civil Rules
LCR 6; Rule 27 by responding to the Motion for Joinder and if proper service,
as required by Rule 4; Summon, was effectuated. Furthermore, it involves
determining whether CSX has an automatic right to a Motion for Default;
default judgment under Civil Rule LCR 55.
III. ISSUE-3: MOTION FOR DEFAULT – RE-OPEN,

MOTION FOR DEFAULT - CONSOLIDATE………….............40
The issue presented is whether Doe-2 State, Doe-3 Pierce County,
Doe-4 U.S. Dept of Veterans complied with Civil Rules LCR 6; Rule 27 by
responding to the Motion to Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate and if proper
service and with Color of Law violations as required by Rule 4: Summons, was
effectuated. Furthermore, it involves determining whether CX has an automatic
right to a Motion for Default; default judgment under Civil Rule LCR 55.
IV. ISSUE-4(a): DUE PROCESS DENIED, RIGHT TO HIRE COUNSEL

DENIED RIGHT TO HIRE COUNSEL, OBTAINED
SIGNATURE BY DECEPTION ..................................................47
The issue at hand is whether Carolyn Green was denied her right to an effective
public defender, who also made a secret agreement through an ex parte, if CSX
was denied her right to hire her own attorney, if proper service as required byLCR
5, Rule 4 was effectuated. Furthermore, whether Doe-1 Providence committed
perjury with the intention of fraud in the Thurston County Superior Court.
V. ISSUE-4(b): INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT V. KIDNAPPING ...........52
The issue at hand is whether the lower court applied improper application
of the law, appellees-defendants complied with RCW 71.05 as required by the
ITA, does immunity exist for appellees-defendants, and was perjury was
committed in both the Thurston County and Pierce County Superior Courts.
VI. ISSUE-5: ARMED FORCES JURISDICTION ...........................................57

The issues surrounding this issue for review are fundamental legal questions:
Can Carolyn Green establish equitable tolling? Additionally, the case delves
into issues surrounding misconduct, intentional concealment, and jurisdiction
by the Armed Forces, as well as the applicability of the Feres doctrine in cases
involving acts of violence and misconduct.
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ii
CONFLICTING RULINGS .......................................................................36
CONCLUSION …………………………………………………….…….66
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES attached.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE attached.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE as attached.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Addington v. Texas
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ...........................................................54, 55
Bentzen v. Demmons,
842 P.2d 1015, 349 n.8 (Wash. App. 1993) .....................................22
Boyce v. West, 862 P.2d 592, 665
(Wash. App. 1993) ......................................................................22, 23
Boyd v. DSHS (2015),
Court of Appeals Division–II No. 45174-3-II...................................64
Carlson v. Green, 1980,
446, U.S. 14, 19 ...............................................................................17
Carolyn Becker v. U.S. Coast Guard, et al.................................................61
City of Vancouver v. Wash. Pub. Emp 't Relations Comm 'n,
180 Wn. App. 333, 356, 325 P.3d 213 (2014) ……………….…....64
Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin,
908 F. 2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990) ..........................................38, 45
Davis v. FEC(2008),
554 U.S. 724, 734 ............................................................................16
Davis v. Fendler,
650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981) ...............................................39
Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) .........................................................22
DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n, (2020),
306 So. 3d 1202, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA) ……..………….…...........14
iii
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe,

431 F.3d 162, 165 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2005) ............................................38
Douchette v. Bothell School District, (1991),
117 Wn.2d 805, 812 fn.6, 818 P.2d 1362 ………………………..58
Eleanor Riese v. St. Mary Hospital (1989 9th Cir.) .................................55
Elliott v. Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXI 91125
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2009) .................................................................18
Equity Res. v. Cty. of Leon (1994),
643 So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA) ............................................15
Farmer v. Brennan, (1994)
511 U.S. (U.S.) ................................................................................17
Gutierrez v. Peters, (1997),
111 F.3d. 1364, 1366 .................................................................17, 22
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (1983) ..............15
Holland, 560 U.S. at 652 ........................................................................... 50
Hollingsworth v. Perry, (2013),
570 U.S. 693, 705 ............................................................................16
Intermagnetics America, Inc.,
101 B.R. 191, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1989) .................................................48
Katz v. Gerardi,
655 F.3d 1212, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2011) .........................................45
Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 374, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986) ..........49
Lessard v. Schmidt (1972), ..........................................................................50
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992),
504 U.S. 555, 560 ........................................................................15, 16
Lum v. Mercedes-Benz USA. .......................................................................48
Luna v. Kernan, (9th Cir. 2015),
784 F.3d 640, 648 ..............................................................................51
McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970) ..........................................................................48
Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed 2d 451 (1975) .....................55
Mission Power Engineering Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
883 F.Supp. 488, 489 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ............................................48
iv
Nist v. Tudor, 407 P.2d 798, 331

(Wash. 1965) .....................................................................................22
O’Connor v. Donaldson
422 U.S. 573-576 (1975) ..................................................................55
Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) ......................................................55
Scott v. Kuhlman .........................................................................................44
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, (2020)
140 S. Ct. 2183, 219 .........................................................................16
Spencer v. King County, 692 P.2d 874, 1 20,
(Wash. App. 1984) ...........................................................................22
Staub v. Proctor Hosp. (2011),
562 U.S. 411, 131 S Ct. 1186,179 L.Ed 144 ....................................64
State v. Ciskie,
110 Wn.2d 263, 284, 751 P. 2d 1165 (1988) .....................................50
State v. Garrett,
124 Wn.2d 504, 520, 881 P. 2d 185 (1994) .......................................50
State v. Hendrickson,
129 Wn.2d 61, 77- 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) ......................................49
State v. Lee
132 Wn.2d 498, 939 P.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................44
Strickland Test ....................................................................................... 48, 49
Summers v. Tice (1948) ................................................................................16
Summit Trust, 2013 WL 3967602 ................................................................39
Swackhammer v. Widnall, (1997),
No. 96-35587 (1997, 9th Cir.) ………………………………..….....57
Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020, 2nd Cir.) ................................................................55
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund v. Dubin Paper Co.,
2012 WL 3018062, (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) .................................38, 45
The Body Keep Score, Bessel Van Der Kolk, M.D......................................34
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., (2017),
581 U.S. ___, No. 16–605, slip op. at 6 ............................................16
United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S. Ct. 2045, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984) ..........49
v
Vaughan v. First Union Nat’l Bank (1999),

740 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA) .............................................15
Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. Stevens (2000),
529 U.S. 765, 771 ............................................................................15
Washington v. Harper
494 US 210, 244 (1990) ..................................................................55
Western Sys Inc. v. Ulloa,
958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1992) ..................................................44
Whitmore v. Arkansas (1990),
495 U.S. 149, 155............................................................................15
Young v. Hamric, (E.D. Mich. 2008).
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43634, 2008 WL 2338606 .................................40
Statutes & Laws

8 U.S.C. § 1324c- Penalties for document fraud .....................................51
18 U.S. Code § 286 ………………………………………………….…24
18 U.S. Code § 371 …………………………………………………….24
18 U.S. Code § 922 ………………………………………………...........3
18 U.S. Code 1031 …………………………………..............................24
18 U.S. Code § 1201 ...............................................................4, 10, 19, 55
18 U.S.C. § 1621- Perjury .......................................................................52
18 U.SC § 1962 (RICO) ………………………………………........…..24
21 C.F.R. § 201.58 Waiver……………………………………...............24
21 C.F.R. §1306.12 ……………………………………...................23, 24
21 C.F.R. §1306.14 …………………………………….........................24
21 USC § 846 ………………………………………………….........….24
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) ..................................................................................37
28 U.S.C. § 1291 …………………………………………………...........3
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ...........................................................................3, 36, 37
42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985 ………………………………………..........…3
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) ......................................3, 7, 9, 55
Article I § 1: Political Power ....................................................................56
Article I § 3: Personal Rights ...................................................................56
Article I § 5: Freedom of Speech .............................................................56
vi
Article I § 10: Administration of Justice ..................................................56

Article I § 11: Religious Freedom ............................................................56
Article I § 14: Excessive Bail, Fines and Punishment .............................56
Article I § 24: Right to Bear Arms ...........................................................56
Article III ..................................................................................................15
Due Process Clause …………................4, 10, 13 17, 42, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56
Eighth Amendment ...................................................................................17
Fourteenth Amendment ............................................................................50
RCW 9A.60.030 (1) Obtained Signature by Deception ...........................51
RCW 18.64.245 Prescription records ……………………………...........31
RCW 18.71.800-new ……………………………………………............31
RCW 4.16.350 ……………………………………………………..........11
RCW 69.41.042 Record requirements……………………………..........31
RCW 69.41.020 Prohibited acts ………………………………..........….31
RCW 69.50.206–Schedule II defines(c) …………………………..........31
RCW 69.50.308–Prescriptions(a) ………………………………........…31
RCW 71.05 ..................................................................................47, 52, 53
Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms ......................................3, 34, 56
Sixth Amendment ....................................................................................49
WAC 246-919-970 Coprescribing of opioids……………………..........29
Rules
Civ. R. 3(g) ..............................................................................................45
Civ. R. 6 .............................................................................................35, 40
Civ. R. 55 Default; Default Judgment ...................................35, 38, 39, 45
Civ. R. 102 Complex, Multiple and Multidistrict Litigation ...................45
Rule 4 .................................................................................................35, 40
Rule 19(1)(2) Joinder by Court Order ......................................................35
Rule 20(2) Permissive Joinder...................................................................35
Rule 21 Misjoinder and Nonjoinder .........................................................35
Rule 27 ................................................................................................35, 40
Rule 60 ......................................................................................................42
Rule 73 ......................................................................................................37
vii
Other Authorities
Cat’s Paw ………………………………………………….…64, 65
Behaviour of Wolves ……………………………………………55
Feres Doctrine ……………………………………………57, 58, 62
Feres Doctrine Spletstoser v. Hyten (2020) …………………...…60
Protect Our Defenders: …………………………………………..60
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) …………...54
The War Horse ………………………………………………...…59
Vanessa Guillen …………………………………………………..60
1) Causation: https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/causation/
2) Standing: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-
2/clause-1/standing-requirement-overview 01/07/2023 csx.
3) Standing: C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts 60 (4th ed.
1983).
4) Standing: https://americasvoice.org/blog/standing-what-it-is-and-why-it-
matters-to-the-supreme-court-and-to-us/ 01/07/2023 csx.
5) Behavior of Wolves; Livingwithwolves.org.
6) The War Horse. Sonner Kehrt @etskehrt, 10/06/22.
7). https://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/news-and-politics/case-vanessa-
guill%C3%A9n-military-crimes-united-states.
8). https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/05/25/i-am-vanessa-guillen-
act-praised-calls-removing-cos-sexual-assault-prosecutions-mount.html.
9) https://www.protectourdefenders.com/history/.
10). https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/03/05/veterans-affairs-
wait-time-medical-appointment-trump-mcdonough-column/6820715002/.
11). https://www.defense.gov/News/News-
Stories/Article/Article/3167285/dod-services-moving-ahead-on-
recommendations-to-combat-sexual-assault/.
12). https://timesupfoundation.org/sexual-harassment-assault-in-the-
military/.
13). Schwartz LM, Woloshin S. Medical Marketing in the United States,
1997-2016.JAMA. 2019;321(1):80–96. doi:10.1001/jama.2018.19320
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2720029 (accessed February
18, 2019).
viii
14). Rob Wipond investigative journalist. How Psychiatric Fraud Drives

Forced Hospitalizations. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYRQ-cJqXW4.
.(January 17, 2023)
15). A Bit About Atypical Antipsychotics. Opioids and Antipsychotics.
www.qnada.org.au/news.
16). Haldol side effects via drugs.com.
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ix
I. INTRODUCTION
In the matter before this Honorable Court, we are at a crossroads of legal
precedent and justice. Carolyn Sioux Green v. United States of America, et al.,
presents a pivotal challenge that not only impacts the rights and interests of the
parties involved but also carries broader implications for the legal landscape
beyond the Ninth Circuit. As we delve into the intricacies of this appeal, it
becomes evident the issues at hand demand careful consideration and thoughtful
analysis. Thank you for your time.
II. BACKGROUND OF CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN
A brief background history of Appellant Carolyn Sioux Green (“CSX”).
Prior to my honorable military service, I had a diverse background. I was an
amateur athlete and even qualified as a contender for American Gladiators. In the
professional sphere, I worked in administration and accounting, primarily in
accounts payable, handling substantial financial responsibilities. I spent several
years in accounts payable and data entry, responsible for paying hundreds of
thousands and millions of dollars. While employed at an auto auction where I
gained experience managing silent bid sales that were paid in large sums of cash,
as well as managed car titles and vehicle transfers. For auction days, most times I
was the runner for the auction block. As a graduate from John Robert Modeling
and Self Development School, where I later worked part-time as an instructor, with
1
part-time modeling. (4-ER 959).
In furtherance, I entered the United States Coast Guard (USCG) on an age
waiver a couple of years before I turned 30 y/o. During active-duty while aboard a
ship, I sustained a catastrophic physical injury to my right buttocks, right hip, right
shoulder and neck. There are witness affidavits. The Military masked my well-
documented physical injury with drugs instead of trying to put me back together.
My injury was treated with inappropriate drugs. The USCG attempted to call my
physical injury an adjustment disorder. Then prescribed inappropriate drugs such
as “valium” to treat my physical injury. I was denied appropriate adequate
effective medical procedural care while active-duty. In fact, after being injured for
464 days directly to my lower extremities, I was reprimanded twice in writing
instead of medical treatment for the injury. The first reprimand was about
complaints I made about the medical provider not being qualified to treat my injury
after being 464 days injured. The second reprimand was for seeking to talk to a
medical provider after hours about my now 653 days physical injury
(5-ER 1050-1051), (5-ER 1061-1063).
After I was honorably discharged, 23 days later (now 690 days injured
without medical treatment), I entered the Dept of Veterans for medical care.
Although the Dept of Veterans documented my physical injury and my complaints
of pain on that first appointment, it failed to provide prompt adequate treatment.
2
Instead, drugs were prescribed with counseling for a “mild” case of post-
traumatic stress. No treatment or medical care for the injury. For years. Even
though my injury was reported and documented in the medical records over and
over again with more abnormalities in my physical structure, my injury continued
to be masked with excessive inappropriate drugs.To make matters worse, the Dept
of Veterans continued to prescribe excessive amounts of drugs from: January 12,
1996–June 9, 2017. This includes the 13 YEARS of CHRONIC OPIOID
THERAPY instead of and with procedural medical treatment. (5-ER 1066), (2-ER
272-280), (4-ER 793-796).
Throughout this process, I have done my best to abide by the Court Rules
expressing the constitutional depravations, conflicting court rulings for removal
under U.S.C. § 1331 to related cases, and have requested oral arguments and ADA
in the process, I extend my apologies for any inadvertent missteps.
III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for
deprivation of rights), § 1985 conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Jurisdiction
under 18 USC § 922 to restore CSX’s firearm rights in the remaining 49 states.
Washington State restored her Second Amendment rights for the state of
Washington only on November 1, 2019. This Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (appeal of final decision).
3
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & CASE OVERVIEW
This appeal presents a series of pressing issues. Drug violations against the
U. S. Department of Veterans was timely filed. In addition, the deprivation of
Constitutional Rights and violations of Federal and State laws, including violations
to Due Process, Second Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. Notably, it underscores the
gross negligence by the Dept of Veterans, Providence St. Peter Hospital
(Providence), State of Washington (State) in grossly neglecting a well-documented
physical injury treating it as a mental illness and by force. Dept of Veterans and the
for exponential delays in procedural medical treatment to the injury, excessive
inappropriate prescribed drugs, leading to severe injuries and more than two-
decades of excessive drug prescriptions with unnecessary appointments. Moreover,
it scrutinizes the U.S. Coast Guard's use of inappropriate drugs rather than proper
effective adequate medical care for a physical injury and their attempt to label her
injury as an adjustment disorder.
Then too, the appeal violations of Federal and State laws, including perjury,
fraud, no legal counsel, denied her right to hire her own attorney, no right to refuse
treatment as a “competent” individual, no notice no proper service, kidnapping
sold to the courts under the guise of civil commitment, the absence of
4
any judicial determination for forced drugging a “competent” physically injured
individual that bypassed all jurisdictional perquisites.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the defendants are in default of the
motions as outlined: Defendants: Doe-1 Providence has an unopposed
unchallenged Motion to Joinder. Doe-2 State, Doe-3 Pierce County, and also
presented as a doe is Doe-4 Dept of Veterans, have an unopposed unchallenged
Motion to Re-Open and Motion to Consolidate matter 3:20-cv-06112-BHS to case
2:21-cv-01276-RAJ. Doe-2, Doe-3, Doe-4 have perfected service that belong in the
SCOTUS case 23M1 and in Hon. Judge Jones case 2:21-01276-RAJ.
Genuine issues of material facts exist. Case Evidence in a Nutshell-(7-ER).
This appeal seeks to address the review de novo for these critical issues and
constitutional depravations, drug violations, to reverse the district court’s
judgments and as such an injunction should be issued.
V. BRIEF SUMMARY
To facilitate clarity for the Court, CSX has incorporated specific years and
months as date markers to create a comprehensive timeline, aiming to offer a more
concise overview of the case's complete scope.
22 years
5 months
12 days
of psychotropic masking drugs for physical injuries is substandard care.
5
Dept of Veterans excessively poly drugged and prescribed excessive drugs
to Carolyn Green for (21 years 4 mo 28 days) Jan. 12, 1996 – June 9, 2017 for a
“mild” case of post-traumatic stress and a catastrophic physical injury. This
includes 13 YEARS of Chronic Opioid Therapy. CSX self-discontinued liquid-
morphine on June 9, 2017. The USCG prescribed inappropriate drugs for her
physical injury from May 02, 1994 – Oct 5, 1995 (1 year 5 mo 3 days+).
(5-ER 1066), (4-ER 493-501). (7-ER).
In 2021 November, a medical professional with 25 years of clinical experience
reported “Carolyn’s Brain Health” as: “The energetic pattern represented is one
seen in stroke where there is a component of vascular and brain involvement.” ….
“that [drugs] must have been a huge assault to the system to still be resonating
strongly after 4 years,” from self-discontinuance of morphine in 2017, with over
two-decades of continual excessive drugging by the Dept of Veterans.
(6-ER 1578-1587). (3-ER 493-501).
CSX sincerely apologizes to the Court for the duplicates in the excerpts of
record. On the lighter side, finding the matching documents is a good cognitive
brain challenge, entertaining, although not intended to be cumbersome. This
process to overcome the excessive and enormous amount of forced drugging then
the years upon years of excessive prescribed drugs by the Dept of Veterans, and
overcoming a stoke in 2021, has been rather challenging. In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
6
An Oral Argument is requested to permit Carolyn Green to verbally express her
case instead of only in writing due to she is challenged with overcoming Aphasia.
It is worth noting in the district court I duly submitted requests for
reasonable accommodations under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).
(1-ER 56-66, 6-ER 1578-1587).
7
VI. CONDENSED TIMELINE
o 2020 September: Lawsuits Filed (2019 Aug 14 initial legal proceeding began).
This was after misfiling in over twenty-governmental agencies.
o 2019 August 14: Initial Filing: Restoration of Rights–Firearm filed in Thurston
County Superior Court and that included evidence in the lawsuits filed in 2020.
Washington State. Restored 11/01/2019. 49 states await restoration.
o 2018 October: Dates perfected service for federal and state drug violations
against U.S. Dept of Veterans.
o 2017 August 30: The first medical treatment for the bodily damage caused by
the reckless use of four-point mechanical restraints used as a means of
convenience that caused injuries to her left-side hind-end. DOE-1 Providence is
the causation of this great bodily damage created May 31, 2001 that was
masked with drugs for 16 years 3 mo.
o 2017 June 09: First day off ALL prescribed drugs. Last day she ingested drugs
prescribed in excess by Dept of Veterans. This last day of liquid-morphine,
after 22+ years of prescribed daily drugs.
o 2015-2023: CSX continues to receive effective procedural medical treatments
(Prolotherapy and Platelet Rich Plasma (PRP)) to recover from physical
injuries, and drug damage. The medical bills and supplements for the ongoing
effective treatment and care to recovery from being maimed has cost more than
8
$50,000. CSX recently filed for bankruptcy. Effective medical treatment, that
includes having two internally broken lower molars extracted that Dept of
Veterans refused to extract even on their recommendation. Money for bodily
structural treatments, vitamin supplements to overcome the enormous amount
of drug damage, for a better quality of life. Her quality-of-life matters.
(9thCir. dkt.4-2, 6-ER 1591).
o 2007-2014: She attended safe educational colleges as a means to help her
recover from complex trauma that included violence. College helped her
cognitively from being poisoned with the abuse of chemical restraints. She was
chemically lobotomized. College helped put her gather the fragments to assist
in putting her life back together. As a coping tool, Carolyn compartmentalized
past violent trauma in attempts to move forward with her life. Still walking
around injured due to the bad substandard of medical care by Dept of Veterans,
on drugs. Defendants like to use that she went to college against her. By the
grace of God and the American Disabilities Act (ADA) assisting, she was able
to complete college in twice the amount of time as others.
o 2009: Medical treatment continued for the lower initial extremity injury.
o 2002 Apr 10: Medical treatment started for the initial lower extremity injury.
o 2002 Apr 07: Walked out of her entire life to receive medical care to so she
could live. Moved to Lakewood, Washington after filing for separation.
9
o 2001 May 31: INJURED, Still walking around on her physical injury sustained
while active-duty with no adequate medical treatment, and sleep deprived,
prescribed drugs for care. Since 1994. Initially by the USCG. Excessive drugs
continued with the Dept of Veterans. I had an isolated incident of erratic driving
on private property with no bystanders, no witnesses, with a clean background.
Then for the isolated incident of erratic driving on private property she was
imprisoned/ kidnapped by legal definition 18 U.S. Code § 1201. She had no
rights. She had no due process. There was no legal counsel. She was denied her
legal right to hire her own attorney. She was forced to endure harsh criminal
mistreatment of being put in four-point-mechanical restraints for near eight-
hours, on her injured self. Forced drugs were administered, as a form of
punishment. (1-ER 72-77).
(1-ER 67-71). (6-ER 1349-1546). In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
o 2001 May 21: Dept of Veterans cancelled her Rheumatology appointment with
Dr. Weeks for Dr. Paxon, again. (6-ER 1612).
o 2000 June 28: Her FIRST Doctor, Dr. Charles “Charlie” Paxon. Injured 1629
days: 85 appointments before her first doctor appointment at Dept of Veterans
Puget Sound. (5-ER 1067-1069), (4-ER 500), 6-ER 1609-1611), (5-ER 1066).
(4 years 5 mo 16 days; or 53 mo and 16 days = 1629 days).01/16/96.
Injured 2319 days: (6 years 4 mo 7 days; 76 mo 7 days). 02/21/94.
10
(On 2001 May 31 DOE-1 Providence four-point-mechanical restraints injuries
were masked with drugs and the poisoning that occurred abusing chemical
restraints. Providence went to great lengths to intentionally conceal their crimes
who “RECOPIED” their illegal mandatory forced drugging that bypassed all
judicial determination). See RCW. 4.16.350. (3-ER 580-585).
o 1996 Jan 12: Entered the U.S. Dept of Veterans Administration who treated her
well-documented physical injury as a mental illness. (5-ER-1066).
o 1995 Dec 20: U.S. Coast Guard Honorably retired her medically without
medical care.
o 1995 Oct 26: Letter from Yvonne Fee to LCDR Henry Reed, Supervisor (D13)
Regarding the local Medical Officer, Dr. Castro and Mr. Tate. In-part; “She
[Carolyn] also stated her Neurologist and had finally been diagnosed. It appears
she has a very serious injury....neglected.....by Dr. Castro... Dr. Castro was
really upset, stated he was going to enter an AMA [against medical advice], and
told her to see Mr. Tate. ....and he proceeded to chastise her for something. He
told her he would have to go speak with the XO, Commander Breckinridge, and
he disappeared... ...however, I can tell you the COAST GUARD is going to be
blamed from something they have no control over, (our local medical officer,
Dr. Castro and Mr. Tate) who shot themselves in the foot yesterday. Not
everyone who see Dr. Castro is a malingerer or whiner when they see him....
11
o Not everyone who seeks medical care will recover on Motrin/Valium/or pain
medication.” (2-ER 465-467), (5-ER 1050, 1051).
o 1995: Active-duty, she was paying out of pocket seeking adequate medical care
and advice. Dr. Tomski was invaluable during this time.
o 1994 Feb 21: INJURED slipped on a stainless-steel ladder on a ship after the
traumatic experiences and hostile work environment at her first unit (5-ER
1050). While stationed at her second unit aboard the UCSCG Mellon (WHEC
717), CSX slipped on a stainless-steel ladder as her boot caught the edge of the
step, resulting in her landing on her right buttocks in a series of five consecutive
impacts. The incident is substantiated with witness affidavits. See (7-ER).
VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards of review for the multifaceted issues presented in this appeal
vary depending on the nature of each issue. From the timeliness of drug violations
filed that include the persistent repetitive illegal refilling and distribution of liquid-
morphine, to the unsettling concerns with the lack of accountability in the
pharmaceutical and dispensing records, these matters encompass both factual
determinations and legal interpretations.
Constitutional deprivations, removal of civil rights, amendment violations,
and default motions trigger heightened standards of review, necessitating a
thorough and searching review of the record and a rigorous examination of the
12
facts and legal principles involved. The Court will review the trial court’s
factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Equitable tolling
may be a factor in achieving justice with the military. Carolyn Green’s objective
and aim is to ensure the application of the correct legal standards and principles to
protect constitutional rights, uphold accountability, achieve justice, reverse the
lower courts judgments, and secure the issuance of an injunction.
VIII. STANDING IS DEMONSTRATED
Carolyn Green seeks to establish legal Standing.
Standing is demonstrated. Due Process was blatant in its denial.
CSX had no rights as a competent individual, and constitutional depravations in the
military. This is illegal and fraudulent. See In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
There are three constitutional requirements to prove standing:
1. INJURY: The plaintiff must have suffered or imminently will suffer injury.
The injury must not be abstract and must be within the zone of interests meant
to be regulated or protected under the statutory or constitutional guarantee in
question. (1-ER 154-167), (5-ER 1050), (3-ER 511), (1-ER 154-167), (6-ER
1562), (6-ER 1640, 1645), (3-ER 553-554), (4-ER 892), (3-ER 629, 637, 638-
639), (3-ER 371-375), (3-ER 378-386), (2-ER-387-405), (4-ER 772-774),
(6-ER 1578-1587), (2-ER 271-280, (2-ER 370-432), (2-ER 406-478). (1-ER,
2-ER, 3-ER, 4-ER, 5-ER, 6-ER), (Bankruptcy filing).
13
2. CAUSATION: The injury must be reasonably connected to the defendant’s
conduct traceable to the injury.
Causation Law & Legal Definition: “Causation is the relationship of cause and
effect of an act or omission and damages alleged in a tort or personal injury action.
A plaintiff in a tort action should prove a duty to do or not do an action and a
breach of that duty. It should also be established that the loss was caused by the
defendant. Causation factor can be decided by the ‘but for’ test. Causation can be
established if the damages or injury would not have caused but for the conduct of
the defendant.”1 (emphasis).
To satisfy the ‘but for’ test: The Action Occurred, Harm and Injury Occurred,
Causation Link: the ‘but for’ test; injuries (6-ER 1562), (6-ER 1559-1561), (6-ER
1615-1620), (6-ER 1117-1124, 1625), (6-ER 1631), (6-ER 1565-1566), (6-ER
1637), (5-ER 1067-1069), (6-ER 1591), (1-ER 72-77, 67-71), (6-ER 1578-1583,
1585, 1587)-Carolyn’s Brain Health. See In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
3. REDRESSABILITY: A favorable court decision must be likely to
redress the injury.
STANDING LEGAL AUTHORITIES
To establish Standing to sue, a plaintiff must have a “legitimate or sufficient
interest at stake in the controversy that will be affected by the outcome of the
litigation.” DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n, 306 So. 3d 1202, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA
14
2020) (quoting Equity Res. v. Cty. of Leon, 643 So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA
1994)). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury in fact,” which is “concrete,”
“distinct and palpable,” and “actual or imminent.” See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Second, a plaintiff must establish “a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of.” See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Third, a plaintiff must show “a ‘substantial
likelihood’ that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” See
Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). See
“Carolyn’s Brain Health November 2021”, and maiming her lower extremities.
“Any litigant must demonstrate that he or she has standing to invoke the power of
the court to determine the merits of an issue.” Vaughan v. First Union Nat’l Bank,
740 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
“at an irreducible minimum,” the constitutional requisites under Article III for the
existence of standing are that the plaintiff must personally have: 1) suffered some
actual or threatened injury; 2) that injury can fairly be traced to the challenged
action of the defendant; and 3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.
In furtherance, for causation, see Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound (1983) Supreme Court of Washington State, whereas, this case
recognized that causation can be established in medical malpractice if the
15
negligence reduced the patient's chances of a better outcome, even if it cannot be
proven that the negligence directly caused the harm. See Summers v. Tice (1948),
where the Supreme Court of California applied the doctrine of "alternative
liability." Under this doctrine, when multiple defendants are negligent, and it's
unclear which one specifically caused the harm, each defendant may be held liable
if they cannot prove their innocence.
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Importantly,
standing is not “dispensed in gross,” and, accordingly, a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing for each claim “he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is
sought.” See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008). See Town of Chester v.
Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S.___, No. 16–605, slip op. at 6 (2017).
A litigant must also maintain standing to pursue an appeal. See, e.g.,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013) ; see also, e.g., Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 219 (2020) (stating that a petitioner
had “appellate standing” where the petitioner suffered a “concrete injury” that was
“traceable to the decision below” and could be redressed by the Court).
“The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to
get [her] complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated.” “gist of the question of standing” is whether the party seeking relief
has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
16
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”2
And is almost exclusively concerned with such public law questions as
determinations of constitutionality and review of administrative or other
governmental action.3
In 1993, before he became a judge, John G. Roberts Jr. expressed this view
in an article published in the Duke Law Journal. “By properly contenting itself
with the decision of actual cases or controversies at the instance of someone
suffering distinct and palpable injury,” the future chief justice wrote, “the judiciary
leaves for the political branches the generalized grievances that are their
responsibility under the Constitution.” He further observed: “Separation of powers
is a zero-sum game. If one branch unconstitutionally aggrandizes itself, it is at the
expense of the other branches.” (Justice Antonin Scalia, then a federal appeals
court judge, wrote a law review article in 1983 titled “The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers.”) 4
In Carlson v. Green, 446, U.S. 14, 19 (1980), allowing a damages remedy
for an Eight Amendment violation for failure to provide adequate medical
treatment. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979), permitting
damages remedy for gender discrimination under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d. 1364, 1366 (1997), intentionally
17
delaying medical care for a known injury (i.e. broken wrist) has been held to
constitute deliberate indifference. [Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. (U.S. 1994).
Deliberate indifference is the conscious or reckless disregard of the consequences

of one’s acts or omissions. Disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or
safety. “Deliberate indifference defined as requiring (1) an “awareness of facts for
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists”
and (2) the actual “drawing of the inference.” Elliott v. Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXI 91125 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2009). See next section for further application.
IX. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH

ARGUMENT & CASE LAW
ISSUE-1: TIMELY FILED DRUG VIOLATIONS

Against the United States Department of Veterans
Presented for Review with Argument & Case Law
The issue is whether the lower court's improper handling of timely filed
drug violations against the U.S. Department of Veterans, including the
repetitive illegal refilling and distribution of liquid-morphine, coupled with an
obvious lack of accountability in the pharmaceutical record, necessitates a
comprehensive review to rectify concerns surrounding excessive drug
prescriptions with bad standard of practices for substandard care in the
treatment of a “mild” case of post-traumatic stress with severe physical injuries
within the Dept of Veterans.
A. Were drug violations against the United States Department of Veterans

Administration filed timely?
B. Was service perfected service pursuant to Rule 4 for the Dept of Veterans?
C. Did the Dept of Veterans violate DEA and FDA rules for refilling and
distributing liquid-morphine?
D. Is it reasonable to create negative life-altering harmful drug interactions
when the harm outweighs the benefits, reducing the quality of life?
18
The following illustrates the excessive drugs prescribed by the Dept of
Veterans after the USCG to treat a “mild” case of post-traumatic-stress and
severe physical injuries that were grossly neglected. In late 2023, Carolyn
Green has recovered mostly from her honorable active-duty service of 1991-
1995, and from the torture from four-point-mechanical restraints initiated by
Doe-1 Providence. Her brain and physical structure are still in the mending
process. See In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
Dept of Veterans is in violation of their CODE of CONDUCT;
Veterans Patient Rights: (2). “You will receive to the extent that you are
eligible, prompt and appropriate treatment for physical or emotional
disorders or disabilities in the least restrictive environment necessary for that
treatment free from unnecessary or excessive medication.” (6-ER 1568-
1577). (emphasis added).
USCG (2-ER 272)

1994: Six (6) drugs,
1995: Ten (10) drugs.
DEPT OF VETERANS (2-ER 272-280)

1996: Four (4) drugs,
1997: Five (5) drugs,
1999: Seven (7) drugs,
2001: Twenty-one (21) drugs;
Carolyn Green was poisoned by Doe-1 Providence, Doe-2 Western State,
and Dept of Veterans. This resulted in a “competent” individual being
chemically lobotomized. This is illegal. She had to ask for a walking cane!!
This started with perjury and for fraudulent purposes in the courts by
Defendants listed here, who premeditated kidnapping sold to the court under
the guise of civil commitment. Then abused her with chemical restraints,
19
intentional concealment of “recopied” drug records by Doe-1 Providence

and great bodily harm from four-point-mechanical restraints. Dept of
Veterans “Injured her R buttock, hips, neck and back. Patient will be put on
mood stabilizers and antidepressants.” (June 12, 2001). (6-ER 1558), (6-ER
1409, 1435-1438). In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
2002: Ten (10) drugs,

2003: Eleven (11) drugs;
“... last time I had a brisk walk around the (apartment)
compound without the sense that I am dragging my right leg–
the first time since my injury” (emphasis)
(Injured Feb. 21, 1994) (January 8, 2003).
2004: Nine (9) drugs,
2005: Twelve (12) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY STARTED
2006: Eleven (11) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
2007: Nine (9) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
2008: Eight (8) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
2010: Six (6) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
2013: Seven (7) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
2014: Nine (9) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
2015: Seven (7) drugs, CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
(4-ER 793-796)
2017: One (1) drug;
June 9, 2017 ENDED 13 YEARS OF CHRONIC OPIOID THERAPY
due to her self-discontinuance. Dept of Veterans repetitively refilled
and dispensed liquid-morphine after she reported and documented
three-times in the medical records that she discontinued this narcotic,
a Schedule II Drug. (4-ER 811-815), (2-ER 241), (5-ER 1070-1348),
(3-ER 493-501).
20
Click on the links:

a) Her Brain 2023 JULY 18: https://rumble.com/v3bdcd8-litigation-process-
wa-state-carolyn-green-recovered-from-brain-damage-07182.html
b) Her Brain 2023 MARCH 11 https://rumble.com/v2dqpsi-more-of-dept-
of-veterans-affairs-blunders.html
c) Her Brain 2019 MARCH 1: https://rumble.com/v3bd7zc-carolyn-green-
recovering-from-brain-damage-03012019.html
d) Her Brain 2018 APRIL 25 pm: https://rumble.com/v3bd7bm-carolyn-
green-recovering-from-brain-damage-04252018-pm.html
e) Her Brain 2018 APRIL 25 am: https://rumble.com/v3bd5nc-recovering-
from-brain-damage-04252018-am.html
21
1) Excessive prescribing of medications-drugs is gross negligence, medical
malpractice, bad faith, reckless endangerment, poisoning, and fraud. To treat a
physical injury with sedation and benzodiazepines and tranquilizers and “mood
stabilizers and antidepressants” and neuroleptics marketed as antipsychotic drugs,
and narcotics. Notice of Paper/Physical Material: Original Veterans Patient Rights
(6-ER 1568-1577).
Bad faith is defined as: “actual or constructive fraud, or a neglect or refusal
to fulfill some duty…by some interested or sinister motive.” Bentzen v. Demmons,
842 P.2d 1015, 349 n.8 (Wash. App. 1993), see also Spencer v. King County, 692
P.2d 874, 1 208 (Wash. App. 1984) (bad faith implies acting with tainted,
fraudulent or ill will motives. (3-ER Drugs Binder pt1, 4-ER Drugs Binder pt2).
Gross negligence is defined as: “the failure to exercise slight care. It is
negligence that is substantially greater than ordinary negligence. Failure to exercise
slight care does not mean the total absence of care but care substantially less than
ordinary care.” Washington Pattern Instruction [WPI] 10.07. The Washington
Supreme Court defines gross negligence as “gross or great negligence, that is,
negligence substantially and appreciably greater than ordinary negligence. Its
correlative, failure to exercise slight care, means not the total absence of care but
care substantially or appreciably less than the quantum of care inherent in ordinary
negligence.” Nist v. Tudor, 407 P.2d 798, 331 (Wash. 1965), see Boyce v. West,
22
862 P.2d 592, 665 (Wash. App. 1993) (gross negligence is “...negligent acts [that
fall] greatly below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm...”). Bad faith, and gross negligence, legal
malpractice, medical malpractice, intentional concealment, and fraud are shown
then proven with substantial evidence standards throughout the matter before the
Court. Excessive drug prescriptions used to mask and treat my physical injury. She
only had a “mild” case of post-traumatic stress, that became complex trauma due
to the abuses and maiming process. (6-ER 1568-1577). In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
Defendant is in violation of numerous other patient rights. Drugs and trauma
cause brain cognitive impairments with anesthetizing drugs to include thirteen
(13) years of Chronic Opioid Therapy along with other inappropriate off-label
drugs. (3-ER 494-502, 618-747), (4-ER 777, 793-796), (6-ER 1578-1587).
A. CSX without seeing a Primary Care Provider for seven (7) months CSX
was able to refill liquid-Morphine month after month. Dept of Veterans refilled and
then dispensed liquid-morphine. Carolyn Green reported to three different medical
providers of her after self-discontinuance of this opioid. Dept of Veterans is in
violation pursuant to Title 21 C.F.R. §1306.12(a) – “Refilling prescriptions:
issuance of multiple prescriptions. The refilling of a prescription for a controlled
substance listed in Schedule II is prohibited.” And, (i) states, “Each separate
prescription is issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner
23
acting in the usual course of professional practice.”, The refilling of a prescription
for a controlled substance listed in Schedule II is prohibited. Other drug violations
against the Dept of Veterans are; 18 U.S.C. 1962 (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1031- Major
fraud against the United States, 18 U.S.C. 286 - Conspiracy to defraud the
Government with respect to claims, 221 U.S.C. 846- Attempt and conspiracy, 18
U.S.C. 371 – Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.
Service perfected October 2018. (2-ER 282-300), (6-ER 1587, 1583).
There is no legitimate medical purpose by individual practioners to refill or
dispense a Schedule II controlled substance to an individual who has discontinued
ingesting and reported and documented to three medical providers.
B. Federal violations for failure to label Aspartame aka Phenylamine. Title 21
CFR §1306.12(a), possibly 1306.14. In regards to Aspartame. Under Title 21
CFR § 201.58 Waiver of labeling requirements (law). There is no label of
Aspartame in the drug effects literature nor is Aspartame listed on the bottle as
an ingredient which is a violation under the Title. Accordingly, who gave the
waiver? (2-ER 207-218).
C. When she asked Dept of Veterans, Dr. Anthony J. Mariano, an employee, a
Director in the Pain Clinic how care works, Dr. Mariano replied, “There is only
so much care to dispense to each veteran so we don’t run out of peanut butter;
this way everyone gets a little something”. She refers to his explanation as
24
doses of care. Rations of care. She was told by Jeffery E. Swanberg, an
employee, a Dept of Veterans Privacy Officer stated, “The system is designed
to set you up for failure,” in 2017. (emphasis).
D. It took the Dept of Veterans 4.6 years plus the 690 days from the initial
injury while on active-duty totaling 2370 days (6.49 years;78 mo) to start
treatment for her initial severe physical injury.
E. 85 (eighty-five) Appointments Before her FIRST DOCTOR

Exponential delays in providing adequate medical treatment.
(1-ER 147-153), (5-ER 1067-1069). In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
F. Maiming and Great Bodily Injuries:

(1-ER 106-146, 154-167), (2-ER 370-478), (3-ER 618-747), (4-ER 772-777),
(6-ER 1578-1587). In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
“I would note in this connection that the stresses associated with her workplace
harassment [when she was stationed at Chetco River] when she was aboard ship
probably did relate indirectly to the occurrence of the injury in that she was
extremely distracted and, although she describes herself as quite athletic and not
prone to accidents, the fall from the ladder was in the context of a period of
extreme stress and distraction,” 07/07/95 Dr. Louis Saeger, a gold standard
doctor.
G. 2000 June 28; Dr. Charles Paxon, a gold standard doctor stated, “This has
never been treated directly except by massage and physical therapy.” “Low
back pain is constantly present but not major issue until she feels the hip is out.
The hip..... malfunction at times for no apparent reason....” (emphasis)
25
H. 2001 May 31–July 27: The Avalanche created by Doe-1 Providence through
perjury and proven fraud. See In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
Left photo taken in 2002.
2001 June 12 “Injured her R buttock, hips, neck and back. Patient will be put on
mood stabilizers and antidepressants.” Dept of Veterans. In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
///
26
I. Prolotherapy, and Platelet-rich Plasma (PRP) treatments uses injections of a

concentration of a patient's own platelets to accelerate the healing of injured
tendons, ligaments, muscles and joints. A type of tissue regeneration.
Very effective. Dr. Adam R. Geiger, a gold standard doctor, in private practice.
This photo is from years after her first official medical treatment started
“begin sacroiliac prolotherapy treatments for iliac upslip.” April 10, 2002.
Effective treatments into 2023 due to drugs masking the injuries.
Thankful to be here in one piece. (3-ER 547).
27
J. 2002 March 05 “She has a positive Gilet test on the right side. She has a
short right lower extremity by about half-inch. Her ischial tuberosity is actually
high by more likely an inch. The iliac crest on the right is high by about an inch
or more. ...” Id.
K. 2003 Jan. 08 “... last time I had a brisk walk around the (apartment)
compound without the sense that I am dragging my right leg–the first time since
my injury” (Injured Feb. 21, 1994)–(Jan. 8, 2003) (emphasis).Dept of Veterans.
L. 2004 May 17–Oct. 23 1995:. Dr. Mark A. Tomski, a gold standard doctor, in
private practive. Beginning date: diagnosis and treatment: “Chronic Recurrent
Si Dysfunction”. Years of this disability: 9 years. Dated 01/03/2005. She paid
Dr. Tomski out of pocket for years starting in 1995 while active-duty.
M. Dept of Veterans delayed cervical spine treatment to 2017 Jan 04 from the
first notation of 1992 July 22. The first procedure for my cervical spine (neck)
took nearly 22 years. My neck, “...showed severe facet degeneration at C2-3
and also facet changes at C3-4.” Id. p. 299 at lines 6-13. The Dept of Veterans
Pain Clinic was the worst with delays, and with no notice of appointment
cancellations. (6-ER 1568-1576).
N. From 2015 through 2023, CSX has had numerous effective and appropriate
medical treatment procedures to recover and to overcome most of these injuries.
Well over $50,000 for effective adequate medical treatment to overcome
28
maiming, and drug damage. CSX has paid out of pocket for years. Her injuries
were masked with excessive drugs instead of adequate procedural treatment. It
wasn’t until she had completely self-discontinued the daily anesthetizing drugs
December 20, 2016, then especially the morphine June 9, 2017 that her injuries
manifested as unresolved. Effective procedural care to rebuild a human being is
expensive. (see treatments Dkt. # # 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, +).
O. Even in November and December 2021. Dept of Veterans is still marred by
intentional delays, “blocking vets from getting outside care,” as Vietnam
Veterans denied help as they bleed out their ears.” In 2019, by Defendants own
admission as the causation and significant contributor of Veteran’s suicide.
Wait-times and cancellations in the matter of Carolyn Green, with substandard
medical care. Scandalous wait-times in 2014. In March 2021, Dept of Veterans
is plagued with unacceptable appointment cancelations.9, 10 (4-ER 901-906),
(3-ER 510, 706-726), (6-ER-1592), (1-ER 147-153).
P. DRUG INTERACTIONS
1. Pursuant to WAC 246-919-970 Coprescribing of opioids with certain
medication “(1) The physician shall not knowingly prescribe opioids in
combination with the following medications without documentation of
medical decision making: (a) Benzodiazepines.” (4-ER 801, 812).
///
29
a) According to JAMA Internal Medicine in 2016 the off-label drug uses
account for more than 44% more adverse effects.13
b) Drug Interaction of Mr. Kenny Campbell a Vietnam War Veteran:

• 10 major, 61 moderate. (4-ER-910-912).
c) Drug Interactions of Carolyn Green:
• 2003-2014: 7 major, 10 moderate.
12 years on Clonazepam**
12 years on Gabapentin
5 years on Methadone (opioid)
10 years on Morphine
11 years on Risperidone **
11 years on Celebrex
8 years on Citalopram
**Contains Aspartame
(4-ER 801) (5-ER 1070-1348).
• 2006: shows the month of February: 6 major, 10 moderate. This carried
on for years. This carried on for years.
Methadone (opioid)
Risperidone **
Celebrex
Seroquel
Gabapentin
Citalopram
Clonazepam**
**Contains Aspartame
Therapeutic Duplication of drugs: four psychotropic, five central nervous
system, two antipsychotics. (4-ER 801), (5-ER 1220-1237).
• 2005-2014: 3 major drug interactions; Morphine and Clonazepam and

Methadone “Opiates in combination with benzodiazepines carries a 5x
increase for adverse outcome including death,” and “may have opioid
hyperallergic.” SIX-YEARS on morphine and methadone simultaneously
with a benzodiazepine. (5-ER 1249-1251).
30
o Drug Interactions by;

Dept of Veterans in 2001: 6 major, 16 moderate.
2001: Western State: 1 major, 5 moderate.
2001: Doe-1 Providence: 8 major, 17 moderate.
(3-ER 493-501), (5-ER 1070-1348), (6-ER 1592).
d) See Drug Transparency (3-ER, 4-ER). (7-ER).
e) Clonazepam, a benzodiazepine is considered a short-term drug yet VA Puget
Sound’s definition of short-term drug in my case was 17 years.
f) Other Veteran Drug Interactions can be further accessed by logging into:
www.drugs.com Username: 984980 Password: betterthinking984980
After logging in to drugs.com, go to the top right corner that shows
username “984980”. Then click on “My Interactions List”. There you will
find her mostly verified drug interactions, as well as those of other Veterans.
Q. PHARMACEUTICAL RECORDS LACK ACCOUNTABILITY
1) Many drugs are missing on the pharmaceutical record with the Dept of
Veterans Puget Sound: Celebrex, Methacarbomol, Gabapentin, Lidoderm
patches, Citalopram, Paxil. Numerous prescription refills are not listed. This is
illegal. (4-ER 853, 797-798, 781-884), (3-ER, 4-ER).
In violation pursuant to: see RCW 18.64.245 Prescription records, see RCW
18.71.800, see RCW 69.41.042, see RCW 69.41.042 Record requirements, see
RCW 69.41.020 Prohibited acts, see RCW 69.50.206–Schedule II defines(c),
see RCW 69.50.308–Prescriptions(a) and see RCW 69.50.312. (3)(d).
31
R. DRUGS NOT RECORDED ON PHARMACEUTICAL RECORD
A few examples,
a) 8 of 12 refills yet the initial 8 prescriptions of Methacarbomol are missing
on the pharmaceutical record. (4-ER 858-859, 881-883), (3-ER, 4-ER).
b) 3 of 4 refills yet no record on pharmaceutical record, 2015, for Feb. 22,
2015. Celebrex at the maximum dose yet the pharmaceutical record is
sparce. Id. p. 397-399. #84 p. 131 Oct. 11, 2011 “...she is already taking full
dose of Celecoxib.” “... she would like to gradually wean away from
morphine. She wonders about using ibuprofen to do that. Unfortunately, she
is on full dose Celebrex already.” (4-ER 810, 853-855), (4-ER 853).
c) Gabapentin. She was on the maximum dose for 10+ years. The
pharmaceutical record does not reflect this. The medical records show the
scripts. Inaccurate and missing prescriptions on pharmaceutical record. Id.
pp. 400-401.
d) Artificial tears, eye drops. She has more eye drops accounted for in
two-years than Dept of Veterans has in the 16 years prescribed, dispensed, and
recorded, with bottles to prove it. Pharmaceutical records lack accountability
for pharmaceuticals refilled, dispensed, recorded, or otherwise. Expressed in the
court filing is a small portion to a larger problem. This case matter has a
significant volume of pharmaceutical records, medical records, and
32
documentation showing with proof the lack of accountability, increasing the
rate in veteran suicide. (4-ER 854, 804-884), (2-ER 262, 265), (6-ER 1592).
S. MEDICAL EXPERTS HAVE TESTIFIED WITH AFFIDAVITS
Medical experts have testified, published articles in peer reviewed literature,
and produced sworn affidavits on the harmful effects of these drugs. Brain function
is impaired on drugs. Neuropathways are disrupted making them inoperative.
These drugs create dysfunctions affecting the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, parietal
lobe, occipital lobe, cerebellum, brain stem, as well as other functions.
Medical Expert Affidavits: Dr. Peter C. Gøtzsche, Dr. Grace E. Jackson, Dr.
Robert Whitaker, and Dr. Peter Breggin expert testimony affidavit See Dr. David
Healy, Mad in America, Dr. Joanna Moncrieff, Ann Blake-Tracy, and investigative
journalist Rob Wipond.14 (3-ER 618-747), (3-ER 619-628), (3-ER 629-647), (3-ER
648-661), (3-ER 662-747).
Scientific Excerpts to Illustrate the Impact these Drugs on a Human Being:

a). “Opioids depress the central nervous system, slowing down messages
from the brain to the body. They bind the opioid receptors in the brain and spinal
cord– the areas.....Opioids can slow breathing, lower blood pressure and pulse,
cause an irregular heartbeat and lower body temperature.” “Opioids affect the brain
stem, an area that regulates automatic body functions, e.g. breathing.”15
b). “Haldol can cause dose-related prolongation of the QT interval.”
Haldol is linked to the highest rate of Extrapyramidal side effects which are
extremely painful debilitating and crippling. Parkinson’s disease, too.16
c). Dr. Grace Jackson testified that the “pharmaceutical industry has skewed
and suppressed data showing the harms these drugs caused. Jackson testified that
the life expectancies of people taking drugs .....had shortened by as much as twenty
to twenty-five years, that the drugs caused many ...to be “chemical brain injured,
contributing to an “epidemic of dementia.”
33
T. Online groups and pages offer assisting people damaged by these drugs help
to recover. Medical experts refute the Recommendation and Report (R&R). The
book, “The Body Keeps Score” by Bessel Van Der Kolk, M.D. refutes the
R&R. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) refutes R&R. (2-ER 370-
432), (1-ER 45-55).
U. To address the Prayer for Relief Sought. There is no monetary amount that
can replace the years wrongly taken from my life from my physical injuries not
being treated for my injuries, to then be maimed. Then discarded in a psy ward
and then in Western State-asylum, to include violent and criminal mistreatment.
To then have to ask for a walking cane, after she was honorably discharged
from the United States Military, Life is a gift given by Our Creator. The Court
requires the filer state an amount for damages. The amount Carolyn Green
stated could be considered extravagant. The point is, Life is priceless. Solutions
were offered, then listed in the Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, to include
other means of compensation as the Court determines. (1-ER 168-206).
V. In 2018 CSX discovered her Second Amendment rights were infringed. This
was from the illegal infringement in 2001. She has been in contempt of Court
more than once not knowing her right to bear arms were infringed. There was
no notice no proper service. Initial legal actions began August 14, 2019 for the
Restoration of Rights in Thurston County Superior Court. Restored 11/01/2019.
34
ISSUE-2
MOTION FOR DEFAULT - JOINDER
The issue presented is whether Defaulted Defendant Doe-1 Providence

complied with Civil Rules LCR 6; Rule 27 by responding to the Motion for Joinder
and if proper service, as required by Rule 4: Summons, was effectuated.
Furthermore, it involves determining whether CSX has an automatic right and
entitled Motion for Default; default judgment under Civil Rule LCR 55.
A. Did Doe-1 Providence file a response or file an opposition to the Motion for
Joinder filed March 16, 2022 as required in Civil Rules LCR 6, Rule 27?
B. Did CSX serve Doe-1 Providence with perfected service for the Motion to
Joinder as required by Rule 4: Summons?
C. Does Carolyn Green as a matter of right to file a Motion for Default; default
judgment pursuant to Civil Rule LCR 55?
D. Did the district court improperly deny the Motion to Joinder without
explanation?
RULE 19(1)(2): Joinder by Court Order: If a person has not been joined as
required, the court must order that the person be made a party. A person who
refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a proper
case, an involuntary [defendant].
RULE 20(2)(A)(B): Permissive Joinder of Parties: (A) any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action.
35
RULE 21: Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties: Misjoinder of parties is

not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court
may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever
any claim against a party.
MOTION FOR DEFAULT
Motion to Joinder
HISTORY: Default Defendant Doe-1 Providence St. Peter Hospital
originated in Thurston County Superior Court (TCSC) matter 20-2-02155-34 then
became aka WAWD 3:20-05258-JCC then remanded to 20-2-02155-34 more
recent aka COA-II 574292-II. It is procedurally improper for proceeding for Doe-1
Providence to be in the Court of Appeals Division-II (574292-II) who filed for a
thirty-day extension to file a response brief due October 27, 2023. Default
Defendant Doe-1 Providence procedurally belongs in the Federal Court or the
Ninth Circuit. As a matter of right, Carolyn Green is entitled Motion for Default;
default judgment.
CONFLICTING REMOVAL RULINGS
The ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 contradicts prior decisions by this court
on state-to-federal case removal. The court allowed a defendant to remove a state
case using 28 U.S.C. § 1331 but denied the same right to the plaintiff.
Case 3:20-06112-BHS was permitted to be removed from Pierce County
Superior Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by defendant Doe-3 Pierce County. The
other portion of this “case splitting” case is in SCOTUS ref:23M1.
36
Case 3:22-05258-JCC was not-permitted to be removed from Thurston
County Superior Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by plaintiff CSX, therefore it was
remanded to Thurston County Superior Court. This case is improperly in the Court
of Appeals. Division-II.
1. Motion to Joinder WAWD 2:21-01276-RAJ: Doe-1 Providence was
filed March 16, 2022 (1-ER 72-77). Unopposed and unchallenged by Doe-1
Providence St. Peter Hospital–Motion for Default filed 09/11/2023.
a) 2021 April 02: TCSC denied Providence’s motion to dismiss.
b) 2021 November: CSX is functioning with a brain of that of a “stroke” patient,
and recovering in her physical structure from maiming.
c) 2022 March 16: CSX filed Motion to Joinder Doe-1 Providence to 2:21-01276-
RAJ. Unopposed & unchallenged to this day.
d) 2022 April 14: CSX filed Notice of Removal to WAWD be coming case 3:22-
05258-JCC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See conflicting court ruling from this
same Court as stated in SCOTUS ref:23M1, Appendix-O.
e) 2022 May 18: CSX did not consent and filed an objection to a Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C 636(c), Rule 73, and Amended General Rule 02-19. No
consent to a magistrate judge. No notice of assignment by the court.
f) 2022 July 07: WAWD 3:22-05258-JCC-TLF remanded to TCSC.
///
37
g) 2022 September 9: TCSC ruled via ex parte granting Providence motion to
dismiss. CSX was intentional to travel to Washington State to attend this
hearing. TCSC Judge Carol Murphy ruled ex parte, not notifying CSX of the
ruling. Doe-1 Providence initiated this case by an illegal ex parte creating the
grotesque violence. Then the Court ruled ex parte to dismiss.
Error Invalidates; Entire Order.
h) 2022 October 07: Judge Jones-(RAJ) denied the motion to joinder without
explanation. (1-ER 21-22).
i) 2023 September 11: CSX filed Motion for Default. LCR 55.
j) 2023 September 14: In a minute order by Judge Jones denied the motions for
default, considered it procedurally improper.
k) 2023 September 19: NOTICE OF AMENDED APPEAL FILED.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) directs the clerk to enter
default against that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once the clerk enters default,
the Court must take as true the factual allegations in the complaint, except
allegations about the amount of damages. When a defendant fails to answer or
otherwise defend an action, Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund v. Dubin Paper
Co., Case No. 11-CV-7137, 2012 WL 3018062, (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) (citing
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 165 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also
38
Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F. 2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990).
As a matter of right, Carolyn Green is entitled Motion for Default.
First, because the Defaulted Defendant Doe-1 Providence have not answered
or otherwise defended this action, CSX cannot obtain a final outcome against them
unless default judgment is granted. CSX would be prejudiced if it is denied the
ability to obtain a ruling on its claims against the Defaulted Defendants. See
Teamsters Health, 2012 WL 3018062. Second, because the Defaulted Defendant
have not responded in any way, they have presented no defense at all. Third,
Defaulted Defendant was properly served through a licensed process server Melvin
Cahoon with Rock Solid Legal Support, Inc., in accordance to the Rules. In fact,
Defaulted Defendant had perfected service by three-different services who did not
answer or otherwise defend this action, failed to state if it was improper, have not
responded in any way. Defaulted Defendants Doe-1 Providence willful neglect,
inexcusable delay is unjustifiable.
Under Rule 55(b), the Court may hold a hearing to determine the appropriate
amount of monetary relief. However, a hearing is not necessary if detailed
affidavits or record evidence make it possible to compute the amount of relief.
Summit Trust, 2013 WL 3967602; accord Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161
(9th Cir. 1981).
As a matter of right Carolyn Green is entitled to a motion for default judgment
against Defaulted Defendant Doe-1 Providence.
The Thurston County Superior Court order is invalid.
39
ISSUE-3
MOTION FOR DEFAULT – RE-OPEN 3:20-06112-BHS
MOTION FOR DEFAULT – CONSOLIDATE to 01276-RAJ
The issue presented is whether Doe-2 State, Doe-3 Pierce County, Doe-4 U.S.
Dept of Veterans complied with Civil Rules LCR 6; Rule 27 by responding to the
Motion to Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate and if proper service and with Color
of Law violations as required by Rule 4: Summons, was effectuated. Furthermore,
it involves determining whether CSX has an automatic right and is entitled to a
Motion for Default; default judgment under Civil Rule LCR 55.
A Did Doe-2 State, Doe-3 Pierce County, Doe-4 Dept of Veterans file a
response or an opposition to the Motion to Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate
filed March 16, 2022 as required in Civil Rules LCR 6; Rule 27?
B Did CSX properly serve Doe-2, State, Doe-3 Pierce County, Doe-4 U.S.
Dept of Veterans with perfected service for the Motion to Re-Open & Motion to
Consolidate, and served with Color of Law violations as required by Rule 4:
Summons?
C Does CSX as a matter of right entitled a Motion for Default; default
judgment pursuant to Civil Rule LCR 55: Default; Default Judgment?
D Did the district court improperly deny the Motion to Re-Open and Motion
to Consolidation without explanation?
RULE 42: CONSOLIDATE CASES: "If actions before the court involve a
common question of law or fact, the court may:(1) join for hearing or trial
any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3)
issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay." FRCP 42(a).
The threshold issue is whether the cases involve common questions of law
or fact. “The party moving for consolidation bears the burden of
demonstrating the commonality of law, facts or both in cases sought to be
combined, Young v. Hamric, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43634, 2008 WL
2338606 at *4 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
40
MOTION FOR DEFAULT

Motion to Re-Open & Consolidate
3:20-06112-BHS to 2:21-01276-RAJ
HISTORY: Doe-2 State of Washington, Doe-3 Pierce County, Doe-4 U.S.

Dept of Veterans, originated in Pierce County Superior Court (PCSC).
Case splitting:
Part-1 Now in SCOTUS ref:23M1 distributed for conference 09/26/2023.

PCSC 20-2-07851-0–Western State
became aka Court of Appeals 55790-8-II that became aka 101455-4 in the
Washington State Supreme Court.
Part-2: WAWD Case No. 3:20-cv-06112-BHS

aka PCSC Case No. 20-2-07852-8;
Carolyn Sioux Green v. State of Washington,
[Department of Veterans Administration], et al:
CSX voluntarily withdrew 06112-BHS complaint due to being accused of
case splitting which she knew nothing about splitting.
Motion to Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate 3:20-06112-BHS
considered “Case Splitting” with the other portion of the splitting side in the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (SCOTUS) Ref: 23M1).
The SCOTUS record is inadequate as it is not sufficiently complete to
permit a decision to serve justice without consolidating and/or
supplementing the record to be presented as those records support CSX
claims. That includes that parties with perfected service are included in
06112-BHS that were not included in SCOTUS yet belong in SCOTUS for
the case matter as a whole (not split)and in 2:21-01276-RAJ.
41
In 3:20-06112-BHS presiding Hon. Judge Settle-BHS wrote,

“Regarding claim splitting, the State is correct that the allegations against it
in a case filed in the Pierce County Superior Court, Civil 20-2-07851-0,
Carolyn Sioux Green v. State of Washington, are identical to the allegations
against it in the instant case.”
In 3:20-06112-BHS presiding Hon. Judge Settle-BHS wrote, “On
September 2021,...” Green asserts that she did not intend to split her claims
(as she has a pending case in state court based on the same factual
allegations)...” Court dismissed without prejudice.
1. Motion to Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate 3:20-06112-BHS to 2:21-
01276-RAJ was filed March 16, 2022. (1-ER 67-71)The Motion was
filed in compliance with RULE 60(1)(b): Relief from a Judgment or
Order (1) Timing. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year
after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding. The
filing was within 184 days. (09/13/2021 to 03/16/2022 = 184 days). The
Court’s process was 696 days which is no fault of CSX. Due process
must not be denied.
a) Doe-2 State, Doe-3 Pierce County, Doe-4 Dept of Veterans Motion to
Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate were professionally served by a
licensed process server Melvin Cahoon with Rock Solid Legal Support,
Inc., and served with Color of Law violations in accordance to Rules.
Unopposed and unchallenged. Default filed 09/11/2023. (7-ER).
42
b) 2021 January 22: PCSC dismissed Doe-2 State of Washington as PCSC
20-2-07851-0 now in SCOTUS ref: 23M1.
c) 2021 January 25: CSX filed a Notice of Appeal to COA-II.
d) 2021 November: CSX is functioning with a brain of that of a “stroke”
patient, and recovering in her physical structure from maiming.
e) 2021 January 26 – November 16, 2022 Case 20-2-07851-0 became
COA-II 557908-II.
f) 2022 March 16: Plaintiff filed Motion to Re-Open and Consolidate
DOE-2 State to 2:21-01276-RAJ. Unopposed and unchallenged.
g) 2022 October 07: Judge Jones-(RAJ) denied the motion to re-open and
motion to consolidate.
h) 2022 November 15 –April 12, 2023 this case was in the Washington
State Supreme Court as case 101455-4.
i) 2023 June 05: The other portion of 3:20-06112-BHS is now in the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (SCOTUS).
j) The 696 Day Court Process is no fault of CSX.
k) Motion to Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate 3:20-06112-BHS
(considered “case splitting”: DOE-3 Pierce County was filed March 16,
2022 (1-ER 67-71). Re-Open Motion and to Consolidate was
professionally served by a licensed process server Melvin Cahoon with
43
Rock Solid Legal Support, Inc., in accordance to the Rules. Unopposed
and unchallenged by Defendant Doe-3 Pierce County for Default filed
09/11/2023. (7-ER).
l) 2023 September 11: CSX filed Motion for Default. LCR 55.
m) 2023 September 14: In a minute order by Judge Jones denied the motions
for default, considered it procedurally improper.
n) 2023 September 19: NOTICE OF AMENDED APPEAL FILED.
The Motion to Re-Open & Motion to Consolidate would support judicial
economic resources, serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses, would
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions to provide for a fair review
of the cases to serve the ends of justice. Consolidation avoids inconsistent
judgments and conflicting rulings.
Related offenses are similar in nature based on the “same conduct.” State v.
Lee 132 Wn.2d 498, 939 P.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1997) (footnote-two). Any question
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. See Scott v.
Kuhlman, case splitting is appropriately raised on a motion to dismiss, 746 F.2d
1377, 1378 (9th Cir.1984), and once the court assesses whether the complaint is
duplicative it must decide on an appropriate remedy. See Adams, 487 F.3d 684,
688-93, (citing Western Sys Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1992). At its
44
discretion, the Court may then dismiss the duplicative lawsuit with or without
prejudice, stay or enjoin the proceedings, or consolidate the two actions. See Id. at
692-93 (holding that in the circumstances of the case the district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the later-filed complaint with prejudice) (with
emphasis).. "[T]he claim splitting rule exists to allow district courts to manage
their docket and dispense with duplicative litigation." Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d
1212, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2011). (emphasis supplied). The substantial evidence
supports consolidating cases to the “case splitting” record.
See Civil Rule LCR 3(g) Notice of Related Cases
See Civil Rules LCR 102: Complex, Multiple and Multidistrict Litigation
See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Id.
See Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund v. Dubin Paper C. Id
See Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin. Id.
As a matter of right, Carolyn Green is entitled Motion for Default for
Motion to Re-open 3:20-06112-BHS and Motion to Consolidate 2:21-01276-RAJ.
First, because the Defaulted Defendants Doe-2, Doe-3, Doe-4 have not
answered or otherwise defended this action, Carolyn Green cannot obtain a final
outcome against them unless default judgment is granted. CSX would be
prejudiced if it is denied the ability to obtain a ruling on its claims against the
Defaulted Defendants. Id.
45
Second, because the Defaulted Defendant have not responded in any way,
they have presented no defense at all. Third, Defaulted Defendant was properly
served through a licensed process server Melvin Cahoon with Rock Solid Legal
Support, Inc., in accordance to the Rules. Defaulted Defendant with perfected
service did not answer or otherwise defend this action, failed to state if it was
improper, have not responded in any way. Defaulted Defendants Doe-2, Doe-3,
Doe-4 willful neglect, inexcusable delay is unjustifiable.
See Rule 55(b). Id.
As a matter of right Carolyn Green is entitled to a motion for default judgment
against Defaulted Defendants Doe-2 State, Doe-3 Pierce County, Doe-4 Dept of
Veterans.
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
46
ISSUE-4(a)
DENIED DUE PROCESS COUPLED WITH SHE WAS DENIED HER
RIGHT TO HIRE COUNSEL, SIGNATURE OBTAINED BY DECEPTION
The issue at hand is whether Carolyn Green was denied her right to an effective
public defender, who also made a secret agreement through an ex parte, if CSX
was denied her right to hire her own attorney, if proper service as required by LCR
5, Rule 4 was effectuated. Furthermore, whether Doe-1 Providence committed
perjury with the intention of fraud in the Thurston County Superior Court (TCSC).
A. Did Thurston County Superior Court provide an effective public defender

for Carolyn Green-respondent then?
B. Did the public defender make a secret agreement with the prosecutor by
stipulating an agree via ex parte hearing in determent of Carolyn Green?
C. Did Doe-1 Providence commit perjury in Thurston County Superior Court?
D. Did the Doe-1 Providence serve proper notice?
E. Was Carolyn Green permitted to hire her own attorney?
LEG-1 THURSTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

1) A signed a 72-hour (legitimate although plaintiff-respondent then does not
agree with his poor decision). (6-ER-1521, 1465). In-a-nutshell-(7-ER).
2) Within eight-hours-and-forty-minutes Doe-1 Providence filed a
premeditated 14-day of (1) on the same day filing an ex parte for a one-minute
hearing in the Thurston County Superior Court. Moreover, plaintiff-respondent
then was not found gravely disabled which is a prerequisite in RCW 71.05.
(6-ER-1508-1512). In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621- Perjury.
Error invalidates: Entire Order. Error Invalidates Order throughout.

47
A legitimate 72-hour turned into an illegal 14-day through an ex parte
where my rights were removed to be heard by a neutral party throughout. She was
denied her right to hire her own attorney. 300-Days. Doe-1 Providence was
intentional to commit perjury in the Thurston County Superior Court with the
intention of fraud. This is illegal. No neutral party. No attorney. A “Competent”
physically injured individual endured 50-days of: Illegal Forced (Excessive)
Drugging made mandatory that bypassed ALL judicial determination, poisoning
her. Illegal confined with illegal extensions of confinement. Violent and abusive.
(6-ER-1522), (6-ER 1490-1496 no legal counsel complete summary, 1497-1561
proof), (6-ER 1521, 1519, 1517-1518, 1526, 1533-1534, 1536-1537). (7-ER)
EX PARTE APPLICATIONS: The "opportunities for legitimate ex parte

applications are extremely limited." In re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 101 B.R.
191, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1989); see also Mission Power Engineering Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 883 F.Supp. 488, 489 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that to be proper, an
ex parte application must demonstrate that there is good cause to allow the moving
party to "go to the head of the line in front of all other litigants and receive special
treatment").... See LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199629, *4 (USDC Central Dist.
Of CA 2012) (cit. omitted). (9th Cir.).Lum v. Mercedes-Benz USA.
To determine whether a court-appointed attorney has given effective counsel,
courts will use the test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The right to counsel serves no purpose unless it
is the right to effective counsel. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
48
No effective legal counsel, in fact, Carolyn Green was denied her right to hire
her own counsel evidenced. Both prongs of the Strickland Test were satisfied by
Plaintiff. Showing she received ineffective no-assistance of counsel, and prejudice.
The abundance of evidence shows deficient performance pursuant to the Strickland
Test satisfying 1) Deficient Performance, and 2). Prejudice. The right to effective
assistance of counsel is the right “to require the prosecution’s case to survive the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
656, 104 S. Ct. 2045, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984).
When such a true adversarial processing has been conducted, even if defense
counsel made demonstrable errors in judgment or tactics, the testing envisioned by
the Sixth Amendment has occurred. Id. “The essence of an ineffective-assistance
claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance
between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict
rendered suspect.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374, 106 S. Ct. 2574,
91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986). The plaintiff-respondent-then who raises a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that his or her attorney' s
performance was deficient, and 2) that he or she was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 77- 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). Under
the first prong, deficient performance is not shown by matters that go to trial
49
strategy or tactics. State v. Garrett, 124 Wn.2d 504, 520, 881 P. 2d 185 (1994).
Under the second prong, the respondent must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel' s errors, the result of the trial would have been
different. State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226, 743 P. 2d 816 (1987).
The standard of review for effective assistance of counsel is whether, after
examining the whole record, the court can conclude that respondent received
effective representation and a fair trial. State v. Ciskie, 110 Wn.2d 263, 284, 751 P.
2d 1165 (1988). In addition, equitable tolling may also be justified because of
“serious instances of attorney misconduct.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 652. Under the
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority have stressed that equitable tolling can
be “based on a range of attorney misconduct not limited to abandonment.”
It is well established that an accused in entitled to an effective assistance of
counsel, free of conflict of interest, during a trial, and process, in violation of the
Fourteen Amendment. In Lessard v. Schmidt (1972), courts compared “civil
commitment to criminal confinement and deemed it constitutionally defective
unless it incorporate[d] due process protections . . . consideration of less restrictive
alternatives.” This violated Carolyn Green’s right to due process. (emphasis.
The two prong Strickland Test application was met proving legal malpractice. I
had no legal counsel at any time, with the attorney’s intention and pre-existing
knowledge of what the lawyers were doing was illegal. (6-ER 1490-1561).
50
LEG-2 PIERCE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
Obtaining my Signature by Deception. Both lawyers appointed by the Pierce
County. This is illegal. Pursuant to RCW 9A.60.030 (1) A person is guilty of
obtaining a signature by deception or duress if by deception or duress and with
intent to defraud or deprive he or she causes another person to sign or execute a
written instrument. In violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324c- Penalties for document fraud.
(6-ER 1426), (6-ER 1438, 1427-1428), (6-ER 1444-1445).
It would be unreasonable for the Court to entertain the lies proposed by the
Defendants. QUESTION: What compelling reason could have motivated Carolyn
Green (formerly Becker) to willingly sign documents endorsing the ongoing use of
chemical restraints at Western State and later at the Department of Veterans?
ANSWER: There is no plausible rationale. In fact, Carolyn Green (formerly
Becker) refrained from signing two documents during her active-duty service in
the military, indicating her clear opposition to such practices.
Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 2015). Without a doubt, Plaintiff
would have obtained a more favorable outcome absent of attorney negligence.
Equitable tolling is granted for extraordinary circumstances, going beyond what is
usual, regular, or customary.
///
///
51
ISSUE-4(b)
INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT v. KIDNAPPING
The issue at hand is whether the lower court applied improper application of the
law, appellees-defendants complied with RCW 71.05 as required by the ITA, does
immunity exist for appellees-defendants, and was perjury was committed in both
the Thurston County and Pierce County Superior Courts.
A. Did CSX meet the statutory criteria of being gravely disabled as required by
RCW 71.05 for an Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA) petition to be valid?
B. Was it legal for Doe-1 Providence to file an ex parte for 14-day the same day
when they already had a signed seventy-two-hour?
C. Did the lower court improperly find this was a civil commitment case?
D. Did the Dept of Veterans premediate a 90-day?
E. Can CSX prove Doe-1 Providence committed perjury in Thurston County
Superior Court, thereby denying Carolyn Green’s Due Process rights.
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1621- Perjury.
The ex parte filing was illegal for a 14-day when Doe-1 Providence already had
a signed seventy-two-hour, filed in the Court the same day less than nine-hours
later. No due process. No legal counsel.
Error invalidates: Entire Order. Error Invalidates Order throughout.
///
//
52
NO EXEMPTIONS EXIST FOR IMMUNITY
Pursuant to RCW 71.05.120(1) that states, ‘PROVIDED, That such duties
were performed in good faith and without gross negligence.’ There is no-immunity
from ordinary medical tort liability when the provider’s conduct in gross
negligence. Immunity is forfeited for Defendants. See In a nutshell-(7-ER).
Grave disability standard not met. No Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
laws were followed. No danger to myself or others. Dangerous standard not met.
Legally defined as kidnapping 18 U.S.C § 1201. No previous psychiatric episodes.
No family psychiatric history. No previous hospitalization. Not a previous
Regional Support Network client. No previous Chemical Dependency treatments.
No justification for forced treatment under 71.05 RCW’s. (6-ER 1503), (6-ER
1378-1381, 1384).
Doe-1 Providence required her to ingest psychotropic drugs and she was
forcibly injected Haldol +42 (forty-two) times and prior to court. Doses were
double-and-a-half as a form of punishment for her legal right to refuse. Doe-1
“RECOPIED” THEIR DRUG RECORDS. Bypassed ALL judicial determination
for standing orders of forced injections to a competent individual.
(3-ER 527-531), (5-ER 1118-1121), (6-ER 1523, 1527-1528, 1532-1534), (3-ER
526, 529), (3-ER 516-539), (6-ER 1469, 1475), (3-ER 580-585).
53
Doe-1 altered their four-point-mechanical-restraints records it was so violent
during the “Thrashing” portion. She had several deep bruises five-days later. Doe-1
Providence tortured me in four-point-mechanical-restraints to where she needed
help by two staff members to walk after the hours that included “Thrashing” which
maimed her lower bowel function movement. (3-ER 511-515)
[Mason General Hospital] one forced injection., [Central Fire Medic] one forced
injection of Ativan 2mg, Doe-2 Western State-asylum forced me to ingest drugs
and forcibly injected psychotropic drugs 22 times (twenty-two) times, even prior to
court against my written request. Dept of Veterans2 forced me to ingest 332 (three-
hundred-thirty-two) drugs in pill form or be forcibly injected Navane &
Trifluoperazine. [United States] overrode my right to refuse. Drug doses were
double and tripled as a form of punishment for her non-compliance. See Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). (6-ER-1633), (6-ER 1567),
(6-ER 1349-1456 Court Records), (6-ER-1435-1436, 1444, 1453-1454).
Defendants have no evidence. Doe-1 Providence has committed perjury in
the Courts for fraudulent purposes at the expense of Carolyn Sioux Green’s life.
This should become a criminal case.
In Addington v. Texas “the individual’s interest in the outcome of a civil
commitment processing is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the
State to justify confinement by proof more substantial that a mere preponderance
54
of the evidence. In Addington, civil commitment “must require that an individual
be both mentally ill and dangerous for civil commitment to satisfy due process”.
Driving fails to meet the dangerous standard. 557 S.W. 2d 511 (1977), vacated,
441 US 418, 426 (1979). Addington requires “clear and convincing evidence” as a
standard. 441 U.S. 418, (1979)
In Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) “To go from a state of
confinement to confinement plus forced medication (drugs) involves a major
change in the conditions of confinement, so that Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed 2d 451 (1975) is inapposite. In O’Connor v. Donaldson
422 U.S. 573-576 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court decided that "A State cannot
constitutionally confine a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends..." In Washington v. Harper “In order for involuntary
medication to be approved, it must be demonstrated that the inmate suffers from a
mental disorder and as a result of that disorder constitutes a likelihood of serious
harm to himself or others (494 US 210, 244) and/or is gravely disabled” Lodging,
Book 9, Policy 600.30, p.1
See Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020, 2nd Cir.).
See Eleanor Riese v. St. Mary Hospital (1989 9th Cir.)
See American Disabilities Act (ADA) Regulatory references.
55
The U.S. constitute Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[a]mong the
historic liberties protected by the Due Process Clause is the ‘right to be free from ..
• unjustified intrusions on personal security.”
In furtherance, Defendants are in violation of the Washington State
Constitution as well as the United States Constitution as such:
Article I § 1: Political Power
Article I § 3: Personal Rights
Article I § 5: Freedom of Speech
Article I § 10: Administration of Justice
Article I § 11: Religious Freedom
Article I § 14: Excessive Bail, Fines and Punishment
Article I § 24: Right to Bear Arms
Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms
///
///
///
///
///
56
ISSUE-5
ARMED FORCES JURISDICTION
The issues surrounding this issue for review are fundamental legal questions:
Can Carolyn Green establish equitable tolling? Additionally, the case delves into
issues surrounding misconduct, intentional concealment, and jurisdiction by the
Armed Forces, as well as the applicability of the Feres doctrine in cases involving
acts of violence and misconduct.
a) Do the Armed Forces have the authority and jurisdiction to knowingly
discharge a physically injured active-duty servicemember on American soil
without further medical care?
b) Are the Armed Forces entitled to deny medical care to a physically injured
active-duty servicemember on American soil?
c) Do the Armed Forces have the authority and jurisdiction to knowingly prevent
and deny access to the Civil Rights Officer aka Civil Enlisted Advisor (CEA)?
This was while during and after retaliation, abusive mis-treatment, sexual
harassment, gender discrimination.
d) Did the USCG intentionally conceal, with deception, the menacing the
appellant with a screwdriver?
e) Are there genuine issues of material fact surrounding the allegations of bad
faith, gross negligence, deception, intentional concealment?
f) Are violent actions, sexual assault against biological women
“incident of Military service”?
57
g) Is the Feres doctrine due for Review by the higher Courts? Is the Feres doctrine
used to shield predators?
At my first unit, Station Chetco River (Chetco), in writing for a long period
of time I was prevented access to the Civil Enlisted Advisor (CEA). For more than
a year. The CEA is considered a Civil Rights Officer in the Military. The
Command at Chetco attempted to negatively label the appellant as having
adjustment difficulties (5-ER 1052).
Examples Carolyn was expected to “adjust” to; being referred to as a "cunt", “the
new wench on board", a "douche bag". I was subjected to an illegal car prowl, men
urinating in front of me, discussions of ejaculation, simulated sexual acts involving
the groins of my superiors. The second in command (XO/XPO) was stabbing a
screwdriver into a wooden countertop while angerly yelling at me over the
installation of a pull-up bar. This is menacing. This is illegal and considered a
felony in the civilian work force. CSX was ordered to paint using lead death paint.
This was after wiping the surface down with Toluene in the enclosed area, a void
of a boat. Toluene is a toxic solvent. (4-ER 885). I was denied a respirator. I was
then blocked from exiting the enclosed area to breathe in the midst of suffocating
from toxic fumes. I was forced to breath intoxicating fumes without a respirator.
Egregious and physically threatening in nature. These are some of the examples of
58
the hostile abusive work environment and treatment during of which time I was
prevented access to the CEA.
The Record is Clear: “The United States Coast Guard has the worst record
for sexual harassment of any federal agency.” The Executive Officer (XO) was the
second in command. “When interview groups were asked if the chain of command
worked in redress of grievances, a frequent reply was “the chain of command is the
problem.” The new XO due to a tour of duty rotation, said regarding the sexual
harassment, “It’s the worst I’ve seen in thirteen years. They’re like a pack of
wolves, three or four.” emphasis.
KNOWN BEHAVIORS OF WOLVES: “What the wolf lacks in size, power
and weapons it makes up for with collaboration and intelligence.” The wolves’
advantages is in collaborating with their pack. Wolves are predators. Wolves are
known to be very loyal, willing to sacrifice oneself for the “team”. Wolves are
territorial. The second in command replacing the first described the actions of the
chain of command as “They’re like a pack of wolves, three or four.” This was the
worse this seasoned active-duty member had seen in 13 years regarding sexual
harassment. Is this a place you would choose to have your daughter, mother, wife,
aunt, granddaughter, or sister work?5 CSX references (4-ER 956-1044).
Due to the intentional prevention of adequate appropriate medical care while
active duty, CSX is requesting a similar recommendation regarding the Department
59
of Defense (DoD) Commands authority presented in 2022. In 2022, the DoD is
moving ahead with recommendations to combat sexual assault that has continued
to run rampant; Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the
Military.7 Namely due to Vanessa Guillen’s murder. Ms. Guillen suffered blows to
the head with a hammer. Then she was dismembered after she was assaulted and
burned. After her corpse was burned, she was buried in three different places, in
2020.7,8 Her murder was after she reported sexual harassment problems to her
Command.
Remarkably, and undeniably, two-decades later the same conduct tolerances
of abuse and criminal mistreatment have continued. Commands and the “chain of
command” should not have the authority to prevent, prohibit, interfere, create
obstacles, for active-duty servicemembers physically injured and on American soil.
My case was entirely preventable. 100% Preventable. In-a-nut-shell-(7-ER).
2022: See Spletstoser v. Hyten United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit No. 20-56180. Feres Doctrine. Argued/submitted January 10, 2022.
Filed August 11, 2022.
2022: Sexual Harassment Becomes an Offense in the Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ).9
2021: Transformative Military Justice Reform.
2020: USAF Veteran Harmony Allen Wins at the U.S. Supreme Court.
2020: SPC Vanessa Guillen Murdered at Fort Hood After Alleging Sexual
60
Harassment. Advocates Reform in Spanish Language.

2020: In Spletstoser v. Hyten Case No. 20-56180 filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Feres Doctrine Challenged.
“… could not be considered ‘incident of military service.’”
2019: Expansion of Special Counsel Program to Include Domestic Violence.
2018: POD Pushes for Medical Malpractice Reform on Behalf of Survivors.
2018: Sexual violence is high in the military in 2018.12
2017: Racial Disparity in Military Justice Report.
2016: Department of Defense Mislead Congress. Accountable for
Misleading Congress. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2015: Embattled: Retaliation Against Sexual Assault Survivors in the U.S.
Military. Watch to Issue Key Report.
2014: From Survivor to Activist.
2013: Senator Boxer Reform the Military’s Pre-Trial Hearing Process to Protect
Survivors.
2013: USAF Rocked by Aviano Scandal. Accountability?
2012: Invisible War Winds the Best Documentary Award.
2011: First Comprehensive Proposal to end commander control of the military
justice system.
2005: Physical evidence of sexual assault and battery yet ruled suicide.
Accountability?
2003: Sexual assault and harassment at USAF Academy. Accountability?
1996: Twelve Drill Instructors arrested for rape and other sex crimes.
1995: Carolyn Becker v. U.S. Coast Guard, et al. Accountability?
1991: Tailhook. No accountability.9
///
///
61
Previous to 1991, there are numerous active-duty female service members who
have experience similar or the same mistreatment for going to work. To serve their
country. To feed their children. To put a roof over their head.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent arguing it was time for the
highest court to revisit Feres. “Under our precedent, if two Pentagon
employees–one civilian and one a servicemen–are hit by a bus in the
Pentagon parking lot and sue, it may be that only the civilian would
have a chance to litigate his claim on the merits,” Justice Thomas
wrote. “Feres was wrongly decided.”6
In the Swackhammer v. Widnall No. 96-35587 (1997, 9th Cir.) the record
establishes the United States Air Force failed to post notice of the right to equal
employment opportunity and the deadlines for filing claims in the Renton
recruiting office in 1985 and 1986. Ms. Swackhammer had no notice of such filing
deadlines. Lynne Swackhammer was also unaware she was the object of
discriminatory conduct and that such conduct caused her current emotional and
physical damages. Thus, she asserted additional equitable grounds for tolling based
on her disassociative memory syndrome and the delayed onset of her damages. See
also Douchette v. Bothell School District, 117 Wn.2d 805, 812 fn.6, 818 P.2d 1362
(1991) ("We do not rule out the possibility for future cases that equitable grounds
might exist which justify a tolling of the statute of limitations in a discrimination
case.").
///
62
Similarly, the Medical Officer, a Commander, the Medical Administrator, a
Chief Warrant Officer, through a by direction initiated retaliation and a hostile
medical environment against the severely physically injured service member that
was further forced up the chain of command to reinforce their personal attacks that
were then approved by the Command. I was honorably discharged with a severe
physical injury, on purpose. I was denied adequate medical care. I was prescribed
inappropriate drugs for my physical injury. Five Military Officers (Tate, Castro,
Fritz, Breckinridge, Peck) were derelict in their duty and failed to perform their
duties to a physically injured active-duty servicemember who was temporarily
assigned to the land unit due to her physical injury. As seen in the brief timeline
above, the USCG’s District Supervisor of the Command for District 13, LCDR
Henry Reed, was notified on Oct. 26, 1995 via a letter by Yvonne Fee, FPA, about
the seriousness of Appellant’s physical injury. (6-ER 1604-1605). (7-ER).
Under the “Cat’s Paw” theory, the animus of a non-decision-maker who has
a singular influence may imputed to the decision-maker. See Staub v. Proctor
Hosp. 562 U.S. 411, 131 S Ct. 1186,179 L.Ed 144 (2011). The Supreme Court
writes a fracture fable of the cat’s paw theory. “In the workplace, the cat represents
an unbiased decision-maker who disciplines an employee unknowingly due to a
supervisor’s bias, represented by the monkey.” See Boyd v. Department of Social
and Health Service (DSHS).
63
The USCG is under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The
same type of supervisor to subordinate applies in the “chain of command.” The
"cat's paw" instruction read, "If a supervisor performs an act motivated by
retaliatory animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse
employment action, and if that act is relied on by the employer and is a substantial
factor in the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable for retaliation.
This instruction is consistent with the law on subordinate bias liability. "[I]f a
supervisor performs an act motivated by ... animus that is intended by the
supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate
cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable." Staub, 131
S. Ct. at 1194 (footnotes omitted). Under Washington law, in order for the act to be
a proximate cause, it must be a substantial factor. City of Vancouver v. Wash. Pub.
Emp 't Relations Comm 'n, 180 Wn. App. 333, 356, 325 P.3d 213 (2014) ("a
complainant seeking to use the subordinate bias theory of liability must show that
the subordinate's animus was a substantial factor in the decision"). The trial court's
instruction properly informed the jury of the law. It required the plaintiff to prove
that the supervisor's animus was a substantial factor in the decision. The trial court
did not err when · it gave the cat's paw instruction.
The cat’s paw applies to USCG Station Chetco River. The second in
command (XO/ XPO) committed an act of illegal menacing toward CSX. XO/XPO
64
(named), apparently angered by complainant's desire to help put up a "pull-up bar",
…., picked up a screwdriver from the boatswain hole, and in front of complainant
repeatedly stabbed the screwdriver into a counter top while screaming at her. He
yelled, "You're not helping. You're hindering. This is the straw that broke the
camel's back. This is going to bite you in the ass."
As of late 2023, I am now mostly recovered, my brain and body are still
mending from my honorable active-duty service of 1991-1995. And, from the
violent criminal mistreatment, assault, of being tortured in four-point-mechanical
restraints causing great bodily harm by maiming my bowel function movement
and other bodily injuries in 2001. Yes, it has taken that long to recover to be here
today. Especially with the excessive poly drugging by the Dept of Veterans while
left injured, for years. Then add the excessive forced and poly drugging that
poisoned her.
///
///
///
///
///
///
///
65
X. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the preceding arguments, Carolyn Green
respectfully request the district court's rulings be reversed and an injunction be
granted.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing statement is made under
the laws of the state of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct, and I am
competent to testify to the matters set forth herein.
RESPECTFULLY, and Sincerely Submitted this 29th day of September 2023.
s/ Carolyn Sioux Green

CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN (aka see Notice #54)
PO Box 38097, Phoenix, Arizona 85069
(253) 588-8100, candidCarolyn@gmail.com
Retained Counsel
Carolyn Green has Standing.
66
No. 22-35794
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN,
Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS, UNITED STATES

COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, [DOE-1 PROVIDENCE
ST. PETER HOSPITAL], [DOE-2 STATE OF WASHINGTON, DSHS, ET AL],
DOE'S 1-155, ET AL
Appellees-Defendants
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington State
EXCERPTS OF RECORD
Volume 7 of 7
CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN

PO Box 38097
Phoenix, AZ 85069
candidCarolyn@gmail.com
(253) 588-8100
Retained Counsel
VOLUME 7
Please see the ADA requests filed for 1-ER 56-66, 6-ER 1578-1587
CASE EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL

All the documents listed below have been filed in the initial filing of Excerpts of
Record, or in the district court, with few filed today. See ADA request for
reasonable accommodations for effective communications, and cognitive help.
Page. 1–12: Standing Proof:

6-ER 1512, 1500, 1521, 1376, 1364, 1519, 1534, 1536, 1520, 1369, 1642.
Page 13–24: Connecting Defendants:

6-ER 1465, 1467, 1469, 1473, 1403, 3-ER 540,
6-ER 1414, 1416, 1409,
Dkt. #258-2 p. 62 in 01276-RAJ,
ER 408.
Page 25–45: No Due Process, No Legal Counsel
pp. 26-28: a) Refused to Sign Two-Military Documents:

Dkt. #124 p. 14, 15, 13 dated 03/23/22.
pp. 29-39: b) Denied Right to Hire her Own Attorney,

Attorney Abandonment:
6-ER 1467, 1521, 1514, 1520, 1525, 1526-1527, 1531,
6-ER, 1533, 1394.
pp. 40-45: c) Signature Obtained by Deception:

6-ER 1551, 1429, 1427, 1438, 1445.
1
Page 46–85: Illegal Forced Drugging, AND Excessive Prescribed Drugs:

6-ER 1557, 3-ER 518, 517, 516, 5-ER 1117, photo of Carolyn filed today,
3-ER 525, 6-ER 1475, photo of Carolyn filed today, 5-ER 1118-1121, 1630,
3-ER 540-541, 6-ER 1634, 3-ER 549, 6-ER 1551, 3-ER 550-552,
6-ER 1485-1486,
6-ER 1453, 1455
Dkt. #50-6 p. 105 in 06112-BHS and in Dkt. #66 p. 39 in 01276-RAJ,
6-ER 1644, 3-ER 493-501,
Dkt. #50-6 p. 168 in 06112-BHS and in Dkt. #123 p. 11 in 01276-RAJ
Dkt. #123 p. 13 in 06112-BHS; Photo of brain examples filed today.
Page 86–126: Bodily Injuries and Maiming

3-ER 560, 6-ER 1603, 5-ER 1051, 6-ER 1602,
Dkt. #124-1 p. 41 in 01276-RAJ
Dkt. # 124 pp. 8-11 in 01276-RAJ
6-ER 1604-1605,
Dkt. #124 p. 14, 13, 16, 15 dated 03/23/22,
6-ER 1607
4-ER 890-891, 1611-1612, 1620, 1500, 1615-1619, 1622, 1514, 1525,
4-ER 892, 6-ER 1557, 3-ER 556-557, 2-ER 473, 2-ER 389, 6-ER 1591,
2-ER 401
photo of Carolyn filed today and stamped over documents,
2-ER 406
NOTE: 4-ER 1619 and 1622. The Olympia Police Department stated,
1622: “Ms. _____ did not try to assault any of us, she just tried to leave.”
1619: What Defendant Doe-1 Providence claimed is another lie as
Providence used four-point-mechanical restraints as a matter of convenience.
This is illegal. Another perjury violation. Carolyn was “Thrashing”. She just
tried to leave and did not “swing” at any one.
2
Page 127–148: “Competent” and brain damaged:

2-ER 386, 6-ER 1517, 2-ER 376-377, 6-ER 1623, 3-ER 513, 3-ER 525,
6-ER 1529, 3-ER 524, 2-ER 378-379, 2-ER 380, 2-ER 382, 3-ER 551,
2-ER 384, 6-ER 1578, 6-ER 1583, 1585, 1579-1580, 1587.
END OF CASE EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL
Pages 149–246: MOTION FOR DEFAULT –with SUMMONS

Doe-1 Providence St. Peter Hospital Motion to Default - Joinder
Doe-2 State of Washington Motion to Default– Re-Open & Consolidate
Doe-3 Pierce County Motion to Default – Re-Open & Consolidate
Doe-4 Dept of Veterans Motion to Default– Re-Open & Consolidate
Pages 247–261: RCW’S; 12-Hours, 72-Hours, and GREAT WEIGHT
Pages 262-288: AMENDED MOTION TO RE-OPEN 3:20-06112-BHS
TO FOLLOW AT A LATER DATE:

Request For Admissions (RFA) Doe-1 Providence:
Dkt. #258 series
Conflicting Rulings
See SCOTUS ref: 23M1 Appendix-O
Decline Magistrate Judge:

Dkt. #8 09/22/21 01276-RAJ-DWC
Email 09/21/22 01276-RAJ-DWC
Dkt. #12 09/23/21 01276-RAJ-DWC
Dkt. #7 05/22/22 05258-JCC-TLF
Dkt. #8 05/18/22 05258-JCC-TLF
Dkt. #13 12/21/20 01804-MAT (magistrate)
Dkt. #13 12/21/20 01804-MAT(magistrate)
Dkt. #14 12/23/20 01804-JLR (Article III)
AMENDED GENERAL ORDER No. 02-19
3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE – PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Carolyn Sioux Green, state and declare as follows: I am over the age of 18 years and I
am competent to testify to the matters set forth herein. On September 29 or 30, 2023, I served a
true and correct copy of the REPLACEMENT OPENING BRIEF IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CASE No. 22-35794 with the Excerpts of Record Volume-7 and this CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE on the following parties to this action, as indicated below:
Counsel: Default Defendant Doe-1 Providence St. Peter Hospital
c/o FAVROS
3131 Elliott Ave., Suite 300, Seattle, WA 98121
amanda@favros.com, shelly@favros.com,ann@favros.com, carrie@favros.com
Counsel: Default Defendants Doe-2 Attorney General of Washington

PO Box 40124, Olympia, WA 98504
serviceatg@atg.wa.gov
(By licensed process server, Melvin Cahoon, Rock Solid Legal, Inc.)
Counsel: Default Defendants Doe-3 Pierce County

c/o Pierce County Prosecutor / Civil
955 Tacoma Avenue South, Suite 301, Tacoma, WA 98402-2160
jana.hartman@piercecountywa.gov
(By licensed process server, Melvin Cahoon, Rock Solid Legal, Inc.)
Counsel: United States of America, Doe-4 Default Defendant

U.S. Attorney: Matt Waldrop – via the CM/ECF system that automatically notifies the parties.
FAVROS PDF Via COA Portal: shelly@favros.com, amanda@favros.com,

carrie@favros.com, ann@favros.com.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington and Arizona
that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this this 29th day of September 2023, in Maricopa County, Arizona.
s/Carolyn Sioux Green
CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN
PO Box 38097, Phoenix, Arizona 85069
(253) 588-8100. candidCarolyn@gmail.com
Retained Counsel
CAROLYN GREEN - FILING PRO SE
September 29, 2023 - 11:30 PM
Transmittal Information
Filed with Court: Court of Appeals Division II

Appellate Court Case Number: 57429-2
Appellate Court Case Title: Carolyn Sioux Green, Appellant v. State of Washington, et al, Respondent
Superior Court Case Number: 20-2-02155-2
The following documents have been uploaded:
574292_Other_20230929232212D2556799_0636.pdf
This File Contains:
Other - witn Excerpts of Record VOL-7
The Original File Name was 7-ER_INDEX-22-35794csx.pdf
574292_Other_Filings_20230929232212D2556799_9726.pdf
This File Contains:
Other Filings - Other
The Original File Name was CSX_AmendedOpeningBRIEF22-35794.pdf
A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:
Shelly@FAVROS.com
amanda@favros.com
ann@favros.com
carrie@favros.com
jana.hartman@piercecountywa.gov
rocksolidlegal2004@gmail.com
serviceatg@atg.wa.gov
Comments:
Appellants AMENDED OPENING BRIEF. NINTH CIRCUIT CASE NO. 22-35794 with Excerpts of Records VOL-7.
Process of Service. 09/29/2023 @ 2330p. CSX
Sender Name: CAROLYN GREEN - Email: CANDIDCAROLYN@GMAIL.COM

Address:
PO Box 38097
PHOENIX, AZ, 85069
Phone: (253) 588-8100
Note: The Filing Id is 20230929232212D2556799

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Case: 22-35794, 09/29/2023, ID: 12801939, DktEntry: 30-2, Page 1 of 84

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

APPELLANTS' AMENDED OPENING BRIEF

CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………………...ii

STATUTORY [& REGULATORY] AUTHORITIES ………………...iii

BACKGROUND OF CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN (CSX) .....................1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT …………………………………….3

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & CASE OVERVIEW .......………….4

BRIEF SUMMARY .................................................................................5

CONDENSED TIMELINE ......................................................................8

STANDARD OF REVIEW …………………………………………...12

STANDING DEMONSTRATED .........................................................13

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH ARGUMENT & CASE LAW

I. ISSUE-1: DRUG VIOLATIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES

II. ISSUE -2: MOTION FOR DEFAULT - JOINDER…………….....................35

III. ISSUE-3: MOTION FOR DEFAULT – RE-OPEN,

IV. ISSUE-4(a): DUE PROCESS DENIED, RIGHT TO HIRE COUNSEL

VI. ISSUE-5: ARMED FORCES JURISDICTION ...........................................57

CONFLICTING RULINGS .......................................................................36

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES attached.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE attached.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE as attached.

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe,

Nist v. Tudor, 407 P.2d 798, 331

Vaughan v. First Union Nat’l Bank (1999),

Statutes & Laws

Article I § 10: Administration of Justice ..................................................56

14). Rob Wipond investigative journalist. How Psychiatric Fraud Drives

In the matter before this Honorable Court, we are at a crossroads of legal

analysis. Thank you for your time.

II. BACKGROUND OF CAROLYN SIOUX GREEN

A brief background history of Appellant Carolyn Sioux Green (“CSX”).

Prior to my honorable military service, I had a diverse background. I was an

professional sphere, I worked in administration and accounting, primarily in

accounts payable, handling substantial financial responsibilities. I spent several

thousands and millions of dollars. While employed at an auto auction where I

part-time modeling. (4-ER 959).

In furtherance, I entered the United States Coast Guard (USCG) on an age

physical injury an adjustment disorder. Then prescribed inappropriate drugs such

as “valium” to treat my physical injury. I was denied appropriate adequate

464 days directly to my lower extremities, I was reprimanded twice in writing

(5-ER 1050-1051), (5-ER 1061-1063).

Although the Dept of Veterans documented my physical injury and my complaints

of pain on that first appointment, it failed to provide prompt adequate treatment.

over again with more abnormalities in my physical structure, my injury continued

of Veterans continued to prescribe excessive amounts of drugs from: January 12,

1996–June 9, 2017. This includes the 13 YEARS of CHRONIC OPIOID

272-280), (4-ER 793-796).

expressing the constitutional depravations, conflicting court rulings for removal

in the process, I extend my apologies for any inadvertent missteps.

III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

deprivation of rights), § 1985 conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Jurisdiction

Washington only on November 1, 2019. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 (appeal of final decision).

IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & CASE OVERVIEW

U. S. Department of Veterans was timely filed. In addition, the deprivation of

to Due Process, Second Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment,

gross negligence by the Dept of Veterans, Providence St. Peter Hospital

(Providence), State of Washington (State) in grossly neglecting a well-documented

for exponential delays in procedural medical treatment to the injury, excessive

decades of excessive drug prescriptions with unnecessary appointments. Moreover,