John Burton Department of Public Afsirs and Center for Confict Resolution George Mason University Fairfax, Virginia USA THE THEORY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1. A Problem of Language In university and community groups there is now a ‘eat deal of interest in ‘conflict resolition’ and much confusion about its nature. Strategie studies of all kinds could be, and frequently are regarded, a fling within the scope of ‘confit reschition’. In particular, the term “arms control’ falls within this concept even though it does not deal with ary of the underlying problems that sve rise to arms, The term ‘confict reschitio’ is wsed here in a specific sense. It refers to the faclitated analysis ofthe underiying sources of confict situations by the parties in conflict. The term also encompasses the process whereby institutional and poicy options are Aicovered that meet the needs of the partes, thus ‘stabihing the basis for 3 resolution of the confit, “The process with which we are concerned is called “facittaion’, to distinguish it from ‘medtation’, a5 the term is normally interpreted. A traditional mediation usualy tries to find and suggest reasonable com- promises, secking agreement by moving from one pasty to another inthe process. A feclitator, however, seeks to help the partes arrive at a common definition of their relationships, define their teparate goals clearly, and through facitated analysis, discover options which meet the needs of all. Te facitztor i, i fact, «panel of four or five persons who work withthe parties ina fice-to- face situation, ora simulation of such a situation using direct exchanges of teats by electronic means. ‘The term ‘mediation’ i frequently used to deseribe most any coafict resohition process. In view of Iistorcal developments it is useful to confine it to the traditional role of the mediator in international situa- tions, eg.. the person appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations, who usualy moves among the parties and tries to arrive at compromises. ‘Simdary, it i convenient to distinguish "facitation’ from ‘negotiation’ and confine this later term to the mean detaled work undertaken once agreement in pin- 125 ciple has been reached a8 a rest ofthe facitation pro- cess, Negotiation is another term whic, tke mediation, is used to deseribe almost any form of conict manage ment. Jes important to make a distinction between ‘setle- ‘ment’ and ‘resolution’. I is possible for a "settlement" to be arrived atin a power-bargining situation, just as ‘court has the power to ‘settle a dispute. In our usage achieving a resolution’ snot the result of compromise ‘or an enforced decision, Iti an outcome that develops ‘ut of an anasis ofthe total situation by the concerned parties to meet their needs. It is also necessary to distinguish between ‘confict management’ and ‘confit reschtion’. The former term has 2 wide appication, from deterence strategies to propaganda. Its significant feature i that it i an at- ‘tempt, usually by the status quo party tothe depute, to avoid escalation ofthe confict while maintaining control without giving way. This positon is typical of the polices of cn-legitimized authorities under threat. Con- flict resolution, on the other hand, seeks to resclve the problem, even though this requires change. For this reason thas a costing component so that the status quo party can relabiy assess the costs and consequences of conflict ‘management. 2. The Shift in Thinking In both the research and practical application of inter- ‘national confit resoution this s a period of transition from one main theory to another. This i why there is 2 problem of ingiage. We are moving from the traci- tional theory of power bargaining, negotiation, and the settlement of dsputes to a new theory of problem solving which involves analysis of goals and interests. This analysis leads to the discovery of agreed options $0 that resolution of conficts can be schieved. While more and more universities wish to offercours and undertake reacrch inthe feld of confict rescluon and some governments (including the United ‘States, Canada and Australia) are making funds available ‘specifically for this purpose, there is no clear consensus: ‘as to approach and content. ‘There ia one stiude which encourages il flowers to ‘bloom. In this view, clarity of concepts and language is to important, fo i i not important to distinguish one approsch or proese trom mothe. However, some 3p- proeches may be weeds with aute poisonous conse- quences. Conict retoion imyles interventions in relations among states and peoples. There are ethical considerations that require professionalism of a high onder, and. in particular an adequate theoretical framework on which to tase tested processes. Some ‘approaches could well do more harm than good. ‘One means of diferentitng between various 27- ‘proaches and the assumptions on which they are based is to look at the history of conflict reselition and the trends that have emerged as a result of experience and failure. Let om go back to 1945 when the Charter of the United Nations was drafted at San Francisco. A that time, conventional wisdom held that the soba society shoul apprommate centralized federal system, There ‘were certain international legal norms to be observed sed a cout to interpret and to apy them, Also there was to be an enforcement insition, the Security Counc, whove member states were to contrbute forces for the ecforcemen: porpse. In short, the word socety was to be constructed and administered along th ines of the nation state, Law ard order, matory rule, nd the commen good were among, ‘the conceptual notions that made up the political philosophy of the time. These notions were also to be plied to the intermational society. This piosophy, bowever, was power phlosophy ‘At both the domestic and the iteration! levels the ‘concept of common good was defines bythe powerfil ‘The belief was that if power were employed to enforce ‘international norms it would result in a stability that was in the common interest. However, such norms had tvaved over the years and rected the interests and practices of power! states. These iafuenial sites ‘were in portion to tke advantage of trade, employ taltary mean to defend tec boundaries, intervene in the ars of wmaler states, and defy or veto any dec- sion by the central authority. ‘We now imow from experience that even at the domestic lave the mode! on which the UN was besed is fnlcty conceived. Tt posts legal autores, that is, authorities recognized by the international society by 128 Ent of their elective control of persons within their ter- ritores. It assumes, however, that these legal authorities are also politically legitimized authorities; that is, authorities who derive their legitimacy from those persons over whom they exercise authority. In the absence of legitimizatin of this kind, the maintenance of law and order by a central authority through coercion is 2 source of domestic violence and protracted cont. ‘There are few authorities in the world society who ‘an claim such lepimization. At the present time some 60 or so overt domestic confit situations are occuring and the use of interal and foreign military forces to ‘maintain unpopular governments is widespread. Conlct may alo occur because the legal norms of societies do rot necessary advance the development of their members. Also, notions of majority nde generally take little account of minority groupe and the issues of ethnicity and distributive ustice. The practice of deaing with conficts by employing nomlegitinized forces may be a form of conflict management, but it does not lead to conflict resolution, ‘The UN was flawed from the outset since many of its ciginal members were and are non-legitimized authorities. This created a situation where serious domestic conficts were supported externally through interventions by great powers end the domestic con- {cts ape over into th international system, The UN veas powerless to intervene since its charter contains @ domestic jurisdiction clause preventing it from deaing with these confiis, The result ia global society plagued with serious domestic conficts and no ap- propeate institution to which parties can tum for assistance. It is not an over-statement to say the UN is body that aflords protection to many state authorities who lack domestic leptimization and wish nly to preserve the status quo bythe use of violence, ‘These authorities attract support from the great powers which fear that domestic conficts wil result in aktered ideological sfations. Tt-was not until the early sstles that any effective challenge was made to the normative and athortarian ‘approach of classical confit settlement theory. Whe it ‘came, it came nthe fd of industrial relations, Scholars ‘nd consultants such as Biske, Sbepard and Mouton 1964) pointed tothe need for interaction and increased productivity. ‘This concept led to an interest in negotiation tech- ‘ques and tothe realization tat to be effective, negotia- tion required some accommodation ofthe interests of the ‘weaker’ side if stabity were to be reached. As a result, techniques in uch negotiating skills were studiedand taught. ‘Once there was a break from the authoritarian model of management and a realization that stability required accommodation to the needs cf those concerned, it was short step to interactive models of decision-making, In this mode decisions are made a8 a result of interaction among all parties concerned After a slow take-if, there was an explosion of new thoughts and practices in al ls of behavioural rel- tionships. They appeared in many areas — from family counseling to the handling of juveniles by courts, ‘tthe international level, however, there has been it- tle change. ‘The orignal pilosophical framework, leading to adversary diplomacy and politics, persists. For example, the UN and is Secretariat in particular, stl see the gobal society inthe dassical framework and rely on mediation or third-party determinations. There is an almost total absence of any problem-solving ‘endeavour, in the sense this term is employed in other fies. However, at the non-ofcil level experiments have arisen out of a quite diferent philosophy of conflict resolution, a paradigm shift of a major order. mn 1966, a group of lawyers in Britain published their considered view tat the trational conflict setlement ‘nstiutons avaiable to states were adequate. They in- chided judicial settlement. mediation, conciliation, negotistion and the other means contemplated within the UN Charter and classical legal philosophy. The lawyers, repeating the conventional wisdom ofthe time, came tothe concusion that only one troble existed, an tnwiingness on the part of states to use these in- struments. On the other hand, the academic community was sharply divided between those who adopted a traditional oF power view and those Who took into account the political consequences of human needs and behaviour. ‘The later sought to determine, not how to settle con- {ct by the application of legal norms, but the nature of confict and how to resolve it by promoting an understanding of by the partes concerned. Clearly, the later process inchided the uncovering of data that ‘would reveal the otherwise hidden motivations, goals and interests ofthe parties to conflict. By these means an acurate assessment of responses to coadtions and poles and an accurate costing of their consequances can be made, ‘One outcome ofa bitter academic confit in the late siaties was an attempt by a London group, the Centre for the Analysis of Confit, to falsify the proposition that disputing parties were unwiling to cooperate in resolv ing conflicts, Their hypothesis was as follows: frst, that ar parties to disputes would use suitable institutions to resolve conflicts if they were available, but that the ex- isting institutions, courts, mediation, and others, were ‘not acceptable. Second, that responsible authorities ‘would not hand over decision making on matters of im- portant concem to an outside body, but would try to resolve confits in an exploratory and analytical framework in which the decision makers were free ‘agents until an acceptable option was agreed upon. ‘Under these conditions it was obvious that some new process would be required. It would have to avoid power bargaining from stated positions and be ex- ploratory in nature. It would have tobe analytical so that the goals and objectives of all sides would be revealed. ‘This new process would require a neutral and skilled thicd party, preferably a pane! of four or five facilitators. ‘Their role would be to inject interdacplinary Imowledge and information into the discussion about conficts and human behaviour generally, and to keep discussions ‘within an analydcal structure, The panel would always avoid putting forward judgemental views about the specific conflict at issue. ‘This thesis was tested in several international and in- tercommunal situations and also at the industria and ‘community Jevels. The testing led to greater insights both into conflictual behaviour and into processes, ‘The falsifying of an existing proposition does not automatically lead to an alternative one. Therefore a theacy of behavioar had to be developed which would ‘ot merely explain why parties were unwiling to meet ‘within existing institutions, but indicate what kindof n- stitutions would be acceptable and belpl, ‘This proved not to be possible uni there had been frther developments by socologsts and other theorists in the general field of conflict and behaviour. ‘Such s the nature of theory building and discovery in the behavioural sciences: its essentialy a-discipinary. The theory of needs, which was built on the work of Maslow and others, stressed values that could not be curbed, Socialized or negotiated, contrary to earlier assump- tions. This theory was a creation to which many persons contributed. One of the important contributors was Paul Sites (1973). He placed power ina realistic perspective by at- ‘wibuting effective power, not to govemiments, but ton viduals and groups of individuals. These individuals ‘would use all means at their disposal to pursue certain ‘haman needs, subject only to constrains they imposed ‘on themselves in their need to maintain valued relation ships. Sites made 00 reference to international relations as such, but directed the attention of those concerned ‘with inter-state relations to an important phenomenon;that certain societal needs will by pursued regardless ‘of consequences. He believed that parties in violent con- flict who have no valued relationships, for reasons of history and their own behaviour, are unrestrained when seeking to parsue such needs, ‘The next step was to make a clear distinction between ‘ontological human needs and individual interests, such ‘as commercial and role interests. At the time, the con- ‘cern was primarily with specic identity-driven conficts, ‘where there was a denial of both identity-related needs and distributive justice. What fret appeared to be unique post-colonial situations of ethnic or cultural confit, ‘were, in fact, special instances of universal conditions ‘where confict exists. Cleary, ethnicity is often an im- portant factor when conflict is present. However, con fict also typicaly relates to underdevelopment, clase diferences, and dlstributve injustice. Today there is a renewed interest in finding the political structures which promote the full development of the individual and the identity group to which the in- dividual belongs. Indeed, the major role of panels associated with conflict resolution seminars isto be in- ‘ovative in guiding the translation of ciscovered shared values into politcal structures and institutions that wil promote their fulfilment. These structures and institu- tions include the development of decentralized systems and forms of functional cooperation that avoid power and ower sharing. This approach makes possible respect among identity groupe and provides for effective cooperation between different cultures, Structures that are decentraized and rely on functional cooperation rather than elite power are the logical extension of cer~ tain trends now a part of social evolution. Such trends include the progressive movement from authoritative power control by a small elite (of which feurialism was ‘8 part) to forms of power sharing and non-power forms of cooperative decision making. However, an explanation of the causes of confi is ‘not a suficient explanation of why conficts are not resolved. It seems likely that they persist, not because ‘of their complexities, but because of the inadequate methods that are adopted to deal with them. This brings tus back to the core issue: how to resolve conflicts, regardless of their origin 3. The Problem of Testing ‘There is one other strand in the fabric of conflict ‘reaclution that should be noted. We are dealing with the ‘most complex feld of study that man will ever come across — the behavioural relationships of humans as persons and as groups. There are no controlled ex: periments possible inthis area since we are dealing with behaviour in open systems. Therefore, any controlled ‘experiment or simulation is likely to lead to false conciu- sions. More importantly, we are dealing with situations in which there cannot be experiments or tests inthe or- inary sense. It is not possible or desirable to test whether Russia o the United States is aggressive by removing the so-called deterrents of NATO and War- saw, Controlled experiments are not possible, In the absence of opportunities to test, reliance has to be placed on the validity of original hypotheses and logical deductions made from them. During the develop- ‘meat of behavioural theory, the philosophy of science ‘was also developing. Despite earlier emphasis on testing as the main interest of science, a scientific value came to be attached to the validity of original hypothesis. This led to 2 questioning of the basic assumptions of traditional political theory. Once basic assumptions were questioned, it was apparent that ‘traditional concepts of law and order, the common good, ‘majority decision making, and the right to rule nd to ex- [pect obedience, were often at the root of confit situs tions. Furthermore, the empirical evidence seemed to show that authorities who deny people identity and evelopment, and attempt to inmpose the norms of the powerful are, in themselves, dysfunctional and a source of conflict. 4, Recent Developments: Interests and Needs “The theory of needs led logically tothe development ‘of a new process that enabled partes to conficts to ascertain the hidden data of motivations and intentions and to explore means by which common human-eocietal needs could be achieved. As these needs of security, ‘eatty and human development are universal, and ‘because their fuiflment is not dependent on liited resources, it follows that confict resolution with win- win outcomes is possible. Classical thinking had led us to belive that conflict ‘was only about interests and that there had to be srin- ners and losers. Asa resitt was thought the individual coukl be socialized and coerced into accepting certain social norms and means a8 methods to settle disputes. However, both theory and application revealed that pro- tracted conflicts, the major concer in world politics, areof security, identity and other ontological aspects of development. This development is significant. It clarifies the roe of confict reschution and removes a major source of the confusion about the subject to which reference was ‘made at the outset. There ae thoae who are concerned with improving bargaining and negotiation techniques, and others who are concerned with problem-solving techniques. Both groups have been and are stil somewint2tlogger-heads. Its lear now that situations ‘exist where traditional negotiation and the use of nor- mative processes are relevant. There are also other cr- ‘cumstances where the tradition! means of setting Geputes are not relevant and in which problem-solving techniques are required. In due course we will be able to diflerenticte the old and the new theories and intcate where one tergesin- ‘tothe other, as when cultural identity i defined in terms ‘of political control. In the meantime, the warning fag is ‘out: those concerned with the handling of conics over wage disputes or unattractive islands inthe South Atlan- ‘ic _may basicaly not be fought over superficial negotiable interests. They may relate rather to basic ‘values that are not for trading, Indeed, it may well be that conficts are protracted unnecessary just because inabenable values are translated into interests merely to {it into the traditional processes of bargaining and ‘negotiation. If there were other confit resolution pro- cesses avalable, the hidden motives. would be revealed and could be dealt with 5. Settlement Process as a Cause of Protracted Conflict ‘There is one other observation that should be made, 1 seems likely that the traditional processes of power Dbarguning and mediation are themselves an additional reason for some conficts to be protracted. Sach pro- cesses often lead to temporary settlements without tacking the underlying issues, ‘The dangers associated with peace-keeping forces are ‘elated to this process issue. In the absence of a con- comitant analytical and faciitated process of confict ‘etolution, traditional peace-keeping practices tend to institutional confict. Peace via force then becomes part of the way of life and makes any resolution all the more dificult. 6. The Problem of Change At this tine we can ofr some hope to a woeld society that seems devoid of it. But it is restricted hope, The structures can no longer meet the challenge of com ‘ting ones. Inthe same way. leadership and elites seek {to conserve existing roles and institutions by whatever ‘power means are at their disposal unt overcome by ‘more powerful forces. Societies have always been in ‘change to full their buman needs, while others fear change and its threat to their interests. Change has ‘raitionlly been regarded as malign and anti-social. We have not developed a language for it, except a negative ‘one, revolt, revolution, dissect, terrorism. Without 2 language and conceptual framework we can bave 0 theory of change, and therefore, no processes of change, except those of power and violence. ‘The evolving conflict resolution processes are eflec- tive only to the extent that parties to disputes are helped to cost accurately the consequences of change and the resistance to change. In this sense, the pro- cesses of faciitated confict reschtion are designed to cut down the delays and upheavals that occur in change ‘and to speed up the evohitionary process toward ‘greater fulfilment of societal needs. Within these limitations we are moving towards an alternative process to change by organized violence that ‘enables parties to move deliberately from point A to point B. In this way change can be more than the mere ‘substitution of one ring elite for another who wil aso pursue sectional interests at the expense of human reeds. ‘This is an important discovery when translated on to the global scene and the relations between the great powers, since both sides fear change lest it prejuce thee relative power postions. Yet both sides kmoor that change in many politcal systems is not merely inevitable, bat also desirable. The US does not particularly desire to elend repressive feudal systems in Central America and dewbere throughout the globe, but it fears the conse ‘quences of unpredictable political change which woud challenge its own system. The Soviet Union, if we can ‘deduce its position from reactions by scholars there, was. astonished and dismayed by the high level of violence that followed change in Ethiopia. If there were 1 relable ‘means of bringing about change with desired cutcomes, ‘many situations in the world society would no longer at- tract great power interventions.‘These considerations direct attention to what is pro- bably the most serious problem in global pois, the deformities of domestic systems, for it constantly leade the great powers into confict. These deformities are sot confined to amaller and under-developed state. The US has its share, which makes it most defensive when more egalitarian systems are introduced within its sphere of influence. In turn, the Soviet Union is set conscious ofits non-participatory society and becomes anxious when there are demands in bordering states for increased participation. One dreams of great power agreements and an iar stittionaized mesna by which confit situations are subjected to an analytical problem solving. process before there is any transfer 6f arms or interventions by the great pomers or by others. The dream includes each cof the great powers giving the other the opportunity to change, belping the other to change, and not exploiting the existence of deformities that wil finally lead one of the great powers to some desperate act of survival. References Babs, Pt, HLA, Sheard and JS; Mouton 1964 Gai Pisin Co, David Davis Memorial Institute 1966. Report of a Study Group on Peaceful Settlement of later national Disputes. Sites, Paul 1973. Control, the Basis of Social ‘Order. Dunellen Publishers.