G.R. No.

L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner
and appellee.
CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar,
parying that judgment be rendered declaring its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the
Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public”.
In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period? The contest is open to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There
is no fee or consideration required nor a purchase required to be made as privilege to participate. The
forms are available upon request at each Caltex station and there is also a sealed can where accomplished
entry stubs may be deposited.
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the contest, thus, Caltex sent
representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest.

However, the postal authorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the
Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibits the use of mail
in conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme.
Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the part of the
contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex that if the
contest was conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives.
In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not,
under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery.

The Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not,
it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of
December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well
threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and
all its representatives.”

This leads to Caltex’s filing of this petition for declaratory relief. The court ruled that the petitioner does
not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution or said rules by
the mails. The respondent then appealed.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violates the Postal Law.

RULING: No. The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest does not violate the Postal Law.
Using the rules of Statutory Construction in discovering the meaning and intention of the authors in a case
clouded with doubt as to its application, it was held that the promotional scheme does not violate the
Postal Law in that it does not entail lottery or gift enterprise. Using the principle “noscitur a sociis’, the
term under construction shall be understood by the words preceding and following it. Thus, using the
definitions of lottery and gift enterprise which both has the requisites of prize, chance and consideration,
the promo contest does not clearly violate the Postal Law because of lack of consideration.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words,
there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly
applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of
inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.

As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale
of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open
to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon
are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise"
are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration
or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute.
Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be
so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that
element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

G.R. No. L-13032 August 31, 1959

PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN DRUG COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
From 14 Feb 1951 to 31 Dec 1954, Philippine American Drug Co., did not include advance sales tax on
importations as part of land cost the difference (Php 0.015) between the amounts actually paid by it to the
bank on said importations computed at the rate of Php 2.015 for every US Dollar and the value of the
imported goods computed at the legal rate of Php 2.00 for every US Dollar; the difference of Php 0.015
represents the premium on the dollar charged by the bank, and paid by the Philippine American Drug in
purchase of foreign exchange. The difference represents the premium on the dollar that the bank charges,
paid by the petitioner in purchase of foreign exchange. Hence, the Commissioner demanded on
November 4, 1955 that the company should pay the ₱10,243.13 as deficiency advance sales tax. The
demand stems from the respondent’s claim that Section 183 (B) wherein the taxable value of the imported
goods falls under the “similar charges” phrase. Petitioner further argues that the phrase includes “the total
value” as a separate item to “the import invoice value”.

ISSUE:
1.Whether the said bank (Premium on the dollar charged by the bank to the importer) falls under the
category of the charges enumerated in the Tax Code, and is included in the taxable value of imported
goods, and must be declared for tax purposes.

RULING:
1.Yes. The court ruled that the petitioner is unjustified in their argument. The court explains that the tax
was imposed on imported goods “based on the total value thereof at the time they are received by the
importer, including freight, postage, insurance, commission, customs duty, and all similar charges”.
Statutory construction application brought forth that “all similar charges” as a component part of the
“total value therefore”, as the petitioner seems to accept, or adding “all similar charges” as a separate item
to the “import invoice value thereof”, the law is clear, and the result is the same: the tax is based upon the
total landed cost of the imported articles. Further, ejusdem generis is a rule that “where, in a statute,
general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general
words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, class, or nature as those
specifically enumerated”; the intention of the law was to include ALL CHARGES, even if the previous
words may not categorically be synonymous with “bank charges”.
G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976

RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN GONTANG, petitioners,

vs. LEONCIO BARRAMEDA, respondent.

FACTS: Plaintiff seeks to redeem the land formerly embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1418,
containing an area of 59.4687 hectares, situated in barrio Taban, Minalabac Camarines Sur; to annul any
and all contracts affecting said property between the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and
Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang and to recover damages, attorney's fees and costs.

The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff to the DBP to secure a loan of P22,000.00. For failure of
the mortgagor to pay in full the installments as they fall due, the mortgagee foreclosed extrajudicially
pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135. On April 23, 1962, the provincial sheriff conducted an auction
sale in which the mortgagee, as the highest bidder, bought the mortgaged property for P7,271.22. On May
13, 1963, the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in favor of the DBP (Exhibit 2) and the DBP executed
an affidavit of consolidation of ownership (Exhibit 3). Upon registration of the sale and affidavit on
September 2, 1963 (Exhibit 1), TCT No. 1418 in the name of plaintiff was cancelled and TCT No. 5003
issued to the DBP (Exhibit-5) in its stead. On September 3, 1963, defendants Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang purchased the land from their codefendant. The sale in their favor was annotated on
TCT No. 5003 on November 26, 1963 only.

Prior to the date last mentioned, or on November 20, 1963, plaintiff offered to redeem the land. In view of
the refusal of the DBP to allow the redemption, plaintiff commenced this suit. The original complaint was
filed in court on November 23, 1963. On August 12, 1964, plaintiff deposited with the clerk of court the
sum of P7,271.22, representing the repurchase price of the land.

The trial court held that the one-year period of redemption began to run on April 23, 1962, when the sale
at public auction was held, and ended on April 24, 1963; that the plaintiff's offer to redeem on November
20, 1963 and the deposit of the redemption price on August 12, 1964 were made beyond the redemption
period; and that defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang 'are legitimate purchasers for value.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the interpretation and application of Section 31, Commonwealth Act 459 (Law that created the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now Development Bank of the Philippines) which provides:

The Mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank whose real property was sold at public
auction, judicially or extra- judicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to said bank shall,
within one year from the date of' the auction sale, have the right to redeem the real property ... (Emphasis
supplied), shall the period of redemption start from the date of auction sale or the date of the registration
of the sale in the register of deeds as the respondent Appellate Court held?

2. Whether petitioners under obligation to look beyond what appeared in the certificate of title of their
vendor the Development Bank of the Philippines and investigate the validity of its title before they could
be classified as purchasers in good faith?

RULING:
The crucial issue to determine is the choice of what rule to apply in determining the start of the one year
redemption period, whether from the date of the auction sale or from that of the registration of the sale
with the registry of deeds. In other words it is whether a literal interpretation of the provision of Section
31 of Commonwealth Act 459 — that the period of redemption shall start from the date of the auction
sale — shall govern, or whether the words, "auction sale" shall be considered in their ordinary meaning or
in the same sense that site is used in the texts of Section 26, now 30, of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and
Section 26 of Act 2938, now Section 20, R.A. 1300 (Charter of PNB). Stated differently, should the word
"sale" used in the above indicated provisions of the Rules of Court and the PNB Charter, under which We
ruled that the redemption period shall start from the registration of the sale in the registry of deeds be
applied to foreclosure sales for the DBP and give to the words auction sale" in its charter the same
meaning of "sale" as used in connection with registered land?

We are of the view that a correct solution to the foregoing issue must entail not merely trying to determine
the meaning of the words auction sale" and "sale" in different legislative enactments, but, more
importantly, a determination of the legislative intent which is quite a task to achieve as it depends more on
a determination of the purpose and objective of the law in giving mortgagors a period of redemption of
their foreclosed properties. Mortgagors whose properties are foreclosed and are purchased by the
mortgagee as highest bidder at the auction sale are decidedly at a great disadvantage because almost
invariably mortgagors forfeit their properties at a great loss as they are purchased at nominal costs by the
mortgagee himself who ordinarily bids in no more than his credit or the balance thereof at the auction
sale. That is the reason why the law gives them a chance to redeem their properties within a fixed period.
It cannot be denied that in all foreclosures of mortgages and sale of property pursuant to execution,
whether judicial or extrajudicial in nature, under different legislative enactments, a public auction sale is a
indispensable pre-requisite to the valid disposal of properties used as collateral for the obligation. So that
whether the legislators in different laws used as collateral for the obligation. So that whether the
legislators in different laws used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of no moment, since the presumption
is that when they used those words "sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in different laws they really
referred to only one act — the sale at public auction indispensably necessary in the disposition of
mortgaged properties and those levied upon to pay civil obligations of their owners.

We find no compelling reason to deviate from the aforequoted ruling and not apply the same to the
present case. To Us petitioners' main contention that there is a great deal of difference in legislative intent
in the use of the words 94 auction sale" in Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 and the word "sale" in See.
32 of Act 2938, and See. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, pales into insignificance in the light of Our
stand that those words used interchangeably refer to one thing, and that is the public auction sale required
by law in the disposition of properties foreclosed or levied upon. Our stand in the Salazar case and in
those mentioned therein (Garcia vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959; Gonzales et al. vs.
Philippine National Bank et al. 48 Phil. 824) is firmly planted on the premise that registration of the deed
of conveyance for properties brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title to the
property and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a transaction involving the same had
taken place.

G.R. No. L-11988 April 4, 1918

JACINTO MOLINA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

The present case was a rehearing granted to the appellee for a trail court decision on Feb 1, 1918. The
petition was granted, and oral argument of the motion was permitted. Jacinto Molina was the owner of
various fish ponds in Bulacan. He was required to pay the merchant’s tax required by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Molina protested that he was an agriculturist and not a merchant and therefore exempt
from the taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants.

Point of contention- Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an “agricultural
product” within the meaning of the term used in paragraph (c) of Section 41 of Act No. 2339 enforced
when the disputed tax was levied and that he is exempt from the percentage tax on merchants’ sales
established by section 40 of Act No. 2339.
Paragraph (c) of Act No. 2339 sec. 41 reads:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the following commodities shall be excluded:
. . . (c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown,
whether in their original state or not. (Act No. 2339, sec. 41.)

The same exemption, with a slight change in wording, is now embodied in section 1460 of the
Administrative Code, of 1917.

In the Trial Court, the Honorable Jose Abreu in a carefully prepared decision ordered defendant to refund
the P71.81 paid by plaintiff as internal-revenue taxes and penalties under protest, with legal interest
thereon from November 26, 1915, the date of such payment under protest.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the fish produced as were those upon which the tax in question was levied are an
agricultural product.

RULING: YES. The fished products were those upon which the tax in question was levied are an
agricultural product. As stated by judged Cooley in his great work on taxation:

The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in
the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made to govern, . . . . If the
words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look
beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was
enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was
meant to be redressed; . . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation,
and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if
followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true
expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not
conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p. 450.)

The admission that the land upon which these fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral
or forest land, does not lead of necessity to the conclusion that everything produced upon them is for that
reason alone to be deemed an "agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under
consideration.

"Agriculture" is an English word made upon of Latin words "ager," a field, and "cultura," cultivation. It is
defined by Webster's New International Dictionary as meaning in its broader sense, "The science and art
of the production of plants and animal useful to man . . ."

In Dillard vs. Webb (55 Ala., 468) it is held that the words "agriculture" includes "the rearing, feeding and
managing of live stock." The same view was expressed in the case of Binzel vs. Grogan (67 Wis., 147).

Webster defines "product" to be "anything that is produced, whether as the result of generation, growth,
labor, or thought ... ," while "grow" is defined in the Century Dictionary as meaning "to cause to grow;
cultivate; produce, raise . . .."

While it is true that in a narrow and restricted sense agricultural products are limited to vegetable
substances directly resulting from the tillage of the soil, it is evident from the definitions quoted that the
term also includes animal which derived their sustenance from vegetable growths, and are therefore
indirectly the product of the land. Thus it has been held that "The product of the dairy and the product of
the poultry yard, while it does not come directly out of the soil is necessarily connected with the soil . . .
and is therefore farm produce. (District of Columbia vs. Oyster, 15 D. C., 285.)

It may safely be asserted that courts and lexicographers are in accord in holding that the term "agricultural
products" is not limited in its meaning to vegetable growth but includes everything which serves to satisfy
human needs which is grown upon the land, whether it pertain to the vegetable kingdom, or to the animal
kingdom. It is true that there is no decision which yet has held that the fish grown in ponds are an
agricultural product, but that is no reason why we should not so hold if we find that such fish fall within
the scope of the meaning of the term. Of necessity, the products of land tend constantly to multiply in
number and variety, as population increases and new demands spring up.
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: The passage of R.A. No. 590 , as the Legislative during that time interpreted Section 9, Article
VIII of the 1937 Constitution as unfair, had so ordered tax collector Saturnino David to collect income tax
from Justice Pastor M. Edencia, amounting to ₱1,744.45, and from Justice Fernando Jugo, amounting to
₱2,345.46 from his salary.

Edencia argued that judicial officers are exempt in payment of income tax on their salries, on the ground
that the imposition of income tax constitute decrease on their salaries.

The appellant however argued that under R.A. No. 590 that “No salary wherever received by any public
officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of
which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”

The Supreme Court subsequently ruled the said law as unconstitutional because the said law decreases the
salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, when it is explicitly stated in the Constitution that that is
prohibited.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Legislature has the power to interpret and change the provisions within the Constitution.

RULING: The court ruled that the Legislative has no right to interpret and change the provisions within
the Constitution by virtue of the fundamental principles of separation of powers, as stipulated in our
constitutional government. The court further argues that the Legislative branch was vested the power to
make and enact laws; the Executive branch was vested the execution of carrying out of the provisions of
said laws; and the Judicial branch was vested the power of interpreting and applying laws. Further, the
exemption is not an asked exemption, but rather a privilege that was already attached to the office of a
judicial officer; it is to entice judicial officers to maintain their independence of judicial thought and
action. Furthermore, any laws passed that counteracts the provisions of the Constitution is automatically
declared unconstitutional, meaning the law passed is automatically null and void.
G.R. No. L-8888 November 29, 1957

SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and VICENTE GELLA, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory argues that cocoa beans should be considered as “chocolate” for the
purposes of exemption from foreign exchange tax imposed by R.A. No. 601. The petitioner imported sun
dried cocoa beans enough to accumulate ₱74,671.04 of foreign exchange tax (17%). Since petitioners
claimed that cocoa beans are chocolate enabled them to sue Central Bank that exacted the payment.
Petitioners also argued that the new law enacted after the payment of the tax, should be enough to explain
their stance.

CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term "chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa
beans.

ISSUE: Whether cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the
foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

RULING: Exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind the
principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation, we are of the opinion and so hold, that
the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw
material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former
is not.

On the other hand, congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa
beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the amendments cannot be applied
in the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953, i.e.,
before the exemption decree after September 3, 1954, pursuant to Proclamation No. 62,.
Congress approved Republic Act 1197, amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for
"chocolate." This shows, maintains the appellant, the Legislature's intention to include cocoa beans in the
word "chocolate.

G.R. No. L-5955 September 19, 1952

JOSE L. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. BALTAZAR, respondent.

FACTS: The mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga was suspended in July 1952. The vice-mayor Jose Salazar
assumed office as mayor by virtue of Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code . However, the
same occasion made the provincial governor, with the consent of the provincial board, by virtue of
Section 21 (a), of the Revised Election Code, appointed Jose L. Laxamana as mayor. Laxamana filed this
quo warranto, claiming that the mentioned provision of the Revised Election Code was already repealed,
thereby rightfully installing him as the lawful mayor of Sexmoan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Laxamana is the correct designated mayor by law.

RULING: NO. The Court ruled that Jose Baltazar is the lawful vice-mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga.
THE COURT DISMISSED THE QUO WARRANTO PETITION OF LAXAMANA.
The two statutory provisions read as follows:

SEC. 2195. — Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion of the absence, suspension,
or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if
there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest
number of votes.

SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office. — Whenever a temporary
vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by appointment by the
President if it is a provincial or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the consent of the
Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office. (R.A. 180, the Revised Election Code.

SEC. 21 (a) — The portion relating to municipal offices — was taken from section 2180 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which partly provided:

SEC. 2180. Vacancies in municipal office. — (a) In case of a temporary vacancy in any municipal
office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial governor, with the consent of the
provincial board.

(b) In case of a permanent vacancy in any municipal office, the same shall be filled by
appointment by the provincial board, except in case of a municipal president, in which the
permanent vacancy shall be filled by the municipal vice-president. . . .

Now it is reasonable to assume that the incorporation of the above section 2180 into the Revised Election
Law as section 21 (a) did not have the effect of enlarging its scope, to supersede or repeal section 2195,
what with the presumption against implied repeals. "Where a statute has received a contemporaneous and
practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is accorded
greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of
the law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the
contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made by an administrative body or executive
officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the
interpretation upon re-enactment." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5109.)

Indeed, even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light
of the principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent
the latter is paramount to the former (sec. 288, Act 190). In other words, section 2195 referring
particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21 (a) as to
vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an exception to or
qualification of the latter.4 "Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals
with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if
there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general
statute." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5204)

Needless to say, the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the executive officers
charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts.
Consequently, it is our ruling that when the mayor of a municipality is suspended, absent or temporarily
unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in accordance with sec. 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with the same subject in a more
detailed way, the two shall be harmonized if possible but if there be any conflict the latter will prevail
When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former.

G.R. No. L-43575 May 31, 1935

JUAN TAÑADA, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice,
EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat, Tayabas, respondents.

FACTS:
: Lorenzo Tañada and others invoked the people’s right to be informed and the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, and now filed a writ of mandamus to
order Juan Tuvera and others to publish, and/or cause the publication of presidential issuances, decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation, and
administrative orders in the Official Gazette.
However, the respondents disagree with the order because petitioners do not have any legal personality or
standing, because the writ of mandamus requires aggrieved parties , which require the personalities to be
private individuals, and in which the petitioners are neither.
However, petitioners argue that the unpublished presidential issuances concern public right, they too are
“aggrieved parties”. The respondents further claimed that the publication in the Official Gazette is not
absolutely necessary requirement for the effectivity of laws, but the laws provide their own effectivity
dates.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are persons that can invoke the writ of mandamus in the petition.

RULING: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners because of the clear construction of the
Constitution’s requirement of publishing laws in the Official Gazette and the effectivity date (after 15
days) of laws, unless otherwise provided, most especially because of the use of the word “shall”, in which
it means it is imperative for officers with publishing duties to follow. Further, since the public needs to be
adequately informed of laws and issuances, the “aggrieved party” becomes the public at large, not the
public officers themselves.

G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.

FACTS: On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila: (1) Ordered Tecson and Alto
Surety Insurance Co., Inc., jointly pay and severally PRATRA the sum of ₱7,200.00 plus 7% interest from
May 25, 2960 until fully paid, plus ₱500.00 for attorney’s fees, and plus costs; (2) Ordered Tecson to
indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., on the cross-claim for all the amounts it
would be made to pay in this decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., pay the
amount adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. Tecson is to complete the payment to his co-defendant with
an interest of 12% per annum.

On November 21, 1955, the decision was served. Later on, Price Stabilization Corporation became
National Marketing Corporation. During that case, then-Price Stabilization Corporation served as the
plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment in
said case.

However, 10 years have passed since that case. Defendant Tecson moved to dismiss the complaint in this
immediate case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and its prescription of
action. Defendant Tecson’s motion was adopted because the plaintiffs forgot that the years 1960 and 1964
were leap years; hence, by virtue of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines , the plaintiffs were two
days late for the revival of judgment. In this immediate case, National Marketing Corporation argues that
the judgment was limiting the definition of a “year” because of the statute of limitations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the revival of judgment request of National Marketing Corporation still is within
the period of revival of judgment.
RULING: The court ruled that the revival of judgment request of National Marketing Corporation no
longer is within the period of revival of judgment.

The court explains that the use of “years” in Article 1152 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is the action
of Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Simply put, the Civil Code defines a year to be
composed of 365 years; hence, a leap year lacks 1 day. Thus, the years of 1960 and 1964 were leap years,
rendering the revival of judgment request as outside the period established (of ten years), about two days
(December 19, 1965 was the last day; plaintiffs came back on December 21, 1965).

Furthermore, the court explains, in the point of view of statutory construction, a year is a calendar year.
Meaning, there are 365 or 366 days within a year.

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN
R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

FACTS: R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize profitability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Bureau of Customs. The law intends to encourage officials and employees of both to exceed their
revenue targets through a system of rewards and sanctions, aptly created and named as the Rewards and
Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. Regardless of employment status, the Act
will cover all officials and employees of the BIR.

The petitioners argue the constitutionality of the Act because it is a tax reform legislation. Because of the
establishment of this system of rewards and incentives, the law essentially transformed the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. They further argue that such system invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.

Furthermore, the petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. Meaning, if the President had set an impossible
standard for anyone in the BIR or BOC to reach, by virtue of Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335, BIR and
BOC officials can be dismissed if they fall short of the target by at least 7.5%. Lastly, petitioners question
the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the grounds of violating the doctrine of separation
of powers; there should be no legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

However, respondents argue the merits of the petitioners solely from the lack of any cases or
controversies that arose from the said creation of the system.

ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9335 is unconstitutional.

RULING: The court ruled that parts of R.A. 9335 is constitutional; only the provision on the creation of a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee violates the Constitution. The court justifies this decision from
the strong presumption of constitutionality for laws enacted from the Congress. There should be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. Consequently, the court
explains that the petitioner’s concern that BIR and BOC officials would become “bounty hunters and
mercenaries” lacked factual and legal bases; it is only speculative.

Secondly, the revenue targets are based on the original, estimated revenue collection expected
(respectively of the BIR and BOC) for a given fiscal year, as approved by the DBCC, and stated in the
BESF submitted by the President to the Congress; meaning, it is not just up to the whims of the President;
it is also under scrutiny of the DBCC. In relation to the concern of security of tenure of BIR and BOC
officials, there is still due process and application of other relevant laws to justify the removal of a BIR
and BOC official; thus, the revenue-generation capability optimization of the BIR and BOC is infused
with public interest.

Lastly, since the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee can make approved (by various, relevant
committees and agencies) Implementing Rules and Regulations functus officio and cease to exist, it
essentially allows the joint committee to change any directive from the executive branch, and then
dissolve. Further, the court explains that if there is any provision in any law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violated the
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Simply, if a provision require congress to approve
implementing rules of a law after it had already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision
that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the
executive branch charged with the implementation of the law. Therefore, the particular section that creates
the committee is the only unconstitutional provision in the law.
G.R. No. 167866 October 12, 2006
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, and PEPSICO, INCORPORATED,
petitioners,
vs.
PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, and PEPITO A. LUMAJAN, respondents.

FACTS: The respondents filed a complained against petitioners (Pepsi-Cola for brevity) for sum of
money and damages.

The issue stemmed from the fact that Pepsi-Cola launched a DTI-approved and supervised under-the-
crown promotional campaign entitled “Number Fever” in 1992. They undertook to give away cash prizes
to holders of specially marked crowns and resealable caps of Pepsi-Cola softdrink products. Specially
marked crowns and resealable caps were said to contain a) a three-digit number, b) a seven-digit alpha-
numeric security code, and c) the amount of the cash prize. In doing so, they engaged in the services of a
consultancy firm with experience in handling similar promotion, to randomly pre-select 60 winning three-
digit numbers with their matching security codes out of 1000 three-digit numbers seeded in the market, as
well as the corresponding artworks appearing on a winning crown and/or resealable cap.

On May 1992, Pepsi-Cola announced the notorious three-digit combination “349” as the winning number.
On the same night, they learned of reports that numerous people were trying to redeem “349”
crowns/caps with incorrect security codes “L-2560-FQ” and “L-3560-FQ.” Upon verification from the list
of the 25 pre-selected winning three-digit numbers, Pepsi-Cola and DTI learned that the three-digit
combination “349” was indeed the winning combination but the security codes “L-2560-FQ” and “L-
3560-FQ” do not correspond to that assigned to the winning number “349”. As “goodwill” however,
Pepsi-Cola offered to give the respondents a small sum of money.

Respondents demanded the payment of the corresponding cash prizes, but Pepsi-Cola refused to take
heed. This prompted the respondents to file a collective complaint for sum of money and damages before
the RTC.

RTC dismissed the same for lack of action, holding that the three-digit number must tally with the
corresponding security code, and that it was made clear in the advertisements and posters put up by Pepsi-
Cola that the defendants must acquire both.

After the motion for reconsideration was denied by the same tribunal, they elevated the case to Court of
Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s order. Hence, the appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ARGUMENTS: Pepsi-Cola: In the previous Pepsi/”349″ cases, i.e., Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, and De
Mesa, SC held that both the three-digit number and the security code must be acquired in order for the
person to be entitled to such cash prize. Pepsi-Cola raised this, alleging that the principle of stare decisis
should have been determinative of the outcome of the case at bar.

Respondents: They justified the non-application of stare decises by stating that it is required that the legal
rights and relations of the parties, and the facts, and the applicable laws, the issue, and evidence are
exactly the same. They contended that they are not similar nor identical with the previous cases, and that
their basis of their action is Breach of Contract whereas the Mendoza case involved complains for
Specific Performance.

ISSUE: ISSUE:
Whether Pepsi-Cola is estopped from raising stare decisis as a defense.

RULING:
SC held that the cases of Mendoza (and the other previous Pepsi/”349″ cases), including the case at bar,
arose from the same set of facts concerning the “Number Fever” promo debacle of Pepsi-Cola. Like the
respondents, Mendoza (and the other previous Pepsi/”349″ cases) were also the holders of supposedly-
winning crowns, but were not honored for failing to contain the correct security code assigned to such
winning combination. In those old cases, SC held that the announced mechanics clearly indicated the
need for the authenticated security number in order to prevent tampering or faking crowns; that in those
cases, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the
issues, and the evidence are exactly the same as those preceding cases.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 8. Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines. When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In the
case at bar, therefore, SC had no alternative but to uphold the ruling that the correct security code is an
essential, nay, critical, requirement in order to become entitled to the amount printed on a “349” bearing
crown and/or resealable cap.

The same judicial principle should also prevent respondents from receiving the money as goodwill
compensation, as the respondents rejected the same and that Pepsi-Cola’s offer of small money had long
expired.

The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving
a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does
not require identity of or privity of parties.28 This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the
Civil Code. It is even said that such decisions “assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which
must control the actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound
to enforce obedience thereto.” Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling
reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be
immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
diminished.
G.R. No. 209535 June 15, 2015

TERESITA S. LEE, Petitioner,

vs.
LUI MAN CHONG, Respondent.

FACTS:
On 17 January 2006, Conrado P. Romero died intestate. He left behind properties which included four (4)
parcels of land in Baguio City, and 4,600 shares of Pines Commercial Corporation, a real estate
development corporation. On 23 February 2006, respondent claimed to be Romero’s nephew, executed an
Affidavit of Self-adjudicating, adjudicating to himself, as the sole and exclusive heir of Romero, the
latter’s whole estate. He then provided that the titles were already transferred to his name. On 10 April
2006, petitioner claimed to be Romero’s common-law wife. She filed her petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Conrado K. Romero before the RTC, which was dismissed, but then was
affirmed by this Court. On 25 August 2006, Lee, with a certain Linda Ng-Perido, filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Affidavit of Self-adjudication against Chong before the RTC. Lee claims to own
half of Romero’s estate during their common-law spousing and declared to be the co-owner of Romero’s
properties.

However, the case she filed against Chong was dismissed for the lack of cause of action and legal
personality to file the said case due to her not having any official matrimonial bond with Romero,
disqualifying her as the heir of Romero under Article 887 and 1003 of the Civil Code. Lee filed another
case arguing that since she and Romero ran various businesses together, she is entitled to half of all of
Romero’s 4,600 PCC shares, and a half portion of each parcel of land he owned. Chong moved for
dismissal against the case for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, adding res judicata to
formally invoke the final and executory judgment in the Special proceedings Case and the Annulment
case she filed against him earlier, involving the same properties. Lee then moved for reconsideration
which was denied by the RTC.

RTC explained already that res judicata already set in after the Annulment Case. Then again, Lee moved
for reconsideration, but was denied by the Court of Appeals. Now in the immediate case, Lee argues that
the CA seriously erred in declaring res judicata had set in so as to bar by a prior judgment in the
Annulment Case the present Recovery Case. Further, because res judicata had already set in, justice was
already sacrificed to technicality.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lee can still pursue her Recovery Case despite res judicata already was set in.

RULING: The court ruled that there is no reversible error in the appellate jurisdiction, more so that res
judicata already permanently stopped all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. The court further explains that
res judicata elements were present: judgment sought to bar the new action must be final, the Court of
Appeals having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the disposition or nature of the case
must be a judgment on the merits, and there must be as between the first and second action the identity of
parties (Lee and Chong), subject matter (entitlement to an intestate), and causes of action (recovery of
estate). And since “bar by prior judgment” is applied once the first and second cases satisfies the identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action, res judicata was justifiably used by the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 107846 April 18, 1997

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILINVEST FINANCE CORP., respondents.

FACTS: Leovillo C. Agustin executed a promissory note in favor of ERM Commercial for the amount of
P43,480.80 (ERM). The note was payable in monthly installments and secured by a chattel mortgage
over an Isuzu diesel truck, both of which were subsequently assigned to private respondent Filinvest
Finance Corporation. When petitioner defaulted in paying the installments, private respondent demanded
from him the payment of the entire balance or, in lieuthereof, the possession of the mortgaged vehicle.
Neither payment nor surrender was made.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26 (RTC
Branch 26) against petitioner praying for the issuance of a writ of replevin o Trial ensued and, thereafter,
a writ of replevin was issued by RTC Branch 26. By virtue thereof, private respondent acquired
possession of the vehicle. Upon repossession, the latter discovered that the vehicle was no longer in
running condition and that several parts were missing which private respondent replaced. The vehicle
was then foreclosed and sold at public auction. Petitioner contends that the award of repossession
expenses to private respondent as mortgagee is “contrary to the letter, intent and spirit of Article 1484 of
the Civil Code”. He asserts that private respondent’s repossession expenses have been amply covered by
the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, hence he could no longer be held liable.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner is allowed in a subsequent appeal and in this petition to resuscitate and revive
formerly settled issues by the appellate court.

RULING:
No. The petitioner is not allowed in a subsequent appeal and in this petition to resuscitate and revive
formerly settled issues. The findings of RTC Branch 40, as affirmed by the appellate court, were confined
to the appreciation of evidence relative to the repossession expenses for the query or issue passed upon by
the respondent court has become the “law of the case”.

This principle is defined as "a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a
question and remands the cause to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled
becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal."

Having exactly the same parties and issues, the decision in the former appeal (CA-G.R. No. 56718-R) is
now the established and controlling rule. Petitioner may not therefore be allowed in a subsequent appeal
(CA-G.R. No. 24684) and in this petition to resuscitate and revive formerly settled issues. Judgment of
courts should attain finality at some point in time, as in this case, otherwise, there will be no end to
litigation.

At any rate, even if we were to brush aside the "law of the case" doctrine we find the award for
repossession expenses still proper. In Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation v. Ridad, 17 the Court
recognized an exception to the rule stated under Art. 1484(3) upon which petitioner relies. Thus:

. . . Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the chattel subject of the mortgage upon his failure to
pay two or more installments, or if he conceals the chattel to place it beyond the reach of the mortgagee,
what then is the mortgagee expected to do? . . . It logically follows as a matter of common sense, that the
necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution by the mortgagee of the action for replevin so that he can
regain possession of the chattel, should be borne by the mortgagor. Recoverable expenses would, in our
view, include expenses properly incurred in effecting seizure of the chattel and reasonable attorney's fees
in prosecuting the action for replevin.

Anent the denial of the award for attorney's fees, we find the same in order. The trial court, as well as
respondent court, found no evidence to support the claim for; attorney's fees which factual finding is
binding on us. We find no compelling reason, and none was presented, to set aside this ruling.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.