ARTS. 37, 38, &39
With contractual capacity, one is generally able to perform contracts and
A. JURIDICAL CAPACITY v. CAPACITY TO ACT
Any physical or juridical being susceptible of rights and obligations, or of being the subject
of legal relations
Persons vs. Things
 A person is the subject of legal relations
 A thing is the object of legal relations
A right is the power which a person has to demand from another a prestation or the power
to do or not to do, or to demand something. On the other hand, an obligation is the juridical
necessity to give, to do or not to do. From the viewpoint of another wielding a right, the
debtor or obligor's obligation is the very reason the right exists in the first place; from the
viewpoint of another shouldering an obligation, the creditor or obligee's right is the very
reason why the obligation has to be performed, paid, fulfilled or accomplished.
How are persons classified? Distinguish one from the other.
Persons are classified into natural and juridical persons. The two may be distinguished
from each other as follows:
1. A natural person or human being has physical existence, whereas a juridical
person exists only in contemplation of law;
2. A natural person is the product of procreation, whereas a juridical person is the
product of legal fiction.
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
 Component elements of capacity:
a. Juridical capacity
‒ There are no degrees of juridical capacity. Juridical capacity is the same in
every person. No one has more juridical capacity than others. It is inherent in
natural persons. On the other hand, it arises in artificial persons when such
artificial persons are created.
Juridical capacity is an inherent and ineffaceable attribute of man; it attaches
to him by the mere fact of his being a man and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, on the other hand, is acquired and may be lost. The former
can exist without the latter, but the existence of the latter always implies that
of the former. The union of these two is the full civil capacity. (Sanchez
Roman, 112-113; 1 Vaverde, 212)
b. Capacity to act
‒ Nobody has 100% capacity to act. The law imposes restrictions on capacity
to act. As long as one has contractual capacity (a.k.a. full civil capacity) one
is near 100% capacity to act. ―Full civil capacity‖ is not really 100% but close
to it.
dispose of property.
Nobody has 0% capacity to act. Infants are close to 0% but still have capacity
to act. For example, even fetus has the right to succeed and also have the
right to the integrity of body. Aliens cannot own colleges or broadcast media.
□ DISTINCTIONS BET. JURIDICAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY TO ACT
They may be distinguished from each other as follows:
1. Juridical capacity is inherent in every natural person, and therefore, is not
acquired, whereas capacity to act is not, and therefore, is acquired.
2. Juridical capacity is lost only through death, whereas capacity to act may be lost
through other means or circumstances.
3. Juridical capacity cannot be limited or restricted, whereas capacity to act can be
limited or restricted by certain circumstances.
4. Juridical capacity can exist without capacity to act, but the existence of the latter
always implies that of the former.
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
or from property relations, such as easements.
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act:
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and
in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political
opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil
life, except in cases specified by law
The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit the capacity to act;
 Age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship.
The consequences of these circumstances are governed in the Civil Code, other codes,
the rules of court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |1

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant, v. GERMAN MARAMBA and
GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.
[G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928]
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein
it is alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land
here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased
Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the fundamental
question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question
to the defendants.
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1,
dated July 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document,
yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant
Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on
this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document,
however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason
that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor, which is clearly shown by the record
and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.
What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second
husband Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from
Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the
testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the
land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued
in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to
sign a conveyance of the land.
At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the
requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of
section 50 of Act No. 496, bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration,
inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the
defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to the
property sold as much less, if it is taken into consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y
Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs.
Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the
contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now
before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the
purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used
in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and
her son in 1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no
amount was given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum
of P663.40, which appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking
the P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at
the rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July
31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the
witness Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was
contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she
possesses about half of the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the
record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, without any express findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.
SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners, v. RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
[G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950]
[Suan Chian v. Alcantara 85 Phil 669 case]
PARAS, J.:
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso
Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon
Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao
(husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon
Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly
disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara
executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon
Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw
Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores
from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share
in the two parcels of land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said
action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores, Damaso
Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter two being, respectively, the brother and father
of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the decision of the
trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in
view of his minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to
pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931,
in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the complaint),
and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided one-fourth interest in the lot originally
covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit. From this judgment
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |2
It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August
3, 1931, showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It
is not pretend and there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely
on such recital of fact. This conclusion is decisive and very obvious in the decision of the
Court of Appeals It is true that in the resolution on the for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals remarked that "The fact that when informed of appellant's minority, the appellees
too no steps for nine years to protect their interest beyond requiring the appellant to execute
a ratification of the sale while still a minor, strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his
minority when the deed of sale was executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently
negative by the following positive pronouncements of the Court of Appeals as well in said
resolution as in the decision.
As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the
appellees were informed of his minority within one (1) month after the transaction
was completed. (Resolution.)
Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect
their interest form and after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of
appellant's minority. (Resolution.)
. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that
appellant was a minor, through the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing
appellees of his client's desire to disaffirm the contract . . . (Decision.)
The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the
contract was made, the delay in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to
bar it unless the period fixed by the statute of limitations expired before the filing
of the complaint. . . . (Decision.)
In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the
appellants invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215),
wherein this court held:
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is
valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions
of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to valid
and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the
laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in
consonance therewith. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840,
July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)
The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the appellants
did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any
detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the consideration therefore
was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino Alcantara. We are of the
opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first place, in the case cited, the
consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing obligation. In the second
place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is
not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported
by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for
and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should
produce its full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate
the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on any ground other
than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a contract
executed by parties with full legal capacity.
The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee
informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous
misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated
information merely leads to the inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the
appellee was a minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's
had faith, when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said information than he
ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants the sum of P500.
Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the
real age of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The
suggestion, while perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the
point, because the findings of the Court of Appeals do not show that the appellants knew
or could suspected appellee's minority.
The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee
informing the appellants of his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the sale,
and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the courts
adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shielded the appellee from laches and
consequent estoppel. This position is untenable since the effect of estoppel in proper cases
is unaffected by the promptness with which a notice to disaffirm is made.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants
absolved from the complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So
ordered.
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners, v. FERNANDO F. DE VILLA
ABRILLE, respondent.
[G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959]
BENGZON, J.:
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court
of Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa
Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |3
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30,
1944 P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing
(Exhibit A) to pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation
of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the
Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have
received P40,000 only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that
Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After
hearing the parties and their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the appellate
court affirmed, in the terms above described.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because
the minority of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense
of the minors. However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which
such minors may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the time of
signing Exhibit A, Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively.
However, the Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they
were not yet of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised
him on their incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative to their age,
parted with his money, then he should be contended with the consequence of his act.
But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed
money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the
legal impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant
case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them
or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in
the same promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they
will not be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their
inability. In fact, according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;
. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract
as part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in
tort. Other authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the basis of such an
action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part of, and does not grow
out of, the contract, or that the enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as
tort does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability on the contract. In order to hold
infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not constructure. It has been held
that his mere silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud
which can be made the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the
belief that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant
to disclose his age is not sufficient. (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document
signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained no
such statement. In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active
misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it
is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment in
favor of limiting the scope of the application of the Mercado ruling, what with the
consideration that the very minority which incapacitated from contracting should likewise
exempt them from the results of misrepresentation.
We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be
legally bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed
only in 1951, and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too late
to invoke it because more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become emancipated
upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are
quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed
within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. The parties do not specify the
exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however, that in October 1944, he was 18
years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that in October 1947, he was 21
years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this defense was
interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed from October 1947.
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article
1301 of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the
minors asking for any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in
this case an action for annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse from liability.
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary
responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact
is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they
have profited by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds
delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese
occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to the extent of
the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively established in the so-called
Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of
current Philippine money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should
now return P1,166.67.3 Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A)
can not be enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding
themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently declared without regard of said Exhibit A,
but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |4
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza
shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo
and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the same creditor the total amount of
P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No
costs in this instance.
U.S., plaintiff-appellee, v. EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
[G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472 March 13, 1914]
TRENT, J.:
The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide,
in one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to
the payment of the costs in each case. From this judgment he appealed. The two cases
have been submitted to this court together.
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the
manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these
crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced
in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent
to the commission of the crimes. they also testified that he had been complaining of pains
in his head and stomach prior to the killing.
Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the
prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he
refused into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by
the appellant; that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who were cut by
him;" that he did not know of any disagreement between the appellant and the two
deceased; that on the morning before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his
head and stomach." The witness further stated that the appellant's "eyes were very big and
red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that
"according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy
he would not have killed his family — his wife and child."
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin capture
the appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt pains in
the head and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting those people " he looked
like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any
attention to who it was."
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and
stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked very
sad at the time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he must
have been crazy because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant,
testified that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his
head is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something
he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say
anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that
about every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you
to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found
that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds
on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side
to the other." The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the
jail and that he did not notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice
whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.
There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into
such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does.
Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An
extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts
crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not
synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot,"
or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness testified that "according to my
own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have
killed his family." That witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of
some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing. Another
witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because he would cut everybody at
random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all unnatural for a murderer,
caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously
at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy
because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the word
"crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner
is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse which
would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant might be
sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you
doing to me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could not be sufficient to show that the
person was insane at the time the deeds were committed.
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an
assault with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which
would involved no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this decision distinguished
between passion and insanity as follows:
But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law
may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal
responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |5
 are bound to control their tempers and restrain their persons, and are liable to the law
if they do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as to make them
reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to keep them from
mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint in season. There would be no
safety for society if people could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then to
desperate acts of violence. That condition which springs from undisciplined and
unbridled passion is clearly within legal as well as moral censure and punishment.
(People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.)
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued with
an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of
anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such
conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are
occasioned by just such motives as these.' "
The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the subject
of anger and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following concise
statement:
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that mere
mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of
mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally
sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its
influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental
depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind.
In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was convicted
of the crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any question as
to the actual commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused committed
them, confined himself to the statement, in behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime
the defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind and that in one of his paroxysms he
committed the said acts, wounding his wife and the other members of her family, without
any motives whatever. In the decision in that case this court stated:
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a
few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was
in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously,
in order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition,
unless his insanity and absence of will are proven.
Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal
actions, we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265):
But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the
accused is sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact.
(State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and nothing more appears, this
presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support a
conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged "beyond a
reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof. This presumption
however may be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the accused that the criminal
intent did not exist at the time the act was committed. This being exceptional is a
defense, and like other defenses must be made out by the party claiming the benefit of
it. "The positive existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a
dispensation to the prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to be proved
as it s affirmed by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.)
What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient merely
to allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a denial, and
ineffectual without proof. In order to make not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient
proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the presumption of sanity and then
any other proof that may be offered.
In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of
passion or revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control
the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of
insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made
affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense
was the direct consequences of his insanity.
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an
enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind
at the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been
proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed
from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. POLICARPIO RAFANAN,
JR., defendant-appellant.
[G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991]
FELICIANO, J.:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral
damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |6
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya
who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the
accused, Ines Rafanan alias "Baket Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at
Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two
children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother
of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6)
meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as
the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store
and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not like,"
and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet
including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with
said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed
her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainant
and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After
the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to
her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave
the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused
that evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine
work in the house. She only left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what
happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel
ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's
mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant
could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976
that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing
what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied
her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in
Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the
complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch
the accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit
"E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant.
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and
in due course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the
testimony of the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution,
"Exhibits B and C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the
mental condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was
suffering from insanity.
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose
testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of
complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident,
is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in
the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that she left the house
of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that she
(the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on
cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential
details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and
therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the complainant.
The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of
complainant in this respect is clear and convincing:
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the
door and brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the
accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then?
A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.
Q And what did you say?
A "I do not like," I said.
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse
with him?
A I struggled and cried.
Q What did the accused do after that?
A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he
wanted to do. He was able to do what he wanted to do.
Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please
demonstrate, if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
xxx xxx xxx
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |7
Fiscal Guillermo: A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he A Around five minutes maybe, sir.
placed the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the Q After that what happened then?
accused do immediately after placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual A He removed it.
intercourse you? Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
A He had sexual intercourse with me. A No more, sir, he sat down.
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening? Q What, if any, did he tell you?
A I was wearing pants, sir. A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my mother and to anybody in their
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear? house.
A Yes, sir, I have a panty. Q What else did he tell you?
Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
respect to your pants and your panty? Q After that where did you go?
A He removed them, sir. A I went home already, sir.
Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?
A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration
why he succeeded. characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened? urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at
A He went on top of me, sir. the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel? meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29
A He was wearing pants. December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty,
was he still wearing his pants? During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants. physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened? Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
A I saw his penis.
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis
which you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's
do, if any? mental condition were set forth:
A I struggled.
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up
accused when he was on top of you? whenever questioned but refused to answer.
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled
xxx xxx xxx hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was
indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to
COURT: Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get? verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He
is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on
when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he
Fiscal Guillermo: claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is
disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought here.
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to
ask a leading question which is a follow-up question? The report then concluded:
Witness:
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina. In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Fiscal Guillermo: Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any? carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce],

PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |8

smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility,
seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing
strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further
hospitalization and treatment. 5
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's
mental condition:
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is
dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by
himself and would show periods of being irritable saying — "oki naman" with nobody in
particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not
know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed any wrong
act and the following conclusions:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa
is at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing
nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response,
dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment. 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become
"better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in
touch with his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the
preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed
with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups. During this
period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and
as freely with other members of the household and slept well, although, occasionally,
appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small
children, talking in a language he could not understand. The report concluded by saying
that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position to
stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-ups.
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in
household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed"
and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in
a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested
that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect
implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped
complainant. The defense next presented Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in
private practice, who testified that she had examined and treated the appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in
People vs. Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal
insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the
Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason,
it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should
absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of
his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with]
imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence
that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to
conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the
basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 |9
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A
linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established
two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition — "or that there be
a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the
test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our
caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the
sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an
accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since
a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable
by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where
the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has
recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article
13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said
to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops between the ages 15 and
30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of schizophrenia
in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a
disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler
also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from
reality and consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain
affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as the
four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he
considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a
diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken
aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic
hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's
thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or
influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of
second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank
symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric
disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli
are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the
hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient,
discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on
what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are threatening or obscene and very
disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own
thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by
hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic
patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses
experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day, but
schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the night,
sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in
schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three
dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory
modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning,
and that are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They
are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid
type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious
power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for
schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and for
many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up
with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that
take control over his mind and body. Also typical for many schizophrenics are delusional
fantasies about the destruction of the world.
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15
it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented
tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was
not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as
follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 10
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor
that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with
the incident in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the
time of the commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will
place his penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which
you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is
committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the
act is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an
insane and a normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning and
consciousness within the standard of society while an insane causes (sic) already devoid
of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his
acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused
here is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform
all the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong
but yet there is no inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going
to commit is wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition.
The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is
[not]
there.
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the
time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical
if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened
complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him,
indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral
quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last two (2)
answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of
the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not believe that
Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition.
In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown
if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of
proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and
convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual
assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. 18
Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr.
Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that
critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or
immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements
based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously,
while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant during his
confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not
exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his
acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power
without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have
been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it would not have affected the
penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount
of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee, v. JUAN CODINA
ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants; VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.
[G.R. No. L-5921 July 25, 1911].
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals,
and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties,
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 11
assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil
Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months from date, with interest at
P1 per month.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five debtors for
payment of the P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per
month from the 15th of December, 1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was served on
Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17, 1909.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and
were so notified, the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76,
together with the interest thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until
complete payment should have been made of the principal, and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of
Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was
declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she was
appointed his guardian by the same court; (3) that, on October 11, following, she was
authorized by the court, as guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings for the
annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity, among them
that concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New
York; (4) that she, the guardian, was not aware of the proceedings had against her husband
and was only by chance informed thereof; (5) that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the
bond, the subject of this suit, he was already permanently insane, was in that state when
summoned and still continued so, for which reason he neither appeared nor defended
himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve the said
defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered against him
in the suit before mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf
of the said defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond
in question, which evidence could not be presented in due season on account of the then
existing incapacity of the defendant.
The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of evidence,
after due consideration of which, when taken, the court decided that when Vicente
Villanueva, on the 15th of December, 1908, executed the bond in question, he understood
perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and that the
consent that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and, consequently,
valid and efficacious. As a result of such findings the court ruled that the petition for an
indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered in the case be denied and that the
said execution be carried out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with
reference to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of exceptions
was presented in support of the appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a
single assignment of error as follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the
defendant Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one
herein concerned.
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal doctrine
which supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply
the result that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract
of bond like the one here in question.
This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the lower court.
It would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted
a veritable mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant
Villanueva was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that
is, that there was not, nor could there have been any other cause for the contract than an
ostentation of wealth and this purely an effect of monomania of wealth; and that the
monomania existed on the date when the bond in question was executed.
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch
of medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility, some of them,
as Casper, going so far into a wealth of classification and details as to admit the existence
of 60 to 80 distinct states, an enumeration of which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion
and the doubt in the minds of the majority of the authors of treatises on the subject in
determining the limits of sane judgment and the point of beginning of this incapacity, there
being some who consider as a sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity and
imbecility, but even those other chronic diseases or complaints that momentarily perturb
or cloud the intelligence, as mere monomania, somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness,
suggestion, anger, and the divers passional states which more or less violently deprive the
human will of necessary liberty." (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p.
342.) In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation such certainly has not yet
been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who suffers the
monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is really insane
and it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under the
influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous
contract .The bond, as aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15,
1908, and his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared
until July 24, 1909.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several years
suffered from such monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-legal doctrine
above cited, that a person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere
illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself
in a contract. Specifically, in reference to this case, the following facts were brought out in
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 12
the testimony given by the physicians, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de
Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant, the first of whom had visited him some eight times
during the years 1902 and 1903, and the latter, only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns his
houses and if you should direct him to read it, do you believe that he would
understand the contents of the document?
A. As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see nothing
particularly remarkable; but afterwards, to decide upon the question involved, it
might be that he could not do that; it depends upon what the question was.
Dr. Ocampo:
Q. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those
concerning greatness?
A. Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of greatness
and wealth.
Q. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he not?
A. Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he can, I
have made no trial.
Q. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the exception of this
monomania of greatness and wealth?
A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.
Q. He knows how to read and write, does he not?
A. Yes, sir I believe that he does.
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he had prepared the
instrument of bond and received the statements of the signers; that he explained to Mr.
Villanueva its contents and when the witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign it
he replied that he was willing and did in fact do so; that the defendant's mental condition
appeared to the witness to be normal and regular and that he observed nothing to indicate
the contrary; and that the defendant was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary
way without giving cause fir any suspicion that there was anything abnormal.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in the Court
of First Instance, over which he presided, the case concerning the estate of the Chinaman
Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness
asked him some questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether he was solvent
and would be adequate surety, and that Villanueva testified the same as many, others had
done, and witness did not notice any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental
faculties; that he answered the questions concerning the property that he held, stated its
value, specified the place where it was situated, his answers being precisely relevant to
the matter treated; that he therefore approved the bond; and that all this took place between
July and September, 1908. This witness having been asked, on cross-examination,
whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the date mentioned, had again been surety in any
other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr. Villanueva should engage
in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond, replied that it was
in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored
to investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had given any
other previous bond, and the discovered that he had in fact previously given bond in a
criminal case, but that, as it had already been cancelled, he had no objection to accepting
the one offered by Mr. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be
not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out
his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a
consideration to substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not be
expressed in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor
proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract of bond the consideration,
general, is no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the liberality of the
benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the ordinary, a bond may be given for some other
consideration, according to the agreement and the free stipulation of the parties and may
be, as in onerous and remuneratory contracts, something remunerative stipulated as an
equivalent, on the part of the beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members
of the firm of Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testified that he had
never had dealings with Villanueva; from which it is inferred that the latter could hardly
have been moved to favor the former by the benefit of an assumed obligation to pay him
some three thousand pesos, with monthly interest .But he added that Arenas & Co.
obtained an agent to look for sureties for them, to whom Arenas paid a certain sum of
money. The witness did not know, however, whether Arenas gave the money for the
signature of the bond or simply in order that the agent might find sureties. The fact is that
the sureties came with the agent and signed the bond.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his dealings
with Arenas, a note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva, on the 13th of
May, 1909, that is, two days before Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting him
to a conference "for the purpose of treating of a matter of great importance of much
interest to Villanueva, between 5 and 6 of that same day, in the garden and on the benches
which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel, on Calle Palacio, corner of Calle Victoria, and if
rained, in the bar on the corner." It can not be affirmed with certainty (the trial court
considers it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the business of giving bonds for a certain
consideration or remuneration; but neither can it be sustained that there was no other
cause for the giving of the bond in question than the mental disorder that dominated the
intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his believing himself so oversupplied with
money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. There is no proof that the
said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if
Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein concerned,
he was influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that, granting that
he was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond now
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 13
under discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary
or insanity, it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be more or less capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
probability that a person was in a state of dementia at a given time, if there is not direct
proof that, at the date of the performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
want of capacity on the part of the executor, the latter was insane or demented, in other the appellant. So ordered.
words, that he could not, in the performance of that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary,
deliberate and intentional consent. The witness who as physicians testified as to
extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct, referred, two of them, to a time prior to CHAPTER 2
1903, and another of them to the year 1908, but none to December 15, 1908, the date of NATURAL PERSONS
the execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. the testimony of one of these witnesses
shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored, in 1908, to have her husband confined in Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein, objection was made by the director of the born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
institution who advised her that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old conditions specified in the following article.
men, as soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked
up in the insane ward; to which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL PERSONALITY. Article 5 of PD #603, “Child and youth
insane enough to be placed among the insane." This same lady, testifying as a witness in welfare code,” amended article 40 of civil code
this case, stated: that no restrictions had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to
go wherever he wished and do what he liked; that her husband had property of his own
and was not deprived of its management; that he went out every morning without her a. Natural persons - refer to individuals or human beings.
knowing where he went; that she did not know whether he had engaged in the business of
signing bonds, and that, with reference to the one now concerned, she had learned of it Birth is what determines legal personality. For natural persons, juridical capacity is inherent
only by finding to note, before mentioned, wherein Arenas invited him to a rendezvous on because it is a function of being born alive. Simplified, that moment when newly born babies
the benches in front of the Delmonico Hotel; that she had not endeavored legally to deprive are born alive, they have juridical capacity.
him of the management of his own real estate which had been inherited by him, although
he did not attend to the collection of the rents and the payment of the land tax, all this being
Notwithstanding the immediately preceding paragraph, a conceived child is already
done by her, and she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the family and to all
considered born "for all purposes that are favorable to it' subject to it being born and to the
their needs. Finally, and with direct reference to the point under discussion, she was asked:
law on fetus under Article 41. This gains relevance in succession cases where a fetus or a
newly-born baby receives inheritance even if it were to die a few hours later. This will
Q. It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he used to go out of the produce a different set of legal effects as to who will then inherit after the death.
house and was on the streets nearly every day? to which she replied:
A. He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He goes to the markets, and
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it
buys provisions and other things. In fact I don't know where he goes go.
is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-
Q. From his actions toward others, did he show any indication of not being sane
uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
when he was on the street, according to your opinion?
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
A. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very strange that
this should have occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there are many people
who can testify in regard to this particular. 1. Law on tetus; For civil purposes. General rule: I he fetus is considered born "if it
is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb."
2. Same:Exception: "[I]f the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months,
The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when he went to the
it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
market, would return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions, and when
from the maternal womb."
she was asked by the judge whether he was a man of frugal habits, she replied that, as far
3. Phrase. The phrase "[f]or civil purposes" is important as this legal provision is not
as she knew, he had never squandered any large sum of money; that he had never been
applicable to, and cannot serve as the basis for, criminal cases e.g. infanticide,
engaged in business; that he supported himself on what she gave him; and that if he had
abortion, etc.
something to count on for his living, it was the product of his lands.
4. 1987 Constitution; Protection for unborn. Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution
provides:"[The State] shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it is unborn from conception."
very evident that it cannot be concluded therefrom that, on December 15, 1908, when

PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 14

 a. Same: Same; Case Law. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. (Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Montaño, G.R. No. 182836, October 13,
2009)
5. Being alive and being born are two different concepts. That a fetus is alive in the
womb does not necessarily mean that it has legal personality because only its
birth will grant him such. Per Article 40, birth determines personality.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law,
by contract and by will.
1. Only natural persons die or meet their death. Juridical persons do not die; rather,
they are abolished (for public corporations, institutions, or entities) or
closed/dissolved (for private corporations, partnerships, or associations).
2. Definition. "[D]eath has been defined as the cessation of life." (Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Montaño, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009,
citing Black's Law Dictionary)
a. Same; Case Law. "Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life... If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death..." (ibid.)
Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to
the other.
1. This article provides for a rule and a presumption.
2. Rule on succession.
a. Between two or more persons called to succeed each other. "If there is a
doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior
to the other, shall prove the same." (Article 43, Civil Code)
3. Presumption on succession.
a. For those who are called to succeed each other and who died first is
uncertain, "in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same
time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another.
GELUZ v CA
[2 S 801 (1961)]
FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present
husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her
parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant.
After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient,
she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later,
she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latter’s daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant’s clinic on Carriedo
and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos,
Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning
for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff’s basis in filing this action
and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
ISSUE: Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?
HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According
to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a
personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before
the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account
of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action
for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it
received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an
unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the
appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be
recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further
investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have
taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more
concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.
Quimiguing vs Icao
[34 SCRA 132]
FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors
in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force
and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite
drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 15
claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboangadel Norte on the ground lack of cause of action.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth
to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original
complaint averred no cause of action”.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD: Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law
a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were
already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation
of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus,
she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
De Jesus v. Syquia
[G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933]
Facts: Antonia Loanco was hired as cashier in the barbershop of Vicente Mendoza, Cesar
Syquia’s brother-in-law. Cesar then courted Antonia, and the latter became pregnant with
a baby boy who was born on June 17, 1931. During Antonia’s pregnancy, Cesar was
always visiting her. On February 1931, he wrote a letter to the priest who was to christen
the baby boy, saying;
Rev. Father, The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
He wrote this on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan. While he was
abroad, Cesar wrote several letters to Antonia Loanco, showing paternal interest in the
situation and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that junior might be strong.
The baby boy, however, was not named Cesar Syquia, Jr., but Ismael Loanco. After giving
birth, Cesar took Antonia to a house in Manila, and they lived together for about a year in
regular family style. Cesar paid for all the household expenses during their living together.
Then Antonia became pregnant for the second time. However, Cesar got married to
another woman.
The purpose of the petition filed by Antonia and her mother is to recover from Cesar
Php30,000 as damages for the breach of promise to marry, to compel Syquia to recognize
Ismael and Pacita (Antonia’s second child) as natural children, and to make him pay for
the maintenance of the children worth Php500 per month.
Issues:
1. Is the note to the priest a proof of acknowledgment of paternity within the meaning of
Article 135 (1) of the (Old) Civil Code?
2. Does the acknowledgment referred to in Article 135 of the Old Civil Code need to be
made in a single document?
3. Can Antonia be granted payment for damages because of breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Article 135 (1) states;
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the
following cases:
When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity,
is in existence
A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of
being dealt with as a living person. The problem of the recognition of the child even
before he was born is no different from that when he is already born. The words
used by Syquia in his letter are not capable of two constructions, and the identity
of the baby was clear.
2. No. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one or
any particular individual. The only requirement is that the writing should be indubitable.
Thus, the many letters Cesar Syquia wrote may be made proof to his acknowledgment
of Ismael Loanco.
3. No. Such promise to marry was not satisfactorily proved and the action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in civil law apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
Continental Steel v. Montano
[G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009]
FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the CBA. The claim was for Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 16
premature delivery while she was on her 38 th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died
during the labor. The company granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the provision in
CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must
have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not
contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed
that there are two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of
legitimate dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s case. They further contend that
the only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence,
according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the
fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N only one with juridical personality can die.
2. W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
HELD:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for
the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide
at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes
the life of the unborn from conception.
2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not
reached 38-39 weeks without depending upon its mother.
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner, v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O.
FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
[G.R. No. L--770 April 27, 1948]
FACTS: Pedro O. Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install,
maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The Public Service Commission
approved the application and held that evidence showed that the public interest and
convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by the authorization of the
operation of another ice--plant, that Pedro Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his
death and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service. The commission ordered that a certificate of public convenience be issued to the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante.
Petitioner contends that the commission erred in allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a “person”.
HELD: Yes. The SC cited the SC of Indiana which held that “The estate of the decedent is
a person in legal contemplation. The word “person” in its legal signification, is a generic
term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons.” It said in another work that ‘persons
are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons
include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation;; (2) a
collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties.
The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.”
Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to
be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction
were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the
executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased.
The underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the
deceased person is considered a “person” is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal
obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Moreover, the citizenship of Fragrante is also extended. The fiction of such extension of
his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason,
as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the
injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the
loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant,
not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public
Service Commission of this Court.
Dumlao v. Quality Plastics
[GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976]
FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering
defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality
Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its
decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.
Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares,
was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he
has given as security under the bond.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 17
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was
not aware on Oria’s death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served
on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed
in his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs
in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873).
Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the
ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was
already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos’ agreed in their stipulation that
indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s death and that they acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent
nullity. Lower court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical
capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against
Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorney’s fees against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil
Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution
sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
[GR NO. 88211, September 15, 1989]
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed,
has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise
and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his
family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening
events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a
Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
8. accumulated foreign debt
9. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue
them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision
to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar
his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision
was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also
claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property
without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them
of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only
be impaired by a court order.
ISSUES: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
HELD: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.Separation of power dictates that each
department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article
it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing
power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the
constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has
residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote
their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which
is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the
State.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 18
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty
of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
CHAPTER 3
JURIDICAL PERSONS
Arts. 44-47
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of
each shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
A juridical person is an organic unit resulting from a group of persons or mass or property
to which the state grants or recognizes personality and capacity to hold patrimonial rights
independent of those of component members
The juridical personality of political subdivisions and public corporations (i.e., GSIS, SSS)
commences when the law creating them becomes effective.
The juridical personality of a private corporation commences upon incorporation with the
SEC.
The juridical personality of a partnership commences upon the meeting of the minds of the
parties.
Although the Catholic Church is not one of those mentioned in Article 44, it is still
considered as a juridical person in Barlin vs. Ramirez because of tradition.
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are
governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. (38a)
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for
public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other
assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If
nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be
applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or
municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal
benefits from the same.
Barlin v Ramirez
[GR L-2832, Nov 24, 1906]
SYLLABUS
1. CHURCH BUILDINGS; POSSESSION; ADMINISTRATION; ESTOPPEL. — In an action
brought by the Roman Catholic Church to recover a church building, against a priest whom
it has put in possession thereof to administer the same, the latter is estopped from alleging
ownership at the time he took possession either in himself or in a third person.
2. ID.; ID.; EJECTMENT; RECOVERY OF POSSESSION. — Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron
(6 Phil. Rep., 286), followed to the point that a person in possession of real estate who has
been derived of such possession can recover it unless the defendants can show a better
right thereto.
3. ID.; TRANSFER TO MUNICIPALITIES BY GOVERNMENT. — The Government of the
Philippine Island has never undertaken to transfer to the municipalities the ownership or
right of possession of the churches therein.
4. ID.; OWNERSHIP; POSSESSION. — Prior to the cession of the Philippines to the United
State the King of Spain was not the owner of the consecrated churches therein and had no
right to the possession thereof. The exclusive right to such possession was in the Roman
Catholic Church and such right has continued since cession and now exists.
5. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. — The Roman Catholic Church is a judicial person in
the Philippine Islands.
PER CARSON, J., concurring in the result:
6. CHURCH BUILDINGS; OWNERSHIP. — The legal title to the State-constructed
churches in the Philippine Island is in the United States.
7. ID.; USUFRUCT. — The beneficial ownership of these churches is in the people of the
Philippine Islands.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 19
8. ID.; POSSESSION AND CONTROL. — The right to the possession and control of these
churches is in the Roman Catholic Church so long as it continues to use them for the
purposes for which they were dedicated.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the
Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and
convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that
this was done by the order of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for this
reconstruction was performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de
barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in the pueblo was required to work for
the government, without compensation, for forty days every year. The time spent in the
reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the forty days. The material
necessary was brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from the funds of the church
and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the completion of the
church it was always administered, until November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman
Catholic Communion and all the people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to
that church.
The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took
possession of the church on the 5th of July, 1901. he administered it as such under the
orders of his superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been
then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the
church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and
other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document of that date, refused to
make such delivery. That document is as follows:
"At 7 o’clock last night I received through Father Agripino Pisino your respected order of
the 12th instant, wherein I am advised of the appointment of Father Pisino as acting parish
priest of this town, and directed to turn over to him this parish and to report to you at the
vicarage. In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you that the town of Lagonoy, in
conjunction with the parish priest thereof, has seen fit to sever connection with the Pope at
Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and join the Filipino Church, the head of
which is at Manila. This resolution of the people was reduced to writing and triplicate copies
made, of which I beg to inclose a copy herewith.
"For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable to obey your said order by delivering
to Father Agripino Pisino the parish property of Lagonoy which, as I understand, is now
outside of the control of the Pope and his representatives in these Islands. May God guard
you many years.
"Lagonoy, November 14, 1902.
(Signed) "VICENTE RAMIREZ.
"RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT."cralaw virtua1aw library
The document, a copy of which is referred to in this letter, is as follows:
"LAGONOY, November, 9, 1902.
"The municipality of this town and some of its most prominent citizens having learned
through the papers from the capital of these Islands of the constitution of the Filipino
National Church, separate from the control of the Pope at Rome by reason of the fact that
the latter has refused to either recognize or grant the rights to the Filipino clergy which
have many times been urged, and it appearing to us that the reasons advanced why such
offices should be given to the Filipino clergy are evidently well-founded, we have deemed
it advisable to consult with the parish priest of this town as to whether it would be
advantageous to join the said Filipino Church and to separate from the control of the Pope
as long as he continues to ignore the rights of the said Filipino clergy, under the conditions
that there will be no change in the articles of faith, and that the sacraments and other
dogmas will be recognized and particularly that of the immaculate conception of the mother
of our Lord. But the moment the Pope at Rome recognizes and grants the rights heretofore
denied to the Filipino clergy we will return to his control. In view of this, and subject to this
condition, the reverend parish priest, together with the people of the town, unanimously
join in declaring that from this date they separate themselves from the obedience and
control of the Pope and join the Filipino National Church. This assembly and the reverend
parish priest have accordingly adopted this resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to
send a copy thereof to the civil government of this province for its information, and do sign
the same below. Vicente Ramirez, Francisco Israel, Ambrosio Bocon, Florentino Relloso,
Macario P. Ledesma, Cecilio Obias, Balbino Imperial, Juan Preseñada, Fernando Deudor,
Mauricio Torres, Adriano Sabater."
At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this document was adopted, there were
present about 100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that the population
of the pueblo was at that time 9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants were satisfied
with the action there taken. Although it is of no importance in the case, we are inclined to
think that the testimony to this effect merely means that about 100 of the principal men of
the town were in favor of the resolution and about 20 of such principal men were opposed
to it. After the 14th of November, the defendant, Ramirez, continued in the possession of
the church and other property and administered the same under the directions of his
superior, the Obispo Maximo of the Independent Filipino Church. The rites and ceremonies
and the manner of worship were the same after the 14th day of November as they were
before, but the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the defendant had been
entirely severed.
In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, Ramirez, alleging
in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church
building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging thereto,
and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an
account of the property which he had received and which was retained by him, and for
other relief.
The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial of the allegation of
the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property
described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of
the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property. After this answer had been
presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a
petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case and join with the defendant,
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 20
Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day
of December filed an answer in which it alleged that the defendant, Ramirez, was in
possession of the property described in the complaint under the authority and with the
consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the owner thereof.
Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the case was tried and
final judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The
defendants then brought the case here by a bill of exceptions.
That the person in the actual possession of the church and other property described in the
complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is plainly established by the evidence. It does not
appear that the municipality, as a corporate body, ever took any action in reference to this
matter until they presented their petition for intervention in this case. In fact, the witnesses
for the defense, when they speak of the ownership of the buildings, say that they are owned
by the people of the pueblo, and one witness, the president, said that the municipality as a
corporation had nothing whatever to do with the matter. That the resolution adopted on the
14th of November, and which has been quoted above, was not the action of the
municipality, as such, is apparent from an inspection thereof.
The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of the church by the people of the
pueblo to the defendant, Ramirez, but there is no evidence in the case of any such delivery.
Their testimony in regard to the delivery always refers to the action taken on the 14th of
November, a record of which appears that in the document above quoted. It is apparent
that the action taken consisted simply in separating themselves from the Roman Catholic
Church, and nothing is said therein in reference to the material property then in possession
of the defendant, Ramirez.
There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be affirmed.
(1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took possession of the property as the
servant or agent of the plaintiff. The only right which he had to the possession at the time
he took it, was the right which was given to him by the plaintiff, and he took possession
under the agreement to return that possession whenever it should be demanded of him.
Under such circumstances he will not be allowed, when the return of such possession is
demanded by him the plaintiff, to say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and
is not entitled to have it delivered back to him. The principle of law that a tenant can not
deny his landlord’s title, which is found in section 333, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is applicable to a case of this kind. An answer of
the defendant, Ramirez, in which he alleged that he himself was the owner of the property
at the time he received it from the plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo was the
owner of the property at that time, would constitute no defense. There is no claim made by
him that since the delivery of the possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has
acquired the title thereto by other means, nor does he is own behalf make any claim
whatever either to the property or to the possession thereof.
(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer, claims as such, to be the owner of the
property. As we have said before, the evidence shows that it never was in the physical
possession of the property. But waiving this point and assuming that the possession of
Ramirez, which he alleges in his answer is the possession of the municipality, gives the
municipality the rights of a possessor, the question still arises, Who has the better right to
the present possession of the property? The plaintiff, in 1902, had been in the lawful
possession thereof for more than thirty years and during all that time its possession had
never been questioned or disturbed. That possession has been taken away from it and it
has the right now to recover the possession from the persons who have so deprived it of
such possession, unless the latter can show that they have a better right thereto. This was
the preposition which was discussed and settled in the case of Bishop of Cebu v.
Mangaron, 1 No. 1748, decided June 1, 1906. That decision holds that as against one who
has been in possession for the length of the plaintiff has been in possession, and who had
been deprived of his possession, and who can not produce any written evidence of title,
the mere fact that the defendant is in possession does not entitle the defendant to retain
that possession. In order that he may continue in possession, he must show a better right
thereto.
The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality has, as such, any right of
whatever in the property in question. It has produced no evidence of ownership. Its claim
of ownership is rested in its brief in this court upon the following propositions: That the
property in question belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the Spanish Government; that
by the treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the Government of the United States;
that by section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property was transferred to
the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that by the circular of that Government,
dated November 11, 1902, the ownership and the right to the possession of this property
passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If, for the purposes of the argument, we should
admit that the other propositions are true, there is no evidence whatever to support the last
proposition, namely that the Government of the Philippine Islands has transferred the
ownership of this church to the municipality of Lagonoy. We have found no circular of the
date above referred to. The one of February 10, 1903, which is probably the one intended,
contains nothing that indicates any such transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy,
therefore, it is very clear that it has neither title, ownership, nor right of possession.
(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership ever admitting that the
Spanish Government was the owner of the property and it has passed by the treaty of Paris
to the American Government. But this assumption is not true. As a matter of law, the
Spanish Government at the time the treaty of peace was signed, was not the owner of this
property, nor of any other property like it, situated in the Philippine Islands.
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parish churches in the Philippine
Islands were built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of
the Laws of the Indies is, in part, as follows:
"Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parish houses of the Spaniards and
natives of our Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost and expense of our royal
treasury, and applied for their service and maintenance the part of the tithes belonging to
us by apostolic concession according to the division we have made."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial churches such as the one in
question. That law is as follows:
"The parish churches which was erected in Spanish towns shall be of durable and decent
construction. Their costs shall be divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal treasury,
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 21
another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the place where such churches are
constructed, and the other part by the Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a
city, village, or place there should be any Indians incorporated to our royal crown, we
command that for our part there be contributed the same amount as the residents and
encomenderos, respectively, contribute; and the residents who have no Indians shall also
contribute for this purpose in accordance with their stations and wealth, and that which is
so given shall be deducted from the share of the Indians should pay."
Law 11 of the same title is as follows:
"We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the fund for the erection of
churches shall be given to their superintendents to be expended for those things necessary
for these churches with the advice of the prelates and officials, and by their warrants, and
not otherwise. And we request and charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in
the collection and disbursement thereof, but to guard these structures."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:
"In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shall be erected a church where
mass can be decently held, and it shall have a donor with a key, notwithstanding the fact
that it be the subject to or separate from a parish."
Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by the King and under his
direction, but it was made unlawful to erect a church without the license of the King. This
provision is contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows:
"Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, and maintain all cathedrals, parish
churches, monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious and pious establishments
where they are necessary for the teaching, propagation, and preaching of the doctrine of
our sacred Roman Catholic faith, and to aid to this effect without royal treasury whenever
possible, and to receive information of such places where they should be founded and are
necessary, and the ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies belonging to us:
"We command that there shall not be erected, instituted, founded, or maintained
any cathedral, parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive churches, or other pious
or religious establishment without our express permission as is provided in Law 1,
title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book, notwithstanding any permission heretofore
given by our viceroy or other ministers, which in this respect we revoke and make
null, void, and of no effect."
By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown of Spain, all tithes in the
Indies were given by the former to the latter and the disposition made the King of the fund
thus created is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which is as follows:
"Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us by the apostolic
concessions of the supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our royal treasury
of those provinces to collect and cause to be collected all tithes due and to become
due from the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in which it has been
the custom to pay the same, and from these tithes the churches shall be provided
with competent persons of good character to serve them and with all ornaments
and things which may be necessary for divine worship, to the end that these
churches may be well served and equipped, and we shall be informed of God, our
Lord; this order shall be observed where the contrary has not already been directed
by us in connection with the erection of churches."
That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the Indies was continued to
the present time is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January, 1856, and by the
royal order of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the construction and repair of
churches, there being authority for saying that the latter order was in force in the
Philippines.
This church, and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines, having been erected
by the Spanish Government, and under its direction, the next question to be considered is,
To whom did these churches belong?
Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of things and, after discussing what
can be called public property and what can be called private property, speaks, in Law 12,
of those things which are sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as follows:
Law XII. — HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT BE OWNED BY ANY
PERSON.
"No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the
subject of ownership by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his
property holdings. Although the priests may have such things in their possession,
yet they are not the owners thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians or servants,
or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or without them. Hence
they were allowed to take from the revenues of the church and lands what was
reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging to God, was to be
devoted to pious purposes, such as the feeding and clothing of the poor, the support
of orphans, the marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women
because of their poverty, and for the redemption of captives and the repairing of the
churches, and the buying of chalices, clothing, books, and others things which they
might be in need of, and other similar charitable purposes."
And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in to which this law has divided
these things, it defines in Law 13, title 28, third partida, consecrated things. That law is as
follows:
"Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by the bishops, such as
churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all
other things which are intended for the service of the church, and the title to these
things cannot be alienated except in certain specific cases as we have already
shown in the first partida of this book by the laws dealing with this subject. We say
further that even where a consecrated church is razed, the ground upon which it
formerly stood shall always be consecrated ground. But if any consecrated church
should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it shall there and then cease
to be sacred as long as the enemy has it under control, although once recovered
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 22
 by the Christians, it will again become sacred, reverting to its condition before the
enemy seized it and shall have all the right and privileges formerly belonging to it."
That the principles of the partida in reference to churches still exist is indicated by Sanchez
Roman, whose work on the Civil Law contains the following statement:
"First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical. A. Spiritual. — From early times
distinction has been made by authors and by law between things governed by divine law,
called divine, and those governed by human law, called human, and although the former
cannot be the subject of civil juridical relations, their nature and species should be
ascertained either to identify them and exclude them from such relations or because they
furnish a complete explanation of the foregoing tabulated statement, or finally because the
laws of the partida deal with them.
"Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly established by God for his
service and sanctification of men and which are governed by divine or canonical laws. This
makes it necessary to divide them into spiritual things, which are those which have a direct
influence on the religious redemption of man such as the sacrament, prayers, fasts,
indulgences, etc., and corporeal or ecclesiastical, which are those means more or less
direct for the proper religious salvation of man.
"7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or ecclesiastical things (sacred, religious, holy,
and temporal belonging to the church). Corporeal or ecclesiastical things are so divided.
"(a) Sacred things are those devoted to God, religion, and worship in general, such as
temples, altars, ornaments, etc. These things can not be alienated except for some pious
purpose and in such cases as are provided for in the laws, according to which their control
pertains to the ecclesiastical authorities, and in so far as their use is concerned, to the
believers and the clergy. (2 Derecho Civil Español, Sanchez Roman, p. 480; 8 Manresa,
Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, p. 636; 3 Alcubilla, Diccionario de la
Administracion Española, p. 486.)"
The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and what
belonged to private persons. In the first group churches are not named. The present Civil
Code declares in article 338 that property is of public or private ownership. Article 339,
which defines public property, is as follows:jgc:
"Property of public ownership is —
"1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and
bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of similar
character.
"2. That belonging exclusively to the state without being for public use and which is
destined to some public service, or to the development of the national wealth, such as
walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their
concession has been granted." The code also defines the property of provinces and of
pueblos, and in defining what property is of public use, article 344 declares as follows:
"Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town
roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces.
"All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall be governed by the
provisions of this code, unless otherwise prescribe in special laws."
It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any mention made of churches. When
the Civil Code undertook to define those things in a pueblo which were for the common
use of the inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the State, while it mentioned a
great many other things, it did not mention churches.
It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law
indicates that churches belong to the State and are public property. That article is as
follows:
"There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of the law:
"First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and which
is for the use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon
roads, and the roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks, public
promenades, and commons of towns, provided they are not lands of common profit to the
inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads, and any other analogous
property during the time they are in common and general use, always reserving the
servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers.
"Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith."
A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the State and
to the eminent domain thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had belonged to the State,
they would have been included in the first paragraph instead of being placed in a paragraph
by themselves.
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the United
States, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce
of man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects of private property in the
sense that any private person could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property
distinctive characteristic of which was that it was devoted to the worship of God.
But, being material things was necessary that someone should have the care and custody
of them and the administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom, under the
Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and administration? For the purposes of the
Spanish law there was only one religion. That was the religion professed by the Roman
Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that religion and for the observance of its rites
that this church and all other churches in the Philippines were erected. The possession of
the churches, their care and custody, and the maintenance of religious worship therein
were necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that body. It was, by virtue of the laws of Spain,
the only body which could under any circumstances have possession of, or any control
over, any church dedicated to the worship of God. By virtue of those laws this possession
and right of control were necessarily exclusive. It is not necessary or important to give any
name to this right of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 23
the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show that the
church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this
right to the exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation,
existed.
The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with reference to the churches in the
Philippines, did not give him any right to interfere with the material possession of these
buildings.
Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies treats Del Patronazgo Real de
las Indias. There is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which
in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the Indies
because he had constructed them. These laws relate to the right of presentation to
ecclesiastical charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the title commences as follows:
"Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops, bishops, dignitaries,
prevents, curates, and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and ecclesiastical offices
whatsoever belong to us, no other person can obtain or possess the same without our
presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of this title."
Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private persons, but
there is nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the private
patron is the owner of the church.
When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not intended to
say that the Government and had no power over it. It may be that by virtue of that power
of eminent domain which is necessarily resides in every government, it might have
appropriated this church and other churches, and private property of individuals. But
nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the Philippines.
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic
Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal
right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. It
was then in the full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That
these rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8,
provides, among other things, as follows:
"And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which
the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which
by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, or provinces,
municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other
associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid
territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such
individuals may be."
It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the Government
of the United States, nor the Government of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way
to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when
Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been
caused by private individuals, acting without any authority from the Government. Against
such interference by private persons with the rights of others, redress is given in the courts
of justice without reference to the provisions of the treaty of Paris.
No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made between
the church and the convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the church and, as
to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies
would apply. That law is as follows:
"We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such houses as may
be deemed sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios may live comfortably
adjoining the parish church of the place where that may be built for the benefit of the priests
in charge of such churches and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian
parishioners, and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any other purpose."
The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. It is always
mentioned in connection with the church and convent and no point is made by the
possession of the church and convent, he is not also entitled to recover possession of the
cemetery. So, without discussing the question as to whether the rules applicable to
churches are all respects applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the purpose of this case
that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery that he has to the church.
(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality
in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution which
antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and which existed
"when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in
the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget
relating to ecclesiastical obligations, presented by Montero Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of
October 1871, speaking of the Roman Catholic Church, he says:
"Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence up to
the time of Galieno, who was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it among the
juridical entities protected by the laws of the Empire, it existed until then by the
mercy and will of the faithful and depended for such existence upon pious gifts and
offerings. Since the latter half of the third century, and more particularly since the
year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection
for the church, the latter gradually entered upon the exercise of such rights as were
required for the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the same as
any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. (3 Dictionary of Spanish
Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal order of the 4th of December,
1890, 3 Alcubilla, 189.)"
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
Appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered
in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be remanded to the court below
for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 24
 SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 161414 : January 17, 2005]
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 the
municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur―which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town
that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving.
Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely
charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative
municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present
petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence,
its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree.
The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General2 in 1965. As discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued
several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among
them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No.
107.4
These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities
involved in that case had failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified
the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for
a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section
68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue
delegation of legislative power.7
After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders
were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief
Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did
not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the
executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the
consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the
Chief Executive over local governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and
the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities
above referred to. It is so ordered.10
Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the
Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is
the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of
Andong,11 suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and
paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of
Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the
municipality and its constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person
has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government
positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school,
Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least
seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen. 15 From 1964 until
1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their
constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and
recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the
time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of
public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways
and means."16
In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court
a Certification issued by the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the
total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive Order No. 107
issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial
Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at
fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental
agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other
municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for
the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.18
The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local
Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).19 The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing,"
per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three
(33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These
municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and
Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella
in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental
Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in
Compostela Valley.20
Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying
[Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its
records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality." 21 He characterizes such
non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of
the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by
reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the
DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a
"regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support
to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management,
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 25
to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public
respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.22
Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues
that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent
laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v.
Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San
Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to Andong, the
municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner
which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited,
as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the
current recognition of the impugned municipality. The provision reads:
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.25
There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better
discerned upon examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which
does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This point shall be further
explained further on.
Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions
of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual questions.
There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camid's astonishing factual allegations
pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was
annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of
these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it
is not a trier of facts.
The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of
the legal principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has
been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that
the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough
to afford title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers
for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter
is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that
their charters had been lost.27 They are especially common in England, which, as well-
worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the
development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long
before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been
expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal authority.
In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has
been held that when no charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be
shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of a town with the knowledge and assent
of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a period as to furnish
evidence of a prescriptive right.28
What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the
municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the
other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial
factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the factual
deficiencies aside, Camid's plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet
and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at
least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camid's
seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy
of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be
countenanced.
It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camid's present action. The assailed
issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to
bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of
the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camid's ultimate cause - the recognition of
Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong still
exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong.
Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance,
rather than a long-standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the
special civil action of certiorari . Still, the relation of the Certification to Camid's central
argument is forlornly strained.
These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation
by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence
of any curative or reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided
before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did to municipalities whose
bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants
explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their
town still exists, much less those who may comport themselves as the municipality's
"Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening.
The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the
petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed. 29 Executive
Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965
by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders. The phrase "ab
initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the inception."32 Pelaez was never
reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of
San Joaquin v. Siva,33 Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong
v. Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or
inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality
of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does
not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
PFR CASES/PRINCIPLES ARTS. 37-51 | 26
This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of
blessed austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso,
both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations.
To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the
Local Government Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the
ramifications of our decision in Pelaez.
The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still
is, not empowered to create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein
recognized "that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating
municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and in actual operation . .
. ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities,
including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose
existence petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No
pronouncement was made as to the other municipalities which had been previously created
by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed unlawful.
Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San
Joaquin v. Siva.37 The Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order
No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A
petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive order, again on the
ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The trial
court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new
decision declaring Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without
elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which
agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to Lawigan's validity. 38
In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the
validity of the constitution of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created
by an executive order,40 and which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities
annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a
municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged
that its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be
inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by
a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an inquiry
into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41
Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even
though it had been organized prior to the Court's decision in Pelaez. The Court declared
void the executive order creating Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from
performing their official duties and functions. 42 It cited conflicting American authorities on
whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is
unconstitutional.43 But the Court's final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was
not a de facto corporation.
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the
fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to
rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the
organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a
time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there
is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. 44
The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the
exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity. 45 Camid devotes several
pages of his petition in citing this point, 46 yet the relevance of the citation is unclear
considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong prior to
its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic
attitude as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal
corporations by way of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v.
Moya.47 The municipality of Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a
complaint against another municipality, who challenged Santo Tomas's legal personality to
institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior judicial action,
yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now
then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a
municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it cannot be a party to any civil
action'. "48
Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a
shift in the jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential
issuances. The questioned municipality of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August
1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order
No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal
status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition
for quo warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did
cite Pelaez as authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, and
the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court.
In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve
further doubt on the legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present
in the case at bar that San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its
legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the executive order creating San Andres
null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was a complete
nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres
had attained the unique status of a "de facto municipal corporation." 51 It noted
that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically
challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well extended the
decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely contradicts Camid's
reading of San Narciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been
declared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power found in Pelaez.53
The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d) 54 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. It clarified the implication of the provision as follows:
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Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that
municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No
pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is
preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power
to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence
are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in
this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
(Emphasis supplied)55
The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court
of Appeals56 and Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of
the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning
in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the Court refused to
invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation
of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town
should likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code,
and should [be] considered as a regular, de jure municipality." 58
The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was
among the issues raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an
expert summation of the evolution of the rule.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal
corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without
power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case
has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that
where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and
its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality
of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as
having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of
Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v.
Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the
municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez
no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a
legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to
the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), '442(d) of which provides that "municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a
de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized
and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years
when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of
E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that
apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule
66, '16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its
charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was
done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself
have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33
dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by '31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes
of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez
had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding
their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which
considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover,
following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation
of Sinacaban'.
From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and
its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited
its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this
Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal
cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially
annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban
was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed
curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not.
There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres,
Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong
was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andong's de
facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would
in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court.
Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties
aggrieved.
It bears noting that based on Camid's own admissions, Andong does not meet the
requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d)
requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive
recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong
has never elected its municipal officers at all. 60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that
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Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the
national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share
of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality
in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the
existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-
CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to
Andong's legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon
the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of
Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61 thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present
inoperative.
We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which
had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned
the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the
Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various
legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del
Sur, or of any other province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San
Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of
Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively.
How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as
existing in the DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that
subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these
municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these
eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated
in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly
reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes
passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis
to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other
municipalities.
We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code that it
does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as
Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders.
The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San
Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal
basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand,
the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and
Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as
done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive
their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which
originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes
which were enacted to revive them.
municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur, 68 and presumably continue to
exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is
through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of
Andong have, all these years, been governed not by their proper municipal governments
but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative solution
is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andong's legal
personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to
somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who
insist Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the
inhabitants of the cave in Plato's famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep
in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
Title II. - CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE
Art. 48. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who were citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the Philippines;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of said Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines;
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (n)
Art. 49. Naturalization and the loss and reacquisition of citizenship of the Philippines
are governed by special laws. (n)
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not
fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place
where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal
functions.

And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has
obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong
in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original
municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran. 67 These three
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 Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of
[238 SCRA 300] law upon marriage cannot be inferred in the Civil Code.

After the exile of the Marcoses, can Imelda run for public office?
Facts: In 1995, Imelda Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the COMELEC. In the COC, she wrote:
“RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: x x x seven Months.”
21 days after, she amended it from “7 months” to “since childhood.” She said that it was an
honest mistake and her residence in Tolosa Leyte is since childhood. The Representative
of the First District of Leyte, Cirilo Montejo, filed a case alleging that she did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency.
When they got married, what changed was her residence. She merely gained a new home
or residence, and not lose her domicile.
In Art. 109 of the New Civil Code — “The husband and wife are obligated to live together…”
it is illogical to conclude that wife should abandon her domicile, where husband can have
multiple residences.
Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new “domicile” after her
marriage, petitioner’s acts following her return to the country clearly indicate she expressly
chose her domicile of origin as expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG. It’s
illogical that she cannot regain her domicile after the death of her husband.

Issue: Is Imelda qualified? Is she a resident of Leyte for at least one year for purposes of
running for May 1995 elections?

Ruling: Yes. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for
certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only “domicile”. So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this
Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Article 50 of the Civil Code, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence. Domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home”, “a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return” (Ong v Republic).

If a person wants to run for public office in a certain locality, what’s important is that his or
her address therein, he has an intention to return, despite of his absence in the past.

Therefore, her jotting of the words “seven” in her COC was not an intention to mislead, and
just an honest mistake.

Next, the fact that Imelda ran as a candidate for different places, is not equivalent to losing
her domicile. The Court cites cases in which, registering in different residences outside
one’s domicile does not mean losing the domicile itself.

Being born in Manila, Imelda was brought back by her father to Leyte.

First, the minor follows the domicile of his parents.

Second, the domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts that correspond with the purpose.

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