E Leco 044 0028

Adam Smith's “Invisible Hand”: Refuting the Conventional
Wisdom
Jean Dellemotte
In L'Économie politique Volume 44, Issue 4, 2009, pages 28 to 41
Publishers Altern. économiques
ISSN 1293-6146
DOI 10.3917/leco.044.0028
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L’Economie politique
Quarterly-october 2009
“Invisible Hand”
Adam Smith’s
p. I
Adam Smith’s
“Invisible Hand”:
Refuting the Conventional
Wisdom
Jean Dellemotte,

Phare laboratory (Pôle d’histoire et d’analyse des représentations
économiques), University of Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne[1].
I
N THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT [1] My sincere thanks
to André Lapidus for his
more generally, Adam Smith is one of the authors whose work careful and informed
has been subject to the greatest distortions. For more than a reading of this text.
century, his thought has been regularly reduced to a few shock [2] For a characteristic
phrases taken out of context - whether deliberately or otherwise example, see Mankiw
(1998, 9-10).
– and bandied around like advertising slogans by dealers in ready-
made thinking. This is the case with the famous metaphor of the
“invisible hand”, which is still used as an excuse to spout the most
extraordinary platitudes about the benefits of the market economy.
Such interpretations usually treat the metaphor as a symbol for
either the supposed harmonious operation of “the market”, or
the spontaneous convergence of private interests, and most often
both at once. They regularly appear in economic journalism, text-
books,[2] high school and university teaching, and even in academic
papers, without anyone bothering to go back to the original text.
Actually reading Smith’s writings no longer seems to be consid-
ered necessary. However, despite the difficulties inherent in their
›››
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
p. II interpretation, they remain the best key to gaining access to his

thought, which cannot be reduced to simplistic schemas.
The first observation to be made is that Adam Smith only

used the expression “invisible hand” three times in the entirety
of his published work, comprising a treatise on moral philoso-
[3] Hereafter abbreviated phy entitled Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759),[3] an essay on
as TMS.
the origins of language entitled Considerations Concerning the
First Formation of Languages (1761), a work of political economy
[4] Hereafter abbreviated
as WN. entitled Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1776),[4] and finally a posthumous work published in 1795 enti-
[5] We also have part of tled Essays on Philosophical Subjects, which collects a number
Smith’s correspondence,
as well as two volumes
of essays on subjects as diverse as astronomy, the philosophy
of students’ notes from of science, the imitative arts, the external senses, and so on.[5] It
lectures taught at the
University of Glasgow. is already striking to see a scholar’s thought, what is more uni-
versally renown, summed up in this way by an expression that
[6] Smith mentions the appears only very rarely in his entire oeuvre. Be that as it may,
predicted appearance of a
comet in 1758, which would
it seems appropriate to take a closer look at the various occur-
confirm the astronomical rences of the phrase, if not to give a definitive interpretation,
hypotheses of Isaac
Newton. then at least to dismiss those that can be shown to be overly
hasty or reductive.

The Invisible Hand Symbolizes the Failure of Science,
and not a “Theorem”
The earliest occurrence of the expression “the invisible hand”
in Adam Smith’s texts is in a 70-pages essay, published post-
humously, but which all evidence indicates was written before
1758.[6] As the full title, The Principles Which Lead and Direct
Philosophical Enquiries Illustrated by the History of Astronomy,
suggests, the history of astronomical systems related by the
author serves above all as a point of departure for laying out his
view of philosophical and intellectual research. It is in this con-
text that Smith makes reference to pre-scientific thought and to
the explanations given by “savages” (primitive people) to explain
unusual natural events.
On the one hand, he assumes that these primitive people

would be too preoccupied with their survival in a hostile environ-
ment to engage in philosophy. This relativism is characteristic of
his writings, as his comments on the diversity of talents show:
this diversity “seems to arise not so much from nature, as from
habit, custom, and education” (Smith 1776, book 1, chap. 2,
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
p. 29). During the early stages of humanity, then, there was no p. III
philosophy.
On the other hand, Smith thinks that the human mind is lazy
and does not, for the most part, question the normal course of
events. Custom and habit then take the place of explanation.[7] [7] We may recognize
here one of the theses
However, when unexpected or unusual events occur (for primitive put forward by his friend
people, events such as storms, a loud clap of thunder, excep- David Hume in Book I of his
Treatise on Human Nature
tional harvests, and so on), the mind is embarrassed. People (1739-1740) and in the
Enquiry Concerning Human
then experience a need for explanations, which may take any Understanding (1748).
form, as long as they in some way restore the invisible chains
that underpin the theater of Nature; in short, making it easier to
understand the environment in which they live. Given that primi-
tive people lacked the time to indulge in philosophy and to work
out scientific explanations for irregular occurrences, they made
use of the form of representation that occurred to them most
readily, namely that of anthropomorphism. Even in these dis-
tant times, people indeed knew from daily experience that their
actions could change the course of events. The irregular course of
nature was therefore taken to be the will of some invisible being
above and more powerful than them, yet who resembled them.
Hence, according to Smith, the origin of polytheism: the cause of

a stormy sea was ascribed to the wrath of Jupiter, a good harvest
to the benevolence of Ceres, and any other unforeseen event to
“the invisible hand of Jupiter.”
Hence the origin of Polytheism, and of that vulgar superstition

which ascribes all the irregular events of nature to the favour or
displeasure of intelligent, though invisible beings, to gods, dae-
mons, witches, genii, fairies. For it may be observed, that in all
Polytheistic religions, among savages, as well as in the early ages
of Heathen antiquity, it is the irregular events of nature only that
are ascribed to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns,
and water refreshes; heavy bodies descend, and lighter sub-
stances fly upwards, by the necessity of their own nature; nor was
the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in
those matters. But, thunder and lightning, storms and sunshine,
those more irregular events, were ascribed to his favour, or his
anger. (Smith 1795b, section 3, pp. 49-50, emphasis added)
Although this first occurrence of the metaphor is hard to

connect with the later two, it immediately shows that in Smith’s
mind the “invisible hand” is not intended to explain anything but ›››
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
p. IV rather reflects the failure of philosophy and the lack of explana-

tions. It symbolizes the pre-scientific stage of thought, when the
“lowest and most pusillanimous superstition supplied the place
of philosophy” (Smith 1795b, p. 50). The first conclusion to be
drawn from this is that all those texts that refer to Smith’s sup-
posed “theorem” or “principle” of the “invisible hand” make use
of the metaphor in a sense opposite to the one he intended. In
Smith’s thought, it is precisely when scientific explanations are
lacking, and when we have neither a “theorem” nor a “principle”
to explain things, that we make recourse to an “invisible hand.”
An Extrapolated Association with the Market

The remaining two occurrences of the metaphor bear a mutual
resemblance, in that both focus on a central figure — in one
case a wealthy landowner, in the other a capital-owner — whose
self-interested behavior benefits the community. These two
occurrences, and the second of these in particular, are regularly
taken as a pretext to interpret the “invisible hand” as a repre-
sentation of market mechanisms. This is without question the
most celebrated of the many clichés attributed to Smith, and by
dint of repetition it has escaped any kind of serious examination
or debate. Actually, it can be shown that such an interpretation

relies on extrapolation rather than a rigorous analysis of the texts
in question.
The second occurrence of the metaphor appears in what

Smith himself saw as his major work (Rae 1895, p. 436): the
Theory of Moral Sentiments. The passage in which it appears
deals with the long-standing debate on luxury, and takes up an
argument developed fifty years earlier by Bernard Mandeville in
The Fable of the Bees (1714). Mandeville’s poem explains how rich
landowners, appeasing their caprices through lavish expenditure
that flatters their own vanity, thereby maintain thousands of poor
people thanks to the income their spending generates. In the
same way, according to Smith:
The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that

number of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. The
rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agree-
able. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of
their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only
their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose
from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide p. V
with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led
by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth
been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and
thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest
of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the spe-
cies. (Smith 1759-90, part IV, chapter 1, 184-5; emphasis added)
For one who knows the author of these lines even a little,
it is difficult to read here a description of the market economy;
first of all because the figure of the landowner who wastes the
larger part of his fortune on maintaining an army of domestic
servants or commissioning luxurious decorations for his palace,
symbolizes the flaws of feudal society and of the Ancien Régime
whose demise Smith’s Wealth of Nations was to celebrate a few
years later. Secondly, it is hard to see in what sense “the market”
as we usually understand it could be represented here. Neither
trade nor competition appear in the text in any clear form. The
emphasis is placed on the side of production (in this case of
luxury goods), rather than of exchange, as the cause producing
the effect.

We can say the same thing, in general terms, about the third
and final occurrence of the metaphor, which appears seventeen
years later in the WN and is by far the most celebrated.
But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely

equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce
of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that
exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours
as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of
domestick industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce
may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours
to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can.
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring
the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no ›››
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
p. VI part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes

that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who
affected to trade for the publick good. It is an affectation, indeed,
not very common among merchants, and very few words need
be employed in dissuading them from it. (Smith 1776, book IV,
chap. 2, 455-6)
It is true that the chapter in which this passage appears aims

to demonstrate the superiority, in terms of the public good, of
the “system of natural liberty” over the “mercantile system.”
However, even here, the notion of “market”, if that is indeed
what Smith was thinking of as he wrote these lines, is either
absent, or only very indirectly referred to. If we have definitively
abandoned the feudal society in favor of the commercial society,
then just as he does in the TMS Smith here describes something
that takes place on the side of production (capital allocation
between sectors), and not on the side of exchange. We are still
prior to what is usually understood by “market,” whether the
conceptual space in which supply and demand interact, or the
more concrete one in which exchanges are carried out. Even if we
understand the market as a system of prices coordinating deci-

sions among agents, as in the most widely-held interpretation
of standard neoclassical theory, the relationship is still rather
tenuous. At the most, we can identify in the text a signal — the
value of the produce, which in Smith’s mind probably means the
profits made by different industries — that guides the decisions
of capital-owners as to its allocation, and a rather vague notion
of competition. However, the parallel goes no further than this.
Yet, there is a well-known chapter in the WN in which Smith

describes proper market mechanisms in a fairly modern sense. I
[8] This chapter appears
in Book I of the WN, refer to the chapter on the “gravitation” of market prices towards
hundreds of pages before
the metaphor of the
natural prices (Smith 1776, book I, chap. 7, 72-81). However, he
invisible hand, which makes no use of the metaphor at this point.[8] If the “invisible
appears in Book IV.
hand” were intended to be a clear representation of the market
in his thought, there can be no doubt that such a meticulous
[9] In a letter to Thomas writer, and one who was very precise in his choice of words,[9]
Cadell, dated March 1788,
Smith acknowledges that would have explicitly stated this to his readers.
he works very slowly and
rewrites each sentence
“half a dozen of times” The equation between “the invisible hand” and “the market”
before being “tolerably
pleased with it” (Smith can thus be regarded as an extrapolation with no real basis in the
1977, letter 276, 311). texts themselves. Apart from an obvious ideological intent, we
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
may suppose that it is rooted in a biased and convenient reading p. VII
of the history of thought, which seeks to present Smith and other
authors from the classical economics school as theoreticians of
market mechanisms and precursors of the neoclassical analysis.
This reading does not stand up to serious scrutiny, however.
Although Smith and Ricardo both analyze the convergence,
resulting from the interaction of aggregate supply and demand,
of market prices toward “natural prices” of production, and
although Smith indeed considers exchange the founding prin-
ciple of the division of labor, it should be noted that analysis of
market mechanisms only take a secondary place in their writings.
It can even be said that the chapter each of these writers dedicate
to the convergence of market prices toward natural prices serves
above all to validate the practical implications of their respective
theories of value.[10] Obviously, the mechanisms which primarily [10] The market price
indeed appears as the
interest these “classical” thinkers are those related to production concrete price, whereas
and distribution. the natural price might
be interpreted as an ideal
price consistent with the
Free Competition between Private Interests theory of value.
Does Not Always Benefit Society as a Whole

If the expression “the invisible hand of the market” is not a faith- [11] It is said that
members of the Reagan
ful translation of Smith’s thought, another interpretation might

administration regularly
wore ties bearing the
appear more plausible. It was popularized at the beginning of image of Smith at the
the 20th century by the historian and philosopher Elie Halévy beginning of his first
presidency.
in a classic work on utilitarianism, The Growth of Philosophical
Radicalism (1901–1904). In this book, Halévy equates “the invis-
ible hand” with the idea that free competition among private
interests will necessarily benefit society as a whole, in terms of
a “natural identity of interests”. This reading obviously serves
to portray Smith as a free competition apologist, or at least as
a precursor of neoliberalism.[11] Halévy views the significance
Smith attributes to the virtuous effects of the division of labor
in his analysis of growth as a “demonstration of the theorem of
the natural identity of interests”. The fact that Smith located the
origin of the division of labor in barter and exchange would fur-
thermore indicate that he saw man as essentially selfish. While
this interpretation may seem credible at first glance, if we look
more closely at the passages in TMS and WN where the metaphor
of “the invisible hand” appears, we can offer two criticisms of
this claim.
In the first place, Halévy’s reading of Smith’s works is par-

tial, not to say biased. Smith indeed never saw humankind as ›››
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
p. VIII essentially self-interested. On the contrary the system of moral

philosophy he develops in the TMS puts forward the notion of
sympathy, which we may succinctly define as a principle which
interests us in the wellbeing of others. Smith saw this princi-
ple as the equivalent in the moral and political spheres of the
Newtonian principle of gravity in the realm of physics (Dellemotte
2002). Halévy also forgets to recall that Smith emphasizes the
virtuous effects of the division of labor in the first book of the
WN just as much as he draws attention to its negative outcomes
in book five. Smith was indeed quite aware of the fact that the
technical division of labor corrupts the body and mind of the
worker “[who] generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it
is possible for a human creature to become”, and consequently
tends to dehumanize the laboring poor (Smith 1776, Book V,
chap. 1, 782). Hence we might conclude that Halévy highlights
those aspects of the text which favor its thesis, while appearing
to conceal those which might cast doubt on it.
A second criticism is that, as Francisco Vergara rightly pointed

out in his book on the birth of liberalism, no author of the intel-
lectual caliber of Smith has ever put forward such an absurd the-
sis with regard to the intellectual context of the period (Vergara

2002). As an empiricist, Smith knew only too well that such a
thesis is contradicted by daily observation. Numerous counter-
examples to the thesis of the “natural identity of interests” can
thus be found in his writings and in the WN in particular. First, as
has just been pointed out, the deleterious effects of the division
of labor in the political and moral spheres is the heavy price paid
for its economic benefits. And Smith calls for the intervention of
the State to provide adult instruction as a means of partly pre-
venting this pernicious effect.
[12] See Smith’s The extension of the division of labor also encounters a
observations about China,
which according to him limit in the size of the market (Smith 1776, book I, chap 3).
had long been mired in
a stationary state: “The Competition among capitalists to make productivity gains
poverty of the lower indeed tends to increase production to the point of exhausting
ranks of people in China
far surpasses that of the the effective demand and ends up reducing profits, giving rise
most beggarly nations
in Europe” [Smith 1976,
to the threat of a stationary state in which accumulation reaches
book 1, chap. 8, 89]; “If by a limit and the large majority of workers get paid a pittance.[12] In
digging the ground a whole
day [a Chinese laborer] can his chapter on wages, Smith also focuses on the irreconcilable
get what will purchase a struggle of opposing interests between capitalists and workers,
small quantity of rice in the
evening, he is contented.” and explicitly takes side with the latter. The former are described
[ibid.].
as plotters, backed by the police and the law, who do not hesitate
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
to let laborers starve in order to increase their profits. Contrary p. IX
to popular belief, merchants and capital-owners did not hold a
special place in Smith’s heart. Conversely, he recommends treat-
ing them with the utmost caution, and claims that the interests
of this social class always run contrary to those of the public in
one way or another (see especially the conclusion of Smith 1776,
book I). They always seek to deceive the political class and popu-
lar opinion by passing off their interests as the general interest,
to the detriment of everybody. Moreover, thanks to the sharper
view they have of their own interests and to their rhetorical skills,
they generally succeed in their objectives. The spontaneous order
that is established through the free competition of private inter-
ests is thus far from being automatically in line with the general
interest, in Smith’s view.
Freedom as a Means and Not as an End

One of the major aims of the WN is, from a normative point of
view, to undermine the tyranny of capitalists and merchants,
symbolized by what Smith calls the “mercantile system”. At
the same time, he seeks to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
“agricultural system” favored by the Physiocrats, which treated
industry as an infertile ground for wealth creation. Although

he opposes to these two “systems either of preference or of
restraint” the “obvious and simple system of natural liberty”,
Smith (1776, book IV, chap 9, 687) did not imply by this latter
a hymn to total freedom nor a promotion of the minimal State.
First, the freedom in question concerns above all the choice

of allocating capital, which should be left to private initiative.
But in no sense does this preclude economic action by the
State itself. Besides ensuring the security of its citizens and the
administration of justice, Smith indeed ascribes a third essen-
tial duty to the sovereign: to “erect and maintain” some public
works and institutions that are of benefit to all, but which do not
offer a rapid enough return on investment to be implemented
by the private sector. While Smith distinguishes two broad cat-
egories within this third prerogative, namely public instruction
and infrastructures which facilitate commerce (roads, bridges,
lighthouses, ports, etc.), its definition is so broad that, transpos-
ing it to the present day, we could without too much difficulty
understand it to include transportation networks, postal and
telecommunications services, the electricity grid, the health sys-
tem, or even some cultural activities. We should emphasize that ›››
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
p. X it is not only a question of “erecting,” but also of “maintaining”

these “works and institutions”. It might be surmised that Smith’s
mistrust of the mentality of capitalists and traders led him to
suppose that if ownership of such infrastructure was theirs they
might be tempted to reduce their costs in order to increase their
profit, to the detriment of the service provided. In which case it
would be wholly dishonest to invoke Smith as a moral authority
for justifying the privatization of public services and enterprises.
Generally speaking, as many specialists have shown, Smith

does not consider freedom as an end in itself, but above all as
a means to achieving the greater good of society (see Vergara
2002, 80–83). This leads him to tolerate numerous limitations
to the principle of “natural liberty” (temporary granting of trade
monopolies, fixing a maximum legal interest rate, introduction
of selective taxes on certain goods, restraining the ability to
issue banknotes, import restrictions, and so on), which were
conscientiously listed over eighty years ago by the economist
and historian of ideas Jacob Viner, in a now-classic paper (Viner
1928). More recently, the naïve image of Smith as a champion of
laissez-faire economics has been challenged by scholars such as
Donald Winch (1978) and Spencer J. Pack (1991).

The Schema of the Cunning of Reason
Actually the metaphor of the invisible hand represents a sim-
ple idea, though one whose scope must be understood in the
context of a specific teleology: the idea that the universe is gov-
erned by a benevolent God, comparable to a Great Watchmaker
or Great Architect. This teleology is borrowed from the Stoics,
whom Smith, while criticizing their “apathy”, cites repeatedly
in his works. In this view, the universe may be likened to a clock
mechanism whose complexity eludes us. We mortals do not
understand anything about watch making: if we open up a watch
to look at its workings, no doubt some spring or cog will appear
unsightly or useless to us. However, were we to remove it, the
watch would stop ticking. Likewise, some apparent evils in the
world resemble these unsightly cogs or springs, whereas they are
actually essential to the mechanism of the universe and destined
to produce a greater good. Thus it is, as we have seen, with the
desire for luxury goods (condemned in his day by the clergy and
the great majority of moralists), and with the lure of profit for the
capitalist. However, it is also the case with resentment, a passion
which seems damaging to the social order yet which, thanks to
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
the intervention of sympathy — the principle of human nature p. XI
that makes us concerned for the fate of others and in certain cir-
cumstances leads us to share their feelings — reinforces the laws
for punishing injury or harm, which are essential to the survival of
the social body (Smith 1759-90, part II, section 1, chap 5, 76-8).
We may note that such a notion of divinity has a particular fea-
ture that enables a deliberately secular interpretation: once the
mechanism of the universe has been set in motion, the Creator
may disappear; a watch functions without the presence of the
watchmaker, and the divine watch can never fail.
In the context of this teleology, the metaphor of the invisible

hand comes to symbolize unintended and beneficial conse-
quences of certain individual actions. The landowner described
in the TMS does not imagine that his appetite for luxury, moti-
vated by his vanity, ultimately provides subsistence for thou-
sands of the poor. The stock-owner of the WN is unaware that
the pursuit of his individual interest is part of the process of
wealth creation that is supposed to benefit all. It is to these
characters, similar to the “savages” of pre-scientific times, that
such outcomes seem mysterious or “invisible”, but not to Smith’s
reader. Because the Scottish philosopher makes such apparent

paradoxes perfectly intelligible. Herein lies according to him the
task of the philosopher: to provide a rational explanation for
sequences of events that are apparently disjointed.
Besides, the idea Smith wanted to express through his meta-

phor was not especially novel for his day. It originated, as we
have said, in Stoic philosophy, and was carried down in popular
Christian thought (God moves in mysterious ways). And it will be
followed and further elaborated by Hegel — who was at least
partly familiar with Smith’s writings — in the form of the schema
of the cunning of reason.
It is important to point out, following the example of Benoît

Prévost, that “the idea that individuals fulfill ends that they do
not intend has no specific association with the market” (Prévost
2001). Nor should it be confused with the thesis of the natural
identity of interests formulated by Halévy, for the simple fact
that individual actions which produce unintended benefits do
not always originate from self-interest — far from it. A closer
look at Smith’s work shows indeed that the most obvious imple-
mentation of the cunning of reason does not lie in the care the ›››
Jean Dellemotte
Adam Smith’s
p. XII capitalist, the brewer, or the baker pay to their own interests,
but rather — against all expectations of those who confine them-
selves to the conventional reading — in the action of sympathy,
an invisible principle by definition, but one now wholly scientific,
just like gravity. People do not deliberately choose to be sensitive
to the feelings of their peers: they are unintentionally sympa-
thetic. It is God who, in His wisdom, has etched this disposition
towards social life in their being. Hence, in Smith’s view, both
social and economic rules can be explained on the basis of senti-
ments, rather than on the basis of reason or interest.
Smith indeed always asserted his membership of the sen-

timentalist tradition, which views the action of the passions as
the origin and modus operandi of many aspects of the social
realm. It is, besides, the central thesis of the TMS. What is true
for morality — that is, in the terminology of the period, for mor-
als — is also true for economics, which is just one dimension
of morality: human reason is a fallible instrument to which the
Creator in His wisdom did not attribute the task of discovering
the most suitable means for encouraging the propagation and
happiness of the species.

Despite how infrequently it occurs, the notion Smith attached
to his famous metaphor finally underlies his entire oeuvre. This
is one point at least on which the conventional view is not mis-
taken. ■
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Adam Smith's “Invisible Hand”: Refuting the Conventional

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Article available online at

Electronic distribution Cairn.info for Altern. économiques.

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p. II interpretation, they remain the best key to gaining access to his

The first observation to be made is that Adam Smith only

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On the one hand, he assumes that these primitive people

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Hence the origin of Polytheism, and of that vulgar superstition

Although this first occurrence of the metaphor is hard to

p. IV rather reflects the failure of philosophy and the lack of explana-

An Extrapolated Association with the Market

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The second occurrence of the metaphor appears in what

The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that

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But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely

p. VI part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes

It is true that the chapter in which this passage appears aims

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Yet, there is a well-known chapter in the WN in which Smith

Does Not Always Benefit Society as a Whole

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In the first place, Halévy’s reading of Smith’s works is par-

p. VIII essentially self-interested. On the contrary the system of moral

A second criticism is that, as Francisco Vergara rightly pointed

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Freedom as a Means and Not as an End

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First, the freedom in question concerns above all the choice

p. X it is not only a question of “erecting,” but also of “maintaining”

Generally speaking, as many specialists have shown, Smith

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In the context of this teleology, the metaphor of the invisible

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Besides, the idea Smith wanted to express through his meta-

It is important to point out, following the example of Benoît

Smith indeed always asserted his membership of the sen-

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Dellemotte, Jean. 2002. “Gravitation Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993

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