13 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES

1. ERMITA MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERAORS VERSUS CITY OF MANILA

2. DAZA VERSUS SINGSON
3. REPUBLIC VERSUS BAYAO
4. RUBI VERSUS PROVINCIAL BOARD
5. ABAKADA VERSUS ERMITA
6. BELGICA VERSUS OCHOA
7. THE HOLY SEE VERSUS ROSARIO
8. VILLAVICENCIO VERSUS LUKBAN
9. ESTRADA VERSUS ESCRITOR
10. CALLALANG VERSUS WILLIAMS
11. IMBONG VERSUS OCHOA
12. OPOSA VERSUS FACTORAN
13. TANADA VERSUS ANGARA

PART 1 OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES CASES 1 - 4

1. ERMITA MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERAORS VERSUS CITY OF MANILA CASE
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due process clause, contending that
said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of
the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Held: No.
Rationale: ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA RULING
The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police
power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture
and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has
been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public
needs."
It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is
that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be
too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare
of the people.
In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.

2. THE CASE OF DAZA VERSUS SINGSON THE CASE OF DAZA VERSUS SINGSON THE CASE OF DAZA VERSUS SINGSON
FACTS. FACTS:After thecongressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the Commission on
Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party,
and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among thosechosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resultingin a political realignment in the HoR.
24 members of the LP formally resigned from thatparty and joined theLDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondinglyreducing their former
party to only 17 members.HoR revised then its representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Dazaand giving this to the newly-formed LDP.
OnDecember 5, 1988, thechamber elected anew set of representatives consisting of the original members except Daza and includingtherein respondent Luis
C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.On January 13, 1989, Daza challenged his removal and the assumption of Singson. Acting initially on his
petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SCissued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent Daza and
Singson fromserving in the CoADaza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto ispermanent. That the reorganization of
theHouse representation is not based on apermanent political realignment because the LDP is not duly registered political party andhas not yet attained
political stability.
ISSUE FROM THE CASE OF DAZA VERSUS SINGSON ISSUES FROM THE CASE OF DAZA VERSUS SINGSON
Whether or not the question raised by Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the SC.
Whether or not the question raised by Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the SC.
RULING THE CASE OF DAZA VERSUS SINGSON RULING FROM THE CASE OF DAZA VERSUS SINGSON
No. The court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issueinvolved is not a discretionary act of the HoR that may not be reviewed by SC because
itis political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act ofthat chamnber in removing Daza from CoA.The term political question
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are tobe decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which fulldiscretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or Executive branch oftheGovernment. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of aparticular measure.
3. THE CASE OF REPUBLIC VERSUS BAYAO THE CASE OF REPUBLIC VERSUS BAYAO THE CASE OF REPUBLIC VERSUS BAYAO
FACTS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REGIONAL
FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII), Petitioner, vERSUS ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, RESPONDENT
April 1, 2005 Memorandum. They alleged that in 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during
one of her visits in Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. Only three departments were not
covered by the suspension of E.O. No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Tourism (DOT), and
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Respondents alleged further in their Memorandum to the DA Secretary that on March 7,
2005, they appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture that the implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance. It cited reasons such as
the huge costs the physical transfer will entail and the plight of employees who have already settled and established their homes in
Cotabato City.
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII is a government office mandated to implement the laws, policies
and programs of the Department of Agriculture in its regional area, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII.
On March 30, 2004, E.O. No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal
City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national
government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their
regional seat of operations to Koronadal City. In an April 1, 2005 Memorandum, the Department of Agriculture (DA)
Undersecretary for Operations Edmund J. Sana directed Officer-inCharge (OIC) and Regional Executive Director of DA-RFU XII Abusama M.
Alid directed to immediately effect the transfer of the administrative, finance and operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to
Koronadal City. On the interim, part of the staff can temporarily hold office at either or both the ATI building in Tantangan and Tupi
Seed Farm, but the main office shall be within Koronadal City. In a Memorandum dated April 22, 2005 addressed to DA Secretary
Arthur Yap, private respondents opposed the implementation of the On March 8, 2005, their Petition was endorsed by Department of
Agriculture Employees Association-12 (DAEAS-12) President Osmeña I. Motañer to then President Macapagal-Arroyo, and on April
12, 2005, this was referred to DA Secretary Yap for his information and appropriate action. Respondents justified their appeal saying that
a building was constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole staff of DARFU XII. On the other hand, there is no building
yet in Koronadal City where rent is very expensive. Moreover, if the regional office remains in Cotabato City, the government need not
spend over ₱7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipment hauling and construction. Finally,
respondents alleged that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantangan has a sub-standard foundation and will not be issued a
certificate of occupancy by the City Engineering Office of Koronadal City as per information from an auditor.
On May 17, 2005, OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the regional office to ATI Building in Tantangan and
Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City, to be carried out on May 21, 2005. This prompted
respondents to file on May 18, 2005 a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order with the RTC, Branch 14 of Cotabato City. The trial court granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. separation of powers between the executive department and thejudiciary as to the wisdom behind the transfer.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 on the ground that the assailed Order of the trial court is contrary to the
pronouncement of this Court in DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for failure of
petitioner to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order. Hence, the present Petition under Rule 45. Petitioner
agues: that (1) this case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition under Rule 65;
(2) the trial court Order enjoining the transfer is contrary to DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees that upheld the separation of powers
between the executive and judiciary on the wisdom of transfer of regional offices; (3) the trial court interfered into this wisdom of the
executive in the management of its affairs; and (4) the trial court disregarded basic rules on amendment and revocation of
administrative issuances and the propriety of injunction as a remedy. Respondents counter that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper
remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions. They allege that the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari for failure of the petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or resolution" contemplated by Rule 45. It is
not an adjudication on the merits. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not even attempt to resolve the propriety of the issuance of the assailed
trial court Order. In any case, respondents argue that petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration is fatal. They contend that this
is a condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule 65, and none of the exceptions are present in this case.
Issue OF THE CASE OF REPUBLIC VERSUS BAYAO
Whether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the DA Regional Office to Koronadal City violates
theWhether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the DA Regional Office to Koronadal City violates the separation of
powers between the executive department and the judiciary as to the wisdom behind the transfer
RULING OF THE CASE OF REPUBLIC VERSUS BAYAO Yes. Petitioner argues that the assailed Order of the trial court enjoining it from
transferring the seat of the DA-RFU XII Regional Office to Koronadal City is contrary to this Court’s pronouncement in DENR v. DENR Region
12 Employees upholding the separation of powers of the executive department and the judiciary when it comes to the wisdom of transfer
of regional offices. This Court has held that while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments. This power of supervision is found in the Constitution as well as in the Local Government Code of 1991,
as follows: Section 25 – National Supervision over Local Government Units –
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to
ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. The President shall exercise supervisory authority
directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities;
through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to
barangays. In Chiongbian v. Orbos, we held further that the power of the President to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the
power to determine the regional center. The case of DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees is in point. This Court held that the DENR
Secretary can reorganize validly the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. We also found as follows:
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no buildings yet to house the regional
offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in
schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsod, through a
resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the
transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or
expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of
the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department,
but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments. The transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN region to Koronadal City is an executive function.
Similar to DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees, the issues in the present case are addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than
to its legality. Some of these concerns are the lack of a proper and suitable building in Koronadal to house the DA regional office, the
inconvenience of the transfer considering that the children of respondent-employees are already enrolled in Cotabato City schools,
and other similar reasons. The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive. When the trial court
issued its October 9, 2006 Order granting preliminary injunction on the transfer of the regional center to Koronadal City when such transfer
was mandated by E.O. No. 304, the lower court did precisely that. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the
three great government branches has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action.
Finally, a verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not have been given weight. An executive order is
valid when it is not contrary to the law or Constitution. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated March 21, 2007 and August 16, 2007 in CAG.R. SP No. 0 1457-MIN, as well as the Decision dated October 9,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Cotabato City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
4. FOR THE CASE OF RUBI VERSUS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO FOR THE CASE OF RUBI VERSUS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO.
RUBI VERSUS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
FACTS. This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro
and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative
Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide. ISSUE OF THE CASE OF RUBI VERSUS
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO. Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to the provincial official and a department head. ISSUE OF THE CASE OF RUBI VERSUS PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF MINDORO. Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to the provincial official and a department head.
HELD: No. That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected, the Court
agrees. However, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?”
As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select
sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state? Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official
and a department head.