Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Power Engineering, Energy and Electrical Drives Torremolinos (Málaga), Spain.

Torremolinos (Málaga), Spain. May 2011

Risk Analysis of Protection System’s Operation in

Distribution Networks with DG
S.A.M. Javadian, Student Member, IEEE M.-R. Haghifam, Senior Member, IEEE M. Massaeli
Islamic Azad University-Islamshahr Branch Tarbiat Modares University Artesh University
javadian@ieee.org haghifam@modares.ac.ir maryam_massaeli@hotmail.com

be happened because of DGs penetration, is introduced.

Abstract--Using Distributed Generation (DG) is an interesting
topic that has drawn attention of electrical engineers in recent
years. The presence of these generation units in distribution
systems, although has many advantages and benefits, has to be
applied after performing detailed studies and investigations due
to their complexities in operation, control and protection of
network. One of the major effects of DGs is their effect on
protection operation of distribution networks. In this paper after
reviewing this influence, risk analysis of protection system’s
operation in a test distribution network according to various
locations and capacities of DGs has been performed. For this
purpose, three indexes for presenting the system’s risk has been
introduced and calculated in different investigated cases.
Index Terms--Distributed Generation; Distribution Network;
Protection; Risk Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The presence of DGs in distribution networks, like many
other technologies, has some disadvantages along with many
advantages it can have [2]-[9]. Among advantages of DGs
one can mention improvement in power quality and reliability
and reduction of loss, meanwhile using DGs leads to
complexity in operation, control and protection of distribution
systems [1], [2]. Injection of DGs currents to a distribution
network results in losing radial configuration and
consequently losing the existing coordination among
protection devices [2]-[7]. The extent at which protection
coordination is affected depends on the size, type and location
of DG, in some cases coordination is lost completely and in
other cases the coordination range diminishes [4], [5].
Regarding the influence of DGs on protection of distribution
systems, so many researches have been performed so far as
well as some researches concerning how to tackle the
resultant problems of applying DGs [1], [8]-[12].
The field of risk analysis has assumed increasing
importance in recent years given the concern by both
Finally, suggested indexes are calculated for different cases
and various capacities of DGs in order to performing risk
analysis.
II. RECLOSER-FUSE MISS-COORDINATION PROBLEM
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show traditional recloser-fuse
coordination in a distribution system. Fig. 1 shows a fuse in
the lateral feeder and a recloser which is located on the main
feeder. In order to have a correct operation, the fuse must be
coordinated with upstream recloser on the main feeder. The
coordination philosophy here is that the fuse should only
operate for a permanent fault on the load feeder. For a
temporary fault, recloser should disconnect the circuit with
fast operation and give the fault a chance to clear. Only if the
fault is permanent, the fuse should be allowed to open. In this
way, the load feeder does not get disconnected for every
temporary fault. Recloser also provides back up to fuse
through slow mode. Since temporary faults constitute 70% to
80% of faults occurring in distribution system, this
arrangement improves reliability while decreasing the
maintenance cost. Fig. 2 shows the recloser-fuse coordinated
graph for all fault currents within Ifmin and Ifmax. This is called
the coordination range. Therefore, as long as the fault current
values for faults on lateral feeder are within the coordination
range, the recloser-fuse coordination is considered to be
acceptable. It can be seen from Fig. 2 that fast characteristic
of the recloser lies below the MM characteristics of fuse
between Ifmin and Ifmax . Therefore, in coordination range the
recloser operates in less time than the time sufficient to
damage the fuse.
Recloser
Fuse
B1
Fig. 1. Recloser-Fuse Arrangement
If Min If Max.
DIgSILENT

Coordination
engineers and scientists in most technical issues. It is one of 1000
Range

the powerful tools for solving engineering problems such as [s]

optimization ones. [13] 10

In this paper after reviewing the effect of connecting Recloser Slow Curve

distributed generation units to distribution network, a new Recloser Fast Curve

method for risk analysis of protection system’s operation is 0.1

Fuse TC
proposed. In the suggested method, three indexes for
Fuse MM
presenting the system’s risk are introduced. Then, a test 0.001
0.40 kV 100 1000 [pri.A] 10000

distribution network for risk analysis, in which all kinds of

Cub_0\Recloser Cub_2\MM Fuse
Cub_2\Breacker

protection miss-coordination among protective devices could Fig. 2. Recloser-Fuse Coordination Range

978-1-4244-9843-7/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE

 If the fault persists after the recloser closes following the
second fast operation, then the fault has to be a permanent
one and hence fuse must operate to clear the fault. As shown
in Fig. 2, the TC curve of the fuse is below the slow curve of
recloser in coordination range. Therefore, for a permanent
fault, fuse will open before recloser operates in the slow
mode. If the fuse fails to operate, recloser will back it up by
operating in the slow mode and finally locking out [5].
After connection of DG, Maximum and minimum fault
currents for a fault on the load feeder will change and for any
fault on load feeder, fuse will see more current than the
recloser. In addition, as conventional protection, a temporary
fault, occurring mostly at lateral feeder, should be
discriminated by the fast operation of recloser. However, this
conventional scheme may not be held when DG is connected
at the end of the feeder. It is possible that this temporary fault
is cleared by the lateral fuse, and be changed to a permanent
fault. These undesirable operations of protective devices
called “Fuse Blowing” and certainly decrease the system
reliability.
In order to clarify the consequence of injected current,
depending on placement of DG toward the recloser, four
different cases are depicted in Fig. 3 and tabulated in table I.
In case 1, fault current seen by the fuse is summation of
both fault currents from the substation and the DG. It
indicates that system problem will occur whenever both DG
source and fault position are located behind the recloser. This
is the case of fuse blowing above mentioned. With this
situation, it is possible that the miss-coordination of recloser
and fuse will happen [14].
In case 2, DG and fault location are respectively after and
before the recloser. In this case, reverse current flows through
the recloser and fuse should operate first. However, it is
possible that the recloser at the fast mode will operate faster
and meaninglessly cause the electricity interruption at the rear
circuit. However, since the rear circuit can be automatically
restored within only few cycles after the fuse has operated, it
brings about only a momentary electricity interruption, which
may be negligible [14].
DG2 DG1
~ ~
G G
Substation Circuit
Recloser
Breaker
Fuse Fuse
Fault2 Fault1
Load(1) Load(2)
Fig. 3. Alternate Cases for Recloser-Fuse Miss-coordination
TABLE I
ALTERNATE CASES FOR RECLOSER-FUSE MISS-COORDINATION
Case DG Unit Fault Location
1 DG 1 Fault 1
2 DG 1 Fault 2
3 DG 2 Fault 1
4 DG 2 Fault 2
For case 3, the same fault current flows through the
recloser and the fuse. This seems that recloser and fuses can
coordinate properly. However, increasing the current will
result in changing the coordination range, and no longer will
maintain the coordination protection [14].
At last, in case 4, both DG and fault location are upstream
of recloser and the fault current will flow to fuse directly and
the recloser will not detect anything. Fuse blowing will not
occur in this case [14].
As a result, only fuse blowing in case 1 will be investigated
in this study.
III. FUSE-FUSE MISS-COORDINATION PROBLEM
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show how fuse-fuse coordination is
traditionally done in a radial distribution system without DG.
Fig. 4 shows the arrangement of two fuses to be coordinated.
Coordination of fuse1 and fuse2 means for any fault on
feederl, fuse l should operate before fuse2 is damaged. This
would be achieved if TC characteristic of fusel is below the
MM characteristics of fuse2 by a safe margin for any fault on
feeder1. Fig. 5 shows the coordination graphs. It shows the
fuses are coordinated for all fault currents within Ifmin and
Ifmax. This is called the coordination range. Therefore, as long
as the fault current values for faults on feederl are within
coordination range, the fuses are coordinated. [5]
Fig. 6 shows a typical distribution network with several
fuses. When there is no DG connected to the system, fuse-
pairs F1-F2, F2-F3, F3-F4 and F5-F6 will be coordinated with
each other. After connection of DG1, DG2 and DG3 the
following changes in the system will be forced: [5]
S
F2 F1
Fig. 4. Fuse-Fuse Arrangement
Fuse1 TC
Fuse2 MM
Ifmax
Fuse2 TC
Fuse1 MM
Ifmin
To main feeder
Fig. 5. Fuse-Fuse Coordination Range
A
B G
S
F4 F5
F3 D DG3
C I
F2 H
DG2
F F6
E
F1
DG1
F7
Fig. 6. A Typical Distribution Network with Several Fuses
1. Minimum and maximum fault current values for a fault
in section HI will increase from source side due to all
upstream DGs. So, F5 and F6 will sense greater fault
current than before, but will never have reverse fault
currents. [5]
2. For a fault in section CD, F3 and F4 will see downstream
fault current, while for a fault in section AB, these fuses
will see upstream fault current. The value of fault current
seen by these fuses for a given fault in section AB or CD
will be same. F1-F2 will also experience the same
situation for upstream and downstream faults. [5]
3. For a fault in section DE, F2 will see more fault current
than F3, while for a fault in section BC, F3 will see more
fault current than F2. In first case, fault currents will be
downstream, while in the second case, fault currents will
be upstream. [5]
In case of (1) above, the fuse coordination is not likely to
be affected if fuses can still coordinate for increased fault
currents. This is because fuses still see only downstream
faults. The only change in the coordination graph of F5-F6
will be the coordination range, since minimum and maximum
fault currents will change. If the increased fault current is so
substantial, that the coordination range exceeds the extent of
the fuse curves, then, of course, these fuses will no longer
coordinate. [5]
In case (2), there is a clear conflict. One of the most
important features of a protection scheme is to clear only the
faulted part of the system. Following this requirement, for a
fault in section CD, F3 should operate before F4, but for a
fault in section AB, F4 should operate before F3. Since both
fuses see the same fault current for a given upstream or
downstream fault, this requirement cannot be fulfilled. This
will be true for fuses F1-F2 also for a fault on section EF and
section CD. [5]
However, there is a margin for case (3). Fig. 7 shows the
characteristics of fuses F2 and F3 without considering DG.
Now, for a downstream fault, F2 will see more current (IF2)
than F3 (IF3). The difference between IF2 and IF3 depends on
size and type of DG2. It can be seen that as long as IF2 is more
than IF3, the coordination will never be lost, since F2 will
always operate before F3 is damaged, which is required for a
downstream fault. For upstream faults, IF3 will be greater than
IF2. In this case, it can be seen from Fig. 7, that if the
difference in currents is more than the shown margin, F3 will
operate before F2 is damaged, i.e., coordination still holds.
However, if the difference is less than the margin, F2 will be
damaged before F3 operates, i.e., coordination is lost. Thus
for a substantial fault current injection from DG, coordination
can hold in such conditions. [5]
IV. RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
For each system component, three statistics are used to
evaluate the system reliability, i.e. λ (average failure rate,
f/yr), r (average outage time, hours), and U (average annual
outage time, hours/yr). In this study, λ is assumed to be
resulted only from electricity faults. Each system component
will be interrupted as long as repair or switching times,
depending on the location of the considered component,
the location of the failed component, and the type of fault.
Taking these interruption durations into account, the outage
duration for the load points connecting to the interrupted
component is derived. So, the outage information of load
points can be directly calculated from the statistics of system
components. Since in this study, both temporary and
permanent faults, each of these three statistics should be
divided into two groups, i.e. permanent and temporary. So, the
average failure rate of each system component can be written
as (1).
i  P ,i  T ,i (1)
Where:
λP,i average failure rate of permanent faults;
λT,i average failure rate of temporary faults;
Each of them gives its own average outage time. In case of
permanent fault occurrence, rP,i is the repair time for
permanent faults, while rT,i is just few seconds in case of
temporary fault. Hence, average annual outage time for all
types of faults can be calculated as follows:
U P ,i  P ,i  rP ,i (2)
U T ,i  T ,i  rT ,i (3)
Finally, the total average annual outage time and average
outage time can be written using (4) and (5) respectively.
U i  U P ,i  U T ,i (4)
ri  U i / i (5)
It should be considered that the repair time for temporary
faults is very short so that without protection miss-
coordination all above equations can be easily written with
only permanent terms.
A. Risk Evaluation of Recloser-Fuse Miss-Coordination
Recloser-fuse miss-coordination will make permanent
interruption for some of system components in case of
temporary faults. For instance, lateral feeders and
transformers may be interrupted as long as the repair time of
fuse, used to replace the fuse blown from the miss-
coordination. In this case, the average failure rate can be
calculated from (1). But, average interruption time for
temporary faults will increase to the repair time of fuse (rf,i).
F2 TC
F3 TC
For Downstream
F3 MM
Fault
F2 MM IF3
IF2
IF2
For Upstream
Fault
IF3
Fig. 7. Coordination Margin with DG in Case of Different Fault Currents
through Fuses
 Considering PHt and PLt for the probability of miss-
coordination for high and low impedance temporary faults
respectively, the unavailability of temporary faults which are
changed to permanent ones due to protection miss-
coordination can be derived from (6).
U T,i  (PT  λ T,i )  rf,i (6)
It should be considered that in (6), it is assumed that rT,i is
the same and equal to rf,i which is the repair time of fuse. This
time is usually more than several minutes, so that the fault
can consider as a permanent fault.
B. Risk Evaluation of Fuse-Fuse Miss-Coordination
Loss of fuse-fuse coordination causes a larger area to be
faced power outage. For example, when coordination of a
fuse and its upstream backup fuse lose, in case of a fault
happening in the protection zone of the main fuse, the backup
fuse will blow earlier than the main one. So, all electrical
consumers which are connected to the protection zone of
backup fuse will face power cut. But, if the protection
coordination remains, only the electrical consumers in the
protection zone of the main fuse will lose the electricity.
Considering PHp and PLp for the probability of miss-
coordination for high and low impedance permanent faults
respectively, the unavailability of permanent faults which
cause a bigger power outage due to protection miss-
coordination can be derived from (7).
U P,i  (PP  λ P,i )  rp,i
(7)
V. RISK ANALYSIS IN THE TEST NETWORK
In this paper, for performing the risk analysis of protection
system’s operation the test network of Fig. 8 has been used.
In the test network, after connection of DG1 and DG2, all
kinds of previously described protection miss-coordination of
fuse-fuse and recloser-fuse between protective devices of the
network can be happened.
In the test network, the protection system consists of one
over-current relay, two reclosers, and five fuses which are
coordinated with each other according to protection graph of
Fig. 9.
Fuses of the test network are installed in the beginning of
sections B, C, F, H, and I. The two reclosers are installed in
the beginning of the sections A and G. Also, the only over-
current relay of the network is installed in the beginning of
the feeder (section A) to protect the whole network.
In the test Network, before connection of DGs, because of
the simplicity of the protection philosophy, the coordination
of protective devices can be easily done. Now, assuming that
the protection miss-coordination can be happened with the
probability of 0.01 in the test network before connection of
DGs, the priviously introdused risk evaluation indexes are
calculated and presented in table II.
For performing above calculations, parameters λ and U
related to protection miss-coordination are calculated for
every load points of the network firstly. Then, using
equations 8, 9, and 10, risk evaluation indexes are derived.
~
G
DG1

5
It should be considered that in (7), it is assumed that rP,i is A B C D E F G DG2

the same and equal to rp,i which is the repair time of

G
~
NET 1 2 3 4 7
permanent faults for equipment i. 6 8
I
H
C. Proposed Indexes for Risk Calculation 9 10
In this paper, three indexes for risk calculation have been
proposed which are Interruption Frequency Risk (IFR), Fig. 8. The Protection System’s Operation Risk Analysis Test Network
Interruption Duration Risk (IDR), and Energy Not Supplied 100000

Risk (ENSR). These indexes can be calculated from [s]

equations 8, 9, and 10 respectively.

1000

total number of customer interrubtions

because of protection miscoordination
IFR  10

total number of customers (8)


 ( PT T ,k  PP P,k ) N k
 Nk
0.1

sum of customer interrubtion durations

because of protection miss  coordination
0.001
20.00 kV 10 100 1000 10000 [pri.A] 100000

IDR  Fig. 9. Protection Coordination Graph in the Test Network

total number of customers (9)
TABLE II.

 (U T ,k  U P,k ) N k RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS IN TEST NETWORK BEFORE CONNECTING DGS
N k λLP 0.1 PLP 0.01
rf 0.5
IFR 0.0353
ENSR = total energy not supplied because of λLt 0.4 PLt 0.01 IDR 0.0327
protection miss-coordination (10) λHP 0.05 PHP 0.01
rp 5 ENSR 0.147
  La ,k (U T ,k  U P ,k ) λHt 0.2 PHt 0.01
 A typical calculation procedure for calculation of λ and U after connection of both DGs and increasing their capacity
related to protection miss-coordination is presented in table without and with considering island operation of DGs.
III. The table presents the calculations for bus No. 4. In the According to these figures, it can be concluded that
table, the value of zero in each column related to probability increasing the capacity of DGs will increase the IDR and IFR
of miss-coordination means that fault happening in that of the network. Also, the islanding operation of DGs has not
section will not cause protection miss-coordination, or the any effect on these indexes. On the other hand, the ENSR
related protection miss-coordination will not affect the power index is very dependent to the island operation of DGs. As it
outage of that bus. For example, in the table, all values of can be seen from the simulation results, if the island operation
protection miss-coordination probabilities for faults on of DGs does not considered, the ENSR will be increased by
section A are zero. The reason is that there is no fuse installed increasing the capacity of DGs. But, by considering the island
on this section. So, all faults on this section cannot lose the operation, the protection system will have lower risk on
protection coordination among protective devices of the energy not supplied by increasing the capacity of DGs.
network. On the other hand, in table III, the value of Pp for The other conclusion that can be made from the simulation
permanents faults on sections C, D, and F equals zero because results is that DGs which are connected to the end of
these faults will blow the fuse of section B in case of distribution feeders have lower effect on the protection
protection miss-coordination and otherwise they will blow the system. For example, comparing Fig. 12 proves that DG2 has
fuse of section C. In both cases, all consumers connected to lower effect on ENSR than DG1. This fact is because of two
bus 4 will face power outage. So, this protection miss- main reasons; first, DG2 will have lower effect on short
coordination will not affect the risk of bus No. 4. It is obvious circuit currents in the network and consequently on the
that this protection miss-coordination has a great effect on protection coordination, and second, the protection miss-
risk indexes in bus 3. coordination made by DG2 will cause less power outage in
For analyzing the effect of DG on the risk of protection the network.
system’s operation in the test network, two diesel generators
has been considered for connecting to the network. As TABLE III.
mentioned above, connection of DG1 and DG2 can cause all TYPICAL RISK CALCULATION FOR BUS 4 OF THE TEST NETWORK
kinds of protection miss-coordination among protective Section λP λT rf rp PP PT λP×PP λT×PT UP UT
A 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
devices of the test network.
B 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0 0.01 0 0.004 0 0.002
For performing risk analysis and investigating the effect of C 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0 0.01 0 0.004 0 0.002
location and capacity of DGs on system’s risk, the D 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0 0.01 0 0.004 0 0.002
calculations have been done 3 main steps. In the first step, E 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0 0.01 0 0.004 0 0.002
only DG1 has been considered to be connected to the network F 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.002
G 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0.01 0 0.001 0 0.005 0
and the risk indexes have been calculated for the network for H 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.002
various capacities of DG1. Then, in the second step, only I 0.1 0.4 0.5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
DG2 has been considered to be connected to the network and Total for 4 N 100 L 0.5 0.003 0.024 0.015 0.012
the risk indexes have been calculated for the network for
various capacities of DG2. Finally in the last step, both DG1 0.5 0.6

and DG2 have been considered to be connected to the 0.4

0.5

network and the risk indexes have been calculated for the 0.3
0.4
ID R
IF R

0.3
network for various capacities of DG1 and DG2. 0.2
0.2
Also, in each step, in order to presenting the advantages of 0.1 0.1
connecting DGs to distribution networks, which will be 0 0

reached by islanding operation of DGs, risk indexes have 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

DG1 (MW) DG1(MW)

been calculating for two conditions; first, DGs cannot operate
in their island mode, and second, DGs have the permission to
continue their operation after a short switching time for
isolation of occurred faults, and supply their neighbor
Fig. 10. IFR and IDR in the Test Network After Connection of DG1 and
Increasing Its Capacity (With and Without Island Operation of DG)
0.5 0.7

consumers locally. 0.4

0.6
0.5
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the increscent of IFR and IDR in 0.3 0.4
ID R
IF R

the test network after connection of DG1 and DG2 and 0.2 0.3

increasing their capacity respectively. Also, Fig. 12 illustrates 0.1

0.2
0.1
the increscent of ENSR in the test network after connection of 0 0

DG1 and DG2 and increasing their capacity. 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

DG2 (MW)
Fig. 13 shows the increscent of IFR and IDR in the test DG2 (MW)

network after connection of both DGs and increasing their Fig. 11. IFR and IDR in the Test Network After Connection of DG2 and
Increasing Its Capacity (With and Without Island Operation of DG)
capacity. Also, Fig. 14 presents the ENSR in the test network
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2
1 1
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DG2 (MW)
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In this paper after reviewing the effect of connecting
distributed generation units to distribution network, a new
method for risk analysis of protection system’s operation has
been proposed. In the suggested method, three indexes for
presenting the system’s risk have been introduced. Then, a
test distribution network for risk analysis, in which all kinds
of protection miss-coordination among protective devices
could be happened because of DGs penetration, has been
introduced. Finally, suggested indexes have been calculated
for different cases and various capacities of DGs in order to
performing risk analysis. Simulation results show that
without islanding operation of DGs the protection system’s
risk will increase after connection of DG while islanding
operation has a great effect on risk indexes and can decrease
total risk of the system. Also, DGs which are connected to the
end of distribution feeders have lower influence on system’s
risk and can result in better performance of protection system
in comparison with DGs connected to the beginning of the
same feeder.
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