Lasoy Et Al v. Zeñarosa, G.R. No. 129472, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 360

9/15/23, 1:38 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 455
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
*
G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005.
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, petitioners, vs.

HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC, BR. 76, QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Requisites to Invoke

the Defense of Double Jeopardy.—To invoke the defense of double
jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the
case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has
been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; Same; An information is valid as long as it

distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
361
VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 361
Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
omissions constitutive thereof.—An information is valid as long as

it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the
offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court
can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018a94c911563d74321c000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/17
is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the

language of the statute in the information. The information will
be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
Same; Same; Same; Except where the death penalty is

imposed a judgment (of conviction) becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
—In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, the Court affirming
the finality of a decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule
120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, stated: A judgment
of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction]
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. Indeed, the belated
move on the part of the prosecution to have the information
amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attained
finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that
amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Same; Same; Same; The only instance when double jeopardy

will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham.—In Sanvicente v. People, this
Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right
against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when
double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
Respondent People of the Philippines argues,
362
Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
citing the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan that the trial was a

sham. We do not agree with the respondent as the trial in the
Galman case was considered a mock trial owing to the act of a
then authoritarian president who ordered the therein respondents

Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure a predetermined final
outcome of acquittal and total absolution of the respondents-
accused therein of all the charges.
Same; Same; Same; It is too late in the day for the prosecution
to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again
accused for the same offense without violating their rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.—The Constitution is very
explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this
case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and
convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were
applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution
to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again
accused for the same offense without violating their rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs; Jurisdictions; All drug-

related cases regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty
imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659 and the provisions of R.A.
No. 7691 still fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts in view of Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).—. . . [A]ll drug-related cases,
regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable
pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted in People vs.
Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555), and of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
still fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691 have neither
amended nor modified this Section.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
363
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for the People.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
After an information has been filed and the accused had

been arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and
after they had applied for probation, may the information
be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground
that the information was allegedly altered/tampered with?
In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor1
Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July 1996,
accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as
follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said
law.
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was

assigned and raffled to Branch 103 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, presided by Judge Jaime N.
Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded 2 guilty and
were sentenced on 16 July 1996 in this wise:
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA

with the assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano
entered a plea of GUILTY to the crime charged against them in
the information.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO
LASOY and FELIX BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4,
_______________
1 Records, p. 41.
2 Records, p. 45.
364

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
Republic Act 6425 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer a jail
term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and the period
during which said accused are under detention is hereby deducted
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.
The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried

marijuana fruiting tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of
the government. The Property Custodian is ordered to turn over
said evidences to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition.
On the same date, both accused applied for 3 probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines,
thru Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos,
filed two separate
4 motions, first, to admit amended
Information, and second, to set aside the arraignment of
the accused, as5 well as the decision of the trial court dated
16 July 1996. In plaintiff’s motion to admit amended
information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were

charged of (sic) Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.
“That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410
grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of
said law.
When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for
transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five
(45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from
La Trinidad to Metro Manila.
_______________
3 Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefore And For

Other Purposes.
4 Rollo, p. 48.
5 Rollo, pp. 53-54.
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in

order to make it conformable to the evidence on hand.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed

that the herewith attached Amended Information against both accused
be admitted and subsequently set for arraignment and trial.” (Emphasis

supplied)
Resolving the motions,

7 the trial court, in its Order dated 03
September 1996, held:
The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as

this court has already decided this case on the basis that the
accused was arrested in possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana
and it is too late at this stage to amend the information.
8
Another Order of the same date issued by the trial court

resolved the second motion in the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well

as the Decision dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor
is hereby GRANTED, it appearing from the published resolution
of the Supreme Court dated October 18, 1995, in G.R. No. 119131
Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon. FRANCISCO
H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by
this court on August 20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small
quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, although under the statute of R.A. 7659 which took
effect on December 31, 1993 the penalty for possession or use of
prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision [correccional] to
reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty and under the
rule on jurisdiction the court which has jurisdiction over a
criminal case is dependent on the maximum penalty attached by
the statute to the crime.
The amended Information reads:
_______________
6 Records, pp. 48-49.

7 Records, p. 52.
8 Records, p. 55.
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
“That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully
unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried

marijuana
9 fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said
law.”
This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the

RTC of 10Quezon City presided by Judge Monina A.
Zenarosa, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572.
11
Both 12accused filed a Motion to Quash which was

opposed by the People in its Comment/Opposition filed
before the trial court. Subsequently, while the motion to
quash before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused
filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari13
which they later moved to withdraw “to pave the way for
Branch 76 of the RTC of 14Quezon City to act judiciously on
their motion to quash.’’ The Court 15 of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 15 November 1996 noted the motion and
considered the petition withdrawn. 16
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997,

the trial court denied accused’s motion to quash, and
scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information.
17 Accused’s Motion 18 for
Reconsideration, duly opposed by the prosecution, was
denied by the trial court in its Order
_______________
9 Records, p. 50.
10 Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
11 Rollo, pp. 26-39.
12 Records, pp. 98-107.
13 CA-G.R. SP No. 41932 raffled to Justice Hector L. Hofileña.
14 Records, pp. 117-119.
15 Rollo, p. 129.
16 Records, pp. 137-142.
17 Records, pp. 152-158.
18 Records, p. 159.
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
19
dated 16 April 1997. Hence, the instant Petition for

Certiorari with 20prayer for injunction and temporary
21
restraining order based on the following grounds:
A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION AND,

THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE
RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; and
B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC,
BRANCH 103, HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
22
DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-66799.

23
In this Court’s resolution dated 23 July 1997, respondents

were required to comment on the Petition.
24 They submitted
their Comment
25 on 18 November 1998. Accused filed their
Reply on 02 March 2000. In compliance
26 with the Court’s
resolution dated 29 March 2000, accused and respondents 27
submitted their memoranda,

28 respectively, on 26 May 2000
and 26 July 2000.
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has
been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed29 or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
_______________
19 Records, p. 163.
20 Rollo, pp. 4-18.
21 Rollo, p. 10.
22 Rollo, p. 10.
23 Rollo, p. 61.
24 Rollo, pp. 87-102.
25 Rollo, pp. 131-146.
26 Rollo, pp. 148-149.
27 Rollo, pp. 163-189.
28 Rollo, pp. 197-212.
29 Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended; Reynaldo Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
368

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
The issues boil down to whether or not the first information

is valid and whether or not the RTC, Branch 103, where
the first information was filed and under which Criminal
Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to try the
case.
On the issue of validity of the information, accused and

respondents submitted opposing views—accused insisting
on its validity, whereas respondents asserted that the
accused were arraigned under an invalid information.
Alleging that there being an alteration on the first
information, hence it failed to reflect the true quantity of
drugs caught in possession of the accused, the prosecution
insisted that the first information under which accused
were arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the 30 trial
court denied the accused’s motion to quash, stating:
. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier

information filed against the accused appeared to be sufficient in
form. It was discovered, however, that an alteration was made as
to the weight of the marijuana fruiting tops which was placed at
only 42.410 grams when the correct amount should have been in
kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity
of the proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the
accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the correct
offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the

prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of any fundamental
requisite which would render void the judgment would also make
ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in
jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same
offense.
_______________
No. 136264, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 121 citing People v. Tac-an, G.R. No.
148000, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA 373, 380; Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 97214, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 175, cited in Potot v. People, G.R. No. 143547,
26 June 2002, 383 SCRA 449.
30 RTC Order, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by

collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting himself from further
prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, either on the ground that the conviction
is void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense
a party to it and therefore not bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum,
pp. 244-245)
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of

the deceitful maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true
weight of the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in the
information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of
prohibited stuff for which they were charged before the
information was tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that
charade when they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the
decreased weight in the now altered information which merited a
much lighter penalty was irregularly obtained. Hence, they
cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in
court which was tainted with fraud.
The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice
or to trifle with the courts by participating in a grand deception of
pleading guilty to a lesser offense knowing that they
participated/acquiesced to such tampering and then tell the court
that they would be placed in jeopardy for the second time.
We do not agree with the trial court.

FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for
appropriate inquest proceedings dated 03 July 1996
addressed to the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused
were apprehended “for conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping with each other in facilitating and
effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of forty-five
pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already 31 in bricks) and
weighing approximately forty-five kilos.’’
_______________
370

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto

Jimenez Viray, Jr., and arresting officer SPO1 Inadio U.
Ibay, Jr., it is stated that the accused were caught with
32
approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops.

For some unknown reasons, however, the Information filed
against the accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e.,

42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the
first Information under which the accused were arraigned
invalid.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule
110 are hereunder quoted:
Section 4. Information defined.—An information is an accusation

in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court.
33
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,
34 this Court citing People v.
Marquez affirmed:
It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an

information as nothing more than “an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and
filed with the court.”
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the

statutory designation of the35 offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof.
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that
a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the
language of the statute in the
_______________

33 G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55.
34 G.R. No. L-23654, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 808.
35 People v. Alba, G.R. Nos. 131858-59, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 811.
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
information. The information will 36 be sufficient if it

describes the crime defined by law.
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is
that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was
committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise
the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is

reasonably complied with. 37
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,

Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint

or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial court’s

point of view that the accused cannot claim their right
against double jeopardy because they
“participated/acquiesced to the tampering,” we hold that
while this may not38 be far-fetched, there is actually no hard
evidence thereof. Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that

accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and
convicted under the first information. Granting that
alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a
hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of the deci-
_______________
36 Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, 12 August 2004, 436 SCRA 337.
37 Rules of Court.
38 In Director, PNP Narcotics Command v. Judge Salazar (A.M. No. 96-
9-332-RTC, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 8), a complaint for gross ignorance
of the law and gross inefficiency was filed against Judge Salazar relative
to the tampering/alteration of the information in Crim. Case No. 96-
66788. However, while the court found that there was indeed a
tampering/alteration, the accused were not at all implicated or faulted for
the act.
372

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
sion dated 16 July 1996. The alleged tampering/alteration

allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the
subject of another inquiry. 39
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, the Court

affirming the finality of a decision in a criminal case, citing
Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, stated:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be

modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed a judgment
[of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to

have the information amended defies procedural rules, the
decision having attained finality after the accused applied
for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer
allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is
emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment.—The information or complaint may be

amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as
to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section
11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
_______________
39 G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456, 467.
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
40
In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the far-

reaching scope of an accused’s right against double
jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution
was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the
trial was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines
41
argues, citing the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan that

the trial was a sham. We do not agree with the respondent
as the trial in the Galman case was considered a mock trial
owing to the act of a then authoritarian president who
ordered the therein respondents Sandiganba-yan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely monitored the
entire proceedings to assure a predetermined final outcome
of acquittal and total absolution
42 of the respondents-accused
therein of all the charges.
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21,
mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears
repeating that the accused had been arraigned and
convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where
they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day
for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the
information and seek to try again accused for the same
offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of
an information by motion of the prosecution and at the
time when the accused had already been convicted is
contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of
the accused.
_______________
40 G.R. No. 132081, 26 November 2002, 392 SCRA 610.

41 G.R. No. L-72670, 12 September 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
42 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II, G.R. No.
118251, 29 June 2001, 360 SCRA 359.
374

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction,

43 the case of Gulhoran
and Bobares v. Escano, Jr., upon which both trial courts
justified their claim of jurisdiction, was actually based on
this Court’s resolution dated 18 October 1995 where this
Court held:
The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under
Section 32 (2) of B.P. 129, as amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been
increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the fine
(Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that

the imposable penalties applicable to the subject cases are within
the range of prision correccional, a penalty not exceeding six
years, thus falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
MTC. It follows that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the charges against petitioners.
If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it

would seem that the Metropolitan Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case under the first Information.
Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996
of the RTC Branch 103 was rendered without jurisdiction,
thus, accused may not invoke the right against double
jeopardy.
Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the
fact that a later resolution superseding the resolution cited
by the trial courts, specifically Administrative Order No.
51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction
to try Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572. The resolution
provides:
RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS

DRUGS, CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A.
NO. 7659
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of

speedy and efficient administration of justice and subject to the
guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial
_______________
43 G.R. No. L-119135, 18 October 1995.
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Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and

decide cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN
BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, AND
VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and
penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659, committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions:
...
11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE

JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR.
Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August

1996, Re: Clarification on the applicability of Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 in relation to
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:
. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in

Administrative Order No. 5-96, to read:
Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of

speedy administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter
set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby
designated to exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY
COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION,
VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.
This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion44 of

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco:
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved

and the penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as
applied/interpreted in People vs. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July
1994, 234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691
expanding the
_______________
44 G.R. No. 110592, 23 January 1996, 252 SCRA 135, 149.
376

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and
R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor modified this Section.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

Granted. The Orders dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April
1997 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is
ordered Dismissed. Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix 45
Banisa are forthwith ordered released from detention

unless there may be valid reasons for their further

detention.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.

and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, orders dated February 14, 1997 and

April 16, 1997 of RTC of Quezon City, Branch 76 set aside.
Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 dismissed.
Note.—The doctrine that “double jeopardy may not be

invoked after trial” may apply only when the Court finds
that the “criminal trial was a sham” because the
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the
criminal case was denied due process. (People vs. Velasco,
340 SCRA 207 [2000])
——o0o——
_______________
45 Records, p. 260.
377
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Lasoy Et Al v. Zeñarosa, G.R. No. 129472, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 360

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Lasoy Et Al v. Zeñarosa, G.R. No. 129472, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 360

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9/15/23, 1:38 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 455

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005.

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, petitioners, vs.

Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Requisites to Invoke

Same; Same; Same; An information is valid as long as it

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 361

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa

omissions constitutive thereof.—An information is valid as long as

is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the

Same; Same; Same; Except where the death penalty is

Same; Same; Same; The only instance when double jeopardy

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lasoy vs. Zenarosa

citing the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan that the trial was a

then authoritarian president who ordered the therein respondents

Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs; Jurisdictions; All drug-

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 363

Public Attorney’s Office for petitioners.

After an information has been filed and the accused had

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was

On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried

On the same date, both accused applied for 3 probation under

Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were

3 Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefore And For

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 365

2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed

be admitted and subsequently set for arraignment and trial.” (Emphasis

Resolving the motions,

The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as

Another Order of the same date issued by the trial court

The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well

The amended Information reads:

6 Records, pp. 48-49.

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried

This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the

Both 12accused filed a Motion to Quash which was

In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997,

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 367

dated 16 April 1997. Hence, the instant Petition for

restraining order based on the following grounds:

A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE

THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION AND,

DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-66799.

In this Court’s resolution dated 23 July 1997, respondents

submitted their memoranda,

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The issues boil down to whether or not the first information

On the issue of validity of the information, accused and

. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier

Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 369

Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by

It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of