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The American Balanced Scorecard Versus the French Tableau de Bord:

The Ideological Dimension
Article in Management Accounting Research · June 2004

DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2003.12.006
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Management Accounting Research 15 (2004) 107–134
The American balanced scorecard versus the French tableau de

bord: the ideological dimension
Annick Bourguignon a , Véronique Malleret b , Hanne Nørreklit c,∗
a
ESSEC Business School, 95021 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France
b
HEC School of Management, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France
c
Aarhus School of Business, Fuglesangs Allé 4, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
Received 15 March 2001; accepted 2 December 2003
Abstract
Much attention is currently given to strategic measurement systems, the balanced scorecard being by far the
most highly profiled among them. The balanced scorecard has not, however, received a particularly warm welcome
in France, where the tableau de bord has been used for at least 50 years. This paper investigates the ideological
assumptions of the two methods, the aim being to explain the differences between them and investigate the extent
to which the ideological assumptions are coherent with the local ideologies of American and French society,
respectively. The paper concludes that the main differences between the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord
may be explained in terms of ideological assumptions, which means that, to a large extent, these management tools
are coherent with the local ideologies in the countries of origin. In addition, this analysis provides some insight
into the more general question of the transferability of management methods and the appropriateness of globalising
management theories.
© 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Ideology; Balanced scorecard; Tableau de bord; Performance measurement; Fair contract; Honour
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem
The balanced scorecard has attracted a great deal of attention, especially in the United States (Ittner
and Larcker, 1998), but also in many other countries (Malmi, 2001; Ax and Bjørnenak, 2000). In France,
however, enthusiasm has been limited. Thus, a recent comparative European survey (Gehrke and Horváth,
∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +45-8948-6377; fax: +45-8948-6125.
E-mail addresses: bourguignon@essec.fr (A. Bourguignon), malleret@hec.fr (V. Malleret), hann@asb.dk (H. Nørreklit).
1044-5005/$ – see front matter © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.mar.2003.12.006
108 A. Bourguignon et al. / Management Accounting Research 15 (2004) 107–134
2002) shows that firms in Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy are familiar with the balanced scorecard
98, 83 and 72% of the responding companies, respectively—but in France it was known to only 41% of
the responding firms. In Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, approximately 20% of the companies
in each of the three countries aimed to implement the balanced scorecard, whereas in France this was
true of only 3%, or one company. One of the explanations for the French reluctance to adopt the balanced
scorecard may be that, for the past 50 years at least, French firms have used the tableau de bord (literally,
the “dashboard”), which 100% of the French companies in the survey (Gehrke and Horváth, 2002)
reported that they used. The tableau de bord is in many ways similar to the balanced scorecard, and some
authors have even suggested that, being a precursor of the balanced scorecard, it may have inspired its
development (Chiapello and Lebas, 1996).
The reaction to the balanced scorecard has not been very warm among academics either and the
following excerpt, which concludes a comparative article, seems to be quite illustrative: “In France, we
have developed the practice of the tableau de bord over more than 50 years compared to six in the States
[spent on developing the balanced scorecard]. Instead of importing a new North-American tool [the
balanced scorecard] without any changes, let us try to understand the reasons for and the conditions of its
creation. And let us follow the words of the poet Valéry, ‘We shall only be enriched by our differences’ ”
(Mendoza and Zrihen, 1999a).
This paper aims to understand some of the French reluctance to the balanced scorecard. Admittedly,
one of the reasons for French companies’ not knowing about the balanced scorecard may be explained
by translation problems. Thus, the title of Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) book The balanced scorecard has
been translated into Tableau de bord prospectif, which may create confusion between the two approaches.
Another reason for the French reluctance is that the traditional tableau de bord, is a presumably fairly
well functioning system with some similarities with the scorecard. However, this reluctant attitude to
American management practices is not untypical in France. The implementation in France of Activity
Based Costing (ABC) (Lebas and Mévellec, 1999) and management by objectives (Franck, 1973) also
seems to have been problematic. Sometimes, the scepticism towards American management approaches
is vigorously voiced: “The French tradition has never accepted the ‘myth’ developed by large North
American businesses such as, first, Dupont and, then, ITT, that financial numbers can serve as a surrogate
for process information and that businesses can be run on the basis of such numbers”(Chiapello and
Lebas, 1996).
This suggests that the explanation for the resistance is not to be found in technical issues alone. Indeed,
French authors point out that the balanced scorecard does not fit the French way of managing firms. Their
claim is, inter alia, that the “mechanical” top-down deployment of the balanced scorecard disregards the
“incremental and collective construction” of strategy in France, which is consistent with the existence of
local “margins of freedom” in that country (Mendoza and Zrihen, 1999a,b). Besides, France, unlike the
United States, has no long tradition of performance-based remuneration. Thus, Malo (1995) associates
the differences between the two performance measurement systems with radically different ways of
cooperating in the two cultures.
Looking at the influence the other way around, the American reaction to the tableau de bord has been
almost absent. There is no translation into English of the original tableau de bord and the American
interest in the tableau de bord or in any comparison with the balanced scorecard appears to be limited to
a few exceptions (Gray and Pesqueux, 1993; Epstein and Manzoni, 1997).
We suggest that the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord, which originated in the United States
and France, respectively, bear the marks of the respective ideologies of these two countries. As will be
A. Bourguignon et al. / Management Accounting Research 15 (2004) 107–134 109
explained below, by ideology we understand beliefs, knowledge and ideas serving to maintain social
order, i.e., to construct hierarchies, to make people obey as well as to cope with uncertainty. Our claim is
that any society has its own distinctive ideology, i.e., ideologies differ among capitalist societies, and that
the distinctive ideology of a society is embedded in the rules and methods used for the purposes of that
society’s collective action. Furthermore, we argue that management methods are tools that can contribute
to constructing hierarchies, making people obey and coping with uncertainty, and that they rely on implicit
ideas about how to create social order, which we refer to as the ideological assumptions of management
methods. We assume that, to a certain degree, the unique ideology of a given society is embedded in
the management methods created and developed in local organisations; i.e., to a certain extent, locally
developed management methods are aligned with the specific beliefs of the local society regarding social
order. This implies that the ideological assumptions of a management method transferred from one place
to another may be more or less coherent with the ideology of the new place: thus, the transferred method
may subvert the existing social order, which may explain local resistance to the technique. The paper
investigates the degree of coherence of the tableau de bord and the balanced scorecard with the general
beliefs underlying the ways of creating and maintaining social order in French and American society; we
shall label these beliefs French and American ideology, respectively. Specifically, the research questions
are the following: (i) Is the ideology embedded in the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord,
respectively, coherent with American ideology? (ii) Is the ideology embedded in the balanced scorecard
and the tableau de bord, respectively, coherent with French ideology?
The paper concludes that the main differences between the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord
may be explained in terms of ideological assumptions, which means that, to a large extent, these manage-
ment tools are coherent with the local ideologies in the countries of origin. We do not claim that the lack of
coherence between the ideological assumptions of management methods and local ideologies is the only
explanation for the limited use, in France, of the balanced scorecard and, in the U.S., of the tableau the
bord; our only claim is that it is part of the explanation. Another part of the explanation may be the different
institutional environments in the two countries (Abrahamson, 1991; Alvarez, 1998; Gehrke and Horváth,
2002); but as will be seen below the institutional environment in a country also bears the marks of its ideol-
ogy. We suggest, however, that understanding the ideological issues may be crucial for the effectiveness of
control systems, i.e., for their ability to make people act in the best interest of the organisation. This means
that, when management approaches are transferred and insufficient consideration given to their ideologi-
cal assumptions, they are likely to miss their objectives and to prove very disappointing. More generally,
our results have implications for the construction and implementation of management systems: the im-
portance of local ideology should be recognised, especially in the case of systems created and developed
in ideologically different environments. Finally, the results give rise to a comment on the implications
for French ideology of the globalisation of mainly American management methods (Alvarez, 1998).
1.2. The conception of ideology—an uncritical perspective
The concept of ideology may be traced back to Antoine Destutt de Tracy, a Frenchman who used it to
describe the scientific study of ideas. Napoleon argued against the ideas of de Tracy and his supporters,
accusing them of being Idéologues (Billig, 1982, p. 12) and thus giving ideology connotations of not
relating to the real processes of life. These negative connotations were reinforced by critical Marxism
in that, according to Marx, ideology concerns the creation of illusions. Thus, ideology is seen as a false
consciousness created by the ruling class to legitimise and reproduce the social system (Tinker et al.,
1982; Giddens, 1979, 1989; Arnold and Hammond, 1994; Alvarez, 1998, pp. 28–29); it is only “reflexes”
and “echoes” of the real processes of life, serving the interests of the dominant class (Ricoeur, 1986).
Ideology as a more neutral concept was advocated by Mannheim (1952), who does not claim that ideology
is an illusion created with cynical intent by the ruling class. In Mannheim’s view (1952), ideology, not
unlike the Marxist conception, is knowledge intended to integrate and conserve social order; yet no social
group can avoid selfish interest, with the possible exception of intellectuals, who may at least avoid it in
their arguments. As a matter of fact, “real processes” are integrated with selfish interest because, as we
grow up, we learn about the world and how to interact with it, which is intimately intertwined with our
goals and wishes (Arbib and Hesse, 1986). From such a more neutral perspective, ideology is generally
viewed as a necessary expression of society and not as something imposed or bad, which should not be
taken to mean that it disallows criticism of the social structure underlying the ideology of a given society
(Arbib and Hesse, 1986). In other words, a neutral conception of ideology does not exclude its being
linked with power and domination (Neimark, 1992, p. 97).
The present study draws on such a rather neutral conception of ideology and not on a critical one. By
ideology, we understand the different types of ideas, knowledge and beliefs employed in order to inte-
grate a social order into a society or an organisation and to keep or change that order (Thompson, 1984,
pp. 4, 76). Ideology encompasses different areas of knowledge organised to a coherent whole; it includes
both “factual” descriptions and analyses of the world and the ways in which people interact in it as well
as normative action-oriented dimensions, e.g., moral prescriptions and life goal standards (Mannheim,
1952; Seliger, 1976; Thompson, 1984; Arbib and Hesse, 1986). Such a mixture of related “factual” and
normative elements gives ideology its action-encouraging appeal and effectiveness (Thompson, 1984,
p. 78); it becomes highly practical and not illusionary. Furthermore, ideology is perceived as concern-
ing the integration (Ricoeur, 1986) of the life and acts of the individual. Thus, it contributes to making
“sense of the world ‘out there’ and helps individuals to deal meaningfully and realistically with it (. . . )”
(Geertz, 1973; Alvarez, 1998, p. 28); in modern life ideology provides a “symbolic outlet” for emotional
disturbance generated by our uncertain and stressful world (Geertz, 1973; Alvarez, 1998, p. 30). Un-
certainty may be coped with by creating reliability in the context of daily social interactions either by
having trust in authorities such as traditional modes of practice, local communities and kinship systems
creating a protective cocoon around a person or by abstract systems such as expert systems and sym-
bolic tokens (Giddens, 1991).1 In conditions of high modernity, social relations tend to be disembedded
1
The concept of uncertainty is introduced in Giddens’ (1991) work on Modernity and Self-Identity, in which he, e.g., analyses
the differences between premodern and modern societies. In his analysis, Giddens discusses different ways of coping with
uncertainty in highly modern versus premodern societies. In our view, the concept is appropriate for analysing and illustrating
differences between current societies. We do not use Giddens’ framework for analysing societies, however, and we do not
subscribe to his rather critical perspective on ideology (Giddens, 1979, 1989). It should also be noted that the concept of
uncertainty applied by Giddens (1991) is different from that used by Hofstede (1984). Giddens (1991) assumes that the need
for coping with uncertainty may be the same in all forms of societies, but the methods by which uncertainty is managed may
be different. Hofstede (1984, p. 110) assumes that some cultures show greater tolerance of uncertainty than others, e.g., France
avoids uncertainty more than the U.S. does. It should also be noted that, when examining the level of uncertainty avoidance,
Hofstede (1984, p. 121) asks questions relating to the extent to which the employees feel nervous or tense at work, intend to
continue with the company or agree that company rules should be broken. Thus a mixture of dimensions are measured where
the first question may be related to the employees’ feelings of uncertainty and the last two are related rather to the extent to
which uncertainty is managed by the “authorities”. No questions seem to concern the extent to which abstract systems are used.
Therefore, as France has a high score on uncertainty avoidance and the U.S. a low one, it is an indication that France very much
manages uncertainty through authorities and that the U.S. does not. As will be seen below this is also what our analysis suggests.
outside personal connections and traditions and instead restructured across time and space (Giddens,
1991). Consequently, there are only few determinant authorities to trust, but there exist many abstract
systems establishing routine forms which contribute to making people cope with uncertainty although
there is constantly doubt with respect to the reliability of these systems (Giddens, 1991, p. 194). Uncer-
tainty may also be managed through the provision of income, status and personal belongings (Boltanski
and Chiapello, 1999, p. 53), which may be determined by authorities such as tradition and social be-
longings or by abstract systems such as management systems. In sum, ideology may be related to
three dimensions which all serve the purpose of our analysis, ideology being concerned with ways
in which to make hierarchies and in which to make people obey as well as with how to cope with
uncertainty.
An ideology is expressed within the whole structure of interactions among the individuals of a society,
their institutions, and their artefacts. Implicitly it relies on individual, more or less conscious, cognitive
models which are socially learned. Similarly to language, however, the ideology of a society can only be
imperfectly represented within the mind of any given individual and will be represented in different ways in
different individuals. We do not assume ideology to have any external objective reality like the physical
world; growing up in a society, however, people accommodate their cognitive schemas in accordance
with the social knowledge, beliefs and ideas of that society: the local ideology shapes their individual
cognitive models in a powerful way (Arbib and Hesse, 1986). Consequently, we may assume that the
ideology underlying a social order differs from place to place and, hence, that societies, organisations and
social groups may have different ideologies. Thus, beliefs regarding social order, i.e., ideology, are locally
anchored (d’Iribarne et al., 1998, p. 8). We therefore think it reasonable for the purposes of this analysis
to assume that there is a French ideology and an American ideology ruling social order in France and the
United States, respectively. Furthermore, we think it is reasonable to assume that ideology is embedded
in the institutional networks of a society, which constitute a sort of organised whole in which all forces
are so tightly connected and integrated that nobody can really escape them (Latour, 1987). Consequently,
this view does not subscribe to the critical Marxist perspective, which involves the cynical intention of
the ruling class in the construction of the ideology of a society.
In organizations, ideologies are embedded not only in the employees’ and the managers’ minds, but
also in management devices; thus management methods implicitly rely on ideological assumptions,
i.e., some specific beliefs, knowledge and ideas regarding the creation or maintenance of social order
(Mannheim, 1952; Burchell et al., 1980; Tinker et al., 1982; Arnold and Hammond, 1994; Boltanski
and Chiapello, 1999, p. 94). Specifically in organizations, ideologies include “all those ideas which are
espoused by or for those who exercise authority in economic enterprises, and which seek to explain and
justify that authority” (Bendix, 1956). Management techniques may create and validate the normative
order of a society and justify individuals as well as social constructions, making their actions plausible and
acceptable (Richardson, 1987). Despite the neutrality of our approach, we do not exclude the possibility
that management techniques may be used to legitimate the body in power, but our position is that this
is not their only purpose. More specifically, we suggest that management techniques may be necessary
for the implementation of some rational order in organizations and for promoting among employees the
willingness to and acceptance of the necessity for cooperation and obedience (Selznick, 1957; Alvarez,
1998, p. 30). Furthermore, management techniques may legitimate the manager and reduce feelings of
uncertainty. Thus, managers have to legitimate their position to their organizations and, hence, their
exercise of authority. In addition, they have to legitimate their position to the environment (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977), and they have to convince themselves that they are able to cope with uncertainty and able
to establish sufficient security to act—they need a symbolic outlet to deal with the emotional disturbance
generated by the environment.
There is a need for creating some kind of normative order and for legitimising and coping with uncer-
tainty everywhere (Giddens, 1991); however, the means and ways of doing so differ according to societies.
As local ideology may furthermore be reflected in management practices as well as in local institutions
(Latour, 1987; Burchell et al., 1980), we suggest that the importance of management instruments and other
means of ideological embeddedness differ across societies. Specifically, the role of management account-
ing with respect to creating social order may differ from one place to another. Furthermore, we assume
that ideologies surreptitiously imposed through the management techniques in which they are embedded
will, in a given local group, succeed to the extent that they exclude conflicting schemas from consideration
which would make their reality appear untenable (Arbib and Hesse, 1986). Thus, when a management
technique is transferred to a new place, there has to be a certain level of coherence between the ideology em-
bedded in the management technique transferred and the ideology of the locality to which it is transferred.
In sum, management methods as instruments of ideology inscription concern not only the issues of
authority, hierarchy and obedience but also those of legitimacy and uncertainty. These issues are also
potentially dealt with by institutions, which are alternative instruments of ideology embedding. As ide-
ology is locally anchored, however, each social group has a unique way of inscribing its own ideology,
i.e., of forming and combining various means of ideology embedding. We suggest that the importance
of management instruments and other means of ideological embeddedness differ across societies and
organisations, but in any organisation, the ideology embedded in the management methods has to be at
least minimally coherent with the ideology of the organisation in order to meet with acceptance.
An ideological perspective on management and accounting systems is not an entirely new phenomenon
although it may not always be labelled ideology (Weber, 1947; Tinker et al., 1982; Richardson, 1987;
Arnold and Hammond, 1994). Most research focuses on the ideological nature of accounting, i.e., on
how accounting is used to legitimise dominant positions. For instance, Tinker et al. (1982) have unveiled
how positive theories of accounting are actually value-laden and support social order; Neimark (1992,
p. 100) has explained how annual reports are used “to create, sustain and reflect ideological structures”;
and Arnold and Hammond (1994) have widened the frame of “dominant positions” in showing how
accounting disclosure could be used in debates by both parties to legitimate their claims. This paper
adopts a radically different perspective. It does not look at how the management techniques interact in
a specific power struggle process but at the extent to which the ideological assumptions embedded in
management devices are coherent with the ideology in France and the U.S., respectively. Furthermore,
although it has been demonstrated that feudal societies are seen to require feudal accounting systems and
capitalist societies capitalist modes of accounting (Rose, 1977; Burchell et al., 1980), we think that our
focus on ideology across different capitalist societies is rather new. With respect to the focus on different
societies, it should be noted that ideology differs from culture as, e.g., defined by Hofstede (1984);
though culture also includes values and beliefs that rule social groups, it differs from ideology in being
a behavioural concept whereas ideology is a cognitive concept. In addition, culture has a wider scope
than ideology as it includes beliefs which are not related to social order. Finally, as management control
is to a large extent concerned with constructing social order, an ideological perspective may contribute
to deepening our understanding of some of the resistance against some management techniques in a
specific society; we therefore use the same underlying concepts for understanding the collective actions
of a certain society and the management technique in question, which should reveal coherence problems
more directly.
1.3. Method
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the common points and differences between
the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord. Sections 3 and 4 present the radically different local
ideologies of the United States and France, respectively, which shape the American and the French way
of creating social order. In addition to the description of the ideologies of these societies, we present an
analysis of the role of management techniques in each society and of how the respective ideologies are
consistent with the ideological assumptions of the two techniques considered here. The conclusion in
Section 5 offers a synthesis of this work and discusses its implications.
The analysis of the technical differences between the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord
is based on literature studies. Literature is considered a relevant source for any attempt to study the
ideological differences between the tableau de bord and the balanced scorecard because they reveal the
spirit of these management control methods. The management literature tells managers how to act and
the way this is told reveals aspects of the ideology embedded in the models (Boltanski and Chiapello,
1999, p. 94). Alternatively, one might use case studies. Such studies, however, reveal aspects of both the
ideology of a specific company and the ideological assumptions of the measurement systems, which may
make it difficult to disentangle the two. In addition, local studies may create a rather fragmented picture
(Arbib and Hesse, 1986), whereas a literature-based analysis, such as the one suggested, offers a more
general framework. A literature-based study, however, is only a first step on the road, calling for further
conceptualisation and empirical examination for the investigation to gain more validity.
With a view to understanding the ideologies of the two societies considered, we examine the basic
foundations of social relations in France and the United States. We use d’Iribarne (1989), who proposed
the images of “a fair contract” and “honour” to characterise the social relationships in French and American
society. The two concepts illustrate the underlying philosophy of the social order. As the concepts are
rooted in the philosophical thoughts of Locke (1689a,b) and Rousseau (1762), who each influenced the
American and the French constitution, respectively, we elaborate the description by including some of
their thoughts in order to enhance understanding. We also draw on the work of Weber (1947) to explain
the work ethic of the American society and the work of Bourdieu (1989, 1996) to describe the social
forces of modern France.
We have chosen d’Iribarne’s (1989) approach to describe the ideologies of the two countries because his
ethnographic investigations show that “honour” and “the fair contract” are still active concepts in today’s
French and American companies, respectively. Further, d’Iribarne’s approach makes it possible to study
ideology from the point of view of each country. Thus, we look at how to create or maintain social order
in a society, using that society’s own concepts, which differs from, e.g., Hofstede’s (1984) approach for
cultural analysis, which uses concepts that are uniform across societies. Describing the concepts which
are constitutive of the ideologies of the two societies allows us to uncover their different ways of creating
social order and thus to increase our understanding of this issue (Dumont, 1977; Boltanski and Chiapello,
1999, p. 98). However, as a result of the use of non-uniform descriptions the sections describing French
and U.S. ideologies are not of the same length.
As ideology is a very comprehensive concept (Eagleton, 1991), this paper does not offer an exhaustive
review of French and American ideologies; their primary characteristics have been selected, however,
because of their relevance to explaining, at a rather general level, the differences between the ways in
which the relation between the individual and the other is governed in these two countries; i.e., our focus
is on the political thoughts related to the constitution of each of these societies. A major risk involved in
describing an ideology is always that of simplification. First, the very attempt at describing “social reality”
is a source of simplification. Second, societies consist of not entirely homogeneous groups and thus of
unequally convergent subideologies: there are many differences among the Americans and as many among
the French. Finding a counter-example to a general statement is very often possible; and disregarding
subideologies leads to exaggerated simplification or, in other words, stereotyping. Third, it may be argued
that ideology changes over time and that, due to what has become known as “globalisation”, the ideological
beliefs of today’s managers and other dominant employees are becoming almost homogenous. Indeed,
describing the essence of the ideology of a society or a company is difficult. The position of this paper is
that, to some extent, the inertia of the ideology of any given society seems to persist over time, but the
internationalisation of companies activates more than one ideology in the same company, making the real
life situation quite complex. Neglecting the comparative ideological perspective would, however, imply
the reification of management approaches—which may be more problematic.
The analysis of coherence adopted here is basically analytical. An analytical approach aims at increasing
the level of clarity and precision in the concepts used for analysing and understanding social reality. This
is a necessity if we are to understand and discuss the constitutive use of management methods in the social
world in which we live (Nørreklit, 1986). Furthermore, being a rational matter, an analytical approach is
appropriate as coherence implies that the ideological assumptions of the management model and the local
ideology of the society have to be logically consistent, compatible and non-contradictory (Edwards, 1972,
pp. 2–130). On the other hand, an analytical approach may be criticised for being speculative and not
being based on empirical observation, but the problem raised in this paper is empirically founded as are
the theories used to describe ideologies. As any explanation of empirical results involves logic, however,
and therefore cannot be found ‘objectively in the world’, any explanation of an empirical phenomenon
will, to a certain extent, be speculation (Wittgenstein, 1921). We aim to justify our explanations with a
fairly detailed analysis, but not one that completely avoids apparent paradoxes and inconsistencies. To
a certain extent, this will probably always be the case in social science as the social world is complex
and imperfect. Our model is indeed reductive and we do not claim that it is a complete description of
the ideologies and issues considered. Nevertheless, it may contribute to increased understanding of the
forces involved in the actual application of management control.
2. Similarities and differences between the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord
Below, we briefly review the main elements of the two approaches and then indicate their common
points and differences.
2.1. The balanced scorecard
The balanced scorecard has to be understood in the light of the still increasing criticism levelled
against the financial measures of accounting systems. The criticism has, in part, focused on their historic
nature, which ensures that they reveal a great deal about the company’s past actions but nothing about
its future alertness (Merchant, 1985; Dearden, 1987; Kaplan and Norton, 1996). The lack of future
orientation may be aggravated when the situation of a company is such that it feels forced to pursue
short-term financial results rather than the long-term goals of the organisation (Dearden, 1969; Merchant,
1985; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). In addition, attention has focused on strategy implementation, which
causes problems in many firms (Kiechel, 1984; Mintzberg, 1994), the risk being that the strategic plan
remains remote from the company’s day-to-day actions. These two interrelated problems have led to the
development of a large number of strategic measuring tools which involve not only financial but also
non-financial measures (McNair et al., 1990; Kaplan and Norton, 1992). The balanced scorecard (Kaplan
and Norton, 1992, 1996) is such another model, which integrates financial and non-financial strategic
measures.
The balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) translates the vision and strategy of a busi-
ness unit into objectives and performance measures in four different areas: the financial, customer,
internal-business-process, and learning and growth perspectives. Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 31) as-
sume the following causal relationships: measures of organisational learning and growth → measures of
internal business processes → measures of the customer perspective → financial measures. The measures
of organisational learning and growth are therefore the drivers of the measures of the internal business
processes. The measures of these processes are in turn the drivers of the measures of the customer per-
spective, while these measures are the drivers of the financial measures. Each strategic area should have
both lead and lag indicators, yielding two directional cause-and-effect chains: lead and lag indicators
apply horizontally within the areas and vertically between areas. This procedure implies that strategy is
translated into a set of hypotheses about cause and effect (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 30).
The balanced scorecard is not just a strategic measurement system but also a strategic control system
which may be used to: (i) clarify and gain consensus about strategy, (ii) align departmental and personal
goals to strategy, (iii) link strategic objectives to long-term targets and annual budgets, (iv) identify and
align strategic initiatives, and (v) obtain feedback to learn about and improve strategy (Kaplan and Norton,
1996, p. 19).
In order to obtain these results with the balanced scorecard, the company has to start by clarifying and
translating its vision and strategy into specific strategic objectives and measures. The next step includes
(i) the communication of the vision and the strategy to teams and employees; (ii) the translation of
strategic objectives and measures into objectives and measures for teams and employees; and (iii) the
creation of a link between rewards and performance measures. Strategy and vision are communicated
through executive announcements, town meetings, videos, brochures and newsletters. The objectives of
the scorecard are deployed through a kind of analytic decomposition process by which the objectives
of top management cascade to lower levels (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 213). The third step concerns
setting targets, aligning strategic initiatives with objectives and linking budgets with long-term plans. The
final step involves strategic feedback and learning.
Kaplan and Norton (2001), The Strategy-Focused Organization, a more recent publication, illustrates by
means of case studies how some companies have implemented the balanced scorecard: many companies
which have adopted the balanced scorecard have found it useful to have their key management processes
focus on strategy and to align the performance of lower hierarchical levels around overall organizational
goals. As described above, however, Kaplan and Norton (2001) do not suggest any fundamental change
to the balanced scorecard model.
More recent academic research on the balanced scorecard has also analysed the implementation of a
balanced scorecard in specific firms (Butler et al., 1997; Mooraj et al., 1999; Ahn, 2001). These articles
confirm the role of the balanced scorecard in strategy implementation and communication. They also
comment on the lack of precision in the concepts described by Kaplan and Norton, which, e.g., leads the
implementing company to invest more efforts in building an operational tool than suggested by Kaplan
and Norton (Ahn, 2001). Finally, these publications highlight the practical aspects of implementing a new
management information system, which may lead to resistance, confusion between, or multiplication of,
indicators, and which requires, at least, that the users adapt to the new performance measures.
In addition, a number of field studies of the balanced scorecard have been undertaken (Malmi, 2001;
Maltz et al., 2003; Olson and Slater, 2002). Malmi (2001), in an article dedicated to the diffusion of the
balanced scorecard in Finnish firms, reports on the diversity of the performance measurement systems
labelled balanced scorecards as well as on the diversity of the uses made of the tool. Maltz et al. (2003)
explore different measures of success and suggest that these measures are contingent on certain variables
such as the level of technology, the size of the firm and the length of the product life cycle while Olson
and Slater (2002) think that the measures should be adapted to the product-market strategy adopted.
Finally, it should be noted that many of the concepts and relationships suggested and used in the balanced
scorecard are fairly open to interpretation, which leaves plenty of room for the reader’s interpretation
of the model (Nørreklit, 2003). This explains why the literature on the implementation of the balanced
scorecard offers a somewhat less monolithic vision of the tool than that indicated by Kaplan and Norton
(1992, 1996).
2.2. The tableau de bord
The tableau de bord is older than the balanced scorecard as the use of it may be dated back to 1932
(Malo, 1995). It has been changed repeatedly over time and the number of versions of the tableau de bord
almost equals the number of management control authors. Although many definitions of the tableau de
bord may be offered, most authors agree on its main characteristics, which we briefly review below.
According to the tradition of the tableau de bord, it is “a tool for the top management of the firm,
allowing it a global and quick view of its operations and of the state of its environment” (Malo, 1995).
Until the late 1980s, the tableau de bord was basically understood as a “reporting device”, making it
possible to control the realisation of previously fixed objectives, and as a tool for diagnosis, reaction and
hierarchical dialogue (Ardoin et al., 1986, p. 143).
In the early 1990s, the general criticism targeting management accounting and control methods (see,
e.g., Chassang, 1989) did not spare the tableau de bord. The principal purpose of performance measures
was claimed to be to “ensure the coherence of actions and their convergence towards strategic objectives”
(Laverty and Demeestere, 1990, p. 267). Although this point in the evolution of the tableau de bord did not
present a clear break, the main emphasis was now put on action and not, as had previously been the case, on
reporting. This led to the development of causal analyses of performance, which provided the basis of the
design of new tableaux de bord, which have sometimes been presented as the key elements of extensive
“performance management” methods such as the OVAR (Objectifs-Variables d’Action-Responsables,
which means ‘objectives-action variables—responsible persons’) method (Löning et al., 1998).
Although the vocabulary may differ according to authors (Chiapello and Lebas, 1996; Gervais, 2000),
they agree on formulating objectives, action variables and action plans in a causal way. The underlying
assumption is that the achievement of a given objective depends on some action variables (or action levers
or key factors, depending on the author), on the basis of which action plans should be implemented. This
is illustrated in Fig. 1. More specifically, a possible objective is increased machine utilization; the action
variables may be breakdown time, the number of shifts and machine flexibility; the action plans for
breakdown time may be preventive maintenance and first level maintenance.
An action variable has to satisfy three requirements: it has to be controllable, it has to occur before the
objective, and the relation between action variables and objectives has to be a causal one, i.e., if an action
Fig. 1. Relation between objectives, action variables and action plans.
variable occurs, then the probability of the objective following has to be high. It has also been suggested
that the variables which, according to Pareto’s rule (80/20), have the most significant influence on the
achievement of the objective have to be selected (Löning et al., 1998, p. 81)
In general, authors (Ardoin et al., 1986; Lorino, 1997; Gervais, 2000) agree on the need for coherence
among the various tableaux de bord used at the different levels of an organisation, but the coherence may
take on different forms. On the OVAR approach (Löning et al., 1998), for instance, the construction of the
tableau de bord begins at the top management level (level N), at which the overall objectives and action
variables (OVA) of the firm are formulated. Responsibilities (R) are then delegated to level N − 1, which
in turn develops its own OVAR schemes, and so on, down to the lowest levels. As a result, objectives
interlock with action variables (action variables at level N are objectives at any level N −1). Responsibility
center managers are responsible for the choice and definition of their own action variables, which implies
extensive delegation. As each responsibility center manager ‘knows best’, the levels are loosely coupled
and the interaction between the two levels is rather a negotiation than a dialogue. For each objective,
action variable or action plan, a minimum of one performance measure (or indicator) has to be defined.
For each performance measure, a reference standard has to be found, which may be based on historical
results, benchmarks or objectives.
Other authors emphasise the need for integrating the various tableaux de bord into a “system” in
order to maintain both “their hierarchical and cross-functional coherence” (Lorino, 1997, p. 243). On
this view, the objectives and performance measures at one level have to be coherent with the objectives
and performance measures at the upper and lower levels. In addition, the objectives and performance
measures associated with an activity (in the sense of ABC) have to be coherent with the global objectives
of the process to which the activity contributes.
In addition, French authors unanimously demand “physical” performance measures to complement
financial measurements, ‘physical’ generally meaning as opposed to financial measurements. Apart from
quality measures (the percentage of late deliveries, the breakdown ratio, etc.), the tableau de bord also
includes social measures (the absenteeism ratio, climate indices, etc.), customer-oriented measures (sat-
isfaction indices, penetration rates, etc.) and process-oriented measures (production time, the accuracy
of sales estimates, etc.).
Most authors also insist on including a learning perspective according to which the measures represent
a basis for learning about the cause-and-effect relationships of actions (Lorino, 1999). The basic idea
is that, if realised performance does not meet the standard, the cause for this should be found and the
problem solved (single-loop learning), but the path should also be questioned (double-loop learning)
(Lebas, 1980; Löning et al., 1998, p. 93).
2.3. Similarities and differences between the tableau de bord and the balanced scorecard
As the tableau de bord and the balanced scorecard translate visions and strategies into objectives and
measures, they may both be categorised as strategic management tools. They both take anticipation to be
more important than reaction and aim at avoiding the monopoly of financial accounting by supplementing
financial measurements with non-financial measurements. The approach of both models is to try to link
top management decisions to the actions of the employees, and the processes of both models work
hierarchically top-down. In addition, they both recommend selectivity with respect to measures so as to
avoid surplus information (Mendoza and Zrihen, 1999a).
They differ, however, in their underlying strategic concept. The balanced scorecard uses Michael
Porter’s model (Porter, 1980, 1985) and builds on four pre-categorised areas of measurements. It should
be noted, however, that Kaplan and Norton (1996) claim that the four areas of measurements are not to be
perceived as a constraining “straitjacket” and that other areas may be added if necessary. The tableau de
bord does not explicitly rely on any specific strategic model and areas of measurements but on managers’
conception of strategy; this means that the manager’s subjectivity and the environment may play a major
part in the design of the area of measurements in the tableau de bord, whereas the balanced scorecard is
more a tool with predetermined categories. The lack of predetermined categories in the tableau de bord
may be part of the explanation why Epstein and Manzoni (1997) found that the tableau de bord is more
complicated than the balanced scorecard in terms of practical application.2 The predetermined categories
of the balanced scorecard may, however, prevent it from becoming sufficiently company-adapted. In
addition, building on Michael Porter’s model (1980, 1985), the approach of the balanced scorecard works
from the outside in, i.e., from the customers to the internal processes; the approach does not have a
resource-based perspective (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) working from the inside out. As the tableau
de bord builds on the strategic perspective of the individual managers, it may involve both perspectives.
Unlike what Epstein and Manzoni (1997) have suggested, the model in itself does not have to be internally
oriented with no focus on external benchmarks.
Second, the balanced scorecard assumes cause-and-effect relationships among the four areas of mea-
surements at the strategic level implying the existence of a sort of generic model of performance. This
assumption is essential because it allows the measurements in non-financial areas to be used to predict
future financial performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 8). Thus, it makes the performance mea-
surement system a feed-forward control system (de Haas and Kleingeld, 1999) reducing the problem of
2
Since they compare the tableau de bord as it often works in practice with the balanced scorecard as it should work in theory,
their criticism is not, however, entirely just.
the lack of future orientation of accounting data. Among some of the suggested areas of measurements,
e.g., between customer satisfaction and financial performance, there is no cause-and effect relationship
(Nørreklit, 2000), however. As regards the French approach, it does not assume any systematic overall
link between the strategic areas of measurements; the overall strategic objectives may actually be in
conflict in the tableau de bord.
Third, the hierarchical (top-down) processes of constructing the balanced scorecard and the tableau
de bord differ. The balanced scorecard is deployed through an analytical hierarchical top-down process
by which the top-management’s objectives cascade to lower levels (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 213).
Thus, there is no interaction between the levels, and the objectives at level N are an analytical sum of the
objectives at level N −1. In the case of each responsibility center, a kind of manager’s mono-responsibility
is assumed by which one person and that person alone has control over what s/he is made responsible
for and nothing else. In the tableau de bord, the deployment requires interaction and negotiation between
the various levels and includes the local prerogative of choosing local action variables, which is based
on the generally accepted idea that local managers know their own businesses best. The managers build
the whole path on the basis of their own experience and knowledge but, as the managers at each level
know best, conflicts between the two levels may arise. Therefore, the levels in the tableau de bord are
loosely coupled and the interaction between the two levels may take the form of negotiations rather than a
dialogue. There may be a kind of distant management process, insofar as it is not really used “interactively
to create an agenda for discussions and meetings” (Epstein and Manzoni, 1997). It should be noted that
in the tableau de bord, the process is viewed as a means of making managers think in terms of process
orientation instead of responsibility, in collective terms instead of local ones and in cross-functional terms
instead of specialised ones. The tableau de bord does not embrace the idea of mono-responsibility. On the
contrary, a system of shared responsibility is entirely possible, by which several persons are responsible
for the same objectives and nobody is in complete control of the variables for which they are accountable.
Fourth, an important difference between the two approaches is their unequal emphasis on rewards. The
balanced scorecard method strongly encourages the linking of rewards to performance measurement.
The performance measurement system makes qualitative objectives such as quality, customer service,
personnel involvement, etc., quantitative ones. It helps differentiate the basis of rewards, which was
previously limited almost exclusively to financial results, and it apparently does so without abandoning
the invaluable “objectivity” of figures. The tableau de bord has no such emphasis on rewards. Instead,
French authors emphasise learning; if, in the tableau de bord, each performance measure is given a
reference standard, this is for the sake of learning from the reference rather than for controlling on the
basis of the standard. The primary purpose of the tableau de bord is not to make employees accountable
for the results but rather to provide information about past and future occurrences. Another frequent
argument of the proponents of the tableau de bord is that the process of designing it is at least as useful
for improving the management of a company as the outcome of the design process, i.e., the tableau de
bord itself.
Fifth, the balanced scorecard is a fashionable method without a tradition but with a fairly optimistic
rhetoric which encourages managers to “go out and do it” (Alvarez, 1998). In this, it differs from the
tableau de bord, which French companies have a tradition for using, changing and developing. Thus, they
have kept developing the concept for at least 50 years.
In sum, the major similarities between the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord, are the following
two: (i) their use of non-financial measurements for anticipation and control, and (ii) their linking top
management strategic decisions to the actions of the employees. The major differences pointed out
between the balanced scorecard and the tableau de bord may be reduced to the following five: (i) their
different underlying strategic concepts, (ii) their different causal performance models, (iii) their different
modes of deploying objectives and indicators in the organisation, (iv) their different relationships between
performance measures and rewards in terms of tightness, and (v) their different traditions. The similarities
may testify to the fact that the need for anticipation and for implementing strategies is probably true
everywhere, but the way of dealing with anticipation and the way of making people implement strategies
are not the same, which explains the differences. These are discussed below in relation to the differences
between the local ideologies of the French and American societies.
3. Ideology in the United States
This part analyses whether American ideology is coherent with the ideological assumptions of the
balanced scorecard and those of the tableau de bord. Section 3.1 describes the logic of the American fair
contract while Section 3.2 concerns the status of management techniques in the United States. The final
Section 3.3 discusses the match between, on the one hand, the American ideology and, on the other hand,
the balanced scorecard or the tableau de bord.
3.1. The American fair contract
Drawing on Tocqueville (1856), d’Iribarne (1989) proposed the image of a “fair contract” to characterise
the social relationships in American society. Everybody is expected to act freely under contracts which
s/he chooses to be committed to and under a general moral claim to fairness (d’Iribarne, 1989, p. 159).
A contract is an agreement between freely engaging persons.
This contractual model of social relationships, which prevails in the United States, has been in-
spired by the ideals of the founding acts of the early emigrants (d’Iribarne, 1989). In 1620, the Pil-
grim Fathers established a society through an act which was explicitly called The Mayflower Compact
(http://www.apatriot.8m.com/FoundingDocuments.html). As it was explicitly concluded “in the name of
God”, it was not only a contract but a compact. As the founding act mentions “Laws, Ordinances, Acts,
Constitutions and Rulings” as well as “Submission and Obedience” towards installed magistrates, the
conviction clearly was that institutions and procedures should govern society. Furthermore, freedom was
a moral concept which did not involve doing just anything desirable but “doing without fear what is fair
and good” (Tocqueville, 1856; d’Iribarne, 1989, p. 162). Thus, in American society, freedom is given
very high, almost sacred, status.
Furthermore, the contractual model has been influenced by the philosophy of Locke (1689a,b), who
described “the social contract” and influenced the thoughts of those who wrote the American Declaration
of Independence (1776) and the Constitution of the United States of America (1787) (http://www.apatriot.
8m.com/FoundingDocuments.html). Locke (1689b) advocated the equality and freedom of the individual,
freedom implying that a person’s labour belongs to that person unless s/he freely contracts it to someone
else. The purpose of the contract was to regulate and remove conflicts (Locke, 1689b); thus the contractual
ideal is associated with great mistrust of the arbitrariness of power and with great faith in the recourse to
the formulation of objective rules as a means of avoiding arbitrariness (Locke, 1689a). The ruling power
should govern on the basis of laws and not impulsive dictates because, where the law stops, tyranny
begins. As an individual, one has no other obligations than to respect the fair contract, but the idea of
a moral code of obligations (Locke, 1689a) implies that there has to be a minimum amount of morality
based on the will of God in the actions of the individual.
The American concept of fairness emphasises the opportunity which any individual has to work his
or her way up from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. This hierarchy reflects values such as work
and achievement; anyone who works hard enough (skills being assumed) will be socially successful.
This spirit is supported by the assumption that the U.S. is the land of opportunities as well as by the
work ethic of the Protestants (Weber, 1947), which dominates the roots of the United States; not only
were many of the first emigrants Puritans (http://teacher.scholastic.com/thanksgiving/index.html), but
John Locke also had a Puritan background (Audi, 1995). According to the ethic of some Protestants,
working is a virtue, and success in one’s achievements may be seen as a sign that one has been chosen
for salvation (Weber, 1947). Similarly, in the United States, honour is attributed in accordance with the
logic that associates moral virtue with a fair exchange, which may be described as the “ideal of the pious
merchants” (d’Iribarne, 1989, p. 161).
Although many of them date back some hundred years, these thoughts may still explain people’s
interaction in modern companies. Thus, d’Iribarne (1989, p. 162) observes that fair treatment of the
individual is generally associated with (i) appropriate rewards of a person’s contribution at work and with
(ii) the idea of everybody being treated equally. In principle, the American ideology still favours a society
where hierarchies do not depend on birth rights and which is governed by fairness: those who contribute
are supposed to be fairly rewarded. The consequence of this concern with fairness is the demand that
judgment be based on well-established facts and not on the opinions of authorities (d’Iribarne, 1996/1997),
i.e., abstract systems rather than tradition serve to reduce the feeling of uncertainty. In addition, by working
one’s way up through a hierarchy, one reduces uncertainty by gaining security in terms of income, status
and belongings.
In sum, the “fair contract” is an ideological representation in that it implicitly supports social order,
i.e., the construction of hierarchies, authority and obedience and the coping with uncertainty.
3.2. The role and status of management techniques in the United States
In the United States, many local management techniques seem to be consistent with belief in the “fair
contract”. More specifically, the relationship between a manager and a subordinate at an American com-
pany may be perceived as the ideal of a client and a supplier freely entering a contract, i.e., the structure
of organizations is seen as an interlocking set of contractual relationships in which great importance is at-
tached to the decentralisation of decision making (d’Iribarne, 1996/1997). Such a hierarchical contractual
relationship may be seen as the idea embedded in decentralized management control (DuPont drawing
on Chandler and Salsbury, 1971; Solomons, 1965; Anthony, 1965; Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998),
where top managers define the overall goals of the companies, which are then deployed to lower levels.
It might also be noted that agency theory perceives the life of the company and the relationship between
the principal and the agent as a contractual relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These approaches
attach major importance to the definition of goals and objectives at all hierarchical levels and to the
methods of evaluation and rewards, which is consistent with the fact that managing ‘contracts’ between
persons requires methods for measuring and rewarding work and achievement. The concern with fairness,
by which each individual is judged on well-established facts and not on opinions, is also consistent with
the contractual ideals as is the fact that the activity of monitoring and control is seen as an obvious and
positive activity. In American firms, rewards linked to results go far beyond monetary compensation,
however, and include, inter alia, job security, promotions, autonomy, and recognition (Merchant, 1998,
p. 69). It should also be noted that the American ideology is embedded in U.S. business practice; it
is opportunity-seeking, challenging the authority of tradition, which implies that uncertainty has to be
managed by the routines and prescripts of expert systems (Giddens, 1991), i.e., management systems. In
brief, management is a social field in the United States, where it embodies the ideal of the fair contract;
and management techniques are the very means by which the contract is implemented.
Management techniques supporting the fair contract, this may serve to explain why management is
a highly respectable field in the United States, where management techniques and management educa-
tion have great credibility. A Master in Business Administration (MBA) degree may lead directly to a
high-ranking management position; top managers at leading companies come from prestigious business
schools and, because of their educational background, believe in management techniques. Similarly, the
status of management education institutions is high, which legitimates the management techniques they
develop; the diffusion of these techniques relies on managers and consultants with an MBA degree and,
consequently, a high social position, which in turn maintains the high status of management education in-
stitutions (Alvarez, 1998). This is the virtual circle of the status of management and management methods
in the United States.
3.3. The coherence of American ideology with the balanced scorecard and with the tableau de bord
As was noted above, the balanced scorecard with its focus on performance measurements and rewards
matches the American ideological concept of the fair contract. The contribution and achievement of the
individual is measured through a wide range of quantitative measurements assumed to be objective and
describing the features of the contract, which offers a major basis for rewards and which ensures, at
least apparently, that the achievements are evaluated on the basis of fair rules. The focus on performance
measures and rewards may play an important role in creating hierarchies and making people obey in an
ideological environment, such as that of the United States, with egalitarian ideals and without ‘birth-right’
hierarchies. Furthermore, the focus on performance measures and rewards is consistent with the American
ideology, which emphasises the opportunity which any individual has to be socially successful, working
his or her way up from the bottom of society to the top: it reflects values such as work and achievement.
However, not only the rewards system itself may create hierarchies and make people obey, but the rhetoric
of the balanced scorecard may also be a powerful instrument of persuasion for creating hierarchies and
making people obey. Thus, although the fairness of the measurements may be questioned, the very
ideological assumption of the balanced scorecard is that anyone who works hard enough will be fairly
evaluated and rewarded.
The balanced scorecard is also consistent with the American way of managing uncertainty through
abstract systems. First, the balanced scorecard will bring security to those who work their way up through
the hierarchy, thus achieving income and status. Furthermore, the explicitness in the balanced scorecard
in the form of an underlying strategic concept may be an appropriate way of managing uncertainty as it
suggests specific routines to follow. Similarly, the claim that causality, which is a deterministic concept,
is involved in the balanced scorecard as well as the analytical deployment process of goals to lower levels
may also reduce the feeling of uncertainty. In addition and given that the status of management methods
is high in the United States, the use of fashionable ones such as the balanced scorecard may also reduce
the feeling of uncertainty in this environment. Thus managers may cope with uncertainty by becoming
isomorphic with their environment and adopting what is considered socially acceptable and prestigious
behaviour (Meyer and Rowan, 1977); when managers use a fashionable management method like the
balanced scorecard, it justifies their profession and consequently reduces their uncertainty. It should also
be noted that the rhetoric of the balanced scorecard may provide managers with a feeling of security as
it optimistically invites managers to “go out and do it” and indicates potential success and consequent
beneficial effects on social status (Alvarez, 1998).
The tableau de bord, on the other hand, undermines the fair contract. The equivocal relationship between
accountability and performance measures, the loosely coupled levels and the idea of negotiation of
measurements do not support the fair contract as the balanced scorecard does, i.e., the lack of associated
rewards does not make it clear that work and achievement will be fairly rewarded and, implicitly, it means
that the tableau de bord does not contribute to the construction of hierarchies and to making people obey
in accordance with the American ideology. Similarly, the tableau de bord does not make it possible to
cope with uncertainty by providing additional income and status. Furthermore, the features of the tableau
the bord are not sufficient for fulfilling any need for managing uncertainty through expert systems. The
local and always subjective definitions of strategy and performance areas included in the tableau de bord
do not establish any routines by which the feeling of uncertainty may be managed; and the fact that
causality in the tableau de bord is built locally by managers means that tableau does not meet any need
for coping with uncertainty through expert systems either. In addition, the loosely coupled levels and the
idea of negotiation of measurements between levels increase the risk of conflict and, hence, the feeling
of uncertainty. Finally, the tableau de bord is neither fashionable nor has it been developed at one of
the leading business schools in the United States; its implementation in an American company would
therefore not legitimate the manager and bring him/her security.
4. Ideology in France
Where the fair contract rules American society, the principle of honour rules in France: everyone
belongs to a social group with specific obligations and privileges distinct from those of other groups.
According to d’Iribarne (1989, p. 56), the present division of French society into groups developing an
acute awareness of their rights and duties dates back to ancient France. Before 1789, French society
was divided into three main “orders”—the nobility, the clergy and the “third rank”—each of them being
themselves divided into multiple groups (d’Iribarne, 1989, p. 63). The status of the three French orders was
related to their place on a symbolic scale from nobility to baseness, the roots of which lay in the notions
of purity of the Middle Ages. The position of the social groups might change over time—for instance, the
Crusades increased the “purity” of the knights; the middle classes, however, did not succeed in leaving
the third rank until 1789 despite their social successes, their wealth—and their claim that they were
“honourable” (d’Iribarne, 1989, p. 68). Times have changed since the French Revolution, but French
society is still dominated by a group-based concentration of power, a developed sense of hierarchies,
and an implicit and permanent reference to nobility and honour (d’Iribarne, 1989). In ancient France,
a person’s place in the hierarchical social structure was a question of birth. Today it is a question of
education.
Section 4.1 elaborates on the concept of French honour while Section 4.2 concerns the new nobilities
created through the education system, i.e., through the Grandes Ecoles. Part 4.3 deals with the status of
management techniques in France. Finally, part 4.4 discusses the fit between French ideology and the
balanced scorecard and then between French ideology and the tableau de bord.
4.1. French honour
Honour is a “prejudice” formulated by each social group for itself, and it is intimately related to the
specific traditions of each particular social group, the pride of the rank and the fear of falling from that
rank; it includes duties and privileges, which are internalised so that, in the end, honour appears to be less
oriented towards others than towards oneself (d’Iribarne, 1989). Honour means that each social group
has its own rights, duties and privileges that distinguish it from other social groups. The loss of rank is
intolerable deprivation, not only because of the loss of honour but also because it is the loss of belonging
and therefore the loss of security.
According to Montesquieu (De l’esprit des lois Montesquieu, 1748), honour serves as “a political
virtue” “by way of which everybody serves the common good while believing to be serving his own
interests” (d’Iribarne, 1989, pp. 60–61). Our understanding of this relation between the individual’s own
interest and the common good may be increased by the thoughts of Rousseau (1762), whose philosophy
inspired the French revolutionaries. According to Rousseau, an individual is born free but is still in chains.
Thus, it is only through being citizens that individuals may fully realize their freedom and exercise their
moral rights and duties because individuals who obey themselves and follow their own interests will only
sink. Being thus forced to accept becoming citizens, people lose their individual freedom but, even though
citizens’ freedom is thus limited by the general will, they are still free. This paradox works because the
individual becomes a free citizen by replacing I must with I will, which is also an I shall when it expresses
assent to the general will (Audi, 1995). The general will is perceived as a universal force which is nobler
than any particular will; individual human participants realise themselves in realising the good of all.
This explains why in willing their own interests, citizens are at the same time willing what is communally
good—the particular and the universal are united.
This dimension of honour may also explain the behaviour of self-control in modern French companies.
Thus, d’Iribarne (1996/1997) found that in French companies little or no attention was given to formal
rules and, when rules are applied, it is done very loosely; similarly, coordination was lax and there was
an extreme claim for own autonomy. Generally, obedience is a very paradoxically valued behaviour in
France. On the one hand, the long tradition of absolute monarchy predisposes the French to accepting the
hierarchy as a natural fact—as long as they are treated in accordance with what their honour commands.
Each party in a relationship has to be faithful to his/her honour. On the other hand, obedience is a sign of
baseness—and, due to the code of honour, the French are assertive, they do not necessarily obey. From the
1789 Revolution on, resistance, if not rebellion, has been part of the French collective identity. Opinions
count and oral aggression is tolerated as a form of relief (d’Iribarne, 1994), but not everything may be said.
Thus, d’Iribarne (1996/1997) found that confrontations in French companies were ritualised in order to
control the risk of escalation inherent in them; not all forms of direct expression and conflict are considered
legitimate. As a consequence, there is asymmetry between what is said about a given problem and the
problem itself. This “disposition to protest” forms “an important element of French republican culture”
(Jenkins, 2000, p. 191). Directly linked to social identity, resistance represents an implicit but strong
collective view of the proper limits to the tolerance of the actions of those in political and organisational
authority (Jenkins, 2000, p. 190). In sum, the French are indeed willing to obey as long as their obedience
preserves the honour of everyone involved. The ideals of both the monarchy and the revolution still apply.
In sum, honour is an ideological representation in France as it supports the social order: honour is the
basis of the social hierarchies, it rules the local ways of exercising authority and commanding obedience
and because it is based on social tradition and belonging, it strongly contributes to security.
4.2. The Grandes Ecoles
The Grandes Ecoles are unique to the French education system (Bourdieu, 1989). The French Grandes
Ecoles continue a national tradition which dates back to the French Revolution, when France was in
urgent need of national administrators. These institutions have a highly elitist and professional image,
and they are dominant institutions insofar as they produce a kind of aristocracy. To enter a Grande Ecole,
candidates have to pass a very competitive and selective entrance examination. In addition, graduating
from a Grande Ecole brings privilege and obligations as did, in former times, birth into the noble class.
There are three types of Grandes Ecoles (Bourdieu, 1989) relevant for making a career in business.
One type is Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), which delivers an education in public adminis-
tration and gives access to the highest positions in public administration in France. Many of its graduates
make careers in business or politics. The entrance examination is open to students who already have a
graduate degree in politics, law or economics either from a university or from another Grande Ecole. ENA
is undoubtedly the most famous Grande Ecole. A second type is the engineering schools (Grandes Ecoles
d’Ingénieurs), which recruit excellent students of science, who prepare for the entrance examination for
at least 2 years, and very often 3 years, after they have passed their baccalauréat (at the age of 18). Most of
these schools are in the public sector and have very low tuition fees (comparable to those of universities).
The most highly ranked engineering Grande Ecole is Ecole Polytechnique (which dates back to 1794 and
still has military status although almost none of the students embarks on a military career) followed by
Ecole des Mines and Ecole Centrale in Paris. The third and final type consists of the business schools
(Grandes Ecoles de Commerce), which also select excellent students on the basis of a multidisciplinary
entrance examination (including mathematics, philosophy, history, languages, etc.) after they have spent
2 or 3 years on specific preparation. These schools are in the private or semi-public sector (incorporated
into Chambers of Commerce and Industry) and, unlike what is the case at engineering schools, their
tuition fees are very high. The most famous group among these consists of the Paris Business Schools
(HEC, ESSEC and ESCP-EAP),3 but they are usually ranked below the highest engineering schools.
In most cases, the nobility of the aristocracy established by the Grandes Ecoles education merely
extends the more ancient aristocracy by birth (d’Iribarne, 1994; Bourdieu, 1989). Thus, during the first
period after the French revolution, the revolutionaries were eager to show that they were as honourable as
the nobility of the ancient regime. They created an aristocracy of talents to replace the blood. Admission
to the Grandes Ecoles was based on highly competitive entrance examinations, which constituted—
and still constitute—rituals revealing each individual’s abilities (d’Iribarne, 1994, p. 93). This kind of
education leads to a title which only a select group of institutions is allowed to confer and, consequently,
to a social membership. For anyone having entered a Grande Ecole, a good professional position is
generally guaranteed and the career will generally depend on the ranking and fame of the institution.
Thus, in 1993, 50% of the 200 most influential French managers came from ENA or Ecole Polytechnique
while only 10% came from business schools, 70% of the latter having been educated at HEC (Bauer
and Bertin-Mourot, 1995). Graduates from business schools mostly hold jobs at the level just below the
top management (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 466). It is remarkable that most top managers have not received
a management-oriented education and that, instead, they come from the most prestigious educational
institutions.
3
Respectively for Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC), Ecole Superteure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (ES-
SEC) and Ecole Supe’rieure de Commerce de Paris-Ecole des Affaires de Paris (ESCP-EAP), respectively.
Unfortunately, more recent data on the backgrounds of French managers are not available. We have not,
however, seen any change in the data that justifies any assumption that the status of the Grandes Ecoles is
eroding. In particular, the dominant position of the Grandes Ecoles, which are not devoted to management,
has not changed. On the contrary, the influence of Ecole Polytechnique and ENA is increasing: in 1985,
their graduates accounted for 37% of the 200 most influential French bosses; the corresponding numbers
were 46% in 1989 and 50% in 1993 (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1996: 49), whereas the number of HEC
graduates remained stable over the period, increasing only from 7 to 8%. The number of graduates from
non-French institutions is strongly increasing but accounted for only 6% in 1993 (2% in 1985).
Although the past 20 years have seen some slight change due to the entry of the universities in the
management education “market” (Takagi and de Carlo, 2000), the general understanding is still that
people go to a university if they feel that they have little or no chance of entering a Grande Ecole. If they
believe that they have a chance then they try to enter a Grande Ecole (de Léotard, 2001). With a few
exceptions, the social status of the universities is lower than that of the Grandes Ecoles in spite of the
fact that the universities have long looked with disdain at firms and practitioners because supposedly they
were not as “noble” as academics. In their view, the education provided at the Grandes Ecoles, which was
more practice-oriented than that at the universities, was thus less valuable than a university education.
The fact that Grandes Ecoles are more socially valued than universities, and at the same despised by them
may appear paradoxical. However, when you notice that you are credited with less social value than your
neighbour, the only way of keeping your self-esteem and avoiding dissonance is to claim that you are
honourable, which you can do by emphasizing that your are more noble than your neighbour with respect
to a specific trait. Nobleness is a very plastic quality and there are many ways of being noble.
The Grandes Ecoles reproduce social hierarchies. Thus, although admission to the entrance tests of
the Grandes Ecoles is in principle free, most of their students come from upper-class families, for whom
cultural and financial access is easier. In 1984–1985, for instance, almost 75% of the ESSEC students
came from the dominant class (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 268). At the same time, more than 42% of the HEC
students had grand-fathers who, on both parental sides, were either executive managers or from the
liberal professions (Bourdieu, 1989, pp. 352–353).4 The cultural advantage has different aspects. The
more extensive “linguistic capital” of the upper classes is not only valuable for style and communication
but provides a more complex system of concepts, which allows them to decipher and manipulate more
complex structures (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970, p. 92). In addition, if someone’s family or relatives
are close to the business world, s/he already knows some social codes of the milieu, which is important
for some oral tests.
As used to be the case before the revolution, escaping the hierarchy in France is very difficult. Unlike
what is the case in the United States, it may appear almost impossible for a French employee to work
her or his way up the organisational ladder towards the top on the basis of good performance. Promotion
exists of course but it is limited by invisible ceilings which are lower than in the United States.
4
As regards the social origins of the students of the Grandes Ecoles, the figures mentioned by Bourdieu (1986) may be enriched
with more recent but partial data given by de Léotard (2001). De Léotard’s survey shows that, in 2000, the parents of 86% of
the HEC students had either an intellectual profession or a managerial/business occupation (managers, CEOs). Only the parent
of 1 student out of 362 was a worker and only 3 students had a parent who was a farmer. The students graduated in 2001 from
Polytechnique presented a similar case: the parents of 83% of the students were engineers, managers, teachers or professionals.
One-third of the students had parents who were working the in educational sector. The parents of less than 1% of the students
were workers or farmers.
In sum, the Grandes Ecoles play a major role in building social and organisational hierarchies and in
reducing uncertainty. Thus, in France, uncertainty is managed rather through traditions and fairly stable
social belongings instead of abstract systems. The French education system is consistent with the French
ideology, i.e., with beliefs in a hierarchical, nobleness-based and honour-ruled society.
4.3. The role and status of management techniques in France
Management as a specific and recognised field is quite a recent phenomenon in France. Apart from law
and economics—the traditional academic bases of management—only accounting and sales management
were taught at the French business schools before the mid-sixties, which explains why their names
typically refer to commerce rather than to business or management. Accounting education was dominated
by bookkeeping, while management accounting and control were not on the agenda at all (Nouschi,
1988). The University of Paris-Dauphine, the first French university dedicated to management studies,
was founded in 1968. Before that time, accounting and sales management were part—a very small part—
of the degrees in economics or law. As French universities did not confer doctoral degrees in management,
the business schools began sending promising young students to American universities in the late sixties
(Chessel and Pavis, 2001, p. 159); the first Ph.D. in management was conferred in 1974. This low emphasis
on management education and the fact that French companies are managed by engineers with little or
no education in management implies a relative lack of a management profession driving the diffusion of
management methods.
The lack of interest in management methods seems understandable when one considers that, in France,
the role which management devices play in the United States is handled by the social hierarchy, which is
based on honour and reinforced by the education and recruitment systems. In France, social hierarchies and
power depend on education rather than on performance, and the way in which social hierarchies are created
in that country explains why decentralisation and subsequent financial control have not gained the strong
position there which they enjoy in the United States. The attitudes of top management and of employees
towards delegation may be ambiguous as delegation questions the specific way of exercising power in
France. It should also be noted that, in France, the social hierarchies and the concept of honour are means of
reducing uncertainty. Thus security with respect to income and status is given by education and consequent
group belonging—not by performance and related management systems. Furthermore, legitimacy in
France is given by education, and the “best” education is not a management education. Therefore, the
adoption of management methods enjoys limited prestige, i.e., it barely contributes to enhancing the
feeling of security associated with legitimacy. In France, in brief, uncertainty is managed through the
rituals of social groups, which implies that the demand for abstract systems such as management methods
to cope with uncertainty is low.
4.4. The coherence of French ideology with the balanced scorecard and with
the tableau de bord
From the analysis presented above it should be clear that the balanced scorecard is not consistent
with French ideology. The balanced scorecard creates a hierarchy through performance measurements
and rewards, which is not useful in France, where hierarchies and a local sense of obedience are con-
structed otherwise: the demand for fairness and the subsequent need for performance measurements are
not very important in a society based on honour, rank and privilege. Performance measurements and
performance-based rewards may even have the potential to erode the status of the governing classes as
given individuals at lower levels in the hierarchy may perform better than given individuals at higher
levels. Furthermore, the focus in the balanced scorecard on accountability and external control may fit
badly with the French concept of honour (d’Iribarne, 1994) because it assumes self-control, which is
more closely related to self-provided rewards and self-realisation and which creates a defensive attitude
towards external control and performance measurements. Carrying out comprehensive checks might be
very problematic because any attempt to do so would tend to incite revolt or deceit (d’Iribarne, 1996/1997).
Extrinsic rewards such as remuneration under various forms, promotion or esteem do not play the role in
France that they do in the United States, and evaluation through qualitative, hence subjective, criteria is
fairly well accepted by those evaluated (Bourguignon, 1998).
Similarly, the analytical top-down deployment of goals in the balanced scorecard and the assumption
of agreement between the hierarchical levels is not consistent with French honour either. In France,
bowing in this way to pressure from above to lower standards in the pursuit of profits and not giv-
ing professional awareness and respect to the norms of one’s counterparts is to undermine the honour
of the professional group to which the individual belongs (d’Iribarne, 1996/1997). Finally, immediate
agreement is inconsistent with the honourable way of life in France. In an honour-based society, lo-
cal acceptance of objectives and the realization of hierarchical relationships generally require a great
deal of tact and judgement on the part of the managers. The optimistic “go out and do it” manage-
ment rhetoric is not likely to be perceived as honourable and therefore not likely to make a subordinate
obey.
It should also be noted that implementing the routines of the balanced scorecard in a French company
will probably not reduce the feeling of uncertainty as it reduces self-determination. Thus the generic
assumption of causality made in the balanced scorecard, the rational deployment process and the existence
of an underlying strategic concept may create a defensive attitude among French employees, which would
lead them not to obey. In addition, the limited institutional support of the balanced scorecard in France
means that its implementation does not legitimate French managers.
As it does not link rewards to performance measurements, the tableau de bord matches the French
ideology better than does the balanced scorecard. It assumes a hierarchy which, as is the tradition in
France, has been created otherwise. As the levels in the tableau de bord are fairly loosely coupled with
room for learning and negotiations, it is also consistent with the concept of honour because it allows
local initiative and self-determination, i.e., it observes the various privileges and obligations of the social
groups. The important point with respect to honour is probably not the effective influence which the local
managers have on the objectives but the influence which they believe that they have or appear to have in
accordance with their local sense of honour. The need for managerial tact and judgement may explain
why Epstein and Manzoni (1997) found the process of implementing the tableau de bord in France to be
longer, less direct and more complex than the implementation of the balanced scorecard in the United
States.
Finally, the tableau de bord does not contribute to enhancing any feelings of security. First, its being
disconnected from external rewards is consistent with the fact that, in France, security is mostly associated
with education and consequent group belonging, not with performance measurement and related rewards.
Second, the local, and always subjective, definition of performance models formalised by the tableau de
bord offers a non-equivocal representation of actions and objectives, which does not reduce uncertainty
feelings. This is consistent with French ideology because, in France, uncertainty is preferably managed
by tradition and social belonging and not by abstract systems.
5. Conclusion and perspectives
The local ideologies in the U.S. and France are very different from each other. In the United States,
everybody is expected to act freely under contracts which s/he chooses to be committed to and under
a general moral claim to fairness. The French counterpart to the Americanfair contract is the principle
of honour, which rules in France: everyone belongs to a social group with specific obligations and
privileges distinct from those of other groups. In the United States, where people are assumed to be equal,
management devices play a major role in creating hierarchies, making people obey, bringing legitimacy
and reducing the feeling of uncertainty. In France, social hierarchy, obedience, legitimacy and security
are mainly questions of education and honour, not of management devices. Consequently, the demand
for management methods to create hierarchies, to make people obey and to legitimate managers is far
from being the same in the two countries. Thus, in the United States, management instruments are a
significant means of creating hierarchies, making people obey and legitimating, whereas in France social
order is mostly embodied in the rituals of the social groups. We have found that the American ideology is
embedded in the balanced scorecard and the French ideology in the tableau de bord and that the coherence
between the American ideology and the tableau de bord appears to be low as does the coherence between
the French ideology and the balanced scorecard.
The method of this analysis may be transferred to other questions. It may, for instance, be useful to apply
it to other management control devices. In general, any device associated with hierarchy, planning, control
and performance measurements may be expected to “resonate” differently in France and the United States.
The method may also be fruitful for analyses involving other societies. Although French resistance is not
unusual—cf. France’s leaving the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and more recent examples
such as public demonstrations to defend chocolate, cheese or other French culinary traditions against
European or world regulations—the coherence problems caused by importing management systems
developed in the United States are probably not specific to the French environment. The problems created
by any lack of coherence between the ideology of a given society and the ideological assumptions of
the management technique applied may, however, be more loudly voiced in the case of France because
of the tendency to rise in rebellion. Nevertheless, the lack of coherence between the ideology of the
society and the ideological assumptions of globalised management methods developed in the United
States may create coherence problems in many other places. We suggest that similar analyses should
be made in some other European countries as well as in some Asian, African, Latin American and
Middle East countries. As it may be very useful for multinational organisations to know the ideology of
a specific society in which they establish themselves, such analyses should probably be undertaken in
any society.
Our results may also have implications for the development of models for controlling multinational
companies. Traditional control theories assume that business procedures may easily be transferred to other
countries, i.e., they apply an ethnocentric (Perlmutter, 1969) approach which assumes that the ideological
assumptions embedded in the control models developed in the society in which the headquarters is located
are universally applicable. Alternative models advocate a high degree of autonomy for the subsidiaries, i.e.,
they suggest the application of a polycentric (Perlmutter, 1969) approach which assumes that aligning
the local modes of control and ideology is conducive to optimal performance. This obviously creates
the potential problem of having incoherent ideological beliefs in the overall organization. Finally, other
theories apply the principle of geocentricism (Perlmutter, 1969) which involves the belief that the synergies
among ideas from different countries of operation should prevail. This, in turn, requires a common
framework with enough freedom for individual locations so that operations meet employees’ needs
everywhere. It also implies, however, that eventually ideological beliefs may be reconciled and converge.
All these approaches optimistically assume applicable solutions, but they do not fully deal with the
potential inherent conflicts involved. Consequently, there is a need for more research into the most feasible
ways of bridging management control systems across ideologies.
Management methods which do not fit with the ruling ideology of a society are not necessarily rejected,
however; they may also shape (Nørreklit, 1986) this ideology. Thus Bourdieu (2000) claims that the
bombardment with American ideology and management rhetoric has resulted in the erosion of French
values. It is true that the process of Americanisation, which in France began after WWII with the Marshall
Plan, has introduced American management methods into French firms and modified their governance
structures (Djelic, 1998). As regards management education, it is also true that the “cohort of management
apostles” (Chessel and Pavis, 2001, p. 147), who went to the United States in the late sixties and early
seventies and back to French educational institutions diffused new management concepts and innovative
teaching methods (Chessel and Pavis, 2001, p. 159). More recently, the globalisation of finance, the
decreasing influence of the trade unions and the French government’s withdrawal from business have led to
some revision of the traditional image of French capitalism as involving an omnipresent State, permanent
labour disputes, etc. (Hanckè, 2001). As mentioned above, we have not seen any signs, however, that the
increasing Americanisation of the management market and the post-1983 “ideological shift” in France
away from the State as a value creator to the firm as one (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1987, p. 6) have
contributed to eroding the status of the Grandes Ecoles. In particular, the dominant position of the Grandes
Ecoles, which are not devoted to management, has not changed from 1985 to 1993. On the contrary, the
influence of Ecole Polytechnique and ENA is increasing This shows that French firms are apparently
unable to call into question social hierarchies and to produce new ones; they accept the ‘tyranny’ of
the initial degree (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1996, p. 70). Moreover, whatever the recent change in
the French capitalist model, the ‘presidentialism’ of French management persists, which is broadly the
result of the strongly traditional social distance between the management elites and the rest of the firm
(Hanckè, 2001). This may not be surprising as the rationale of honour and the hierarchies of nobility have
survived more than two centuries with a republican political system and are strongly embedded in the
French identity. A few decades of even strong American influence cannot radically change this. However,
Bourdieu (2000) is probably right that, although the process is a rather slow one, the French identity is
changing and the new forms are not yet wholly visible. They will necessarily bear the marks of the old
elements of ideology, however, which implies that there will still be reason to be concerned with whether
the ideological assumptions of management tools are consistent with the ideology of the society.
However, our analysis also points to the need for further research into how human beings and organi-
sations are influenced by management technologies which involve ideological assumptions inconsistent
with the local ideology of the society. It may plausibly be assumed that the dominance of U.S.-constructed
accounting standards and control systems may conceal a deeply-rooted ideological commitment to U.S.
values and beliefs that may be inappropriate in the pluralistic cultural and economic field of multinational
commerce. Nonetheless, this ideology prevails due to the structural force of the unquestioned power of
multinational capital in a largely depoliticized global market. The relevant issue, then, is whether the
globalisation of mainly U.S. developed management and accounting systems erodes ideological differ-
ences or whether local ideology is still contained within those differences? The key question concerns
the issue of whether the form and rationality of various accounting and control regimes may help us
determine whether ideological differences are approaching or, alternatively, resisting singularity.
Acknowledgements
We thank Robert Scapens, two anonymous reviewers, René Demeestere, Marie-Laure Djelic, Inginar
Gehrke, Kit Kristensen, Pascal Langevin, Falconer Mitchell, Lemiart Nørreklit, Junko Takagi and Philippe
Zarlowski for their helpful comments. Thanks are also due to the participants of the Founding Congress of
the European Academy of Management (Barcelona, April 2001), 24th Annual Congress of the European
Accounting Association (Athens, April 2001) and EIASM Workshop on Performance Measurement and
Management Control (Nice, October 2001), where the firsts drafis were presented. Finally, we would like
to thank Margrethe Petersen for her help with the English language.
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The American Balanced Scorecard Versus the French Tableau de Bord:

Article in Management Accounting Research · June 2004

Annick Bourguignon véronique Christiane Malleret

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The American balanced scorecard versus the French tableau de

1.2. The conception of ideology—an uncritical perspective

2.1. The balanced scorecard

2.2. The tableau de bord

Fig. 1. Relation between objectives, action variables and action plans.

3. Ideology in the United States

3.1. The American fair contract

4.1. French honour

4.2. The Grandes Ecoles

4.3. The role and status of management techniques in France

5. Conclusion and perspectives

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