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Ecocultures: Blueprints for Sustainable Communities
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ECOCULTURES 5
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Towards sustainable ways of living 8
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Steffen Böhm, Zareen Pervez Bharucha and Jules Pretty 10
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On Christmas Eve 1968, from high above the Earth in lunar orbit, American 18
astronauts Frank Borman and William Anders added image number AS8-14-2383 19
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to NASA’s catalogue. It went on to become one of the most iconic photographs
of all time. ‘Earthrise’ shows our planet rising above the empty lunar landscape,
back-dropped by the cold emptiness of space. The dull brown of the lunar surface
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and the pitch dark of space dominate most of the image. But at the centre, Planet
Earth glows with colour and the patterns of life. Oceans, swirling clouds and
landmasses all crowd the arc of planet that hangs above the lunar horizon.
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It is home. 26
Viewed thus from space, it became plainly obvious that life, and all that supports 27
it, is quite distinctly bounded within the thin layers of water, land and air that form 28
our biosphere. Perhaps unsurprisingly, ‘Earthrise’ is widely regarded as one of the 29
catalysts for the modern environmental movement, compelling us to recognize our 30
fundamental dependence on our planet amid a seemingly empty universe. 31
Forty years later, a quite different set of images shows our world in a very different 32
way. In 2011, Canadian scientist Felix Pharand-Deschenes put together a composite 33
image of the Earth, showing major road and rail networks, transmission lines and 34
underwater cables superimposed over a satellite image of cities lit up at night. These 35
pictures show our world’s roads and railways, electricity lines, shipping lanes and air- 36
traffic (Globaïa, 2013). This ‘cartography of the Anthropocene’ is a different take on 37
life on Earth than what was captured in Earthrise. Instead of foregrounding ‘spaceship 38
Earth’, these newer images highlight the buzz of human life in our world. Our species 39
is everywhere: trading, talking and travelling all over the planet. If Earthrise showed 40
us our one home, Pharand-Deschenes shows us what we are doing there. 41
To put it in the form now ubiquitous in environmental scholarship and activism, 42
Pharand-Deschenes’s images represent the Anthropocene: a time in the planet’s 43
history where human influence predominates. 44
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4 Steffen Böhm, Zareen Pervez Bharucha and Jules Pretty
1 The term was coined by atmospheric scientist Paul Crutzen and ecologist
2 Eugene Stoermer in an article in Global Change Magazine. Here, they described the
3 transformation of the biosphere and observed:
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5 Considering these and many other major and still growing impacts of human
6 activities on earth and atmosphere, and at all, including global, scales, it seems
7 to us more than appropriate to emphasize the central role of mankind in
8 geology and ecology by proposing to use the term ‘anthropocene’ for the
9 current geological epoch.
10 (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000)
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12 Though the advent of industrial modernity is part of a much longer historical
13 process stretching back to the post-Roman re-emergence of Europe (Braudel,
14 1981), for the purposes of defining the first signs of biosphere-wide change,
15 Crutzen and Stoermer locate the start of the Anthropocene in the late eighteenth
16 century, coinciding with the invention of Watt’s steam engine. The first planet-
17 wide, tangible footprints of human activity on Earth, such as altered concentrations
18 of atmospheric greenhouse gases and changed biotic assemblages in lakes, have been
19 found to date from this time.
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As might strike anyone looking at the Pharand-Deschenes images, we argue that
underlying the physical manifestations of the ‘Anthropocene’ is a global conver-
gence – by choice, necessity or force – on a particular ideal of prosperity. Around
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the world, economic globalization has led to the seemingly unstoppable spread of
a culture of material consumption, fuelled by (and in turn fuelling) economic
growth, as measured in GDP. The pattern, scale and pace of this growth are
26 unprecedented in human history. By extension, its escalating human footprint on
27 the planet is now unmistakable and it is no coincidence that the emergence of the
28 ‘Anthropocene’ has overlapped with the rise of the economic system that we call
29 ‘capitalism’. It is undeniable that this system has led to unprecedented material
30 prosperity for many millions and has also catalyzed the expression of some of our
31 most deeply cherished values – of tolerance, democracy and the rights of the
32 individual. But it is by no means a sustainable way to live, nor does it guarantee
33 human health and well-being. Both people and planet are suffering as a result of
34 its unintended consequences, including global climate change, resource depletion,
35 land degradation, biodiversity loss, socioeconomic instability and poor public
36 health.
37 But alternatives exist. Though the railways, roads, cables and blazing cities of
38 Pharand-Deschenes’s images appear to have covered the Earth, there are millions
39 of people who continue to live in ways that explicitly link social and ecological
40 well-being, and, in doing so, ensure relative sustainability and adaptability. Rural,
41 land-based societies provide one such class of alternatives. Here, people live directly
42 off the land and sea: hunters, gatherers, fisherfolk, peasants and farmers organize
43 their communities around different values and stories than those guiding the
44 Anthropocene. These are the values and stories that we examine in this book.
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Ecocultures: towards sustainable ways of living 5
At a time when the global dominance of varieties of neoliberal capitalism seems 1

inevitable, even as its impacts for nature and society are increasingly called into 2
question, these alternative visions of human society offer hope that we can live 3
sustainably and navigate this period of great social-ecological change. There is no 4
single way, we learn, in which to organize society. There are many different visions 5
of well-being and prosperity beyond the simple measures of economic growth. 6
Where these visions are cherished and allowed to become manifest, communities 7
enjoy high levels of well-being and resilience through periods of inevitable change. 8
Where these visions are dismantled by other modes of ‘development’, both people 9
and planet suffer. Sadly, these ‘alternative’ lifestyles are often dismissed as either 10
archaic or unattainable. Instead, we argue that they are both desirable and viable 11
starting points for a global transition to sustainable living. 12
Whether in long-established or emerging communities, these ways of living 13
nurture the social and cultural relationships people have with each other, their 14
connection to the land and the natural environment, as well as their economic 15
independence and resilience. We argue that such lifestyles are well placed to engage 16
positively with a transition to sustainability, while retaining personal and communal 17
experiences of happiness and well-being. We call such communities ‘ecocultures’. 18
There exists a continuum of such ‘ecocultural’ living. 19
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Some 300 million people belong to indigenous or tribal societies (Lee and Daly,
1999). Of these, some 100 communities around the world are ‘uncontacted’, in
the sense of choosing not to participate in mainstream or dominant society, even
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though they may be aware of other communities and ways of life. Relatively more
‘integrated’ into the dominant global society are rural communities of farmers and
fishermen living off the land and sea. La Via Campesina, the international peasant
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movement, represents about 200 million peasants and small-scale farmers globally. 26
All these communities have land-based livelihoods, built upon a rich compendium 27
of knowledge on how to live relatively sustainably on the land over time. Such 28
ways of living may seem entirely alien to those of us who live and work within the 29
‘hyper-developed’ and increasingly urban world, and it is certainly true that such 30
traditional, land-based lifestyles should not necessarily be romanticized as exemplars 31
of sustainability or human well-being. Yet it is indisputable that, to varying extents 32
and in different ways, traditional, land-based societies demonstrate an excellence 33
in living lightly on the land, sustaining its gifts over many generations, and actively 34
nurturing a deeply felt, personal connection to nature which is thought to enhance 35
both personal and community well-being. In these societies, culture supports a 36
vision of the ‘good life’ on the land through spiritual beliefs and practices, rich 37
ecological knowledge and sophisticated rules for resource management and 38
resource sharing. 39
While these ways of life imply an actively nurtured, reciprocal relationship 40
between ecology and society, our global consumer society, by contrast, restricts 41
itself to viewing nature as source (of resources) and sink (for wastes). Resourcing 42
such a culture has meant changing the biosphere in new, fundamental and, some 43
have argued, irreversible ways (MEA, 2005; Röckström et al., 2009; Pretty, 2013). 44
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1 Recognizing this, many individuals and communities, particularly those who have
2 already gone through the cycle of ‘hyper-development’, are intentionally setting
3 up new modes of living. Integrated to various degrees in dominant society, these
4 ‘alternative’ communities of Transition Towns, ecovillages and communes attempt
5 to reconnect people and landscapes. There are now thousands of ecovillages as well
6 as Transition Town initiatives around the world, where people strive to live in
7 human-scale communities, characterized by human, environmental, economic and
8 spiritual co-existence (Böhm, 2014; Hawken, 2007; Litfin, 2013).
9 In this book, we reflect on the lessons offered by these ways of living, for the
10 long work of transition to sustainability, resilience and well-being. Such transitions
11 are not only desirable and required; they are well under way around the world in
12 countless communities, initiatives and projects. These ‘green shoots’ offer a positive
13 vision of what is possible when we nurture the connections between people and
14 planet.
15 In what follows, we briefly review the global polycrisis of unsustainability –
16 composed of a number of interlocking global challenges coming together in a
17 ‘perfect storm’ (Godfray et al., 2010b) that threatens continued life on Earth. We
18 then examine the implications of current ways of life for human well-being.
19 Increasing attention to this concept, especially in the developed world (Dolan et
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al., 2008), rests on the recognition that, rather than depending on GDP growth for
well-being, there needs to be increasing attention to the central components of
well-being, including good health, social cohesion and vibrant landscapes. We then
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describe our conception of ‘ecocultures’ and conclude the chapter with a summary
of the various cases presented in this book.
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The global polycrisis of unsustainability
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28 The notion that human beings have a responsibility to tread lightly on the Earth is
29 old wisdom. Folklore and traditional knowledge is replete with injunctions against
30 greed and warnings against misusing the land (Pilgrim and Pretty, 2010; Pretty,
31 2011; Sahlins, 1972). The most recent substantial break from this kind of caution
32 can be traced to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when, during the
33 European Enlightenment, humanity began to be viewed as a thing apart from
34 nature, and capable, through reason and intellect, of modifying the world to suit
35 its own ends. This thinking, subsequently manifested in the world’s first wave of
36 industrial revolutions and the rise of capitalism in England, underlies the current
37 Anthropocene and its impacts.
38 Alongside a particular view of nature, as something to be tamed, improved by
39 human ingenuity and harnessed for human needs, the Enlightenment also put
40 forward a particular praxis of social, economic and resource ‘management’, which
41 ‘accordingly with the demands of efficacy, technological feasibility of economic
42 performance, and “management” of a huge and expanding “world system”’, was
43 concerned with simplifying and rationalizing life itself (Dussel, 2013). Such a system
44 of management – whether of nature, peoples or places – was primarily concerned
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with building the material prosperity and political capital of small, but technologi- 1
cally advanced, European nations. In order to do so, the places, lifestyles and 2
landscapes of the world were viewed mainly in terms of their material, physical and 3
financial contribution, often excluding from consideration ‘many valid variables 4
(cultural, anthropologic, ethical, political, religious variables)’ (Dussel, 2013). 5
This simplified worldview locked into place a paradigm of economically 6
rational, techno-centric governance that is still quite evident across the world today. 7
It conditions how we think about the task of governance itself – as a means to bring 8
about the ideal envisaged by the European Enlightenment. Any other state of being 9
is regarded as anachronistic, primitive and amenable to ‘improvement’ (Escobar, 10
1992). From this thinking sprang the industrial revolutions, the rise of European 11
colonialism, and the vision of capitalist development that continues to dominate 12
globally today. 13
This worldview is expanded and kept in place by a powerful discursive system 14
involving the marketing of ‘development’ (Böhm and Brei, 2008), encouraging 15
continuous economic growth (as measured in GDP) fuelled by the over- 16
consumption of material and cultural products and services (Pretty, 2013). The rise 17
of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, as well as many other 18
middle-income countries, shows that across the world there is now a growing 19
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global convergence on this quite specific vision and practice of ‘development’ –
modelled after the urbanized and industrialized world of high-income countries.
Yet, as Misoczky and Böhm (2013) argue with reference to Latin America, this
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‘faith in the myth of development’ in the developing world is primarily fuelled by
the expansion of extractive industries: high-tonnage, open-pit mining and oil and
gas drilling, as well as monoculture agribusiness. For example, a close examination
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of the recent economic development of Brazil reveals that it is not less but 26
increasingly dependent on the extractive industries (Böhm et al., 2012). The large- 27
scale expansion of soya plantations and other models of industrial agribusiness are 28
responsible for a growing share in the exports of the country, leaving behind a 29
devastating impact on the Brazilian people and ecosystems, particularly the 30
retreating Amazon forest. Unsurprisingly, there are many popular struggles against 31
such narrow hegemony of ‘development’ in Latin America as well as many other 32
parts of the world, as people’s livelihoods and the ecosystems they depend on are 33
threatened. But as these industries are thought to represent and implement 34
‘development’, challenging them is exceptionally difficult. As Esteva (2000) has 35
put it, no other concept has been as influential in our modern world as that of 36
‘development’ – at once signifying a supposedly universal human aspiration, an 37
imperative and connoting a particular mode of social organization built through 38
continual material progress and capital accumulation. 39
However, multiple fields of scholarship and activism have long attempted to 40
mount a challenge to the universalist and universalizing conception of material 41
progress gained through industrial modes of development. From the very early 42
years of the Industrial Revolution, there have been critiques of human mismanage- 43
ment of nature and our increasingly devastating impact on Earth. In 1864, George 44
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1 Perkins Marsh wrote the seminal Man and Nature: Physical Geography as Modified by
2 Human Action. Here, he observed how human activity had already ‘done much to
3 mould the form of the earth’s surface’ (Marsh, 1864). Marsh conceded that such
4 ‘moulding’ was necessary for the spread of civilization, but the sight of desecrated
5 landscapes impelled him to observe that ‘man has too long forgotten that the earth
6 was given to him for usufruct alone, not for consumption, still less for profligate
7 waste.’
8 Marsh’s observations were certainly unique at the time. It was difficult to believe
9 that human influence could be as pernicious as he described. His observations,
10 however, are well vindicated today (IPCC, 2013; MEA, 2005; Royal Society,
11 2012). Since the first publication of Man and Nature, generations of environmental
12 thinkers have taken the shine off capitalist modernity by cataloguing its influence
13 on the biosphere. As a result, it is abundantly clear that several interlinked
14 challenges – resource depletion, climate change, pollution, land degradation and
15 biodiversity loss – threaten social-ecological well-being worldwide. These are the
16 result of poor resource management, unsustainable demands made by growing
17 populations and patterns of over-consumption worldwide (Pretty, 2013).
18 Warnings about the ensuing catastrophe have also been with us for a long time.
19 As early as 1798 Malthus argued that population growth would inevitably lead to
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starvation and poverty, and he explicitly ruled out the ‘possible existence of a
society, all members of which should live in ease, happiness and comparative
leisure; and feel no anxiety about providing the means of subsistence for themselves
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and families’ (Malthus, 1798). Although the substance of Malthus’s original essay
has now been thoroughly debunked (Jackson, 2009), Malthusian perspectives on
looming resource scarcity have proved remarkably resilient. They enjoyed a revival
26 in the mid-twentieth century, partly as a result of shortages imposed by the World
27 Wars. In the 1940s, Burch and Pendell (1945) advanced the theory that population
28 pressure had led to the outbreak of war. Based on these, Osbourn (1948) painted,
29 in the words of a reviewer, a picture of civilization ‘gone with vanished soil,
30 marching deserts, a hungry, thirsty, unhappy land’ (Johnson, n.d.). In the same year,
31 Vogt (1948) warned of consequences stemming from the unfavourable ratio
32 between population and resources. These ideas reached a climax with Ehrlich’s The
33 Population Bomb (1968), which warned that a population explosion in the 1970s
34 and 1980s would lead to catastrophic famine.
35 In their seminal 1972 report, The Limits to Growth, Meadows et al. explored the
36 consequences of exponential growth in population and industrial development.
37 They modelled change along five interrelated dimensions: population, industrializa-
38 tion, malnutrition, resource depletion and pollution. Although, by their own
39 admission, the exercise was ‘imperfect, oversimplified and unfinished’ (Meadows
40 et al., 1972), it served as the first attempt to come to a unified, long-term, global
41 view of the consequences of unsustainable economic growth patterns. For the first
42 time, the report envisaged the end of perpetual economic growth, arguing for a
43 new kind of equilibrium. The authors acknowledged that such a state was perhaps
44 an ‘idealized’ solution, but emphasized that such equilibrium ‘need not mean an
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end to progress or human development’. Instead they envisaged what later writers 1
have called, ‘prosperity without growth’ (Jackson, 2009). 2
In 1987, the Brundtland Report Our Common Future sought to answer the 3
question of how to better the human condition while protecting the environment 4
(WCED, 1987). This laid the foundations for environmental policy-making through 5
the 1990s and early 2000s, including the 1992 Rio Summit (and its +10 and +20 6
events), Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration and the Commission on Sustainable 7
Development. These represented the first set of moves in global policy-making for 8
sustainability. Governments attempted to systematically imagine development 9
models that would enable both human and environmental well-being. A number 10
of international protocols (e.g. Kyoto for greenhouse gas emissions), agreements 11
(e.g. Montreal for ozone), conventions (e.g. the Convention on Biodiversity), 12
development targets (e.g. Millennium Development Goals) resulted from the 13
momentum created at this time. As a result, some international and national 14
ecosystem and climate assessments (e.g. MEA, 2005; NEA, 2011) have begun to 15
indicate that progress has been made on limiting some of the impacts of human 16
activity on the biosphere. Yet the iron cage of rapidly rising consumption means 17
that far too little is being done to limit the impact upon Earth’s finite resources. 18
The same reports have underscored the depth and urgency of the sustainability 19
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challenge. In 2005, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) unequivocally
demonstrated how poor management was damaging the world’s ecosystems and
hindering their ability to support life, particularly for the poorest and most
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marginalized of human societies. The MEA’s ‘Summary for Decision-Makers’
opens with an insight which is at once obvious and yet apparently absent from the
current practice of global political economy: ‘Everyone in the world depends
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completely on Earth’s ecosystems and the services they provide, such as food, water, 26
disease management, climate regulation, spiritual fulfillment, and aesthetic enjoy- 27
ment’ (MEA, 2005). Harnessing these resources has allowed millions of people to 28
enjoy unprecedented material prosperity, but ‘not all regions and groups have 29
benefited from this process – in fact, many have been harmed’. Frayed ecosystems 30
hinder human development without exception. Though land-based communities 31
are the first to suffer, ultimately wealth is no real buffer against the damage caused 32
by environmental degradation. Ultimately, all will suffer. Still, the poor and 33
marginalized currently bear a disproportionate cost because they live at the front- 34
lines of environmental change, experiencing its effects directly and often without 35
any recourse to even basic protections afforded by adequate nutrition, shelter, 36
sanitation and medical care. 37
Attempting a different method for assessing planetary health, a team led by Johan 38
Rockström (Rockström et al., 2009) selected nine interdependent dimensions that 39
they considered key life-supporting processes, and attempted to identify thresholds 40
for each, marking a ‘safe operating space for humanity’. The nine dimensions are: 41
climate change; ocean acidification; stratospheric ozone concentration; the nitrogen 42
and phosphorus cycle; global freshwater use; land system change; the rate of 43
biodiversity loss; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading. The team’s 44
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1 assessment shows that three planetary boundaries have already been passed – those
2 for climate change, rates of biodiversity loss and changes to the global nitrogen
3 cycle (Rockström et al., 2009).
4 Finally, in 2012, the Royal Society report, People and the Planet, summarized the
5 scale and impacts of human activities on the Earth. These, it stated, have led to
6 three pressing and interlinked challenges: poverty; ‘unsustainable consumption’ in
7 developed and emerging economies; and unsustainable population growth. Here
8 too, authors acknowledge that increasing material consumption has improved
9 quality of life for many. Yet there has also been tremendous inequality in the
10 distribution of the costs and benefits of consumption. Globally, they conclude, the
11 Earth simply cannot resource our continually growing and converging aspirations.
12 Individually, each of these reports and warnings can be critiqued; but it is
13 beyond argument that together they unequivocally signal the general direction in
14 which the world is travelling. Globally, our very success in manipulating our envi-
15 ronment and our fixation with a culture of material consumption are undermining
16 the ability of the planet to sustain not just our species but all life. No single approach
17 to global forecasting has captured all the drivers, trends and impacts of our human
18 lifestyles on the planet, but together, all conclude that the Earth has exceeded its
19 capacity to supply ecosystem goods and services (or provide ‘sources’) and absorb
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the negative effects of our lifestyles (or ‘sinks’). Both population and consumption
continue to rise exponentially, and therefore it is clear that impacts on both the
environment and the economy will continue to grow. Thus, ‘overshoot’ (Meadows
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et al., 1972) has already begun to occur.
Underscoring all of this is a global convergence towards levels of material
consumption that characterize ‘western’ lifestyles. Techno-optimists believe that such
26 consumption can continue to be resourced by new technologies and continued
27 prospecting for new sources of raw materials. Underlying this is the idea that with
28 better technologies and processes – and perhaps by attempting to internalize some of
29 the environmental and social costs into the system – economic growth and develop-
30 ment can be ‘decoupled’ from negative environmental and social consequences.
31 Technological advances and innovative ecological finance approaches may indeed
32 result in ‘relative’ decoupling: ecological intensity may decline per unit of output.
33 However, with increases in population and consumption, ecological intensities may
34 still rise in absolute terms, albeit at a relatively slower pace (Jackson, 2009). What we
35 need is absolute decoupling: a real reduction in our ecological footprint. Yet, despite
36 much progress in improving efficiencies and refining production, such decoupling is
37 simply not occurring at the moment. Marginal improvements in efficiency and
38 productivity (or, unfortunately, through the off-shoring of production) greatly
39 obscure the scale of required reductions in our ecological footprint (Jackson, 2009).
40 And gains made by efficiency are overwhelmed by increases in the size of the
41 economy. This may partly be because of the ‘rebound problem’, by which efficiency
42 gains free money which can then be used for further efficiencies or even other non-
43 material consumptive purposes, but which tends to be used to drive more con-
44 sumption: the Jevons paradox (Jackson, 2009; Sorrell, 2009).
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Technological improvements, as well as economic and financial innovations, are 1

of course necessary. However, they can only ever be a part of the solution rather 2
than a silver bullet. Pollution, habitat loss, land degradation and inequality are just 3
some of the so-called ‘wicked’ problems that remain even after decades of 4
technological innovation for sustainability. At a fundamental level, the idea that 5
Earth is a store of resources to be transformed into material products fails both 6
people and planet. 7
We argue that a transition towards more sustainable lifestyles will come from 8
re-visioning the human place in nature, realizing ourselves not as separate, but as 9
part of the whole, with a responsibility to nurture the biosphere in perpetuity. It 10
will not occur because we are afraid of weathering the ‘perfect storm’ of unsus- 11
tainability. Instead, we believe that what is needed is a deeper and more positive 12
process: a re-visioning of the relationship between people and planet, undertaken 13
in different ways by individuals, families, communities and nations. Such visions 14
will show the potential for reconnection to bring about not just planetary health, 15
but also personal well-being, joy, health and flourishing. There is strong evidence 16
to show that well-being – the ‘good stuff’ of life – is brought about by such 17
reconnection and re-braiding of the human and the natural (Pretty, 2013). It is a 18
vision to find a way towards reconciling our aspirations with the finitudes of our 19
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planet (Jackson, 2009). 20
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Human well-being and the perfect storm
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Material consumption can increase well-being when it enhances people’s capa- 24
bilities without adverse effects on others (including non-human beings and future 25
generations), and when it respects the carrying capacities of the planet (Pretty, 26
2013). On the one hand, developments in science and technology, along with our 27
architectures of trade and commerce, have brought new capabilities, comforts and 28
freedoms to millions of people unthinkable just generations ago. But the links 29
between material consumption and well-being are far from simple, and it is not 30
clear that consumption leads directly to health or happiness. Economic prosperity 31
goes alongside some quite adverse impacts on individuals’ health and well-being. 32
The damage wrought on nature is also writ large on the human body. Sedentary 33
lifestyles, isolation and loneliness, unhealthy eating habits and substance abuse are, 34
in part, the physical and emotional counterparts of degraded landscapes, fragmented 35
communities, climate change and biodiversity loss. 36
Globally, around a billion people are obese: the result of dietary transitions, 37
perverse food systems and sedentary lifestyles. In the United States, obesity and related 38
co-morbidities cost £117 billion in healthcare and play a role in the deaths of 300,000 39
people annually (Worldwatch Institute, 2011). In England, over 60 per cent of adults 40
are either overweight or obese, as are 30 per cent of children between two and fifteen 41
years of age (UK Department of Health, 2011). With this comes an elevated risk of 42
chronic co-morbities, such as type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, strokes and 43
certain cancers. At a point just under two generations after a World War that brought 44
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1 a legacy of food rationing persisting to 1954, average incidence of obesity in the UK

2 in the mid-1980s was 3 per cent. Just one generation later, it had risen to 24 per cent
3 of adult men and 26 per cent of adult women. By 2012, some 16 per cent of children
4 were obese, and a further 14 per cent overweight (CMO, 2013).
5 These are the dark shadows under our glittering culture of material consumption.
6 In the emerging economies, these diseases now account for more deaths than
7 those caused by communicable diseases (Nugent, 2008). In India, for example,
8 demographic changes, increasing urbanization and changed dietary patterns are
9 leading to an epidemic of chronic non-communicable disease and obesity, particu-
10 larly in urban areas (Shetty, 2002). Current trends indicate that by 2025, India will
11 become the ‘diabetes capital of the world’, the prevalence of cardiovascular disease
12 is three times as high in urban India than in rural parts and there has been a dramatic
13 increase in the incidence of certain cancers amongst urban Indian women (Joshi
14 and Parikh, 2007; Joshi et al., 2008).
15 It is important to understand that these changes are not simply the result of poor
16 personal choices. Cultures of consumption structure the social, economic and
17 cultural context within which people exercise individual choices. Picking between
18 healthy and unhealthy foods, for example, may hinge not just on personal tastes,
19 but also on industry structures and the effectiveness of policy-making, as well as on
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people’s incomes, time, skills and the quality of subsidized food available to those
on low incomes (Nugent, 2008).
Changing lifestyles also influence mental health. It has been estimated that by
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2020, mental ill health will be the leading cause of disability in the developed world.
Life satisfaction is not automatically conferred by material prosperity. Comparisons
across countries indicate that life satisfaction increases with GDP only up to a
26 certain amount. Beyond a certain per capita GDP threshold – one estimate is
27 £10,000 – life satisfaction becomes relatively independent of further changes to
28 GDP (Pretty, 2013).
29 The benefits of material prosperity are also poorly distributed, both between and
30 within nations. Globally, as Misoczky and Böhm (2013) point out, ‘the division of
31 labour among nations is such that some specialize in winning and others in losing’.
32 Despite the nearly fourfold growth in world economy since the 1950s (World
33 Bank, 2012), more than 2 billion people currently live on less than $2 per day. Just
34 over 800 million people have no access to safe water, and just over 2 billion have
35 poor and unsafe sanitation. While over a billion people are obese, just under a
36 billion are hungry. These people need to consume more just to have enough to
37 ensure physical survival, let alone robust health and well-being. They need more
38 food, water and sanitation, and the entitlements, incomes, infrastructure and
39 livelihoods that ensure access to these.
40 At the same time, disproportionate ‘over-consumption’ in the global North
41 and rich pockets of the global South means that the average global citizen is
42 consuming too much. The United States, for example, has less than 5 per cent of
43 the global population, but consumes about a quarter of the world’s fossil fuel
44 resources (Worldwatch Institute, 2011). Figures 1.1a and 1.1b show that this
Proof
10 10
9 9
Ecocultures-p.qxd
8 8
7 7
15/8/14
6 6
10:16
5 5
4 4
Page 13
3 3
2 2
Human Development Index (HDI)
Overall life satisfaction (2006–10)
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1 1
0 0
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
GDP per capita (PPP$, 2009) GDP per capita (PPP$, 2009)
FIGURE 1.1a Relationship between GDP and life satisfaction by FIGURE 1.1b Relationship between GDP and HDI at country level
countries (n=145). (Source: Pretty, 2013). (n=173). (Source: Pretty, 2013).
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Proof
1 over-consumption does not necessarily lead to more human development. That is,
2 indefinite growth in material wealth and GDP will not add more to the Human
3 Development Index (HDI) or to life satisfaction. Increasing GDP is important for
4 those who have nothing or little: a growing GDP enables those who have nothing
5 or little to grow and better themselves, as Figure 1.1 shows. Yet once people reach
6 basic material wealth, growing GDP seems to add only marginally to human
7 development.
8 In summary, the globally dominant vision of ever-increasing material culture as
9 conducive to ‘the good life’ is not, in fact, correct. It cannot be resourced by finite
10 Earth, and actively hinders human health and well-being, especially for those who
11 have done least to contribute to the ‘perfect storm’. Life on Earth, now and in the
12 future, will depend fundamentally on a re-visioning of the human choices and
13 actions that have led us to where we are. There is a need to reconsider what
14 development and progress mean, and what we are trying to achieve by ‘growth’.
15 Given the depth and breadth of the challenge, we argue that it is not just new
16 technologies, laws or regulations which will achieve sustainability, but a deeper
17 conversation about the values and principles by which we structure our cultures,
18 societies and economies. We offer this book as one contribution to this con-
19 versation – a contribution to the existing, manifold calls for rethinking our
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relationship to this planet, a call for doing things differently.

Doing things differently
23
24 There have been many calls for different ways of living based on a reconnection
25 between nature and culture, and there has been much scholarship on the subject.
26 Searching for the key phrase ‘sustainable communities’ returns 98,200 results on
27 Google Books. An early call came from Mark Roseland’s Toward Sustainable
28 Communities: Resources for Citizens and their Governments, which focused primarily
29 on reorienting western urban communities. These, he said, were ‘ecologically
30 unconscionable[,] . . . economically inefficient and socially inequitable’ (Roseland,
31 1992). What was needed, then, was to apply the concept of ‘sustainable develop-
32 ment’ to community planning. Since then, it has become clear that communities
33 in both global North and South will need to navigate a worldwide ‘perfect storm’,
34 and either recapture or envision afresh a more sustainable path (see Swilling,
35 Chapter 13).
36 We locate our concept of ‘ecocultures’ within such calls, recognizing the need
37 to see beyond the obvious challenges of resource scarcities and imbalances between
38 increasing demand and diminishing supply. ‘Resource-based environmentalism’
39 does, of course, present an urgent imperative for us to reconsider our ways of life.
40 Writings in the vein of Malthus (1798), Ehrlich (1968) and Meadows et al. (1972)
41 have done much to focus the world’s attention on the implications of resource
42 overuse. These are necessary, but insufficient in both diagnosis and prognosis. It is
43 not enough, we argue, simply to conserve ‘resources’ and use them wisely, as nature
44 is more than source and sink. Seeing it as such is simply another manifestation of
Proof
Proof
a narrowly utilitarian perspective that opens the way to commodification, financial- 1

ization and the market-based systems of resource management that have so far failed 2
to deliver effective outcomes (most visibly, at the moment, in the case of climate 3
change; see Böhm and Dabhi, 2009). Instead, considering well-being – of people 4
and planet – highlights a bigger set of issues that need to be addressed. For instance, 5
a focus on conserving resources does not necessarily deal with issues of distribution 6
and equity, two twin cornerstones of any truly sustainable global order. It is also 7
difficult to value the ‘non-material’ contributions of healthy ecosystems, which are 8
a source of aesthetic, cultural and spiritual value to those who live on and around 9
them. More importantly, seeing landscapes merely in terms of resources obscures 10
the complex interactions between nature and society – each co-creating the other. 11
For land-based communities worldwide, landscapes and nature are endowed with 12
special significance: they are, variously, part of the human community, an embodi- 13
ment and site of the sacred, and a fundamental part of personal and community 14
identity (Abram, 1996; Berkes, 1999; Nelson, 1983; Pretty, 2007). 15
Taking these contributions into account implies the need for a fundamental re- 16
examination of how we live, and how we could live better. While ecocultures will, 17
we contend, demonstrate a lighter touch on the land – using less, and making it go 18
further – they will also use the land qualitatively differently, actively nurturing 19
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landscapes, ecosystems and the human connections to these.
This prioritization means that ecocultural ways of life value nature differently,
both for its contributions to human society and for itself. In environmental
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scholarship, there have been calls for such an orientation in the writings of ‘deep
ecologists’, for example, who have called for the ‘rights’ of the environment to be
respected, and for the ‘biotic community’ to be valued intrinsically – that is, for
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and of itself. In recent times, perhaps the best known articulation of deep ecological 26
thinking comes from the writings of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, who 27
recognized the need for revaluating human activities on Earth in total, rather than 28
simply tackling isolated sustainability challenges. For Naess, the consideration of 29
the crisis of our world, and of the creation of another, more sustainable way of life 30
requires a scrutiny of everything in light of broad and long-term sustainability 31
(Naess, 1995). Central to this re-visioning is the recognition of the fundamental 32
and irrevocable interlinkages between all of life on Earth, and of the intrinsic value 33
of both human and non-human life, ‘independent of its usefulness for narrow 34
human purposes’ (Naess and Rothenberg, 1989). Life on Earth, it is recognized, is 35
a result of connections rather than isolated elements. And things – material, non- 36
material, human or non-human – ‘are internally related and constituted in a web 37
of relationships’ (Shrivastava, 1996). It is because of these interconnections that 38
deep ecologists recognize the oneness of all life, and therefore the value of all life. 39
These stipulations call for an ecological ethics that goes beyond narrow managerial 40
manipulation of ecosystem goods and services. Such a view is now more than 41
adequately supported by ecology and sustainability science. This field of 42
interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary scholarship has been fast emerging as a field 43
in its own right, with the number of scholarly publications growing exponentially 44
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1 since the 1980s in both the developed and developing worlds (Bettencourt and
2 Kaur, 2011). It systematically explores the ‘united whole’ of which ‘ecosophers’
3 have spoken. A key focus within the field is an effort to understand the links
4 between human (social) and ecological systems, and how these links function over
5 time in ways that either maintain or change linked ‘social-ecological’ systems.
6 The ability to withstand or adapt to change is termed ‘resilience’, which has
7 become a much used but also misused term in recent years. The term has a variety
8 of colloquial usages and historical meanings (Schoon, 2005). In this book, we draw
9 on scholarship on resilience as applied to the human dimensions of social-ecological
10 change (Holling, 1973). In this stream of scholarship, resilience is understood as a
11 capacity for self-organization, renewal, transformation and adaptability, such that
12 communities remain flexible and dynamic but also retain an essential structure and
13 function in the face of internal or external shocks and other drivers of change
14 (Costanza et al., 2007; Holling, 1973).
15 Resilience in this sense does not imply the preservation of a static state, but one
16 that is capable of continuous adaptation in response to evolving conditions
17 (Holling, 1996). A central insight of resilience theory is that complex social-
18 ecological systems are anything but static. Instead, they maintain themselves by
19 making constant, subtle course corrections and adaptations, designed to enhance
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both social and ecological well-being. By extension, resilient communities are those
that expect surprise, build contingency plans and develop a knowledge base on how
to nurture ecological and social capital. Neither is resilience necessarily always a
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positive attribute. Many undesirable traits and features of global capitalism, such as
stark social inequalities and environmental degradation, demonstrate ‘dark’
resilience – that is, they persist despite multiple and continuing attempts to address
26 these challenges.
27 A key theoretical cornerstone for resilience and sustainability science has been
28 the work of the political economist Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2009). Her work on new
29 institutional economics has shown how, rather than simply acting alone and in
30 order to maximize utility for themselves, people often cooperate successfully in
31 order to manage collectively owned resources. While resources may be finite,
32 cooperative management and effective rules have allowed people to share these
33 effectively. The systems of management explored by Ostrom and her colleagues
34 show that people are not simply doomed to fight over scarce resources in the ways
35 predicted by conventional economic theories. Instead, communities around the
36 world demonstrate the effectiveness of mutually agreed, reciprocal and mutually
37 beneficial co-management, developed and administered by communities them-
38 selves (Hawken, 2007; Pretty, 2003).
39 Insights from psychology also help as we begin to reorient towards more
40 sustainable, communal ways of living. For instance, multiple streams of evidence
41 now demonstrate that human well-being and flourishing are served by the satisfac-
42 tion of basic needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy. The satisfaction of
43 these three basic needs is what underlies psychological health and flourishing, in
44 both western and non-western cultures (Chirkov et al., 2003; Jang et al., 2009;
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Ryan et al., 2005). People flourish when given a chance to connect to nature and 1
to community, and when their lifestyles are organized around purposeful and 2
meaningful activity. People who engage in land-based livelihoods or green exercise, 3
for example, have daily contact with nature, which has been shown to produce 4
feelings of closeness and connection (Frantz et al., 2005; Wilson, 1984). Closeness 5
to nature also fosters closeness and attachments with other people (Weinstein et al., 6
2009). 7
To summarize: for us, it is clear that we are in the midst of a polycrisis of 8
unsustainability. A number of interlinked challenges threaten the biosphere, and 9
both people and planet are suffering. It is recognized that this is because of a global 10
proliferation of unsustainable lifestyles, which together characterize a globally 11
dominant culture of material consumption. In recognition of this, there have been 12
calls for a transition to ‘deep’ sustainability. Part of this transition will need to 13
involve a re-imagining of the ‘good life’, of what it means to be human, to be 14
civilized, to progress and to be happy. In other words, we will need not just new 15
policies, laws, rules and technologies, but fundamentally new ways of seeing the 16
world and our place in it. 17
Raskin et al. (2002) call this a ‘Great Transition’: ‘a planetary transition toward 18
a humane, just and ecological future’. Such a future is, they write, more than 19
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possible, if radical revision of technologies is accompanied by ‘a reconsideration of
human goals’. Macy (2005) calls it a ‘Great Turning’, consisting of three interrelated
dimensions: slowing damage to the Earth and life on Earth; analyzing the structural
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causes of unsustainability and the creation of structurally sound alternatives; and a
shift in consciousness towards a new set of ‘deeply ingrained values’.
Over and over again, then, we see calls for new ways of living, thinking and
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being, based on new values and priorities. Simply tinkering at the margins will not 26
do. Technological fixes and campaigns on single issues will not bring about a deep 27
and sustained transition to personal and planetary well-being. The ‘acquisitive 28
materialism’ which constitutes the underlying social value system of our current 29
world (Martell, 1994) is not made sustainable by technologies that promise 30
efficiency: ‘simplistic assumptions that capitalism’s propensity for efficiency will 31
allow us to stabilize the climate or protect against resource scarcity are nothing short 32
of delusional’ (Jackson, 2009). What is needed, then, is a different world, a different 33
way of life, a different way to live in communities, in line with the principles of 34
nature and Earth. We offer the concept of ecocultures as a means to think about 35
what a different world might look like, and also to show that alternative ways of 36
life are already all around us. 37
38
39
Ecocultures: a deeper vision for sustainable ways of living
40
While much of the world is converging towards cultures of high material con- 41
sumption, and a sense that a hegemonic ‘market society’ encompasses all aspects of 42
life, it is also clear that there are already many examples of good practice within 43
sustainable communities in existence. Examining the ways these communities live 44
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1 and organize can provide a rich source of knowledge, wisdom and vision from
2 which to draw lessons for a wider global transition to sustainability and resilience.
3 That is, we contend that when it comes to sustainability, resilience and well-being,
4 many answers already exist. Ecocultures provide visible examples of what life might
5 look like if we were to organize our societies with care and concern for each other
6 and the planet.
7 We define ‘ecocultures’ as communities in which lives and lifestyles are orga-
8 nized around the recognition that social and ecological well-being are interlinked,
9 and where sustainability and resilience are prioritized and actively nurtured. In
10 other words, ecocultures are exemplars in the art and science of sustainable living.
11 What might be the defining features of such communities?
12 Our vision for an ecocultural ‘ideal type’ is based on both our reading of the
13 imperatives that emerge out of the present crisis of sustainability on the one hand,
14 and our observation of sustainable communities on the other. In presenting a vision
15 for sustainable communities, we do not wish to suggest that we have reached a
16 static, universally applicable definition. Neither do we suggest that those communi-
17 ties we have designated as ‘ecocultures’ are ideal in every respect. There is no doubt
18 that every community, of whatever type, faces social-ecological challenges, and
19 that the lived experience of sustainability is likely to offer just as many complexities
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and tradeoffs as life within our current, unsustainable milieu.
We also do not advocate, or engage in, a romantic view of so-called ‘traditional’
societies, past times or subsistence lifestyles.
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25
An important part of learning from others is deciding what works in one’s own
context. While it is desirable and appropriate for us to learn that viable alternatives
exist, it is not the intention of this book to advocate the simple transference of
26 lessons from one context to another. Diversity of cultures, contexts and conditions
27 is a key characteristic of the real-world compendium of ecocultures. In this book
28 are cases from both rural and urban communities, in both developed and develop-
29 ing country contexts. We have included both ‘established’ communities – those
30 following particular lifestyles for considerable periods of time – and ‘emerging’
31 ones, which are just beginning to put into place new ways of being and doing.
32 Respect for this diversity is fundamental, as it is clear to us that sustainability and
33 resilience depend on a close matching between communities and diverse contexts.
34 Finally, it is important to note that we do not deny the need for global, regional
35 and national actions that organize governance of the biosphere in new ways. This
36 is urgent. However, we acknowledge a parallel need to study and learn from those
37 manifold communities that already live different lives relatively successfully –
38 communities that live more sustainably and are more resilient than those following
39 a high material consumption development path. Given the global reach of industrial
40 modernity, it is sometimes easy to forget that alternatives to the unsustainable
41 outgrowth of global capitalism are already in existence wherever we look (Gibson-
42 Graham, 2006).
43 We bear these considerations in mind when setting out defining features for an
44 ecocultural ‘ideal type’.
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First, we posit that an overarching ethic of care for linked social-ecological well- 1
being is the foremost defining feature of ecocultures. Whereas the current global 2
hegemony of economism largely restricts issues of sustainability and resilience to 3
resource availability, and conflates well-being with material prosperity, we contend 4
that the fundamental organizing principle of an ecoculture is fellowship with and 5
between humans and nature. 6
Second, and related, to this, an ‘ecocultural’ conception of quality of life might 7
constitute something more than, or even entirely different from, economic well- 8
being. It might be signified by, for example, indicators of human development, an 9
emphasis on human flourishing or simply the ability to navigate nature’s seasons 10
successfully. 11
Third, it is evident from our case studies that individuals living ‘ecocultural’ lives 12
hold a particular view of nature and the human place within it. Specifically, we 13
contend that within ecocultures, nature might be viewed as something more – or 14
even entirely different than – a ‘means’ to our ‘given ends’. It is here that we find 15
the strongest resonance to the ‘deep ecology’ or ‘ecocentric’ framework of Naess 16
and his colleagues. 17
Finally, based on these values and priorities, we contend that an ecocultural way 18
of living involves the active and sustained nurturing of natural, human and social 19
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‘capital’, not in isolation but together. We content that these features broadly
encompass the values which guide and shape ecocultural ways of living, repre-
senting a unique take on development and society, which, if implemented, might
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offer a chance at deep and lasting sustainability and resilience.
Recognizing the promise of these ecocultures, it is also important to acknow-
ledge that many such communities are finding it difficult to maintain or develop
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25
resilience. Ways of life that have flourished for many centuries are in some cases 26
simply disappearing as a result of changing social-ecological conditions. There is a 27
need to value and nurture sustainable communities that are increasingly being sub- 28
sumed or displaced by the global hegemony of market society, over-consumption, 29
the commodification of nature and progressive individualization. Many existing 30
ecocultures are viewed by this hegemonic view as unviable, primitive or anachro- 31
nistic. There is a need to unlearn the values that high-consumption dominant 32
cultures foster and to recognize alternative, ecocultural values. Hence, we believe 33
that alongside an examination of the lessons that these communities offer us, it is 34
also important to examine how and why certain lifestyles are vulnerable. 35
This book is, then, one of many responses to the call to re-imagine development 36
for sustainability, and to recognize the potential and promise of communities 37
around the world that are already living relatively sustainable lives. In our view, 38
the practices, norms and ways of living presented in the case studies of this book 39
differentiate these communities as ‘green shoots pushing up through the rubble’ 40
(Macy, 2005). They offer us glimpses of hope, glimpses of a different, more sus- 41
tainable future, which we have no choice but to strive for. 42
43
44
Proof
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1 The structure of this book

2
This book is organized into three parts. The first deals with established ecocultures
3
– those which may, more contentiously, be loosely termed ‘traditional’ societies.
4
Chapters within this part describe both persistence and loss. Many established
5
ecocultures around the world are finding their ways of life denigrated and destroyed
6
by modern development. Considered archaic and marginal, these unique ways of
7
8 life are being disrupted in the push for land and resources to fuel our global con-
9 sumer culture. Others are more indirectly impacted, through global environmental
10 change and the slow but sure dispersal of community members away from the land.
11 Yet many communities are still drawing upon their knowledge, culture and
12 relationships with the land in order to help them survive. Others are finding that
13 old ways will no longer serve.
14 The essays begin with a chapter by Julian Clifton on the Bajau of the Wakatobi
15 national park in Indonesia. Clifton describes the unique contemporary lifestyles of
16 the Indonesian Bajau communities residing in Sulawesi’s Wakatobi National Park,
17 and examines the resilience of the Bajau link to the sea, whilst also describing
18 emerging livelihood practices that threaten this resilience. To date, the Bajau have
19 been able to maintain their unique way of life through a combination of strong
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20 family-based support networks and the maintenance of a rich compendium of
21 local ecological knowledge. Clifton goes on to discuss the various emerging social-
22 ecological challenges that increasingly threaten Bajau resilience, and assesses the
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25
communities’ ability to cope with these. Competition between the (primarily)
subsistence-oriented fishing of the Bajau and other uses of the marine environment
(including commercial fishing, conservation and tourism) challenge Bajau control
26 over the marine environment. The Bajau peoples’ capacity to deal with these
27 challenges is limited by both cultural and political factors. Notions of ecological
28 conservation and ‘adaptive capacity’ are challenging to apply within the Bajau
29 cultural milieu: formal institutions hold less sway than informal ties and historic
30 social, political and economic marginalization has kept the indigenous communities
31 from having a strong voice in decisions on the marine environment and its
32 protection.
33 In the next chapter, by Tero Mustonen, we look at a fishing way of life in a
34 very different context. Mustonen looks at the ice-fishing communities of North
35 Karelia, Finland, which maintain a distinctive traditional practice of winter seining,
36 or ice fishing, in freshwater lakes. Communal seining has been practised here for
37 thousands of years, and since the 1800s, communities have maintained seining
38 through significant social-ecological change. Most recently, climate change and the
39 continued advance of modernity challenge the continuation of the practice. Yet
40 ice fishing continues and, with it, a unique connection to the land remains alive.
41 Mustonen points out that ice fishing does not endure as ‘a museum piece’. Instead,
42 it remains relevant and is continually evolving. Ice fishing involves a deep
43 knowledge of many landscapes of lakes, developed through close and continued
44 interaction. Mustonen highlights the particular qualities of this knowledge – and
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the deep ethic of care embedded within it. Seining involves more than knowing 1
information about the land. Instead, it involves particular ways of knowing that renew 2
communities’ identities and ties with the landscape. 3
Staying in the circumpolar North, Naotaka Hayashi looks at the ways in which 4
traditional hunting persists amongst the Inuit, and examines its contribution 5
to communities’ social, cultural and spiritual life. Hayashi particularly highlights 6
Inuit adaptability – the result of living with continual transformations in the Arctic 7
landscape. As with the case of the Bajau, Hayashi describes how a detailed 8
understanding of the land combined with particular qualities of mind have enabled 9
the Inuit to adapt to life in the changing and challenging circumpolar North. With 10
the advent of climate change, these attributes will only increase in importance. 11
Unstable sea life and changed animal migration patterns necessitate ever more 12
flexibility. Hunters change prey, routes and methods depending on what is feasible, 13
and must thus bring tremendous knowledge and mutual cooperation to bear on 14
every hunt. Locally agreed formal and informal rules help to structure the actions 15
of individual hunters. New technologies – which in some cases entail a lighter 16
touch on the land and thus increase resilience – co-exist with the traditional. Also 17
important for resource management and resilience are local and regional govern- 18
ment bodies, which regulate resource management. While the Inuit are certainly 19
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highly adaptable, these government measures instituted before climate change have
greatly facilitated local coping.
Leanne Cullen-Unsworth and Marilyn Wallace then describe how an aboriginal
20
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22

community in Queensland, Australia, is taking active steps to maintain its distinc-
tive culture and ties to the land. Here, ‘returning to country’ is a key source of
resilience. The authors describe the creation and working of the Wet Tropics
23
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25
World Heritage Area, a UNESCO World Heritage Area created in recognition 26
of the social-ecological importance of the humid tropical forests of Australia. 27
Indigenous ecological knowledge (IEK) plays a vital role in the management of this 28
cultural landscape, and is co-created by nature and aboriginal society. The authors 29
particularly highlight the various formal agreements and institutions that come 30
together to manage this landscape. Here, aboriginal communities have long 31
struggled to have their rights recognized and formalized. Formal agreements, plans 32
and partnerships enable the aboriginal community to play a central and well- 33
recognized role in the management of the land. This in turns builds social- 34
ecological resilience by facilitating land management and reinforcing traditional 35
rights, identities and histories. 36
In the final chapter of the first part, Chicu Lokgariwar discusses the difficult 37
question of communities’ transition away from long-established land-based lifestyles 38
in order to survive change. Whereas the cases described by Mustonen, Hayashi and 39
Cullen-Unsworth and Wallace describe varying degrees of ‘successful’ adaptation 40
to changing conditions, Lokgariwar looks at a case in which dealing with change 41
involves the transformation of an ecocultural way of life. As with other established 42
ecocultures in what some might consider ‘difficult’ environments, Himalayan 43
communities have long lived with the threat of disaster as a result of a continually 44
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1 shifting landscape. For the small-scale farmers in this region, difficulties of terrain
2 and relative isolation are compounded by the growing threat of climate change. At
3 the same time, increasing population and changing market demands add their
4 pressures to a landscape long modified by deforestation, clearing and cultivation.
5 In the absence of any government strategy to proactively mitigate these pressures,
6 local communities are transforming their livelihoods out of necessity. Where farms
7 lack viability, people are moving out of agriculture. While this could be interpreted
8 as a lack of resilience, Lokgariwar argues that it may in fact simply be an adaptation
9 strategy. Where communities have no option, the preservation of a way of life is
10 less important than finding ways to survive. Climate change and cultural change
11 are thus going hand in hand, and communities here are finding ways to earn their
12 livelihood, and in doing so some are gradually transitioning away from ‘ecoculture’
13 and into more urban-based lifestyles.
14 In Part II, we consider ‘emerging ecocultures’: communities in which people
15 are actively attempting to create lifestyles that reconnect with the land and express
16 concern for linked social-ecological well-being. Many such communities, such as
17 Transition Towns and ecovillages, are emerging across the world. The examples
18 within this part of the book suggest that these communities are embracing broadly
19 similar ‘design principles’ to the established ecocultures described in the previous
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22
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part. These include a respect for community, a sense of solidarity and collective
learning, a deeper reliance on local rather than global resource chains and a
recognition that well-being comes from more than monetary gain. Yet, there are,
23
24
25
of necessity, important differences. Individuals within ‘emerging’ communities are
often not living land-based lifestyles, and are far more integrated, culturally and
materially, with the mainstream of modern industrial and post-industrial civilization
26 than those living in established ecocultures. Their motivations for attempting to
27 ‘create’ communities are not based on long-established cultural identities, but on
28 the quest for improved well-being and sustainability.
29 The part begins with a chapter by Eve Annecke, who describes the evolution
30 of Lynedoch EcoVillage, the first socially mixed, mixed-income, ecologically
31 designed community in South Africa. Over fifteen years, Annecke has been
32 centrally involved in building up this community, which emerged as a response to
33 ecological crises and the deep social wounds inflicted by apartheid and associated
34 poverty and marginalization. A number of interlinked priorities were thus
35 important: ensuring the well-being of children, working to heal social tensions,
36 land reform and land management. Annecke reflects on the village’s achievements,
37 implications and future as through the eyes of a child resident. This device allows
38 us to reflect on how various initiatives at the ecovillage – particularly those
39 pertaining to new systems of education – are improving social-ecological well-
40 being and building up the potentials of the next generation. Annecke reflects on
41 the various strands that come together to enable this transformative community.
42 First among these is the role of the Sustainability Institute, which provides a focus
43 for learning and education that feeds back into the journey of the ecovillage within
44 which it is located. Second is the development of a common vision and language
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around sustainability and ecological technology. Related to this is the difficult and 1
valuable work of building a community. The work of creating trust and building 2
building connections between people and networks of support involves continual 3
effort. 4
From South Africa we move to Brazil, where Leopoldo Cavaleri Gerhardinger 5
and his colleagues describe life in São José in the south of Brazil, drawing out how 6
the ecovillage maintains social-ecological resilience. Over a twenty-five-year 7
period, São José has instituted an impressive set of resilience-enhancing tech- 8
nologies, social structures, institutions and governance practices. Together, these 9
have enabled the community to navigate a number of challenging events including 10
a six-month drought in 2000, landslides and energy shortages. Three overarching 11
features are especially important in the continued development of these resilience- 12
enhancing attributes. First, the authors highlight the creation and working of a 13
number of sophisticated and continually evolving formal governance structures, 14
which guide how the community works to manage resources. These include a 15
coordinating body, formed as an association in 1996, and formal partnerships with 16
surrounding indigenous groups and churches. Importantly, these structures are 17
flexible, adapting in form and function as the community develops. Second, central 18
to the vision and working of the community is the influence of the unifying 19
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spiritual practice of the Santo Daime religion and an explicit quest to include
spiritual practice, exploration and learning into the life of the community. Finally,
strong leadership plays an important role in building a shared vision and effective
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governance structures through which to make it manifest.
Jacob Corvidae then tells the story of his efforts to set up EcoVillage Detroit,
which was shining for a while before ‘quietly falling over, settling back into the
23
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25
ground’. But, says Corvidae, ‘what happened afterward may be the most important 26
part of the story’. In Detroit, much has been made of a groundswell of sustainable 27
development that is trying to reorient this hitherto ‘Babylon of modern industrial- 28
ization’ towards ecologically sound, inclusive and equitable development. Corvidae 29
and a small team of local residents initiated projects around green building 30
techniques, hosted weekly potlucks designed to build community, revived an 31
abandoned community garden and volunteered at an inner-city farm programme. 32
The overarching aim was to build an ecovillage ‘that worked to serve our entire 33
wider community, and not just a green elite’. Working with social tensions and 34
building in social inclusion were fundamentally important. A few years on, the 35
ecovillage gradually folded. Corvidae considers the lack of a formal structure to 36
have been a ‘key mistake’, reflects on the quality of his leadership and, finally, on 37
the influence of personal matters that simply pulled key participants in different 38
directions, away from the project. ‘Away from all our grandiose plans’, he explains, 39
‘real life happened’. But all was not lost. EcoVillage Detroit was part of a wider 40
emerging movement to build sustainable communities in the city and it provided 41
important momentum for the larger story. Corvidae ends the chapter by discussing 42
a number of wider implications for the creation of sustainable communities, 43
particularly in ‘legacy cities’ such as Detroit. Here, collapse and deterioration make 44
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1 way for novel solutions. Distressed areas, says Corvidae, can be ‘key places to invest
2 in humanity’s future’. But the story of EcoVillage Detroit highlights important
3 implications for those seeking to rejuvenate such communities. Central to the task
4 is building in social inclusion, justice, a shared language and people’s diverse
5 concerns. In Detroit, racial and class diversity and deep social divides makes this
6 challenging; but those who respect diversity at the beginning of any project, says
7 Corvidae, ‘are far ahead of the rest’.
8 Jane Hindley then describes the case of Bristol Green Doors, an initiative
9 designed to mainstream sustainable building in the UK. Here, ‘one of the leakiest
10 housing stocks in Europe’ contributes around a quarter of the country’s GHG
11 emissions. Bristol Green Doors seeks to promote home energy retrofitting through
12 events that improve citizens’ understanding of the issues and make retrofitting seem
13 ‘normal, sensible and desirable’. The initiative seeks to promote change through
14 providing a positive vision, and practical tools through which individuals can realize
15 it. The initiative uses ‘open house’ events, a well-established and culturally familiar
16 mode of learning and activism, to showcase exemplars of retrofitted homes. Bristol
17 Green Doors also benefited from the fact that other green open homes events had
18 begun across the UK, and there was growing political and academic interest in the
19 issues of sustainable housing and retrofitting. An important feature has been the
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decision to mainstream the appeal of retrofitting, targeting the general public rather
than core networks of green activists. Rather than promoting the activity as a
‘green’ initiative, Bristol Green Doors has sought to connect to popular culture and
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25
everyday concerns. Partly in response to this choice, and partly to ensure a viable
organizational form, Bristol Green Doors’ founders have chosen to set up a
professionally run, potentially self-financing organization that projects a coherent
26 ethos, distinct from other sustainability initiatives, such as Transition Towns. Limits
27 exist, however: homeowners face financial barriers and both the construction
28 industry and central government are variously ‘locked in’ to existing standards,
29 practices and models.
30 Finally, Larch Maxey reviews an array of emerging initiatives to explore how
31 they contribute to a wider transition to sustainability and well-being – the latter an
32 increasingly important and explicit aspect of the work of emerging ecocultures in
33 the UK. Like other chapters within this part of the book, Maxey’s contribution
34 reflects on the difficulties involved in ‘creating’ ecocultures, while individuals and
35 communities remain embedded – spatially and experientially – within a contrary
36 mainstream culture. In a section on the ‘dysfunctionality’ of intentional com-
37 munities, he analyzes reasons why there are many failures or partial successes for
38 every ‘success story’. Individuals engaged with community initiatives experience
39 great demands on their time and energy; this in turn contributes to a high turnover
40 of members, and is destabilizing for the community as a whole. A broader culture
41 of blame and victimhood can appear in the absence of strong processes to develop
42 shared visions, governance structures and communication systems. This involves
43 inevitable tensions that need to be navigated. Maxey presents the ‘Balanced View’
44 approach as a potential mechanism through which to navigate some of these
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tensions, particularly those pertaining to the preservation of individual well-being. 1

Maxey considers Balanced View to be a worldwide virtual community in itself, 2
and discusses how its precepts can help emerging place-based communities. He 3
then presents two cases of emerging ecocultures and uses Balanced View’s approach 4
to analyze how they contribute to the ‘Great Transition’ to sustainability. 5
In Part III, contributions by Steve Quilley and Mark Swilling reflect critically 6
on the potential of sustainable communities to contribute to the global transition 7
to sustainability. A key aim of this book is to present cases of established and 8
emerging ecocultures in ways which inform wider transitions in other communities 9
and over larger scales across nations and internationally. 10
Swilling evaluates the Transition movement as a potential alternative to 11
industrial modernity, critically analyzing its promise of relocalized, place-bound, 12
bio-regional communities. A specific focus of Quilley’s critique is the relative lack 13
of attention to the form such communities will take. He argues that relocalization, 14
combined with the retreat of the State, against a backdrop of civilizational collapse, 15
potentially entails the re-emergence of non-democratic forms of social organiza- 16
tion, and he expresses the need for attention to problems of violence and security. 17
Quilley first provides an account of the development of the Transition Town 18
movement and broadly describes its key features. A key defining feature of 19
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Transition Towns has been their ‘determinedly upbeat and optimistic’ nature,
‘positive about the ecological, communitarian and psychological benefits that might
emerge in the wake of energy scarcity’. Yet, Quilley argues that there are complex
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tensions to be navigated between ‘the good society’ on the one hand and the
ecological footprint on the other: ‘in a rather profound sense, ecological integrity
is inversely proportional to civilization’, he writes.
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25
Transition Towns are also relatively ‘agnostic’ about the implications of civiliza- 26
tional collapse for geopolitics, political economy and state governance. This 27
neglect, Quilley argues, creates a fundamental tension at the heart of the Transition 28
movement. A further tension pertains to the discourse of Transition as a means to 29
recreate ‘place-bound, ecologically rooted and face-to-face communities’ – similar 30
to the so-called ‘communities of fate’ that characterize traditional agrarian societies. 31
Yet, Quilley argues, Transition is very much a ‘community of choice’, populated 32
largely by educated, relatively affluent, left-leaning, cosmopolitan individuals with 33
strong attachments to the liberal-social democracies that prioritize individual 34
freedoms and expression. For most people, it will be difficult to reconcile with the 35
constraints, discipline and convenience of the global ‘grid’ of goods and services 36
upon which we have come to depend so heavily. And without a focus on security, 37
fledgeling communities navigating global challenges may soon find themselves 38
overwhelmed because of their lack of attention to the problems of violence and 39
security. For Quilley, then, the current discourse of Transition, while valuable, 40
does not yet go far enough to really grapple with the full scale of the challenges 41
ahead. 42
A particularly challenging question is the potential for transition in the 43
developing world. Here, legacies of poverty and environmental degradation induce 44
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1 relatively greater vulnerability to emerging global challenges such as climate change,

2 resource depletion and economic volatility. At the same time, the countries of the
3 global South are growing rapidly, industrializing, urbanizing and following roughly
4 the same model as the modern industrial west. There are questions about whether
5 the world can afford the replication of such a model, and whether it represents an
6 adequate mechanism to ensure social-ecological resilience and well-being. Against
7 the backdrop of such questions, Swilling explores a variety of alternative models of
8 development from across the developing world, each representing different stages
9 along an ‘ecocultural continuum’ and demonstrating a number of attributes that
10 evidence an ecocultural sensibility.
11 We conclude the volume with a chapter by Böhm et al., reflecting on the key
12 lessons and insights offered by established and emerging ecocultures. We begin this
13 chapter by highlighting some of the features that seem to enable ecocultural ways
14 of living. These include a close connection to the land, the development of
15 knowledge and skills required to live lightly on it, the preservation of close social
16 ties, community autonomy and flexibility, such that communities can respond to
17 challenging and changing times. Next, we discuss some of the immense challenges
18 that both emerging and established ecocultures must navigate. Communities that
19 have lived long on the land are finding it changing beyond recognition as a result
20
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22
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of climate change and the impacts of economic development. Emerging com-
munities must navigate the dysfunctionalities that come with group organization.
Putting these enabling factors and challenges in context, we end with reflections
23
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25
on the potential of ecocultures to contribute to a wider global transition to
sustainable ways of living.
These cases are differentiated into three categories. First are cases of communities
26 that are resisting disconnections: rural communities that are explicitly resisting
27 disconnection from nature instigated by modernity. Green urbanism initiatives are
28 top-down initiatives that seek to minimize the damage of modern infrastructures
29 and built environments. Liveable urbanism initiatives seek to create affordable,
30 sustainable and viable living environments for the urban poor. These three
31 categories cover a wide array of initiatives and models that all seek to provide some
32 degree of linked social-ecological resilience and well-being. Together, these
33 exemplars provide important, visionary ‘experiments’ from which to draw lessons
34 for urban development in the rapidly transforming regions and countries of the
35 world.
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38
39
40
41
42
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44
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Ecocultures: Blueprints for Sustainable Communities

Book · January 2015

Steffen Böhm Zareen Bharucha

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At a time when the global dominance of varieties of neoliberal capitalism seems 1

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Technological improvements, as well as economic and financial innovations, are 1

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1 a legacy of food rationing persisting to 1954, average incidence of obesity in the UK

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Overall life satisfaction (2006–10)

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a narrowly utilitarian perspective that opens the way to commodification, financial- 1

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1 The structure of this book

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tensions, particularly those pertaining to the preservation of individual well-being. 1

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1 relatively greater vulnerability to emerging global challenges such as climate change,

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