[ A.C. No. 12719 (Formerly CBD Case No.

17-5316), February 17, 2021 ]

SANNY L. GERODIAS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TOMAS A. RIVERAL, ATTY. ANNABEL G.

PULVERA-PAGE, AND ATTY. LORENA M. SUPATAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

On February 21, 2017, Sanny L. Gerodias (Gerodias) filed a disbarment complaint1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Attorneys Tomas A. Riveral (Riveral), Annabel G.
Pulvera-Page (Pulvera-Page) and Lorena M. Supatan (Supatan).

Gerodias was a former employee of Oriental Port and Allied Services Corporation
(OPASCOR).2 During his employment, he underwent several disciplinary investigations for various
reasons such as heated altercations with co-employees, damage to company property and
abandonment of work. The last disciplinary investigation which lead to his voluntary retirement from
OPASCOR was the incident of him stealing a box of perfumes owned by OPASCOR's clients.
Instead of terminating Gerodias, OPASCOR offered him the option of voluntary resignation with
payment of separation pay.3

Gerodias, on the other hand, demanded to avail of the early retirement option. Despite the fact that
he was short of two years to avail of the company's early retirement program, which requires a total
of 15 years of service, Gerodias' request was approved by Riveral, the President and General
Manager of OPASCOR. Thus, he was paid a retirement pay in the amount equivalent to 22 months
with full grant of other benefits despite the fact that he only worked for six months for the year 2016.4

However, a month after Gerodias received his retirement pay, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against OPASCOR and demanded a breakdown of the deductions made on his retirement
pay. On the other hand, OPASCOR filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against Gerodias.5

On February 3, 2017, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Gerodias' complaint for lack of merit.6 On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed in toto the LA's decision in its
April 17, 2017 Decision7 and May 31, 2017 Resolution.8

Meanwhile, a disbarment case was filed by Gerodias against Riveral as the President and General
Manager of OPASCOR; Pulvera-Page, as the Corporate Secretary of OPASCOR and one of the
lawyers in the firm of Riveral, Pulvera & Associates; and Supatan, as: a lawyer in Riveral, Pulvera &
Associates who received Gerodias' Position Paper during the proceedings of the labor case.
Gerodias averred that Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and
1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when they, together, with Jessielou Cadungog
(Cadungog), the Labor Union President of OPASCOR, connived and conspired to dismiss him from
his employment:

Specifically, Gerodias accused Cadungog, as appointed director of OPASCOR and as Labor Union
President, to have represented conflicting interests which resulted in him failing to represent
Gerodias' interest during his disciplinary investigation.9 Gerodias also questioned the two confusing
and conflicting Secretary's Certificates filed by OPASCOR in the labor and criminal cases which
were signed and executed at the same time by two different persons, namely, by Pulvera-Page and
Mary Lou Z. Geyrosaga (Geyrosaga), respectively. Both secretary's certificates indicated that
Pulvera-Page and Geyrosaga were corporate secretaries of OPASCOR.10
In addition, Gerodias averred that Pulvera-Page's representation of OPASCOR and all the other
individual respondents in the labor case, namely, Riveral and Cadungog, is evidence of conspiracy
to terminate his employment. Lastly, he likewise claimed that Supatan's act of receiving a copy of his
Position Paper during the proceedings of the labor case indicates her connivance with Riveral and
Pulvera-Page.

On the other hand, Supatan argued that her participation in the labor case by receiving a copy of
Gerodias' Position Paper in behalf of Riveral, Pulvera-Page & Associates does not justify the
allegations of conspiracy against her.11 Riveral and Pulvera-Page also belied the conspiracy
accusation against them and maintained that Gerodias was not illegally dismissed from employment
but voluntarily retired effective on June 17, 2016 by way of graceful exit.12

They further argued that no decision was made by OPASCOR's Board of Directors (BOD) to
terminate Gerodias. Instead, Riveral, as the President and General Manager of OPASCOR,
approved Gerodias's application for retirement in good faith.13 Lastly, both Pulvera-Page,
OPASCOR's Corporate Secretary and Geyrosaga, OPASCOR's Recording Secretary, are duly
authorized to issue Secretary's Certificates on motions or resolutions passed and approved by
OPASCOR's Board of Directors.14

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

On December 22, 2017, the IBP issued its Report and Recommendation15 recommending the
dismissal of the administrative case against Riveral, Pulvera- Page and Supatan for lack of factual
and legal basis. The acts and/or participation of Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan do not violate
ℒαwρhi ৷

any of the Canons in the CPR, the Lawyer's Oath or Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. On
March 22, 2018,; the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) resolved to adopt the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the complaint.16

Meanwhile, on October 25, 2018, Gerodias sent a Letter17 with attached Affidavit of
Desistance18 to the IBP expressing his disinterest in pursuing the disbarment case filed against
Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan.

Our Ruling

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the IBP and approves the recommendation to dismiss the
complaint against respondents Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan. Settled is the rule that for a
charge to justify a disciplinary action against a lawyer, the complainant must present convincing
proof to substantiate the charge. Otherwise, the lawyer is presumed innocent.19

In this case, the IBP properly found that Riveral, as the President and General Manager of
OPASCOR, did not act in bad faith in approving the early retirement of Gerodias instead of criminally
charging him and terminating his employment under which he would have received a considerably
lesser separation pay than the retirement package. As President and General Manager, he
approved Gerodias' request to avail of the early retirement program even when he was short of two
years in service as per the company policy. We find no violation of the CPR or the Lawyer's Oath in
Riveral's benevolent act of accommodating Gerodias' request. No evidence was presented to show
that Riveral acted with bad faith, malice, or ill will. Hence, the presumption of good faith in his favjor
stands.20

As to the two questioned Secretary's Certificates signed and executed by Pulvera-Page as the
Corporate Secretary and Geyrosaga as the Recording Secretary, We agree with the IBP that the act
is sanctioned under Article IV, Section 1, 2nd paragraph of the Amended By-Laws21 of OPASCAR.
The corporation's power to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the BOD which may duly
authorize an individual through its corporate by-laws or by a specific act to sign documents in behalf
of the corporation.22

Hence, there is nothing erroneous nor illegal in Pulvera-Page's signing and executing a Secretary's
Certificate as OPASCOR's Corporate Secretary as she is duly authorized to do so by virtue of the
Amended By-Laws and the Director's Certificate23 dated July 3, 2017. Thp fact that Geyrosaga is
ℒαwρhi ৷

also duly authorized to sign and execute a Secretary's Certificate by virtue of the said Director's
Certificate does not connote; connivance nor conspiracy between the two to terminate Gerodias'
employment. In addition, OPASCOR BOD's act of authorizing two persons to execute Secretary's
Certificate is not prohibited and well within the ambit of the law.

Lastly, We cannot fathom how Supatan's act of receiving Gerodias' Position Paper in the
proceedings of the labor case would imply conspiracy and connivance with Riveral, Pulvera-Page
and Cadungog in order to illegally terminate Gerodias from his employment. As per the records,
Supatan is an associate of the firm of Riveral, Pulvera-Page & Associates which represents
OPASCAR in the labor casb filed by Gerodias. Hence, Supatan, as an associate of the firm, is duty
bound to assist and represent its client OPASCAR in the said labor case including the receipt of any
pleadings filed. To reiterate, her act of receiving a copy of Gerodias' Position Paper is a lawful act
and does not in any way violate the CPR nor the Lawyer's Oath.

Mere allegation of conspiracy is not evidence and not equivalent to proof. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant and the case must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Evidently, complainant Gerodias utterly failed to discharge such burden. If anything, what is
apparent in the records is complainant's penchant for filing baseless disbarment cases for the
flimsiest of reasons. It should not surprise him if respondents would justifiably counter with legal
actions of their own against him to vindicate their rights.

ACCORDINGLY, this administrative case against Atty. Tomas A. Riveral, Atty. Annabel G. Pulvera-
Page and Atty. Lorena M. Supatan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 8959, October 07, 2020 ]

RISIE G. BAYGAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLARO MANUEL M. RIVERA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by complainant Risie G. Baygar
(Risie) against respondent Atty. Claro Manuel M. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) before the Office of the Bar
Confidant of this Court. The case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3391.

The Factual Antecedents

In her Petition, Risie alleges that Atty. Rivera committed acts constitutive of a Violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).2 At the time of the commission of
the acts complained of, Atty. Rivera was the Municipal Administrator3 of Binangonan, Rizal.

In her Complaint, Risie alleged that in the morning of March 9, 2010, officers from the Business
Permit and Licensing Office (BPLO) of Binangonan went to the sari-sari store of her father, Rodolfo
Baygar (Rodolfo)4 and informed them that they need to secure a business permit for their billiard
table5 and sari-sari store.6 They handed Risie a No Permit Notice dated March 9, 2010 for the
billiard table and a videoke machine.7

In the evening of March 17, 2010, Atty. Rivera, together with BPLO officers, health office, and
members of the Binangonan Police and Special Action Unit, returned to the store to implement a
Closure Order (Closure Order).8 However, Risie noticed that the Closure Order was dated March
18, 2010.9 When she returned the Closure Order back to them, the enforcers changed the date and
added the phrase "w/ BILLIARD".10 Thereafter, Atty. Rivera ordered the seizure of billiard
accessories11 to which Risie protested since the Closure Order did not include the seizure of the
said items.12 However, Atty. Rivera allegedly threatened13 Risie with imprisonment instead of just
seizing the items.14 Meanwhile, an altercation ensued between Rodolfo and R. Collantes, a member
of Atty. Rivera's team, as Rodolfo did not want to give up the items that were being seized.15

On March 22, 2010, Risie and her father secured the necessary business permits for the sari-
sari store, videoke machine, and billiard table.16 Risie then asked the Municipal Treasurer where to
claim the previously seized items17 who, in turn, referred Risie to Atty. Rivera.18 Risie then
proceeded to Atty. Rivera's office and asked for the release of the seized items.19 However, Atty.
Rivera did not release the seized items and instead asked her to pay additional fines for their
release.20

Meanwhile, on May 18, 2010, the Municipal Treasurer issued another Closure Order (Second
Closure Order) against Risie's father for failure to pay the fines and penalties in relation to the March
17, 2010 operation.21 Attached to the Second Closure Order is a computation of the fines and
penalties prepared by Atty. Rivera.22 Rodolfo protested the Second Closure Order.23 Then, Risie
and her father were surprised when they learned that Atty. Rivera filed a criminal complaint against
them for Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 for operating a business without securing a
business permit.24
This prompted Risie and her father to file various cases against Atty. Rivera. Aside from this
complaint for disbarment, Rodolfo also instituted an administrative case against Atty. Rivera before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC)25 and criminal complaints for Falsification of Public
Documents26 and Robbery27 before the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

Risie claims that the officers should have merely locked the establishment without seizing the items
as the closure order did not give them authority to do so.28 Moreover, the billiard table was not
initially included in the scope of the closure order and was added only during the operation.29 And,
the additional amounts demanded by Atty. Rivera were not included in the original assessment,
hence, it must have been extortion.30

In his Comment,31 Atty. Rivera claims that Risie has distorted the truth to suit her purpose of
continuously harassing him when she felt aggrieved by the processes of the municipality in
implementing the local tax ordinance.32 He claims that on March 17, 2010, the Municipal Mayor
ordered him to assemble a team to carry out the closure of the businesses owned and operated by
the Baygar family on the night of the same day33 since the Office of the Mayor received several
complaints that the businesses operated by the Baygar family caused disturbance to the area at
night.34

Atty. Rivera then organized a team and proceeded to the store in the evening of the same
day.35 Atty. Rivera claims that it was Risie who started arguing with Carina Biazon (Carina), a BPLO
Inspector, in a loud voice.36 Atty. Rivera alleges that it was Carina who changed the date and added
the phrase "w/ BILLIARD" in the Closure Order.37 He did not question the corrections because he
believed that he and the team had the authority from the Municipal Mayor to conduct the operation;
besides, the billiard table indeed did not have a business permit at that time.38 He admitted having
given the order to seize the billiard accessories and bottles of beer.39 A Special Action Unit
member, R. Collantes, complied with his order to seize the items.40 However, an altercation ensued
between Rodolfo and R. Collantes.41

Atty. Rivera avers that he was never in possession of the seized items and that these were kept in
the BPLO.42

On March 22, 2010, Risie went to his office asking for the release of the seized items. He advised
Risie that she may either pay the fine or she can write the Mayor a letter-request for the release of
seized items.43

Instead of heeding his advice, Risie and her father Rodolfo filed various criminal and administrative
cases against him, including this Petition for Disbarment.44

Atty. Rivera claims that he was merely performing his job of implementing the local tax
ordinance.45 As the Municipal Administrator, he is tasked to enforce the local tax ordinance that was
allegedly violated by the Baygar family.46 He explains that the error in the date of the closure order
was a mere inadvertence, as their original plan was to conduct the operation on the night of March
17, 2010.47 As to the addition of the phrase "w/ BILLIARD," he believed that the correction was
proper since the billiard table had no business permit at that time.48 He insists that the seizure of the
items was for a legitimate purpose.49 He denied acting in an arrogant manner towards Risie and her
father.50 On the contrary, he addressed them in a subtle and low voice.51 He also explains that the
original assessment given to Risie did not include the fine imposed in connection to the seized items
because at that time, the assessment of penalties was not yet included in the computerization
program of the municipality.52 Atty. Rivera further explains that the criminal case for Violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 was filed against both Risie and Rodolfo as they were in violation
of the ordinance in operating businesses without the required business permits.53
In her Reply, Risie attached a video recording of the events that transpired in the evening of March
17, 2010.54 Atty. Rivera challenged the authenticity and accuracy of the video recording.55

Report and Recommendation of the IBP:

In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Michael G.
Fabunan noted that (a) there was no reason for Atty. Rivera to criminally charge Risie for violating
Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 because she is not the owner of the business subject of the
closure order; (b) the closure order did not authorize seizure of the items; (c) Atty. Rivera and the
team improperly implemented the closure order a day before the stated date.56 The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Rivera be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six months.57

In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-47458 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG)
adopted with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by
increasing the period of suspension to one year, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws, and for gross violation of Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Claro Manuel M. Rivera is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Atty. Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration59 but it was denied by the IBP BOG in its Resolution
No. XXI-2015-37360 dated June 5, 2015.

The Court's Ruling

The Court disagrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. A judicious review of the
allegations of Risie failed to show that Atty. Rivera committed acts constitutive of a Violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.

According to the IBP, it was error on the part of Atty. Rivera to have criminally charged Risie for
violating Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 because she is not the owner of the business subject of
the closure order. We disagree. Whether to include Risie or not in the charge is purely discretionary
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

on the part of Atty. Rivera. If he perceives that Risie is involved in the management of the business
of her father without the requisite business permit, then he can very well include Risie in the charge.
In any event, it is the prosecutor who will ultimately decide whether to include or drop Risie from the
charge.

Next, the IBP recommends that Atty. Rivera should be held administratively liable for seizing other
items that are not included in the seizure order and for prematurely implementing the Closure Order.
We again disagree. As we see it, Atty. Rivera was merely implementing the local tax ordinance when
he enforced the Closure and Seizure Orders on the businesses operated by the Baygar family
without the necessary business permits. More importantly, Risie's recourse from the alleged acts of
Atty. Rivera is not through this disbarment complaint. She could have assailed the issuance of the
Closure Orders before the proper authorities.

To stress, Atty. Rivera's acts could not be considered as violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the
CPR. Atty. Rivera was merely performing his official duties as Municipal Administrator of the
Municipality of Binangonan, particularly the implementation of the Closure Order against the
businesses operated by the Baygar family and matters related thereto. As Municipal Administrator,
one of his duties is to "assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local government
unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he
may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government unit."61 The
implementation of a closure order and the issuance of business permits may be considered well
within this function of a Municipal Administrator. Significantly, Risie failed to prove by substantial
evidence that in the performance of his functions, Atty. Rivera committed acts in violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.

Finally, it has not escaped our attention that the Baygars already filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rivera before the CSC as well as two criminal complaints before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Claro Manuel M. Rivera is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8959 | October 07, 2020

Risie G. Baygar, Complainant,

Vs.

Atty. Claro Manuel M. Rivera, Respondent.

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
This administrative case arose from a Petition for
Disbarment [1] filed by complainant Risie G. Baygar (Risie) against
respondent Atty. Claro Manuel M. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) before
the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. The case was
referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and docketed as CBD
Case No. 12-3391.
The Factual Antecedents
In her Petition, Risie alleges that Atty. Rivera committed acts
constitutive of a Violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). [2] At the time of the
commission of the acts complained of, Atty. Rivera was the
Municipal Administrator [3] of Binangonan, Rizal.
In her Complaint, Risie alleged that in the morning of March 9,
2010, officers from the Business Permit and Licensing Office
(BPLO) of Binangonan went to the sari-sari store of her father,
Rodolfo Baygar (Rodolfo)[4] and informed them that they need to
secure a business permit for their billiard table [5] and sari-sari
store. [6] They handed Risie a No Permit Notice dated March 9,
2010 for the billiard table and a videoke machine. [7]
In the evening of March 17, 2010, Atty. Rivera, together with
BPLO officers, health office, and members of the Binangonan
Police and Special Action Unit, returned to the store to implement
a Closure Order (Closure Order).[8] However, Risie noticed that
the Closure Order was dated March 18, 2010. [9] When she returned
the Closure Order back to them, the enforcers changed the date
and added the phrase “w/ BILLIARD”. [10] Thereafter, Atty. Rivera
ordered the seizure of billiard accessories [11] to which Risie
protested since the Closure Order did not include the seizure of
the said items. [12] However, Atty. Rivera allegedly
threatened [13] Risie with imprisonment instead of just seizing the
items. [14] Meanwhile, an altercation ensued between Rodolfo and
R. Collantes, a member of Atty. Rivera’s team, as Rodolfo did not
want to give up the items that were being seized. [15]
On March 22, 2010, Risie and her father secured the necessary
business permits for the sari-sari store, videoke machine, and
billiard table. [16] Risie then asked the Municipal Treasurer where to
claim the previously seized items [17] who, in turn, referred Risie to
Atty. Rivera. [18] Risie then proceeded to Atty. Rivera’s office and
asked for the release of the seized items. [19] However, Atty. Rivera
did not release the seized items and instead asked her to pay
additional fines for their release. [20]
Meanwhile, on May 18, 2010, the Municipal Treasurer issued
another Closure Order (Second Closure Order) against Risie’s
father for failure to pay the fines and penalties in relation to the
March 17, 2010 operation. [21] Attached to the Second Closure
Order is a computation of the fines and penalties prepared by
Atty. Rivera. [22] Rodolfo protested the Second Closure Order.
[23]
Then, Risie and her father were surprised when they learned
that Atty. Rivera filed a criminal complaint against them for
Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 for operating a
business without securing a business permit. [24]
This prompted Risie and her father to file various cases against
Atty. Rivera. Aside from this complaint for disbarment, Rodolfo
also instituted an administrative case against Atty. Rivera before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) [25] and criminal complaints
for Falsification of Public Documents [26] and Robbery [27] before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
Risie claims that the officers should have merely locked the
establishment without seizing the items as the closure order did
not give them authority to do so. [28] Moreover, the billiard table
was not initially included in the scope of the closure order and
was added only during the operation. [29] And, the additional
amounts demanded by Atty. Rivera were not included in the
original assessment, hence, it must have been extortion. [30]
In his Comment, [31] Atty. Rivera claims that Risie has distorted the
truth to suit her purpose of continuously harassing him when she
felt aggrieved by the processes of the municipality in
implementing the local tax ordinance. [32] He claims that on March
17, 2010, the Municipal Mayor ordered him to assemble a team to
carry out the closure of the businesses owned and operated by the
Baygar family on the night of the same day [33] since the Office of
the Mayor received several complaints that the businesses
operated by the Baygar family caused disturbance to the area at
night. [34]
Atty. Rivera then organized a team and proceeded to the store in
the evening of the same day. [35] Atty. Rivera claims that it was
Risie who started arguing with Carina Biazon (Carina), a BPLO
Inspector, in a loud voice. [36] Atty. Rivera alleges that it was
Carina who changed the date and added the phrase “w/
BILLIARD” in the Closure Order. [37] He did not question the
corrections because he believed that he and the team had the
authority from the Municipal Mayor to conduct the operation;
besides, the billiard table indeed did not have a business permit at
that time. [38] He admitted having given the order to seize the
billiard accessories and bottles of beer. [39] A Special Action Unit
member, R. Collantes, complied with his order to seize the items.
[40]
However, an altercation ensued between Rodolfo and R.
Collantes. [41]
Atty. Rivera avers that he was never in possession of the seized
items and that these were kept in the BPLO. [42]
On March 22, 2010, Risie went to his office asking for the release
of the seized items. He advised Risie that she may either pay the
fine or she can write the Mayor a letter-request for the release of
seized items. [43]
Instead of heeding his advice, Risie and her father Rodolfo filed
various criminal and administrative cases against him, including
this Petition for Disbarment. [44]
Atty. Rivera claims that he was merely performing his job of
implementing the local tax ordinance. [45] As the Municipal
Administrator, he is tasked to enforce the local tax ordinance that
was allegedly violated by the Baygar family. [46] He explains that
the error in the date of the closure order was a mere inadvertence,
as their original plan was to conduct the operation on the night of
March 17, 2010. [47] As to the addition of the phrase “w/
BILLIARD,” he believed that the correction was proper since the
billiard table had no business permit at that time. [48] He insists that
the seizure of the items was for a legitimate purpose. [49] He denied
acting in an arrogant manner towards Risie and her father. [50] On
the contrary, he addressed them in a subtle and low voice. [51] He
also explains that the original assessment given to Risie did not
include the fine imposed in connection to the seized items
because at that time, the assessment of penalties was not yet
included in the computerization program of the municipality.
[52]
Atty. Rivera further explains that the criminal case for
Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 was filed against
both Risie and Rodolfo as they were in violation of the ordinance
in operating businesses without the required business permits. [53]
In her Reply, Risie attached a video recording of the events that
transpired in the evening of March 17, 2010. [54] Atty. Rivera
challenged the authenticity and accuracy of the video recording. [55]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP:
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2013,
Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan noted that (a)
there was no reason for Atty. Rivera to criminally charge Risie for
violating Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 because she is not
the owner of the business subject of the closure order; (b) the
closure order did not authorize seizure of the items; (c) Atty.
Rivera and the team improperly implemented the closure order a
day before the stated date. [56] The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Rivera be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six months. [57]
In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-474 [58] dated August 9, 2014, the
IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
by increasing the period of suspension to one year, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A,”
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws, and for gross violation of Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Claro
Manuel M. Rivera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
Atty. Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration [59] but it was
denied by the IBP BOG in its Resolution No. XXI-2015-
373[60] dated June 5, 2015.
The Court’s Ruling

The Court disagrees with the findings and recommendation of the

IBP. A judicious review of the allegations of Risie failed to show
that Atty. Rivera committed acts constitutive of a Violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR.

According to the IBP, it was error on the part of Atty. Rivera to

have criminally charged Risie for violating Municipal Ordinance
No. 2006-006 because she is not the owner of the business subject
of the closure order. We disagree. Whether to include Risie or not
in the charge is purely discretionary on the part of Atty. Rivera. If
he perceives that Risie is involved in the management of the
business of her father without the requisite business permit, then
he can very well include Risie in the charge. In any event, it is the
prosecutor who will ultimately decide whether to include or drop
Risie from the charge.

Next, the IBP recommends that Atty. Rivera should be held

administratively liable for seizing other items that are not
included in the seizure order and for prematurely implementing
the Closure Order. We again disagree. As we see it, Atty. Rivera
was merely implementing the local tax ordinance when he
enforced the Closure and Seizure Orders on the businesses
operated by the Baygar family without the necessary business
permits. More importantly, Risie’s recourse from the alleged acts
of Atty. Rivera is not through this disbarment complaint. She
could have assailed the issuance of the Closure Orders before the
proper authorities.

To stress, Atty. Rivera’s acts could not be considered as

violations of the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR. Atty. Rivera was
merely performing his official duties as Municipal Administrator
of the Municipality of Binangonan, particularly the
implementation of the Closure Order against the businesses
operated by the Baygar family and matters related thereto. As
Municipal Administrator, one of his duties is to “assist in the
coordination of the work of all the officials of the local
government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of
the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the
chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government
unit.” [61] The implementation of a closure order and the issuance of
business permits may be considered well within this function of a
Municipal Administrator. Significantly, Risie failed to prove by
substantial evidence that in the performance of his functions,
Atty. Rivera committed acts in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and
the CPR.

Finally, it has not escaped our attention that the Baygars already
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rivera before the
CSC as well as two criminal complaints before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent

Atty. Claro Manuel M. Rivera is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

[ A.C. No. 12030, September 29, 2020 ]

LOURDES E. ELANGA AND NILO ELANGA REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT

EVELYN E. VELOSO AND MELLY ELANGA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This is a Complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Lourdes E. Elanga (Lourdes) and Nilo E.
Elanga (Nilo) against respondent Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok (Atty. Pasok) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts:
Atty. Pasok is the legal counsel of the plaintiffs2 in Civil Case No. 204 against the Elangas for
Partition, Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Accounting and Share, Attorney's Fees and
Damages pending before Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cotabato City.3 Lourdes is
the eldest sister of the plaintiffs and Nilo is her son.4

The clients of Atty. Pasok alleged that the Elangas failed to deliver a copy of the Original Certificate
of Title No. V-2044 which is in their possession after Nilo redeemed the lot from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Conversely, Lourdes and Nilo argued that the plaintiffs did not
reimburse them for the redemption of the lot.

In a March 25, 2002 Decision,5 Branch 15 of the RTC of Cotabato City required the clients of Atty.
Pasok to reimburse Nilo the amount of P162,178.03 representing the redemption price plus interest,
penalties, as well as damages and attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals deleted the
awards for damages, attorney's fees, and appearance fees.6 The said decision became final and
executory.7 Despite failing to settle their obligation, the plaintiffs still demanded for the delivery of the
copy of the title of the property.8 As impressed upon the Court, the said civil case is still in the
execution stage.

Relevantly, Lourdes and Nilo alleged that during the pendency of Civil Case No. 204, Atty. Pasok
entered into a series of transactions involving the subject lot under litigation, viz.:

a.) [Notarization] of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition9 dated 7 May 1999 which complainant
Lourdes Elanga denied having signed, hence [the] allegation of forgery and falsification;

b.) [Notarization] of a Real Estate Mortgage10 dated 8 October 2001, without the knowledge
and consent of complainants [Lourdes and Nilo Elanga as well as the trial court];

c.) Agreement11 dated 8 October 2001 signed by respondent [Atty. Pasok] with his clients
indicating the receipt of the proceeds of the said mortgage [in the amounts of P23,782.00
and P162,178.03;

d.) Promissory Note12 dated 8 October 2001 notarized by respondent [Atty. Pasok relative]
to the above stated Real Estate Mortgage[;]

e.) Receipt [by] respondent [Atty. Pasok] of the amount of P23,782.00 from the proceeds of
the above stated Real Estate Mortgage transaction;

f.) Alleged retention by respondent [Atty. Pasok] of P162,178.03, the amount paid by
complainant Nilo Elanga to redeem the subject lot from the bank.13

In his Answer,14 Atty. Pasok denied falsifying the signature of Lourdes in the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition.15 He claimed that his clients and the Elangas met with him personally because they have
settled their differences. During the meeting, they executed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in
anticipation of the urgent sale of the subject lot.16 He countered that the Elangas refused to deliver
the copy of the title of the lot and to receive the reimbursement from the plaintiffs.17 In addition, he
admitted that he prepared and notarized the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, and that Lourdes
signed the said document personally before him.18 Likewise, he averred that he received the
amount of P23,782.00 from his clients as reimbursement for his transportation expenses.19

Notably, in a Joint Affidavit20 dated October 4, 2012, Atty. Pasok's clients stated that they paid him
P23,782.00 as part of his attorney's fees.21
In their Reply,22 the Elangas contended that Atty. Pasok allowed his clients to mortgage the subject
property without their (Elangas) conformity despite his knowledge that Civil Case No. 204 was still
pending and even notarized the document evidencing the mortgage and received a portion of the
proceeds of the mortgage.23

Report and Recommendation of the IBP:

In a Report and Recommendation24 dated February 26, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner25 of
the IBP-CBD found that Atty. Pasok violated the provisions of the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, as
follows:

x x x [Respondent's participation as a notary public in the execution of Real Estate Mortgage x x x of

the property subject of litigation without the knowledge and consent of the petitioners and of the
Court; and this despite his knowledge that the TITLE of the property is in [the] possession of the
petitioners; the preparation and execution of an Agreement dated October 8, 2002 x x x
simultaneous with the execution of the Real Estate Mortgage wherein he allowed Francisco Erazo to
get the share of Lourdes Elanga without minding the fact that Francisco Erazo (respondent's client),
and Lourdes Elanga are opposing parties in Civil Case No. 204, thus, it was impossible for Francisco
to represent Lourdes; that respondent notarized the Real Estate Mortgage even without the
signatures of Lourdes Elanga (co-owner of the property) and Nilo Elanga; that respondent together
with his clients, received the amount of P400,000.00 out of the said Real Estate Mortgage
transaction wherein [Atty. Pasok] received the amount of P23,782.00 as stated [in the] said
Agreement; and that respondent retained the amount of P162,178.03, wherein said amount [was]
not [turned over to] herein complainants [Lourdes and Nilo] (defendants in the civil case) nor said
amount was consigned to the court.26

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Pasok be reprimanded.27

In Resolution28 No. XXI-2015-149, the IBP-BOG adopted the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification as to the recommended penalty in that Atty. Pasok should be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. The IBP-BOG found that Atty. Pasok violated
Rules 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the CPR as well as the Lawyer's Oath.

Aggrieved, Atty. Pasok filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 which the IBP-BOG denied in its
Resolution30 No. XXI-2017-865.

Undeterred, Atty. Pasok filed a Petition for Review31 assailing the IBP-BOG's Resolutions before the
Court which We referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for its evaluation, report and
recommendation.

Report and Recommendation of the OBC:

In a Report and Recommendation32 dated July 18, 2019, the OBC recommended the suspension of
Atty. Pasok from the practice of law for three (3) years given that he committed several infractions.

The OBC found Atty. Pasok's participation as a notary public in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage highly improper considering that he knew that the copy of the
title was still with the Elangas and that they (Elangas) did not sign the said documents. Similarly, the
OBC found that Atty. Pasok was being dishonest when he signed an Agreement allowing one of his
clients (Francisco Erazo) to receive Lourdes's share even if they were opposing parties in a pending
civil case.33
Also, the OBC found as inappropriate and irregular Atty. Pasok's receipt of P23,782.00 and
P162,178.03 from the proceeds of the mortgage agreement which he himself notarized.

Taking these into account, the OBC found that Atty. Pasok had fallen short of the high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required of him as a lawyer. Atty. Pasok used his
knowledge of the law to secure undue gains for himself even when he knew that the practice of law
is imbued with public interest and that he has duties to his clients, his fellow lawyers, the courts, and
the public to act in accordance with the law.34

The Ruling of the Court

The Court adopts the findings of the OBC but modifies its recommended penalty to suspension from
the practice of law for five (5) years, revocation of his current notarial commission, if any, and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for five (5) years.

Atty. Pasok argues that the instant Complaint was not properly notarized.35 He asserts that Lourdes
was ill and bedridden in Sultan Kudarat during the execution of the Complaint and that Nilo could not
have personally appeared before the notary public whose office is in Malabon City. Moreover, he
claims that the attorneys-in-fact of the Elangas who permanently reside in Marilao, Bulacan, could
have brought the prepared Complaint to Sultan Kudarat for Lourdes and Nilo to sign; thus, the same
was not personally signed and sworn to before the notary public in Malabon City.36

Moreover, Atty. Pasok avers that the IBP-BOG did not clearly state the facts and its reasons for
increasing the penalty to a one-year suspension, contrary to Section 12, Rule 139-B37 of the Rules
of Court.38 In the same manner, Atty. Pasok argues that the Investigating Commissioner's Report
and Recommendation tackled issues which were not raised in the Complaint.39

Our Ruling

Atty. Pasok's contentions fail to persuade.

Atty. Pasok's claim of irregularity in the notarization of the instant Complaint is speculative at best
and not supported by proof. His arguments were pure conjectures and unverified. Moreover, he did
not convincingly demonstrate that it was absolutely impossible for the Elangas to appear before the
notary public in Malabon City. In any case, assuming that the Elangas did not personally appear
before the notary public, such defect is not fatal to the Complaint's validity. In line with this, Section
11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 11. Defects. - No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the
Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of
justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant,
including invalidation of the entire proceedings.40

The alleged defect in the notarization of the Complaint could not be considered substantial and did
not result in a miscarriage of justice since Atty. Pasok was able to fully participate in the proceedings
before the IBP. Atty. Pasok did not submit proof to substantiate his allegations. Additionally, there is
a presumption of regularity41 in the performance of duty by the notary public that he notarized the
Complaint in accordance with the rules, absent clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
Likewise, we are not convinced with Atty. Pasok's contention that the IBP-BOG did not explain the
basis for its recommendation to increase the penalty to a suspension of one year. The IBP-BOG
specifically indicated in its Resolution that it approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and thereby made the same an integral part of Resolution No. XXI-
2015-149.42 Moreover, the IBP-BOG clearly stated in the same Resolution that Atty. Pasok violated
Canon 1, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 of the CPR, hence, it recommended the penalty of one (1)-year
suspension from the practice of law. Such ratiocination, however brief, suffices since the
Investigating Commissioner already adequately provided the details in the Report and
Recommendation which the IBP-BOG expressly adopted. Besides, the resolutions of the IBP-BOG
are only recommendatory and always subject to the Court's review.43 Thus, the IBP-BOG's
Resolution cannot be deemed as a final decision in this administrative case since the Court is vested
with the power to either affirm, modify or reverse the IBP-BOG's Resolutions.

Atty. Pasok further argues that the Report and Recommendation tackled issues which were not
raised in the Complaint.44 This argument is bereft of merit. Suffice it to state that the Court has the
authority to look into relevant issues pursuant to its disciplinary power,45 especially when the
important details were provided in the Complaint and the subsequent pleadings of both parties.
Here, we find that the Complaint sufficiently raised the pertinent issues which needed to be resolved.

With regard to the substantive issues, the Elangas46 alleged that Atty. Pasok allowed the
mortgage47 and even notarized the document evidencing the same despite knowing the pendency
of Civil Case No. 204 and that the copy of the title of the subject lot was in the Elangas' possession.
Purportedly, Lourdes and Nilo were likewise not made aware of the mortgage as they alleged that
the signature of Lourdes was forged. Furthermore, Atty. Pasok allowed Francisco to receive
Lourdes's share from the proceeds of the mortgage despite knowing that Francisco and Lourdes
were opposing parties in the civil case. To make matters worse, the Agreement48 provided that Atty.
Pasok received P23,782.00 as part of the proceeds of the mortgage transaction. Undeniably, Atty.
Pasok's receipt of part of the proceeds of the mortgage is highly irregular. Additionally, the
Agreement was signed only by the plaintiffs and Atty. Pasok. Lourdes's signature is noticeably
absent as supposedly, her brother Francisco, would receive her share. Yet, there was no proof
presented showing that Lourdes actually agreed to this arrangement.

Moreover, in the same Agreement, Atty. Pasok also received P162,178.03 from the proceeds of the
mortgage supposedly for delivery and deposit to DBP to facilitate the release of the owner's copy of
the title of the subject lot. This is questionable given that the said amount should be given to the
Elangas and not to DBP since the Elangas already redeemed the subject lot from DBP. Curiously,
though, according to Catalina Erazo Dela Gracia (one of Atty. Pasok's clients), in her
Affidavit49 dated October 15, 2015, they (the plaintiffs) gave the said amount to the Sheriff to turn
over to Lourdes and Nilo. Since the Elangas refused to receive the same, the money was returned to
Catalina and not to Atty. Pasok as alleged by Lourdes and Nilo. Nevertheless, regardless of who
actually received the money, it was improper for Atty. Pasok to be among the recipients of the
proceeds of the mortgage.

To stress, Atty. Pasok notarized the document evidencing the Real Estate Mortgage and received
part of the proceeds thereof as expressly stated in the Agreement, specifically in the amounts of
P162,178.03 and P23,782.00. By notarizing the mortgage document and subsequently receiving
part of the proceeds thereof, Atty. Pasok violated Rule 4, Section 3 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial
Practice which states:

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

xxxx
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest,
cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; x x x50

Otherwise stated, Atty. Pasok was disqualified from notarizing the Real Estate Mortgage document
since he will directly or indirectly gain from the mortgage's proceeds, as he in fact did thereafter.

The Elangas consistently asserted that Lourdes's signature in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
was forged. To prove this claim, they asked for Lourdes's signatures in relevant documents to be
professionally examined. Notwithstanding this, they insisted that Atty. Pasok allowed Lourdes's
signature to be forged in the said document.51 The Court will have to refrain from resolving this
contention since "[d]isbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents
should not be the occasion to establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases should first be duly
and competently established either in criminal or civil proceedings appropriate for that purpose."52

"[T]he quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in a disbarment case is substantial evidence
or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The complainant has the burden of proving his allegations against respondents."53 In
the case at bench, the Elangas proved with substantial evidence that Atty. Pasok committed several
infractions pertaining to his participation in relevant documents concerning the opposing parties not
only as a retained counsel but also as a notary public, and which involved monetary considerations
which he improperly received.

In light of these circumstances, the Court finds that Atty. Pasok violated Rules 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 of
Canon 1 as well as Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the CPR, as follows:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.

xxxx

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Likewise, he violated the Lawyer's Oath54 when he did not conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.

Considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case, We find it apt to modify the
recommendation of the OBC by increasing the penalty of suspension to five (5) years from the
practice of law upon Atty. Pasok effective upon receipt of this Resolution for violating the Lawyer's
Oath, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 1, Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the CPR, and Section 3, Rule 4
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,55 as well as revocation of his current notarial commission, if
any, and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for five (5) years.

The infraction which Atty. Pasok committed as a notary public merits a revocation of his incumbent
commission, if any, and a disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for five (5)
years. Withal, Atty. Pasok should bear in mind that "[l]awyers commissioned as notaries public are
mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest."56 Indeed, Atty. Pasok's "failure to properly perform his
duty as a notary public resulted not only in damage to those directly affected by the notarized
document, but also in undermining the integrity of the office of a notary public and in degrading the
function of notarization."57 Therefore, taking all of Atty. Pasok's transgressions as a whole, it is but
appropriate that a suspension from the practice of law for five (5) years be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, for violating the Lawyer's Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years effective upon
receipt of this Decision with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely. He is likewise found guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice; thus, his present notarial commission, if presently commissioned, is REVOKED and he
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as notary public for a period of five (5) years. He is ordered
to ACCOUNT for the amounts of P162,178.03 as well as P23,782.00 that he received from the
proceeds of the real estate mortgage with the obligation to RETURN the entire amount to his clients.

Respondent is DIRECTED to file a Manifestation to this Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
guidance and information. SO ORDERED.

[ A.C. No. 8522, October 06, 2020 ]

TEODORO L. CANSINO and EMILIO L. CANSINO, JR., Complainants, VS. ATTY. VICTOR D.
SEDERIOSA, Respondent.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a Joint Affidavit-Complaint1 for disbarment filed by Teodoro L.
Cansino and Emilio L. Cansino, Jr. (complainants) against Atty. Victor D. Sederiosa (Atty.
Sederiosa) for conspiring in the execution and notarization of fictitious and simulated documents.

The Factual Antecedents

Complainants alleged that Atty. Sederiosa was a friend and law school classmate of their brother
Paulino Cansino (Paulino). They claimed that Atty. Sederiosa notarized the following spurious
documents despite the death of their parents and/or the non-personal appearance of the affiants
therein:
 (a) an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate2 dated January 3, 1995 which was purportedly
executed by their father Emilio Cansino, Sr. (Emilio Sr.) (already deceased since August 1,
1991)3, and their mother Victoria L. Cansino (Victoria). The Extrajudicial Settlement stated
that Emilio Sr. and Victoria adjudicated and partitioned between themselves the properties of
their deceased daughter, Belen L. Cansino (Belen), which consisted of the following: (a) a
600 square meters parcel of land known as Lot No. 72 situated in Mintal, Davao City; (b) a
300 square meters land in GSIS Heights Matina, Davao City; and (c) accounts receivables
due from Emilio L. Cansino (Emilio, Jr.) in the amount of P247,000.00;

(b) a Deed of Sale of Hereditary Rights4 dated January 3, 1995 allegedly executed by
Victoria and their brother Paulino. The Deed of Sale stated that Victoria sold and conveyed
the subject properties of the Extrajudicial Settlement to Paulino in the amount of
P200,000.00;

(c) a Deed of Sale of Hereditary and Conjugal Property Rights5 dated January 13, 1995,
stating that Victoria sold, transferred and conveyed her conjugal share with Emilio Sr. on the
subject properties to Paulino;

(d) a Secretary Certificate dated April 30, 2008 which was signed by a certain Carlo C.
Lagman, corporate secretary of the Integrated Project Corporation (IPC), authorizing
Felicitas Cortel to sell, transfer and convey a vehicle with plate number LAB 874. The said
vehicle was assigned to Emilio Sr. during his employment with the IPC; and

(e) a Deed of Sale dated April 30, 2008 transferring the said vehicle to Paulino.

In a Report and Recommendation6 dated February 20, 2014, the Investigating

Commissioner7 found Atty. Sederiosa liable for the acts complained of and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and the revocation of his notarial
commission during the period thereof.

On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-7838 adopting
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modifying the recommended penalties in this
wise:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and for violation of the 2004 Rules
of Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Victor D. Sederiosa's notarial
commission if presently commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year.9

In a Resolution10 dated December 7, 2015, this Court resolved to adopt and approve the findings
and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors (BOG), to wit:

(1) respondent Atty. Victor D. Sederiosa is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year effective from notice; and

(2) respondent Atty. Victor D. Sederiosa's notarial commission, if presently commissioned, is

IMMEDIATELY REVOKED for violation of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and the Code
 of Professional Responsibility, and he is further DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
Notary Public for two (2) years.11

On February 9, 2016, Atty. Sederiosa filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 before the IBP BOG. He
averred that he received a copy of the IBP's October 11, 2014 Resolution only on January 29, 2016.
Also, he sought for the reexamination of its findings and the reduction of the penalty imposed upon
him.

Meanwhile, complainant Emilio, Jr. filed before this Court a Manifestation and Motion with Notice of
Change of Address of Counsel13 informing this High Court that despite the Court's December 7,
2015 Resolution suspending Atty. Sederiosa from the practice of law, the revocation of his notarial
practice and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public, he has continuously
engaged in the practice of law and has remained to be a duly commissioned notary public. In
support of his claim, Emilio, Jr. presented as evidence the following: (a) July 14, 2016
Certification14 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Davao City - Office of the Clerk of Court stating
that Atty. Sederiosa was a duly commissioned notary public in Davao City for the years 2016-2017;
(b) Atty. Sederiosa's Commission for Notary Public15 and his Oath dated January 8, 2016; (c) a
photograph16 of Atty. Sederiosa's law firm's signboard; and (d) an Affidavit of Loss17 duly notarized
by Atty. Sederiosa on August 8, 2016.

Atty. Sederiosa, in turn, submitted a Manifestation18 stressing that he did not violate the suspension
order of the High Court. He claimed that he did not officially receive a copy of this Court's December
7, 2015 Resolution and that he only learned about it when Atty. Emilio P. Cansino III, complainants'
counsel, filed a Manifestation on September 6, 2016 before this Court.

Atty. Sederiosa also stressed that the only copy of a resolution that he received was the October 11,
2014 Resolution of the IBP to which he timely filed a motion for reconsideration which remained
unresolved.

In a February 19, 2018 Resolution,19 this Court referred Atty. Sederiosa's Motion for
Reconsideration to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for report and recommendation.

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its July 3, 2019 Report and Recommendation,20 the OBC found Atty. Sederiosa's Motion for
Reconsideration without merit. It noted that contrary to his claim, Atty. Sederiosa duly received the
Court's December 7, 2015 Resolution on January 29, 2016 as shown in the Registry Return Receipt.
Hence, the OBC recommended that Atty. Sederiosa be further suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one year and be permanently disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.

Issue

The sole issue for resolution is whether Atty. Sederiosa is administratively liable for engaging in the
practice of law during his suspension, and for notarizing documents despite the revocation of his
notarial commission, and for being commissioned as notary public notwithstanding his
disqualification.

Our Ruling

After a careful examination the records of the case, We resolve to adopt the findings of the OBC but
with modification as regards the recommended penalty.
In an attempt to evade any liability, Atty. Sederiosa lamentably resorted to lies when he denied
receipt of the Court's December 7, 2015 Resolution suspending him from the law practice, revoking
his notarial commission and disqualifying him from being commissioned as such.

Registry Return Receipt No. 395621 clearly shows that a certain Deo Zuniga (Zuniga), in behalf of
Atty. Sederiosa, duly received a copy of Our December 7, 2015 Resolution on January 29, 2016.
Interestingly, Atty. Sederiosa failed to show proof that Zuniga was incompetent to receive the same
as he was neither a clerk or a person in charge of his office nor a person of sufficient age and
discretion then residing in his place of residence.22 He simply denied receipt of the suspension
order and did not assail the authority of Zuniga to receive the same. Verily, the registry receipt
constitutes a prima facie proof that the suspension order had been delivered to and received by Atty.
Sederiosa. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is upheld.23

We now resolve the issue whether Atty. Sederiosa engaged in the practice of law during the period
of his suspension. The Court rules in the affirmative.

The regulation of the practice of law falls upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court. As such, a
lawyer who has been suspended from the practice of law by the Court must refrain from performing
all functions which would require the application of his legal knowledge within the period of
suspension.24 The practice of law includes any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience.25 It comprises the
performance of acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service
which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.26

Guided by the foregoing on what constitutes a practice of law, it is beyond cavil that notarizing of
documents constitutes a practice of law. In fact, one of the requirements to be a duly commissioned
notary public is that he/she must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. Pertinently,
Section 1, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice27 provides:

SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive Judge to any

qualified person who submits a petition in accordance with these Rules.

To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:

(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;

(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;

(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and maintains a regular
place of work or business in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;

(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office
of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and

(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.
(Emphasis Supplied.)

In other words, a lawyer, during the period of his/her suspension, is barred from engaging in notarial
practice as he/she is deemed not a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing, which is one of
the essential requisites to be eligible as a notary public.
There is more than enough evidence that shows that Atty. Sederiosa has continuously been
practicing his legal profession despite the suspension order against him. He remained to be a duly
commissioned notary public from January 8, 2016 to December 31, 2017 as attested by the
Certification from the RTC - Davao City, the Commission for Notary Public dated January 8, 2016,
and the Affidavit of Loss dated August 8, 2016 which he duly notarized. In short, he had never
served his suspension.

It must be stressed that at the time he notarized the Affidavit of Loss on August 8, 2016, Atty.
Sederiosa was already cognizant of the Court's December 7, 2015 Resolution as early as January
29, 2016. As such, he was already aware that the Court had imposed the following penalties upon
him: (a) immediate revocation of his notarial commission; (b) disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years; and (c) suspension for one year from the
practice of law. Consequently, Atty. Sederiosa should have refrained from performing the duties of a
notary public and engaging in law practice. Yet, he continued to notarize documents in clear
defiance of the Court's orders. By doing so, he continued to practice law.

All told, Atty. Sederiosa is administratively liable for engaging in law practice during his suspension
and for performing his duties as a notary public despite revocation of his commission. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Emphasis Supplied.]

Atty. Sederiosa's willful disobedience to a lawful order of this Court constitutes a breach of the
Lawyer's Oath28 which mandates every lawyer to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein", and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to his clients.

Atty. Sederiosa likewise trampled upon the ethical standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His actuations amounted to gross deceit and malpractice, or gross misconduct in
violation of the following particular provisions in the Code:

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

Furthermore, the fact that Atty. Sederiosa actively engaged in notarial practice despite revocation of
his commission is indisputably contemptuous.

In Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Gumba,29 Atty. Haide V. Gumba continued to practice law by filing pleadings and
appearing as counsel in courts despite her suspension. Thus, the Court suspended her from the
practice of law for an additional period of six months from her original six months suspension, with a
warning that a repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with more

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,30 we further suspended Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for
six months for practicing his profession notwithstanding his suspension. In Ibana-Andrade v. Atty.
Paita-Moya31 we imposed a similar penalty against Atty. Eva Paita-Mora who, despite receipt of the
Resolution on her suspension, continued to practice law through filing of pleadings and acting as
counsel in courts.

However, in the most recent case of Zafra III v. Atty. Pagatpatan32 the Court meted the most severe
penalty of disbarment against therein respondent who continued to practice law for over 11 years
despite the Court's suspension order.

In the instant case, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years as
commensurate to the infractions he committed, on top of the suspension for one (1) year previously
imposed upon him which he has yet to serve, with revocation of his current notarial commission, if
any, and permanent disqualification from acting as notary public.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction hence it must be exercised with great
caution.33 It must therefore be imposed only for serious reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
bar.34 As We have emphasized in Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia,35 viz.:

Indeed, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. Without doubt, a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment. However, the said penalties are imposed with great caution, because
they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond repair.

The transgression committed by Atty. Sederiosa is a mockery on the High Court's power to discipline
erring lawyers. Engaging in the practice of law during one's suspension is a clear disrespect to the
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

orders of the Court. In doing so, the faith and confidence which the public has reposed upon the
judicial system has been put at stake as it gives the impression that a court's order is nothing but a
mere scrap of paper with no teeth to bind the parties and the whole world. Moreover, Atty.
Sederiosa's unauthorized legal practice is a clear violation of his duty to observe the law and rules.

On a final note, the Court, once again, reminds the lawyers that the practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to uphold not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.36 This We
have put emphasis on in Atty. Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr. :37
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical
conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional
dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal
his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law
confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty
and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or
private capacity. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to
continue as an officer of the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Victor D. Sederiosa is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for TWO (2) YEARS, on top of the ONE (1) YEAR SUSPENSION previously imposed upon him.
His current notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED. Atty. Sederiosa is PERMANENTLY
DISQUALIFIED from acting as notary public.

The suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, and disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect immediately upon receipt of this Decision by
Atty. Sederiosa. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his
suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[ A.C. No. 12375, February 26, 2020 ]

CLARA R. ICK, RUBY ELINBERGSSON AND TERESITA EDOSADA, COMPLAINANTS, V.

ATTY. ALLAN S. AMAZONA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Clara R. Ick, Ruby Elinbergsson, and Teresita Edosada (complainants) filed this Complaint-
Affidavit1 against the respondent, Atty. Allan S. Amazona (respondent), before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for notarizing an allegedly false document.

The Complainants' Position

Complainants alleged that on March 9, 2016, respondent notarized a letter2 dated March 7, 2016
signed by a certain Michelle B. Lotho (Lotho), Director and Auditor of South Forbes Phuket
Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc., addressed to Loiue A. Odiamar, Head of the Homeowners
Association Franchising Unit, Dencris Business Center in Calamba City. According to complainants,
this letter was used to facilitate the registration of South Forbes Phuket Mansions Homeowners
Association, Inc.3

Complainants averred that the said letter falsely stated that most buyers of the subdivision lots were
out of the country and as such, it was highly improbable to secure their signatures.4 Complainants
claimed that respondent knew that such assertion was untrue because he was in constant
communication with the residents of South Forbes Phuket Mansions, including complainants.5

Complainants further claimed that the list of members with corresponding signatures6 attached to
the March 7, 2016 letter was al so false, since it referred to their attendance during a meeting for a
property manager held on December 3, 2015, and not for a homeowners meeting for the registration
of the homeowners' association when in fact there was none.7

Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report and Recommendation8 dated January 12, 2017, Investigating Commissioner Jose
Villanueva Cabrera (Commissioner Cabrera) recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against respondent for lack of merit. 1a₩phi1

Commissioner Cabrera opined that the mere act of notarizing the March 7, 2016 letter is not in itself
a violation of the Notarial Rules9 since respondent merely attested to the fact that Lotho has
personally appeared before him and subscribed to the truth of the contents of the said letter.
Commissioner Cabrera stated that the truth or falsity of the allegations in the said letter is the sole
responsibility of affiant Lotho and does not extend to the respondent as notary public.10

In its January 26, 2017 Resolution,11 the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of
fact and recommendation of Commissioner Cabrera in dismissing the complaint.

Our Ruling

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP and
finds that the dismissal of the complaint is in order.

Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Settled is the rule that in disbarment
proceedings, the complainant must satisfactorily establish the allegations of his or her complaint
through substantial evidence. Mere allegations without proof are disregarded considering the gravity
of the penalty prayed for. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.12

The Court agrees with the IBP that the complained act does not constitute any violation of the Rules
of Court, the Notarial Rules, nor the Code of Professional Responsibility.13 Respondent merely
performed his duty when he attested to the fact that Lotho personally appeared and signed the said
letter before him. We agree with the IBP that the truth or falsity of the contents of the letter is the
responsibility of the affiant Lotho and not of the respondent, especially since no substantial evidence
was presented to prove that he knowingly notarized a false document.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the complainants failed to establish through substantial
evidence a cause for disciplinary action against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the January 26, 2017 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. ACCORDINGLY, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Allan
S. Amazona is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 12408, December 11, 2019

VENSON R. ANG, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. SALVADOR B. BELARO, JR.,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Complainant Venson R. Ang (Venson) seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty.

Salvador B. Belaro, Jr. (Atty. Belaro) for violation of Administrative Matter No. 02-8-13-
SC or the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The Factual Antecedents

The late Peregrina Dela Rosa (Peregrina) owned a parcel of land with a building erected
thereon which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52899 1 situated in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. In 1982, she appointed complainant Venson as
administrator of the subject property. Upon Peregrina's demise on November 24, 2002,
the property was inherited by complainant Venson and his siblings namely: Virginia Ang
Ting, Venhart Dela Rosa Ang, Villy Ang Teng Him Buenaventura (Villy), and Vermont
Dela Rosa Ang (Vermont). The siblings never partitioned the property or assigned their
rights to any of the co-owners.

On March 6, 2015, complainant Venson and his siblings were surprised to learn that
Peregrina's title to the subject property was already cancelled by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights 2 (Extrajudicial
Settlement) which they allegedly executed on March 26, 2014. The Extrajudicial
Settlement was notarized by respondent Atty. Belaro on March 26, 2014 before whom
complainant Venson and his siblings purportedly personally appeared and subscribed
therein. Complainant Venson and his siblings also discovered two other versions of the
same document that were submitted to the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) 3 and
the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City 4 that were
likewise notarized by respondent Atty. Belaro.

Perusal of the three versions of the Extrajudicial Settlement showed several

irregularities therein. These are: (a) the name of Virginia Dela Rosa Ang-Ting was
misspelled as Verginia Rosa Ang-Ting; (b) the husband of Villy was not stated therein;
(c) the Extrajudicial Settlement instrument was allegedly executed on March 26, 2014,
but the subject property remained in the name of Peregrina as of July 2014; (d) only
the version of the instrument that was submitted to the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) showed the date of death of Peregrina and that it was published under the law;
(e) Villy was indicated as a signatory therein despite her demise on April 5, 2012, two
years before it was executed; and (f) the Extrajudicial Settlement submitted to
MERALCO bore no witnesses while the LRA's copy was signed by two unknown
witnesses, and the instrument submitted to the RTC-Quezon City indicated Ma. Shiela
Dioneda (Dioneda)5, the alleged secretary of respondent Atty. Belaro, as the sole
witness therein.6

Complainant Venson and his siblings also discovered that respondent Atty. Belaro
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated December 16, 2014 which was purportedly
executed by and between Vermont and Rowena Ang (Rowena) as sellers, and Lou
Aldrin Ridad, Louzelle Ann Ridad, Louisse May Ridad, Louie Aaron Ridad, and Louissa
Liendle Ridad as buyers.

An Acknowledgement Receipt8 dated December 16, 2014 was likewise notarized by

respondent Atty. Belaro showing that Vermont and Rowena allegedly received
P5,000,000.00 from the buyers in consideration of the purported sale of the subject
property.

As a result thereof, complainant Venson filed the instant letter�-complaint. 9 Attached

to the complaint were the reproduction copies of the questioned documents, the
specimen signatures10 of respondent Atty. Belaro that were requested from the office of
the Executive Judge of RTC-Quezon City, and a Certification 11 dated March 20, 2015
issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the said trial court.

On April 8, 2015, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), through Director Dominic C.M. Solis, issued an Order 12 directing the
parties to file their respective verified position papers. The Investigating Commissioner
thereafter set the mandatory conference on June 25, 2015. 13 However, only
complainant Venson appeared during the mandatory conference. 14

Respondent Atty. Belaro then filed an undated Manifestation with Motion for
Reinvestigation15 informing the CBD that he belatedly received the copy of its Order as
it was sent to the school where he reports only on weekends. Also, the annexes
mentioned in the complaint were not attached therein. Thus, respondent Atty. Belaro
requested the CBD for 10 days within which to file his answer or position paper and to
photocopy the annexes of the complaint.

Pending the resolution of is Manifestation with Motion for Reinvestigation, respondent

Atty. Belaro filed his Answer16 to the letter complaint denying that he notarized the
questioned documents involving the subject property. He claimed that his alleged
signatures found therein were forgeries as evidenced by his specimen signatures
submitted before the RTC-�Quezon City when he applied for a notarial commission.
Respondent Atty. Belaro also denied having caused the filing of the questioned
notarized documents before the government agencies concerned. He further averred
that he did not know the differences and alterations made in the different versions of
the Extrajudicial Settlement instrument which were submitted to MERALCO, the LRA,
and the Clerk of Court of RTC-Quezon City. Lastly, he claimed that he does not
personally know Dioneda and that she was never employed as his secretary.

Subsequently, the parties filed Joint Motion to Dismiss 17 before the CBD seeking the
dismissal of the complaint claiming that it arose from a misapprehension of facts.
Attached to the joint motion is an Affidavit of Desistance18 executed by complainant
Venson. Respondent Atty. Belaro also informed the CBD of his intention to withdraw his
Motion for Reinvestigation.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

In a Report and Recommendation19 dated July 30, 2014, Investigating Commissioner

Arsenio P. Adriano noted that the signatures of respondent Atty. Belaro in the
Extrajudicial Settlement instrument appear to be falsified as these were different from
his genuine signatures submitted to the Executive Judge of RTC-Quezon City when he
applied for a notarial commission. Despite the alleged forgery, his notarial seal was
used in the documents. Based on this, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
respondent Atty. Belaro failed to properly secure the same since no other person was
allowed to use it other than him.20

Anent the signatures of respondent Atty. Belaro in the Deed of Absolute Sale and in the
Acknowledgement Receipt, the Investigating Commissioner found that these were
similar to his admitted genuine signatures. Nonetheless, respondent Atty. Belaro was
found negligent since he failed to require Rowena, the alleged vendor in the deed, and
Vermont, the recipient of the purchase price in the Acknowledgement Receipt, to
produce competent evidence of their identities because he merely relied on their
respective community tax certificates. Moreover, while both documents appeared to be
executed on December 16, 2014, their entries in the Notarial Registry Book were
however strikingly apart from each other. The Deed of Absolute Sale was entered in his
Notarial Register as Document No. 226, page no. 42, Book No. VI, series of 2014, while
the Acknowledgement Receipt was entered as Document No. 258, page no. 48, Book
No. VII, series of 2014.21

The Investigating Commissioner therefore found respondent Atty. Belaro negligent in

the performance of his duties and obligations as a notary public. He thus recommended
that respondent Atty. Belaro be suspended from the practice of law for six months and
ineligible for being commissioned as notary public for a period of one year. 22

The IBP Board of Governors' (BOG) Recommendation

On April 29, 2016, the IBP-BOG issued Resolution No. XXII-2016-280 23 which adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with
the modification that respondent Atty. Belaro be instead meted the penalty of
revocation of his existing notarial commission, disqualification from appointment as
notary public for two years, and suspension from the practice of law for three months.
An Extended Resolution24 was issued by the IBP-BOG with respect to the said
modification of the recommended penalties to be imposed against respondent Atty.
Belaro.

Aggrieved, respondent Atty. Belaro filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 before the IBP-
BOG. He claimed that the findings of the IBP were not based on substantial evidence;
that it merely relied on complainant's evidence; and that his motion for reinvestigation
was not even acted upon or considered prior to the disposition of the complaint against
him. Hence, he was not given a chance to present his own evidence which would have
shown that he was a victim of the conspiracy perpetrated by the sibling of complainant
Venson.

Respondent Atty. Belaro also alleged that, at present, he was elected as the
representative of 1-Ang Edukasyon Party-List in the House of Representatives. As a
result, thereof, the penalties imposed by the IBP may have been mooted because he is
not in the active practice of law.

Acting on respondent Atty. Belaro's Motion for Reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued a
Resolution26 on June 29, 2018 modifying its recommended penalty, viz.:
RESOLVED to PARTIAL GRANT the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration by imposing
the penalty of DISQUALIFICATION FROM BEING COMMISSIONED AS NOTARY PUBLIC
FOR TWO (2) YEARS, in lieu of the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months considering that - (i) the complainant had executed an Affidavit of
Desistance and ii) this is Respondent's first offense.27
The Issues

In essence, the issues for resolution are:

(a) whether the IBP violated respondent Atty. Belaro's right to due process;

(b) whether the findings and recommendations of the IBP were proper; and
(c) assuming that respondent Atty. Belaro is indeed liable, whether his subsequent
election in the House of Representatives as a party-list representative mooted the
imposition of penalty.

The Court's Ruling

After a careful deliberation, We modify the findings of the IBP and the sanctions to be
imposed against respondent Atty. Belaro.

I.

There was no violation of respondent Atty. Belaro's right to due process

The right to be heard is the most basic principle of due process. It is a settled rule that
there is no denial of due process when a party has been given an opportunity to be
heard and to present his case. There is only denial of due process when there is total
absence or lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court. 28

Respondent Atty. Belaro claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because
the case was already submitted for resolution when it came to his knowledge. He also
insists that the IBP's resolution was solely based on complainant Venson's evidence as
the IBP did not act on his motion for reinvestigation.

We disagree.

Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings and
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.29 In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court defined administrative due process
in this wise:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 31 (Citations omitted)
A thorough examination of the records shows that respondent Atty. Belaro was
accorded ample opportunity to defend himself and adduce his own evidence. The IBP
duly notified him of the proceedings by sending the notices via registered mail to St.
Dominic Savio College of Law, where he used to teach and was the College Dean. While
respondent Atty. Belaro claimed that the notices were not sent to his regist red address
of place of business, such bare assertion deserves scant consideration as he failed to
sufficiently prove that the service of notices was highly irregular.

Notably, upon being informed of the notices, respondent Atty. Belaro filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Reinvestigation and a subsequent Answer to Letter-
Complaint Requesting for Formal Investigation dated September 22, 2015. He even
filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP assailing the April 29, 2016 Resolution
which was in fact given due course by the IBP. Therefore, the minimum requirements of
administrative due process have been observed and met by the IBP.

II.

Respondent Atty. Belaro is liable for breach of notarial law and for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility

The act of notarization is not an ordinary routine but is imbued with substantive public
interest. It converts a private document into a public document resulting in the
document's admissibility in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is therefore entitled to full faith and credit on its face and by law. 32

It is the duty of notaries public to observe utmost care in complying with the formalities
intended to protect the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it
embodies.33 The Court, in Gonzales v. Ramos,34 elucidated the importance of
notarization, to wit:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of
Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. Such act is no empty
gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a
notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand
and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of
requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. 35 (Citation omitted)
We agree with the IBP that the signatures of respondent Atty. Belaro found in the three
versions of the Extrajudicial Settlement were indeed forgeries. The signatures were
strikingly dissimilar to his specimen signatures submitted before the RTC-Quezon City
when he applied for notarial commission. However, our conclusion differs as regards his
alleged signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Acknowledgement
Receipt.

Contrary to the findings of the IBP, the questioned signatures were different from
respondent Atty. Belaro's specimen signatures on file with the RTC-Quezon City even to
the naked eye. First, the middle initial letter "B" in the specimen signatures was in a
downward to upward stroke compared to the questioned signatures which showed that
the letter "B" was close to being unrecognizable. Second, the first strokes in the
specimen signatures were pointed downwards whereas in the questioned signatures
these were cursive. Third, anent the signature stroke of respondent Atty. Belaro's
surname, the first downward strokes in the specimen signatures were pointed at the
end compared to the questioned signatures which were circular. Fourth, the strokes of
the first letter in the surname in the specimen signatures appeared to be more of a
letter R or B compared to the questioned signatures which significantly looked like letter
N. Fifth, the tips of the end strokes in the specimen signatures were cursive or round
unlike in the questioned signatures which were both pointed. Sixth, the strokes in the
surname in the specimen signatures were not drawn as one straight line as compared
to the questioned signatures. Lastly, the specimen signatures appeared to be executed
in a free rapid continuous stroke unlike in the questioned signatures which showed a
slow upward stroke resembling hesitation on the part of the person signing the
documents. Clearly, the signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale and in the
Acknowledgement Receipt were not the genuine signatures of respondent Atty. Belaro.

Nonetheless, respondent Atty. Belaro is not exculpated from administrative liability. As

observed by the IBP, the Extrajudicial Settlement bore his notarial seal. The 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice36 clearly states that, when not in use, the official seal of the notary
public must be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible only to him or the person
duly authorized by him.37

Here, respondent Atty. Belaro utterly failed to sufficiently provide any laudable
explanation why his notarial seal was found in the documents. He simply asserted in his
Answer to the Letter-Complaint that the signatures of the notary public found in the
subject instruments were not his, that he did not cause the filing of these documents to
any government agencies, and that he never employed Dioneda as his secretary.
Indubitably, respondent Atty. Belaro did not properly secure and keep his notarial seal
in a safe place inaccessible to other persons so as to ensure that nobody can use the
same without his authority. Had he done so, his notarial seal would not have been
affixed to the Extrajudicial Settlement which converted the same from a private
document into a public document. Thus, respondent Atty. Belaro has been remiss in his
duty to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his functions as a notary public
and to comply with the mandates of law.

In being careless in failing to secure and keep his notarial seal in a safe place away
from any person not authorized to use the same, respondent Atty. Belaro committed a
transgression of the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The negligence of respondent Atty. Belaro likewise extended to his reportorial duties as
Notary Public. Although he appeared not to have notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the Acknowledgement Receipt yet he entered the same in his Notarial Registry
Book. Had respondent Atty. Belaro been meticulous and cautious in the performance of
his duties as Notary Public, he would have noticed from the start that he did not
notarize the subject instruments and exclude the same from his Notarial Registry Book.

Undoubtedly, respondent Atty. Belaro failed to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties
of his office which are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 38 His
negligence therefore not only caused damage to those directly affected by the notarized
documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the
function of notarization.39 Hence, it is but proper to hold respondent Atty. Belaro liable
for his negligence as a notary public and as a lawyer.

III.

Appropriate penalty to be imposed

On the aspect of the penalty to be imposed, the Court holds that respondent Atty.
Belaro should be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial
commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line with current
jurisprudence, and as recommended by the IBP, his disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public for two years is in order. The revocation of his
incumbent notarial commission, if any, is likewise called for. 40

Furthermore, for his negligence to secure and keep safe his notarial seal which
facilitated the cancellation of the title to the subject property and the subsequent
transfer thereof, the Court finds that a suspension from the practice of law for six
months is warranted.

IV.

The filing of a joint motion to dismiss containing complainant Venson's

Affidavit of Desistance and the election of respondent Atty. Belaro as a
member of the House of Representatives do not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint, much less the imposition of the penalty.

Respondent Atty. Belaro in an attempt to escape liability, argues that the filing of the
Joint Motion to Dismiss and the execution of the Affidavit of Desistance by complainant
Venson should be treated not as a compromise agreement between them as parties.
Instead, these showed that the administrative complaint which complainant filed
against him lacked factual basis. Thus, respondent Atty. Belaro asserts that sanctions
cannot be imposed in the absence of substantial evidence that he is administratively
liable.

We disagree.

An affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant or the withdrawal of the

complaint is not sufficient cause to warrant the dismissal of an administrative
complaint.41 It remains true notwithstanding the reasons raised by the complainant as
to the execution of the affidavit or withdrawal of the complaint. The main objective of
disciplinary proceedings is to determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It
is conducted for the public welfare and the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant.
What matters is whether the charge in the complaint has been proven on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record.42 This was exhaustively emphasized by the Court
in Loberes-Pintal v. Baylosis,43 citing Bautista v. Bernabe,44 to wit:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.45 (Citation omitted)
Moreover, the fact that respondent Atty. Belaro is not in the active practice of law by
reason of his election in the House of Representatives as a party-list representative of
1-Ang Edukasyon Party-List in the 2016 National Election, is irrelevant.

The Court takes judicial notice that the Mid-Year Election has been conducted in May
2019 which has changed the sitting members in the House of Representatives including
the party list representatives. Based on the 2019 election results, the 1-Ang Edukasyon
Party-List failed to win any seat in Congress. Hence, respondent Atty. Belaro's
argument has been rendered moot and academic.

Besides, assuming arguendo that respondent Atty. Belaro remains to be a

Representative, he still cannot escape liability on the ground that he is not in the active
practice of law. To begin with, no law or statute provides that the penalties against an
erring lawyer cannot be imposed if said lawyer is inactive in the practice of law by any
reason such as election in public office. Despite his being inactive in the practice of law,
the fact remains that he is still a member of the legal profession. Hence, the Court is
not precluded from conducting disciplinary investigations against him or imposing
disciplinary sanctions if so warranted. It is in accordance with the Court's power to call
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court in
order to preserve the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice. The Court may therefore strip off the profession of members
or impose other forms of sanctions upon them who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.46

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Salvador B. Belaro, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating

the 2004 Rule on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX MONTHS, effective
upon receipt of copy of this Decision. Moreover, his notarial commission, if any, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public
for a period of two years from finality of this Decision.

Atty. Belaro is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his
suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi�-judicial bodies where he
has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be attached to Atty. Belaro's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 9417, November 18, 2020 ]

JOHN PAUL KIENER, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RICARDO R. AMORES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This administrative case arose from two identical Complaints1 filed by complainant John Paul Kiener
(John Paul) before the Office of the Bar Confidant2 (OBC) and the Office of the Court
Administrator3 (OCA) praying for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions4 against respondent Atty.
Ricardo R. Amores (Atty. Amores). The OCA referred the Complaint filed before it to the OBC.5

The Factual Antecedents:

In his Complaint, John Paul alleges that Atty. Amores committed an act that is in violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice6 (Rules on Notarial Practice) and Canons 1, 10, and 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).7

John Paul was the accused in a criminal case for Estafa entitled People of the Philippines v. John
Paul Kiener,8 pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu.9 Atty. Amores was
the private prosecutor on behalf of private complainant Pado's Divecamp Resort Corporation
(Corporation).10 He was also a commissioned notary public at that time.11 Irene Medalla (Irene),
the Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, executed a Secretary's Certificate on July 18,
2007.12 The Secretary's Certificate authorized Cho Chang Je, the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Corporation, to file a criminal case (referring to the above mentioned criminal case)
on behalf of the Corporation against John Paul. Atty. Amores was the one who notarized the
Secretary's Certificate.13 The Secretary's Certificate was attached to the Complaint-Affidavit filed in
the criminal case.14

John Paul claims that the Secretary's Certificate was defective and improperly notarized.15 He
alleges that Atty. Amores as notary public failed to indicate the serial number of his notarial
commission in the notarial certificate, and that Irene's signature appears to have been printed or
scanned (digital copy) into the document.16 He asserts that because of the use of a printed
signature, Irene could not have been physically present before Atty. Amores when the document
was signed and notarized.17 John Paul claims that this act constitutes a violation of the requirement
of physical presence of the signatory in the performance of a notarial act as provided in Rule IV,
Section 2 of the Rules on Notarial Practice.18 Further, he claims that this act likewise constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01,19 Canon 1, Rule 10.01,20 Canon 10, and Rule 19.01,21 Canon 19, of the
CPR.22

On August 16, 2012, Atty. Amores filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment with Motion
for Consolidation of Instant Case with Administrative Case No. 9055.23

In his Comment,24 Atty. Amores claims that Irene signed the Secretary's Certificate in his
presence.25 He counters that the use of a printed or scanned signature does not in itself constitute a
violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice.26 He farther claims that it is common practice for the
signatory to sign only one copy and to reproduce the originally signed copy to the desired number of
copies before notarization.27 Moreover, John Paul's allegations are matters that could be raised by
way of defense in the criminal case instead of being used for the filing of an administrative case
against him.28 He also claims that the instant case is a personal attack and a form of harassment
given that there is another pending administrative case against him.29

On June 19, 2013, this Court, upon the recommendation of the OBC, ordered the consolidation of
the instant administrative case with Administrative Case No. 9055 (A.C. No. 9055), which was
already referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).30 The instant case was likewise
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.31

A.C. No. 9055, entitled John Paul Kiener and Julie S. Kiener v. Atty. Ricardo D. Amores, involves a
Complaint charging Atty. Amores with violation of the CPR when he committed acts of Gross
Negligence or Misconduct in belatedly entering his appearance, failing to attend hearings, submitting
pleadings beyond the reglementary period, and falsely representing to the lower court that there was
an on-going amicable settlement among the parties in a case.32 The IBP recommended that Atty.
Amores be suspended from the practice of law for six months with warning that repetition of the
same act shall be dealt with more severely.33
The Court notes that A.C. No. 9055 has already been resolved even though consolidated with the
instant case. In a Resolution34 dated June 8, 2016 of the First Division of this Court, Atty. Amores
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

was found guilty of Gross Misconduct, Inexcusable Negligence, Gross Incompetence, and Gross
Neglect of Duty as a lawyer. He was suspended from the practice of law for six months, with warning
that repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.35 He was subsequently held in
contempt, where he paid a fine of P5,000.00, for his failure to immediately obey the order of his
suspension from practice of law as mandated in the said Resolution.36 Eventually, in a subsequent
Resolution dated July 11, 2018, the Court lifted the order of his suspension and allowed Atty.
Amores to resume his practice of law effective immediately.37

Report and Recommendation of the IBP:

Reverting to the instant case, Investigating Commissioner Erwin L. Aguilera recommended the
revocation of Atty. Amores's appointment as Notary Public and his disqualification from
reappointment as such for a period of two years.38 He found that Atty. Amores failed to ascertain
the genuineness of Irene's signature when he notarized the document and that there was no
evidence to show that Irene was physically present.39

However, in Resolution40 No. XX1-2015-332 dated April 19, 2019, the IBP Board of Governors
(BOG) reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, and
resolved to dismiss the administrative case. The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to REVERSE, as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A," and considering that the Secretary's Certificate was personally signed
by Irene Medalla and she was present during its notarization, the case against Respondent is
hereby DISMISSED.41

In its Extended Resolution,42 the IBP BOG ruled that Irene indeed appeared before Atty.
Amores.43 As notary public, Atty. Amores carries with him the presumption that he has performed
his duties as required.44 This presumption of regularity was not overcome by John Paul.45 Nothing
on record shows that Irene was not or could not be physically present at that time.46 Moreover, John
Paul had no personal knowledge of the events to support his allegations.47

John Paul filed a Motion for Reconsideration48 but this was subsequently denied by the IBP BOG in
a Resolution dated June 17, 2019.49

Our Ruling

The Court disagrees with the IBP. Atty. Amores should be held administratively liable for violating
the Rules on Notarial Practice when he notarized a document without the presence of the signatory
and failed to indicate his commission number in the notarial certificate.

It is settled that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making
it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by
law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the
public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined."50 Atty. Amores
is, therefore, bound to strictly comply with these notarial rules.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, one of which is a jurat. Atty.
Amores performed a jurat when he notarized the Secretary's Certificate with Irene signing as the
Corporate Secretary. Rule II, Section 6 of the Rules on Notarial Practice defines a jurat as:

Section 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

This provision requires that the signatory, or the affiant in some cases, physically appears before the
notary public and signs the document in his presence. Rule IV, Section 2 of the same rules further
provides:

xxxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document —

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

This provision bolsters the requirement of physical appearance as it prohibits the notary public from
performing a notarial act if the signatory is not in his/her presence at the time of the notarization.

In Prospero v. Delos Santos,51 the Court emphasized that "a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed."

To repeat, Atty. Amores failed to observe the requirement of physical presence when he notarized
the Secretary's Certificate. Upon examination of the document, and as admitted by Atty. Amores
himself, Irene's signature in the Secretary's Certificate attached to the complaint-affidavit in the
criminal case was merely printed. In short, it was not an actual handwritten signature of Irene. Atty.
Amores's defense that Irene physically signed one copy that was subsequently reproduced then
notarized, does not convince this Court. Atty. Amores did not present any proof that Irene was
indeed physically in his presence upon the signing and notarization of the document. It goes without
saying that Irene had signed the document elsewhere, scanned it, and then sent it electronically to
Atty. Amores for the latter to print, reproduce, notarize, and use for the designated purpose. If indeed
Irene had personally appeared before him, he should have asked her right then and there to affix her
signature to each and every copy of the document, not just to one copy.
It is also worth mentioning that Atty. Amores failed to indicate the serial number of his notarial
commission in the concluding part of the notarial certificate of the Secretary's Certificate as required
by the rules.52

Based on the foregoing, Atty. Amores violated the Rules on Notarial Practice. For having committed
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

such violations, he also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the CPR, which requires every lawyer to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal
processes, and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct.53

As to the penalty, recent jurisprudence provides that a notary public who fails to discharge his duties
or fails to comply with the Rules on Notarial Practice may be penalized with revocation of his current
notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public.54 Thus, the Court
holds that Atty. Amores's current notarial commission, if there is any, should be revoked. Further, he
should be disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.

On a final note, the Court deems it necessary to remind lawyers who are currently commissioned as
notaries public that a community tax certificate (CTC) is no longer considered as competent
evidence of identity.55 Atty. Amores used a CTC as competent evidence of identity of Irene in
notarizing the Secretary's Certificate. However, it was not a violation at the time of the performance
of the notarial act in 2007 as the use of CTCs was prohibited only in 2008 by virtue of an
amendment to the Rules on Notarial Practice as clarified in the case of Baylon v. Almo.56

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Ricardo R. Amores GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, his notarial
commission, if still existing, is REVOKED, and he is hereby DISQUALIFIED from being reappointed
as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Ricardo R. Amores's personal record, and the Office of the Court Administrator and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

[ A.M. No. SCC-15-21-P (Formerly A.M. No. 15-01-01-SCC), December 09, 2020 ]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ANINDING M. ALAUYA,

CLERK OF COURT II, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MOLUNDO-MAGUING-RAMAINBUADIPOSO-
BUBONG, MOLUNDO, LANAO DEL SUR, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:
This administrative matter stemmed from a financial audit report1 of the Financial Audit Team, Fiscal
Monitoring Division, Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), on the
books of accounts of Aninding M. Alauya (respondent), Clerk of Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court (SCC),
Molundo-Maguing-Ramain-Buadiposo-Bubong, Lanao del Sur, for the period from January 1, 2008
to February 28, 2014.

Factual Antecedents:

In the December 15, 2014 Memorandum2 for the Court Administrator, the audit team submitted its
observations, findings, and recommendation to preventively suspend respondent without pay and to
submit his written explanation for the imputed offenses, to wit:

3.a. Removal of office records, financial and case records, from the office and keeping them
in their residence;

3.b. Failure to transfer some of the court case records in the office premises despite the audit
team's instructions and the memorandum, from the presiding judge;

3.c Skipping the four (4) [pages of Official Receipts] ORs with serial numbers 11772062 to
11772065 and 11772161 to 11772164 for [Judiciary Development Fund] JDF and [Special
Allowance for Judiciary Fund] SAJF, respectively;

3.d. Detaching the three (3) copies (original, duplicate and triplicate) of OR No. 11772165
and the unused original copy of OR No. 11772166 from the booklet;

3.e. Failure to report and remit the collections under OR No. 11772066 and 11772165 in the
amount of P180.00 and P820.00, respectively, both dated 4 April 2012;

3.f. Antedating OR Nos. 11772210 and 11772211 for 19 March 2010 and 28 June 2013,
respectively, when in fact said series of ORs were previously found unissued as of 4 March
2014, to make it appear that the LRF collections [were] properly receipted;

3.g. Non-submission of Monthly Financial Reports.3

The OCA, in its December 15, 2014 Memorandum,4 adopted the recommendations of the audit
team and endorsed the same for approval of the Court. We approved the recommendations of the
OCA in Our February 23, 2015 Resolution.5

In compliance response to Our February 23, 2015 Resolution, respondent submitted the following:
(1) Letter-Comment dated April 24, 2015;6 (2) Manifestations dated July 27, 2015;7 (3) Letter dated
September 10, 2015;8 and (4) Letter dated April 19, 2016.9

In his Letter-Comment10 dated April 24, 2015, respondent interposed the following defenses:

Respondent claimed that he brought home various case records for purposes of completion and that
this was with the prior knowledge and conformity of Presiding Judge Abdulhalim L. Saumay (Judge
Saumay).11 Respondent also denied that he did not comply with the directive to return the case
records to the court. He emphasized that he returned the subject case records and placed them
inside the court's steel cabinet.
As to the allegations that he skipped four (4) pages of official receipts for the JDF and SAJF, and
detached three (3) copies (original, duplicate and triplicate) of Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 11772165,
and the unused original copy of O.R. No 11772166 from the booklet, respondent averred that these
were due to mere inadvertence on his part.12 He explained that he instructed one of the court
personnel to deliver the official receipt booklets for the JDF and SAJF to the office at Molundo,
Lanao del Sur.

However, instead of delivering the booklets, said court personnel allegedly detached the official
receipts for the JDF and SAJF and inadvertently skipped four (4) pages of official receipts in the JDF
and SAJF booklets. The unused original copy of O.R. No. 11772166 was detached from the SAJF
booklet, which was delivered by the court personnel to the audit team together with the three (3)
copies (original, duplicate and triplicate) of O.R. No. 11772165.13 Ironically, respondent faulted the
audit team for allegedly failing to make a proper inventory of official receipts and to notify him about
the missing official receipts.

Anent the allegation that respondent failed to report and remit collections, he admitted that there was
a delay in the reporting of collections under O.R. Nos. 11772066 and 11772165 but that the
collections and remittances under the ORs have already been reported and remitted to the
Accounting Division of the OCA.14

As to the alleged antedating of official receipts, respondent admitted antedating O.R. Nos. 11772210
and 11772211 for March 19, 2010 and June 28, 2013, respectively.15 However, by way of defense,
he averred that he was forced to antedate the receipts in order to complete the Legal Research
Fund (LRF) issuances considering that the use of official receipts issued by the Supreme Court for
the LRF is prohibited.16

As to his non-submission of monthly financial case reports, respondent argued that it was
attributable to the low caseload of the court.17 He later submitted the monthly financial reports of the
court covering the period from January 1, 2008 to February 28, 2014, which is the period covered by
the audit.18

Respondent reiterated the foregoing defenses in his Manifestations dated July 27, 2015,19 Letter
dated September 10, 201520 and Letter dated April 19, 2016,21 and raised other additional claims
to address the charges against him.

Meanwhile, this Court, in its December 7, 2015 Resolution,22 referred respondent's Manifestations
dated July 27, 2015, and Letter dated September 10, 2015 to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

Report and Recommendation of the OCA:

July 5, 2016 Memorandum:

In its July 5, 2016 Memorandum,23 the OCA found respondent guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty,
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and recommended his suspension from office for one (1) year
without pay "with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with
more severely."24 The OCA ratiocinated in this wise:

First, respondent could not make up his mind with respect to the charge that he removed office,
financial and case records, from the office and kept them in his residence. He initially offered a mere
denial but thereafter gave a qualified admission that the bringing of case records to his home was
with the consent of Judge Saumay. He again gave another reason in his letter dated 10 September
2015 stating that he took the case records home because there was no electric power at that time in
Molundo, Lanao del Sur where his office is stationed and he used his computer at his home in
Marawi City to encode the orders. This reason appears to be a mere afterthought and puts into
question respondent's credibility.

Second, respondent explained that he avoided commenting on the memorandum issued to him by
Judge Saumay as required by the audit team because he did not want to have any conflict with
Judge Saumay. Further, instead of directly answering the allegation, he cited as an excuse the fact
that he wrote the majority of the orders of Judge Saumay per instruction of Judge Saumay. Such
failure to comment and his silence on the allegations are detrimental to his cause.

It is the natural instinct of man to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is
totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations, Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as an implied admission of
the truth thereof.

Third, while respondent admitted that he brought home some of the records albeit with the consent
of Judge Saumay, he however did not present any court order to support his claim. This is contrary
to Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Ru1es of Court mandating that "(n)o record shall be taken from the
clerk's office without an order of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules. xxx."

Fourth, respondent raised the defense that it was a personnel of the court who was responsible for
the skipping of four (4) [pages] of official receipts for the JDF and SAJF, and the removal of three (3)
copies (original, duplicate and triplicate) of O.R. No. 11772165 and the unused original copy of O.R.
No. 11772166.

The finger-pointing deserves scant consideration. For one, respondent did not even name the
personnel who was responsible. Secondly, as clerk of court, he is designated as the custodian of the
court's funds and revenues, records, properties and premises, and shall be liable for any loss or
shortage thereof. Finally, and more importantly, as clerk of court, he is chiefly responsible for the
shortcomings of his subordinates to whom administrative functions normally pertaining to them are
delegated. Thus, respondent cannot exculpate himself from the anomalies by just passing the blame
to another employee.

Fifth, with respect to the unremitted collections, a perusal of Annex "C" of respondent's comment will
reveal that the report was dated May 11, 2012 while the SAJF and JDF deposit slips were both
dated April 5, 2012. Based on these documents, the April 4, 2012 collections amounting to P180.00
and P820.00 under O.R. Nos. 11772666 and 11772165, respectively, were remitted and reported on
April 5, 2012 and May 11, 2012, respectively. However, the April 2012 monthly report of JDF and
SAJF presented by respondent during the conduct of the audit showed no such transactions. The
finding is supported by the JDF and SAJF subsidiary ledgers of the Accounting Division, FMO, OCA,
which bear no collection and deposit in the said month. The said ledgers also indicate that the
aforesaid transactions were reported only in 2015. Likewise, the date in the machine validation in the
JDF and SAJF deposit slips is March 5, 2014 and not April 5, 2012. This gives rise to the conclusion
that respondent falsified the date in the deposit slips to make it appear that the collections were
remitted and reported in 2012.

Sixth, respondent's admission of antedating the official receipts constitutes dishonesty defined as the
"(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud
deceive or betray.
Finally, with respect to his non-submission of the monthly financial report, respondent's
justification i.e., the low caseload of his court, is patently without merit as paragraph 3 of OCA
Circular No. 112-2004 categorically mandates:

3. In case no transaction is made within the month, written notice thereof shall be submitted to the
aforesaid Office no later than the 10th day of the succeeding month.

xxxx

In the present case, dismissal from the service may be too harsh considering the following
circumstances, to wit: (1) this is respondent's first infraction after nineteen (19) years of service in the
judiciary; and (2) he remitted, albeit belatedly, the total amount of his shortages before the complaint
against him was filed. xxx25 (Emphases in the original)

In view of the foregoing findings, the OCA, in its July 5, 2016 Memorandum, submitted the following
recommendations to the Court:

1. respondent Aninding Alauya, Clerk of Court II, SCC, MolundoMaguing-Ramain-

Buadiposo-Bubong, Molundo, Lanao del Sur, be found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty,
dishonesty and grave misconduct; and

2. respondent Alauya be SUSPENDED for one (1) year without pay with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely.26

Meanwhile, this Court received respondent's Letters dated April 19, 201627 and February 2,
201728 relative to the instant administrative case against him. The Court also received a copy of a
letter-complaint dated September 1, 2016 against respondent from various court personnel29 from
SCC Molondo, Lanao del Sur.

In a July 24, 2017 Resolution, this Court referred the letters to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

November 17, 2017 Memorandum:

In compliance with the July 24, 2017 Resolution of the Court, the OCA issued a
Memorandum30 dated November 17, 2017 finding that respondent's letters did not warrant any
modification of the recommendations earlier cited in its July 5, 2016 Memorandum, thus:

The allegations deserve scant consideration.

First, while respondent harmonized his two (2) conflicting reasons in bringing home the case
records, i.e., to help write lacking orders on motions filed and on interlocutory matters, because of
the inability of their Presiding Judge to write in the English language and due to the lack then of
electric power in their office, the fact remains that there was no court order to support his claim
contrary to Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.

Second, with respect to his argument that had he known earlier of the scheduled audit, he would
have delivered the case records to the office at least a day before, the same is untenable as it is
respondent's duty to return the records to the court especially so in the instant case where there was
no authority in writing for respondent to do so.
Third, respondent also tries to explain his failure to name the personnel by stating that he took
responsibility for the negligence of his personnel and because he actually ratified the said act.
However, while respondent as clerk of court is chiefly responsible for the lapses of his subordinates
to whom administrative functions normally pertaining to them are delegated, he should still have
named the alleged employee to give his allegations a semblance of truth.

Finally, with respect to respondent's other allegations, it appears that he ascribes ill motive on the
part of the audit team, but he has not presented any evidence to prove his claim. As stated in the
previous memorandum, in the absence of evidence ascribing any ill motive on the part of the audit
team, it logically follows that there was no such improper motive and that, corollarily, their report is
worthy of full faith and belief.

Thus, this Office does not find anything in respondent's letters that would warrant the modification of
our recommendation in our Memorandum dated 08 July 2016 that respondent to be found guilty of
gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct and consequently be suspended for one (1)
year without pay with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt
with more severely.31

The OCA also noted that the September 1, 2016 complaint-letter against respondent raised matters
which were wholly unrelated to the instant administrative case and that the charges raised therein be
resolved in a separate administrative case against respondent for Dishonesty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best interest of the Service, and Grave Misconduct.

The OCA, in its Memorandum dated November 17, 2017, then made the following
recommendations:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the

Honorable Court that:

1. the (a) letters dated 19 April 2016 and 02 February 2017 of respondent Aninding Alauya,
Clerk of Court II, SCC, Molundo-Maguing-RamainBuadiposo-Bubong, Molundo, Lanao del
Sur, and (b) letter dated 01 September 2016 of Judge Abdulhalim L. Saumay, et al.,
be NOTED;

2. respondent Aninding Alauya be found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and
grave misconduct and be SUSPENDED for one (1) year without pay with STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely; and,

3. the letter dated 01 September 2016 of Judge Abdulhalim L. Saumay, et al., be docketed
as a SEPARATE COMPLAINT against respondent Aninding Alauya for dishonesty, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and grave misconduct, and respondent Aninding
Alauya be required to COMMENT thereon.32

Our Ruling

We adopt the findings of the OCA that respondent failed to perform his duties with the degree of
diligence and competence expected of a Clerk of Court and its recommendation to suspend him for
one (1) year without pay.
Clerks of Court perform vital functions in the administration of justice. Their functions are imbued
with public interest that any act which would compromise, or tend to compromise, that degree of
diligence and competence expected of them in the exercise of their functions would destroy public
accountability and effectively weaken the faith of the people in the justice system.33

Notably, as the designated custodian of the court's properties, it was incumbent on respondent to
ensure that relevant rules are followed for their proper safekeeping and organization. In this regard,
Section 14, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court provides that "[n]o record shall be taken from the clerk's
office without an order of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules." On a related
matter, it also bears stressing that Article 22634 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any public
officer who removes, conceals or destroys documents or papers officially entrusted to him or her.35

Here, respondent was charged with the proper safekeeping and management of all court records
under his custody. While he proffered several, albeit, conflicting defenses as grounds to exculpate
himself from liability, the fact remains that there was no court order to support any of his claims
contrary to Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. Clearly, he displayed neglect of duty when he
removed financial and case records from the court without proper authority.

Respondent was equally remiss in skipping four (4) pieces of official receipts for the JDF and SAJF,
and removing three (3) copies (original, duplicate and triplicate) of O.R. No. 11772165 and the
unused original copy of O.R. No. 11772166. He attributed these shortcomings to a court personnel
but without identifying the said personnel. He cannot, however, escape liability by shifting the blame
to his subordinates. As the Clerk of Court, he is the designated custodian of court properties,
particularly in this case, the official receipts for the JDF and SAJF. Therefore, he should be made
primarily liable for any loss, shortage or impairment thereof.36

Significantly, respondent's unauthorized removal and improper safekeeping of court records were
compounded by acts of graver malfeasance - the incurring of shortages, and delay in the remittance
of collections, as well as the belated submission of monthly financial reports on the same.

It is well-settled that Clerks of Court are tasked with the collections of court funds. As they are not
authorized to keep funds in their custody, they are duty bound to immediately deposit with
authorized government depositories their collections on various funds.37 Such functions are
highlighted by OCA Circular Nos. 50-9538 and 113-200439 and Administrative Circular No. 35-
200440 which mandate Clerks of Court to timely deposit judiciary collections as well as to submit
monthly financial reports on the same.

These circulars are mandatory in nature and are designed to promote full accountability for funds
received by the courts. Notably, any failure or even delay in the remittance of collection has been
perceived as a serious breach of duty to the public.41 These acts deprive the courts of the
opportunity to use the fund as well as the interest thereon which may have been earned if the
amounts were timely and/or properly remitted or deposited to authorized government depositories.42

Clearly in this case, respondent failed to perform with utmost diligence his financial and
administrative responsibilities. As correctly found by the OCA, and as readily admitted by respondent
himself, he was remiss in his duties in remitting the court collections on time, and regularly
submitting his monthly reports. He also incurred shortages amounting to P1,000.00.
ℒαwρhi ৷

Respondent cited several reasons to justify his shortcomings but which we find to be unacceptable.
To be clear, in the event that daily deposits of cash collections are not feasible, the same shall be
made at the end of every month.43 In fact, even when no transaction is made within the month,
written notice thereof shall be submitted no later than the 1Oth day of the succeeding
month.44 Having failed to do so, respondent cannot now escape liability from his own inaction.

Notably, while the noted shortages were already restituted, respondent's failure to remit or deposit
the correct amount upon collection thereof was already prejudicial to the court as it did not earn
interest income on the said amount, or was otherwise deprived of using the same. Thus, even when
he has restituted the funds, his unwarranted failure to fulfill his responsibilities deserve administrative
sanction by the Court, and not even payment, as in this case, of the collection of the shortages will
exempt him from liability.45

Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (RRACCS) provides that Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, and Serious
Dishonesty are grave offenses which merit the penalty of dismissal from service even for the first
offense.46

However, in determining the penalty to be imposed, the Court considers the facts of the case and
such factors which may serve as mitigating circumstances. In this regard, respondent's length of
service in the judiciary for nineteen (19) years can be considered in his favor. Moreover, this Court
notes that respondent has been preventively suspended since 2015. In view of the foregoing, the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year is proper.

On another matter, we also agree with the findings of the OCA that the September 1, 2016
complaint-letter against respondent raised matters which are unrelated to the instant case. Thus, all
charges raised in the complaintletter should be resolved in a separate administrative case against
respondent for his alleged infractions of Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, and Grave Misconduct.

WHEREFORE, Aninding M. Alauya, Clerk of Court II of the Shari'a Circuit Court, Molundo-Maguing-
Ramain-Buadiposo-Bubong, Molundo, Lanao del Sur, is found GUILTY of Gross Neglect of Duty,
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED without pay for a period of one (1)
year effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

The letter dated September 1, 2016 of Judge Abdulhalim L. Saumay, et al., shall be docketed as
a SEPARATE COMPLAINT against respondent, to be raffled among the Members of the Court for
resolution.

SO ORDERED.

[ A.M. No. 2019-14-SC, February 10, 2020 ]

RE: INCIDENT REPORT OF THE SECURITY DIVISION AND ALLEGED VARIOUS INFRACTIONS
COMMITTED BY MR. CLOYD D. GARRA, JUDICIAL STAFF EMPLOYEE II, MEDIATION,
PLANNING AND RESEARCH DIVISION, PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER OFFICE,
PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY
 DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

In an Information Report1 (Report) dated May 29, 2019, Eddie B. Macapanas and Archie J. Comilan,
Shift-In-Charge and CCTV Operator, respectively, of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA)
Training Center, stated that respondent Mr. Cloyd D. Garra (Garra), Judicial Staff Employee II,
Mediation, Planning and Research Division, PHILJA and Staff Driver,2 violated the PHILJA Training
Center House Rules3 (House Rules) concerning the reception of visitors, viz.:

For security reasons, curfew time for guests billeted at the PTC is at 11:00 p.m. Visitors of guests
shall be received only in the lounge located at the Front Office and allowed to stay until 10:00 p.m.4

In particular, the Report stated that on May 28, 2019, at approximately 3:47 p.m., Household
Attendant II Emilyn Janaban (Janaban) was heading to Room 107 of the Training Center to assist a
guest. It was at this time that Janaban observed that a woman proceeded inside a nearby room,
particularly, Room 110, and who was closely followed by Garra. The woman was later identified as
Maria Edwina V. Sampaga (Sampaga), Mediation Aide of the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC), a
participant of a seminar being held in the Training Center,5 and the solo occupant of Room 110 from
May 28 to 31, 2019. Janaban thus reported the incident to Watchman II Zyra Canaan,6 Security
Division personnel, and Gretchen Solis, front desk staff on duty.

CCTV footage7 revealed that both Sampaga and Garra entered Room 110 at 3:29 p.m. and
remained therein until 3:51 p.m., or for approximately 22 minutes, after which both Sampaga and
Garra left Room 110 and went their separate ways.

The Report was forwarded to the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) on May 30, 20198 for
evaluation.

In Memorandums9 both dated June 10, 2019, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative
Officer, Atty. Maria Carina M. Cunanan directed Garra and Sampaga10 to submit their written
explanation on their alleged violation of the House Rules concerning the reception of visitors.

In his June 13, 2019 Letter,11 Garra admitted to the incident as above narrated, but proffered the
following reasons and justifications: first, that Sampaga is his common-law wife who has been living
with him for more than 14 years; second, that they have a 13-year-old daughter and a 6-yearold son
together;12 and third, being her husband, he merely used the occasion to check up on Sampaga.

Sampaga, on her part, raised in her June 17, 2019 Letter13 the same admissions and defenses
submitted by Garra and further added that she only permitted Garra to enter Room 110 "as she had
a few things to request from him (i.e., 'ibinilin')."14

Upon further investigation by the OAS, it was discovered that Garra's personal record (201 file)
includes an April 17, 1998 Certificate of Marriage, which indicates that Garra is legally married to a
certain Melissa M. Osbual Garra (Osbual). Garra also declared in a Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF) or Pag-IBIG Member's Data Form, and his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN) forms from 2006 to 2012 that Osbual is his legal spouse. The same information,
however, was omitted in Garra's 2007 to 2011 SALNs, including his SALNs beginning 2013. The
OAS likewise noted the absence of any record on file that Garra requested for a change of status
from married to single, or that any annulment decree was submitted to the OAS.15
Considering the foregoing, the OAS, on July 23, 2019, issued a second Memorandum16 to Garra,
which required him to submit his written explanation on why he should not be administratively
charged with immorality for maintaining a common-law relationship with Sampaga while being legally
married to Osbual, and dishonesty for his failure to declare his marriage to Osbual in a number of his
SALNs.

In response to the July 23, 2019 Memorandum, Garra, on August 5, 2019, submitted a Letter17 to
the OAS confirming his marriage with Osbual. Garra, however, submitted that while he and Osbual
had two children together, they have not cohabited with each other since 2003. As Osbual allegedly
abandoned Garra for another man, Garra was constrained to carry out his responsibilities as both
father and mother to their children on top of fulfilling his duties as staff driver. It was in 2005 that
Garra met Sampaga who remained his common-law wife and who assisted him in the rearing and
care of their children and his children with Osbual.18

Garra further alleged in his Letter that his relationship with Sampaga is publicly known to employees
of PHILJA and a few employees of this Court. Garra also explained that he did not seek to obtain a
decree of annulment of his marriage with Osbual as he opted to devote his small income for
payment of living expenses, and tuition and other school fees of all of his children.19

By way of defense to the charge of dishonesty, Garra contended that he did not intend to provide
false information in his Pag-IBIG Membership form and SALNs for years 2007 to 2011, including his
SALNs beginning 2013. Considering his strained relationship with Osbual, and his current
relationship with Sampaga, Garra was confounded with his marital status, and by reason of which,
Garra simply placed "N/A" on the documents.

Report and Recommendation of the Office of Administrative Services

In its November 6, 2019 Memorandum,20 the OAS made the following evaluation and
recommendation, to wit:

The first category of established facts characterizes the administrative offense of Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. Classified as a light offense under Civil Service Rules, it
bears the penalty of a reprimand for the first offense.

xxxx

Unfortunately for the respondent, by cultivating a relationship with Ms. Sampaga and starting a
family with her while still under the legal bond of marriage with Ms. Osbual, resulted [in] his
breaching of the marital vows that he took when he contracted a marriage with the latter. As the law
dictates that marriage is intended to be a permanent union unless judicially sundered or declared
non-existent, his acts not only fell short of the exacting standards required of employees of the
Judiciary, but also constitutes the administrative offense of Immorality (i.e., "Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct"), which is punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day for the first offense,
and dismissal from the service for the second.

As to the charge of Dishonesty for not declaring Ms. Osbual as his legal spouse in his 2007 to 2011
SALN forms as well as from 2013 onwards x x x.

xxxx
This deliberate misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in an official document amounts to
the administrative offense of Dishonesty. The same holds true even assuming that there was no
deliberate intent to mislead or defraud the government, such as in the case at bar, where the
respondent was aware that by doing so, it could not officially alter his legal status, since dishonesty
covers a broad range of conduct. It connotes untrustworthiness and lack of integrity, disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive, and betray. Moreover, a SALN is a sworn document.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, this Office respectfully submits that respondent PHILJA Staff Driver Cloyd
D. Garra be found GUILTY of the administrative offenses of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules
and Regulations, Immorality (Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct) and Dishonesty and that the latter
be SUSPENDED for one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction
shall be dealt with more severely.21 (Citations omitted)

Our Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OAS.

Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations

By his own admission that he in fact entered the premises of Sampaga's quarters in Room 110
instead of meeting her in the lounge as required by the House Rules, Garra is deemed liable for
Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations under Section 46(F)(3), Rule 10 of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). Whether Sampaga is
Garra's legal or common-law spouse is of no moment. Needless to state, the rules are clear that all
guests, regardless of their relation to the occupants of the PHILJA Training Center, are only allowed
to conduct visits in the lounge.

Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct

Garra is also guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct as defined under Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 15, Series of 2010, which provides:

Section 1. Definition of Disgraceful and Immoral conduct - Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct refers
to an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned
by the society. It refers to conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community.

The same Circular highlights that "[d]isgraceful and [i]mmoral conduct may be committed in a
scandalous or discreet manner, within or out of the workplace."22

This Court has held in a number of cases that a man having an illicit relationship with a woman not
his wife is within the purview of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Civil Service Laws.23 Here,
Garra admitted in his June 13, 2019 and August 5, 2019 Letters that he has cohabited, and
continues to cohabit with Sampaga, a woman who is not his wife, with whom he begot two children.

Notably, Garra, in his Letters, admitted that he entered into a relationship with Sampaga in 2005, or
two years after Osbual supposedly abandoned him for another man. This is not the place for
determining Osbual's infidelity and abandonment of her family. What is material in this case is the
fact that without his marriage being first dissolved, Garra lived with another woman not his wife, and
with whom he found another family.

It cannot be overstressed that -

Time and again we have stressed adherence to the principle that public office is a public trust. All
government officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. This constitutional mandate should always be in the minds of all public servants to guide them
in their actions during their entire tenure in the government service. The good of the service and the
degree of morality which every official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect
and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that
no untoward conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while holding office
should be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into
account.24 (Citations omitted)

Dishonesty

It is undisputed even by Garra that he remains legally married to Osbual. There is no confusion here.
In this connection, we agree with the OAS that Garra's deliberate omission of this fact in his SALNs
for several years constitutes Dishonesty. "Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or
distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray
and an intent to violate the truth."25

Here, Garra's lack of honesty is evident when, on several occasions, he deliberately placed "N/A" in
his SALNs from 2007 to 2011, including his SALNs beginning 2013, despite knowledge that he is still
legally married to Osbual. The fact that Garra omitted such information in his SALNs on different and
various occasions is a clear manifestation of his propensity to lie and to distort the truth just to suit
his personal interest and purpose. This, the Court cannot countenance.

CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 (Rules on the Administrative Offense of Dishonesty) provides for
different circumstances when Dishonesty is considered Serious, Less Serious, or Simple.26

Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 provides that the presence of any of the following
attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act constitutes Simple Dishonesty: "(a)
The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government; (b) The dishonest act had
no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the respondent; (c) In
falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her
employment; (d) That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender; and (e)
Other analogous circumstances."27

Applying CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, while Garra's misrepresentation or omission of his marital
status in his SALNs can be considered as a dishonest act, we agree with the OAS that such act
constitutes Simple Dishonesty as the same did not cause damage or prejudice to the government
and had no direct relation to or did not involve the duties and responsibilities of Garra as staff driver.
The same is true with the misrepresentation Garra committed, where the information omitted is not
related to his employment.

The penalty to be imposed upon Garra

According to Section 46 B.3, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct is a grave
offense which is punishable by suspension from service for a period of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Section 46 F.3, Rule
10 of the same rules classifies Violation of Reasonable Rules and Regulations as a light offense,
which is punishable by reprimand for the first offense; suspension of one (1) to thirty (30) days for
the second offense; and dismissal from the service for the third offense.

Under CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, Simple Dishonesty is punishable by suspension of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense; six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year suspension for the second offense; and dismissal for the third offense.28

In determining the proper penalty to be imposed on Garra, the OAS ruled in this wise:

Under Section 55 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, if the respondent is
found guilty of two (2) or more different offenses, the imposable penalty should be for the most
serious offense, while the rest shall be considered aggravating. Since the penalty for Immorality
(Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct) is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day for the first
offense, in consideration of the two (2) aggravating circumstances in the case at bar, we submit that
the respondent be suspended for one (1) year x x x.29 (Emphasis supplied)

It bears noting, however, that Garra's deliberate omissions of his marital status in his SALNs were
committed not less than three (3) times, particularly, when he intentionally made such omissions in
his 2007 to 2011 SALNs, including his SALNs beginning 2013. These omissions, when so treated
separately, could have merited the penalty of dismissal under the RRACCS.

Considering, however, Garra's length of service, and given that his marital status is not a material
component of the SALNs, we find that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year is in
order. Notably, his outright dismissal from service would be too harsh a penalty in this case.

In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the recommendation of the OAS that Garra should be
suspended for a period of one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, Mr. Cloyd D. Garra, Judicial Staff Employee II, Mediation, Planning and Research
Division, Philippine Judicial Academy, and Staff Driver, is found GUILTY of the administrative
offenses of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct, and Dishonesty. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

This Decision takes effect immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be appended to Mr. Cloyd D.
Garra's 201 File.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486 [Formerly A.M. No. 17-02-45-RTC, September 03, 2019 ]

RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING

JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BUTUAN CITY,
AGUSAN DEL NORTE

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Death of the respondent judge during the pendency of his administrative case shall not terminate the
proceedings against him, much less absolve him, or cause the dismissal of the complaint if the
investigation was completed prior to his demise. If death intervenes before he has been dismissed
from service, the appropriate penalty is forfeiture of all retirement and other benefits, except accrued
leaves.

Such is the situation in this administrative matter initiated against Judge Godofredo B. Abul,
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, in which
the complaint charged him with extortion committed against prison inmates detained for violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

Antecedents

On April 7, 2015, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the letter sent by Rev. Father
Antoni A. Saniel, Director of the Prison Ministry of the Diocese of Butuan,1 denouncing the
extortionate activities committed by Judge Abul against the detainees of the Provincial Jail of
Agusan.2 Allegedly, Judge Abul had demanded money ranging from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 in
exchange for the detainees' release from jail or the dismissal of the criminal cases.3 Father Saniel
submitted with his letter the affidavits of Hazel D. Reyes (Reyes)4 and Anna Marie B. Montilla
(Montilla) that attested to the extortion activities of Judge Abul.

In her affidavit, Reyes claimed that she was an "asset" of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA); that Judge Abul had extorted money from detainees accused of and undergoing trial for
drug-related charges in exchange for their liberty; that a certain Naomi Saranggani, the wife of a
detainee, had approached and asked her if she wanted her criminal case to be dismissed; that
Saranggani had told her that Judge Abul summoned her to look for detainees facing drug-related
charges who wanted their cases to be favorably resolved; that Saranggani had told her and Montilla
that they should start raising money totalling P200,000.00 to pay Judge Abul; and that Montilla had
related that when she attended her December 5, 2014 hearing, Judge Abul asked for her cellphone
number so that they could directly communicate with each another.

On her part, Montilla averred that she had met Saranggani on November 4, 2014 when the latter
went to the Agusan del Norte Provincial Jail to await the release of her husband, Walid Saranggani;
that Saranggani had asked if she (Montilla) had wanted to be released from prison herself because
Judge Abul could arrange her release in exchange for the sum of P200,000.00; that Saranggani had
then used her phone to call someone whom she kept addressing as "judge;" that Saranggani had
then handed the phone to her to talk to the person, who introduced himself as Judge Abul, and
asked if she could pay P100,000.00 in exchange for her release; that she had later on personally
met Judge Abul during her scheduled hearing on December 5, 2014, and he had told her that they
should help one another because she could be convicted based on the document that she had
signed; that Judge Abul had asked her phone number in case he would want to see her after her
release; that Saranggani had intimated to her that they paid P250,000.00 to Judge Abul to secure
the release of her husband; and that she had learned through Saranggani that Judge Abul had also
been instrumental in the release of other prisoners after they had paid him.

Investigation and Report

of the Judicial Audit Team

The OCA conducted a fact-finding investigation of the complaint filed by Father Saniel through a
team led by Atty. Rullyn S. Garcia.5

The team interviewed Reyes and Montilla who confirmed their affidavits. Reyes and Montilla also
separately confirmed that in February 2015, Judge Abul arrived at the provincial jail and talked to
them; that Judge Abul asked Reyes to execute a disclaimer that he would prepare and that he would
ensure her release from detention; that as to Montilla, Judge Abul appeared to be annoyed by her
affidavit, and said to her that he would just inhibit but would see to it that she would be convicted.6

The team reviewed the records of Criminal Case No. 15630 charging Walid Saranggani, Shaira
Salic, Mike Saranggani and Ryan Umpa for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 and raffled
to the RTC Branch presided by respondent. The team concluded that Criminal Case No. 15630 had
been decided in haste and without regard to procedural rules that cast doubt on the regularity of the
acquittal of all accused.7

On February 28, 2017, the Court En Banc issued a resolution placing Judge Abul under preventive
suspension, and required him to comment on the complaint and the investigation report.8

Comment/Answer of Judge Abul

In his comment/answer,9 Judge Abul denied all the accusations, and insisted that the same were
false, baseless and concocted by an evil and malicious mind for the sole purpose of besmirching his
unblemished record of service in the Judiciary. He maintained that Fr. Saniel had no personal
knowledge of the alleged extortion activities; that the declarations of Reyes and Montilla were not
based on their personal knowledge and were thus inadmissible against him; that he did not go to the
provincial jail to confront Reyes and Montilla, but only to talk to the jail warden to inquire if the
prisoners were being allowed to leave jail; that the affidavits of Reyes and Montilla had been
notarized before notary public Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, but the representative of the latter had stated
that said affidavits were not notarized by Atty. Poculan; and that it was improbable for him to
demand money from Reyes and Montilla considering that they had appeared to have no visible
income to support themselves.

Pending review of this administrative case, the Court received the letter from the respondent's wife
dated September 13, 2017 informing about Judge Abul's demise.10 Subsequently, the counsel for
the late judge filed a Notice of Death and Motion to Dismiss,11 praying for the dismissal of the
complaint in view of the respondent's death and the punitive nature of the administrative liabilities.12

OCA Report and Recommendation

On February 20, 2018, the OCA submitted its report,13 and recommended therein as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend for the consideration of the Honorable

Court that:
 1. The motion to dismiss filed by respondent Judge's counsel, Atty. Teristram B. Zoleta,
be DENIED for lack of merit; and

2. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del
Norte, be ADJUDGED GUILTY of grave misconduct constituting violations of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and FINED in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement gratuity.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14

The OCA disagreed with the urging of the respondent's counsel to dismiss the complaint in view of
his intervening demise, observing:

It has been settled that the death of a respondent does not preclude a finding of administrative
liability. However, it may necessitate the dismissal of the case upon a consideration of the following
factors: first, if the respondent's right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of
exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds equitable and humanitarian reasons;
and third, the kind of penalty imposed.

In this case, none of the foregoing factors exists. First, respondent Judge's right to due process was
not violated. As borne by the records, he was duly informed of the accusations against him, having
been furnished with a copy of the letter-complaint of Fr. Saniel and its attached affidavits, as well as
a copy of the investigation report of Atty. Garcia. In fact, he filed his comment thereon, which the
Court received on 19 April. 2017. Second, his death alone is insufficient to justify the dismissal of the
case on the ground of equitable or humanitarian consideration. A case was ordered dismissed by
the Court by reason of the respondent's death for equitable and humanitarian considerations as the
liability was incurred by reason of respondent's poor health. In this case, there was no circumstance
other than respondent Judge's death that may warrant the invocation of equitable or humanitarian
ground in his favor. Third, the penalty of fine may still be imposed notwithstanding his death. In fact,
in one case, the respondent who died before the investigating judge was able to finish and submit
his report but was duly notified of the proceedings against him and was directed to file his answer,
although he opted not to comply therewith, was still meted the penalty of forfeiture of his retirement
benefits, except his accrued leave credits, after having been found guilty of grave misconduct.15

The OCA found that the allegations against Judge Abul had been confirmed and validated by Judge
Abul himself and by the court records; that the affidavits of Reyes and Montilla had appeared to be
credible in light of Judge Abul's inability to impute any ill-motive, malice or bad faith to the accusers;
and that based on the results of the investigation Judge Abul had violated Canon 2, Canon 3 and
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary in a manner that amounted
to grave misconduct.16

Issue

Did Judge Abul's actuations amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary?

Ruling of the Court

We adopt the findings of the OCA but modify its recommendation.

Based on the sworn declarations of Reyes and Montilla, as well as the court records of Criminal
Case No. 15630, there appeared to be sufficient grounds to hold Judge Abul administratively liable
for extortion as charged against him. Consequently, the Court concurs with the following
observations of the OCA, viz.:

Going into the merits of the case, it may be true that some of the statements made by Reyes and
Montilla in their respective affidavits and before Atty. Garcia were not necessarily based on their own
personal knowledge since they were just mostly conveyed to them by Naomi. Nonetheless, these
statements cannot simply be brushed aside as hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence
against respondent Judge. It bears stressing that some of these statements were confirmed and
validated by respondent Judge himself and by the records of Criminal Case No. 15630.

First, Reyes and Montilla claimed that respondent Judge went to the Agusan del Norte Provincial Jail
on 4 or 5 February 2015, and this was admitted by respondent Judge, although he denied talking
with them since his supposed purpose in going there was merely to ask its Officer-In-Charge, Mr.
Antenorio, whether prisoners are allowed to leave the jail premises without the court's authority in
light of the complaint-affidavits of Reyes and Montilla against him that were executed before Atty.
Puculan on 13 January 2015. However, the positive assertion by Reyes and Montilla that he
personally talked with them inside the Provincial Warden's office is more credible than his bare
denial. Notably, Montilla claimed that it was Mr. Antenorio who convinced them to talk with
respondent Judge. If, indeed, he did not purposely talk with Reyes and Montilla, he could have easily
obtained an affidavit or statement from Mr. Antenorio to refute such allegation, but he conveniently
failed to do so.

Second, the allegation of Reyes that Naomi told her and Montilla that the drugs case against her
(Naomi's) husband and his co-accused was dismissed by respondent Judge on 24 November 2014,
as well as the allegation of Montilla that Naomi went to the Provincial Jail sometime in November
2014 to fetch her husband and relatives after they were acquitted by respondent Judge, are not
without factual basis. As borne by the records of Criminal Case No. 15630, the Decision acquitting
the accused in said case was promulgated on 24 November 2014 without the presence of all the
accused, even if such presence is required under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thereby making it necessary for Naomi to fetch her husband and his co-accused from the
Provincial Jail. The consistency between the statements of Reyes and Montilla and the
circumstances of said case, as borne by the records, makes the allegations of Reyes and Montilla
credible.

It bears stressing that respondent Judge was furnished with a copy of the Investigation Report dated
10 February 2017 of Atty. Garcia, where said statements and circumstances of the subject criminal
case were clearly outlined. It was also stated therein that Reyes claimed that Naomi told her that her
husband and his co-accused obtained a favorable decision after paying respondent Judge the
amount of Php 250,000.00. Atty. Garcia characterized the proceedings in the same criminal case as
a "patent irregularity" since respondent Judge "decided it with undue haste and without due regard to
the procedural rules, resulting in the questionable acquittal of all the accused" However, despite the
gravity of the irregularity imputed to him and despite being required to comment thereon, respondent
Judge offered not a single word to refute the findings and observations of Atty. Garcia, thereby
giving the impression that respondent Judge has admitted such findings and observations.

The foregoing circumstances render the allegations of Reyes and Montilla not only admissible in
evidence but also convincing, especially so that respondent Judge failed to offer any plausible
imputation of ill motive, malice or bad faith on their part to make any false accusation against him.
Montilla claims that she negotiated with respondent Judge over the phone regarding the amount he
was asking in exchange for the dismissal of her case in the presence of Reyes and Naomi. Reyes
corroborated Montilla's statement, having overheard the conversation between respondent Judge
and Montilla as the phone was set on speaker mode. Montilla further claims that during the
scheduled hearing of her case on 5 December 2014, respondent Judge called her to the lawyer's
table, and admonished her for asking that the Php 200,000.00 she was supposed to pay him be
reduced even if the affidavit she executed showed that she is guilty.17

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of every whiff of
impropriety not only in regard to his discharge of judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his
office and even as a private individual.18 Indeed, judges should be extra prudent in associating with
litigants and counsel who have matters pending before them in order to avoid even the mere
perception of possible bias or partiality. They should be scrupulously careful with respect to pending
or prospective litigations before them to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that
their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must they
possess proficiency in law but they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure
litigants and their counsel, with great comfort, of the judges' competence, integrity and
independence.19

In view of this, whether or not Judge Abul really demanded money in exchange for either the liberty
of Reyes and Montilla or the dismissal of the criminal case filed against them even became
immaterial herein. By simply meeting and talking with them as the accused whose cases were then
pending in his sala, Judge Abul already transgressed ethical norms and compromised his integrity
and impartiality as the trial judge. His actuations flagrantly violated the following norms and canons
of The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, to wit:

CANON 2
Integrity

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

xxxx

CANON 3
Impartiality

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision to made.

SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

xxxx

CANON 4
Propriety

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

xxxx

As regards the acquittal of the accused in Criminal Case No. 15630, the Court agrees with and
adopts the following relevant findings thereon by the OCA, to wit:

While there was no direct evidence that respondent Judge was paid Php 250,000.00 in
consideration for the acquittal of all the accused in Criminal Case No. 15630, the highly questionable
circumstances surrounding their acquittal on reasonable doubt give credence to the allegation of
corruption against him. The decision was premature and grossly unprocedural, the same being in
violation of Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. Notably, he allowed the accused to manipulate
the proceedings when he unduly acted favorably on their memorandum praying for their acquittal
despite the vehement opposition thereto of the prosecution, correctly pointing out that the same
could not be treated as demurrer to evidence having been filed out of time. Worse, without
considering the merits of the prosecution's opposition to the memorandum despite its legal and
logical soundness, he submitted the case for decision by merely stating in his order that "the defense
has filed a memorandum indicating that they (sic) are submitting the case for decision based on
prosecution's evidence and the prosecution has submitted its comment." With extraordinary and
undue speed, he penned the decision on the same day that the case was submitted for decision,
and he promulgated the decision without the presence of the accused in violation of Section 6, Rule
120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Plainly enough, Judge Abul's actuations and behavior constituted grave misconduct. It is settled that
grave misconduct exists where the requisites of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule are present. As an element of grave misconduct, corruption consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.20

Judge Abul's death intervened in the meantime. Nonetheless, and as recommended by the OCA, his
death should not result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint. In Gonzales v.
Escalona,21 we held that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had meanwhile ceased to hold office. Verily, jurisdiction over the case or
subject matter, once acquired, continues until final resolution. With more reason is this true herein
because Judge Abul was fully afforded due process during the investigation.

Worth noting is that the Court already sternly warned Judge Abul in Calo v. Judge Abul, Jr.22 "to be
more circumspect in issuing orders which must truly reflect the actual facts they represent to obviate
engendering views of partiality among others." The warning evidently fell on deaf ears in view of the
clear showing that Judge Abul still committed another serious offense.

It is now time to impose the stiffer penalty on him.

Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, grave misconduct constituting violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious offense that results in dismissal from the service, forfeiture
of all or part of the benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reappointment or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except accrued leave
credits.23

Had Judge Abul not died, he would have been meted the extreme penalty of dismissal, with the
concomitant forfeiture of all retirement and allied benefits due to him, except accrued leaves, as an
accessory penalty. Considering that his intervening death has rendered his dismissal no longer
feasible, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of all such retirement and allied benefits, except accrued
leaves, then becomes the viable sanction.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES the late Presiding Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. of
Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT; and, accordingly, FORFEITS all benefits, including retirement gratuity, exclusive of
his accrued leaves, which shall be released to his legal heirs.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.M. No. RTJ-21-006 [Formerly OCA IPI-18-4802-RTJ], March 15, 2021 ]

ZAHARA PENDATUN MAULANA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE OSCAR P. NOEL, JR.,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 35, GENERAL SANTOS CITY, SOUTH COTABATO,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This resolves the Complaint1 filed by Zahara Pendatun Maulana (complainant) against respondent
Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, General Santos
City, South Cotabato.

Complainant alleged that she is one of the respondents in the case entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Misuari Matabalo Brahim and Fatima Zahara [Pendatun] Maulana," where she was
charged with violation of Republic Act No. 10591 (RA 10591), or An Act Providing for a
Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunition and Providing Penalties for Violations.2 The
firearms involved in the case were seized by virtue of Search Warrant Nos. 17-983 and 17-994 by
the law enforcers, which were issued by respondent Judge on July 11, 2017.

While searching the house of complainant located at Block 2, Lot 19, Phase I, Dona Soledad
Subdivision, Barangay Labangal, General Santos City, the following seized firearms were identified:
one (1) unit caliber 40 pistol HS with SN W50706; one (1) unit MS Parabellum 9mm caliber pistol
with SN R59108; one (1) unit caliber 380 (Pietro beretta) Italy made with SN E48994Y; several live
ammunition for M14 rifles; and several magazines containing live ammunition for M16 rifles.5

On September 25, 2017, the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) of General Santos City issued a
Resolution6 dismissing the complaint for violation of RA 10591 against complainant "for Lack of
Evidence and/or Probable Cause"7 citing the Certification8 dated September 14, 2017 obtained by
the OCP from the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) which indicated that complainant is the
licensed/registered holder of one (1) unit caliber 40 pistol HS with SN W50706, while Misuri
Matabalao Brahim (Brahim), complainant's corespondent in the above-cited criminal case, is the
licensed/registered holder of one (1) unit MS Parabellum 9mm caliber pistol with SN R59108.

As for the one (1) unit caliber 380 (Pietro beretta) Italy-made with SN E48994Y, the prosecutor found
that although the said firearm was covered by a mere Letter Order and Acknowledgment Receipt of
Equipment (ARE),9 it was not one of the items stated in Search Warrant Nos. 17-98 and 17-99.

With respect to the live ammunition for M14 rifles and magazines containing live ammunition for M16
rifles, the prosecutor found reasonable ground to believe that they were "government issued
properties under the custody of Corporal Danny K. Mingka in the performance of his duties as
member of the Philippine Army and who was a detailed security"10 of complainant.

Complainant's counsel thus filed a Motion to Release Seized Items11 dated September 29, 2017
praying for the release of the seized firearms to their respective owners. Prior to the scheduled
hearing of the said motion on November 16, 2017, respondent Judge allegedly directed complainant
to proceed to his chambers and asked her to shoulder the amount of P300,000.00 representing the
expenses that will be incurred which he, his court personnel, and the government prosecutor will
incur when they travel to Camp Crame, Manila, to personally verify licenses for the subject
firearms.12 During the actual hearing, complainant's counsel, instead, moved for the withdrawal of
the Motion to Release Seized Items.13

In open court, however, respondent Judge allegedly made it appear that it was complainant who
moved for respondent Judge and his court personnel to have the licenses personally verified, and
offered to shoulder their travel expenses. Thus, in an Order14 dated November 16, 2017,
respondent Judge granted the supposed prayer of complainant, thus:

x x x x movant prayed that the Court as well as his personnel and the government prosecutor in
order to expedite the proceedings of the case to go to Camp Crame and personally verify the
records of the movant with the said office as well as the authenticity of their license, with the
undertaking to shoulder the expenses of the same. There being no objection on the part of the
government prosecutor, the motion is hereby GRANTED. x x x x15

In his Comment16 dated May 11, 2018, respondent Judge clarified that he issued the November 16,
2017 Order based on the manifestation of complainant's counsel during the hearing of the Motion to
Release Seized Items. In particular, he maintained that during the hearing, complainant's counsel
requested the court and court personnel, including the government prosecutor, to personally verify
the authenticity of the seized firearms and their licenses at complainant's expense.17 Respondent
judge presented the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken during the hearing. He also
pointed out that complainant did not file any motion for reconsideration or amendment of the
November 16, 2017 Order.18

Respondent also emphasized that complainant failed to submit to the court a copy of the License to
Own and Possess Firearm (LTOPF) with respect to one (1) unit caliber 380 (Pietro beretta) Italy-
made with SN E48994Y, and that the ARE pertaining to the said seized firearm was not the LTOPF
which would thus warrant its release to complainant Respondent judge disclaimed any fault in the
delay of the release of the seized firearms, claiming that any such delay is attributable to
complainant's failure to submit the proper documents requested by the court.19

In his Supplemental Comment20 dated June 8, 2018, respondent further clarified that complainant
presented a mere photocopy of the September 14, 2017 Certification from the FEO. However, when
the original was submitted, several inconsistencies were observed in the signatures therein,
including the brand of firearm it referred to.21 Anent the allegation that he demanded
PhP300,000.00 from complainant prior to the November 16, 2017 hearing, respondent vehemently
denied the same, claiming that he could not possibly make such a demand in his chambers when
the conversations could be easily overheard by the court staff.22

On August 16, 2018, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an Affidavit of
Desistance dated August 9, 2018 allegedly executed by complainant where she manifested that she
completely and absolutely exonerates respondent of any liability.23 In particular, complainant
claimed in her affidavit that "she was greatly mistaken in her perception of the facts and the
surrounding circumstances that led her to believe that respondent committed the acts she
complained of."24

Complainant also admitted in her affidavit that she, in fact, personally asked her counsel to pray in
open court that she was willing to pay P300,000.00 for the personal verification of the authenticity of
licenses relative to the seized firearms. To verify the authenticity of the affidavit, the OCA contacted
complainant to confirm if she, in fact, executed the same, to which she replied in the negative.25
Due to the varying factual accounts of complainant and respondent prior and during the hearing on
November 16, 2017, and complainant's Affidavit of Desistance dated August 9, 2018, the OCA, in its
Report26 dated May 22, 2019, recommended to this Court that the instant complaint be referred to
the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City Station for further investigation.

In a Resolution27 dated July 31, 2019, this Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, referred the
administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro Station,
for investigation, report, and recommendation. The complaint was eventually raffled to Associate
Justice Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale as Investigating Justice.

Findings of the Investigating Justice:

Notably, during the January 13, 2020 hearing before the Investigating Justice, complainant
confirmed the filing of her affidavit stating her desistance in the administrative charge against
respondent.28 In this regard, the Investigating Justice, in her Report29 dated January 24, 2020,
found that:

From the foregoing, it is clearly shown that complainant freely and voluntarily executed her affidavit
of desistance. Her conscience bothered her when things got out of hand because she merely
wanted to secure the release of her two firearms. When asked twice about the effect of her
desistance, she stated that she wants the court to dismiss the administrative complaint against
respondent.30

During the January 13, 2020 hearing before the Investigating Justice, complainant attested to the
veracity of the contents of her affidavit and confirmed all statements therein. After ascertaining that
complainant freely executed the Affidavit of Desistance, the Investigating Justice recommended
posthaste the dismissal of the administrative charge against respondent.31 In a Resolution32 dated
June 10, 2020, this Court referred the January 24, 2020 Report of the Investigating Justice to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

Report and Recommendation of the OCA:

In its Memorandum33 dated November 19, 2020, the OCA disagreed with the recommendation of
the Investigating Justice. The OCA explained that the desistance of complainant did not necessarily
warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent.

The OCA then found that respondent breached the norms and standards of the court, and
committed gross ignorance of the rules when he issued his November 16, 2017 Order.34 The OCA
stressed that it is not the duty of respondent to personally verify the authenticity of the certification
submitted to him, and that respondent only had to rely on the Certification of the FEO and the ARE
submitted by complainant in deciding the issue of possession or non-possession of valid licenses for
the seized firearms.35

The OCA thus found respondent liable for gross ignorance of the law, and recommended that he be
"fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.000) [with warning] that a commission of any of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely."36

Our Ruling

We agree with the findings of the OCA but with modification as to the recommended penalty.
The complaint should not be dismissed solely on the basis of complainant's affidavit of desistance.

The recommendation of the Investigating Justice to dismiss the complaint was solely grounded on
the complainant's affidavit of desistance and her predisposition to have the administrative case
against respondent dismissed as testified by her during the January 13, 2020 hearing before the
Investigating Justice. Unfortunately, the Investigating Justice's Report contained no discussion
whatsoever on the facts and issues presented for investigation and evaluation.

On this score, we agree with the OCA that the complaint against respondent should not be
dismissed on the basis of the affidavit of desistance alone. This Court has always held that the
withdrawal of a complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not necessarily warrant the
dismissal of an administrative complaint.37 Thus, in Escalona v. Padillo,38 we held that:

No affidavit of desistance can divest this Court of its jurisdiction under Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against erring officials and employees of the
judiciary. The issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action
against the respondent, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of the
courts. Neither can the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainant's
whims. To rule otherwise would undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel. The
people, whose faith and confidence in their government and its instrumentalities need to be
maintained, should not be made to depend upon the whims and caprices of complainants who, in a
real sense, are only witnesses. Administrative actions are not made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. Such unilateral act does
not bind this Court on a matter relating to its disciplinary power.39

Thus, the fact that herein complainant manifested before the Investigating Justice that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case does not, as a matter of course, warrant the automatic
dismissal of an administrative case against respondent, more so in the instant case where
respondent appears to have admitted certain material allegations in the complaint filed against him.

Respondent committed gross ignorance of procedural rules when he issued the November 16, 2017
Order.

After careful evaluation of the facts presented, this Court finds merit in the administrative complaint
filed against respondent notwithstanding the subsequent desistance of complainant.

There is no question at this point that despite complainant's submission of the ARE and Certification
dated September 14, 2017 from the FEO certifying that complainant and Brahim are the
licensed/registered holders of the seized firearms,40 herein respondent did not grant
complainant's Motion to Release Seized Items.

Respondent, instead, issued the November 16, 2017 Order, thereby authorizing himself, the court
personnel and the government prosecutor to personally verify the authenticity of the firearm licenses
at Camp Crame at the expense of complainant. To justify the propriety of the November 16, 2017
Order, respondent asserts his doubts on the authenticity of the September 14, 2017 Certification of
the FEO, and the inadequacy of the ARE submitted by complainant.

OCA Circular No. 11-2011,41 citing Del Rosario vs. People,42 provides that certifications issued by
the FEO Records Section are sufficient proof of the fact of possession or non-possession of a valid
license to own or possess firearms or explosives in the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms.
OCA Circular No. 11-2011 further states that personal appearances of FEO records personnel is not
required in order to establish the authenticity of FEO-issued certifications.
This only means that FEO-issued certifications are sufficient evidence, and thus, should be accepted
by the courts in determining the presence or absence of a valid license or permit to own or possess
firearms.

Accordingly, it is not the duty of respondent to personally verify the authenticity of the September 14,
2017 Certification of the FEO, or the firearm licenses of complainant and Brahim. Neither is
respondent enjoined by the rules to travel from General Santos City to Camp Crame, Quezon City to
do the same.

Anent the ARE submitted by complainant pertaining to the caliber .380 Pietro beretta, it has already
been established that the seized firearm was not one of the items particularly stated in Search
Warrant Nos. 17-98 and 17-99.

It was thus highly irregular, if not anomalous, for respondent to issue the November 16, 2017 Order. 1a⍵⍴h!

1If indeed respondent found the ARE inadequate, or doubted the authenticity of the September 14,
2017 Certification of the FEO on the basis of the alleged unusual signature of the Chief of its
Records Section, or that it indicated a different firearm, respondent could have simply required
complainant to submit another and/or original FEO certification for the seized firearms.

At this point, there is no definitive finding that respondent himself urged complainant to shoulder the
expenses for verification of the firearm licenses in the amount of P300,000.00.

However, even granting, without admitting, that it was complainant's counsel who requested the
court to personally verify the authenticity of the seized firearms and their licenses at complainant's
expense, it should have been denied by respondent as there was no ground for him to grant such
motion and issue his November 16, 2017 Order. Not only does the issuance thereof demonstrate his
gross ignorance of the rules, this also casts doubt on his integrity and probity as a member of the
Judiciary.

As regards the recommended penalty, we deem it appropriate to impose a penalty of suspension

from office without salary and any benefits for three (3) months instead of a fine of P20,000.00 as
recommended by the OCA, with stem warning that a commission of the same or similar infraction
will merit a harsher penalty.

Time and time again, this Court emphasized that a Judge is at all times duty bound to render just,
correct and impartial decisions in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.43

WHEREFORE, Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos
City, South Cotabato is hereby SUSPENDED from office for three (3) months without salary and any
benefits, with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 3288

MERCURIA D. SO, Complainant

vs.
MA. LUCILLE P. LEE, Respondent
*

RESOLUTION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Subject of this Resolution are the October 9, 2017 and March 15, 2019 Petitions to Retake the
1 2

Lawyer's Oath and to Sign the Roll of Attorneys of Ma. Lucille P. Lee (Lee), one of the successful
examinees of the 2016 Bar Examinations.

Factual Antecedents

On May 19, 2017, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from Mercuria D. So (So)
3

alleging that Lee is a defendant in Civil Case No. 740 and is not fit for admission to the Bar
considering her irresponsible attitude towards her monetary obligations. Attached in the said letter
was a copy of the Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money So had filed against Lee.
4

In her Comment, Lee claimed that she was unaware of the pendency of Civil Case No. 740 as she
5

learned of it only when she registered for the oath taking. She admitted that she obtained a
₱200,000.00 loan from So but had already paid a total of ₱140,000.00 for 10 months. Lee explained
that due to the losses her business suffered, she failed to pay the subsequent monthly payments.
She pointed out that she did not intend to evade her obligation to So, but had asked the latter to give
her ample time to settle it.

In its July 11, 2017 Report, the OBC noted that Lee was an applicant of the 2016 Bar Examinations
6

and in her application, she declared that a civil case was filed against her on January 29, 2014
docketed as Civil Case No. 1436 titled "Nonoy Bolos v. Ma Lucille Lee Jao" for collection of sum of
money. It highlighted that Civil Case No. 1436 pertained to the several loans Lee had incurred with
Joseph "Nonoy" Bolos (Bolos) in the aggregate amount of ₱1,450,000.00."

In its August 1, 2017 Resolution, the Court held in abeyance Lee's request to be allowed to sign the
7

Roll of Attorneys in view of the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436, and required her to
manifest the status of the aforementioned cases.

In her October 2017 petition, Lee manifested that Civil Case No. 740 had been dismissed in view of
the Compromise Agreement she had entered into with So. She manifested that she already paid So
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the approved Compromise Agreement. 8

In her March 2019 petition, Lee reiterated the dismissal of Civil Case No. 740 and the satisfaction of
her obligation in accordance with the Compromise Agreement with So. In addition, she noted that a
Judgment by Compromise had been issued dismissing Civil Case No. 1436 in view of the
Compromise Agreement she had executed with Bolos. It was agreed upon that Lee would pay Bolos
at least ₱15,000.00 a month starting one month after she signs the Roll of Attorneys. 9
In its March 28, 2019 Report, the OBC recommended that Lee be allowed to retake the Lawyer's
10

Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the condition that she inform the Court within one
month from the time she has made her first payment of ₱15,000.00 to Bolos and to inform the Court
upon full payment of the debt in accordance with the terms and conditions of the compromise.

The Issue

WHETHER LEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE

LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

The Court's Ruling

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. It is extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral
11

qualifications and the Court is duty-bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to
exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. Section 2,
12

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the minimum requirements applicants for the admission
to the Bar must possess, to wit:

SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission as
a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines, and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the depravity of private and
social duties that man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals. 13

Jurisprudence had deemed the following acts as crimes involving moral turpitude: abduction with
consent, bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery, profiteering, robbery, murder,
estafa, theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, issuance of bouncing checks, intriguing
against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury,
forgery, direct bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry,
blackmail, bribery, duelling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss
on insurance contract, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension
laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, falsification of public document, and estafa
through falsification of public document.14

Nevertheless, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. The determination whether there is
15

moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances. In
16

turn, it is for the Court to ultimately resolve whether an act constitutes moral turpitude. In the same
17

vein, not all civil cases pertain to acts involving moral turpitude. As defined, acts tainted with moral
turpitude are of such gravity that manifests an individual's depravity or lack of moral fiber.

As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees
to take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases
involve acts evincing moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of each case should be taken
into account to establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. If it were otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession
would be seriously jeopardized by the expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect
one's moral character.

Thus, the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not enough reason to prevent
her from taking her Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The existence of these civil
cases alone does not establish that she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude.

It is equally important to note that all civil cases filed against Lee had been dismissed on account of
the compromise she entered into with her creditors. Thus, there is no longer any obstacle which may
hinder her in officially becoming a member of the Bar by taking her oath and signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.

Nevertheless, Lee must still satisfactorily exhibit that she would not renege on her monetary
obligations to Bolos. As above-mentioned, Civil Case No. 1436 was dismissed after Lee had agreed
to enter into a compromise with Bolos and set the terms and conditions for her to settle her monetary
obligation. There is no question that Lee owes Bolos a sum of money.

It must be remembered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year suspension from the practice of law. After taking
18

her Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys, Lee would be a full-fledged member of the
legal profession and subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court. This is true even if there
would be no complainants, as the Court may motu proprio initiate disciplinary
proceedings. Concomitantly, she is bound to act in a manner consistent with the high standards
19

imposed on lawyers — otherwise, she could be subjected to administrative sanctions. The

requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, but a continuing requirement for membership in the legal profession. 20

In sum, the pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar examinees to take their
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless the same involves acts or omissions which had
been previously determined by the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude. This is of course without
prejudice to the filing of any administrative action against would-be lawyers who fail to continue to
possess the required moral fitness of members of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
to ALLOW Ma. Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to
the condition that she: (a) notify the Court within one (1) month from making her first monthly
payment to Joseph Bolos; and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her monetary obligation
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the January 29, 2019 Judgment by Compromise.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10938, October 08, 2019

EDITHA M. FRANCIA, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. QUIRINO SAGARIO,

RESPONDENT

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 filed by Editha M. Francia
(complainant) against the respondent, Atty. Quirino Sagario (Atty. Sagario), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
failing to file the petition for annulment despite receiving his legal fees.

The Facts

Sometime in 2009, complainant contracted the services of Atty. Sagario to handle the
annulment of her marriage to her husband, Jose Francia. Atty. Sagario agreed to
represent her for a total fee of PhP 70,000.00. In accordance with their agreement,
complainant paid Atty. Sagario an initial payment of PhP 30,000.00 on December 14,
2009 for which the latter issued an acknowledgment receipt. On January 20, 2010,
complainant again paid Atty. Sagario PhP 20,000.00 upon the latter's assurance that he
would soon file the petition for annulment of her marriage. Atty. Sagario again issued a
written acknowledgment for the said payment. During a subsequent meeting held on
February 6, 2010, complainant paid another PhP 7,000.00 to Atty. Sagario who did not
issue any receipt this time reasoning that the amount would be used as filing fees and
representation expenses for the sheriff. After receipt of a total sum of PhP 57,000.00
from the complainant, Atty. Sagario avoided her phone calls and cancelled their
appointments. Atty. Sagario limited his communication with complainant through text
messages only. Despite several demands from complainant, Atty. Sagario did not file
the petition.

After six months had lapsed without Atty. Sagario having filed anything in court in
connection with complainant's annulment case, complainant asked him to just return
the total amount she had paid. In response, Atty. Sagario promised that he would
return the money he received from complainant but failed to do so despite several
repeated demands. Consequently, complainant filed a small claims case 2 against Atty.
Sagario before Branch 38 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.

Atty. Sagario failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings before the MeTC despite
service of summons and notice of hearing. Thus, on October 19, 2010, the MeTC
ordered Atty. Sagario to pay complainant the amount of PhP 50,000.00 with interest.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing defendant Quirino Sagario to

return the amount of P50,000.00 to plaintiff Editha Macay Francia, plus legal rate of
interest of 12% per annum [from] August 26, 2010, the date of extra-judicial demand
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.3

Notwithstanding the MeTC's Decision ordering him to return the amount he received
from complainant, Atty. Sagario has yet to pay complainant the amount adjudged.
Complainant was compelled to bring the matter before the IBP.

Ruling of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report and Recommendation4 dated May 5, 2014, Investigating Commissioner

Salvador B. Belaro, Jr. (Commissioner Belaro, Jr.) recommended that Atty. Sagario be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Commissioner Belaro, Jr. found that:

"[Atty. Sagario] committed grave misconduct when he converted the money received
by him from the Complainant without filing the petition for annulment of marriage, let
alone further the cause of his client and represent her in court. His continuous inaction
and evasive attitude towards the client and the courts show the cavalier attitude of the
respondent and appalling indifference in willful disregard of the duties of a lawyer to his
client and to the legal profession."5

In Resolution No. XXI-2014-799 dated October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Belaro, Jr. that
Atty. Sagario be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation of
Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.02, Canon 17, and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Our Ruling

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds Atty. Sagario guilty of professional
misconduct for violating Canons 16, 17, and 18 of the CPR. The Court adopts the
findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Once a lawyer agrees to represent a client, he/she is duty-bound to exert his/her best
effort and to serve the latter with utmost diligence and competence. A lawyer owes
fidelity to his/her client's cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him/her. A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him/her by
his/her client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he/she must be held
administratively liable.6

The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently provides:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In this case, Atty. Sagario breached his duties to his client when he failed to exercise
due diligence in handling the annulment case of complainant. In fact, to the detriment
of complainant, he failed to render any legal service to her despite receipt of fees in the
total amount of PhP57,000.00. This constitutes a clear violation of Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the CPR.

Atty. Sagario also violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 17 when he
failed to return the amount of PhP 57,000.00 upon complainant's demand. The relevant
provisions of the CPR provide:

CANON 16 � A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 � A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

Rule 16.03 � A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x

CANON 17 � A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.7 In Maglente v. Agcaoili, Jr., 8 we held
that:

[W]hen a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same
must be immediately returned to the client. A lawyer's failure to return the money to
his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is
indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.

The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes upon the lawyer
the duty to account for the money received from his/her client. A lawyer's failure to
return upon demand the money he/she received from his/her client gives rise to the
presumption that he/she has appropriated the same for his/her own use. An attorney-
client relationship requires utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the
lawyer. In this case, Atty. Sagario clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a
member of the Bar.9

Moreover, Atty. Sagario did not bother to submit his response to the complaint before
the MeTC in the small claims action filed against him. To make matters worse, Atty.
Sagario did not even appear during the scheduled mandatory conference or file any
responsive pleading before the IBP despite due notice. Atty. Sagario's failure or refusal
to answer the complaint against him and to appear at the mandatory hearings before
the MeTC and the IBP are manifestations of his stubborn, disobedient, and disrespectful
attitude toward lawful orders of the court and illustrate his willful disregard for his oath
of office.10
Having established his administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper
penalty to be imposed upon Atty Sagario. In similar cases where a lawyer neglects
his/her client's case despite receipt of legal fees and fails to return the latter's money
despite demand, the Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.

In Rollon v. Naraval,11 the Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for two (2) years for the lawyer's failure to render any legal service despite receipt
of legal fees. In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the recommendation of the
IBP that Atty. Sagario be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
two (2) years.

Considering the pronouncement of the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38, directing Atty.
Sagario to return the amount he received from the complainant, this Court will refrain
from making further discussion or ruling on said issue.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Quirino Sagario is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and
16.03 of Canon 16, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, Atty. Quirino Sagario is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years effective immediately with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 12071, March 11, 2020 ]

JONATHAN C. PARUNGAO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. DEXTER B. LACUANAN,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

The present administrative case arose from a Disbarment Complaint initiated by Jonathan C.
Parungao (Jonathan) against respondent Atty. Dexter B. Lacuanan (Lacuanan) before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD
Case No. 13-4044, for representing conflicting interests.

In his Complaint, Jonathan alleged that he was introduced by his wife, Mary Grace, to Atty.
Lacuanan in 2007. Since then, Atty. Lacuanan had served as Jonathan's counsel in several
transactions which involved either Jonathan alone or both Jonathan and Mary Grace (Spouses
Parungao). In 2008, Jonathan, who was then still engaged in the buy and sell business, consulted
Atty. Lacuanan regarding the collection of payment from a client. Thereafter, he retained Atty.
Lacuanan's services and paid his professional fees amounting to P3,000.00 for consultation or
conference. In 2009, Jonathan had a pending application for dealership with Chevron, and Atty.
Lacuanan submitted a proposal for a retainer agreement for the said business with a retainer fee of
P5,000.00, but such agreement did not push through. In March 2011, the Spouses Parungao availed
of Atty. Lacuanan's services for the purchase of a lot from the Metropolitan Banking and Trust
Company (Metrobank). The Deed of Absolute Sale for the said lot was executed on May 13, 2011
between Metrobank as vendor and the Spouses Parungao as vendees. Atty. Lacuanan also had to
verify with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96 the existence of a purported
writ of possession for the same lot. For this engagement, Atty. Lacuanan was paid P2,000.00 per
appearance. In addition, Atty. Lacuanan, using his letterhead, drafted and signed a demand letter
dated November 2, 2011 on behalf of his client, Jonathan, addressed to one Remedios S. Espela
(Espela), requiring Espela to pay the P35,000.00 estimated cost of the necessary repairs on the
defective Toyota Fortuner which Espela sold to Jonathan or otherwise, to give back the entire
amount of consideration paid by Jonathan for the said vehicle upon return of its possession to her.

According to Jonathan, more than just a professional relationship, a friendship also developed
between him and Atty. Lacuanan. Atty. Lacuanan dined several times with him and his wife in
Greenhills, San Juan. Atty. Lacuanan even visited Jonathan's car showroom in Dampa, Libis.
Jonathan had confided with Atty. Lacuanan details regarding his personal life, family, and even
about his marriage.

Jonathan further narrated that by February 2013, his marriage with Mary Grace was encountering
serious problems. Jonathan was suddenly served with a subpoena from the Office of the City
1âшphi1

Prosecutor of Quezon City requiring him to attend the preliminary investigation hearings scheduled
on May 22 and June 6, 2013 of the Criminal Complaint for Concubinage, Physical Injury, and Threat,
in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,1 filed against him by Mary Grace. Jonathan was
surprised that Atty. Lacuanan attended the said hearings before the Assistant City Prosecutor as
counsel for Mary Grace. Subsequently, in September 2013, Jonathan received Summons dated
August 30, 2013 with the attached Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by Mary Grace,
through her counsel, Atty. Lacuanan, and docketed as R-QZN-13-02668 before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 107.
Based on the foregoing allegations, Jonathan prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Lacuanan for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15.03 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), the Lawyer's Oath, and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. He
maintained that there was no severance of the attorney-client relationship between him and Atty.
Lacuanan and it had continued from the time they met in 2007 until the filing of the criminal
complaint against Jonathan before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. Jonathan argued in the
alternative that even if there was already a termination of the attorney-client relationship between
him and Atty. Lacuanan, the latter still committed the violations he was being charged within the
Disbarment Complaint as the lawyer's duty to protect his client's confidences extended beyond the
expiration of the professional employment. Jonathan asserted that during the time they got together,
whether for professional consultations or personal visits, he had confided to Atty. Lacuanan personal
matters which the latter could use against him in Mary Grace's criminal complaint and civil case. He
had not given Atty. Lacuanan any written consent to represent Mary Grace as counsel in the criminal
and civil proceedings against him.

Among the documentary evidence Jonathan submitted in support of his Disbarment Complaint were
a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 2011 between Metrobank and the Spouse
Parungao and the demand letter dated November 2, 2011 to Espela printed on Atty. Lacuanan's
letterhead and signed by Atty . Lacuanan to prove that said lawyer had previously rendered legal
services to Jonathan and his wife Mary Grace; and an Affidavit dated March 21, 2014 executed by
Leonora C. Parungao, Jonathan's mother, to corroborate Jonathan's assertion that Atty. Lacuanan
never asked for Jonathan's consent to represent Mary Grace as counsel in the criminal complaint
and civil case when they all met at the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

Atty. Lacuanan, for his part, admitted that he had been friends with Mary Grace since 2006 and that
Mary Grace introduced him to Jonathan in 2007. He denied, though, that he and Jonathan were
close friends and that the latter confided or divulged to him anything about his personal life and
marital affairs.

Atty. Lacuanan further contended that there was no standing attorney-client relationship between
him and Jonathan. He only rendered intermittent professional services to the Spouses Parungao
from 2008 to 2011, all relating to Jonathan's businesses. He pointed out that Jonathan himself could
particularly identify and prove only a couple of such transactions, the last one being way back in
2011. Even then, they had only met face-to-face around six times, since they communicated mostly
through cellphone or through Mary Grace. He maintained that there was no conflict of interest under
the purview of Rule 15.03 of the CPR because Jonathan was no longer his client at the time he
agreed to be Mary Grace's counsel in the criminal and civil proceedings against Jonathan; and more
importantly, he did not acquire any information, confidential or otherwise, which would be valuable or
material in the pending legal proceedings between the Spouses Parungao. The information as
regards Jonathan's standing, income, capacity to pay, assets and liabilities, and businesses - which
Jonathan claimed to be valuable in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Mary
Grace - were not confidential as these were all known to Mary Grace as Jonathan's wife. In addition,
Atty. Lacuanan argued that a lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client only when
the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of
the previous litigation in which he appeared for a former client. The demand letter he prepared for
Jonathan and the verification he made to check the legal intricacies of the sale of the lot from
Metrobank to the Spouses Parungao are totally alien, unrelated, and immaterial to Mary Grace's
criminal complaint and civil case against Jonathan.

In addition, Atty. Lacuanan avowed that he was not initially involved in Mary Grace's filing of the
criminal complaint for concubinage, physical injury, and threat against Jonathan at the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office on April 19, 2013 since he was out of the country from March 29 to April 29,
2013. Mary Grace only secured his professional services thereafter. He also recounted that at one
instance, he met Jonathan at the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office as regards Mary Grace's criminal
complaint and he took the opportunity to fully disclose to Jonathan about his possible legal
representation for Mary Grace in the said criminal proceedings as well as in the civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage which was then yet to be filed. Jonathan did not object and only
requested that Atty. Lacuanan convince Mary Grace not to pursue the criminal complaint. It was only
after making the full disclosure to Jonathan that Atty. Lacuanan accepted the engagement with Mary
Grace for the criminal and civil proceedings against Jonathan.

Atty. Lacuanan submitted Mary Grace's Affidavit dated January 9, 2014 to establish the
circumstances of his professional engagements with her for the criminal complaint and civil case
against Jonathan.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report and Recommendation2 dated May 19, 2014, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A.
Villamor generally adopted Atty. Lacuanan's allegations and arguments and ruled that no conflict of
interest existed in the present case. Thus, he recommended that Jonathan's charges against Atty.
Lacuanan be dismissed.

However, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2015-3193 on April 19, 2015,
which reads:

RESOLVED to REVERSE, as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", finding Respondent guilty of conflict of interest. Respondent being the
counsel to spouses Jonathan and Mary Grace Parungao in certain criminal and civil cases and is
thus proscribed from appearing as counsel for the wife, Mary Grace, or for the husband Complainant
herein, as the case may be, in cases where both parties are contending protagonists. Hence, Atty.
Dexter B. Lacuanan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.

In its Extended Resolution4 dated August 11, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors held that Atty.
Lacuanan was administratively liable on the basis of the following: (a) the rule prohibiting the
representation of conflicting interest covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used; (b)
Atty. Lacuanan's acceptance of the engagement with Mary Grace invited suspicion of unfaithfulness
and double dealing which led to the filing of the instant Disbarment Complaint; (c) Atty. Lacuanan's
actions in representing Mary Grace in the civil and criminal cases filed against Jonathan, a former
client, even if these cases were totally unrelated to Atty. Lacuanan's previous engagement with the
Spouses Parungao, were improper and constituted serious misconduct; (d) The termination of the
attorney-client relationship provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
in conflict with a former client because the client's confidence reposed on his attorney could not be
divested by the mere expediency of terminating the professional engagement; and (e) Atty.
Lacuanan likewise violated the duty imposed upon him as an attorney under Section 20(e), Rule 138
of the Rules of Court to maintain inviolate the confidence and, at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client.

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXII-2017-13075 dated April 20, 2017, denied Atty.
Lacuanan's Motion for Reconsideration.

Our Ruling
The Court resolves not to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. We hold that Atty.
Lacuanan is not guilty of representing conflicting interests and absolves him of all administrative
charges.

At the outset, the Court notes that based on evidence on record, when Atty. Lacuanan agreed in
2013 to represent Mary Grace as her legal counsel in the criminal and civil proceedings that the
latter instituted against her husband and herein complainant, Jonathan, there was no longer an
existing attorney-client relationship between Atty. Lacuanan and Jonathan. As Atty. Lacuanan avers,
his engagements with Jonathan were intermittent and limited. In particular, these involved facilitating
the sale of a lot by Metrobank to the Spouses Parungao and verifying the legal implications thereof;
plus drafting a demand-letter to Espela concerning a defective vehicle sold to Jonathan, both of
which took place in 2011. There was no standing retainer agreement between Atty. Lacuanan and
Jonathan. The Court shall keep these factual considerations in mind in resolving Jonathan's
Disbarment Complaint.

The prohibition against a lawyer representing conflicting interests is rooted in his duty to protect the
interest and confidence of his clients.

A member of the bar vows in the Lawyer's Oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best
of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his client. To ensure
the fidelity of a lawyer to his clients, Canon 15.03 of the CPR prescribes that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts[;]" while Canon 17 of the same Code mandates that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." Section 20(e) of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court likewise enjoins a lawyer "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client x x x."

A lawyer's duty to protect the interest and confidence of his client, together with the corollary
obligation not to represent interest in conflict or inconsistent with the same, extends even beyond the
end of his professional engagement with said client.

The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an

interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed
should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of
the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's
confidences acquired in the previous relation.6

In addition, "[t]he protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination
of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client."7

In Quiambao v. Bamba8 (Quiambao Case), the Court had the occasion to lay down the tests by
which it can be determined whether or not a conflict of interests exists:

Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts." This prohibition is founded on principles or public policy and good taste. ln the course of
a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including
the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep in violate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose. Developments
in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer's conduct lies within
this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there
is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the
lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment.9 (Emphasis supplied.)

Of the three tests identified above, the third test - with references to "new relation," "former client,"
and "previous employment" - specifically applies to a situation wherein the professional engagement
with the former client was already terminated when the lawyer entered into a new engagement with
the present client. It bears to stress that this test explicitly requires the lawyer's use against his
former client of "confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment."

The Court further categorically declared in Palm v. Iledan, Jr.10 that "[a] lawyer's immutable duty to
a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only
on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated."

Hence, for there to be conflicting interests when a former client is involved, the following
circumstances must concur: (a) the lawyer is called upon in his present engagement to make use
against a former client confidential information which was acquired through their connection or
previous employment, and (b) the present engagement involves transactions that occurred during
the lawyer's employment with the former client and matters that the lawyer previously handled for the
said client.

In contrast, when the opposing parties are both the lawyer's present clients, the prohibition on
conflicting interests is necessarily stricter and its extent broader, as reflected in the following
pronouncements of the Court in the Quiambao Case:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where

the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has
to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients
and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Canon 2 1 of the CPR, "[a] lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." It is settled that the mere relation of attorney
and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. Proof must be presented that the client
intended the communication to be confidential.12

In the case at bar, Jonathan failed to establish that Atty. Lacuanan has confidential information
which the latter acquired through their connection or previous employment and which can be used
against him in the pending civil and criminal proceedings instituted by Mary Grace. Jonathan
generally avers that in the course of their professional and personal relations, he had shared with
Atty. Lacuanan confidential information as regards his marital and family life as well as his
businesses and properties. However, these are merely his bare allegations, unsubstantiated by any
piece of evidence, and disputed by Atty. Lacuanan.

Relevant herein is the ruling of the Court in BSA Tower Condominium v. Reyes II13 placing the
burden of proof on the complainant to prove with substantial evidence the allegations in his
administrative complaint against a lawyer, thus:

The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, on the other
hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and
is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be
given credence. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

It was also completely unnecessary, and not to mention highly improbable, for Atty. Lacuanan to
have acquired knowledge of all of Jonathan's assets and businesses in order to carry out or
accomplish their previous engagements. To recall, Jonathan employed the services of Atty.
Lacuanan for two specific matters, i.e., to facilitate the sale of a lot from Metrobank to the Spouses
Parungao and draft a demand-letter concerning a defective vehicle sold to Jonathan. These are
apparently simple undertakings which Atty. Lacuanan could get done even with limited information.

Moreover, there is merit to Atty. Lacuanan's argument that the allegations of concubinage, grounds
for both the criminal and civil proceedings against Jonathan, are based on public records,
particularly, the final and executory Decision dated September 27, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. No. 70503, which recalled and set aside the Decision dated May 28, 1999 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, Branch 75, declaring null and void Jonathan's previous marriage to one Annaliza
Javellana-Parungao (Annaliza). The said Decision of the appellate court effectively upheld the
validity of Jonathan's previous marriage to Annaliza. Documents which are public records could not
be considered confidential.14

Finally, Mary Grace has employed th e services of Atty. Lacuanan as counsel for two legal
proceedings against Jonathan, viz., (a) the criminal complaint for concubinage, physical injury, and
threat, in relation to R.A. No. 9262; and (b) the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
significant events which led to the institution of said proceedings only took place from late 2012
onwards. It is being alleged in both proceedings that Jonathan separated from Mary Grace and left
the family dwelling in November 2012; that Mary Grace discovered in February 2013 that Jonathan
was already cohabiting with another woman; and that when Mary Grace chanced upon Jonathan
and his other woman on April 17, 2013, an altercation ensued between them, with Jonathan
ultimately inflicting physical injury on Mary Grace. The pending criminal and civil proceedings against
Jonathan in which Atty. Lacuanan now acts as counsel for Mary Grace evidently involve matters that
are totally distinct and unrelated to Atty. Lacuanan's previous two engagements with Jonathan,
which only pertained to the acquisition of a lot and a defective vehicle in 2011. Absent any showing
that said lot and vehicle still formed part of the current marital assets of the Spouses Parungao, they
have no material significance in the pending proceedings between the spouses.

WHEREFORE, the instant Disbarment Complaint of Jonathan C. Parungao against Atty. Dexter B.
Lacuanan is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 12631, July 08, 2020 ]

ATTY. FERNANDO P. PERITO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BERTRAND A. BATERINA, ATTY.

RYAN R. BESID, ATTY. RICHIE L. TIBLANI, AND ATTY. MARI KHRIS R. PAMMIT,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Fernando P. Perito (Atty. Perito) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against respondents Atty. Bertrand A. Baterina (Atty. Baterina), Atty.
Ryan R. Besid (Atty. Besid), Atty. Richie L. Tiblani (Atty. Tiblani), and Atty. Mari Khris R. Pammit
(Atty. Pammit).

The Facts

Atty. Perito was the lawyer for the accused in a kidnapping case entitled People v. Josephine and
Jason Bracamonte which was filed before Branch 169 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.
The case was initially filed by Antonio Galian (Galian) but he was later substituted by Geri Villa.
Respondents Attys. Baterina and Besid2 were the private prosecutors.3

During the reinvestigation of the kidnapping case, the Investigating Panel of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) issued a Resolution dated August 1, 2007 dismissing the charge against the
Bracamontes. Attys. Baterina and Besid, as Galian's counsels, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the DOJ dismissed in a Resolution dated September 27, 2007. Atty. Besid then filed a Petition
for Review4 before the Secretary of Justice.5

Meanwhile, in view of the DOJ's August 1, 2007 Resolution and the repeated failure of the private
complainant to appear despite due notice, the RTC issued an Order on September 17, 2007,
provisionally dismissing6 the case against the Bracamontes, but without prejudice to any motion for
reconsideration which may have been filed by the private prosecutors. Consequently, Attys. Baterina
and Besid filed a motion for reconsideration7 which the RTC denied in an Order dated December 17,
20078 for lack of conformity of the public prosecutor. Afterwards, Attys. Baterina and Besid filed a
Petition for Certiorari9 with the Court of Appeals (CA) with Dulce Hernandez (Dulce) (mother of the
alleged kidnap victim) as petitioner.10

On August 29, 2008, Attys. Baterina and Besid learned that the Bracamontes had filed a disbarment
case against them before the Court which was docketed as A.C. No. 7929. Suspecting that Atty.
Perito was behind the filing of said complaint, Atty. Baterina filed a countersuit for
disbarment11 against Atty. Perito which was docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2468.12

Relevantly, though, A.C. No. 7929 (Josephine Bracamonte, et al. v. Attys. Bertrand A. Baterina and
Ryan R. Besid) was dismissed, and thereafter declared as closed and terminated.13 Also, CBD
Case No. 09-2468 (Atty. Bertrand A. Baterina v. Atty. Ferdinand P. Perito) was dismissed by the
IBP-Board of Governors (BOG) for lack of merit.14

Nonetheless, in the case at bench, Atty. Perito charged herein respondents with pursuing a losing
and dismissed case or endlessly persecuting the Bracamontes in the kidnapping case, and for filing
a baseless disbarment complaint against him (Atty. Perito) grounded on suspicion. Atty. Perito
likewise charged respondents Attys. Baterina and Besid with misrepresentation because Dulce was
never an original complainant in the proceedings before the Office of the Prosecutor of Malabon, the
DOJ and the RTC of Malabon, nor can she represent the then alleged minor victim who already
reached the age of majority at that time.15

Moreover, Atty. Perito charged Attys. Baterina and Besid of demeanor unbecoming of members of
the Bar for purportedly accusing him of "'being the cause of the prolonged detention of accused
Josephine Bracamonte,' 'delaying the proceedings of the case and obtaining undue advantage by
not attending the hearing scheduled by the Court,' 'adopting a scheme where counsel will go to court
and making a manifestation in open court even if the case is not scheduled on that day,' [and]
'depriving private complainant of his day in court, fair play and right to be heard'."16

In addition, Atty. Perito asserted that respondents failed to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court for imputing upon the Presiding Judge of the RTC with grave abuse of discretion "amounting to
excess of jurisdiction by succumbing to the pressure employed by counsel (complainant Perito) who
uses dirty and coercive tactics to obtain a favorable judgment by any and all means possible and
completely [disregarding and compromising] its supposed integrity".17

Atty. Perito impleaded Attys. Tiblani and Pammit as respondents in the instant complaint since they
allegedly conspired with Attys. Baterina and Besid in filing a disbarment case against him.18

Conversely, herein respondents argued that the petition for review and petition for certiorari which
they filed in the kidnapping case were remedies which can be availed of as a matter of law in behalf
of their client and that resorting to such remedies cannot be a ground for disbarment.19 They added
that contrary to Atty. Perito's allegation, Dulce can properly file the petition since the complainant
was a minor when the alleged felony was committed. They further stated that a petition
for certiorari is an entirely different remedy with a new cause of action and that the criminal case
should not be affected even if Dulce was a stranger to the proceedings before the DOJ and the
RTC.20 Similarly, they averred that the imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the RTC was
necessary for a certiorari petition under Rule 65 and cannot be a ground for disbarment if the said
imputation was supported by facts and logic.21

Moreover, the respondents explained that the act of Attys. Tiblani and Pammit in filing a disbarment
case in behalf of Atty. Baterina against Atty. Perito is not a ground for disbarment.22

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation23 dated March 9, 2018, the Investigating Commissioner24 of the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that the respondents did not violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the dismissal of the complaint.

The Investigating Commissioner stated that the burden of proof rests upon Atty. Perito to prove his
allegations with [substantial] evidence.25 In light of this, the Investigating Commissioner found that
Attys. Baterina and Besid did not violate Rule 1.03, Canon 1 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR
since the pleadings which they filed in the criminal proceedings were proper remedies under DOJ
Circular No. 70 (2000 NPS Rule on Appeal) and the Rules of Court. Also, if Attys. Baterina and
Besid did not pursue the said remedies, they would have been remiss in their duties to their client.26

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that Attys. Baterina and Besid did not violate Rule
11.04, Canon 11 of the CPR. Their imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the Presiding Judge
1âшphi1

of the RTC was necessary to substantiate their certiorari petition before the CA, especially when
they questioned the orders of the RTC which provisionally dismissed the case and denied the motion
for reconsideration thereof.27
As for Attys. Tiblani and Pammit, the Investigating Commissioner found that they did not violate Rule
1.03 and Canon 8 of the CPR since there was no proof that they were motivated by ill will in
representing Atty. Baterina in the disbarment case that he (Atty. Baterina) filed against Atty. Perito
and in the other disbarment case filed by the Bracamontes against Attys. Baterina and Besid.28

Noting that this is the third disbarment case involving Attys. Perito, Baterina and Besid whether as
parties or counsels, which all stemmed from the kidnapping case involving the Bracamontes, the
Investigating Commissioner reminded the lawyers to focus on the merits of their claims, exercise
mutual respect and courtesy with each other, and not to indiscriminately file disbarment suits against
each other.29

In a Resolution30 dated November 8, 2018, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and to dismiss the petition.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court adopts the findings and approves the recommendation of the IBP to dismiss the instant
petition for disbarment against the respondents.

After assessment of the attendant circumstances, the Court is convinced that the present disbarment
case stemmed from the kidnapping case, which unfortunately affected the professional relationship
of the lawyers of the therein parties. Upon perusal of the records, We note that Atty. Perito somehow
initiated the conflict with the respondents by using intemperate language and strong allegations in a
number of pleadings which he filed. Hence, it would be apt to remind the lawyer-parties of the import
of the following provisions of the CPR:

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.

We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's finding that the remedies which Attys. Baterina and
Besid pursued and exhausted were sanctioned by the applicable rules and were intended solely to
advance their clients' interest in the kidnapping case. Furthermore, they did not violate Canon 11,
Rule 11.0331 when they filed a certiorari petition before the CA in order to assail the issuances of
the RTC. In fact, their actions are supplied by Canons 17 and 19 of the CPR, as follows:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW.

Similarly, Attys. Tiblani and Pammit who were representing Atty. Baterina in the latter's disbarment
cases were merely protecting Atty. Baterina's interests. Indeed, "[a] lawyer owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exet1ion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his
client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by
the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of
his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the
judge or the general public."32

To Our mind, the respondents' acts did not constitute as gross misconduct or a violation of the
Lawyer's Oath or the CPR. Additionally, the respondents committed none of the grounds for
disbarment enumerated in Section 27, Rule 13833 of the Rules of Court.34

Besides, "[a]s a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. x x x "35

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Atty. Perito did not present substantial evidence to show
that herein respondents violated the CPR. In fact, the instant petition is simply evidence of the
parties' frustration against each other and of their refusal to resolve their issues as lawyers in a more
dignified and less adversarial manner. Withal, the parties are reminded to act and be guided by the
Lawyer's Oath and the CPR, and to faithfully conduct themselves in a manner expected from
members of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Bertrand A. Baterina, Atty. Ryan R. Besid,
Atty. Riche L. Tiblani, and Atty. Mari Khris R. Pammit is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 12666, March 04, 2020 ]

SANTIAGO B. BURGOS, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. JOVENCIO JAMES G. BEREBER,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This resolves the Complaint1 filed by Santiago B. Burgos (Burgos) against Atty. Jovencio James G.
Bereber (Bereber) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In his complaint, Burgos claimed that Bereber committed acts constituting conflict of interest, and
lacking in "delicadeza."

Burgos alleged that he is a member-consumer of District III2 of Capiz Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(CAPELCO), a non-stock, non-profit electric cooperative supervised by the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), which currently provides electric services to the Province of Capiz. On July 1,
2015, Burgos and two other member-consumers of District III of CAPELCO, on the basis of a NEA
Comprehensive Operations Audit,3 filed an administrative complaint4 with the NEA against several
management staff of CAPELCO and certain members of its Board of Directors for committing acts
constituting Grave Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, and Falsification. Having been elected as director by
member-consumers of District III, Burgos insisted that Bereber failed to advance their interests, and
as such, had no regard for professionalism, ethics, integrity, and "delicadeza" when he represented
the accused members of the Board of Directors and management staff in the proceedings before the
NEA.

On his part, Bereber admitted in his Verified Answer,5 Position Paper,6 and other allied pleadings
that the accused members of the Board of Directors consulted with him and sought his legal services
in connection with the administrative complaint filed by Burgos with the NEA. Bereber then drafted,
prepared, and signed their answer to the NEA complaint, and appeared as counsel/collaborating
counsel for them in the same case during the preliminary conferences before the NEA.7 This
notwithstanding, Bereber insisted that he did not represent conflicting interests and, perforce, cannot
be held administratively liable therefor.

In particular, Bereber argued that there existed no lawyer-client relationship between him and
Burgos, considering that Burgos, at no instance in the past, obtained his legal advice or sought
consultation on any legal matter arising from the pending NEA complaint and/or the NEA
Comprehensive Operations Audit.8 On the contrary, Bereber emphasized that he even acted as
counsel for the adverse parties in Civil Case No. 477 for forcible entry and damages, and in Criminal
Case No. 2564 for light coercion filed against Burgos pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
in President Roxas, Capiz.9

Bereber further argued that he has the discretion to represent the causes of his fellow member-
consumers of CAPELCO, such as the accused members of its Board of Directors, in the NEA
administrative case. On this point, Bereber clarified that the district election of CAPELCO is only for
the purpose of determining the number of directors that will sit on its Board of Directors. Thus, while
he was elected as director of CAPELCO by the member-consumers of District III, he does not, by
virtue thereof, exclusively represent them in the board, nor does he become the counsel of the
member-consumers of the district where he was elected. Bereber explained that, as CAPELCO
director, he is mandated to represent not only the member-consumers of District III, but also the
entire membership of CAPELCO.10

Bereber also maintained that current state of laws does not prohibit him from practicing his
profession as a lawyer upon his election as CAPELCO director,11 and that "delicadeza" is "not a
ground to prohibit a lawyer from acting as counsel to a party."12

In a Report and Recommendation dated January 2, 2018,13 Investigating Commissioner Jeric J.

Jucaban of the Commission on Integrity and Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) recommended the dismissal of the complaint for hick of merit. The Investigating Commissioner
opined that Burgos failed to show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between him and Bereber.
Moreover, he noted that there is no basis under the laws governing electric cooperatives,
particularly, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 269,14 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
10531,15 which would support the conclusion that Bereber's election as director gave rise to a
lawyer-client relationship between him and Burgos, or the general membership of CAPELCO for that
matter. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that Bereber, in representing the cause of
his fellow members of the Board of Directors, merely exercised "independent judgment" as director
of CAPELCO, viz.:

The need for a director to exercise independent judgment is further recognized by the Securities and
Exchange Commission when it issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 19 Series of 2016 prescribing
the Code of Corporate Governance for Publicly-Listed Companies. Under Principle 5 of the said
Code, the SEC requires that the "Board should endeavor to exercise objective and independent
judgment on all corporate affairs."

Such issuances of the SEC underscores the responsibility of a director to safeguard and advance
the interest of the corporation, as his primordial concern rather than just the interest of a particular
set of members or stockholders thereof. x x x A director, therefore, is not bound by the wishes of a
stockholder or member, and could take a position contrary to that taken by them.16

The Investigating Commissioner agreed with Bereber that there is no law which bars him from
practicing his legal profession upon his election as director of CAPELCO, viz.:

What is prohibited by our jurisprudence is a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation

representing members of the same corporation's board of directors in a derivative suit brought
against them by the members or stockholders. For a suit to be considered derivative, however, "the
corporation should be included in the suit," which is not present in this case.17 (Citations omitted)

The Investigating Commissioner also held that lack of "delicadeza" is not one of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar.

In a Resolution dated December 6, 2018,18 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation to dismiss the complaint against Bereber.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP and accepts its recommendation to dismiss the complaint
against Bereber for lack of merit.
We take note at this point that Bereber rendered his legal services to CAPELCO further to his duties
and responsibilities as director. This is evident from the December 18, 2015 Affidavit19 of Mr.
Salvador A. Asis, former President of CAPELCO (as attached to Bereber's Answer), which states, in
part:

4.) Atty. James is the only lawyer in CAPELCO's Board of Directors; the entire members of the board
appreciate so much his presence as director because he shared with us his legal opinion on matters
requiring it for the betterment of CAPELCO, its members-consumers and employees, he drafted our
rules of procedure to be observed every board meeting; he argued and give inputs on legal points,
passed several resolutions and policies, drafted the revision of our by-laws and did many other
works; he chaired the newly created Committee on Employees' Welfare and did his assigned tasks
well; he worked in the CAPELCO very satisfactorily as a director and a lawyer; the running of the
general management of CAPELCO is smooth and well with the help of Atty. James[.]

Considering that an administrative complaint was filed with the NEA against certain members of the
board and management staff in their capacities as directors and officers, respectively, of CAPELCO,
Bereber, as its counsel, took on the responsibility of representing them during the proceedings
before the NEA. From the foregoing recitals, it appears, therefore, that Bereber assumed the dual
role of a director and lawyer of CAPELCO.

Bearing in mind his roles as director and lawyer of CAPELCO, the issue for consideration of this
Court is whether Bereber is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he appeared as counsel for the
accused members and management staff of CAPELCO in a case filed against them by CAPELCO
member-consumers of District III.

Rules on conflict of interest are embodied in Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR: which states, to wit:

Canon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.

xxxx

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall riot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

In Hornilla v. Salunat,20 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.21
Simply put, in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating the rules on conflict of interest under
the CPR, it is essential to determine whether: (1) "a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;"22 (2)
"the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty;"23 and (3) "a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment."24

Considering the foregoing, the proper resolution of the issue herein involved necessarily hinges
upon the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Notably, the absence of an attorney-client
relationship between Bereber and Burgos is an essential element of Bereber's defense to the charge
of conflict of interest.

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find no conflict of interest when Bereber
appeared as counsel before the NEA for the accused directors and management staff of CAPELCO.

The Court finds insufficient evidence which would confirm the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between Burgos and Bereber. We are inclined to believe the defense of Bereber, i.e.,
that at no instance did Burgos obtain Bereber's legal advice in connection with the pending NEA
complaint and/or Audit Report, in as much as Burgos made no attempt to refute such allegations
decisive of this controversy.

In his attempt to show even a semblance of an attorney-client relationship between him and
Bereber, Burgos suggested that Bereber is a supposed "representative" of District III from which the
complainants of the NEA case, such as Burgos, are also member-consumers thereof. This Court,
however, agrees with the finding of the IBP that Bereber, as CAPELCO director, represents the
entire membership of CAPELCO, and not just the member-consumers of District III. In any case,
Burgos failed to establish that Bereber was engaged as counsel by the member-consumers of
District III.

Moreover, a lawyer can be said to be representing conflicting interests specifically in circumstances

when he, having been engaged as counsel for a corporation, subsequently represents the members
of the same corporation's board of directors in a derivative suit filed against them. To be clear, a
corporation in a derivative suit is the real party in interest, while the stockholder filing suit in the
corporation's behalf would only be considered a nominal party.25 This is clearly wanting in this case.
While the facts established on record reveal that Bereber assumed the role as counsel of
CAPELCO, the administrative complaint filed before the NEA against the accused CAPELCO
directors and managerial staff were brought by Burgos and other consumer-members in their
individual capacities and not in behalf of CAPELCO.

This Court is also not inclined to mete out disciplinary punishment on Bereber on the allegation of his
supposed lack of "delicadeza" or sense of decency in this case because it is not a legal ground for
administrative disciplinary action under the CPR. At best, Bereber can be said to have merely
exercised independence of judgment as a lawyer when he defended the interests of other member-
consumers of CAPELCO.

Indeed, while "[t]his Court will not hesitate to mete out [the] proper disciplinary punishment upon
lawyers who are shown to have failed to live up to their sworn duties, x x x neither will it hesitate to
extend its protective arm to them when the accusation against them is not indubitably proven."26
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Thus, the Complaint against Atty. Jovencio
James G. Bereber is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

[ A.C. No. 8111, December 09, 2020 ]

ADELITA S. VILLAMOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ELY GALLAND A. JUMAO-AS,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Adelita S. Villamor (Villamor) charges Atty. Ely Galland A. Jumao-as (Atty. Jumao-as) with violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for representing conflicting interests.

Villamor alleged that Felipe Retubado (Retubado) and Atty. Jumao-as coaxed her into organizing a
lending company. Retubado volunteered to handle the day-to-day operation while Atty. Jumao-as
would handle the legal side of the business. Persuaded by these representations, Villamor acceded.

True to his word, respondent took care of the registration of the company with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as well as preparation and drafting of some legal documents such as
the Articles of Incorporation (AOI).1 In addition, when the company needed additional funds, Atty.
Jumao-as informed Villamor that she could borrow from Debbie Yu (Yu). Soon after, Atty. Jumao-as
delivered the amount of P500,000.00 to Villamor, which amount was infused into the lending
business as additional capital. Atty. Jumao-as then prepared a promissory note where all three of
them signed as co-borrowers. Villamor, however, was neither given a copy of the said promissory
note nor had any occasion to meet Yu.

In March 2007, respondent requested Villamor to sign blank SEC pre-printed AOI forms. That same
month, Atty. Jumao-as gave Villamor a copy of the Certificate of Registration2 of their lending
company which they named as AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. To her surpise, Villamor noted that
respondent3 and Retubado each own 30,000 shares of stock or 48% of the company despite the
fact that they only contributed a minimal amount of money.

In April 2008, respondent told Villamor to issue a postdated check amounting to P650,000.00 in the
name of Yu as a belated security for their loan of P500,000.00, with P150,000.00 representing
accrued interest. Respondent assured Villamor that said check will not be negotiated.

In May 2008, Atty. Jumao-as and Retubado left Villamor's company and joined Yu's 3E's Debt Equity
Grant Co., also a lending company. Subsequently, Villamor also came to know that Atty. Jumao-as
and Retubado were trying to convince the collectors of AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. to abandon Villamor
and to join their new lending company. They told Villamor's collectors to remit their collections to
3E's Debt Equity Grant Co. since Villamor owed Yu the amount of P650,000.00 and that they could
join their new company after they have fully remitted the amount of P650,000.00.

Worse, on October 8, 2008, Atty. Jumao-as sent a demand letter to Villamor, for and in behalf of Yu,
demanding payment of P650,000.00.

Hence, this complaint.4

In fine, Villamor alleged that respondent represented conflicting interests when he sent her the
demand letter in behalf of his new client, Yu. Atty. Jumao-as also breached her trust and confidence
when he deceitfully organized 3E's Debt Equity Grant Co. in direct competition to AEV Villamor
Credit, Inc. and for manipulating her collectors into leaving AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. and remitting
their collections to 3E's Debt Equity Grant, Co.

Respondent denied any lawyer-client relationship with Villamor. He claimed that it was Retubado
who engaged his services solely for the incorporation of AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. He admitted
having facilitated the amount of P500,000.00 loaned from Yu, his client. He averred that he was the
one who delivered the amount to Villamor and had her sign a promissory note which was prepared
by Yu's secretary.

Atty. Jumao-as stressed that his participation was solely to facilitate the incorporation of AEV
Villamor Credit, Inc. He denied the imputation that Villamor hired his services as the lawyer of the
said lending company. Lastly, he asserted that 3E's Debt Equity Grant Co. is a proprietorship
business owned by Yu.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP:

The Investigating Commissioner5 found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interest and
thus recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with severely.6 The Board of
Governors (BOG), in its Resolution No. XX-2013-1407 dated February 13, 2013, unanimously
adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but with modification that the period of
suspension be increased to two years with warning.

Respondent sought reconsideration stating that as early as December 5, 2009, Villamor had already
filed her Affidavit of Desistance. However, the IBP was not swayed and thus denied respondent's
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-1128 dated March 21, 2014.

Our Ruling

We adopt the findings of the IBP that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests and
approve its recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.

In my recent ponencia,9 we discussed conflict of interest in this wise:

Rules on conflict of interest are embodied in Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, which states, to wit:

Canon 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.

xxxx

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

In Hornilla v. Salunat, the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Simply put, in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating the rules on conflict of interest under
the CPR, it is essential to determine whether: (1) "a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;" (2) "the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty;" and (3) "a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment."10 (Citations
omitted)

Thus, to determine whether a conflict of interests exists, it is necessary to first ascertain whether a
lawyer-client relationship existed between Villamor and respondent on one hand, and Yu and
respondent on the other.

The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a
legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or for
representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment on, the
lawyer is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client.11

In this case, there can be no denying that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Villamor and
respondent despite the absence of any express or written agreement or arrangement as to
attorney's fees. Atty. Jumao-as' argument that it was Retubado who engaged his legal services and
that his participation was limited only to the incorporation of the lending company, is misplaced. It
must be stressed that in the course of the incorporation, respondent directly dealt with Villamor as
owner of the company; conversely, Villamor definitely made consultations with respondent on legal
matters pertaining to the incorporation and operation of the lending business. In turn, respondent
learned of confidential information from Villamor. In fine, a lawyer-client relationship existed between
Villamor and respondent. On the other hand, respondent expressly admitted that Yu was also his
client.

Thus, when respondent sent a demand letter to Villamor on behalf of Yu, he was clearly
representing conflicting interests. Suffice it to state that Villamor and Yu have inconsistent interests.
If respondent would argue for the rights of Yu, he would in effect directly oppose the interests of
Villamor. In short, he would be representing inconsistent and opposing interests which is not
allowed.

Canon 15 of the CPR requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his/her dealings
and transactions with his/her clients. Corollary to this, Rule 15.03 provides that lawyers shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
As the records bear out, Atty. Jumao-as was the one who reserved with the SEC the name of their
business, AEV Villamor Credit Inc., as evidenced by the stamp marked at the bottom portion of the
AOI which indicated: presented by: Name: Ely Galland Jumao-as, dated March 12,
2007.12 Respondent's name and signature also appear at the bottom portion of the Certificate of
Incorporation of AEV Villamor Credit Inc, which he notarized.13

On the other hand, respondent expressly admitted that Yu is also his client. It is also on record that
Atty. Jumao-as sent a Demand Letter dated October 8, 2008 for and in behalf of his client, Yu,
demanding payment of P650,000.00 from Villamor.14 Likewise, respondent also sent a Reply Letter
dated October 22, 2008, for and in behalf of his client Yu, stating that Villamor received the
P500,000.00 from him (respondent) and in exchange, Villamor signed a promissory note in favor of
Yu.15

The rule prohibiting representing conflicting interests was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may be allowed to represent a client involving the same or
a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. The
nature of the relationship, is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

In view of the foregoing, there is no doubt that the act of respondent of representing conflicting
interests warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In Quiambao v. Bamba,16 the Court pointed out that jurisprudence regarding the penalty solely for a
lawyer's representation of conflicting interests is suspension from the practice of law ranging from
one to three years. In Vda. De Alisbo v. Jalandoon, Sr.,17 the respondent, who appeared for
complainant in a case for revival of judgment, even though he had been the counsel of the adverse
party in the case sought to be revived, was suspended for a period of two years. Also, in Philippine
National Bank v. Cedo,18 the Court suspended the respondent therein for three years, but only
because respondent not only represented conflicting interests, but also deliberately intended to
attract clients with interests adverse to his former employer.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ely Galland A. Jumao-as GUILTY of violating Canon 15, Rule
15.03 Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

Respondent is DIRECTED to file a Manifestation to this Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judical bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Ely Galland A. Jumao-as as an attorney-at-law; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country for their guidance and information. SO ORDERED.

[ A.C. No. 12875, January 26, 2021 ]

PRUDENCIO B. PORTUGUESE,* JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JERRY R. CENTRO,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This is a Complaint1 against Atty. Jerry R. Centro (Atty. Centro) for gross negligence, abandonment,
and dereliction of duty.

The Antecedents:

Respondent Atty. Centro was complainant Prudencio B. Portuguese, Jr.'s (Portuguese) counsel in
Civil Case No. 71772 pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 of Surigao City.
Atty. Centro drafted and filed the Answer3 to the Complaint.4 Portuguese alleged that at the
termination of the proceedings, the parties were required to file their memoranda. After several
follow-ups, respondent informed Portuguese that the memorandum was already filed in
court.5 However, on January 25, 2018, to his and his family's shock, Portuguese was served a copy
of a Notice6 by a sheriff, giving them three days to comply with the Writ of Execution7 in connection
with the civil case.8 Apparently, this was the first time that Portuguese learned of the rendition of a
judgment in the said case.9

Portuguese claimed that Atty. Centro received a copy of the RTC's July 10, 2017 Decision10 on
August 10, 2017 but the latter never advised him about it. Moreover, Atty. Centro did not file any
pleading to appeal or question the RTC's Decision. Worse, Portuguese discovered that Atty. Centro
did not actually file a Memorandum contrary to the latter's representation. Portuguese asserted that
Atty. Centro also failed to do the following: file any pleading to contest the Motion for Execution;
notify him of the scheduled hearing on the Motion for Execution; and inform him about the trial
court's resolution granting the Motion for Execution.11 Lastly, Portuguese averred that respondent is
facing other administrative charges, specifically A.C. No. 11421 entitled "Emilie A. Lao v. Atty. Jerry
R. Centro"12 and another one supposedly filed by Atty. Centro's spouse.13

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP):

In a Report and Recommendation14 dated April 29, 2019, the Investigating

Commissioner15 recommended the suspension of Atty. Centro from the practice of law for three (3)
years.16 The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Centro's inaction deprived the complainant
of a relief from the adverse decision in the civil case. As counsel for Portuguese, he neglected to
perform his duty to exert efforts to avail of every remedy and defense authorized by the law in order
to protect his client's cause. Also, respondent's failure to file a memorandum was a breach of Rule
12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires lawyers to seasonably file
pleadings and to offer an explanation for failure to do so.17

Moreover, Atty. Centro violated Rule 18.04 of the CPR which mandates lawyers to keep the client
informed of the status of a case. Even after he learned of the RTC's July 10, 2017 Decision on
August 10, 2017, Atty. Centro did not inform Portuguese about the adverse judgment to enable his
client to decide if an appellate review will be sought. Respondent also failed to notify Portuguese
about the Motion for Execution and did not do anything to oppose the motion, assuming there was a
ground to do so. Atty. Centro's failure to apprise Portuguese of the developments in the case caught
Portuguese off-guard and unprepared.18 The Investigating Commissioner also noted that Atty.
Centro failed to file his Answer to the instant Complaint despite notice,19 which showed his
nonchalance and propensity to ignore lawful orders, in violation of Canon 11 of the CPR which
requires lawyers to observe and maintain respect due to the courts and to judicial officers.20

In a Resolution21 dated June 17, 2019, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the recommendation to suspend Atty. Centro from
the practice of law for three (3) years.

Our Ruling

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP to suspend respondent from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years.

The Lawyer's Oath22 mandates every lawyer to conduct himself/herself according to the best of
his/her knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his/her clients. Atty.
Centro unfortunately departed from his sworn oath by committing the following acts: 1) failing to file a
Memorandum and even misrepresenting about filing it; 2) failing to inform Portuguese of the RTC's
Decision; 3) failing to protect Portuguese's interest against the adverse RTC's Decision; 4) failing to
inform Portuguese of the Motion for Execution, the scheduled hearing, and the resolution granting
the said motion; and 5) failing to file an Answer to the instant Complaint. Worse, when Portuguese
confronted him about the deliberate lapses concerning the civil case, the latter merely replied that
there was nothing more he could do and that he was giving up the case for good.23 Considering the
foregoing, Atty. Centro is undoubtedly guilty of violating the following provisions of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 -A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 -A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Atty. Centro's unjustifiable negligence and abandonment of his client's cause violated the Lawyer's
Oath as well as the CPR. He casually set aside a legal matter that was entrusted to him and which
LaW㏗iL

deserved his full attention and diligence. He was grossly negligent of his duty as counsel and was
manifestly disinterested in his client's cause. He must be reminded that as a lawyer, he "is duty-
bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care
and devotion. This is because a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed on him."24

In administrative proceedings against a lawyer, the Court, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
"calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney."25 In this case, We note that Atty. Centro disregarded the directive for him to file his
Answer to the Complaint against him. This only goes to show Atty. Centro's indifference to lawful
orders and established processes. "His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the IBP
to comment x x x revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its
proceedings. He thereby exposed a character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal
Profession."26

Atty. Centro must be reminded that "being a lawyer is a privilege burdened with conditions.27 As a
member of the bar, [he] must maintain the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by refraining
from committing acts which might diminish in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the profession."28 He should have informed Portuguese at the earliest
opportunity that he could no longer properly represent him and perform his functions as counsel.
This way, Portuguese would have the option to secure the services of another lawyer so that his
interests would be protected. Unfortunately, Atty. Centro did not even bother to apprise Portuguese
about the developments in the civil case or inform him of his incapacity to continue as counsel. In
fine, respondent committed transgressions not only against his client but the IBP and the Court as
well.

It is settled that "[a] member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and/or breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the [CPR]. For the practice of law is 'a profession, a form of public trust,
the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.' The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts."29

In the case at bench, Atty. Centro, just like other lawyers who have been penalized before him,
"demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the
trust of his client, the Court, and the public, in general."30 As commensurate penalty for the damage
he brought upon Portuguese, a three-year suspension from the practice of law upon him is fitting.31

WHEREFORE, for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Jerry R. Centro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years
and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is DIRECTED to file a Manifestation to this Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Jerry R. Centro as an attorney-at-law; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country for their guidance and information.

The March 12, 2020 Letter of Atty. Randall C. Tabayoyong, Director for Bar Discipline, is NOTED.
SO ORDERED.

[ A.C. No. 12609, February 10, 2020 ]

SPOUSES DARITO P. NOCUENCA AND LUCILLE B. NOCUENCA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.

ALFREDO T. BENSI, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Spouses Darito P. Nocuenca (Darito) and Lucille B. Nocuenca (Lucille, collectively complainants)
filed this complaint1 for disbarment against respondent, Atty. Alfredo T. Bensi (Atty. Bensi), before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainants alleged that Atty. Bensi violated Rule
1.01,2 Canon 13 and Rule 10.01,4 Canon 105 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as
well as the Lawyer's Oath when he assaulted the complainants in an effort to prevent them from
entering a disputed property. Complainants further averred that Atty. Bensi filed a criminal case
against them based on false allegations.

The Complainants' Position

Complainants alleged that the present case originated from Civil Case No. 6143-L,6 an action for
Declaratory Relief, Reformation of Contract, Recovery of Possession of a Portion of a Property,
Cancellation of Tax Declaration, Damages, and Attorney's Fees, filed by plaintiffs-spouses Restituto
Bensi and Dominga F. Bensi (plaintiffs) against Atty. Bensi and other defendants therein. The
plaintiffs are the parents of Lucille.

On January 25, 2007, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lapu-Lapu City, rendered a Partial
Summary Judgment7 declaring plaintiffs to be the lawful owners of a 428.8-square-meter portion of
Lot No. 1499-C.8 This portion of the disputed lot serves as a site for a Catholic chapel.
Complainants claimed that they inherited the said portion after the death of Lucille's parents.

Complainants alleged that on June 5, 2013, in the course of exercising their right of ownership over
the portion of the disputed lot, they went to the chapel to post a sign that reads, "PRIVATE
PROPERTY, NO TRESPASSING"9 but they were assaulted and clobbered by Atty. Bensi and his
son. Due to the incident, complainants filed two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries against Atty.
Bensi and his son before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Lapu-Lapu City.

Shortly after the incident, complainants went to the chapel to reopen it for religious purposes and for
the benefit of the community. However, they were shocked when they discovered that the altar was
tom down and all religious articles were thrown out. Complainants believed that these were done at
the behest of Atty. Bensi.

On August 28, 2013, Atty. Bensi filed a criminal case for Trespass to Property with Physical Injuries
against the complainants. According to complainants, the criminal case was anchored on false and
fabricated accusations. Ultimately, the case was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor in an
October 8, 2013 Resolution for lack of merit.
Complainants argued that the physical injuries they suffered at the hands of Atty. Bensi clearly fell
within the ambit of unlawful conduct proscribed by Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. Moreover, they
claimed that the criminal case contained false accusations in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath thereby warranting the penalty of disbarment.10

Complainants pointed out that the Court, in a previous administrative case, had already reprimanded
Atty. Bensi.

The Respondent's Position

On the other hand, Atty. Bensi claimed that the bigger portion of Lot No. 1499-C is owned by his late
parents and that the same had not yet been partitioned by the heirs.

Atty. Bensi claimed that on June 5, 2013, complainant Darito brought a hammer and a flat bar which
were used as a chisel to forcibly open the padlocked gate of the chapel. As the caretaker of the
property, Atty. Bensi asked the complainants from whom did they ask permission to open the closed
gate.11 This resulted in a heated confrontation where Lucille rushed and attacked Atty. Bensi while
shouting, "P*TANG INA NINYO, WALANG HIYA KAYO!"12 Atty. Bensi fell down on the floor of the
chapel. His son rushed inside and held the hands of Lucille. Thereafter, Atty. Bensi's son picked up a
plastic handle of an umbrella and struck the head of Lucille while Darito went outside to gather rocks
and threw the same at Atty. Bensi. Fortunately, he was not hit.

Because of the incident, complainants filed two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries against Atty.
Bensi and his son. Atty. Bensi, for his part, filed a criminal case for Trespass to Property with
1a₩phi1

Physical Injuries against the complainants.

On February 13, 2015, the complainants filed the present administrative case for disbarment.

On April 15, 2015, Atty. Bensi filed his Answer with Urgent and Earnest Motion to Issue a Subpoena
Duces Tecum13 against the complainants.

On May 25, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Notice of Mandatory

Conference14 directing the parties to appear on June 18, 2015 and to submit their Mandatory
Conference Brief at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled date of conference.

On June 15, 2015, the complainants filed their Mandatory Conference Brief.15 Only the
complainants appeared during the mandatory conference on June 18, 2015.

On September 23, 2015, the next mandatory conference, only Lucille appeared. Atty. Bensi failed to
appear the second time. On the same day, however, Atty. Bensi filed his Mandatory Conference
Brief.16

On November 27, 2015, Atty. Bensi filed a Motion to Conduct Clarificatory Hearing,17 which motion
was denied by the Investigating Commissioner.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In her Report and Recommendation 18 dated June 13, 2016, Investigating Commissioner Suzette A.
Mamon (Commissioner Mamon) recommended that Atty. Bensi be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of thirty (30) days.
Commissioner Mamon found that:

In the instant case, there were findings of probable cause against respondent with his son for slight
physical injuries which Were duly filed in Court. While it can be said that the crime of slight physical
injuries is not one which can be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude, more so that there
has yet no conviction on the part [of the] herein respondent, it must be emphasized that lawyers
must behave within the tenets of morality and good moral character. x x x19

Moreover, Commissioner Mamon found that Atty. Bensi committed acts in violation of the Lawyer 's
Oath and Section 20(f),20 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he allegedly assaulted the
complainants.

In its February 22, 2018 Resolution,21 the IBP-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to reverse
the findings of fact and recommendation of Commissioner Mamon and instead, recommended that
the case be dismissed, thus:

RESOLVED to REVERSE the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, and instead, recommend that the case against Atty. Alfredo T. Bensi be Dismissed
considering that respondent was in possession of the property and that the aggressive behavior of
the complainant triggered the altercation.22

Our Ruling

Every person has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Considering the
gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer, the Court has consistently
ruled that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his/her complaint through substantial
evidence.23 Time and again, the Court has held that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.24

The IBP-BOG, in its Extended Resolution,25 stated that preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. The IBP-BOG found that the
complainants failed to prove their claim by preponderance of evidence. Consequently, it upheld Atty.
Bensi's presumption of innocence and dismissed the complaint against him.

While the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP-BOG to dismiss the disbarment
complaint, it bears stressing that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial
evidence and not preponderance of evidence. This issue had already been clarified in Reyes v.
Nieva26 where the Court held that:

Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence — as opposed to preponderance of

evidence — is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending
this type of cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. x x x"

In Dela Fuente Torres v. Dalangin,27 the Court reiterated that the quantum of proof in administrative
cases is substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
After a careful review of the records, the Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP-BOG
dismissing the case against Atty. Bensi.

The main issue in this case is whether Atty. Bensi should be disciplined for his involvement in the
June 5, 2013 altercation with the complainants over a disputed family property.

The Court observes that Atty. Bensi was in possession of the disputed property when the
complainants tried to enter and take it. Complainants were then equipped with a hammer and a flat
1âшphi1

bar to force their way inside a locked gate of the chapel. Complainants believed that they were the
lawful owners of the property on the strength of a Partial Summary Judgment which awarded the
property to Lucille's now deceased parents.

Nevertheless, even if the complainants are indeed the lawful owners of the disputed property, they
should not have taken the law into their own hands through force. What the complainants should
have done was to invoke the aid of the proper court in lawfully taking possession of the property.

Article 536 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another
of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing.

While lawyers are mandated to act with dignity and in a manner that inspires confidence to the legal
profession, their rights must still be protected just like every ordinary individual. The legal profession
and the threat of disbarment should not be used as a means to provoke lawyers who are acting well
within their rights.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the complainants failed to establish through substantial
evidence a cause for disciplinary action against Atty. Bensi.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Alfredo T. Bensi is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 10636, October 12, 2020 ]

MANUEL B. TABLIZO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS. JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO, ADORACION A.

AGBADA, ELBERT L. BUNAGAN, AND JOAQUIN F. SALAZAR, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative case for Grave Misconduct initiated by complainant Manuel
Bajaro Tablizo against the following respondents, all officials of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon:

(a) Respondent Atty. Elbert L. Bunagan (Bunagan), Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer
(GIPO) I - Bureau A;

(b) Respondent Atty. Joaquin F. Salazar (Salazar), Director, Evaluation & Investigation Office
(EIO) - Bureau A;

(c) Respondent Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco (Golangco), GIPO I - Bureau B; and

(d) Respondent Atty. Adoracion A. Agbada (Agbada), Director, EIO - Bureau B.

It arose from the following factual antecedents:

Through separate Complaint-Affidavits filed before the Provincial Prosecutor Office of Virac,
Catanduanes, complainant averred that Santos V. Zafe (Zafe) and Jose U. Alberto II (Alberto), then
former and incumbent Mayors, respectively, of the Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, violated
Republic Act (RA) Nos. 30191 and 67132 when they failed to sign each and every page of certain
municipal tax ordinances3 as required by Section 54 of the Local Government Code (LGC) and for
still implementing them in the said Municipality, despite their defect and nullity. The Complaint-
Affidavits were indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon where they were docketed as
OMB-L-C-12-0531/0MB-L-A-12-06-13 and OMB-L-C-12-0532/OMB-L-A-0614 (OMB Cases) and
raffled to respondent Atty. Bunagan, GIPO I -Bureau A. After an exchange of pleadings by the
parties, respondent Atty. Bunagan issued a Consolidated Resolution4 dated October 18, 2013
(Consolidated Resolution), reviewed by respondent Atty. Salazar, EIO Director - Bureau A, with the
following recommendations:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that:

1. In OMB-L-C-12-0531, the complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against
respondents former Municipal Mayors JOSE U. ALBERTO II and SANTOS V. ZAFE, both of
the Local Government of Virac, Catanduanes, be DISMISSED for lack of merit;
 2. In OMB-L-C-12-0532, the complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against
respondent former Municipal Mayor JOSE U. ALBERTO II of the Local Government of Virac,
Catanduanes, be DISMISSED for lack of merit; and

3. In OMB-L-A-12-0613 and OMB-L-A-12-0614, the administrative complaints against

respondents former Municipal Mayors JOSE U. ALBERTO II and SANTOS V. ZAFE, both of
the Local Government of Virac, Catanduanes, be DISMISSED for the reasons discussed
above. However, respondents are admonished that similar omission in the future shall be
dealt with severely.5

The Consolidated Resolution was approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales (Carpio
Morales) on December 26, 2013.6

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Consolidated Resolution on the ground that
grave errors of facts and violation of law had been committed prejudicial to his interest and rights. He
also included in his Motion for Reconsideration a prayer that respondents Atty. Bunagan and Atty.
Salazar inhibit themselves from the resolution of said motion to avoid any suspicion of partiality.

Acting on complainant's prayer for the inhibition of respondents Atty. Bunagan and Atty. Salazar,
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Gerard A. Mosquera (Mosquera) reassigned the OMB Cases to EIO
- Bureau B.

On April 8, 2014, a Consolidated Resolution (on Complainant's Motion for

Reconsideration)7 (Consolidated Resolution - MR) was issued by respondent Atty. Golangco, GIPO
I - Bureau B, and reviewed by respondent Atty. Agbada, EIO Director - Bureau B, recommending
that complainant's Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit. The Consolidated
Resolution - MR was approved by Ombudsman Carpio Morales on June 9, 2014.8

Thereafter, complainant filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit dated July 9, 2014 against respondents
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), docketed as A.C. No. 10636. He averred that
"respondents maliciously failed to follow/observe the standards of personal conduct provided under
R.A. No. 6713 and R.A. No. 6770 in the discharge and execution of their official duties for failing
and/or refusing to investigate in the real sense of the word, the charges against Alberto and
Zafe."9 After receipt of respondents' Joint Comments, the Court, in a Resolution10 dated July 29,
2015, referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation. It was docketed as CBD Case No. 15-4788 before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.

Complainant also subsequently filed a letter-complaint dated August 13, 2014 before the Internal
Affairs Board (IAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman charging respondents with Grave Misconduct
based on the very same allegations. The Evaluation Report11 dated October 10, 2014 submitted by
the IAB Investigator and approved on January 23, 2015 by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
Mosquera, dismissed the complaint outright.

In the meantime, Investigating Commissioner Dominica L. Dumangeng Rosario (Dumangeng-

Rosario) scheduled and facilitated mandatory conferences among the parties in CBD Case No. 15-
4788 on December 14, 2015, February 18, 2016, and July 22, 2016. Respondents attended all the
mandatory conferences12 and duly submitted their respective mandatory conference briefs and
subsequently, their Joint Position Paper.

In contrast, complainant failed to appear in any of the mandatory conferences. For the mandatory
conference scheduled on February 18, 2016, he filed a Manifestation and Motion requesting the
appointment of a suitable member of the Bar to act as his counsel and assist him during the hearing,
citing Sections 2 and 7 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. His Manifestation and Motion was
forwarded by the IBP Board of Governors to the National Center for Legal Aid (NCLA). However,
Atty. Jonas Florentino D.L. Cabochan (Cabochan), NCLA National Director, replied through a
letter13 dated May 16, 2016 that the NCLA does not represent parties in disbarment proceedings. In
an Order14 dated June 27, 2016, Investigating Commissioner Dumangeng-Rosario informed
complainant of Atty. Cabochan's reply to his Manifestation and Motion; advised complainant to
engage the services of counsel and to submit his mandatory conference brief within 10 days from
notice; and directed the parties to attend the next mandatory conference on July 22, 2016. Once
again, complainant failed to attend the mandatory conference on July 22, 2016, submitting instead
another Manifestation and Motion in which he maintained that:

2. x x x Simply put, my trust and confidence in respondents herein as Ombudsman lawyers, have
really eroded. Their resolutions dismissing and exonerating the respondents in my ombudsman case
against the two (2) mayors of Virac, Catanduanes are the reasons why I filed a case against them at
the Supreme Court because up to this point and time the people of Virac are made to pay their taxes
computed based on the unsigned revenue code. x x x15

After stating that his financial and health predicaments rendered him permanently unable to attend
the mandatory conferences and that he needed the services of a counsel as he had no training and
skill to prosecute the case by himself, he moved and prayed that Investigating Commissioner
Dumangeng-Rosario pursue and continue the investigation of the instant administrative case in the
interest of justice, equity, and fair play. Complainant then already submitted the case for
resolution.16

Report and Recommendation of the IBP:

In her Report and Recommendation dated January 27, 2017, Investigating Commissioner
Dumangeng-Rosario concluded, thus:

As discussed above, it is not sufficiently shown that the respondents, Atty. Golangco, Atty. Agbada,
Atty. Bunagan, and Atty. Salazar [have] violated any of their professional duties as a lawyer and
therefore it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint against them be DISMISSED.17

The IBP Board of Governors then passed a Resolution dated April 20, 2017 adopting the findings of
fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the complaint against the
respondents.

Our Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the aforementioned Resolution of the IBP. Complainant herein
charges respondents with Gross Misconduct in relation to the performance of their official duties as
officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. In Vitriolo v. Dasig,18 the Court laid down that as a general
rule, "a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by
this Court as a member of the Bar."19

In his Complaint-Affidavit herein, complainant was essentially challenging the Consolidated

Resolution and Consolidated Resolution - MR in the OMB Cases in which respondents dismissed
complainant's criminal and administrative charges against Zafe and Alberto. He averred that
respondents maliciously refused or failed to conduct proper investigation of the charges in the OMB
Cases to complainant's detriment and, hence, eroding his trust and confidence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Gross misconduct is punishable by either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, as
provided under Section 27,20 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It has been defined as "any
inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose."21

In Rico v. Madrazo, Jr.,22 the Court pronounced:

It is settled that in disbarment and suspension proceedings against lawyers in this jurisdiction, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Thus, this Court has held that "in consideration of the
gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar, we have
consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through substantial
evidence." A complainant's failure to dispense the same standard of proof requires no other
conclusion than that which stays the hand of the Court from meting out a disbarment or suspension
order.

In the case at bar, there is an absolute dearth of evidence of the respondents' alleged Gross
Misconduct. Other than his bare allegations, complainant was unable to present proof to
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

substantiate his grave charges against respondents. That the Consolidated Resolution and
Consolidated Resolution - MR issued by the respondents in the OMB Cases were adverse to
complainant does not, by itself, establish malice or prejudice against him.

In contrast, respondents enjoy, absent any evidence to the contrary, the presumption that they had
regularly performed their official duties23 as GIPOs and Directors of the EIO, Office of the
Ombudsman, when they resolved the OMB Cases. All parties were accorded the opportunity to be
heard following the rules of procedure before the Office of the Ombudsman. In fact, Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon Mosquera effectively granted complainant's prayer for the inhibition of
respondents Atty. Bunagan and Atty. Salazar of EIO - Bureau A by re-assigning complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Consolidated Resolution to respondents Atty. Golangco and Atty.
Agbada of EIO - Bureau B for resolution. It is also noteworthy that both the Consolidated Resolution
and Consolidated Resolution – MR were reviewed and ultimately approved by Ombudsman Carpio
Morales.

Furthermore, a perusal of the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Resolution - MR issued by

respondents readily shows that they sufficiently presented the factual and legal bases for the
dismissal of complainant's charges against Zafe and Alberto. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the
subject Resolutions were completely arbitrary, capricious, or groundless.

More importantly, if complainant really believed that respondents committed reversible errors in
judgment or grave abuse of discretion in rendering the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated
Resolution - MR, then his remedy would have been to seek judicial review24 of the same, and not
through a disciplinary case against the respondents. The following declaration of the Court in
administrative matters involving judges may be applied by analogy herein: "An administrative
complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted
with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty."25
WHEREFORE, the present administrative case for Grave Misconduct against respondents Atty.
Elbert L. Bunagan, Atty. Joaquin F. Salazar, Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco, and Atty. Adoracion A.
Agbada, in their respective capacities as officials of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 12487, December 04, 2019

FE EUFEMIA E. VALMONTE, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR.,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Before the Court is a Complaint1 disbarment dated November 11, 2014 filed by
complainant Fe Eufemia Estalilla-Valmonte against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada,
Jr. for violation of the Supreme Court's directive suspending him from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year pursuant to its December 2, 2013 Resolution in Dagala
v. Atty. Quesada, Jr.2

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant alleged that she the wife of Marcelo A. Valmonte, Jr.; that her husband
was charged with murder of her brother, Manalo Estalilla (Manolo); that the murder
case, docketed as Crim. Case No. 4573-BG, entitled People of the Philippines v. Marcelo
A. Valmonte, Jr., was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union,
Branch 33; that in March 2014, respondent entered his appearance in the said case as
private prosecutor on behalf of the common-law wife of Manalo; that respondent filed
several pleadings in the said case; and that complainant later learned that respondent
entered his appearance and filed pleadings in court while he was serving his suspension
from the practice of law.

Despite due notice, respondent failed to file a comment and to appear during the
mandatory conference before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).3

After considering the evidence presented by complainant, the Investigating

Commissioner of the IBP submitted his Report and Recommendation 4 dated June 30,
2017 recommending that respondent be meted the penalty of suspension for another
year from the practice of law for his unauthorized practice of law.

Finding the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner fully

supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the
Board of Governors of the IBP, on June 28, 2018, resolved to adopt the same. 5

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the findings of the IBP, but with modifications as to its
recommendations.

On December 2, 2013, the Court promulgated a Resolution in the case

of Dagala suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year
effective from the date of his receipt of the said Resolution for failing to exercise the
required diligence in handling the labor case of his client. 6 In the absence of any
contrary evidence, a letter duly directed and mailed is presumed to have been received
in the regular course of mail.7 Here, respondent is presumed to have duly received the
said Resolution.

In March 2014, or three months after the promulgation of the Resolution suspending
him from the practice of law, respondent filed the following pleadings before the RTC of
Bauang, La Union, in Crim. Case No. 4573-BG:

1) Notice of Appearance with Motion8 on March 20, 2014;

2) Comment on the Opposition9 n May 9, 2014; and

3) Motion to Withdraw Appearance as Private Prosecutor 10 on May 23, 2014.

Respondent's acts of signing and filing of pleadings for his client in Crim. Case No.
4573-BG months after the promulgation of the Resolution are clear proofs that he
practiced law during the period of his suspension. And as aptly found by the IBP,
respondent's unauthorized practice of law is considered a willful disobedience to lawful
order of the court, which under Section 27,11 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a ground
for disbarment or suspension.

As to the penalty imposed, a review of recent jurisprudence reveals that the Court has
consistently impose an additional suspension of six months on lawyers who continue to
practice law despite their suspension.12

However, considering that the Court had already imposed upon respondent the ultimate
penalty of disbarment for his gross misconduct and willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of the court in an earlier complaint for disbarment filed against him in Zarcilla v.
Quesada, Jr.,13 the penalty of additional six months suspension from the practice of law
can no longer be imposed upon him. The reason is obvious: "[o]nce a lawyer is
disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his privilege to practice
law."14

But while the Court can no longer impose the penalty upon the disbarred lawyer, it can
still give the corresponding penalty only for the sole purpose of recording it in his
personal file with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), which should be taken into
consideration in the event that the disbarred lawyer subsequently files a petition to lift
his disbarment.15

In addition, the Court may also impose a fine16 upon a disbarred lawyer found to have
committed an offense prior to his/her disbarment as the Court does not lose its
exclusive jurisdiction over other offenses committed by a disbarred lawyer while he/she
was still a member of the Law Profession.17 In fact, by imposing a fine, the Court is able
"to assert its authority and competence to discipline all acts and actuations committed
by the members of the Legal Profession."18

All told, the Court finds respondent guilty of unauthorized practice of law. And although
he has already been disbarred, the Court, nevertheless, deems it proper to give the
corresponding penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law for the sole
purpose of recording it in his personal file in the OBC. The Court, likewise, considers it
necessary to impose upon respondent a penalty of fine in the amount of PhP
40,000.00.19

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby FINDS respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada,

Jr. GUILTY of unauthorized practice of law and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, considering that he has already
been disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed but nevertheless should be
considered in the event that he should apply for the lifting of his
disbarment. ACCORDINGLY, and IN VIEW OF HIS CONTINUING DISBARMENT, a
penalty of FINE in the amount of PhP 40,000.00 is imposed upon him.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. Copies shall likewise be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 [ A.C. No. 12719 (Formerly CBD Case No. 17-5316), February 17, 2021 ]

SANNY L. GERODIAS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TOMAS A. RIVERAL, ATTY. ANNABEL G.

PULVERA-PAGE, AND ATTY. LORENA M. SUPATAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

On February 21, 2017, Sanny L. Gerodias (Gerodias) filed a disbarment complaint1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Attorneys Tomas A. Riveral (Riveral), Annabel G.
Pulvera-Page (Pulvera-Page) and Lorena M. Supatan (Supatan).

Gerodias was a former employee of Oriental Port and Allied Services Corporation
(OPASCOR).2 During his employment, he underwent several disciplinary investigations for various
reasons such as heated altercations with co-employees, damage to company property and
abandonment of work. The last disciplinary investigation which lead to his voluntary retirement from
OPASCOR was the incident of him stealing a box of perfumes owned by OPASCOR's clients.
Instead of terminating Gerodias, OPASCOR offered him the option of voluntary resignation with
payment of separation pay.3

Gerodias, on the other hand, demanded to avail of the early retirement option. Despite the fact that
he was short of two years to avail of the company's early retirement program, which requires a total
of 15 years of service, Gerodias' request was approved by Riveral, the President and General
Manager of OPASCOR. Thus, he was paid a retirement pay in the amount equivalent to 22 months
with full grant of other benefits despite the fact that he only worked for six months for the year 2016.4

However, a month after Gerodias received his retirement pay, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against OPASCOR and demanded a breakdown of the deductions made on his retirement
pay. On the other hand, OPASCOR filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against Gerodias.5

On February 3, 2017, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Gerodias' complaint for lack of merit.6 On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed in toto the LA's decision in its
April 17, 2017 Decision7 and May 31, 2017 Resolution.8

Meanwhile, a disbarment case was filed by Gerodias against Riveral as the President and General
Manager of OPASCOR; Pulvera-Page, as the Corporate Secretary of OPASCOR and one of the
lawyers in the firm of Riveral, Pulvera & Associates; and Supatan, as: a lawyer in Riveral, Pulvera &
Associates who received Gerodias' Position Paper during the proceedings of the labor case.
Gerodias averred that Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and
1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when they, together, with Jessielou Cadungog
(Cadungog), the Labor Union President of OPASCOR, connived and conspired to dismiss him from
his employment:
Specifically, Gerodias accused Cadungog, as appointed director of OPASCOR and as Labor Union
President, to have represented conflicting interests which resulted in him failing to represent
Gerodias' interest during his disciplinary investigation.9 Gerodias also questioned the two confusing
and conflicting Secretary's Certificates filed by OPASCOR in the labor and criminal cases which
were signed and executed at the same time by two different persons, namely, by Pulvera-Page and
Mary Lou Z. Geyrosaga (Geyrosaga), respectively. Both secretary's certificates indicated that
Pulvera-Page and Geyrosaga were corporate secretaries of OPASCOR.10

In addition, Gerodias averred that Pulvera-Page's representation of OPASCOR and all the other
individual respondents in the labor case, namely, Riveral and Cadungog, is evidence of conspiracy
to terminate his employment. Lastly, he likewise claimed that Supatan's act of receiving a copy of his
Position Paper during the proceedings of the labor case indicates her connivance with Riveral and
Pulvera-Page.

On the other hand, Supatan argued that her participation in the labor case by receiving a copy of
Gerodias' Position Paper in behalf of Riveral, Pulvera-Page & Associates does not justify the
allegations of conspiracy against her.11 Riveral and Pulvera-Page also belied the conspiracy
accusation against them and maintained that Gerodias was not illegally dismissed from employment
but voluntarily retired effective on June 17, 2016 by way of graceful exit.12

They further argued that no decision was made by OPASCOR's Board of Directors (BOD) to
terminate Gerodias. Instead, Riveral, as the President and General Manager of OPASCOR,
approved Gerodias's application for retirement in good faith.13 Lastly, both Pulvera-Page,
OPASCOR's Corporate Secretary and Geyrosaga, OPASCOR's Recording Secretary, are duly
authorized to issue Secretary's Certificates on motions or resolutions passed and approved by
OPASCOR's Board of Directors.14

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

On December 22, 2017, the IBP issued its Report and Recommendation15 recommending the
dismissal of the administrative case against Riveral, Pulvera- Page and Supatan for lack of factual
and legal basis. The acts and/or participation of Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan do not violate
ℒαwρhi ৷

any of the Canons in the CPR, the Lawyer's Oath or Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. On
March 22, 2018,; the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) resolved to adopt the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the complaint.16

Meanwhile, on October 25, 2018, Gerodias sent a Letter17 with attached Affidavit of
Desistance18 to the IBP expressing his disinterest in pursuing the disbarment case filed against
Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan.

Our Ruling

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the IBP and approves the recommendation to dismiss the
complaint against respondents Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Supatan. Settled is the rule that for a
charge to justify a disciplinary action against a lawyer, the complainant must present convincing
proof to substantiate the charge. Otherwise, the lawyer is presumed innocent.19

In this case, the IBP properly found that Riveral, as the President and General Manager of
OPASCOR, did not act in bad faith in approving the early retirement of Gerodias instead of criminally
charging him and terminating his employment under which he would have received a considerably
lesser separation pay than the retirement package. As President and General Manager, he
approved Gerodias' request to avail of the early retirement program even when he was short of two
years in service as per the company policy. We find no violation of the CPR or the Lawyer's Oath in
Riveral's benevolent act of accommodating Gerodias' request. No evidence was presented to show
that Riveral acted with bad faith, malice, or ill will. Hence, the presumption of good faith in his favjor
stands.20

As to the two questioned Secretary's Certificates signed and executed by Pulvera-Page as the
Corporate Secretary and Geyrosaga as the Recording Secretary, We agree with the IBP that the act
is sanctioned under Article IV, Section 1, 2nd paragraph of the Amended By-Laws21 of OPASCAR.
The corporation's power to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the BOD which may duly
authorize an individual through its corporate by-laws or by a specific act to sign documents in behalf
of the corporation.22

Hence, there is nothing erroneous nor illegal in Pulvera-Page's signing and executing a Secretary's
Certificate as OPASCOR's Corporate Secretary as she is duly authorized to do so by virtue of the
Amended By-Laws and the Director's Certificate23 dated July 3, 2017. Thp fact that Geyrosaga is
ℒαwρhi ৷

also duly authorized to sign and execute a Secretary's Certificate by virtue of the said Director's
Certificate does not connote; connivance nor conspiracy between the two to terminate Gerodias'
employment. In addition, OPASCOR BOD's act of authorizing two persons to execute Secretary's
Certificate is not prohibited and well within the ambit of the law.

Lastly, We cannot fathom how Supatan's act of receiving Gerodias' Position Paper in the
proceedings of the labor case would imply conspiracy and connivance with Riveral, Pulvera-Page
and Cadungog in order to illegally terminate Gerodias from his employment. As per the records,
Supatan is an associate of the firm of Riveral, Pulvera-Page & Associates which represents
OPASCAR in the labor casb filed by Gerodias. Hence, Supatan, as an associate of the firm, is duty
bound to assist and represent its client OPASCAR in the said labor case including the receipt of any
pleadings filed. To reiterate, her act of receiving a copy of Gerodias' Position Paper is a lawful act
and does not in any way violate the CPR nor the Lawyer's Oath.

Mere allegation of conspiracy is not evidence and not equivalent to proof. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant and the case must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Evidently, complainant Gerodias utterly failed to discharge such burden. If anything, what is
apparent in the records is complainant's penchant for filing baseless disbarment cases for the
flimsiest of reasons. It should not surprise him if respondents would justifiably counter with legal
actions of their own against him to vindicate their rights.

ACCORDINGLY, this administrative case against Atty. Tomas A. Riveral, Atty. Annabel G. Pulvera-
Page and Atty. Lorena M. Supatan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.