WAR,CULTURE

AND
ECONOMY IN JAVA
1677-1726
 DATE DUE

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Southeast Asia Publications Series

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War, Culture and Economy in Java
 ASIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA
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Agricultural Development War, Culture and Economy in
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Keith Foulcher Flinders University
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Anthony Milner Australian National University
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 URANAGAN UNIVERSITY GULLEG
LIBRARY wr
BRITISH COLUMBIA”

War, Culture and Economy

in Java, 1677-1726
Asian and European Imperialism
in the Early Kartasura Period

M. C. RICKLEFS

Asian Studies Association of Australia

in association with
ALLEN & UNWIN
Sydney
© M.C. Ricklefs, 1993
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.
No Reproduction without permission. All rights reserved.
First published in 1993 by
Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd
9 Atchison Street, St Leonards, NSW 2065 Australia

National Library of Australia

Cataloguing-in-Publication entry:
Ricklefs, M.C. (Merle Calvin), 1943—.
War, culture and economy in Java, 1677-1726.
Bibliography.
Inciudes index.
ISBN 1 86373 380 9.

1. War—Economic aspects—Indonesia—Java. 2. Java (Indonesia)—

History. 3. Indonesia—History—1478-1798. 4. Indonesia—Politics
and government—1478-1798. 5. Java (Indonesia)—Economic
conditions. 6. Java (Indonesia)—Social conditions. I. Asian Studies
Association of Australia. II. Title. (Series: Southeast Asia publications
series; no. 24).
959.82021
Typeset by Vera-Reyes Inc., Manila
Printed by Kin Keong Printing, Singapore
LODO Se) Oso aaa |
 In memory
of two teachers
who had hoped to read this,
H. J. de Graaf (1899-1984)
and
Th. G. Th. Pigeaud (1899-1988)
The grave of Amangkurat I (d. 1677) at Tégalwangi (Tégalarum).
Contents

Preface ix

Transcription, Orthography and Personal Names Xl

Abbreviations Xili

Illustrations XVi

Maps XVil

Tables XViil

Introduction: Social, Cultural, Economic and Military Settings

ca. 1650-70 1

1 The Disintegration of the State of Mataram, 1677 30

2 Foreign Intervention and the Return to Central Java, 1677-80 44

3 Reestablishing Dynastic Authority in Central Java, 1680-82 60

4 The Attempt at Separate Empires: Kartasura, the VOC and
Madura, ca. 1681-85 69
5 The Crisis of 1686: Surapati and the Slaughter of the
Europeans at Kartasura 84
6 Waiting for War, 1686-95 100
VOC-Kartasura Impasse and the Crumbling of the
Kartasura state, 1696-1703 114

Vii
Vill CONTENTS

8 Politics, Culture and Technology in the First Javanese War

of Succession, 1704-8 129
9 Politics and Economics in the Quieter Years of Pakubuwana
I, 1709-17 152
10 Religion and War in the East and the Outbreak of the
Second Javanese War of Succession, 1717-19 168
11 The Victory of the Kartasura-Company Alliance, 1719-23 188
12 The New Order in Pacified Java, ca. 1721-26 203

Conclusion: War, Economy and Cultural Reinforcement D9)

Appendices

1 Principal Members of the House of Mataram in the Later

Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries 235
2 Major Officials of the VOC in the Later Seventeenth and
Early Eighteenth Centuries 236
3. Weights, Measures and Currencies 238

Glossary 240

Bibliography 242

Notes 260

Index 407
Preface

The study of war, culture and economy takes one to the worst and the
best, the most and the least dramatic, sides of human history. When in
1973 I began the research which, after many interruptions, has culmi-
nated in this book, however, my aim was more modest: to fill a gap in the
secondary works on the history of Java. H.J. de Graaf and Th. G. Th.
Pigeaud had provided accounts for the period from the fifteenth to late
seventeenth centuries, my own doctoral research concerned the latter half
of the eighteenth century, and P.B.R. Carey and others were attacking the
nineteenth century with impressive results. The Kartasura period
(1680-1745) seemed to have attracted no one’s attention, so I decided
upon a study of what I expected to be a relatively limited amount of
material in order to write a brief narrative account of that period, empha-
sising European-Javanese relations.
I soon discovered that the sources for Kartasura were voluminous. I
empathised across the ages with the high officials of the VOC in Batavia
who complained in 1719 about the
rather great quantity of letters with which the Commander Gobius
and the Council at Sémarang nearly inundate us from day to day,
and to which are attached such numerous Javanese documents that
one nearly gets lost in them.... All of our repeated admonitions to
those at Sémarang to abbreviate the paper work have not been able
to divert them therefrom, despite the fact that the Hon. Gobius
himself declared that this was rather a burden upon him and he was
exhausted by it.!
By 1978 I had concluded that I could not cover enough of the extant
Kartasura material within the foreseeable future to justify writing a general
account. I confided to H.J. de Graaf that I had decided instead to write a
series of studies of the episodes which I felt I had researched adequately,

ix
x PREFACE

linked by briefer narratives based on published sources. To my surprise,

he replied that he had had a similar experience with Kartasura. In 1947-
8 he had set to work on the period and, like me, had gone under in the
flood of evidence. He had compiled voluminous typed notes containing
extensive paraphrases and verbatim extracts from VOC records but had
never completed his research. These notes he now offered to me. When
these great bundles of materials arrived in my study, I discovered that
some of the VOC records studied by de Graaf were the same as those I
had studied, but generally our efforts had complemented each other’s.
Even the overlap was useful, for comparisons showed that we had gener-
ally noted the same sorts of matters in our reading of the VOC archives.
Thanks to de Graaf, I thus had the materials for a very large book on
the Kartasura period—but also needed more years to process his notes. De
Graaf wrote to me that he hoped to live long enough to see this work
appear, but alas this was not to be. As the work progressed, frequently
interrupted by other commitments, the Kartasura book grew to be a pro-
posed work of two volumes. It has now become two separate books, the
first of which is offered here. The second still requires further research
before it can be written.
As my research deepened, naturally new significances and unexpected
issues surfaced. The book which is published here offers, I believe, grounds
for rethinking some aspects of cross-cultural history both in the Javanese
and in a more general context. It also fulfils my original aim of partially
plugging the gap in historical accounts of Java. I should warn readers,
however, that the records for this period in both Dutch and Javanese are
so voluminous that even the work now before you is, in many parts, little
more than a superficial analysis which could be fleshed out by more detailed
scrutiny of the evidence and further argument.
I owe a debt of gratitude to many persons and institutions who have
assisted this research over the years. The two men to whose memory this
book is dedicated, Dr H.J. de Graaf and Dr Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, have left
their mark on all that I write. The School of Oriental and African Studies
of the University of London, All Souls College and Monash University all
provided support and facilities for this research. The Arsip Nasional R.I.
in Jakarta and the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague provided the bulk
of the VOC material for this study, while Javanese sources came primarily
from the British Library and India Office Library in London. The book has
been published with the assistance of the Monash University Publications
Committee. Maps were prepared by Mr. Gary Swinton.
Many individuals have answered specific questions for me, and are
thanked in the footnotes below. Very special thanks go to Dr P.B.R. Carey,
whose painstaking and exhaustive comments upon the first draft of this
book were invaluable. The whole draft was read also by Professor C.
Fasseur, whose comments on the VOC aspects of the topic in particular
PREFACE xi

saved me from some formidable historical briar patches. Dr V.J. Houben

also read through the draft and made helpful comments upon it, as did
Professor C.D. Cowan. Dr Leonard Blussé and Dr Stuart Robson offered
valuable suggestions for the Introduction. Needless to say, none of these
bears any responsibility for the final form of this book.
As I put this book together, I concluded that the juxtaposition of war,
culture and economy gave greater meaning to the cross-cultural history of
Java in this period. I trust that what follows will persuade some readers to
agree with me. For those who do not, I hope that what I have written will
stimulate fruitful argument.

M. C. Ricklefs
Transcription, Orthography
and Personal Names

The transcription system employed below for Javanese script is that

now commonly used in Indonesia, with the addition of @ for /a/ (like the
e in “fallen’”) to distinguish it from e for the character taling which is
pronounced as either /e/ or /e/ (like either the a in “fate” or the e in “‘set”’).
For the rest, vowels are pronounced as in English except for a which is
pronounced rather like English o when it is found in penultimate and final
syllables without final consonants. Consonants have generally the same
value as in English except for c which is pronounced like the ch in “chair”.
In Malay (but not in Javanese), sy is pronounced like the sf in “share”.
Old Javanese, Arabic and Sanskrit words follow currently accepted sys-
tems of transliteration.
Javanese individuals changed names several times during their lives.
This book attempts to use as few names as possible for each individual,
but it proved impossible to reduce everyone to just one name. Dutchmen
usually kept the same names, but employed inconsistent spellings for them.
In each case, one spelling has been adopted as the standard form. Both in
Dutch and in Javanese, the spelling of words often differed from what was
later regarded as standard. Here all quotations from contemporary sources
reproduce the original orthography.

Xil
Abbreviations

Arya
Adipati
Anno Domini, the Christian era
Ajéng
Anno Javanico, the Javanese era
Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta
Ang. Angabei
AR I, U, Ill, IV Susuhunans Amangkurat I (r. 1646-77), II
(r. 1677-1703), Ill (r. 1703-8), IV (r. 1719-26)
ARA Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague
Ay. Ayu
Batavia as sender or recipient of a letter cited in notes:
Governor-General of the VOC and Council of
the Indies, Batavia
BK Babad Kraton, British Library Add. MS
12320. Written in Yogyakarta in AJ 1703-4
(AD 1777-8) by R.Tg. Jayengrat
BKI Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
BL British Library, London
BS Babad ing Sangkala, India Office Library MS
Jav. 36 B, dated AJ 1663 (AD 1738). Text and
English translation in M.C. Ricklefs, Modern
Javanese historical tradition: A study of an
original Kartasura chronicle and related
materials (London: School of Oriental and
African Studies, 1978). All references are to
canto and stanza numbers.
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies

Xill
X1V ABBREVIATIONS

BTJ(BP) Bale Pustaka, Babad tanah Jawi (31 vols.;

Batawi Sentrum: Bale Pustaka, 1939-41). The
Surakarta Major Babad
Capt. Captain
CNS UIE LY Pan./Png. Cakraningrat I (r. 1624-47), II
(r. 1680-1707), If (r. 1707-18), IV (r. 1718-46)
of West Madura
Coolhaas, Gen.Miss. W.Ph.Coolhaas (ed.), Generale missiven van
Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII
der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (8 vols.;
*s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960-85)
dd. dated
Dip. Dipati
dJ J.K.J. de Jonge and M.L. van Deventer (eds.),
De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in
Oost-Indién: Verzameling van onuitgegeven
stukken uit het oud-koloniaal archief (16 vols.;
*s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1862-1909)
Dm. Démang
DR Dagh-Register gehouden int casteel Batavia vant
passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Ned-
erlandts India (31 vols.; ’s Hage: Martinus
Nijhoff; Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1887-1931).
Each volume is identified by year.
AD err Unpublished Batavia Dagregister volumes held in
Arsip Nasional R.I., Jakarta. Each volume is
identified by year, detailed references by date of
entry.
fetes folio, folios
fl. florins, guilders
H.XVII The Heren XVII, Directors of the VOC,
Amsterdam
IOL India Office Library, London
Jépara as sender or recipient of a letter cited in notes:
chief VOC officer and council, Jépara
JMBRAS Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic
Society
KITLV Het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en
Volkenkunde, Leiden
Karaeng
Kyai
Leiden University Oriental MS
Lieutenant
Mas
ABBREVIATIONS XV

Major
manuscript, manuscripts
Netherlands Bible Society MS, Leiden University
Library
no date, undated
Ngabei
Panémbahan
PB I, IL, Ill, IV Susuhunan Pakubuwana I (r. 1704-19), II
(r. 1726-49), III (r. 1749-88), IV (r. 1788-1820)
Png. Pangeran
I. reigned
R. Raden
Rds. Riksdaalders
Rds.Holl. Dutch Rijksdaalders
Tec. received
Sémarang as sender or recipient of a letter cited in notes:
chief VOC officer and council, Sémarang
Sergeant
Spanish Reals
Tijdschrift van het (Koninklijk) Bataviaasch
Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen
Tuménggung
Verhandelingen van het (Koninklijk) Bataviaasch
Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen
identification series of maps held in the Alge-
meen Rijksarchief, The Hague
Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, the Dutch
East India Company
VOCA
(OB 7. used to cite documents from the Algemeen
Rijksarchief, The Hague. “VOC...” gives the
number of the volume in the VOC series; “OB
...” gives the year of the same volume in the
series of Overgekomen brieven en papieren.
Illustrations

1 The grave of Amangkurat I (d.1677) at

Tégalwangi vi

2 Ruins of Kartasura:
Gunung Kunci (treasury)
gédhong obat (gunpowder store)
interior wall of central kraton precinct
northern wall of central kraton precinct
remnants of Sri Ménganti

3 Capt. Tack and Surapati as mythology

4 Reputed grave of Capt. Tack at Jépara

5 Génthong (water container) in the ruins of

Kartawinata/Kartasari/Madegonda

XV1
Maps

Battle of Surabaya, May 1677 38

Major Campaigns of Sept.—Dec. 1678 51

Kartasura in 1686 86

Major Campaigns of the First Javanese War of

Succession, 1704-8 138

Major Campaigns of the Surabaya War and the

Second Javanese War of Succession, 1717-21 170

Java 402

South-Central Java 403

The Region of Surabaya 403

Bali 404

Approximate Ground Plan of Kartasura 405

XVil
Tables

1 Pakubuwana I’s debts and repayments 1708-20 154

2 Pasisir deliveries March 1709 156

3 Deliveries of March 1709:

Summary figures for Kartasura,
Moncanégara and Pasisir

4 VOC accounts for Java’s East Coast, 1717-23

XViil
Introduction: Social,
Cultural, Economic and
Military Settings ca.
1650-70

This book is a study of the violent interaction over half a century between
two societies, Javanese and European, with other ethnic groups on the
margins. It is appropriate to begin by considering these societies on the
eve of their intensive involvement with one another, but not entirely easy
to do so. There have been stimulating but generalised studies of what is
regarded as a classical, pre—colonial Javanese state and society! and others
of the social setting of the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde
Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC).’ The former, however, lack chronologi-
cal specificity: they assume a changeless society, thereby justifying the use
of sources from any period to build up their static model.’ A study such
as this which aims to analyse change can of course do little with works
which assume that there was none. Studies of European society in Indo-
nesia have some of the same difficulty about them. They furthermore
concentrate upon the VOC’s headquarters at Batavia and are thus not
necessarily reliable guides to the European social setting beyond Batavia’s
frontiers, in this case particularly along Java’s north coast (pasisir).*
This introduction attempts to describe both Javanese and European society
in Java in the period ca. 1650-70, that is, just before the events described
in Chapter I. It rests upon records from that period as far as is possible.
There are, however, many difficulties with this evidence. While there is a
substantial amount of VOC documentation from this time, the volume of
Javanese material is very slim and neither of these bodies of sources is
necessarily informative on the topics of greatest interest here. Nor, where
they are informative, are they entirely reliable. One must, therefore, pro-
ceed with caution. From time to time there is no alternative to speculation,
but respect for the extant sources may at least minimise the risk of anach-
ronisms.
For Javanese society one must rely in part upon European documents
Z INTRODUCTION

which are contemporary, but which also reflect misunderstanding and mis-
information. The most important of these are the records of Rijklof van
Goens, five times VOC ambassador to the court of Mataram between 1648
and 1654. He was an experienced eye-witness, but lacked one of the most
elementary tools of cross-cultural understanding, for he apparently had
very little knowledge of the Javanese language.” Many Javanese works
describe this period and doubtless some were first written during it, but
they all survive only in later copies or recensions; it is usually impossible
to establish the degree of revision which such texts may have undergone
and thus to know how far to employ them as guides to an earlier period.
In the India Office Library, however, is preserved a manuscript called
Babad ing Sangkala (Chronicle of the Chronograms) written in November
1738 which, this writer has argued, can be shown to contain a copy of a
text originally composed before ca. 1670.° This work is, therefore, of
particular value for this introduction.
For European society—or the semi-European, Mestizo or “Indies” society
which flourished under the VOC—contemporary travellers’ accounts are
valuable. The most notable of these are the sometimes sensationally cen-
sorious journals and Oost-Indise spiegel (East Indies mirror) of the VOC
surgeon Nicolaus de Graaff, who visited Indonesia on his voyages of
1639-43, 1644-6, 1668-72, 1676-9 and 1683-7. Secondary works by
Blussé, Taylor and Boxer are also invaluable.’
Armed with such materials and with some instincts derived from the
study of the history of Java in the later seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, one may construct a reasonable picture of the social, cultural, military
and economic aspects of the period ca. 1650-70. More research would
refine this picture, but might not provide much greater confidence of its
fidelity.

Javanese Society ca. 1650-70

Social siructure

Hierarchy was the governing principle of Javanese society, but this did
not mean immobility. A hereditary aristocracy was defined in terms of
proximity of descent to the reigning monarch. A rule of declining rank at
each generation was well attested in later centuries and may be presumed
to have existed in the same or similar form in the mid-seventeenth century.
Thereby the son of a king was a prince (pangeran), but his son was of a
lower rank, the latter’s son of a lesser rank still, and so on. Similar rules
applied to female descent. As L.W.C. van den Berg pointed out, this
differed from European conventions of aristocracy, for with each new
monarch in Java a new and younger group of princes (and further descend-
ants) was created, while the offspring of former kings continued to drop
INTRODUCTION 3

in rank at each generation.* Persons without claims to royal descent could

also be elevated to the aristocracy by royal fiat.
The number of Javanese aristocrats was large because of polygamy.
Being Muslims, Javanese men could have up to four wives. Aristocrats
had in addition numerous concubines (sélir). To avoid producing illegit-
imate offspring, when one of his sélirs was pregnant an aristocrat could
divorce a legal wife, marry the sélir in time for the birth of the child, then
again repudiate her under Islam’s simple rules of divorce.? These numer-
Ous aristocrats were supported by the king assigning to them tax and
corvée rights over appanage lands. As was the case in later periods, pre-
sumably aristocrats normally lived in the court city, where they could be
watched, while subordinates administered their appanages.
Administrative positions were held by members of an official class. This
was divided into gradations of rank by a system of titles probably less
regularised in their application than was later the case. It was not normal
for members of the royal family to have posts of this kind; rather they
were in the hands of non-aristocrats whose tenure and status was depen-
dent on keeping the favour of their patrons. There were, however, both
intermarriage and links of mutual economic advantage between aristocrats
and officials. A mark of royal favour was to present a royal daughter to
such an official in marriage (a putri triman): the offspring of such unions
were assimilated to the lesser ranks of the aristocracy.
Outside of the capital city, regional families were often powerful. Some
may have descended from ancient local dynasties. In this study, the two
most important such families—those of Surabaya and West Madura—
originated with governors imposed over those regions by their overlord
the king of Mataram.
At the bottom of the social scale were those who produced and traded
the agricultural wealth which supported the non-producing officials and
aristocrats. This wealth was great, as will be seen below. The peasant
cultivators of Java produced not only for their families and taxing over-
lords, but for trade as well. On the north coast in particular many peasants
must have been well acquainted with production for export.
There were also Javanese craftsmen and artisans, although it is difficult
to know how many would have lived solely from such skills. Java was
particularly noted for its metal smiths. They produced the idiophone in-
struments which were the foundation of the Javanese gamélan orchestra
and which were traded far beyond the island. Weapons were also pro-
duced, particularly the Javanese kris (dagger), and were widely traded. As
was true of medieval Europe, so in Java the smiths’ trade was enveloped
in elaborate rituals and beliefs: far from being mere craftsmen in the esti-
mation of Javanese society, these were persons with access to suprahuman
powers.!°
Islamic religious communities stood somewhat outside the generally
4 INTRODUCTION

hierarchical structure of the society. Pious and learned men, usually called
kyais, established religious schools (pésantren) where students of religion
(santri) came to learn the Qur’ dn, to study the books of the Shafi‘t School
of Law and to become mystics (Sir). Such centres of learning and pious
life were established throughout Java, often at the sites of holy graves, par-
ticularly those of the legendary apostles of Islam in Java, the walis. The
descendants of such figures and other religious leaders were much vener-
ated, and the sites associated with them were thought to be depositories of
supernatural powers (kramat). Many religious centres were given the status
of “independent” (pradikan) villages, which freed them from the tax and
corvée obligations of other settlements. Needless to say, this only in-
creased their attractiveness to those who sought to avoid obligations to
their secular lords. This religious elite represented a source of patronage,
a cultural model and a moral force potentially at odds with those of the
hereditary aristocracy. The relationship between the religious and aristo-
cratic elites was therefore complex and often fraught with suspicion, at
times with plain violence. Ca.1648—9 the Mataram king Amangkurat I
(r. 1646-77) ordered the slaughter at his court of several thousand re-
ligious leaders and their family members from throughout his kingdom."'
And as will be seen below, the religious lords of Kajoran and Giri were
central figures in the great rebellion of the 1670s.
Javanese society was, however, rather more loosely structured than this
hierarchical picture may suggest. Upward mobility was possible in several
ways: through the favour of powerful patrons, through marriage, but above
all through personal success. Success in battle was a major means to
elevation in this martial society. Similarly, wealth gained through official
position could enable one to enlarge one’s entourage of dependants and
influence. Wealth gained through trade was perhaps of more dubious social
efficacy, but it would probably be wrong to suppose that later aristocrats’
contempt for traders applied at all times and everywhere, particularly on
the commercialised pasisir.
Social hierarchy was reflected in language usage. The Javanese language
has one of the most complex systems of social levels in the world. This
is not a matter of mere honorifics or elegant circumlocutions, but of whole
sets of vocabulary and grammatical forms which vary in accordance with
the relative social levels of speakers. There are two basic levels, krama
(high Javanese) and ngoko (low Javanese), and several further refine-
ments of these.'* The historical development of these levels is obscure, but
there is little doubt that they were already well-established by the mid-
seventeenth century, for they had been observed by the Portuguese Tomé
Pires in the second decade of the sixteenth century:
And that it may be known there is no greater pride than in Java,
there are two languages, one for the nobles and the other for the
people. They do not differ as the language at court does with us;
INTRODUCTION 5)

but the nobles have one name for things and the people another;
this must certainly be the same for everything."
Undoubtedly sumptuary laws and complex rules of behaviour also reflected
Javanese social hierarchy, but evidence of these survives only from later
periods.
It is difficult to say how many Javanese lived in the mid-seventeenth
century. A royal census was taken in 1651 but its results are lost. They
may be reflected in somewhat later statistical evidence'* but these figures
are in any case expressed in households rather than heads of population.
Javanese demographic history is vexed by inadequate data and heated
controversy. Here it is only possible to put forward this writer’s estimate
that there was a maximum of perhaps three million Javanese around 1650.
This number could undoubtedly be disputed, but no one would greatly
inflate it. The central point remains that in comparison with more modern
times,'° Java was very underpopulated and vast tracts of land were still
virgin forest.

Economy
Mid-seventeenth century Java was a land of great natural wealth. It was
blessed with rich conditions for rice cultivation and had long been the rice
bow! of the Indonesian Archipelago. In 1648, Batavia imported 6000 /asts
of rice (approximately 21 million lbs avoirdupois/9600 metric tons) from
Java’s pasisir. Many other foodstuffs were also grown. Van Goens listed
fruits, beans, peas and manifold domestic livestock: water buffalo, cattle,
sheep, goats, deer, pigs (an ungulate comment upon either the limited
penetration of Islamic food laws or the number of Chinese), geese, ducks,
chickens, pigeons, and turtledoves. To these could be added the plentiful
game in the vast uncut forests of Java. “The wealth of this island is
unbelievable,” van Goens wrote, “nature having planted there everything
except for gold and silver that men upon this earth might ever wish from
the Lord God.”'®
Manpower was required to exploit this wealth, so the prosperity of
various parts of Java reflected the population there. This writer attempted
elsewhere to use rather shaky statistical evidence to set out the relative
distribution of economic power. This revealed particularly the wealth of
Pékalongan on the western pasisir, Surabaya in the east and West Madura,
all areas which will figure prominently in this study. In the eastern interior,
Kédhiri on the upper Brantas River, Madiun and Panaraga on the Madiun
River, Jipang on the Sala River and Blora seem to have been prominent,
and will be so in this book. Yet the richest lands of all were probably those
around the court in Central Java, the centre of the islands’ agricultural
wealth and of its political power."’
Java’s trade products were not limited to rice and other foodstuffs.
6 INTRODUCTION

Historically, textiles had been a major trade item and timber was becom-
ing so. One of the first effects of the establishment of the headquarters of
the VOC—a large ship- and building-constructing enterprise—at Batavia
in 1619 was increased demand for Java timber. Cotton, pepper, cubeb,
ginger, sugar, sulphur, saltpetre and chalk could also be obtained in J ava.!®
The manufacturing of metal items, notably gongs and weapons, has been
noted above.
Given such resources along with a domestic market of considerable
sophistication and external demand from European and Asian traders, it is
not surprising that there were regular marketing arrangements with con-
comitant commercialisation and monetisation in Java. Javanese calculate
simultaneously in weeks of five, six and seven days. The five-day week
is called pasaran (from pasar, market), indicating its primary function of
regulating cycles of market-days. This week is at least as old as the ninth-
century inscriptions which first record it.'” Before the arrival of the Span-
ish and Portuguese in Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century, Chinese
copper cash was apparently the main coinage in circulation in Java, but
locally minted gold, silver and tin coins also survive from an early
period.” By the mid-seventeenth century the Spanish (Mexican) silver
Real or “piece of eight” was the main monetary unit, with coins of lesser
denomination and local manufacture also in circulation. These coins, called
picis, were made of tin, lead and copper.*! When the Dutch complicated
matters by introducing their own Rijxdaalder or Dutch Real, the Javanese
used the term “old Real” (reyal sépuh) for the Spanish coin.”

Administrative structure and laws of the Mataram empire.

The capital city with its court (Araton) was undoubtedly conceived by
its inhabitants as the centre of the kingdom, and in many respects it was
that. As will be seen below, however, and as has been suggested by the
discussion of religious centres above, some Javanese seem to have fixed
upon foci of loyalty and identity other than the monarch and his court. In
later texts the kingdom was conventionally regarded as extending from its
centre to its periphery as if it were a series of concentric circles, which,
geographically, it was not: from négara (the capital) through négaragung
(the greater capital, the core territories around the court city), to moncané-
gara (the “foreign” or outer lands, in fact only interior districts to the east
of the court in this period), the pasisir (coast, referring only to the north
coast) and finally tanah sabrang (overseas, used also to apply to places on
Java outside the Javanese-speaking heartland such as Batavia).”3 There is
no clear evidence of such schematisation in the mid-seventeenth century,
but similar general concepts may have prevailed at court.
The kingdom was divided into fourteen provinces” but there was hardly
an institutionalised system for administering these from the centre.
INTRODUCTION i,

Amangkurat I experimented with a series of administrative arrangements,

none of them successful.* Although in the pre-Islamic age there had been
(at least at times) a chief administrative officer of the kingdom entitled
Apatih, the most famous being the fourteenth-century Gajahmada,”° by the
mid-seventeenth century this post seems to have fallen into desuetude.
There was, however, an official bearing the title Tuménggung Mataram
whose responsibilities may have been similar to a Patih’s.”’ It will be seen
below that the post of Patih reappeared in the Kartasura period, with one
or two such men presiding over various experimental structures for con-
trolling the kingdom’s provinces. The administrative life of the kingdom
remained in fact highly personal, operating through networks of patronage
and alliance, with a low level of institutionalisation.
The inability to institutionalise and regularise a system of regional
administration was rooted in Java’s geographic, climatic and demographic
circumstances. The Javanese were clustered in pockets of population across
territory some 500 km/330 miles long (from about Cirébon in the west to
about Prabalingga in the east) and up to 200 km/120 miles in width. These
clusters were connected by some substantial rivers, some well-constructed
roads and, along the pasisir, by coastal waters.”> But nonetheless serious
communications problems remained in this mountainous island. Much of
the countryside was wild jungle, roads were easily cut by volcanic erup-
tions, the climate, rebels or brigands, rivers could be too flooded or too
low for safe travel and monsoon winds could make coastal navigation
treacherous. In such circumstances, permanent formal institutions of cen-
tralised control were near to impossible.
Taxation arrangements were like those of administration in general: ir-
regular and unpredictable. Taxes were paid to the centre both in cash and
in kind.” A major occasion in the court calendar was Garébég Mulud, the
celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad held each 12 Mulud,
the third month of the Islamic lunar year. Then all the dignitaries of the
realm were expected to appear at the kraton to pay their obeisance and
their taxes. It was, needless to say, also one of the most intense periods
of intrigue and manoeuvring each year. Corvée labour was also demanded
at all levels of the state, both for military and other duties.*°
Personalised structures of administration required particularly two classes
of people, hostages and spies, who were sometimes indistinguishable.
Members of regional lords’ or officials’ families often lived for long periods
or permanently at court. They might be both hostages for the monarchy
and spies for their families, as well as seekers of their own fortunes. Royal
daughters married to powerful men played similar dual roles. There were
other spies and informants at all levels of society, peddling information
and influence as their means of livelihood in this intensely conspiratorial
state.*!
There were undoubtedly formal legal codes, although none survive from
8 INTRODUCTION

this period. Van Goens gave some small idea of the contents of such
codes.2 To judge from later manuscripts, it is reasonable to assume that
pre-Islamic Javanese principles of jurisprudence and justice would have
informed this ostensibly Islamic legal system.»
This was not, however, a litigious society, but a fighting one. No sources
give the impression that when conflicts arose among powerful people,
their first recourse was to the law. At bottom, what held this state
together—insofar as it held together at all—what facilitated the networks
of patronage, alliance, intrigue, surveillance and marriage, was force or the
threat of force. He who dominated was he who could, if put to the test,
enforce his dominance with violence, or who was believed to be capable
of doing so. The Javanese state, society and culture were martial in spirit,
a fundamental aspect which will be discussed separately below.

Role of the king

The monarch in this period bore the Javanese title Susuhunan (“he to
whom homage is paid’’).*4 In 1641 the Islamic title Sultan had been adopted
by the dynasty’s greatest warrior king, Sultan Agung (r. 1613—46);*° as
will be seen below, it continued to be employed from time to time by
rebels. The monarch was seen by himself and his followers as the centre,
the very embodiment, of the empire, a convenient fiction in the service of
their interests. His favour was theoretically the source of status, distinction
and authority, and his loins of nobility. Yet, as has already been suggested
and as will become clear in this study, there were countervailing centres
of power and loyalty in this ramshackle empire.
The king’s exercise of power was to a large degree indirect, through the
cooperation of lesser notables. The king had professional companies of
soldiers at his command, and throughout the empire certain villages seem
to have owed taxes and corvée directly to him rather than to a lesser lord.*°
Yet the manpower which the monarch could, even in theory, command
directly was limited. Moreover, it appears that a distinction was drawn
between the king’s personal wealth and the revenues of the state.*’ This
suggests that royal access even to the court treasury may have been re-
stricted in some way. Hence the mobilisation of economic or manpower
resources required the ruler to persuade, cajole, threaten or compel other
powerful men with more direct control of resources until he achieved a
consensus of notables in his favour. Complex intrigues, bargains and
pressures naturally attended these affairs. A powerful person at court needed
courage, luck and sophisticated skills to maintain his or her position. Most
such figures were men, but some were women, especially but not only the
mothers, wives and sisters of kings.
There is little doubt that most if not all Mataram monarchs—and cer-
tainly the one who occupied the throne in the years 1650-70, Amangkurat
I—would have been absolute dictators if they could. But they could not:
INTRODUCTION 9

neither the geography nor the demographic patterns nor the economic and
political realities of Java allowed this. The king was, in a sense, the
embodiment of the state, but this state was such a shaky edifice that to be
its embodiment was not to be a great deal, except insofar as others de-
cided to endorse the imperial fictions of the Mataram dynasty. A central
question in the political history of this empire is thus what it was that
made lesser notables endorse or reject royal authority.

Court life
The culture of the court was martial and equestrian, its public face
featuring weapons and horses. “They are great lovers of horses”, wrote
van Goens, “and would rather do without themselves than deny their horse
its due.’”** Each week great tournaments were held at the kraton, where
notables spent the day in jousting and other displays of their skills and
wealth to the accompaniment of multiple gamélan orchestras. Van Goens
claimed that at least 20,000 men were to be seen on the great square (alun-
alun) at the north of the court on such days.*? On these occasions also
tigers were released inside a great square of lancers and were killed when
they tried to fight their way to freedom, a blood sport known as rampog
macan.*” Similar tournaments were held at other centres in emulation of
the courtly style: Nicolaus de Graaff observed one such at Jépara in 1686.*!
The three great festivals of the Islamic year were celebrated with much
pomp at the kraton. These were called Garébégs: Garébég Mulud in the
third lunar month to celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, Garé-
bég Puasa at the start of the tenth month to mark the end of the fast and
Garébég Bésar in the twelfth month in celebration of the pilgrimage to
Mecca and commemoration of Abraham’s preparedness to sacrifice his
son.” As was noted above, the first of these was a particularly important
gathering, when notables from throughout the realm were expected to pay
their taxes and obeisance to the Susuhunan.
The court also hunted, both at the kraton and in the wild countryside,
especially for deer, wild buffalo (bantheng), rhinoceros and tiger. A
krapyak (hunting enclosure) was located near the court where animals
(thousands of them, according to van Goens), were kept for hunting in
controlled conditions.’ One monarch was said to have died there, Paném-
bahan Seda ing Krapyak (“the lord who died in the krapyak’”; reigned ca.
1601-13). Tigers and banthengs were also set to fighting each other for
the entertainment of the court. “This makes a very powerful and cruel
fight, and it is well worth seeing”, reported van Goens.“*
Higher culture such as literature, dance, music, bathik (dyed textile) and
wayang (the shadow-play) were also patronised at the kraton. Van Goens
claimed that most Javanese were literate.* This seems unlikely in general
but may have been true of the aristocrats and courtiers with whom he had
most to do. Court literature included works inspired by Islam but also
10 INTRODUCTION

classics of pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist inspiration. The history of Old

Javanese literature after Islamisation is obscure because of the rarity of
manuscripts older than the eighteenth century, but it seems reasonable to
accept that Old Javanese was still read as a literary language in the sev-
enteenth-century kraton.*° Chronicles were also composed, and are par-
ticularly important sources for the study of Javanese history. Van Goens
observed wayang performances (“old comedies” he called them),*’ dances
including both a martial dance with weapons and apparently wayang topeng
(masked dance),*® and the playing of gamélan orchestras*’ at the court.
Apparently bathik was then, as it is now, primarily a female art.~°
There was much splendour and display of status and influence at the
court, but behind this lay a world of brutal power struggles. Rumours
abounded, people were promoted, demoted, exiled and assassinated. In the
period under discussion here, murder was a frequent tool of royal dis-
pleasure. Unaware that he was seeing an unusual reign, one which was
later taken by the Javanese to be the quintessential example of tyranny,
van Goens wondered at “the strange manner of their government, which
is inconceivable to us, whereby the old are murdered in order to make
place for the young.”*' One feels that the wheels of Javanese government
were at times greased as much by poison as by wealth.
Women played important roles at court. Probably because they were
less able to pursue their fortunes independently in this masculine power
structure, they were allowed closer access to the monarch than were men.
Thereby they acquired information and influence and often exploited them
successfully. It was noted above that the mothers, wives and sisters of the
monarch were often important figures. The king also had a personal
bodyguard of women armed with pikes and heavy muskets. Female arti-
sans saw to the court’s various needs. In all, van Goens believed there to
be 10,000 women in the court and, at night, not a single man aside from
the king.”

Religious life
To judge from what little early evidence survives, Islam began to acquire
its first Javanese adherents in the fourteenth century.’ By the time under
consideration here, it was the religion of the vast majority of Javanese. Yet
Hindu-Buddhism did not thereby disappear from Java, for some evidence
suggests that Hindu-Buddist communities survived in Central and East
Java well into the eighteenth century.’ There is little doubt that Javanese
Islam was influenced greatly by these older religious traditions. It was
influenced, too, by Javanese social traditions, for the egalitarianism in-
herent in Islamic doctrine was well submerged in Javanese ideas of social
hierarchy. Similarly, Javanese literature and art forms continued to be
shaped by their pre-Islamic as well as Islamic heritages. Nevertheless,
INTRODUCTION ; 11

however great the older influences upon it, Islam was the dominant re-
ligion in the society.
The earliest Islamic religious texts to survive from Java are two manu-
scripts no later than the end of the sixteenth century in date. Both teach
orthodox Islamic doctrine in its mystical (Safi) form, and Sufism prob-
ably remained the dominant variant of Islam in seventeenth-century Java.
No doubt this facilitated its accommodation in a society previously accus-
tomed to Hindu-Buddhist mysticism. There are, however, profound differ-
ences between these two religious traditions in both faith and practice. The
“early Javanese code of Muslim ethics” edited by Professor Drewes, a
Javanese text of less certain antiquity but which clearly derives from some
time and place where Islam and Hindu-Buddhism still coexisted, suggests
that there was considerable social conflict along religious lines.*°
Islam seems to have been most important as a social identifier. It was
pointed out above that throughout Java there were religious schools and
holy sites which stood somewhat outside the theoretical state hierarchy
and were foci of loyalty alternative to it. There no doubt one found pious
scholars competent in Arabic and familiar with Islamic works of jurispru-
dence and theology. There the formal precepts of Islam may truly have
shaped many adherents’ lives. But elsewhere in the society, and particu-
larly at the kraton, Islam was apparently mcre powerful as a marker of
cultural identity than as a guide to personal faith and behaviour. Van
Goens reported that Javanese aristocrats were contemptuous of non-Muslims
but that they also consumed strong drink and opium in violation of Qur’anic
prohibitions.*’

Cultural and ethnic identities

If Islam was a major label of identity in seventeenth-century Java, there

were others. There is no doubt that “Java” was an old quasi-geographic
concept. The fourteenth-century Nagarakértagama and other Old Java-
nese works refer to Yawa, Yawabhimi (the land of Java), Yawadwipa (the
island of Java), Yawamandala (the territory or realm of Java), Yawapurt
(the kingdom of Java) and so on.** The concept seems to have referred to
an ethnic or cultural entity as much as a geographic one, for this Java was
distinguished from Sunda, the highlands in the west of the island.°° In the
late Old Javanese text Tantu Panggélaran, written ca. 1500-1635, the
people who lived in this place are called “the people of the island of Java”
(wong Jambudipa).” Yet the absence of such a usage in other Old Java-
nese texts, so far as this writer can discover, suggests that the concept of
a Javanese people may have been an idea of no great antiquity or gener-
ality perhaps even as late as the seventeenth century.
That Jawa remained a marker of cultural as much as geographic identity
is suggested by the “early Javanese code of Muslim ethics” edited by
1) INTRODUCTION

Drewes, which refers to the Java religion (gama Jawa) as distinguished

from the Islamic religion (agama Sélam).°! It is possible that the idea of
a Javanese identity came to be approximately coterminous with an Islamic
identity as one of the fruits of the success of Islamisation. This made
membership of Javanese society less a matter of ancestry than of religion
and culture. Tome Pirés observed this in the early sixteenth century:
These lord pates [the lords of the pasisir] are not Javanese of long
standing in the country, but they are descended from Chinese, from
Parsees and Kling, and from the nations we have already mentioned
[i.e. also Arabs, Gujeratis, Bengalis, Malays]. However, brought up
among the bragging Javanese, and still more on account of the riches
they have inherited from their ancestors, these men made themselves
more important in Javanese nobility and state than those of the
hinterland.”
The formal assimilation of Chinese Muslims by the granting of Javanese
names and the giving of such names to Arabs who were, of course, also
Muslims, is also attested later in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. According to van Goens, it was of significance to the king and his
advisers that the Makasarese of South Sulawesi and the Banténese of
West Java were fellow Muslims whereas the Balinese were “unbelieving
kafirs”, as were the Dutch.“
A Javanese identity, overlapping substantially with an Islamic identity,
may have served to identify Javanese as opposed to some non-Javanese,
but there is little evidence of bonds of much strength within this ostensible
community. There was much diversity and plenty of violence both before
and after the mid-seventeenth century, particularly along regional lines,
between followers of religious leaders and supporters of the king, and
among rival claimants to the throne. Such conflicts were encouraged and
an all-Java identity discouraged by Java’s geographic, demographic and
communications circumstances. It is entirely probable that in the middle
of the seventeenth century, most Javanese thought of themselves in the
first instance as Muslims and/or Surabayans, Mataramese, Pajangese, or
whatever, and as Javanese only secondarily, when it was relevant that
they were not Sundanese, Madurese, Malay or something else. Then, the
speaking of the Javanese language was presumably the primary mark of
belonging, whereas otherwise regional dialects probably provided more
provincial labels.

The place of war

There has been sufficient discussion above of conflict and the martial
aspects of Javanese culture to make it clear that violence was a central
social fact. A well-known phenomenon was the amuk (a frenzied attack),
whence the English phrase “to run amuck’’.© A central function of the ad-
INTRODUCTION 13

ministrative arrangements of the state was the levying of men and wealth
for war. Military power was the basis of imperial politics. Java’s poor
communications and barely institutionalised administrative network may
indeed have encouraged war. Regions were emboldened to resist central
authority while the centre, if personal ties, threats, cajolery and murder
failed, could in the end only attempt conquest and retribution.

Military technology
As was true also of the warring nations of Europe in the same period,
one of the most developed branches of industry in mid-seventeenth-cen-
tury Java was military technology. Since at least the 1620s and in fact
probably long before, Javanese had manufactured their own gunpowder.
A Chinese bombard (an early type of cannon) dated 1421 was found in
Java,*’ so by the time under consideration here artillery had probably long
been known. Some pieces were from European or other foreign sources
but others, both at the court and in provincial towns, were of local manu-
facture.** The Javanese also used and manufactured their own muskets,
which may safely be assumed to have been matchlocks.”
In 1651 van Goens visited the kraton gun foundry. There he saw arti-
sans manufacturing muskets, iron cannon, iron cannon balls and krisses.
He was surprised, however, by the laboricus methods used for making
cannon and musket barrels. In Europe, cannon were cast in a clay mould
with a central core which was broken after each casting, whereupon the
barrel was bored out further with a bit. Musket barrels were forged from
flat wrought iron which, after up to 100 heatings in the forge, was worked
into the desired tubular form. Although van Goens first refers to the casting
(gieten) of the king’s artillery, he goes on to describe in detail how Java-
nese iron cannon and musket barrels were forged (gesmeet) around an iron
core which must afterwards be withdrawn with great difficulty, whereupon
the hole was laboriously bored out to its desired calibre using a steel bit
of square cross-section. The results of all this effort were apparently satis-
factory. When the king asked van Goens what he thought of these arma-
ments, diplomacy obliged him to praise them. But he seems in fact to have
been favourably impressed particularly by the muskets and gunpowder.”
In times of necessity, the kraton’s capacity for producing firearms was
apparently considerable. Van Goens was told a year later that in the space
of three months the king’s artisans had produced 800 muskets and many
small iron cannon.”!
Van Goens’s report of 1651 appears to reflect a distinction between
smaller guns which were forged and larger cannon which were cast. The
Javanese had been casting heavy artillery in the same general way as
Europeans for some time. At the modern court of Surakarta is found the
cannon Kyai Pancawura or Sapujagat, the heaviest piece known from the
14 INTRODUCTION

Indonesian archipelago, weighing some 19,000 Ibs/8600 kg and capable of

firing an iron ball of some 260 Ibs/118 kg. This is a cast gun of Javanese
manu-facture probably from the 1620s.” In 1664 the VOC servant Wouter
Schouten recorded that the Javanese “cast also heavy cannon, but the
pieces turn out rather crude and clumsy and some are uncommonly large
and heavy.” Javanese gun-casting perhaps improved as more was learned
about European techniques. In the chapters which follow there will be
occasion to note the general speed with which the Javanese adopted
European military technology.”
When a Javanese army marched, it consisted partly of elite professional
troop companies in the service of the monarch or lesser lords, but mostly
of peasants levied as soldiers and porters. It carried muskets and hauled
cannon, but was largely armed with other weapons. Schouten noted krisses,
pikes, sabres, shields, spears and poisoned blow-pipe darts among Java-
nese arms.”> The proportions armed with these various weapons is hard to
estimate. Van Goens appears to have exaggerated considerably in his report
that king’s army could amount to 900,000 men of whom 115,500 were
armed with muskets.’ Figures one-third this size seem more probable.”

European Society in Java ca. 1650-70

Social structure

European society in Java can be more briefly described than the Java-
nese, partly because it is better known due particularly to the work of
Boxer, Taylor and Blussé, partly because there was less of it. This society,
too, was hierarchical, with position defined by one’s place in the VOC
bureaucratic structure. There were no hereditary ranks in the VOC, but
connections were important and nepotism was a significant problem. This
social structure was reflected in elaborate forms of address and graduated
displays of status and wealth, regulated by social convention and eventu-
ally by Company sumptuary regulations.’”’ The Company’s hierarchy
reached out from Batavia to its outer posts, of which there was only one
in the Javanese heartland, at Jépara, and that not permanently, in the
period 1650-70.
Social mobility was a conspicuous feature of Company society. Nico-
laus de Graaff saw the VOC as a refuge for all those who had suffered
misfortunes in Europe, who had too many children to support, who were
bankrupt, runaway students, informers or other licentious types who had
wasted their patrimony, not to mention various “scoundrels, pimps, hooli-
gans, cads, gutter-snipes, drunks, villains, gamblers, card-sharps, swin-
dlers, ruffians, prodigals, deserters, loafers, scoffers, sneak-thieves and
good-for-nothings”. “In the Indies one can make good children, good
sailors and good soldiers from all such fellows”, he asserted.’? Small won-
INTRODUCTION IS

der that there was little sign of those substantial, upright and pious
Calvinists painted by Rembrandt: here instead were the disorderly folk of
the innkeeping artist Jan Steen.
The most dramatic case of upward mobility was that of Antonio van
Diemen. He was bankrupted in Amsterdam in 1617 at the age of twenty-
four. In search of a new future, he enlisted as a VOC soldier and set sail
for the Indies in 1618, using a faise name to avoid the Company’s ban
on hiring bankrupts. The Heren XVII (the Seventeen Gentlemen, the
Company’s Directors in Amsterdam) discovered this and promptly or-
dered their servants in Batavia to take good measures against van Diemen
and to give him no employment. Yet a year later he was in charge of the
VOC’s financial records in Batavia. His personal qualities and skills
guaranteed him further promotion. Seven years later he was a member of
the Council of the Indies, two years thereafter Director-General (the se-
cond highest post in the Indies), and in 1636 he became Governor-General
(1636-45).*°
Given mortality rates on shipboard and in the tropics, a degree of
desperation was required to seek a better life in the Indies, and few who
did so found a future as brilliant as van Diemen’s. Nicolaus de Graaff
described the particularly harsh life of a Company soldier, “ordered to
march with your musket on your shoulder through mountain, forest and
valley, through thickets, wildernesses and quagmires, with a handful of
dry rice and a bit of raw pork in your bag.”*! Those who served as merchants
in the VOC faced fewer perils and greater opportunities for self-enrich-
ment, but for them, too, life was frequently far short of luxurious.
The number of Europeans in Java was small. A census of population
within the walls of Batavia and its voorstad (suburb) at the end of 1674
counted some 2000 Europeans (called Nederlanders), as compared to 700
Mestizos, 2700 Chinese, 5400 Mardijkers, 1300 Javanese and Moors (non-
Indonesian Muslims), 600 Malays, 1000 Balinese and, the largest group of
all, 13,300 slaves, in a total population of 27,000.** In a post like Jépara
a mere handful of Europeans was to be found. Many of these in fact came
from places other than the Netherlands. Contemporary sources mention
Poles, Swedes, Danes, Norwegians, Germans, Swiss, English, Scots and
Irish among others.*? This large non-Dutch presence was typical of the
Dutch shipping industry in general, not a peculiar feature of the VOC.™
By the mid-seventeenth century already significant numbers of Europeans
in the Indies had been born there, had never seen Europe and had a non-
European mother.

Economy
The Dutch East India Company operated a complex network of econ-
omic relationships within Asia and between Asia and Europe, with Batavia
as its focal point. These complexities need not be pursued for the purpose
16 INTRODUCTION

of this study.*° It is important to understand, however, the nature of the

VOC’s specific economic interest in the realm of the Javanese king. In the
middle decades of the seventeenth century, the VOC controlled or had a
dominating influence in only a few Indonesian territories outside of Bata-
via, none of them on Java.*° The trade products it sought for sale in Europe
and Asia included none of significance from the Mataram empire. Pepper
from the kingdom of Bantén in West Java was important, but even that
played a declining role in VOC trade by the period 1650—70.°*’
The Company’s economic interests in the Mataram empire thus had
little to do with its wider trading activities; rather, they were a corollary
of the location of its headquarters at Batavia in 1619. While there were
few Europeans in Batavia, its total population inside and outside the walls
including Chinese, Mestizos, Mardjikers, slaves and others was of the
order of 80,000 by the 1670s.** There was no possibility of feeding this
population without food imports, particularly from Central and East Java.
This van Goens called “the food store (spijsekamer) of Batavia”,® a view
echoed throughout the period of this study.” Nor could the city be built
or ships constructed and repaired without imports of timber, of which the
principal source of supply was Java’s pasisir. The physical defence of the
city also required ongoing interest in the affairs of the Javanese hinterland.
Thus, in the period 1650-70 Java played an essential role in the survival
of Batavia, the centre and capital of the Company’s entire trading empire
from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan, but it was not itself of significance
in that trade.

Administrative structure

The VOC was governed from Amsterdam by the Heren XVII, the
Seventeen Gentlemen. But voyage times between the Netherlands and
Batavia were so long—eight months on average in each direction’?'!—that
the senior VOC figure at Batavia, the Governor-General, was effectively
in charge of the Company’s affairs unless they were so disastrous that
Amsterdam took special measures to intervene. A Director-General was
second in command. A Council of the Indies of some dozen men advised
the Governor-General and supposedly restrained his otherwise dictatorial
powers. Conflicts among vested interests and factions within the Company
often surfaced in the Council’s deliberations. There were other specialised
posts within the Batavia hierarchy: judicial officers, bookkeepers, alder-
men, trustees of orphans, and so on. But these were not powerful posts in
themselves, for the Company ruled all. As Blussé observes, “save for the
names, Batavia in fact lacked all those political institutions that gave her
Dutch sister cities inner strength: its citizens lacked all political power or
privilege”.”’> 92 From this control the Company gained little direct profit, but
INTRODUCTION 7

its officials often raked off substantial personal fortunes. If the Europeans
of Batavia lacked civic identity and power, even more so did VOC officials
in a Javanese town like Jépara, socially isolated in their small trading post.
The VOC military hierarchy was separate from the commercial struc-
ture, and there was some tension between the two. VOC military officers
were exclusively European in the mid-seventeenth century, so far as this
writer is aware, but a few of Indonesian origin will appear later in this
book. The soldiery they commanded was an ethnic patchwork. There were
Europeans of various origins, people of mixed ancestry of various kinds
and companies recruited from particular Indonesian areas. The VOC seems
to have kept companies of Mestizos, Mardijkers, Ambonese, Balinese and
Bugis military on a fairly permanent footing and enlisted more Indone-
sians when they were needed. In major campaigns the Company always
fought alongside local allies with their own commanding officers.?? The
Madurese will play a particularly important role in this respect in the
chapters to follow.

Social life
Much has been written on this subject. Contemporary observers concen-
trated on Batavia, which they depicted as a scandalous amalgam of idle-
ness and debauchery. The women of the town received particularly splenetic
treatment from Nicolaus de Graaff.** Blussé treats them more gently”° and
Taylor and Boxer show how they were the key to both the family relation-
ships and the Mestizo culture of Batavia.”® There is, however, little need
to discuss these damsels here, for their life of indulgence and splendour
was confined to Batavia. European society in a place like Jépara was too
small a cultural enclave to generate the institutions upon which they thrived.
The legendary over-indulgence and excessive drinking of their menfolk
translated more successfully to such outlying posts.
In a place like Jépara, VOC men were more likely than in Batavia to
have a local concubine or wife, and to produce children whose European
cultural roots were tenuous. Their own identity may occasionally have
been of doubtful durability in such places. In Bantén, Nicolaus de Graaff
encountered the orangkaya (a distinguished person) Wiraguna, formerly a
Dutch bricklayer named Hendrik Lucassen Cardeel van Steenwijk.”’
The life of Europeans in the tropics was dominated by the fact of early
death. The main natural threats to health were paralysis, oedema, syphilis,
fevers and, perhaps above all, dysentery.”* These were compounded by
excessive alcohol consumption. Boxer thought it “no exaggeration to say
that most of the Dutch and English males who died in the tropics died of
drink, even making due allowance for the heavy toll taken by malaria and
dysentery.”””
18 INTRODUCTION

Religious life
The Republic of the Netherlands had its historical roots and defined its
political identity in Calvinism. It has already been suggested, however,
that little Calvinist religiosity survived the long voyage to Java. The
language of religion suffused the documents of the VOC and the church
was a central social institution of Batavia, but the seeds of John Calvin’s
stern pieties found tropical soils infertile. “The Company was certainly no
missionary society and even the convinced Calvinists who helped to found
it and who served in the hardest years were persuaded of this,” observed
one historian of the Netherlands; “yet for them it was unquestionably a
work of God.” Thus, there was much invocation of God’s protection for
the Company, but little emulation of the life of Christ or display of that
sober substance which marked God’s elect upon this earth.
In the Indies, Calvinism functioned primarily as a political and social
marker.!°! Being a Calvinist meant above all that one was neither a Roman
Catholic nor a Muslim. In the Indies, however, where so many things
could be fixed, where a bankrupt using a false name could become
Governor-General, even religious identities had an element of flexibility
about them. The controversial Arnold de Vlaming van Outshoorn (ca.
1618-62) achieved much in east Indonesia despite being suspected of
never truly having made the conversion from Catholicism to Calvinism
which he professed.'°? Governor-General (1653-78) Joan Maetsuycker,
too, had Roman Catholic parents and made an act of conversion to Cal-
vinism. Suspicions of his religious sincerity nevertheless remained, fuelled
by the fact that during his four decades in Batavia not once did he take
Communion. Yet he rose to the top of the VOC hierarchy.'® In these and
similar cases, the professed conversion to the dominant Calvinist category
was more important than what they believed.
The few Dutch Reformed clergymen and lesser church workers in the
Indies were Company employees entirely under VOC control. There was
no question of separating church and state or of the clergy acting as critics
of Company actions. The VOC allowed no proselytisation of Muslims, but
the conversion to Calvinism of Indonesians whom the Portuguese had
made into Catholics in Ambon was a high priority. Otherwise, the clergy
were expected to minister to VOC servants and keep out of the way of
more important Company affairs.'%

Cultural and ethnic identities

In the complex ethnic setting of the VOC in Java, a common identity

could not be defined in terms of Dutch ancestry. Nor would Dutch culture
do, for many of the European inhabitants of Batavia and posts like Jépara
were poorly educated, had never been to the Netherlands, spoke Dutch
only as a second language and married or were raised by Asian or Eura-
INTRODUCTION 19

sian women whose cultural milieu had little to do with that of the me-
vrouwen of Amsterdam, Leiden or Gronigen.'®
There were four principal signs that one was a European in Java. The
first was being in the service of the Dutch East India Company. The
second was being an adherent of the Dutch Reformed Church. The third
concerned language. Malay was widely used in the streets of Batavia and
elsewhere and in the seventeenth century Portuguese was probably spoken
in more European homes than Dutch. But Dutch, then still called “low
German” as it was well into the nineteenth century, was the language of
the VOC’s affairs; without command of it, one was outside the European
social core.'°° The fourth sign was dress: Europeans wore certain kinds of
clothes in public, mainly apparel unsuited to the tropics, whatever they
wore in the privacy of their homes.
Thus was defined a group identity which may be thought of as Euro-
pean, but which was only rarely called that at the time. This is hardly
surprising, since there was little sense of a European identity in Europe.
Rather, VOC sources more often labelled these people Nederlanders, a
kind of cultural shorthand, or “whites” (blanken) as opposed to locals who
were “blacks” (swarten).'°’ This was, however, a rather polychrome
whiteness, not to be confused with the pseudo-purities of later ages. In this
period before Social Darwinism and its spurious ranking of the “races” of
mankind, there was no explicit racist ideology to petrify the sense of
difference between Europeans and Asians into the odious rigidities of
other times and places. People were assimilated into this “white” society
whose colour of skin would have shocked later White Supremacists.'"°

The place of war

The Netherlands had military as well as commercial traditions in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.'” The Dutch revolt against Spanish
Habsburg rule began in the 1560s under the leadership of Prince Willem
van Oranje (William of Orange, 1533-84). This initiated the Eighty Years
War, the independence of the Netherlands finally being guaranteed by the
Treaty of Miinster in 1648. The Dutch were shortly thereafter embroiled
in the First (1652-4), Second (1665-7) and Third (1672-4) Anglo-Dutch
Wars. Willem van Oranje’s son Prince Maurits van Nassau (1567—1625)
was probably the greatest soldier of his time. Count Jan van Nassau
(1535-1606), Count Willem Lodewijk van Nassau (1560-1620), the
admirals Maarten Harpertsz. Tromp (1598-1653), Cornelis Tromp
(1629-91) and Michiel Adriaansz. de Ruyter (1607-76) and the engineer
Baron Menno van Coehoorn (1641-1704) were among the great figures of
seventeenth—century European military history.
The combination of military and commercial impulses fuelled the VOC's
dynamism in its early years in Indonesia. In 1614 Jan Pietersz. Coen
wrote to the Heren XVII,
20 INTRODUCTION

You should know from experience that in the Indies trade must be
conducted and maintained under the protection and favour of your
own arms and that these arms must be got out of the profits won
from the trade, so that trade cannot be maintained without war nor
war without trade.''°
Thus war was as central to the VOC in Java as it was to Javanese
society. Similarly, displays of martial might were important in Batavia, as
they were in Mataram’s capital city. In 1676 Nicolaus de Graaff watched
the civic militia on parade:
All commanding officers over land forces or the ships must
appear in full weapons in the Batavia castle and march in order in
the presence of the Governor-General and Councillors of the Indies.
And ... all free citizens, Javanese, Malays, Ambonese and other
inhabitants appeared in the same fashion fully armed before His
Excellency and Councillors, each being specially dressed and
equipped, these peoples performing many strange leaps and attractive
tricks./1

Military technology
The VOC was heir to the technological advances which accompanied
the fighting in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the period
of transition from medieval to.modern warfare. Sir George Clarke calcu-
lated that during the entire seventeenth century, in only seven complete
calendar years was there no war between European nations.'!* Out of this
fighting came improved small arms, artillery, siegecraft and fortifications,
drill, tactics and logistics.''%
These innovations were brought to Java by the Company. Those to do
with infantry weapons in particular were quickly adopted by Javanese
society, as will be seen below. The VOC was casting its own artillery in
Batavia before the 1650s.''* The Dutch school of fortress design was well
suited to tropical circumstances. It emphasized low thick earthen ramparts
(sometimes in demi-revetment), acute angles, wet ditches and multiple
outer works.'! In all areas of military technology, it appears to have been
the VOC alone which was the source of innovations in Java after the mid-
seventeenth century; the Portuguese and English had ceased to be of
significance in this regard.
VOC soldiers fought also with weapons of cold steel, and not only
against the Company’s enemies. Sabres, dirks and pikes were important
weapons in this age of slow-loading, unreliable and inaccurate muskets
still devoid of bayonets.''® But they mixed poorly with the heavy drinking
and pugnacious character of many VOC servants. Conflicts were common,
frequently leading to drawn weapons, injury and sometimes death among
VOC servants of all echelons. Such incidents usually involved daggers,
INTRODUCTION PDhI

although sometimes firearms were used.''’? The Company attempted to

maintain rigid discipline and employed harsh punishments including tor-
ture and execution in order to keep such violence under some control, with
only partial success.!!*

Other ethnic groups

It will already be clear that it was not only Europeans and Javanese
who appeared on the historical stage of seventeenth-century Java. Neither
space nor the extant source material allows discussion of other ethnic
groups of the kind which has gone before, but a few brief observations
may be of value.

Chinese

The Chinese were essential to the VOC’s survival. Indeed, Blussé refers
to Batavia in the period 1619-1740 as a Chinese colonial town.!!? In the
1670s there were some 2700 Chinese living within Batavia’s walls !?° and
more in its hinterland and elsewhere throughout Java. They were not,
however, a unified ethnic or cultural group. Some practised the Chinese
religion.'*! Others cut off their queues, that symbol of Chinese subservi-
ence recently decreed by the conquering Qing dynasty, and became
Muslims; these were what the Europeans called “shaved Chinese”.!”?
Some of these Chinese Muslims, as was noted above, were assimilated
into Javanese society by the granting of Javanese names. Other Chinese
Muslims apparently remained distinct from the Javanese social mainstream.
This is suggested by the use of the Malay title éncik before their Chinese
or Malay (but not Javanese) names and of the term péranakan or pranakan
Cina (“Chinese with local roots”) to refer to them as a group.'?* There
were also Chinese Christians,' but there is little information available
about them and they do not seem to have been of significance in Java in
the period covered by this study.

Other non-Indonesian Muslims

There were certainly Arabs and South Asian Muslims in Java at this
time. They were merchants and doubtless in some cases also religious
notables. There is, however, little evidence concerning them at this period.

Madurese

These people, occupying the substantial island off Surabaya, had a

reputation as warriors and devout Muslims. They will be seen to play a
major role in Java’s domestic affairs after the 1670s, as was noted above.
22 INTRODUCTION

Makasarese and Bugis

These two related ethnic groups from South Sulawesi were, like the
Madurese, regarded as warriors and firm Muslims. They were also great
traders. In the 1660s their land was the scene of major warfare in which
the VOC was involved.'% This warfare forms part of the background to
their involvement in Java, as will be seen below.

Balinese

The Balinese were also a nation of soldiers, but they were the only
major ethnic group of Indonesia not to have converted to Islam. Hinduism
still ruled, with at least some Buddhist remnants present as well.'”° As will
be seen below, the Balinese were intimately involved in the affairs of
Blambangan in far southeast Java, just across the narrow Straits of Bali.

Conclusion
This introduction does not aim to provide the basis for scholarly con-
clusions but rather to set the scene ca. 1650—70 and provide information
with which to make sense of the chapters which follow. Nevertheless four
concluding points are worthy of brief attention.
First, there were profound cultural differences between the European
Protestants in Java and the Javanese Muslims but, at the risk of grossly
oversimplifying cultural history, one may say that these were differences
of kind rather than degree. There is no evidence at this time of those smug
certainties of superiority which Europeans later donned with the boiler-
suits of industrialisation. Each culture was exotic to the other, but each
was also infused with a belief in the supernatural which largely defined
social identity. Each was set in social and administrative structures be-
tween which there were many parallels.
Second, there were differences in technology but they were small. The
VOC’s main technological superiority was at sea, a realm of such little
direct significance for European-Javanese relations that it has not been
considered above. Both European and Javanese society were pre-indus-
trial. The advances which the VOC was about to bring to Java were in the
realm of military technology and would prove readily transferrable to
Javanese society.
Third, on both the Javanese and European sides, ethnic and cultural
categories were important but had a degree of fluidity about them. It was
possible to change categories and to occupy ambiguous positions among
them, at least in some circumstances.
Finally, most Europeans and Javanese knew very little of each other in
the years 1650-70. In this introduction the valuable works of van Goens
and de Graaff, among others, have been used for information on Javanese
INTRODUCTION De)

society. But such works were either tucked away in VOC archives or, if
published, appeared in Europe. In Europe there was a market for tales of
the exotic but the Europeans in Java who lived next to that exotic world
seem only rarely to have thought it a proper object of study. Indeed, theirs
was not in general a society committed to the intellectual analysis of much
of anything except the pursuit of wealth and advancement. For their part
the Javanese seem to have regarded the few Europeans they encountered
as inconsequential curiosities. The stage was set, however, for a rapid and
bloody learning experience for both sides.
 7 -

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led >: a= oa Gat @ a
os i > MA Saeaen) se
rae = 7 Rae
ik or a ee ry
te oie ee Cf: Gia
mow) 7 sl iae @& ~—e
*t aa > pagan c
. eer eS
. ! ~ at

7 ie =

~
Gunung Kunci (the reputed site of the treasury) in the ruins of
Kartasura.
The remnants of the gédhong obat (gunpowder store) in the ruins of
Kartasura.
The interior of the central kraton precinct in the ruins of Kartasura.
The northern wall of the central kraton precinct in the ruins of
Kartasura.
Remnants of the Sri Ménganti (which separated the inner precinct of
the kraton from the outer areas to the north) in the ruins of Kartasura.
 The Disintegration of
the State of Mataram,
1677

There were three empires in Central and East Java in mid-1677, one
collapsed, one newly established but with little time to survive, one hardly
knowing that it was about to be. The first was the Javanese state of Mataram,
whose disintegration set the stage for the troubled years of the court of
Kartasura (1680-1745). The second was the newly established empire of
Raden Trunajaya, a prince from the line of the lords of West Madura who,
not yet thirty years of age, stood victorious at the head of an anti-Mataram
coalition. The third was the Dutch East India Company (VOC), which was
about to learn the consequences of a decision to intervene in the affairs of
the Javanese.
The Mataram empire was one of the greatest and the last of the imperial
states of Java.' It was founded in the late sixteenth century and its dynasty’s
descendants still head the royal and princely houses of Central Java today.
Some six decades of warfare from the 1580s onwards were needed to im-
pose a fragile Mataram hegemony over the contending states and statelets
of Central and East Java. Isolated centres of population in the interior,
major trading states along the north coast, the seats of old regional dy-
nasties, the major kingdom of Surabaya and the neighbouring island of
Madura all fell to Mataram. These conquests left a legacy of economic,
political, cultural and dynastic animosities which smouldered long after.
Much of the final conquest was the work of Sultan Agung (r. 1613-46),
one of the dynasty’s great fighting kings, a man successful, creative and
brutal in the tradition which defined royal greatness in pre-modern Java as
in many similar kingdoms.
Agung’s son and successor, Susuhunan Amangkurat I (r. 1646-77), was
brutal without being successful or creative. Dr de Graaf described in two
volumes the process by which this king destroyed the state which his
father had welded together. Where Agung conquered, threatened, cajoled

30
DISINTEGRATION OF MATARAM 3]

and manoeuvred, Amangkurat I demanded and murdered. With little re-

spect for the political balancing required to govern a state as unwieldy as
seventeenth-century Java, Amangkurat J tried to centralise his kingdom to
serve his interests alone. He achieved thereby the alienation of many of
those upon whose consensus the Javanese state depended: princes, officials,
regional notables and religious leaders.
Among the young dignitaries who lived at Amangkurat I’s court at
Plered was a prince of the house of West Madura named R. Trunajaya.
When Sultan Agung conquered Madura in 1624, he had taken the only
surviving local lord, the ruler of Sampang, back to Mataram, bestowed on
him the grandiloquent Javanese appellation Cakraningrat’ (J, r. 1624-47)
and then sent him back to govern West Madura as a vassal ruler. His son
R. Dm. Mélayakusuma may have succeeded him as lord of West Madura
under Agung’s suzerainty, but the evidence is unclear about this. During
the subsequent reign of Amangkurat I, merely to be a person of distinction
with a potential to gather a following was sufficiently dangerous. In 1656,
Mélayakusuma was murdered at the court, along with his mother, two
brothers and three of his senior officials, according to a Dutch source.* He
left behind his seven-year-old son R. Trunajaya. Authority over West
Madura was given to the murdered man’s brother, who later bore the title
Cakraningrat IJ (1680-1707) and who was to play a crucial role in Java-
nese history for the first quarter-century of the court of Kartasura.
At some point, Trunajaya fled the Mataram court to save his own life.
He went to Kajoran, the home of an Islamic holy figure called Raden
Kajoran or Panémbahan Rama, some 26 km/16 miles northeast of the
court. The Kajoran family was of importance not only for its religious
authority but also for its long-standing marriage connections with the
House of Mataram. Trunajaya became Kajoran’s protégé and married his
daughter.
By the late 1660s opposition to Amangkurat I was deeply rooted among
the surviving dignitaries of his kingdom. The king’s own son and Crown
prince was among the alienated; through the mediation of R. Kajoran he
entered into a conspiracy with Trunajaya sometime around 1670. It was
agreed that Trunajaya would launch a rebellion with the Crown Prince’s
blessing and on the latter’s behalf, while the Crown prince would for the
time being remain at court, concealing his part in the rebellion.
This Mataram Crown prince was a man of whom the Dutch thought
little. They would think even less of him by the time his reign as Susuhunan
Amangkurat II (1677-1703) came to an end. In 1670 they heard rumours
that he was in disfavour with the king either because he was suspected of
having joined a conspiracy against the monarch (as indeed he had) or
because he spent the nights in Mataram “vagabonding and violating wives
and young daughters”.°
The Crown prince’s mother was from the old ruling family of Surabaya.
32 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

She had died a few weeks after his birth but apparently he had continued
to be raised at court by the Surabaya family. Among the reasons for his
alienation from his father was, it seems, the assassination at the king’s
wish of his grandfather Png. Pékik of Surabaya and many other members
of the family in 1659. Other reasons included conflicts with his father over
women and, of course, plain avarice and ambition, neither of which was
wanting in the prince’s character. In the conspiratorial atmosphere of the
court, the crown prince’s intrigues pitted him also against various brother
princes. Several of these were to play major roles and one, Png. Pugeér,
would later succeed him as king Pakubuwana I (r. 1704-19).
Trunajaya travelled to Madura, gathered a following and by 1671 had
taken control of the island. His uncle, Png. Sampang (later named Cakra-
ningrat II), could do little to check his nephew’s progress from his resi-
dence in far-away Mataram. Around 1675 Trunajaya sealed an alliance
with the Makasarese leader Karaeng Galesong who was then in East Java.
He thereby joined to his cause marauding Makasarese warriors who had
fled their homeland in South Sulawesi in search of new homes and plun-
der, and who were shortly to find plenty of the latter in Java.° In 1675
Madurese and Makarese forces began to take the port towns of East Java.
The spread of fighting on Java’s coast naturally attracted the attention
of the VOC, for the need to defend Batavia and to supply it with food-
stuffs, timber and other minor products, along with the Company’s general
trading interests, had led the pasisir to acquire great significance in Dutch
eyes. When the Dutch, one of the leading fighting nations of Europe, met
the Javanese and Madurese, two of the great warrior peoples of Asia,
during a period which Chandler describes as “a watershed in the history
of the development of warfare’,’ the scene was set for military, political,
cultural and economic encounters of epic duration and consequence for all
parties. It was to be almost fifty years (1675-1723) before Java saw a
lengthy period of peace. During these decades both Dutch and Javanese
figures would have reason to regret that their encounter had ever taken
place, but the logic of past events and the political, economic and military
requirements of both sides repeatedly drove them together. For Madurese
lords, these troubles in Java opened unparalleled opportunities.
The years of turmoil which first brought the VOC, Madurese and Java-
nese into battle with one another were hard ones for the common Java-
nese. Amangkurat I’s tyranny was compounded by crop failures beginning
in 1674. Rice was so scarce that the VOC was obliged to turn to Siam for
what it normally bought along the coast of Java. By early 1677 widespread
starvation was reported. There were also omens: Mt. Mérapi, the great
volcano which towers over the plains of Mataram, erupted in 1672, rains
fell out of season, there were earthquakes and lunar eclipses and a total
solar eclipse occurred over Central Java in December 1676.8 In the Java-
DISINTEGRATION OF MATARAM 33

nese calendar the end of the seventeenth century was approaching (AJ
1600 began in March AD 1677); this was a time when court traditions
anticipated the fall of the kingdom? and the populace at large almost
certainly expected major changes.
In 1676 Amangkurat I sent a large army under the command of his son
the Crown prince against Trunajaya’s forces. Either he did not suspect the
prince’s role in fomenting the rebellion or, if he did, he perhaps sent him
away from court in the company of other princes in order to have him
murdered. The Crown prince, for his part, may have supposed that his
protégé Trunajaya would only offer sham battle. But Trunajaya seems by
now to have had ambitions which no longer included the Crown prince.
By about August 1676 he began to style himself raja (king) and paném-
bahan (“he to whom obeisance is paid”: a title usually associated with
aspirants to imperial power and/or persons of great spiritual authority).
The battle which Trunajaya offered at Gogodog in northeast Java in Octo-
ber 1676 was real enough and his victory was total. Even before this re-
sounding victory, Javanese had been deserting Amangkurat I to join the
rebellion; now the process accelerated.
The VOC was still uncertain what its military role should be. It had
been involved in generally ineffectual naval action against the Makasarese
off Sumbawa in 1673-5 and had assayed to little purpose some cooper-
ation with Amangkurat I’s north coast officials against the rebels in early
1676. The latter episode revealed how deeply the king and others sus-
pected the VOC’s motives as well as how difficult it was to hinder a
rebellion so firmly rooted in the king’s own tyranny.
The VOC’s dilemma arose from a conflict between its trading and its
military-imperial impulses. The former could best be served by peaceful
and stable conditions on Java’s north coast which would facilitate VOC
trade. Such conditions would serve also the provisioning and security
needs of Batavia. Given, however, that Mataram authority was collapsing
and that the VOC imagined peace and stability to be recoverable only
through a restoration of that authority, military action in defence of the
dynasty seemed called for. Yet this might prove so costly that the VOC’s
profitability would be undermined and so ruin Java that its trade would be
destroyed. As one of the best-informed VOC officers observed, interven-
tion would mean “certain costs and uncertain profits”.'°
There were many VOC officers for whom the lure of military and imperial
glory and personal enrichment was greater than the smug satisfaction of
profits recorded in Company account books. Such men would shortly find
what they thought to be an answer to the VOC’s dilemma. If the VOC
intervened on behalf of the dynasty in return for a guarantee of compen-
sation for the costs of that intervention and additional trade concessions,
then profit must surely follow victory. It would be difficult to estimate how
34 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

many people died, how much suffering resulted, what resources were
consumed in consequent decades through the Company’s search for this
chimerical solution.
In 1677 the Governor-General of the VOC was the aged Joan Maet-
suycker (1606-78). While the Company’s imperial role greatly expanded
in South Sulawesi, West Sumatra, Malabar and Sri Lanka during his
quarter-century (1653-78) at the head of its administration in Asia, much
of this expansion was due to dynamic figures below him in the VOC
hierarchy, notably Rijklof van Goens (1619-82) and Cornelis Janszoon
Speelman (1628-84).'' Van Goens had much experience as a VOC am-
bassador to Asian monarchs, including five trips to Mataram during
Amangkurat I’s early years (1648-54); his accounts of these trips were
used extensively above in the introduction to this volume. He also success-
fully commanded VOC forces against the Portuguese and English in India
and Sri Lanka and served as governor of the VOC post in Sri Lanka in the
years 1662-3 and 1665-75. In September 1675, he became Director-General
in Batavia, second in rank to Maetsuycker, whom he was shortly to suc-
ceed as Governor-General (1678-81). Admiral Cornelis Speelman was
one of the most striking Dutch personalities of this period, renowned for
his military daring, courage and success as well as for his debauchery and
corruption. His conquest of the Makasarese Sultanate in 1666-9 was a
landmark in the history of eastern Indonesia.'? He succeeded van Goens as
Director-General in 1678 and as Governor-General in 1681.
At the end of October 1676, the Council of the Indies decided to send
military assistance to Amangkurat I. By this time the whole pasisir seemed
about to fall into the hands of Trunajaya and his Javanese, Madurese and
Makasarese followers. In late November, a VOC force of 200 men turned
back the threat to Jépara, the seat of Amangkurat I’s governor of the pasi-
sir Ky. Ang. Wangsadipa. But Trunajaya’s forces merely selected other
targets, conquering all other ports on Java’s coast as far west as Cirébon
by January 1677. Rebellion against Amangkurat I had now broken out in
the interior of Java as well. There was also, however, serious trouble on
the rebel side. Trunajaya and his Makasarese allies clashed violently in
late 1676 and by January 1677 Karaeng Galesong and other Makasarese
warriors were attacking Trunajaya’s lands in Madura itself.
As the Mataram hegemony splintered like the thin veneer it was, the
issue for the VOC was how far to intervene and at what price. Amangkurat
I, the Crown prince and indeed Trunajaya, too, sent messages to Batavia
seeking assistance. Governor-General Maetsuycker was willing for the
VOC to aid the dynasty by playing a limited military role which might
make possible some mediation of the conflicts. In return he expected
repayment of the VOC’s war costs and written confirmation of Batavia’s
boundaries from the Javanese king. Admiral Speelman, who was named
commander of the VOC forces on Java’s coast in December 1676, had
DISINTEGRATION OF MATARAM 35

ambitions for more extensive intervention, proposing by way of repay-

ment some control over both imports and exports through Java’s ports.
Maetsuycker and the Council of the Indies ruled out such a plan, but
Speelman was not one to be much restrained by such orders.'? On 29
December 1676, he sailed from Batavia with a force of 310 European
soldiers and four companies'* of Ambonese, Malays, Balinese and Mar-
dijkers'> plus 600 sailors and others for use in East Java. These would
join the 400 or so VOC troops already in Jépara, bringing the total of
VOC military available for his use to around 1500 men.
Speelman disembarked at Jépara on 20 January 1677 at the invitation of
Amangkurat I’s governor Wangsadipa. A week later, again with Wang-
sadipa’s consent, a VOC force of 100 men was established on the hill
called Danaréja which commanded the town and harbour.'® The remnants
of a VOC fortress may still be seen on this hill. At this stage Speelman
preserved neutrality in the war between Amangkurat I and Trunajaya,
sending messages to both in the hope that a peaceful resolution might be
achieved. By late February, however, it seemed clear that there was little
hope of such a settlement from Trunajaya. He was insulted by Speelman’s
demand that he appear personally in Jépara, which offended the royal
status he now claimed for himself. In any case, with the court of Mataram
clearly nearing collapse, Trunajaya had little incentive to negotiate a settle-
ment.
The VOC wished its intervention in the affairs of the Javanese state to
rest upon a clear agreement with the Susuhunan, one which was in a
written form and thus, in Dutch thinking, enforceable. The VOC had signed
a treaty of friendship with Amangkurat I in 1646!’ but this had become a
dead letter as conflicts between the court and the Company had escalated.
Thus, formal renewal of this friendship and an agreement for the repay-
ment of the Company’s costs were required.
In late February 1677 Wangsadipa concluded a comprehensive agree-
ment with Speelman.'* In this, the Company promised “to protect the
Susuhunan against those enemies with whom the Company itself does not
have a peace agreement”, so long as the Susuhunan repaid the VOC’s
costs. On behalf of Amangkurat I, the contract promised the VOC, inter
alia, freedom from tolls or inspection of its goods, freedom to import or
export any commodity, the right to erect trading posts in any location and
to have whatever timber and Javanese manpower were necessary for these,
a limit of two percent Javanese toll on anyone trading with the VOC and
a prohibition on the settlement in the kingdom of, or of trade with, Maka-
sarese, Malays, “Moors” (non-Indonesian Muslims) or anyone associated
with the Makasarese who did not bear a VOC pass. Section Eight of the
agreement was one of the most economically significant parts: it promised
that the Susuhunan would deliver to the VOC every year 4000 Jasts (ko-
yans)"? of select rice (approximately 14 million lbs avoirdupois or 6400
36 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

metric tons) to be paid for at the current market price.

Section Thirteen, which promised repayment for the Company’s antici-
pated military costs, would prove to be of enduring economic and politi-
cal consequence. Over the years 1677, 1678 and 1679 the king was to pay
a total of Sp. RI. 250,000 in cash (half of it immediately) and to deliver
free of charge to Batavia 3000 koyans of rice (approximately 10 million
lbs avoirdupois or 5000 metric tons). If, contrary to Speelman’s over-
confident calculations, the war extended beyond the end of July 1677,
the king was to pay an additional Sp. RI. 20,000 for every month. In
addition, the costs of a VOC garrison on the hill Danaréja at Jépara “on
behalf of the Susuhunan for the security of Jépara” would be fully borne
by the Javanese monarch. The scale of these promises can be gauged in
the light of later statements that in 1677 the total royal treasury amounted
to a value of some Sp. RI. 300,000 to 350,000.” If one uses the later VOC
cash equivalent of Sp. RI. 20 for each koyan of rice, then the total cash
equivalent of the repayments to the VOC would be sufficient to exhaust
the royal treasury, or nearly so, if the war ended by July 1677. But the war
was not going to be over so quickly; nor would the royal treasury be
available to pay these debts.
Speelman sent Jacob Couper to Mataram on 8 March 1677 to gain the
king’s ratification of the contract. Couper was an Edinburgh-born Scots-
man who had served in the VOC since 1663 and reputedly knew the
Javanese language well. He had already acted as ambassador to Amangkurat
I in 1669 and since 1675 had been urging the Company to support the king
against his enemies.”! He was thus well-suited to gain the king’s ratification.
While Couper was on his trip to Mataram, a Dutch trader brought friendly
messages to Speelman from Trunajaya. For a short time, Speelman ap-
parently considered giving Trunajaya military help against the Makasar-
ese, but then resumed his course of supporting the ailing Mataram dy-
nasty alone. While Couper was away, an earlier emissary of Speelman’s,
Wangsadipa’s son Ky. Jagapati, returned to Jépara from the court with
warm expressions of friendship for Speelman from the Susuhunan.
Before Couper could return with royal ratification of the contract,
Wangsadipa provided Speelman with a document giving him full military
powers. Thereby Wangsadipa, who claimed that he was “ordered to govern
the whole coast of Java by His Highness the Susuhunan ... and who has
all the power, who is the representative of and acts for His Highness the
Susuhunan”, handed supreme authority in the war against the Madurese
and Makasarese (Javanese enemies were not mentioned) to Speelman as
the representative of the Governor-General and Council of the Indies. In
the name of the Susuhunan and his four sons, Wangsadipa declared the
Admiral to be acting on behalf of the king in all matters of war and thus
to have authority over all dignitaries and commoners. All were ordered to
obey Speelman’s orders as if they came from the Susuhunan himself—not
DISINTEGRATION OF MATARAM oi,

perhaps a very compelling form of authority in March 1677, with the

king’s rule visibly collapsing.** Speelman promptly sent two Javanese
officials to Mataram to gain royal ratification of this document, too, but the
circumstances of war were to prevent their return until about early June.
Couper returned from Mataram on 24 March with ratification of the
February 1677 contract. The Susuhunan’s seal had been placed by the
Crown prince, the king having been too ill to do it himself, and was ac-
companied by the seals of the Crown prince and princes Pugér, Martasana
and Singasari. The Susuhunan and the princes had, however, rejected Article
Three, which requested an extension of the eastern borders of Batavia; this
clause thereby ceased to be a part of the agreement.”
Couper’s report on Mataram gave the VOC cause for serious doubts
about the court. The king was sick and the princes were manoeuvring for
advantage, several individually accusing the others of being opposed to
the VOC, while assuring Couper of their own good will. Perhaps most
serious of all, the finances of the court appeared to be “not at all ample,
indeed far from what one imagined them to be’, as Speelman put it.** The
readiness with which the king and princes promised to repay the VOC’s
expenses contrasted uncomfortably with their insistence to Couper that
they hadn’t then enough money to give him a contribution. They said that
the royal treasury was empty (a claim they would later contradict), great
sums having been distributed among the Mataram nobility since the war
began. Earlier in March, the king had sent Rds. 10,000 to Speelman in
Jépara and that, Couper was told, was all there was.” So Couper returned
to the coast with a ratified contract and a warm assurance from the Crown
prince that he was “the Admiral’s own son’”’® but without a penny.
Speelman now took the VOC intervention a step further, although he
was concerned about the state of the royal treasury from which repayment
for the Company’s expenses was to come. Early in April 1677 he sailed
to Trunajaya’s stronghold at Surabaya. The Madurese prince was confident
of impending victory over Mataram and seemed friendly enough towards
the Company, but he refused to meet Speelman on board a VOC ship. This
showed understandable caution, but Trunajaya also failed to keep a
rendezvous with Speelman in neutral waters. The VOC’s estimation of
Trunajaya declined as a result of emissaries’ reports that the young rebel
was a drunkard. It was not of course that the Dutch were unused to strong
drink—Admiral Speelman himself was, after all, described as “the be-
sotted Dutch general” in the Malay Syair Pérang Méngkasar*’—but this
perhaps made Trunajaya unpredictable. By the end of April, Speelman had
decided upon attack instead of negotiation.
It must be emphasized that there appears to have been no significant
technological difference between Trunajaya’s forces and the VOC on land.
Nor did any significant differences appear between European and Javanese
military technology down to the early nineteenth century, mainly because
 38 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

the Javanese quickly adopted those few technical innovations which the
VOC introduced from Europe. This cannot be over-stressed, for one must
avoid the anachronism of ascribing technological superiority to Company
forces. There were three aspects of military affairs where the VOC and its
Indonesian enemies sometimes differed significantly. The first was num-
bers, in which the indigenous forces usually had superiority. The second
was discipline, where some VOC forces were superior. The third was
strategy and tactics, where also the VOC was sometimes better.

BATTLE OF SURABAYA, MAY 1677

(simplified from VEL 1279 in ARA)

TRAITS OF MADURA

;
Kali
Peégirian

( TJ batteries
a
f e TJ citadelf{_]
CS
—_ tt TJ palisadese S
TJ palisade
*FY O) a
=— ‘S H a
TJ battery "Neg
HT]
1
he TJ alun-alun

( Old alun-alun
TJ palisads

fA Housing

TJ Trunajaya's
Sit baascale
NOTE: Trunajaya's citadel 5 Kilometres
was located approximately eae oer
where the Surabaya 2 3 Miles
Governor's office now is.

Surabaya was defended by fortifications, artillery and substantial num-

bers of men. Two rivers flowed past the city northwards to the Straits of
Madura. The more westerly, the Kali Mas, was diverted to form a moat
(which was, however, reportedly dry during the east monsoon from about
March to September) around the old royal citadel where Trunajaya had
established his court. Thence it flowed northward, past new elevated
fortifications and two artillery batteries and through palisaded barriers, to
its mouth. Along this line was Trunajaya’s main defensive strength. The
DISINTEGRATION OF MATARAM 39

more easterly river, Kali Pégirian, led to Ampel, the site of the holy grave
of Sunan Ngampel-Dénta, one of the legendary walis (apostles of Islam)
in Java. Trunajaya apparently expected no attack from this quarter and had
hardly defended this, his right flank, except for palisade barriers across the
river. The distance from Trunajaya’s main works to the coast was about
4.5 km/2.8 miles,** most of that distance consisting of marshy ground
thickly covered with scrub and under water at high tide.”
On 4-5 May 1677, the VOC forces landed and took the holy place at
Ampel after little resistance. Trunajaya was surprised by this attack on his
right flank. Indeed, during the days of desultory negotiations that followed
he accused Speelman of being unknightly in not attacking his main pos-
itions head on. During these discussions Trunajaya and the VOC moved
their works forward until their artillery batteries faced each other at a
distance of only a pistol-shot. Time was on Trunajaya’s side. An irrigation
dam upriver was used to cut the water supply to the VOC forces who
could thereafter obtain only brackish water. Sickness spread among
Speelman’s troops and he feared that further delay would merely produce
stronger enemy fortifications and reinforcements. So on 12-13 May, Speel-
man ordered a heavy artillery bombardment followed by an attack on
Trunajaya’s main works. After heavy fighting these fell to the VOC and
Trunajaya fled towards the ancient capital city of Kédhiri in the interior.
He saved twenty bronze cannon but abandoned sixty-nine iron and thirty-
four bronze pieces (twenty of them small ships’ cannon, bassen) to the
Voc.
Speelman wished to follow his victory at Surabaya with a major cam-
paign into the interior but was hampered by the limited size of his army,
which was reduced daily by disease. As an initial step towards an interior
campaign (which was not, in the event, to take place for fifteen months),
Speelman sent two VOC detachments to clear enemy Madurese from the
northeast coast in the Kéndhéng mountains, Sidayu and Tuban areas. He
also attempted to gain the submission of Trunajaya’s erstwhile allies the
Makasarese under Karaeng Galesong, now at Pasuruan, and of as many as
possible of the lords of Trunajaya’s home island of Madura. By the end
of June the clearance operation was fulfilled with no losses to the VOC
side. But negotiations with the Makasarese broke down in early May, just
when success seemed likely. Several Madurese lords submitted to Speel-
man in Surabaya in late May, but an attempt to install one of them, R.
Martapati, as a faithful ally in Madura collapsed as soon as the VOC force
which had escorted him returned to Surabaya; three days later Martapati
and his followers arrived in Surabaya as refugees from.victorious sup-
porters of Trunajaya.
Speelman himself then sailed to Madura to inflict defeat and pillage
upon Trunajaya’s followers, but was obliged to call off his campaign in
July upon receipt of news that the court of Mataram itself had fallen to
40 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Trunajaya. This frustrated all his plans for a drive into the interior of Java
to join with the Mataram forces. When he was informed that Amangkurat
I was fleeing for Jépara, Speelman hastened back to defend the town. His
superiors in Batavia, however, did not share Speelman’s enthusiasm for
further involvement in Mataram. They did not wish to commit VOC troops
in Java because of threats both to Batavia from Bantén in West Java and
to the VOC post at Malacca from the Malays of Johor. On 6 July, Batavia
ordered a halt to all of the Admiral’s grandiose plans: “Not one of our
people, great or small, is to go to Mataram”.*°
There is little doubt that Speelman’s conquest of Surabaya and sub-
sequent measures had two consequences which probably hastened the fall
of Mataram. Firstly, they drove Trunajaya and his forces farther inland
and may thereby have precipitated an early attack on the court. Secondly,
they apparently encouraged Islamic sensibilities as a cementing force of
resistance against the king and his new Christian allies.
An Islamic sense of identity had long been evident among the rebel
forces. The spiritual authority of R. Kajoran (whom Speelman called “that
prophet of the devil”) was essential to the rebellion from the beginning.
The lord of Giri, one of the most prominent Islamic notables of Java, lent
his support at least from the early months of 1676. In May 1677, Trunajaya
told Couper that the Susuhunan was not his lawful sovereign because he
was not a Sultan. Couper replied that Amangkurat I could give himself the
title if he wished, but Trunajaya said that this was untrue: the title must
come from Mecca.*! Now prophecies spread that so long as the kafir
(infidel) Dutch were present, Java would never prosper. Thus the VOC
intervention had succeeded in giving a rebellion against the Javanese
monarch the additional character of religiously justified resistance to
foreign intrusion.** More Javanese were now prepared to join Trunajaya’s
cause. The Crown prince himself later said to the VOC that one of the
reasons for the fall of the court was because it was felt in Mataram that
the court and the Company were too close.*
Already by April 1677 R. Kajoran’s forces had apparently begun mili-
tary operations in the vicinity of the court at Plered. The sources for the
progress of the war in the interior are not satisfactory, but it seems that by
June the court itself was beyond defending. Mataram forces under the
command of the king’s four sons made a belated entry onto the field of
battle and were defeated after heavy fighting, partly through superior
enemy operations and partly through command errors and disunity among
the princes themselves. The Crown prince later complained that he had
been unable to get the people of Mataram to fight.* As Babad ing Sangkala
put it,

The soldiers of Mataram

all lost their supernatural power;
and the princes,
DISINTEGRATION OF MATARAM 4]

their hearts were like women’s,

having no courage, terrified.
It was the wish of God.*>

Other Javanese chronicles say that Mataram had come to the end of the
century which was its divinely alloted time and the king had to accept this
ineluctable fate.*° With the commencement of the Javanese year (AJ) 1600
early in March AD 1677, Mataram’s century was thus over.
Near the end of the king’s occupation of his beleaguered court, conflict
increased between the Crown prince and his brother Png. Pugér. Amangkurat
I seems to have favoured Pugér over the Crown prince and bestowed upon
the former the title Susuhunan Ingalaga (“king on the field of battle”). It
was Pugér who led the final resistance to the rebel forces, such as it was,
when the time came.
On a date which is not certain but was probably around 28 June 1677,°”
the king fled the court, leaving its defence in the hands of Png. Pugér
(Susuhunan Ingalaga). Madurese and rebel Javanese forces from through-
out East Java and the central pasisir then entered and sacked the court,
putting Pugér and his demoralised forces to flight. The treasury of Ma-
taram and all but its heaviest cannon and oldest women were carried off
to Trunajaya’s new capital at Kédhiri. Trunajaya’s uncle Png. Sampang
(later Cakraningrat IT) decided that it was time to declare himself a par-
tisan of his victorious nephew’s cause and went along. Some 20—25,000
Javanese were reportedly left behind to occupy the conquered court. Ac-
cording to Dr de Graaf’s analysis, the king and his sons went their separate
ways into the countryside. Amangkurat I encountered Pngs. Pugér and
Singasari, neither of whom wished to accompany him. Then he found the
Crown prince, who went with his father on his flight north-westwards
through mountainous areas not yet fallen to the rebels. They headed towards
the coast, where was to be found the Susuhunan’s only remaining ally of
significance, the VOC.*8
Javanese chronicles describe the wretched tyrant’s flight in dramatic but
unverifiable detail. In the middle of the night as the city burned, the king
fled, soon pursued by Madurese and Makasarese forces while others sacked
the court. In this version, the king ordered his sons Pugér, Martasana and
Singasari to stay behind at the village of Jénar (near Kutaarja in Bagélen,
west of the court) but kept the Crown prince and another younger son,
Png. A. Mataram, with him. At Karanganyar farther to the west the royal
party was robbed by the villagers who were ignorant of the identity of
their victims. The king first ordered money and gold to be scattered and
then cursed the villagers, who thereupon offered obeisance to him. But
according to the Javanese accounts, Amangkurat I, who was gravely ill,
knew it to be God’s will that his reign should end, so he sent officials
ahead to prepare a grave for him at Tégalwangi (a few kilometers south
of Tégal, on the north coast).*’
42 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

As the king lay dying, the chronicle account says, he instructed his son
the Crown prince to join forces with the Dutch to recapture the court and
to take revenge upon the people of East Java (bang wetan), whom he
identified as the principal enemy.” It was the wish of God that a new age
should come in which the infidel (kapir) Dutchmen would be victorious in
war, so the Crown prince should stay with them. The king then entrusted
to his heir the royal regalia (a hand-over presumably in part symbolic,
since it is improbable that all of the holy pusakas had been salvaged from
the court) and responsibility for the other princes, the three eldest of whom
(Pugér, Martasana and Singasari) were then manning lines in Bagélen.
Amangkurat I then died. His body was washed, prayed over and taken to
Tégalwangi for burial.*! A VOC ship awaited the Susuhunan’s arrival at
Tégal and on 13 July 1677 thirteen VOC soldiers attended his burial.*
The Crown prince, a man probably now in his late thirties,** thus became
Amangkurat II (r. 1677-1703), but he had little in the way of royal re-
sources. He had some of the regalia, at least one younger brother and some
women and courtiers with him, but he had no court, no army and no
treasury. The fate of the last was a matter of particular interest to the VOC.
A man who claimed to have been present at the fall of the court said that
Sp. RI. 300,000 had been taken to Kédhiri, whereas Amangkurat II said
that only half that amount had been taken while Sp. RI. 200,000 remained
in Mataram in the hands of Trunajaya’s commander Tg. Mangkuyuda.* In
either case, there was little prospect of Amangkurat II laying hands on the
royal treasury for the time being. Although one of his emissaries told the
VOC that the new monarch had 20,000 diamonds with him which he was
going to sell in order to pay the Company,* nothing was subsequently
seen of such a treasure.
That Mataram had fallen and the old king was dead were among the few
certainties in Java in mid-1677. Another was that the VOC had occupied
Batavia for nearly six decades and had no intention of leaving. But for the
rest, all was uncertainty. It was not clear whether Trunajaya’s new king-
dom would endure, still less whether it might achieve a union of interior
and coastal interests such as the Mataram dynasty had failed to achieve
during a century of conquest and repression. No more predictable were the
prospects of Amangkurat II, except that they appeared bleak. Whether
Speelman would find support within the VOC for continued intervention
in the Javanese civil war was open to doubt, and what the effects of such
an intervention might be was of concern to many outside the Company as
well as within it, where the additional question of its likely implications
for VOC finances loomed large.
With hindsight, one is struck by the greatest unknown of all in 1677.
That there was civil war was clear. That it was the beginning of fifty years
and more of discord, battle and chaos no one guessed. There had been
much bloodshed and violence in Javanese history before the 1670s. But in
DISINTEGRATION OF MATARAM 43

the decades thereafter major complications were introduced by the inter-

vention of so many non-Javanese forces: Madurese, Makasarese, Balinese,
Ambonese, Malays, Chinese, Mardijkers and Europeans will all play their
roles in the chapters to follow. In particular the confluence of Dutch East
India Company, Madurese and Javanese imperial aspirations would give
the ensuing troubles a chronic and deeply disturbing character which was
to leave unknown numbers dead and shake the foundations of these main
imperial contenders.
y)
Foreign Intervention
and the Return to
Central Java 1677—80

The sacked Mataram kraton (court) now housed no king. Trunajaya

called himself ruler of Java in his new capital at Kédhiri. Amangkurat II
also called himself king, but was at Tégal on the north coast with neither
wealth to support his royal dignity nor an army to lend it substance. Two
of his brothers in the interior of the island were about to make their own
claims upon the succession. For over three years the question of whether
or how Amangkurat II could establish himself in Central Java had, how-
ever, to be postponed while attention focussed upon his enemies in East
Java. This was thus a reign with a most unpropitious beginning. Indeed,
Javanese tradition says that it nearly didn’t begin at all.
According to Babad Kraton, Amangkurat II was so downcast by the fall
of the court and the death of his father (events which he had helped to
bring about, of course), that he immersed himself in meditation inside a
mosque in Banyumas. He summoned Rd. A. Mértalaya, the lord of Tégal,
and asked him to prepare a ship to carry him on the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Mértalaya and others urged him instead to accept the responsibilities of
kingship and to lead his people against the Madurese, Makasarese and
East Javanese enemies.!
Finally signs came in a dream to Amangkurat II that it was God’s wish
that he should become king. He had the pusakas, so he put on the holy kris
named Ky. Balabar and mounted a throne; his officials were amazed to
see him give off a radiance (cahya) like the moon, a sign of rightful sov-
ereignty. He now assumed the full royal titles, Susuhunan Amangkurat
Senapati Ingalaga Ngabdulrahman Sayidin Panatagama (“king Amangkurat,
commander-in-chief on the field of battle, Ngabdulrahman [‘servant of the
Merciful’, i.e. God, a common Arabic name of uncertain significance among
the dynastic titles], lord of the faith, regulator of religion”), titles whose
grandiloquence was quite unmatched by material substance in mid-1677.

44
FOREIGN INTERVENTION 45

Amangkurat II then sent one of his officials on a quest on his behalf for
the wondrous flower named Wijayakusuma which was to be found near
the south coast, a quest which succeeded and thereby confirmed Amangkurat
II’s legitimacy.” That VOC sources support little of this part of the Java-
nese story demonstrates nothing, for even decades later, when the Dutch
became more knowledgeable about Javanese court affairs, matters of such
spiritual significance were rarely made known to them.
Mértalaya of Tégal urged Amangkurat II not to ally with the VOC but
rather to rely upon his Javanese supporters alone. Here Dutch sources
support the Babad Kraton account. In the Javanese version, Mértalaya
accused the Dutch of being traitorous, a common attribute among kafirs,
thereby neatly mirroring the view of the Javanese held by Europeans in
this period.* The symmetry of such stereotypes suggests how deep were
the misunderstanding and distrust upon which the king and the Company
would now attempt to base their alliance. VOC officials were disturbed by
the opposition from “this shrewd fellow” Mértalaya.” Amangkurat II
nevertheless appeared to persist in his aim of allying with them.
One might imagine that Amangkurat II, chosen by God and by his
followers to be king, would have had unrivalled legitimacy in the estima-
tion of a Javanese chronicler, but Babad Kraton also ascribes at least some
legitimacy to his brother Png. Pugér. Pugér was now some thirty years of
age. He was of no particularly estimable character in the eyes of the
Europeans, who knew little of him but believed him to be amiable, aimless
and popular with the masses but an opium addict.° This was the man to
whom twenty-seven years later the VOC would become more committed
than to any other (see Chapter 8). According to the babad, Pugér was
visited in a dream by his dead father who ordered him to retake the kraton.
Having consulted upon awakening with his officials and the ascetics (para
tapa), Pugér then became king with the titles Senapati Ingalaga Sayidin
Panatagama (“commander-in-chief on the field of battle, lord of the faith,
regulator of religion”).’ In the chronicle he is called Panémbahan (“he to
whom obeisance is paid”), but in contemporary letters he also used the
royal title Susuhunan.*
Pugér (Susuhunan Ingalaga) then levied men from Bagélen—a district
with which he would long maintain special links—and marched eastwards
with his brothers Pngs. Martasana and Singasari against the forces of
Trunajaya. The people of Mataram flocked to his banner and after fierce
fighting he reconquered the old kraton. Pugér then reestablished royal
justice, installed his followers as court officials and attracted the scattered
common folk to return. Yet, says the chronicle, although the people of
Mataram were happy at the return of their lord, rains were infrequent,
there was much sickness, and food was scarce and expensive, signs that
the kingdom would fall. Contemporary sources support the broad outlines
of this account and suggest that the court was reconquered by Pugér by
46 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

mid-October 1677 at the latest.'° His brothers Martasana and Singasari and
his step-brother Png. Natabrata were apparently no longer with him; the
first, at least, had also taken royal titles."
Now began a long period of tension between Amangkurat II and Puger.
The VOC and Amangkurat II sent several emissaries to Pugér in the hope
of achieving some reconciliation. Pugér replied that he was acting in his
brother’s interest but would not come to the coast (to pay obeisance)
because his presence was required in the interior. Before long, however,
he was refusing to receive his brother’s emissaries, claiming that he was
ill.!2 Even more ominously, he told Speelman that immediately before
fleeing the court Amangkurat I had declared, “Pugér, you shall take my
place and be my substitute (vervanger)”, a claim which portended a chal-
lenge to his brother’s succession. He even seemed to suggest that the VOC
should agree to a partition of Java between them."
Amangkurat II was deeply distrustful of Pugér and his other brothers,'*
but he also had little faith in his sole significant ally, the VOC. This may
have reflected the anti-Dutch views of Mértalaya of Tégal, upon whom the
king greatly relied. From July until mid-September 1677, Amangkurat II
refused to go from Tégal to Jépara, where Speelman and his forces were
ensconced. The distrust and misunderstanding between the Europeans
and Javanese is exemplified by a babad story which may be true, although
it is not corroborated by VOC sources. The VOC commander named
Elduwelbeh’> and other officers supposedly entered the presence of the
new king in respectful European fashion, standing upright with their hats
tucked under their arms. They thereby offended the Javanese custom of
showing respect by sitting flat on the ground (thus, below the level of the
monarch) with head covered. The king thought that this showed unwilling-
ness to pay obeisance to him. Mértalaya was so infuriated that he grasped
Elduwelbeh by the neck and attempted to force him to the ground. The
Dutchman protested at this treatment and threatened to leave. But another
Javanese lord then explained that Dutch custom (adat) was different from
the Javanese. Indeed the foreigners were unable to sit cross-legged upon
the ground, he said. The misunderstanding having been smoothed over,
the VOC offer of military assistance to Amangkurat II was confirmed.'®
In September 1677, Amangkurat II was finally brought from Tégal to
Jépara on a Company ship. Speelman expected a detailed contract confirming
the terms of the alliance and the repayment of VOC expenses to be a
major item of business. He was frustrated to discover, however, that the
Susuhunan seemed more concerned to recover various women left behind
at the fall of the court and in his subsequent travels.'!’ By contrast, the
babad account depicts the king’s move from Tégal as a grand royal prog-
ress and one of his main concerns at Jépara as the gathering of informa-
tion from the interior.'®
Only in mid-October was a treaty signed between Amangkurat II and
FOREIGN INTERVENTION 47

the Company. This confirmed the agreement concluded by Wangsadipa

and Speelman in February (before the fall of the court) concerning the
dynasty’s debt to the VOC: Sp. RI. 250,000 and 3000 koyans of rice
(approximately 10 million lbs. avoirdupois/5000 metric tons), plus Sp. RI.
60,000 to cover the three months from the end of July to the end of
October. Since the king now had no treasury to pay these debts, a novel
solution was agreed. The seaports of the north coast were ceded in full
sovereignty to the VOC until the royal debt was repaid. In the meantime,
the king’s officials were to administer these ports as vassals of the VOC
and would see that all revenues went to the Company.'? This agreement
appeared to fulfil Speelman’s aspirations to gain control of Java’s coastal
trade.
Further agreements gave the Company even more. The eastward move-
ment of the boundaries of Batavia which the court had rejected in March
was now accepted by Amangkurat II, as was a VOC monopoly over the
import into his kingdom of textiles and opium.”® In January 1678 the
Company was given a monopoly over the purchase of sugar.” And finally
the seaport of Sémarang, the adjacent coastal village of Kaligawe and all
subsidiary districts were surrendered in full and permanent sovereignty to
the VOC.” Speelman understood these subsidiary districts to reach as far
inland as Salatiga.”
Speelman’s superiors in Batavia were not pleased with these agree-
ments. They were pessimistic on several points of detail and worried in
general about too deep an involvement in the affairs of the Javanese state.
Furthermore, whereas the old treaty of 1646 called for the VOC to join the
Mataram dynasty in opposing common enemies (which would include
Trunajaya), Speelman now seemed ready to commit VOC forces on
Amangkurat II’s behalf against the king’s brothers, who were not enemies
of the Company. Nevertheless, Batavia gave Speelman a free hand in the
matter of these contracts, which, had it not done so, he would doubtless
have exercised anyway.” Batavia would have been even more worried if
it could have foreseen that the Company was embarking upon a bloody
and costly intervention in Java on the basis of agreements much of which
would prove to be worthless. Speelman himself was contemptuous of
Amangkurat II, but failed—or refused or pretended not—to see that this
contempt was both cause and symptom of grounds for doubting the dura-
bility of the alliance upon which his schemes depended.
With their agreements in hand, Amangkurat II and Speelman were
anxious to march into the interior. They were restrained both by cau-
tious VOC policy” and by apparent incompetence and conflicts among
the Javanese lords. Before the end of October 1677 the king was urging
an early campaign, at the same time begging the VOC to prevent the
plundering of the stolen Mataram treasury by the VOC’s turbulent Maka-
sarese troops when Trunajaya was finally defeated.” Military probes in
48 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

November and December by the king’s two main coastal lords, R. Ad.
Mértapura and Ad. A. Mértalaya, with some VOC support, produced mixed
results. Kudus, Pathi, Juwana and Jipang were retaken but Jipang was then
abandoned and fell again into enemy hands. VOC forces under Couper
meanwhile reoccupied Surabaya and established a VOC base there. Ma-
taram was reported to be in the grip of dreadful epidemics and famine,
so Amangkurat II was now inclined to avoid an expedition there and let
the kingdom fall to him instead through the death of his opponents and
their followers. For his part, Speelman was growing so incensed and con-
temptuous of his allies that he told the king and his courtiers (so he said)
that they were fit only to be Trunajaya’s slaves.’
Having failed to persuade the king to abandon his kafir VOC allies and
to rely upon Javanese support alone, Mértalaya now refused to pay obeis-
ance to Amangkurat II, according to Babad Kraton.** VOC sources say
that he was suspected of conspiring with R. Kajoran and the Sultan of
Bantén, who also was contemptuous of Amangkurat II’s reliance upon
infidels.” Amangkurat II sent his trusted old follower Mértapura, who had
himself recently refused an attempt by R. Kajoran (to whom he was re-
lated) to suborn his loyalty, with others to arrest Mértalaya. The result was
a fight in which both Mertalaya and Mértapura were killed in January
1678.°° Amangkurat II now had to appoint new coastal governors (Ad.
Mandaraka and A. Urawan),*! but at least political allegiances were
somewhat simplified by the death of Mértalaya, whose policy had been to
support Amangkurat II but not at the price of allying with Christians.
Further simplification was evident by the middle of 1678 when it was
learned that Pngs. Martasana and Singasari had both died in the epidemics
sweeping Central Java, thereby leaving Png. Pugér as the sole significant
princely challenger to Amangkurat II.”
Personnel changes on the Company side as well now contributed to the
resolution of policy conflicts. In January 1678 Governor-General Maet-
suycker died, taking with him much of the caution which had dominated
discussions in Batavia. He was succeeded as Governor-General by Rijklof
van Goens, whose previous post as Director-General now went to Speel-
man himself. More aggressive views now ruled the VOC. Speelman’s
arrival in Batavia was delayed until April, but once there his plans for
military intervention into the interior of Java in order to place Amangkurat
II upon the throne were put into action. Command over the expeditionary
force was assigned to Anthonio Hurdt, a short, pock-marked Dutchman in
his forties who had long experience in administrative posts in eastern
Indonesia but who knew little of Java and had hardly any military ex-
perience. He was apparently chosen for this task largely because he was
the only senior VOC servant who was both available (having recently
ceased to be governor of Ambon) and prepared to accept the command.
By July Hurdt had reached Batavia. The Company also decided to bring
FOREIGN INTERVENTION 49

Arung Palakka, Speelman’s ally in the conquest of the Makasarese state

of Goa in 1666-9, and his Bugis warriors to join the VOC against its
enemies in Java, including of course Arung Palakka’s old foes the Maka-
sarese.*} In the event, however, the VOC diverted Arung Palakka and his
men to Batavia because of a fear of hostilities from Bantén, so they did
not take part in the campaign against Kédhiri. Amangkurat II meanwhile
adopted (or had imposed upon him by his Dutch counsellors) an epistolary
style which can only be called abject, begging his “grandfather’’ Gover-
nor-General van Goens and his “father” Speelman to restore his kingdom
to him and to teach him how to govern it.
While the VOC asssembled its expeditionary force of 1400 European,
Mardijker and Indonesian soldiers to join the 900 VOC soldiers already on
the coast of Java,** there were again grounds for doubting the cause for
which they were about to fight. In violation of his agreements with the
VOC, Amangkurat II informed the Danish East India Company that it
could trade freely in Java, which led to a “firm but no less friendly rebuke”
to him from Batavia.*° More ominously, there were still signs that the
king’s alliance with the Company was alienating his followers. When
Isaac de Saint Martin, Speelman’s temporary successor at Jépara pending
Hurdt’s arrival,*’ reprimanded the king’s officials for having allowed Bantén
shippers to sell opium and textiles at Jépara in violation of the VOC’s
monopoly, he met an unexpected and disconcerting response. Midway
through public reading of the royal grant of monopoly, a senior Javanese
official interrupted the proceedings to shout, according to de Saint-Martin,
“that the Susuhunan was mad, that he just gave away his land and more-
over had promised the Company 300,000 reals [sic] and a further 2000
[sic] koyans of rice annually, and moreover was it intended to make them
slaves here and more such-like impudences launched with great ve-
hemence.” The Dutch of course reprimanded the official; the other digni-
taries departed in silence.*
With a doubtful alliance and limited knowledge of the enemies it was
about to face or the land through which it had to march, the VOC never-
theless prepared to launch its first great campaign into the interior of
Java.*? Four columns were formed. Capt. Francois Tack, a thirty-year-old
native of The Hague whose flamboyant involvement in Javanese affairs
was to bring his life to a bloody end at the age of thirty-six,” was to lead
a column southward from Sémarang into the Pajang district to engage R.
Kajoran’s forces. Hurdt, now grandly entitled “Superintendent, Admiral,
Campaign- and War-Commander’”, would lead the main force from Jépara
southeastwards to the valley of the Sala (at this time still called the Sémanggi)
river, there to join with Tack and thence march eastwards to Trunajaya’s
capital at Kédhiri. The Dutch aristocrat (Jonkheer) Capt. Abraham Daniel
van Renesse and Capt. Frederik Hendrik Mulder were to march inland
from Rémbang to engage the Madurese and their allies and then join the
50 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

main force for the attack upon Kédhiri. Willem Bastinck, a VOC merchant
(Coopman), was to go to Surabaya and there contact the Makasarese
Karaeng Galesong, whose enmity towards his erstwhile ally Trunajaya had
reached such intensity that he had apparently attacked Kédhiri itself and
subsequently withdrawn with his men to Képér at the southern mouth of
the Brantas river (Kali Térusan or Porong).*! The VOC forces were to
leave no garrisons behind them on their march,” so increasing penetration
would also mean lengthening undefended lines of supply and communica-
tion. This strategy was all the more daring because the wet monsoon was
about to begin: the Company’s men might find themselves, their baggage
and their cannon literally bogged down in the midst of unknown and
hostile territory with no secure lines of retreat.
On 21 August 1678 Tack left Jépara for Semarang with 385 men and
orders to take whatever further soldiers could be spared from the small
Sémarang garrison. Five days later van Renesse and Mulder marched
overland for Rémbang with 308 soldiers to whom the VOC garrison at
Pathi was to be added. On 27 August and 2 September detachments were
sent southwards to prepare Godong on the Serang river as the assembly
point for the main force. Artillery, baggage and munitions were sent there
by river; from there they would have to be transported overland. On 5 Sep-
tember Hurdt and Amangkurat II themselves left Jépara. The king’s forces
were estimated at 3000 men armed with pikes plus 1000 porters. Other
Javanese forces were to join or be levied en route; some of these would
prove to have firearms.
After six days at Godong, the army advanced into enemy-held territory
to the south. The problems of the marching army were those familiar to
seventeenth-century soldiers, whether in Europe or Asia: indiscipline and
desertions in both VOC and Javanese forces, porters who absconded, guides
who chose the wrong routes, exhausted, sick and dying men and draught
animals, bogged gun-carriages and wagons, swollen unbridged rivers, rain
and more rain. In some places rice was available; elsewhere neither food
nor clean water could be found. The enemy avoided battle and skirmishes
were few until the combined army reached Singkal on the west bank of the
Brantas river north of Kédhiri a month later, on 13 October. European and
Javanese stragglers and foragers were, however, at risk from enemy par-
ties. As the VOC and Javanese forces passed, some local lords declared
their allegiance to Amangkurat II. Thereby the number of Javanese in the
army rose to over 13,000.*%
At Singkal, the VOC-Amangkurat II army endeavoured for six weeks
to find a way across the Brantas river, which was swollen by monsoon
rains, in order to reach Trunajaya’s fortified capital on the east bank.
Throughout these weeks, Hurdt and his commanders had to contend with
dwindling supplies, bad weather, illness and desertions. By the time they
attacked Kédhiri, Amangkurat II’s force of 13,000 had dropped to about
 FOREIGN INTERVENTION 51

a thousand armed men. The VOC had some 1750 soldiers by then, among
them 659 Europeans many of whom had dysentery.’ Lacking the neces-
sary boats or pontoons to cross the river, Hurdt’s military prospects were
far from good. Nor were Trunajaya’s forces known with certainty. Reports
at the time suggested that he had around 1000 men, but it was later claimed
by his uncle Png. Sampang that Trunajaya had had some 14,500 men on
the eve of the VOC-Amangkurat II attack upon Kédhiri.*

MAJOR CAMPAIGNS OF
SEPT.-DEC. 1678

cant! aU asheSe
mere MH we
Sémarang’
I aus
lus tay“ty ly
| % As
isa oan De LD Thy Aaa
Wile
Surabaya™
ws
= x
Ynys
“4 Wanakarta y),
ls
mT PAJANG
2 i f @ Payak 20SKépér ~
CS Wi Mt shir yee
: "ZG ®, Anjasmara 2 Mt Arjuna
= = TAT AWAY
A 4 Plered 5 ee BeTS Kédhiri Ru Mey otal! a, ee
= a es S > a =
in Haas oy ae shitids Tye = eS 7p ny, =
Any’ we chSSite ae Malang =.“
er me Arye
f Frys
® Tack's column
® Hurdt's column
® van Renesse and Mulder's column ; =
® Bastinck's column =
0 20 40 60 80 100 Kilometres
—————t ot od
F —
0 10 20 30 40 50Miles

Trunajaya’s soldiers threw up fortifications on the east bank of the river

and maintained artillery fire from them with cannon as heavy as twelve-
pounders as well as many lighter pieces. Trunajaya’s cavalry meanwhile
inflicted substantial casualties in skirmishes and broke the discipline of
their opponents on more than one occasion. In such encounters, of course,
it was not always Trunajaya’s forces which came off best. His artillery
dominance was, however, clear. His cannon balls reached Hurdt’s and the
Susuhunan’s lodgings and even the VOC field hospital. Yet the VOC-
Amangkurat II forces lacked sufficient munitions to mount an artillery
reply, instead saving supplies for the attack on Kédhiri itself. On 21 October
Trunajaya’s forces launched a wild night attack on the VOC’s Malays
through an opening in the unfinished Company palisade. They were driven
off but not before they had set the Malay’s quarters afire with the aim of
destroying the ammunition. Trunajaya’s younger brother R. Suradipa led
52 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

this assault and was fatally wounded in it. In late October the VOC decided
to construct a separate palisade to protect the ammunition, baggage and
sick. Trunajaya’s men also worked in other ways to undermine the morale
of their opponents. As the VOC sentries did their rounds on the night of
2-3 November, from the darkness came gamélan music and voices mock-
ing them in Dutch with “Who goes there?”, followed by lusty laughter.
Trunajaya had several fortified posts along the Brantas river, so supply-
ing the VOC-Amangkurat II forces by boat from Surabaya seemed out of
the question. Willem Bastinck therefore took command of an overland
supply column. After his visit to Képér, where he believed that he had
gained the cooperation of Kr. Galesong,*® he returned to Surabaya and
marched thence on 20 October with twelve Europeans, a force of Javanese
and some of Galesong’s followers, who soon deserted. Bastinck was then
left with some 380 armed Javanese as well as porters to see his train of
buffalo-carts loaded with rice through to Singkal. There were reportedly
800 carts each pulled by seven or eight water buffaloes bringing an esti-
mated 40 koyans (approximately 130—150,000 Ibs avoirdupois/60—70 metric
tons) of rice. By usual VOC estimates, this would have sufficed to feed
3400-4400 men for a month.*’ The approximately 6000 buffaloes pulling
the carts of course represented a major fresh meat supply. There is appar-
ently something wrong with these records, however, for 40 koyans divided
among 800 carts would give each so small a load that it could almost be
carried by pikul over a man’s shoulders.** By means which are equally
unclear—perhaps the submission of people through whose districts Bastinck
passed—his Javanese force was said to total 3000 when he reached Singkal
on 3 November. The VOC there had inadequate means to protect a large
supply train. Three days later the enemy attacked these carts, burnt ten or
eleven of them and killed numerous people. The remaining carts were then
packed inside the VOC’s main palisade on the river. Despite the obscur-
ities of these sources, it seems clear that with his provisions renewed, and
the ammunition more safely stored in the new palisaded fortification, Hurdt
was prepared to accede to Amangkurat II’s request for more aggressive
measures.
On 5 November, de Saint-Martin compelled Trunajaya’s forces to flee
from Manukan (farther south on the west bank) but failed to cross the river
because of heavy fire from the opposite bank and the depth of the water.
On the night of 6-7 November a crossing was attempted farther down-
stream. This, too, failed when the two largest boats the VOC had planned
to use were found already to have sunk, the Javanese failed to appear and
enemy fire and the strong current barred the crossing. Hurdt now gave
Amangkurat II an ultimatum to supply the necessary pontoons for a bridge
and two week’s supply of match (for the VOC’s matchlocks)*” or the
Company would withdraw.
The Javanese failed to provide the promised match but appeared to
FOREIGN INTERVENTION 53)

produce instead a miracle, for the river dropped during the night of 16-17
November. The babad account says that this occurred when Amangkurat
II personally led the way across on horseback, thus ascribing it to the
power of the king’s sanctity.°° In fact the king took no part in the fighting
but the water did fall and cavalry were able to cross without boats. Infan-
try still required boats and all forces faced heavy fire from Trunajaya’s
side of the river. Nevertheless, a crossing was made at Curing, where the
river was estimated to be some 115 metres/370 feet wide. Trunajaya’s
forces were driven from their works, leaving eleven bronze and iron cannon
behind.
From this bridgehead, the VOC-Amangkurat II army marched south-
ward to attack Kédhiri itself on 25 November 1678. The city was found
to be some 8.5 km/5.3 miles in circumference, defended by forty-three
batteries and by walls up to about 6 metres/20 feet high and 2 metres/6.5
feet thick (an effective defence against infantry and cavalry, but not against
heavy artillery). Some 1200 VOC soldiers and about a thousand Java-
nese?! were divided into two columns which attacked Kédhiri on the
northwest and east. Amangkurat II himself returned to the comparative
safety of Singkal. Trunajaya’s forces resisted the advancing army but were
put to flight. Hurdt’s column then entered the east side of the city under
heavy enemy fire. On the northwest de Saint-Martin’s forces drove straight
through to the alun-alun, the great square before Trunajaya’s residence in
the centre of the city. Capt. Tack then led four VOC companies in a
courtyard-by-courtyard conquest of the royal residence, where the VOC
marines had the advantage of hand-grenades. Finally Trunajaya abandoned
his lost capital and fled southwards into the countryside. According to the
VOC, Trunajaya’s forces suffered heavy losses but the Company lost only
four Europeans, two Makasarese and one Batavia Javanese killed in action
plus twenty-seven wounded. Amangkurat II lost two senior commanders.**
The Company’s and Amangkurat II’s soldiers now set to plundering
Kédhiri, which the king much criticized the VOC for allowing.* In the
course of the looting, all of the captured Mataram treasury—from which
both the VOC and the Javanese king had hoped to see the Company’s
costs repaid—disappeared into soldiers’ pockets. In the captured court
were found abducted Mataram women, horses, holy regalia such as the
cannon Nyai Sétomi™ and an object which attracted much attention, the
so-called golden crown of Majapahit. Javanese monarchs of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries wore nothing which could be described as a crown,
but clearly there was such an object in fifteenth-century Majapahit, for a
golden crown was described by the Chinese visitor Ma Huan. Now this or
a similar crown was discovered in the plundered court and handed to Capt.
Tack, who turned it over to Amangkurat II only after the king agreed to
pay him a reward of Rds. 1000. Tack had to wait a considerable time for
his money and through his high-handed behaviour seems to have earned
54 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

a special and deadly place for himself in the royal memory, as will be
seen in Chapter 5.
The episode of the golden crown of Majapahit was discussed by Dr de
Graaf>® who showed that the Europeans were wrong to impose their cul-
tural assumptions about the importance of crowns and crownings upon the
different protocol of the Javanese court. While the crown was clearly a
prized possession, it was not among the holy regalia (pusaka). Thus, when
Hurdt presented the crown to Amangkurat II, who then placed it upon his
own head on 27 November while VOC muskets and cannon fired salutes,
the VOC officers were wrong in imagining that they were witnessing a
coronation in the European style. De Graaf suggested that when the king
came to realize what this “coronation” meant to Europeans, and in particu-
lar the way in which it symbolised the Europeans’ idea that the Company
was central to his power and legitimacy, the crown may have come to
stand for all that he hated about the VOC.
By 13 December 1678, the plundering was finished and the last of the
European deserters was executed.*’ So the 288 VOC sick and wounded,
the six field pieces and most of the remaining ammunition were loaded
onto boats. On 15 December, Hurdt, Tack and van Renesse left for Sura-
baya with the river convoy. De Saint-Martin and Amangkurat II evacuated
Kédhiri three days later. The river convoy reached Surabaya on 17 De-
cember, having lost some boats and men in the heavy current. With the
wet season upon them, the overland column had a difficult passage. The
journal of the march described a struggle “with a wet skin and hungry
belly” through flooded fields and impassable roads. “The men, both Euro-
peans and Natives, lay hungry, tired and spent like beasts along the road,
indeed in the water, without being able to raise themselves.”** They reached
Pérning, upriver from Surabaya, on Christmas Eve. There they were vir-
tually cut off by floods. Some made it to Surabaya on rafts, others were
taken onto boats sent up for them, the rest finally reaching Surabaya over-
land on 5 January 1679.°°
The VOC’s first major interior campaign in Java had been completed.
It had succeeded in defeating Amangkurat II’s main enemy Trunajaya. But
Trunajaya was still at large, his ally R. Kajoran was still active in Central
Java and the Makasarese under Kr. Galesong were still plundering East
Java (although their attitude towards the VOC was unclear). The king’s
brother Png. Pugér still held the old court of Mataram while much of the
rest of the dynasty’s heartland in south-central Java was in the hands of
various local insurgents. Madura was still in turmoil and it was unclear
whether Cirébon on the north coast would accept Amangkurat II’s over-
lordship. The king himself had won little respect from VOC officers, the
loyalty of his people seemed questionable and the money with which he
had promised to repay the VOC had disappeared in the looting of Kédhiri.
For the VOC, this first major military intervention was a complete success
FOREIGN INTERVENTION 2)

neither militarily nor financially. Nor could it even be said to be over,

given the challenges still facing Amangkurat II, to whose cause the VOC
had so fully attached itself. This attachment itself was the origin of much
frustration. The Company was prepared to threaten Amangkurat II with
withdrawal of its support unless he showed what Batavia would recognize
as greater competence and responsibility. During the next year and more,
the VOC’s letters bristled with both complaints about the king’s lack of
diligence and extraordinarily blunt and undiplomatic admonitions to him
to set his house in order.*' Yet the VOC fought on in his name, in the hope
that in the end it would prove wise and profitable to have done so.
The first significant VOC action after the Kédhiri campaign took place
at Képér on the Kali Porong (the southern branch of the Brantas) in East
Java. There Kr. Galesong and his Makasarese had established themselves
in a fortified headquarters, whence they pillaged the region. Bugis forces
under Arung Palakka, the VOC’s Ambonese commander Capt. Jonker and
other VOC troops under Couper were sent to deal with them. In October
1679, Képér was finally taken after a five-week siege. The losses, primar-
ily through illness, during this campaign were so severe that of the 5000
men who marched from Surabaya only 1600 survived. By early 1680,
most Makasarese had left East Java. Arung Palakka’s own men were
hardly any easier to restrain from plundering the local inhabitants than the
Makasarese had been, so they, too, were sent home early in 1680.
A smaller VOC force of 300 Bugis and twelve Europeans commanded
by J.A. Sloot with several hundred Javanese troops had meanwhile gone
to occupy Wanakarta in the Pajang district of Central Java—the village
which was shortly to become the site of the new court of Kartasura. In
September 1679, this force attacked R. Kajoran’s fortified position nearby,
killing some 240 of his followers and capturing Kajoran himself, a man
whose role in fomenting Trunajaya’s rebellion in 1675 had been crucial.™
Sloot ordered Kajoran put to death but found that no Javanese would kill
the holy man. A Bugis soldier therefore dispatched him. Kajoran’s two
sons and thirty of his lieutenants were also killed.“ Thus ended another
major opponent to Amangkurat II.
Amangkurat II’s principal enemy, Trunajaya, was still free in East Java.
He had with him a loyal force of Madurese and Makasarese, but as he
moved through the highlands around Malang his following seems to have
dwindled through illness, desertion and starvation. At the end there were
only 424 people with him. But for a time he still exercised wide influence,
with followers in Madura and much of East Java. Kr. Galesong, who
escaped from Képér in October 1679 with sixty of his men, joined Trunajaya.
But when Trunajaya learned of negotiations between the VOC and Gale-
song (who was very ill) for the latter’s surrender in November, he sum-
moned Galesong to him at Ngantang where the Makasarese lord died,
perhaps having been murdered.”
56 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Commander Jacob Couper, who was now in charge of the VOC’s af-
fairs on the north coast of Java,’ took direct charge of attempts to capture
Trunajaya. A series of letters to Trunajaya produced unsatisfactory results
so VOC forces, together with Arung Palakka’s Bugis and Javanese
soldiers were sent into the highlands after him in December 1679. A
thousand Makasarese at Batu (near Malang) surrendered to the VOC. But
Trunajaya fled his new “court” at Ngantang before his pursuers got there.
Now Amangkurat II himself left Surabaya and went up to Payak in the
highlands to join in the pursuit of his foe. This somewhat untypical eager-
ness to be present at the scene of action was ascribed by Dr de Graaf to
a fear on the king’s part that if the Europeans had an opportunity to inter-
rogate Trunajaya they would discover the king’s own role in stimulating
the years of warfare which had already cost the VOC so much, a discovery
which might lead them to favour his brother Png. Pugér over him.®
Amangkurat II now began his own efforts to induce Trunajaya to submit,
also to no avail.
Trunajaya’s answer to one of Amangkurat II’s letters constitutes a
memorable last statement of his cause.® After an imaginative overview of
his activities which claimed that he had always wished to be a loyal
subject of the king, Trunajaya went on to admonish the king not to mix
with the Dutch Christians.
Your Highness’s servant [Trunajaya] does not at all trust the
Dutchmen and a half or a third of the Javanese themselves have
no wish to appear before your Highness so long as you retain the
Dutch .... It is not seemly for Your Highness to reign as king
and mix and go about with Christians, for even Your Highness’s
dignitaries have an uncommon aversion to this. And according to
your servant’s poor judgement, you'll never reign as king in this
way, for all the Javanese will become Christians and that will
diminish your esteem. ... Your Highness’s ancestors never before
had anything to do with Christians for they wished to settle their
own affairs, for they [the Dutch] are like grafts which are
attached to a tree and finally wither the trunk.... Your Higness’s
servant humbly requests that you make your court at Majapahit,
so that the whole island of Java might know that Your Highness
has established his court there and in the future you must have
nothing to do with heretics... .

With his admonitions to Amangkurat II to abandon his Christian allies

and move to Majapahit, Trunajaya linked powerful themes which had
helped to sustain the warfare for five years. Javanese xenophobia, cultural
chauvinism and an Islamic religious identity combined with a pride in the
pre-Islamic past symbolized by Majapahit to deny the possibility that a
king who relied upon European Christians could be a true king by Java-
nese standards. A Javanese king should be true to his past and to his faith
FOREIGN INTERVENTION Sy

and rely upon his own people to solve his problems. By implication, a
king who needed the VOC must be a king without Javanese support, a
king without that consensus of notables which was essential to the state:”°
in other words, no king at all, but an imposter maintained by foreign arms.
Indeed, as will be seen below, before long it was rumoured in Java that
Amangkurat II was quite literally an imposter, a Dutchman in disguise.
Trunajaya’s letter thus encapsulated a truth which subsequent decades of
trouble and warfare would confirm, that the intervention of the VOC could
not solve but could only exacerbate the deeply rooted crisis of the Ma-
taram dynasty.
Amangkurat II was of course unmoved by all this. He ordered the VOC
Ambonese Capt. Jonker, who had been acting as his bodyguard, to take his
120 men and capture Trunajaya. Eventually Trunajaya could see no escape
from the ring which was closing around him in his last refuge high on Mt.
Anjasmara. After preliminary negotiations through intermediaries, Trunajaya
surrendered to Jonker on 26 December 1679. He appeared in a “garment
of black satin, a black turban with gold rings about his head and a long
black staff in his hand.’””' Amangkurat II was anxious to have this dramatic
figure to himself.
Jonker took Trunajaya to Payak and delivered him to Couper, who
handed him on to Amangkurat II]. The babad accounts of what then
happened seem histrionic but are confirmed to some extent by contem-
porary evidence. Amangkurat II supposedly told Trunajaya that he, the
king, had taken two oaths. The first presumably went back to the original
conspiracy of ca. 1670: that Trunajaya would rule Java outwardly (i.e. as
Patih) while Amangkurat II ruled it inwardly. Trunajaya reluctantly agreed
to accept such authority, thereby fulfilling the king’s oath. VOC sources
similarly say that at first Amangkurat II honoured Trunajaya, giving him
his father’s title Mélaya[kusuma] and the governance of half of Madura.
But the king then said he had taken a second oath at Tégal, presumably
at the burial of his father in 1677. This was that the holy kris Ky. Balabar
would not receive a new sheath until Trunajaya’s chest had first served
that function. Thereupon the king personally stabbed Trunajaya. All of the
assembled Javanese officials were required to stab and mutilate the body
and to eat the liver. The head was then severed and placed beneath the
king’s throne.” Of this horrific tale, Couper at least reported also (but only
on the authority of what the king said to him, so while this is contempo-
rary it is not a truly independent report) that Amangkurat II personally
killed Trunajaya on 2 January 1680 and that his officials then stabbed the
body. Couper bluntly wrote that Trunajaya was “better dead than alive”.
In keeping with the mood of the occasion, Couper ordered the massacre
of all of the sixty-eight Makasarese who had surrendered with Trunajaya.
The king and the VOC then returned to Surabaya.
In Surabaya, Amangkurat II still had to face the challenge of the lord
58 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

of Giri. This Panémbahan or Png. Giri was descended from Sunan Giri,
one of the nine walis (the semi-legendary apostles of Islam in Java), and
had great spiritual authority. He had prophesied the fall of Mataram in
1677” and many refugees had apparently fled to him during the fighting
in East Java. Now he refused to pay obeisance to Amangkurat II or to
surrender to him the holy kris Kalamunyéng. According to Babad Kraton,
this was because Png. Giri had heard that the man calling himself
Amangkurat II was an imposter, in fact the son of the Admiral (probably
Speelman, but perhaps Hurdt was meant). Such rumours would dog the
king later in 1680 as well. The babad says that Amangkurat II’s emissary
lied to Png. Giri in saying that he could not verify that the Susuhunan was
really the son of Amangkurat I.”
Whether or not the babad tale of doubt about the king’s identity was
true, Giri’s refusal to submit led to a battle in late April 1680 which the
VOC described as the most furious of the war. Losses were heavy on both
sides before the Giri forces were defeated. Png. Giri was wounded and
captured and then strangled upon Amangkurat II’s orders. Twenty-five of
his sons, sons-in-law and nephews, representing virtually the whole family
line, were killed along with many wounded and captured commoners. A
nephew of the dead lord was left alive and made the new lord of Giri.
Amangkurat II now added the kris Kalamunyéng to his set of holy re-
galia.’”°
With East Java now generally free of opponents, Amangkurat II could
turn his thoughts to the dynasty’s heartland in Central Java, where his
brother Png. Pugér still occupied the old court of Mataram. Almost all
contacts from 1678 to mid-1680 between the Company and Amangkurat
II on the one hand and Pugér (still calling himself Susuhunan Ingalaga) on
the other suggested that when Amangkurat II arrived in the interior of
Central Java, Pugér would submit. But Amangkurat II refused to believe
this.”°
By about mid-1680 Amangkurat II had decided to build a new kraton
rather than to occupy the old court in Mataram. According to Babad
Kraton, various sites were considered before Wanakarta in the Pajang
district of Central Java was selected because its future greatness had been
prophesied by a disembodied voice speaking to the king’s grandfather
Png. Peékik of Surabaya ca. 1628.”’ This village had been occupied by
Javanese and VOC forces under J.A. Sloot since the previous year. In
June 1680, Amangkurat II, Jacob Couper and the remaining VOC forces
in Surabaya” set sail for Sémarang. En route the king fell ill at Tuban and
asked the Europeans to proceed without him. Suspicions soon grew that
the king was in fact avoiding contact with the Europeans as much as
possible. Not until 19 August did he arrive at Sémarang, where both he
and Couper lay ill until early September.”? The march to Wanakarta took
FOREIGN INTERVENTION 59

place in mid-September with the king travelling a day or two behind his
VOC allies, perhaps to avoid too obvious an association with them.°*°
Amangkurat II arrived at Wanakarta by the light of many torches after
sunset on 15 September 1680. Sometime during the next few days the
village was officially pronounced to be the new court and was renamed
Kartasura Adiningrat (“prosperous-heroic, most beauteous of the earth”).
Curiously, there is confusion in Javanese sources about the date of this
great event, but it seems to have taken place ca. 21-3 September.*! Again
rumours spread among the Javanese that the man occupying this new court
was not the Javanese king but a son of Speelman in disguise, in response
to which Amangkurat II had himself carried in a palanquin (since he was
too ill to walk or ride) around his court to demonstrate his true identity.*
This rumour would shortly play an important role in Amangkurat II’s
relations with his brother Png. Pugér.
By September 1680 neither the Dutch East India Company nor
Amangkurat II nor the alliance which they represented was yet in control
of all the territories of the old Mataram state. But the preceding three years
had transformed the circumstances of both parties. In 1677, a desolate
king had turned to a seaborne European trading company with its head-
quarters in West Java to help him win back the kingdom in East and
Central Java which he had lost and had no other means of regaining.
Ambition had sealed this alliance on both sides. Now the Dutch East India
Company had waded through the mud and bloodshed of East Java to
establish itself as a power in Central and East Javanese politics with claims
to a permanent position on the Javanese coast and in the Javanese econ-
omy. Amangkurat II’s enemies in East Java and some of those in Central
Java had been destroyed and he now had a real prospect of ruling the
kingdom of his ancestors. As he lay in his sickbed in the village which he
had just declared to be the new kraton of Kartasura, the main remaining
question appeared to be whether he could resolve the challenge posed by
his brother Png. Pugér’s control of the old court of Plered in Mataram.
Amangkurat II and the VOC might reasonably have thought this to be the
last remaining obstacle to peace and dynastic stability. But if they thought
so, they were wrong.
3
Reestablishing
Dynastic Authority in
Central Java, 1680-2

The establishment of the new court of Kartasura did not, presumably,

make any positive impression upon those who refused to accept its occu-
pant as their rightful king; it merely provided a geographical focus for
their opposition. For Amangkurat II’s supporters, however, it marked an
important stage in the progress to that peace, order and prosperity for
which they had risked so much. While major challengers still threatened
its physical security, Amangkurat II’s new court began quickly to assume
the trappings of an established Javanese kraton.
From his accession in 1677, Amangkurat II had been rewarding faith-
ful followers with positions and titles. Many of these men had died and
many such posts must have been far from lucrative during the troubled
years which followed. From mid-1680 onwards, however, there came to
the fore men who would live to grow powerful and exercise considerable
influence in the years ahead. One of the most important of these was Pan.
Cakraningrat II.
Cakraningrat II, formerly known as Pangeran Sampang, was Trunajaya’s
uncle. His unpopularity as lord of West Madura after 1656 had apparently
contributed greatly to the preference for Trunajaya there.' In 1677 Png.
Sampang decided to support his nephew’s cause and went with him from
Mataram to Kédhiri. But there he fell out with Trunajaya and was ban-
ished to the wilderness of Lodhaya (south of Blitar) where Trunajaya
hoped evil spirits (or the plentiful tigers there) would dispose of him. Yet
he survived and, with the fortunes of war turning, offered his obeisance to
Amangkurat II at Kédhiri after Trunajaya’s defeat in November 1678.
This was accepted and the king indeed named this fickle vassal Patih
(chief administrative officer) to replace Mandaraka, who had recently died.
At this point he was given the grand title Cakraningrat. He remained as
Patih only until mid-1680 when he again became lord of West Madura
until his death in 1707.7

60
REESTABLISHING DYNASTIC AUTHORITY 61

The Cakraningrat line would continue to rule West Madura for the next
sixty-six years, becoming one of the main political and military forces
within the Javanese state. It did so both because of the dynamic leader-
ship and ambitions of its lords and because of its control of substantial
manpower and resources. Indeed statistical evidence, which is not to be
relied upon in detail, suggests that in the first decade of the eighteenth
century West Madura represented something like 13 per cent of the total
economic resources (including population) of the pasisir regions of the
kingdom.* .
If the political, military and economic power of West Madura were
combined with that of adjacent Surabaya, a potent alliance was formed.
The statistical evidence referred to above suggests that this combination
would represent something of the order of one-quarter of the pasisir’s
economic resources.* In mid 1680 Amangkurat II gave control of Sura-
baya to Ang. Jangrana I (d. 1693) and named the latter’s brother Ang.
Onggajaya (d. 1688) governor of Pasuruan. Jangrana is credited by Babad
Kraton with heroic (and essentially unbelievable) feats in the war against
Trunajaya; VOC records confirm at least that he fought bravely on
Amangkurat II’s side while Cakraningrat II was sitting in the Lodhaya
jungle wondering how to save his skin.° This Surabaya family would be
a major political force in the coming years. As early as October 1680,
however, VOC reports were suggesting that Jangrana I was a man of great
pride who had little affection for Amangkurat II.°
The stage was thus being set for renewed rivalry between the Central
Javanese dynasty and the interests of Madura and East Java, a rivalry
reaching back at least to Sultan Agung’s conquests of the early seven-
teenth century and probably before, and which had fuelled much of the
Trunajaya war. But for the moment those eastern lords had chosen to ally
with the VOC and Amangkurat II, whose most pressing challenges thus
lay in the Central Javanese heartland of the dynasty. There remnants of the
previous rebels as well as the king’s brother Png. Pugér threatened
Amangkurat II’s possession of his new court.
Several rebels submitted to Amangkurat II, including R. Natabrata, the
son of Ratu Malang who had been the centre of such uproar during his
father’s reign,’ and Trunajaya’s former military commander, the aged
Madurese Mangkuyuda.*® Others were killed.” As Amangkurat’s men as-
sumed control of their new appanages in the interior, they naturally en-
countered local figures who were reluctant to give way to them. In some
cases these new men apparently also exploited their domains with ex-
cessive zeal,'° thereby encouraging resistance.
The most serious resistance arose when the king’s claims to sovereign
authority were denied by the scions of the holy house of Témbayat, midway
between Kartasura and Mataram.'' The old Pangeran of Témbayat had
died leaving three sons, the eldest of whom proclaimed himself Png. Ménang
62 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

or Maménang and now denied the authority of Amangkurat II. Témbayat

thus became, in effect, the northern outpost of a belt of resistance which
ran southward into the rugged Gunung Kidul mountains, where Wana-
kusuma (present-day Wanasari) was a centre for remnants of R. Kajoran’s
followers. In the case of both Témbayat and Wanakusuma, Islamic re-
ligious traditions and sensibilities were apparently central to the resisters’
sense of identity. In October 1680, Kartasura troops were sent to Tém-
bayat where the princes of the family and other holy figures were cap-
tured. As had happened before, at first the Javanese would do these men
no harm but eventually they were killed on the king’s orders. Then in late
October, Capt. J.A. Sloot and the king’s new Patih Ad. Urawan! set out
from Kartasura with 100 European and Ambonese soldiers, about 70 Maka-
sarese and an estimated 1000 Javanese to scourge the area from Témbayat
to the south. Villages were burnt, nearly 100 people were killed and 150
women and children were captured during this two-week expedition. But
others escaped into the jungle, among them Png. Wanakusuma who would
later threaten the kraton itself.'°
In late 1680, none of these centres of resistance to Amangkurat II was
as important as Png. Pugér, still sitting quietly in possession of the court
of Plered in Mataram. Prior to their arrival in Kartasura in September, the
VOC believed that Pugér would submit to Amangkurat II, but the latter
told them they were wrong to think so.'* As was pointed out at the end of
the previous chapter, after the establishment of his new court, Amang-
kurat II, who had been too ill to be seen in public, found it necessary to
have himself carried about in a palanquin to disprove rumours that he was
really a Dutchman, indeed Admiral Speelman’s son, pretending to be the
king.'!° These rumours also spread to the old court at Plered in Mataram
where, according to both Dutch and Javanese sources, Pugér was uncertain
whether he was dealing with a Dutchman or his brother. Babad Kraton
says that Pugér believed the real Amangkurat II to have gone to Mecca.
In any case, the babad reports Pugér to have said, even if it were truly his
brother but he was only carrying out the orders of the Dutch, it would
nevertheless lead to the destruction of the state. In late September, Capt.
Sloot, Png. Natabrata and other Javanese dignitaries went from Kartasura
to Plered to deliver letters from the VOC and Amangkurat II (who ad-
dressed his brother with the royal title Susuhunan Ingalaga) and to gain
first-hand intelligence from Pugér’s court. It was soon clear that Pugér was
unwilling to submit to Amangkurat II. According to Babad Kraton, a
crucial reason for this was that Png. Natabrata lied in saying that the
occupant of the court of Kartasura was, indeed, a Dutch imposter. The
VOC now began to plan for war.'® In this conspiratorial setting, with
rumours of a changeling at its centre, it was fitting that the Dutch aristocrat
(Jonkheer) and VOC military hero Jan Albert Sloot van Boekelo should
have chosen this time to entitle himself grandly Galiazza Visconto
REESTABLISHING DYNASTIC AUTHORITY 63

d’Aragona."’ His superiors ignored this apparent madness and continued to

address him prosaically as Captain Sloot.
The Company and Amangkurat II were anxious to deal quickly with
Pugér. The Europeans believed that only then could they withdraw their
military forces from Java’s interior, as they much wished to do, and thereby
oblige the king’s Javanese supporters to accept their responsibilities for
the kingdom’s security. In the meantime, Amangkurat II’s officials seemed
to the VOC to be wholly devoted to self-enrichment and intrigue and the
local commoners appeared lukewarm about their new king.'* It is not clear
how widely spread still were the rumours that Amangkurat II was really
a disguised Dutchman, but certainly the presence of VOC forces was
being used by the king’s enemies to attempt to suborn his followers’
loyalty. Both VOC and Javanese records say that Pugér’s side saw the
presence of Europeans as a primary issue and spoke of the coming battle
as Holy War (prang sabil).'°
R. Anrangkusuma, who was then replacing Urawan as the king’s Patih,
produced letters which accused the Europeans of merely employing
Amangkurat II as a tool to gain mastery of Java, after which they would
kill him. The circumstances in which these letters were supposedly dis-
covered were as suspicious as the letters themselves, but the VOC’s sus-
picions of Anrangkusuma, later their arch-enemy, were not yet aroused.
Similar letters came from Mataram. One compared the Europeans to people
who cut down forest for new rice fields and Amangkurat II to the tree
which such workers left in the middle of the field for shade until the rest
of the trees were cleared, when this last tree, too, would be felled.”°
Amangkurat II himself seems to have continued to harbour suspicions of
the VOC. On the other hand, a significant flow of refugees from Mataram
suggested that not all Pugér’s commoners were anxious to stand by him
when it came to war, although the people of Bagélen were said to be
committed to him.”!
The VOC and Amangkurat II made a last effort in early October 1680
to send a mission to Pugér, but the emissaries were refused an audience,
ostensibly because Pugér would see no one during the fasting month (Puasa
AJ 1603/25 Sepember—24 October 1680).”” When no emissaries came from
Pugér at the end of Puasa, the armies marched. A small Company force
of 25 men and Javanese pikemen reported to total at least 15,000 blocked
the road running northwest of Mataram at the toll-port Trayém and
Tangkilan. On 13 November over 400 VOC soldiers (220 Europeans, 114
Mardijkers, 46 Ambonese and 31 Makasarese) plus some 20,000 armed
Javanese marched from Kartasura to Plered.”*
Babad Kraton’s description of Amangkurat II’s appearance as he rode
out, whether or not it is an accurate portrayal, certainly encapsulates the
ambiguity about who this king was and what he stood for:
64 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

His Highness Amangkurat

quickly donned Dutch-style garb,
with socks and cap,
a jacket of three layers
of velvet divided at the chest
with glittering braid,
his stockings decorated with golden thread, antique
his buckles of polished gold,
A breast plate of three layers
with finely worked borders, tiger’s-eyes
glittering brilliantly,
a beautiful kuluk jangkangan [a kind of hat]
fitted with glittering Dutch braid:
if observed from afar
he looked like the Governor-General of Batavia.

Wearing a hussar sword

hanging from a glittering belt covered in fine gold,
he was not at all like a prince of Mataram
sitting upon his throne.

After brief skirmishes the Amangkurat II-VOC army crossed the River
Opak (then still called Umpak)* at Taji. Rather more serious clashes
followed in the vicinity of the old court, but without a major battle having
taken place Pugér and most of his dignitaries fled westward into Bagélen
on 17 November.*° Babad Kraton claims that Amangkurat II had ex-
changed his Dutch dress for Javanese clothing and the yellow parasol of
royalty. Upon recognizing that the king was indeed his brother, Pugér had
fled in great confusion, thinking, “If I submit to my elder brother I will
shame my troops, if I carry on I will shame myself.”’’ Kartasura forces
totalling some 16—17,000 soldiers were sent in pursuit of him, but with the
wet monsoon well established no major military action was likely.?8
Amangkurat II reoccupied Plered for a few nights and the Europeans
paused to admire the majestic but much dilapidated old court before they
returned to Kartasura, taking with them inter alia the old throne and the
captured royal elephant.”
Pugér now associated himself with two rebellious groups led by Dipati
Galunggung and Raja Namrud. The former was the less significant. This
group asserted control of a vast area centred on the Mt. Galunggung region
of West Java (northwest of Tasikmalaya) and claimed to be partisans of
R. Kajoran and loyal to Pugér. Its leader surrendered to a VOC force in
January 1681, subsequently escaped, but surrendered again in August 1681
and was then summoned to Kartasura.*°
Raja Namrud was an adventurer variously reported to be Makasarese or
REESTABLISHING DYNASTIC AUTHORITY 65

Balinese in origin. He had established himself at Slinga in northern

Banyumas at least by early 1680, whence the Company hoped to dislodge
and destroy him before withdrawing to the coast.*! When Pugér returned
to Bagélen in November 1680, he thus found himself between Namrud to
the west and the Company and Kartasura forces to the east. For a month
Couper attempted unsuccessfully to get Pugér to submit, although several
of his followers did so. Couper then crossed the River Praga with VOC
and Kartasura forces and put Pugér’s army to flight. Pugér was thought to
be fleeing to Bantén,** whose Sultan was no admirer of Amangkurat II, but
in fact he fled into the arms of Namrud.
Pugér gave Namrud a wife and concubines and joined forces with him.
The VOC were now so decimated by the terrible illness and death com-
monly associated with the wet monsoon that they withdrew to Kartasura
in late January 1681 and thence to the coast in March, leaving behind
forty-four men as a lifeguard for Amangkurat II. Pugér’s fortunes then
quickly revived. He drove the Kartasura forces from Bagélen in March.
With an army said to be 10—-17,000 strong he retook Mataram in August.*3
Now Pugér and the Wanakusuma rebels who had threatened Kartasura the
previous year prepared to attack Amangkurat II’s court itself. The VOC
hastened a force of over 300 Makasarese, Malays and Europeans to the
interior, but by the time it arrived in mid-August 1681 Amangkurat II had
already led his own army onto the field and given his enemies an initial
repulse. Further fighting followed in the vicinity of the court. Pugér’s
fortunes now again seemed on the wane. The Wanakusuma rebels
fled northwards and Pugér retreated to Bagélen.** By this time Namrud’s
forces had also suffered military reverses at the hands of Javanese and
VOC forces on the western pasisir.*° The interior villages which his bands
pillaged were said by September 1681 to be so exhausted that the rebels
were finding it difficult to obtain provisions.*° South of the court, Couper
led a 300-man VOC force and 2500 Javanese through Gunung Kidul in
October, burning villages and driving the remaining Kajoran partisans
towards Bagélen and Png. Pugér.*’
Upon hearing rumours that the alliance between Pugér and Namrud had
disintegrated into hostility and even armed conflict, Commander Couper
hurried to attack Pugér with an army of some 20,000 Javanese and over
700 VOC European and Indonesian soldiers. On 10 November they drove
some 1000 Bagélen troops from a major fortification 15 km/9.4 miles in
length along the Bagawanta river. Two days later they repulsed an attempt
by Pugér to attack them from the rear, massacring about 300 of Pugér’s
men in the process and leaving both Pugér’s hopes and his followers in
disarray. On 17 November 1681, just one year after he had first been
driven from Mataram, Pugér surrendered to Couper at Ambal, near the
coast south of Kutawinangun. He was received graciously and sent on his
way to Kartasura with a VOC escort. With him surrendered other royal
66 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

relatives and old court servants. Couper now prepared to deal with
Namrud.**
With Pugér, the aspirant alternative king, safely on his way to submit
to his brother, the VOC found that they faced a new rebel king, for Nam-
rud had declared himself Susuhunan or Sultan.*” They also faced the onset
of the wet monsoon. They struggled with their Javanese allies (20,000
men but only 6,000 pikemen among them) to the Sérayu river, by now
swollen to a width of some 100 fathoms (180m / 600 ft ) and a depth of
3-4 fathoms (5.5—-7.3m / 18—24 ft). This they crossed with losses of men,
horses and baggage. Then they encountered Namrud’s forward defence
works, a double bamboo palisade an hour’s ride in length, 1.5—2 m / 5—7
ft wide filled with tamped earth and defended with “Spanish troopers”,
sharpened bamboo spears set in the walls to repel scalers, a device then
also in use in Europe. The defenders were armed with spears, stones and
firearms. Yet these formidable works fell quickly to the attackers. A se-
cond fortification high on a hill fell after heavy fighting during a monsoon
downpour. Namrud’s forces now withdrew to his main fortification near
Slinga.
Namrud’s fortress on the River Kélawing (a tributary of the Sérayu) was
named Mésir, the Arabic name for Egypt.*° It was one of only two places
in Java known to this writer to have been named after a Middle Eastern
location, the other being Kudus, after a/-Quds, Jerusalem. A battle took
place at Mésir for three hours late in the day and into the night of 16
December 1681. Namrud and 2000 followers put up a furious resistance
against the VOC and Kartasura attackers. Rather unusually, the latter’s
performance in battle was praised by Couper. The VOC and Kartasurans
stormed through three concentric sets of double palisades from all sides
and finally ran amuck among the defenders in the dark of night. In the
morning the bodies, over 2000 in number, were found to include women
and children, even newborn babies. Even Couper, who had seen many
bloody deeds, expressed regret at this indiscriminate massacre. Namrud
and his senior lieutenants were among the dead. The VOC lost six dead
Europeans, an equal number of dead Indonesian soldiers and forty-four
wounded, while Amangkurat II lost six or seven senior officials and an
unknown number of commoners. The withdrawal from Mésir began on 26
December 1681, through rugged terrain and heavy rain, with sick officers
being carried and dying horses and Javanese troops being left along the
route. On 11 January 1682 the commanders reached Kartasura.*!
That the victory over Namrud was of particular significance to
Amangkurat II—being the destruction of the last major opponent within
his kingdom—is suggested by two pieces of evidence. After Couper and
the Company forces had left Kartasura to return to the coast in early 1682,
Amangkurat II reportedly summoned his field commander, A. Sinduréja,
and Tg. Suranata of Démak for a detailed report on the fighting. Upon
REESTABLISHING DYNASTIC AUTHORITY 67

learning of the heroism of the VOC, he supposedly declared, “God has

confirmed me as ruler over the kingdom of Java through the help of the
Hon. Company.’** The VOC only learned this by hearsay and the report
may of course be inaccurate. If it is correct, the Europeans were perhaps
wrong to understand this as royal praise and gratitude for their support.
For the king may have been referring to the prophecy ascribed to Sultan
Agung that in the future it would be the Dutch who would install the kings
of Java,** or to his own dying father’s reported advice that the reconquest
of Mataram and revenge upon his enemies must be achieved in alliance
with the Dutch.* Perhaps he was declaring that these prophecies had now
been fulfilled: he was installed on his throne and the VOC could therefore
be dispensed with. The second piece of evidence supports the idea that
Amangkurat II wished to remove the Europeans from his affairs, for they
were written out of the history of the conquest of Mésir. In Babad Kraton
the story is anachronistically placed after the departure of Amral Elduwelbeh
from the court and VOC forces play no role. Nor do they appear in the
Babad ing Sangkala or Surakarta Major Babad versions.** Later events
would confirm that the VOC’s support of Amangkurat II had earned not
royal gratitude or affection, but rather resentment and dislike.
The destruction of Mésir meant the end of the major campaigns needed
to establish Amangkurat II upon the throne of the Mataram dynasty. The
VOC—no less persuaded than the Javanese in this pre-secular age that
spiritual forces governed men’s lives—declared a day of general thanks-
giving in Batavia.*° Perhaps now the Europeans could see a message in the
comet which had appeared in the skies at the end of November 1680,
shortly after Pugér had first been driven from Mataram, of which the VOC
residents at Tégal could only say, “the meaning of it is known to Almighty
Goda’
Yet even now the new kraton of Kartasura was not militarily secure, for
the Wanakusuma rebels attempted one more assault on the court. On 18
February 1682, the VOC sent out Makasarese and Mardijkers to assist
7-8,000 Javanese to repel this threat, but the rebels (estimated to be only
1000 strong) broke the VOC-Kartasura lines and put the defenders to
flight. The VOC soon saw victorious Wanakusuma partisans running across
the great square of Kartasura before the VOC palisade itself, preparing to
set the kraton afire. The VOC lifeguard at the court and the forces in the
palisade opened fire on the rebels and at last put them to flight, leaving
150 dead. The following day, Cakraningrat II of West Madura and Ang.
Jangrana I of Surabaya arrived at Kartasura (for the Garébég Mulud
festival, 12 Mulud AJ 1605/22 March 1682) with 3000 soldiers. With a
VOC. force, Cakraningrat II’s Madurese destroyed the village of Wana-
kusuma in the southern mountains on 24 February, but Png. Wanakusuma
himself escaped yet again.**
With the scattering of the Wanakusuma rebels and the destruction of
68 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Namrud achieved, it seemed time to complete the reconciliation between

Amangkurat II and his brother Png. Pugér. Pugér had not been received
at court upon his surrender, but had been obliged to bide his time at a
village south-west of Kartasura until passions had cooled. On 26 February
1682, he was received at the kraton and formally submitted to Amangkurat
II. He was pardoned and given a sizeable appanage (the VOC say 1000
households; Babad Kraton says 2000). Their brother R.A. Panular, who
had formerly been with Pugér, also submitted and was pardoned.” In
succeeding weeks 120 Bagélen officials and several notables from
Lurungténgah (the area formerly ruled by Namrud) also came to pay
obeisance to Amangkurat II.°°
It appeared that, at long last, some security attended the Susuhunan’s
throne. The city of Kartasura could now field 20,000 armed men according
to VOC estimate?! and the king’s military prospects seemed reasonable.
For nearly five years, VOC and Javanese armies had sought to install
Amangkurat II and to destroy his enemies by military force. The country-
side of Java had been littered by bogged and broken vehicles and arms,
burned villages and fields and dead people and animals. At last the VOC-
Amangkurat II alliance seemed triumphant over all its foes. Pngs. Si-
ngasari and Martasana, R. Kajoran, Kr. Galesong, R. Trunajaya, Png. Giri,
the scions of Témbayat and Raja Namrud were dead, Png. Pugér had
submitted and scores of lesser figures were dead or in hiding. Both allies
could believe that they had achieved their primary aim, the restoration of
Mataram dynastic authority in the hands of Susuhunan Amangkurat II.
Yet in the victory of this alliance lay the seeds of its disintegration, for
there was a fundamental difference of understanding between the Javanese
king and his European allies. For the latter, the war had been fought to
restore a dynasty which would maintain stability in Java for the benefit of
VOC trade. The Company’s costs, now far greater than anyone could have
dreamed when the contract of February 1677 was signed, were to be
repaid from the king’s incomes and the Company’s trade would enjoy a
guaranteed priority and protection. The VOC wished to fight no more on
the king’s behalf, but it had every intention of seeing its prerogatives and
dues attended to. For Amangkurat II, no longer a desperate prince without
an army but a secure middle-aged monarch of a century-old dynasty, the
VOC was a motley mercenary force, formidable in battle but not a toler-
able source of demands upon him or of advice about how Java should be
governed. He can have had no doubt that he sat upon his throne en grande
tenue, was féted by rich and powerful lords, was served by women, arti-
sans and scribes and claimed dominion over Java’s wealth all because of
the VOC’s intervention on his behalf. This, and every reminder of this, he
could not forgive.
 The Attempt at Separate
Empires: Kartasura, the
VOC and Madura, ca.
1681-5

Between late 1680, when Pugér was driven from Mataram, and the early
months of 1682, when large-scale campaigns at last came to an end, it
became possible for the three main powers in Central and East Java—
Amangkurat IJ, the VOC and Cakraningrat II of West Madura—to begin
to contemplate how they might reap the rewards of victory. Their general
aims were clear. The VOC wished its previous military expenditures repaid
and its trade and territorial concessions implemented so that profitable
commerce could follow. This seaborne trading company hoped to become
the main commercial actor on Java’s north coast, without further entangle-
ment in the court’s military affairs. Susuhunan Amangkurat II wished to
exercise dominion throughout Java and to enjoy the power, wealth and
standing which he regarded as his due. He did not desire Europeans
meddling in his affairs or claiming his riches. Cakraningrat II aimed to
extend his influence across Madura and into East Java, building by stealth,
influence and intrigue the empire which his nephew Trunajaya had failed
to win by force. Each of these powers was aware of the other, but none
had yet realised how entangled their affairs had become. In pursuit of
separate goals, they found themselves drawn together in a fashion which
would produce tension, conflict and eventually bloodshed.
The VOC’s first priority was to establish its coastal trading operation.
While the return of peaceful conditions facilitated the Company’s trade, it
was hampered by opposition on the part of coastal lords to its new monopoly
rights. The VOC’s officers particularly believed that the two main coastal
governors, Tg. Suranata of Démak and Tg. Mangunonéng of Pathi, were
working against them. The company encountered difficulty and apparent
obstructionism in obtaining timber and rice, the most important pasisir
products for the VOC, and in getting the labour promised in the 1677
contracts. A minor official named Narapaksa who assisted the VOC in

69
70 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

obtaining timber was apparently for that reason the object of a murder plot
in 1680 and was spirited away to Batavia, where he lived at the VOC’s
expense.! There were also misunderstandings between the VOC and
Amangkurat II about the geographical limits of the Company’s control of
Sémarang and the manner of paying port incomes to the Company to
reduce the royal debt: it seems the king wanted these paid to him first,
presumably to count (or to skim off) the money on the way through, rather
than directly to the VOC.”
The conditions under which the Javanese population lived may have
militated against the Company’s trade, although the evidence is conflicting.
Some sources reported improving conditions and even said that opium
usage among the Javanese had increased during the war years because of
an excess of ready cash. Yet in 1680 the Europeans reported people starv-
ing along the roads of Surabaya and in 1682 identified opium addiction as
a cause of poverty rather than a sign of wealth. The Company also en-
countered a superstition that some of the teak forests of the north coast
were haunted, a belief which persists to this day. If the wood was cut,
blood rather than sap would flow, the Company was told. The Dutch,
whose fund of superstitions evidently did not include bleeding trees,
regarded this as a frivolous excuse to avoid cooperation.*
In July 1680 the VOC’s trading privileges were announced at market
places along the coast by the Susuhunan’s emissaries. Transgressors were
threatened with having their right hands severed.° Nonetheless problems
persisted. Even Amangkurat II himself proposed that the French as well as
the VOC should be allowed to trade under certain conditions.® In October,
the king gave the Company further written confirmation of its trading
privileges and of the limit of two per cent duty levied upon anyone who
sold products (except for timber) to it. Still there were difficulties.’
During the last year of fighting in the interior, agricultural conditions
improved somewhat on Java’s north coast. This produced a good rice
harvest in 1681 and low purchase prices, although in some areas Chinese
merchants bought most of the rice before the VOC could, or Javanese
lords manipulated the price. The VOC’s opium sales went well, but in all
other products, notably textiles, trade was at a virtual standstill. The acqui-
sition of timber was still a major problem. This was partly because of con-
tinued obstruction by Suranata and others, partly because Amangkurat II
summoned the population, and particularly the woodcutters (the Kalang
people), to the interior, presumably both to fight and to work on his new
kraton. Couper persuaded the Susuhunan to send 400 Démak Kalangs
back to the coast in early 1681, leading to some improvement in timber-
cutting.*
The arrangements for timber-cutting became entangled in a lengthy and
acrimonious squabble between the VOC’s chief administrator (Opperhoofd)
ATTEMPT AT SEPARATE EMPIRES Wil

at Jépara, Senior Merchant (Opperkoopman) Cornelis Bartelsz. Marchier,

and the military officers Sloot and Couper. Marchier claimed (and Couper
denied) that Couper had accepted the levy of ten per cent on timber sold
to the Company as stipulated in Amangkurat II’s order of October 1680,
notwithstanding the two per cent limit fixed in the treaty of February 1677.
Marchier insisted that this hindered timber cutting by making it insufficiently
profitable for the Kalangs. In September 1681 Couper got the timber levy
reduced to two per cent. A few months later Batavia decided to demote
and replace Marchier and others in an attempt to end debilitating conflicts
between the VOC’s civil and military authorities in Java.” The Company’s
administration was not helped by recurring cases of the theft of its wares
and cash by its own servants, '° nor by a great fire which destroyed the
VOC office at Tégal with all its records, cash and provisions in August
1681, although its warehouse and gunpowder store were saved.'!
The Dutch East India Company’s efforts to establish and defend its
coastal trading operation involved it directly in that part of the Susuhunan’s
empire which was most remote from the kraton. The coast had tenuous
communication and administrative connections to the court and its produc-
ing, trading, and political interests may have made the VOC appear more
relevant than the court’s officials and tax-gatherers. It was thus an area
which might relish greater independence from Kartasura. It is not surpris-
ing that on these outskirts of the empire conflicts between court and
Company arose frequently over subsequent decades. The VOC’s hope that
Amangkurat II would administer the pasisir so as to facilitate VOC trade
and the Susuhunan’s wish that, having won back his kingdom for him, the
VOC would stay out of his way while he imposed his authority in all his
dominions would both prove to be unrealistic. The first major conflict
arose over the court of Cirébon'’ on the western extremity of Amangkurat
II’s coastal domains, near the boundary between his territories and those
he had ceded to Batavia.
During the war against Trunajaya, the three brothers who ruled Cirébon
had been obliged to dally with Sultan Agéng (r. 1651-83) of Bantén,
Amangkurat II’s enemy. The VOC was as unwilling as Amangkurat II to
see Cirébon fall under Bantén suzerainty. Batavia would then face hostile
lands on both its west and east sides, so the Company preferred to take
Cirébon under its own protection. Such an arrangement was unlikely to
win favour from Amangkurat II, for he regarded the Cirébon lords as his
vassals. A link with Batavia was, however, attractive to the Cirébon princes,
who would thereby gain VOC military backing and escape allegiance to
either Bantén or Mataram, with their inevitable attendant taxes, journeys
to and periods of residence at the court, manpower levies and political
conflicts which, at their worst, could be fatal. When in 1680 Sultan Agéng’s
authority in Bantén was eclipsed by that of his son (soon to be Sultan Haji,
72 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

r. 1682-7), the Cirébon brothers proclaimed their loyalty to the VOC,

which promptly constructed a fortress called de Bescherming (Protection)
theres?
Amangkurat II, who was just establishing his new court of Kartasura
(September 1680) and was about to face the final challenge of Pugér’s
control of Mataram, thus saw one of his outlying dependencies detached
by his own European allies. He expressed regret and dissatisfaction, but
was too dependent on VOC armed forces to insist that his rights as suzer-
ain over Cirébon be recognized.'* When the relationship between the VOC
and Cirébon was enshrined in a treaty of January 1681, about which the
Susuhunan was not consulted and of which he received a copy only two
months later, he was even more displeased. This contract declared the
Cirébon princes to be protégés of the VOC. On the grounds of being long-
standing “vassals and subordinates” of the Susuhunan, the princes under-
took “without prejudice to the friendship with the Company, to be and
remain honourable, steadfast and true allies and friends of the Susuhunan
Amangkurat [II] Senapati Ingalaga” and his descendants. Cirébon prom-
ised to assist Amangkurat II against his enemies with VOC approval, but
this was tied to an identical commitment by Amangkurat II which could
only become effective when and if he added his signature to this treaty,
which he was to be invited to do. Thus Amangkurat II’s former “vassals
and subordinates” were now his “allies and friends” and were to act even
as such only with the VOC’s approval.'
When Amangkurat II was informed of the VOC-Cirébon treaty in March
1681, he expressed anger to Couper, saying that the Cirébon rulers were
faithless subjects who had conspired with Bantén against him and who had
yet to appear to seek his pardon. “Do the [Governor]General [van Goens]
and Admiral [Speelman] wish to make my enemy subjects into free
princes?”, he asked. Couper, who seems to have been as surprised as
Amangkurat II at this treaty, assured the Susuhunan that Batavia was
acting for his own good; the royal response to this was silence.'® As the
warfare in Central Java progressed to its conclusion towards the end of
1681, Amangkurat II remained dissatisfied with the VOC’s seduction of
Cirébon’s allegiance. The Cirébon princes for their part were, not surpris-
ingly, unwilling to go to Kartasura, as the Dutch wished at least one of
them to do, to mollify the Susuhunan and to persuade him to join in
signing the January 1681 treaty.!”
Had Batavia been gifted with greater perception, it might have seen that
Amangkurat II had a lengthening list of matters for which he was unpre-
pared to forgive the Company: its control of the Priangan highlands of
West Java, its consistently supercilious treatment of him, Captain Tack’s
insistence upon payment for returning the Majapahit crown at Kédhiri in
1678, the very necessity of VOC military support, the Company’s inter-
ference in his coastal administration and now the theft of one of his
ATTEMPT AT SEPARATE EMPIRES 13

dominions within the Javanese ethnic heartland. The Babad Kraton ac-
count of this period contains a passage which, by its very inconsistency
with Dutch records, may suggest a need in the court to conceal the VOC’s
lése-majesté over Cirébon and the Susuhunan’s inability to do anything
about it. The VOC’s Admiral Elduwelbeh asks leave of Amangkurat II,
saying that Java is now cleansed of enemies. Amangkurat II (speaking
ngoko as a monarch should when addressing subordinates) gives Elduwelbeh
permission to depart, sends his greetings (tabe) to the Governor-General
and says that his payment to the VOC is the land of Cirébon and all the
villages of Priangan.'* Thus a fait accompli was transformed into an exercise
of royal prerogative in the chronicle. In due course the Susuhunan would
seek more tangible and sanginuary means of asserting his precedence.
Amangkurat II spoke to Couper in September 1681 of suspicions among
his people, presumably shared by him, that when the VOC had finished
restoring the Mataram kingdom it would turn its arms against the Susuhunan
and conquer his realm. Such rumours had long circulated in Java, no doubt
with the encouragement of the king’s enemies, and Couper again denied
them.’ The king’s suspicions of the Company apparently remained never-
theless. When he sent an embassy to Batavia in October 1681 offering
belated felicitations to van Goens upon having become Governor-General
nearly four years before, it was a sober mission. The Susuhunan’s letter
was formally received by the Governor-General and Council of the Indies
on 17 November—coincidentally the same day when Pugér was submit-
ting to Couper in the interior—and was found to be written in a style
which, at least in Dutch translation, was obsequious enough. But the
embassy was led by men of no great distinction and quite remarkably
brought no gifts. Amangkurat II blamed the exigencies of war for his
slowness to send a mission and said that there were no gifts because he
had nothing which his “father” the Governor-General would like.”? This
was a signal to Batavia, which wished not to see it, that after all the years
of fighting the Susuhunan neither respected nor trusted the Company.
Both Commander Couper and the Susuhunan were anxious to see VOC
forces withdrawn from the interior. Couper particularly wanted his unruly
Makasarese veterans dispatched home to South Sulawesi before they worked
havoc upon the Susuhunan’s newly pacified domain. He also much wished
to lay down his own command. But Batavia left Couper and six companies
(i.e. some 300 men) of Europeans and Mardijkers in Kartasura after their
return from Mésir in January 1682. Until October, Couper was obliged to
sit at the court, watching his soldiers falling ill and dying, before finally
being ordered to the coast.’!
During these eight months Couper was able to observe how the
Susuhunan and his officials functioned in a time of relative peace. What
he saw did not entirely reassure him. While there were signs that Amang-
kurat II would take a greater role in the affairs of state than the VOC
74 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

believed him hitherto to have taken, there were also signs of undue influence
being exercised by his wives, particularly the Ratu Wetan.* And the Patih,
R. Ang. Anrangkusuma, immediately seemed to Couper to offer cause for
worry. He greatly offended Couper by apparently arranging that the
Susuhunan not greet him and the VOC forces personally upon their return
to Kartasura in January 1682; only some days later was Couper received
at court.”?
During the first months of 1682, dislike grew between the VOC and the
kraton. The Patih Anrangkusuma and other courtiers may have preferred
the profits of exploitation to the stability which might attend judicious
government. The threat to the kraton from the Wanakusuma rebels in
February 1682” was, in Couper’s view, aggravated because many natives
of the Pajang district (where Kartasura was located) were alienated by
Anrangkusuma’s extortionate government and therefore joined the rebels.
Couper claimed to have said this to the Susuhunan in the Patih’s presence
and to have proposed his replacement. After a lengthy silence, Amangkurat
II asked with whom should he replace Anrangkusuma. Couper replied that
he didn’t know, but among the king’s many courtiers there must be someone
competent.*? With no evidence other than the Dutch, it is difficult to know
whether Couper’s estimation of Anrangkusuma was correct, but certainly
his accusations can hardly have enhanced the Patih’s affection for the
VOC.
For a month from early April 1682, Amangkurat II refused to receive
Couper on the grounds that he was ill.2° Couper made his displeasure
known and was eventually received in early May, on which and a sub-
sequent occasion the Susuhunan spoke in strong terms about Cirébon’s
attachment to the VOC. He was angry that with VOC endorsement he was
being regarded as a fellow sovereign by lords who had recently been his
vassals, that none of the Cirébon princes had come personally to Kartasura
even to seek his approval for their independence of him, and that by virtue
of its detachment from him Cirébon, which had done nothing to assist him
in regaining his kingdom, would also be excused from paying its share
(which the king said should be one-quarter, one-third, or even one-half) of
the money he must pay to the VOC. This latter amount, incidentally,
Amangkurat II still referred to as Sp. RI. 310,000, a figure which had been
out of date as soon as the fighting lasted beyond October 1677 and which
took no account of the large rice deliveries and other commitments also
stipulated in the February and October 1677 agreements.”’ His contracts
with the VOC, said the Susuhunan, did not oblige him to approve a treaty
such as that between Cirébon and Batavia and he had no intention of doing
so: Cirébon belonged to him. Couper replied that when Amangkurat II
was at Jépara some years before he had told Speelman that he would not
object to the independence of Cirébon if it were also independent of Bantén
and under Batavia’s control. And it shouldn’t be too hard for him to cope
ATTEMPT AT SEPARATE EMPIRES His)

with the financial matter, said Couper.** What in fact Amangkurat II had
apparently said at Jépara was merely that if Cirébon were lost to him he
would rather see the Dutch control it than Bantén.” And he clearly wanted
an agreement at least to reduce his debt if the VOC was going to appro-
priate his dominions.
Before long there were rumours that the Susuhunan was plotting to
massacre all Dutchmen or to murder Png. Pugér, who had surrendered
with VOC guarantees of his life and was thus the Company’s protégé at
court. Couper denied the former rumour and doubted but could not reject
absolutely the latter.°° There were indeed several murders of Europeans by
Javanese in 1682 but they appear to have been isolated incidents.*! The
Javanese governor of Sémarang, the town ceded to the VOC in January
1678, was murdered in Kartasura in April but this, too, appears to have
been without political significance.** Javanese-European relations in the
city of Kartasura were exacerbated by the action of the VOC soldiers left
there for eight months with little to do. They were accosting Javanese
women in their homes, smoking opium and drinking, activities which
Couper endeavoured to halt, no doubt with less than complete success.*4
The VOC intervened in the civil war in Bantén between Sultan Agéng
and his son Sultan Haji in March 1682. Francois Tack and Isaac de Saint-
Martin led a VOC force which rescued Haji from defeat and began to
impose VOC dominance there. In April the Susuhunan’s ambassadors,
who were still in Batavia, joined emissaries trom Johor, Jambi and Palem-
bang in congratulating the VOC upon its victory. But when Amangkurat
II himself was told he showed little interest.** He could hardly have been
pleased at this further demonstration of the VOC’s armed might. It may
have been particularly unwelcome to him because it was associated with
Captain Tack, who had earned the king’s malice over the affair of the
Majapahit crown in 1678.*°
While the king built a magnificent court to symbolise and confirm his
dominion—the kraton’s fortress walls were extended, more cannon were
installed and over a thousand deer were rounded up in the unpopulated
jungle that Mataram had become to fill a new royal hunting park at Kar-
tasura*°—affairs in the outer reaches of his realm were demonstrating how
tenuous was the Susuhunan’s authority there. The detachment of Cirébon
by the VOC was the most dramatic case, but there were other areas,
including districts where the VOC had little tong-term interest, where
royal authority was of dubious potency.
In the far eastern salient of Java, for example, the aged Mas (or Sunan)
Tawangalun of Blambangan plundered virtually at will in the wild,
mountainous country around Lumajang and Pugér. His forces were said
(perhaps unreliably) to number up to 20,000 men. In 1680-2 he struck as
far west as the borders of Pasuruan. In late 1680, the VOC briefly estab-
lished a pagér (palisade) to defend Pasuruan, but in December a Company
76 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

force of 56 men sent out from there with some 6000 Madurese and Java-
nese was abandoned by its allies and defeated by Tawangalun, with the
loss of its Lieutenant and four other Europeans.”
The Blambangan forces also had links with Arya Kartasana, the lord
of Kédhiri and Kartasana, who renounced his allegiance to the Susuhunan
in late 1680 and with a few hundred followers plundered the barely
populated highlands around Malang. Brothers named Darmayuda and
Sutaprana also roamed these eastern areas. The last two were killed near
Payak in December 1681 by forces under Cakraningrat II of West Madura
and Ang. Jangrana I of Surabaya, but Arya Kartasana escaped to Blam-
bangan.*®* The Wanakusuma rebels who threatened Kartasura in January
1682 also reportedly had support from Panaraga, Madiun, Kémagétan,
Jagaraga and Kaduwang dissidents.*” In the course of that year it was
necessary to send VOC and Kartasura forces westwards into the wilds of
Lurungténgah (Namrud’s old area) and south to Gunung Kidul to scatter
small Wanakusuma remnants. For several months in 1682-3 Kartasura
residents had an abundance of public executions of captured rebels to
entertain them and encourage their loyalty.*°
Compared with the previous years of fighting, this period saw little
more than small bands of rebels and brigands roaming almost-depopulated
districts. Yet even these episodes continued to bring VOC and Javanese
armed forces into action together. Time and again military exigencies
rendered impractical that separation of Company and kraton affairs which
both sought. These actions confirmed the Europeans’ contempt for the
Javanese: “Experience has taught us that absolutely no reliance is to be
placed upon all the Javanese promises or their valour’, was a comment of
1681.*! Such attitudes were not lost upon the Susuhunan and his courtiers,
whose wish to be rid of supercilious VOC officers was no doubt tempered
only by military necessity.
The island of Madura, one of the Susuhunan’s most valued provinces,
was of great interest to the VOC for its economic resources and strategic
position. In this it was like Cirébon and Java’s pasisir, but unlike many of
Java’s remoter inland districts. Restoring the Susuhunan’s authority over
Madura was not easy. Amangkurat II sent Cakraningrat II there with a
supporting VOC force in January 1680, but it was found impossible to
subdue Trunajaya’s former governor of Madura, Macanwulung. This
gentlemen was apparently from an old Suménép aristocratic family which
had been displaced after Sultan Agung’s conquest of 1624, when Mataram
imposed its own governor over Suménép.” His military prowess and popular
following were combined with political acumen: he now submitted to
Amangkurat II, was recognized as the king’s governor of eastern Madura
(Sumenép and Pamékasan) and was given the new name and title of Tg.
Yudanagara. Cakraningrat II now had only western Madura (Arosbaya,
Balega and Sampang) to subdue, but his continuing unpopularity (accord-
ATTEMPT AT SEPARATE EMPIRES a,

ing to the VOC) slowed this process. While the VOC, and perhaps the
king, began to doubt Cakraningrat II’s abilities, Yudanagara rose in their
estimation. He took part in the defeat of Giri in April 1680 and himself
executed Png. Giri and his wounded sons, thereby winning further royal
favour and VOC respect. When renewed resistance arose in Suménép and
Sampang in May 1680, Yudanagara was hastily dispatched to Madura.to
put it down.*’ Cakraningrat II was still the king’s Patih at this time and no
doubt found it impossible both to fulfil the Patih’s responsibilities for the
entire kingdom and to subdue his own portion of it on Madura. This diffi-
culty was resolved when first Ad. Urawan and then R. Anrangkusuma suc-
ceeded him as Patih from about mid-1680.
In about August 1680 Wasengrana, an old supporter of Trunajaya,
gathered a popular following in Madura by appearing as Trunajaya risen
from the dead. Dressed in black like the dead prince, he soon had control
of Cakraningrat II’s territories of Sampang, Balega and Arosbaya, putting
to flight the terrified sons of Cakraningrat II who were in charge there.
Yudanagara was anxious to gain advantage from these circumstances by
returning from Sémarang, where he then was, to Madura, but Cakraningrat
II’s position as lord of West Madura meant that he, too, must play a role
in the reconquest. At Amangkurat II’s insistence, but with little enthusi-
asm, the Europeans promised a VOC force of sixty-four Europeans and
Ambonese to support the two Madurese lords, who made a show of rec-
onciling their differences. But when they reached Grésik, Yudanagara left
Cakraningrat II behind and proceeded with his forces alone to Madura.
Cakraningrat II, offended by the insolent, presumptuous and—what was
worse—successful actions of his former subordinate and enemy Yuda-
nagara, was now refused VOC reinforcements on the grounds that these
had only been promised if he and Yudanagara acted jointly. He then sailed
to Madura anyway to take part in the reconquest of the island. By early
October 1680 he was again in charge of West Madura. Wasengrana fled
to Blambangan but other rebel leaders were captured. The captives were
summoned to the newly established capital at Kartasura along with
Yudanagara and Cakraningrat II, whose differences the VOC and king
hoped there to reconcile.** These hopes were in vain.
The VOC’s inclination to admire Yudanagara was soon tempered by
news that he was intriguing to undermine Cakraningrat II’s authority, that
he harboured Makasarese warriors and perhaps had friendly links with
Tawangalun of Blambangan.* In 1682 he appealed to the Governor-Gen-
eral to be made a vassal of the Company rather than of Kartasura, the
Cirébon arrangement which would prove attractive to several coastal lords
over coming decades and which the VOC politely refused on this and,
with one exception, every subsequent occasion until the 1740s. The
Company now realized that Yudanagara was more than the amiable but
simple soldier they had thought him to be.*°
78 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

As the VOC moved into this period of relative peace, it learned that
Madurese and Javanese affairs were often not what they at first seemed.
Throughout 1683 and into 1684, Cakraningrat II and Yudanagara fed tales
of each others’ perfidy to the VOC, the truth of which is no longer recov-
erable. It is, however, clear that Yudanagara continued to request that he
might stand under VOC protection down to early 1684 and Amangkurat
II, for what it is worth, appears to have been more suspicious of Yudana-
gara than of Cakraningrat II.*’
While the Dutch faced the difficulty of unravelling such intrigues, they
continued to be baffled by the way the court was run. As far as they could
see, Amangkurat II was a carefree incompetent, so beguiled by R.
Anrangkusuma’s provision of dances and other entertainments that he left
the affairs of state in the hands of Anrangkusuma and Ratu Amangkurat
(apparently one of the surviving wives of his father but not his own mother).
These two, the Dutch were prepared to believe, relied for advice on an old
woman and one of the dwarfs living in the kraton. By late 1683, Png.
Pugér, whom the VOC respected and sought to protect, seemed to be
threatened by the court intrigues, and the senior VOC officer at Kartasura,
Capt. Lt. Aarnout Grevinck, was refused entry to the court at least for a
time.*®
It seems probable that the VOC in fact knew little of the inner workings
of the court, for unknown to the Company anti-European conspiracies
were almost certainly already brewing. The roots of such animosities are
not difficult to find, as the preceding pages suggest. There were other
causes not mentioned above. On at least one occasion, for example, the
king complained that the VOC office at Jépara was not passing on to him
all the tolls collected there.” Ignorant of the effect of its actions, the VOC
persisted in its myopic interference. When in 1684 Amangkurat II wished
to forbid the use of opium (long before forbidden to the subjects of the
Sultan of Bantén) in order to save the youth of Java from ruin, the Company
thought only of the commercial implications and dissuaded him.*° The
VOC was more pleased with the king’s ordering of a head-tax ostensibly
to produce the revenue needed to pay his debt to the Company,°! but
nothing reached the VOC from this source. The Europeans could not know
that it was now less than two years to the bloody dénouement of VOC-
Kartasura relations described in the following chapter.
But before the court shed the blood of Europeans, both parties fought
the remnants of the court’s indigenous enemies, as military exigencies
continued to thrust them together in an embrace of mutual distrust and
contempt. Png. Wanakusuma and his followers and remnants of the Ka-
joran line still controlled many villages in Gunung Kidul and could mount
a force reported to be over 1000 men in mid-1683, when they struck
Témbayat and even appeared to threaten the kraton itself. Batavia sent 140
soldiers to assist the king’s forces, reportedly 60,000 strong at one point.
ATTEMPT AT SEPARATE EMPIRES 719

Although by the end of 1683 many Gunung Kidul rebels had been killed
or captured, among Amangkurat II’s field commanders the Europeans
respected only Png. Pugér (whose forces reportedly killed hundreds of the
enemy) and Ang. Jangrana I of Surabaya. The competence and loyalty of
the rest of the king’s officers were, in the VOC’s eyes, essentially con-
temptible.”
Amangkurat II, too, seems to have doubted the loyalty of those who
served him. In early 1683 he summoned his officials and required that
they reconfirm their loyalty with a water-oath.*? At least one anonymous
Kartasura chronicler appears to have agreed that all was not right at court.
No doubt impressed by both the supernatural significance and the sym-
bolic appositeness of a total solar eclipse over Central Java on the morning
of 24 July 1683, he recorded that “there was a solar eclipse; dark was the
age of Kartasura.”°* The more detailed Babad Kraton text unfortunately
omits this period altogether, skipping from the death of Namrud and the
submission of Png. Pugér in late 1681 to the Surapati episode discussed
in the following chapter,” and thus sheds no light upon the affairs of the
court at this time.
While the Company’s relations with the kraton were complicated by
mutual ignorance and probably deliberate misinformation, coastal affairs
also reflected ongoing difficulties between Europeans and Javanese. Piracy
against the Company’s trading allies the Chinese, and suspected arson
against VOC buildings and in the Chinese quarters of Jépara and Sémarang
were probably not without political significance.** Continuing conflict
between the Company and Tg. Suranata of Démak over rice procurement
also suggested the strains caused by the VOC coastal role. Suranata appar-
ently believed that he could stop locals arranging illicit deals with the
Company if he could channel all rice sales to the VOC through himself,
threatening otherwise to halt sales entirely.°’ Difficulties also continued
over timber supplies. And threats to Javanese who cooperated with the
Company reportedly led many to stop doing so.*’ The distortions to coastal
economic and political patterns caused by the Company’s efforts to insti-
tutionalise itself as the dominant trading force presumably threatened the
local lords’ control and probably heightened ethnic tensions. It was still
too early for the emergence of coastal dignitaries who would manipulate
the VOC. presence to their advantage: it is perhaps not surprising that
when they did emerge some at least were ethnic Chinese-become-Java-
nese, as will be seen in Chapter 12.
The Company’s internal affairs were hardly smoother than its relations
with the Javanese at this time. In addition to the ongoing revelations
of internal conflict, incompetence, debauchery and corruption which
are a standard part of the VOC records,” the deaths in January 1684
of Governor-General Speelman and his trusted second-in-charge, the
Director-General Balthazar Bort, disclosed vistas of maladministration and
80 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

dishonesty hitherto unimagined. Speelman was posthumously accused of

governing virtually without the Council of the Indies, of imprisoning over
a hundred innocent persons, of selling free men as slaves, of allowing
payments for nonexistent soldiers and undone work and of underpaying
Indonesian pepper producers. He was held responsible for the ineffective-
ness of the VOC’s opium monopoly, for its general administrative
inefficiency and for widespread private trading. Textiles sales were said to
be one-tenth of what they had been before. As if this were not enough to
blame the dead hero for, it was concluded that he had been guilty of
massive personal corruption. Batavia—that is to say, Speelman’s suc-
cessors who had not yet enjoyed his scope for self-enrichment—confiscated
all of his estate which could be got hold of. This amounted to Rds. 218,700,
at a time when Batavia possessed only Rds. 43,638 in its treasury. It was
believed that Speelman had smuggled an even larger and now irretrievable
amount to Europe in the form of jewels.®! The Reverend Valentyn, whose
own dishonesty and self-interest were not inconsiderable, added that Speel-
man was a great drinker and a great lover. The streets of Batavia, said
Valentyn, were proof of this, for they were full of Speelman faces. Not
for nothing did the Dutch historian F.W. Stapel, when compiling a popular
volume of portraits of the Governors-General, omit to mention Speel-
man’s gargantuan self-indulgences, commenting only that “Speelman dis-
tinguished himself in various ways.’
The succession to Speelman created further internal trouble. Anthonio
Hurdt, who succeeded Speelman in command of the expeditionary force
in Java in 1678, now wished to follow him as Governor-General. The
council of the Indies, however, instead chose Joannes Camphuys, a forty-
nine-year-old bachelor who had the support of a younger party within the
Council. Hurdt was named Director-General and the Council of Indies
remained split between his supporters and the Governor-General’s. Camp-
huys proceeded to govern almost without reference to the Council. Indeed,
when the conflict was at its worst in 1687 he rarely attended its meetings.
This factionalism was only resolved when Amsterdam expelled Hurdt from
the Council in that year.
The death of Speelman appears also to have changed Batavia-Kartasura
relations for the worse. Speelman had been very personally involved in the
restoration of Amangkurat II, the man whom rumours had so often ac-
cused of being his son. When the king was told of Speelman’s death, he
asked a protocol question which portended the end of an era in VOC-
Javanese relations. He had always addressed Speelman as his father,
Amangkurat II said, but how should he address the new Governor-Gen-
eral? Three months later he proposed to regard Camphuys and the Council
of the Indies as his brothers.°° Meanwhile some Kartasura officials report-
edly proposed to the king that Sémarang should no longer belong to the
VOC, since with Speelman’s death the treaties were annulled.® Consider-
ATTEMPT AT SEPARATE EMPIRES 81

able bloodshed and crisis were to follow before Amangkurat II decided to

call Camphuys, too, his father.°’ And two decades would pass before
anything like a stable new VOC-Kartasura relationship was defined. News
of the conflict within the VOC hierarchy after Speelman’s death would
almost certainly have reached Kartasura and may have encouraged the
view that, if changes in the relationship with the Company were desirable,
now would be a good time to seek them.
Batavia knew that aspects of its relations with Kartasura required urgent
regulation. There had been little sign of the money which Amangkurat II
owed, the king still harboured objections to the detachment of Cirébon
from his dominions, the VOC’s trading privileges were frequently in-
fringed, the boundaries of Batavia and Sémarang were disputed and the
Company wished to be rid of the expense of a VOC lifeguard at the court.
Above all, the company was worried about the activities of Makasarese,
Balinese, Malay and other adventurers and vagabonds and wished to be
sure that such people were not given support or refuge at the Javanese
court. In April 1684, Joannes Cops, Senior Officer (Opperhoofd) at Jépara,°*
was ordered to go to the kraton to announce that in due course Jacob
Couper would follow as Special Commissioner to speak with the king on
these matters. Amangkurat II was being told, in other words, that his
finances, his prerogatives, the trade of his empire and who was allowed to
live at his court were matters upon which the Company would shortly
instruct him. He was also told that his senior officials were failing in their
duties to him, not a message likely to win the VOC support among royal
advisers”. When Cops got to Kartasura in September 1684, he found that
Anrangkusuma allowed the VOC commandant, Capt. Lt. Grevinck, vir-
tually no access to Amangkurat II (perhaps on the Susuhunan’s orders,
perhaps at his own initiative) and that the king avoided any real nego-
tiation of outstanding issues.’ He returned to Batavia bringing with him
ambassadors of the Susuhunan who stayed until February 1685, but who
lacked authority to negotiate the matters in dispute.’!
In East Java and Madura, too, VOC, Javanese and Madurese affairs
were entwined in a potentially dangerous fashion. Piracy along the coast
threatened both European and indigenous shipping; not only pirates of
various non-Javanese origins but also some local lords were probably in-
volved.” At the same time, Ang. Jangrana I and Png. Cakraningrat II were
apparently seeking opportunities to expand their influence in ways which
are, however, obscure in the sources consulted for this study.” The latter’s
rivalry with Tg. Yudanagara of East Madura was undiminished. The VOC
decided in January 1685 to send the Senior Merchant Jeremias van Vliet”
with a VOC force to Surabaya and Madura to regulate the affairs of the
Company and Amangkurat II. His authority to act on behalf of the latter
was flimsy, resting solely upon a letter given him by Amangkurat II’s
ambassadors then in Batavia.”
82 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

By the time van Vliet reached the east coast, news had arrived of the
death, apparently in early November 1684, of Tg. Yudanagara. A scramble
for East Madura had immediately begun among Yudanagara’s sons-in-law
Ky. Brajapati, A. Baskara and Ky. M.A. Pulangjiwa, his grandson R.
Sudérma (then barely into his teens) and Png. Cakraningrat II. At Sura-
baya in April 1685, van Vliet got all parties to accept a partition of East
Madura among the four East Madurese aristocrats as a temporary arrange-
ment, pending ratification by Batavia and the Susuhunan. The latter had
already received Pulangjiwa and Brajapati at court concerning the suc-
cession, but Lt. Grevinck and Anrangkusuma (whose interests in this matter
are not clear) reportedly dissuaded the king from disposing of the territory
other than by partitioning it among the four aspirant successors.’° The
Dutch believed that the pardoned former rebel Wasengrana was involved
in both the piracy along the coast and the intrigues in Madura. When two
VOC officers recognized him among Cakraningrat II’s entourage at Sura-
baya, they tricked him into their lodgings and apprehended him. The
Javanese were persuaded to execute Wesengrana and impale his head.”
Van Vliet then fired the chief of the Company’s Surabaya post for mis-
management and corruption’*® and, no doubt pleased with his many ac-
complishments,” returned to Batavia. He had probably prevented a civil
war in Madura, but had done so at the price of demonstrating to Amang-
kurat II that the VOC was prepared to intervene in his empire when it felt
like it. This was a dangerous message to convey in 1685.
The VOC probably believed that its more vigorous intervention in coastal
and royal affairs in 1685—the testing, in effect, of the boundaries between
the Company and the Kartasura spheres of authority—had been success-
ful. Procurement of timber, salt and sugar improved, textile and opium
sales began to recover’? and Tg. Suranata even paid Sp. RI. 30,000 against
the king’s debt.*'! The Company might have noted a more accurate omen,
however, in the murder of two Europeans returning from Kartasura to
Sémarang.” For the result of the VOC’s actions was not to be a Javanese
administration more consistent with Company interests, which would
thereby facilitate a VOC withdrawal from involvement in the kingdom’s
affairs.** Instead the Company had taken some of the final steps needed to
lead the Kartasura court to the view that its entire involvement with the
Dutch was calamitous. Now that the kraton seemed free of large-scale
military opponents, the king and his courtiers could hardly see pressing
reasons to pay the continuing economic and political costs which the VOC
alliance entailed.
The years since the restoration of Amangkurat II in Central Java had
failed to produce a stable VOC-Kartasura relationship. The Company
detached Cirébon from the king’s domains over continuing royal objec-
tions.** It treated the monarch and his officials with a superciliousness
which no society—and certainly no king—could have failed to mark. It
ATTEMPT AT SEPARATE EMPIRES 83

demanded money and trading prerogatives. Amangkurat II lent his ear to

rumours that the Company’s aim was eventually to conquer his entire
kingdom and, if he was inclined to accept the Company’s denial of these
rumours, must have been shaken by the VOC’s conquest of Bantén in
1682. No Javanese king could ever be entirely sure of the loyalty of his
subordinates or his control over his lands, especially more outlying dis-
tricts. Such circumstances made the very presence of a powerful, inter-
fering force like the VOC seem threatening to a Susuhunan. The Company’s
inclination to trumpet its judgements of disloyalty or incompetence among
high royal officials earned it few allies in that quarter.
From Kartasura’s perspective, continuation of this sort of relationship
could be justified only on the grounds of military necessity or obligation.
The destruction of Amangkurat II’s main enemies removed the former
ground and, if there had been a recognition of obligation to the VOC,
Speelman’s death in 1684 seems to have ended it. The threat of a high-
powered VOC embassy to settle outstanding issues and the demonstration
by van Vliet’s 1685 mission that the Company was prepared to intervene
directly must have impressed upon the kraton the urgency of restructuring
its relationship with Batavia. Knowledge of dissension within the VOC
administration may have led the king and his courtiers to think that the
time was propitious—as indeed it was—for the application of the primary
means available to them to rid themselves of VOC interference: the use of
violence.
In all of this the VOC held the initiative and can be seen to have
pursued a course which exacerbated its relations with the court. It must be
said, however, that it is difficult to see how the Company could have
pursued the only obvious alternative, withdrawal from the affairs of Central
and East Java and Madura. For without certain products, especially timber
and rice, from the Javanese pasisir, the Company’s headquarters at Bata-
via could hardly have survived.** This consideration lay behind the de-
cision to support the Mataram dynasty against Trunajaya at great cost to
the VOC, to recover which costs still further involvement in the affairs of
Java was required. In a more enlightened age greater cultural sensitivity
might have been expected, but the 1680s in Java were not years of cultural
enlightenment. They were years of misunderstanding, contempt and conflict.
The VOC had created few friends and many enemies by its intervention
in Java. It was now at last to be repaid for all it had done, not, as it hoped,
in cash and rice, but in blood.
 The Crisis of 1686:
Surapati and the Slaughter
of the Europeans at
Kartasura

The events of 1686 in Java centred upon a Balinese adventurer named

Surapati. He became a legend during his life both to Europeans and to
Javanese and a model long thereafter of either the hated, feared and
murderous native or the heroic warrior, depending upon one’s point of
view. His life is shrouded in myths and half-truths generated by both In-
donesians and Europeans; confident historical analysis of his career is thus
difficult. His adventures have attracted two doctoral dissertations. H.J. de
Graaf’s 1935 Leiden thesis De moord op Kapitein Francois Tack, 8 Febr.
1686 was a landmark in the study of modern Javanese history in which de
Graaf, the father of this field, became the first professionally trained his-
torian to integrate Javanese and Dutch sources.'! Ann Kumar’s Surapati,
man and legend, published over forty years later, is primarily a study of
Indonesian chronicle materials concerning Surapati. The present chapter
relies heavily upon the work of Kumar and especially de Graaf.
Javanese stories about Surapati’s life before he reached the court of
Kartasura are exemplified in the Yogyakarta chronicle Babad Kraton written
in AD 1777-8. This may be compared with Kumar’s sources, which she
identified as being of West Javanese, East Javanese and Blambangan ori-
gin.” For this part of his life, Surapati has been transformed into an epic
figure, his true past obscured but his future greatness discernible through
the folds of legend.
_ The Babad Kraton’ tale begins in the city of Batavia, where one Kapitan
Emur* owns a handsome Balinese slave. This slave has brought his master
good fortune in both trade and official appointments ever since his pur-
chase at the age of seven. The Dutchman is by now extremely rich and one
of the twelve Councillors of the Indies (Edler rolas).° Emur has therefore
named the boy Untung (“good fortune”) and adopted him, and gives in to
his every wish. Emur also has a beautiful pubescent daughter who finds

84
THE CRISIS OF 1686 85

Untung irresistible; eventually they have an affair. Meanwhile Emur show-

ers gifts upon Untung, who passes them on to others and thereby forms a
circle of devoted followers among Bugis and Balinese slaves. But the
merchant then realises that his riches are disappearing and that a liaison
exists between Untung and his daughter, whereupon he thrashes Untung
half to death. Emur relents when the comely young man begs forgiveness.
When the affair between Untung and the merchant’s daughter resumes,
however, Emur is unforgiving. He throws Untung into stocks (bélokan)
with sixty companions.
Untung asks his comrades what they would do if, with God’s help, he
were able to free himself and them. They swear absolute loyalty, where-
upon Untung slips out of the stocks and releases them. He then announces
that he wishes to run amuck (angamuk) amongst the Dutch. In the ensuing
hostilities many VOC soldiers die, as do many of Untung’s followers. But
as Untung’s fame spreads, more slaves flock to him. Eventually Dutch
military action forces Untung and his forty remaining comrades to leave
the Batavia area for Cirébon. En route they encounter the Cirébon Sultan’s
favourite, who is named Ki Surapati and who fears that Untung will supplant
him in the Sultan’s favour. So he endeavours to trick and overpower
Untung. The latter single-handedly defeats Ki Surapati and puts him to
flight. Ki Surapati then goes to the Sultan of Cirébon and claims that he
was attacked by Batavian robbers. When Untung appears before the Sultan
and confirms that he has only forty men, the Sultan denounces Ki Surapati
as a liar, for never did forty thieves dare to rob a hundred men. Ki Surapati
is then taken to the great square before the court and executed.
The Sultan says to Untung that he knows of his wish to seek refuge in
Cirébon, but that Cirébon is not strong enough to protect him, for it has
been given to the VOC. Instead he advises Untung to travel eastward to
the king of Mataram (i.e. Kartasura), a great ruler who is able to safeguard
him. The Sultan then gives to Untung the name of his former favourite R.
Surapati (“courageous unto death”) and prophesies his fate: “you will be
an enemy of the infidels” (kopar).®
Untung—henceforth known as Surapati—sets off to the east from Ciré-
bon. In Banyumas he and his followers proclaim two brothers, the heads
(pértinggi) of the village Cibarang named Saradénta and Saradénti, to be
kings.’ Surapati leaves twenty of his followers there under the command
of his foremost lieutenant Umbul Jaladriya® and with the other twenty goes
to Kartasura, where he gains an audience with Anrangkusuma. He tells the
Patih that he seeks refuge from maltreatment at the hands of the Dutch. If
the king should be concerned about a VOC request to turn him over, says
Surapati, everything should be left to him alone: he will take on the Dutch
day or night, for he commands all the arts of war. Anrangkusuma then
promises him a favourable reception from Amangkurat II.
By now reports have reached Kartasura of a rebellion in Banyumas.
 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA
86

KARTASURA IN 1686
(simplified from Nicolaus de Graaff's Reisen)

(MIMIC
Central precinct_

Loner eran caver SEG 88) oe thas Seabees tiger cages

(VOC Ry \ east gate

watch
"Seban" (alun-alun)
[actually the krapyak?]

"Passer" (market)
[actually the a/un-alun?]

a —_- [fenced waringin trees] & LE,

Surapaten

Cakraningrata
Pugeéran

"Agter wegh" (rear road)

Amangkurat II orders Anrangkusuma to deal with this but Surapati volun-

teers instead. Of course his lieutenant Jaladriya now captures and kills the
rebel king Saradénti (the brother Saradénta having disappeared from the
tale) whom Surapati himself had previously set up. As far as Kartasura
knows, a deed of great valour has been performed. Surapati and his fol-
THE CRISIS OF 1686 87

lowers are therefore showered with riches and fine clothing at court.? By
now Surapati and Anrangkusuma are great friends.
The VOC records on Surapati paint a picture less embroidered with
obviously mythic elements. They depict him as an escaped Batavia slave
who from the late 1670s was the foremost leader of the bands of brigands,
mostly escaped Balinese slaves, who roamed the wild country south of
Batavia.'° In March 1683 a VOC force under Captain J. Ruys encountered
a large number of these highwaymen. Being too many to attack, they were
promised that they would not be returned to slavery, a ploy which Ruys
hoped would “tame” them until the opportunity arose to kill them all.
Surapati himself surrendered soon thereafter and was even enlisted as a
lieutenant in the VOC’s military service, in which capacity he was care-
lessly provided with some VOC firearms. He was employed to pursue
Png. Purbaya, a son of the defeated Sultan Agéng of Bantén, and the
Makasarese Sufi Syeikh Yusuf who had also opposed the VOC in Bantén."!
In January 1684, however, Surapati and his band turned upon a VOC force
of thirty-nine Europeans at Cikalong, killed some twenty of them and
returned to their previous occupation of brigandage. For months the VOC
tried unsuccessfully to entice him into surrendering again. Finally in
September 1684 nearly 800 VOC soldiers set out under Commander Jacob
Couper via Cirébon to attack the “murderous traitor Surapati ... and his
faithless gang” in the Galunggung area. Heavy losses were inflicted upon
Surapati’s followers in one clash, but sickness among the VOC and heavy
rains forced the Company to withdraw from the pursuit as Surapati went
eastwards. By March 1685, news was received of his favourable reception
at Kartasura."”
During the remaining months of 1685, tension was high in Kartasura.
Amangkurat II and his courtiers nervously anticipated the arrival of the
VOC Special Commissioner, with memories of the Company’s campaign
against Surapati and its intervention in Madura’? in late 1684 and early
1685 fresh in their minds. The court also awaited the return of Amangkurat
II’s emissaries who had gone to Batavia in June 1685 and requested,
among other things, the handing back to Amangkurat II of Cirébon and
all other Kartasura territories under VOC control. Batavia’s announcement
that it would send Francois Tack rather than Couper as its special am-
bassador can hardly have soothed the king’s nerves.'* This was the man
who had sold him the crown of Majapahit at Kédhiri in 1678 and to whom
he had tried to avoid paying the promised Rds. 1000, which had therefore
been deducted by the VOC from revenues owing to Amangkurat II in
1681. Tack’s most recent actions included commanding the conquering
expedition to Bantén in March 1682." He thus stood in the king’s eyes for
much that he hated and feared about the VOC.
Surapati’s presence at the court added to the list of matters in dispute
between Kartasura and Batavia; it also offered the anti- VOC party in the
88 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

kraton an opportunity of dealing with the Company. The VOC asked for
Surapati’s arrest but the king refused for reasons which the Dutch re-
garded as frivolous. At first Amangkurat II said that he was merely trying
to lull Surapati and his followers into lowering their guard.'® Later he
claimed that Surapati had remedies which had enabled him to survive two
attempts to poison him by Anrangkusuma,'’ who was in fact known to the
Europeans as their principal opponent at court and Surapati’s principal
friend. In November 1685, members of the small VOC garrison at Karta-
sura clashed with a party of Surapati’s followers at the cost of one fatally
wounded and one badly beaten soldier. According to the Dutch, in order
to give the appearance of a less one-sided assault, Surapati had “a young
black” belonging to himself killed and then claimed that this was a Bali-
nese victim of the Company. The VOC concluded that Amangkurat II was
going to give them little or no assistance against Surapati, although they
cannot have guessed what really lay in store.'®
It was at this point, in November 1685, that the intrigues and tensions
at the court seemed to reach a peak. The VOC commandant, Capt. Lt.
Grevinck, was suddenly told in secret that Amangkurat II was about to
take flight to Mataram through the rear exit of the court on the advice and
in the company of Anrangkusuma, but against the wishes of most of his
senior courtiers. Not knowing what this might betoken, Grevinck ordered
the VOC lifeguard to march with flying banners and sounding drums to
the south of the court, with orders to stay there or to follow Amangkurat
Il wherever he might go unless he personally ordered them away. Grevinck
thereby effectively suggested to Amangkurat II and anyone else prepared
to ponder the point that the soldiers were as much the king’s custodians
as his lifeguards. It then began to rain and as darkness fell, the royal
departure was put off.'?
The king now summoned Grevinck and told him that in a day or two
he would indeed go to Mataram. Then he would call all the VOC from
Kartasura to join him and leave the annihilation of Surapati and his fol-
lowers to R.A. Sinduréja. With rumours circulating that the VOC was
plotting something nasty against him, the king also proposed that, since he
could not pay what he owed the Company, he would stay in Mataram with
a small retinue, leaving the court in the hands of Sinduréja and not return-
ing until his debt was paid by his officials. When Tack arrived, his officials
would lay their krisses at his feet and beg him to treat them kindly. Grevinck
told the king that such measures would expose him to greater danger and
attempted to put the ostensibly rattled monarch at his ease, apparently with
some success, for the trip to Mataram never took place. The VOC thought
ail of this to be a plot by Anrangkusuma to thrust responsibility upon
Sinduréja, a most senior courtier but one whom the VOC thought to be
declining in favour, and to induce Surapati to flee.?? Whatever the case, it
does seem that Surapati and his men were such a formidable military force
Capt. Tack and Surapati as mythology: Tack as a wayang kulit ogre
(left), Surapati as a heroic figure in wayang kulit (centre) and wayang
golek (right).
90 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

that no one at court was anxious to tackle them and there was a fear that
the VOC might somehow compel the court to do so. Suspicions of the
Company continued. Sinduréja and other senior courtiers made a trip to
the north coast shortly thereafter, probably to spy out what sorts of mili-
tary preparation the VOC was making for Tack’s embassy to the court.
By November 1685 Tack was ready to depart from Batavia for Karta-
sura via Cirébon. The Company’s aims for the embassy were settled. Tack
was in effect to recoup the VOC’s losses to whatever limited extent was
possible and to restore Javanese respect for the Company, which was
thought to suffer from the ongoing impasse in relations. These goals were
to be achieved by acceding to what were believed to be the king’s views
as far as was reasonably possible, in order to gain an agreement. The court
of Kartasura would doubtless have been surprised to know how far the
Company was prepared to compromise on quite central points. The VOC
wanted its protectorate over Cirébon to be recognized but insisted that one
of the three Cirébon princes at last accompany Tack to Kartasura to
acknowledge Amangkurat II as “their elder brother and the leading Java-
nese king of the land”. The VOC’s own right to trade free of tolls was to
be maintained but Company subjects trading privately with VOC passes
might be charged tolls in the king’s ports and territories. The limit of two
per cent tariff fixed in Section Seven of the February 1677 treaty upon
goods sold to the VOC could be raised to three per cent. The king’s
obligation under Section Eight of that treaty to deliver 4000 koyans
(approximately 14 million lbs avoirdupois/6400 metric tons) of rice at
market prices could be abandoned for a VOC right to purchase whatever
rice it needed. The Company also desired an extension of Batavia’s east-
ern boundary from the river of Pamanukan (Kali Cupunagara) to that of
Indramayu (Cimanuk) so that Batavia would border on Cirébon on the
east, but was prepared to give up its claim to sovereignty of Semarang and
Kaligawe and wished to close or reduce several of its other coastal posts.
The most pressing issue was the royal debt to the Company, calculated by
the VOC to amount by then to Sp. RI. 1,540,000. The Company had
stopped increasing this figure for ongoing costs in 1682 to avoid frighten-
ing the king off his enormous liability altogether. If it were necessary in
order to gain the Susuhunan’s agreement to the other points which the
VOC regarded as important, Tack was authorised to reduce this debt by
as much as 84 per cent to Sp. RI. 250,000.”
A secret appendix to Tack’s orders concerned Surapati. He was to lay
hands on Surapati if at all possible and kill him and his leading com-
panions. If they escaped he was to put a price on their heads. If neither of
these was possible, he was to promise Surapati a pardon if he would leave
Kartasura for Batavia. If this, too, proved impossible, he was to leave
matters as they were and get out with the VOC’s prestige as intact as
possible.?> Armed with these instructions, on 3 November Tack was for-
THE CRISIS OF 1686 9]

mally installed as Commissioner and Ambassador to Amangkurat II and

set sail from Batavia. His second-in-command was Jeremias van Vliet, the
man who had intervened in Madura in 1685.74
It is at this point that Tack himself enters the Babad Kraton account as
another semi-mythological character. In Batavia, says the chronicle,
Surapati’s military prowess is of such renown that none of the Company’s
warriors dares undertake to capture him. None, that is, except a captain
named Etak, the son of the conqueror of Makasar.” The latter, unnamed
in the babad, was of course none other than Admiral Speelman. So Tack,
a son of Speelman, is about to face that other putative son of Speelman,
Amangkurat II.
Tack stopped at Cirébon to restore order in both the VOC’s and the
princes’ affairs. A new Company Resident was installed and one of the
three rulers, Png. Anom, was persuaded to go along to Kartasura in order
finally to regularise the VOC protectorate over Cirébon in the presence of
Amangkurat II. On 20 December Tack and his companions travelled to
Sémarang. On 4 February 1686 they set off from there for Kartasura,
escorted by the Susuhunan’s dignitaries R.A. Sinduréja, Ad. Urawan, Tg.
Suranata and Tg. Ingawangga.”©
The timing of Tack’s embassy to Kartasura might have been better.
Aside from having chosen the wet season, with the result that his travel
would be slower and more difficult, he was also about to appear in the
midst of the greatest festival of the Javanese court calendar. The annual
celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad on the twelfth of the
month Rabingulawal (or Mulud), known as Garébég Mulud,”’ was an occasion
when the kingdom’s dignitaries were all obliged to appear at court. This
was a time for tax-gathering and high-level politicking, since for weeks
surrounding the Garébég the capital was crowded with lords and their
armed entourages from throughout the realm. In AJ 1609, 12 Mulud fell
on 6 February AD 1686, so whatever transpired upon the arrival of Tack
would be before the eyes of the assembled dignitaries of the empire.
The Babad Kraton account of the tense period before Tack’s arrival at
court”® is no doubt influenced by the mythologising which surrounds all
these events. In the absence of other documentation, however, it is at least
worthy of epitome and, as will be seen below, seems to be consistent with
Dutch sources on some points. Here R.A. Sinduréja presents to Amangkurat
II a letter from the Governor-General demanding that Surapati be surren-
dered. Sinduréja recommends compliance but the Susuhunan summons his
younger brother Png. Pugér, Pan. Cakraningrat II of West Madura and
Ang. Jangrana I of Surabaya, three of the most powerful and influential
lords of his realm, for advice. The Madurese and Surabayan lords also
advice compliance, for otherwise war between the king’s Javanese and
Dutch servants (abdi-dalém Kumpéni, presumably meaning the VOC life-
guard at the kraton) will be unavoidable. Prince Pugér—the man who
92 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

surrendered in November 1681 with VOC guarantees of his safety and

who would later be the Company’s choice for the throne—says to the
Susuhunan that he should go along with the VOC in its desire to have
Surapati but that none of his Javanese subjects should assist the Company
in this. Surapati is a Muslim and has done Amangkurat II no wrong, so the
king should not betray him because of Company pressure. Instead he
should claim that Surapati is Anrangkusuma’s subject but not his and let
the VOC do what it can by itself.
Amangkurat II accepts Pugér’s advice and gives him responsibility
for orchestrating the court’s handling of the crisis. The king also orders
that arms be given to Surapati. That night Pugér holds a meeting
with Anrangkusuma, Surapati and other lords. Pugér explains that if the
VOC insists upon having Surapati, Anrangkusuma is to act as the shadow
puppet (ringgit, wayang, that is, the figure whose movements will screen
from view the role of the monarch). Anrangkusuma is delighted with this
task. To Surapati, Pugér says that if he dares to do battle with Tack the
king approves and will give him supporters; if not he is to leave Kartasura.
Surapati of course accepts the challenge with alacrity. So while on the
coast a royal emissary invites Tack to come to court, the lords of Java
assembled at Kartasura prepare for battle.
Tack is escorted to Banyudana (5 km/3 mi west of Kartasura, where
state visitors usually rested before their reception at the court). At this
point Amangkurat II orders Jangrana I to set fire to the southern part of
the kraton (pasowan kidul) and to shout that this was the work of Surapati.
This action seems to be confirmed by Dutch records.”? When in Banyudana
Tack demands the surrender of Surapati, Sinduréja responds that Surapati
is not a subject of the king, who would wish to turn him over, but rather
of the Patih Anrangkusuma who has become the king’s enemy. This is
demonstrated by the attack upon the court, which was only narrowly saved
from falling. “Tomorrow”, says Tack, “Surapati will fall into my hands”.
In the court, Amangkurat II summons his lords and Surapati. He tells
Cakraningrat II and Jangrana I to organise a dramatic but sham assault
upon Surapati for Tack to see upon his arrival the following day. And then
he adds, “I wish to watch the battle of Surapati against Tack tomorrow:
set them to fight upon the a/un-alun” (the great public square before the
court). All depart to await the morning and the outcome of their con-
spiracy against Tack, which another chronicle, Babad ing Sangkala of
1738, likens to the driving of stags for a royal hunt.*° VOC records confirm
that on 4 February, the day when Tack marched from Sémarang for
Kartasura, Cakraningrat Il and Anrangkusuma came to Grevinck, the VOC’s
commandant at court, offering assistance in encircling Surapati’s com-
pound and thereby rendering him harmless. Tack told Grevinck in a letter
of 6 February to accept the offer immediately. On 7 February Cakraningrat
II informed Grevinck that he and Jangrana I would proceed to attack Sura-
THE CRISIS OF 1686 93

pati, an announcement recorded in Babad Kraton. They wished no Euro-

peans to be involved.*!
The precise sequence of events on Friday 8 February 1686, when Tack
arrived at Kartasura, is difficult to establish. In addition to contemporary
reports from both European and Indonesian witnesses preserved in the
VOC archives—which disagree on important points and are rendered more
than usually doubtful by the emotional atmosphere in which many of them
were recorded—one has also the inventive Rev. Valentyn’s later version
of events, Javanese chronicle accounts and a quite confusing Dutch depic-
tion of the scene of the action accompanying a contemporary but second-
hand account. The last, published by the VOC surgeon Nicolaus de Graaff
in 1701 and reproduced in simplified form on p. 86 here, apparently rests
ultimately upon eye-witness stories. But there are several questions about
its details and, indeed, one may reasonably be left in doubt whether the
scene is depicted from the north or from the south, or rests upon a con-
fusion of directions.*? Nonetheless, with the guidance of H.J. de Graaf’s
doctoral dissertation, one may reconstruct the events of 8 February, at
least in broad outline, with some confidence.*?
Cakraningrat II, commanding a force of some 10,000 men, began the
day’s action by surrounding and opening musket-fire upon Surapati’s
residence. This was defended by perhaps one hundred Balinese who had
dressed in white and thus, it seems, ritually prepared for death. The Balinese
counter attacked amuk-style, cut down several Javanese and moved east-
wards. Their success in this escape convinced Dr de Graaf that this had
been a sham battle as described in Babad Kraton, where the attackers are
said to use gunpowder but no shot.
Upon hearing this gunfire, the VOC forces at the kraton under Capt. Lt.
Grevinck took up defensive positions pending clarification of the circum-
stances in which they found themselves. By 11 a.m. news was received
that Tack was approaching and two VOC companies marched from Kar-
tasura to join him near Banyudana. The total VOC force was now, it
seems, something over 320 Europeans (inflated by Babad Kraton to over
2000).*° Together they proceeded to the Company’s bamboo palisade
fortress facing the kraton, whence Tack’s second-in-command, Jeremias
van Vliet, and Lt. Benjamin van der Meer were sent to the court to dis-
cover what was happening. Upon their arrival, they found that Amangkurat
II had just left in order, so he later said, to do battle with Surapati. Tack
sent word that the king should return to his court or be regarded as the
VOC’s enemy. He thereupon returned, according to his later statement.*°
Tack then dispatched a company under Grevinck to reinforce the VOC
guard over the court and king.
Tack was told that Surapati was making a stand to the east of the court.
At this point Tack committed a fateful error. He left his pikemen and all
but six of his grenadiers to guard the VOC’s palisade with its guns and
94 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

ammunition, and marched off with his musketeers to deal with the
Company’s arch-enemy, full of foolish enthusiasm for the coming fight.
When he reached the burned houses east of the court, however, there was
no sign of Surapati. Cannon and small arms fire from the west indicated
that Surapati was in action back at the kraton or at the VOC fortress facing
it across the alun-alun. It thus seems that Tack had been decoyed into a
position whence his return to the court would lead him into an ambush on
the alun-alun, in keeping with the plot described in Babad Kraton.
Upon reaching the alun-alun, Tack discovered at least one building”’ in
flames and Capt. Lt. Grevinck and several of his men from the kraton
watch already “very brutally massacred” by the enemy. According to Babad
Kraton, by this time one of the Cakraningrat II’s commanders had grown
overly enthusiastic and ordered his people to load their weapons with real
shot. Thereby the sham battle of the Madurese and Surabayans against
Surapati turned into a genuine one and more casualties occurred.** Now
several buildings in the front of the kraton caught fire. According to the
VOC sources, Surapati ensconced himself behind the tiger cages at the
front of the burning court*? while Tack drew up three companies (some
150 men) in formation facing him. On the VOC’s rear and flanks some
West Madurese, Javanese (presumably Surabayan) and even a few Bali-
nese soldiers joined them. Babad Kraton says that Amangkurat II and his
three younger brothers (including Png. Pugér) sat in state upon the raised
terrace at the front of the court (Siti Béntar) to watch the coming battle,
a statement of symbolic significance but hardly likely to be of much literal
accuracy, given the pyrotechnics of the occasion.*°
Now the VOC and their few allies approached the kraton palisade and
gave fire, while Surapati withdrew into the court precincts. At this point
the Dutch discovered that the rest of their lifeguard at the kraton, except
for one survivor, had also been massacred and their wooden guardhouse
set afire with the bodies inside. Surapati then launched an assault on Tack
which was repulsed with heavy firing. In case there might be any doubt
amongst Babad Kraton’s Javanese audience about the symbolic significance
of Tack in all this, the chronicle depicts him at this point “‘not [dressed]
in the style of the Company, but wearing a golden crown ... like Kum-
bakarna,”*' the enormous younger brother of the ogre king Rawana from
the Rama epic. This was the crown of Majapahit of course. The symbol-
ism is as obvious as the plot into which Tack had now fallen: Amangkurat
II would finally repay Tack and the VOC for the affronts of 1678 and all
the years thereafter.
There was a brief pause in the fighting. Babad Kraton says that Surapati
fought “like a wounded buffalo” and then withdrew to rest but was ordered
by the king to resume contact with the enemy. Twice he rested and was
ordered back into action, says the babad account.*? VOC records also
speak of three attempts by Surapati to escape the flames engulfing the
THE CRISIS OF 1686 95

court buildings behind him by breaking through the VOC line in front.
Each pause in the fighting gave the Europeans a chance to reload their un-
wieldy matchlocks. The third attack was so much greater in its fury that
Lt. A. Eygel, against whose company it was partly directed, later com-
mented, “God knows if it didn’t take place with the help of the Susuhunan’s
own Balinese.’** According to Babad Kraton, it was indeed at this point
that Amangkurat II ordered Png. Pugér to reinforce Surapati. In this account,
Pugér picks eighteen of his soldiers, dresses with them in the style of
Surapati’s men and joins in the fighting.’
In the face of the last furious assault, VOC discipline broke. Enveloped
in smoke from black powder weapons and the burning court so thick that
visibility was reduced virtually to nil, the Europeans found themselves
with neither time to reload their muskets nor pikes to repel their attackers.
If orders could be heard they were not obeyed as the Company’s soldiers
tried to escape the killing ground and flee to their fortress, abandoning
banners and weapons in their flight. Van der Meer, van Vliet and Tack
were all killed. Tack was said to have been cut down as he tried to mount
his horse, which was found dead beside him;* on his body twenty
wounds were later counted. With them fell most of their soldiers. Lt.
Eygel was the only officer to escape and was subsequently accused of
cowardice. By noon, when a heavy monsoon rain put an end to the day’s
brief action, seventy-five** Europeans lay dead in the mud and ashes of the
Susuhunan’s forecourt, where two days before the dignitaries of the realm
had commemorated the birth of their Prophet. It is not known how, or
whether, the courtiers observed the obligatory noon prayers on this Friday.
With the Europeans fell some forty to fifty Balinese, including all their
leaders except Surapati himself; a further fifteen wounded died shortly
thereafter.”
There is little room for doubt about the Susuhunan’s role in this affair.
As Crown prince he had used Trunajaya as his stalking-horse and now he
had used Surapati. The Babad Kraton account places Amangkurat II at the
centre of the conspiracy and is supported by later Javanese evidence. In
1708 Surapati’s son referred to the killing of Tack by his father “upon the
orders and with the consent of ”’Amangkurat II. This tradition lived on in
court circles: according to the Surakarta Major Babad, over fifty years
after the event Png. Pugér’s grandson Pakubuwana II proposed to an anti-
VOC courtier that they be enemies on the outside but allies on the inside,
like Amangkurat II and Surapati.** Further evidence would shortly fall into
the hands of the Europeans which would deepen suspicions of the king.
More difficult questions arise concerning the role of Png. Pugér. Babad
Kraton says not only that Pugér reinforced Surapati but that he personally
killed Tack with the holy pike Kyai Plered.” In 1686, the VOC had no
suspicions of Pugér and Dr de Graaf regarded this babad tale as “most
doubtful, seeing his later position at the court.”*’ Pugér had surrendered
96 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

over four years before with VOC assurances for his safety and eighteen
years later would persuade the Company to adopt him as its candidate for
the throne. If one concludes from this that he had special affinity for or
gratitude to the Dutch, then personally killing Tack would seem incon-
sistent. If, however, one assumes that the central theme of Pugér’s career
was self-interest—a quality no less common among men of his class,
nation and time than of any other—then the objection disappears. Indeed,
if he was regarded at court as something of a protégé of the VOC he
would have had reason to demonstrate the opposite when the Company
was about to be ejected violently from the kraton’s affairs.
That Pugér might have played the role ascribed to him in the babad is
not, of course, to say that he did. It is also possible that the chronicle
account was an attempt to prepare the ground (perhaps retrospectively) for
Pugér’s later reign as Susuhunan Pakubuwana I (1704-19) by demonstrat-
ing that he was not a stooge of the Dutch, that he could handle a super-
naturally powerful pusaka like Kyai Plered and that he was a greater
warrior than his deceitful brother Amangkurat II. These might all be means
of asserting that legitimacy which Pugér’s usurpation of 1704—5 would so
badly need. Other chronicle mythologising to support his claim to legit-
imacy will be seen below.°! Yet the tale may nonetheless be true. Pugér’s
role in the deaths of Tack and his compatriots thus remains obscure.
After the killings, the surviving VOC force of 248 men took refuge in
their fortress, a structure defended only by rotting bamboo palisades and
some ten cannon.” For half an hour serious confusion reigned there.
Meanwhile Surapati and his band made displays of bravado on the alun-
alun and a gamélan orchestra could be heard from the court playing (ac-
cording to Tack’s translator as quoted by Valentyn) a celebratory melody
called Banyu Banjir (“flooding waters”), soon taken up by another gamélan
in R.A. Sinduréja’s residence. But no one molested the European sur-
vivors as they collected their dead. Then Surapati and his men left the
court, reportedly with some of the Susuhunan’s horses and fine firearms as
royal gifts.>*
Although the VOC did not know it, Amangkurat II may also have
rewarded Surapati by giving him the governance of Pasuruan™ or, accord-
ing to a later and obviously self-interested source, all of Java to the east
of Mt. Lawu.°? Whatever the case, Surapati certainly headed eastwards and
within a few months was reported to have established a court at Pasuruan,
where he spent his time in the enjoyment of tax revenues, tournaments and
other courtly entertainments. Adjacent districts submitted to him.5° The
king ordered out forces to pursue Surapati but they had no success, as was
probably intended.*’ Anrangkusuma also left Kartasura. According to Babad
Kraton he was ordered to go with Surapati to Pasuruan,** but in fact he
seems to have remained at court for some weeks and then to have gone
his separate way.” He was replaced as Patih by R.A. Sinduréja.™
 eas
“4 i
=

ma eee

An old Dutch grave on the hill Danaréja at Jépara, locally identified

as the grave of Capt. Tack.
98 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

It was three days before a Makasarese sergeant got froin Kartasura to

Jépara bringing news of the debacle of 8 February.°' The Company’s
higher administrative ranks were as unsure as its men in Kartasura of
what might happen next. But Amangkurat II was, fortunately for the
Europeans, pretending innocence. The day after the killings he received
the two senior surviving VOC officers and expressed his dismay at what
had occurred. He asked to have a VOC lifeguard restored to him, which
was declined on the grounds that the guardhouse at the kraton had been
destroyed the previous day. Outwardly cordial visits by the king to the
VOC garrison followed. The Europeans strengthened the defences of their
dilapidated post, but there was no Javanese attack.
Amangkurat II seems to have been just as anxious about how events
would unfold. He hastily rebuilt the defence works at the front of his
burned court and ordered the levying of peasant soldiers from the pasisir.
It was reported that anxious discussions were taking place within the kra-
ton about what might happen if a new VOC Special Commissioner were
to be sent. In early March the king seems to have contemplated fleeing his
kraton upon hearing rumours of a substantial VOC force landing at Jépara.
Capt. Lt. Eygel, now in command of the Company’s Kartasura garrison,
hastened to reassure the king and even told him disingenuously that Batavia
regarded the death of Tack as a closed matter and certainly laid no blame
upon Amangkurat II.”
The Company’s main aim was to get its men out of Kartasura. Amang-
kurat II apparently wanted to keep some of them there, perhaps as hos-
tages or even in the belief that the VOC might still be gullible enough to
accept his innocence and to act as his bodyguards. After nearly six weeks
of pretending that their relations with the Susuhunan were warm and
trusting, the Company’s survivors were finally allowed to leave on 20
March, with Javanese porters to assist them and escorted part of the way
by Cakraningrat II and Sinduréja. They took along the body of Tack,
whose reputed grave may still be seen on the hill Danaréja at Jépara.°?
For nearly twenty years there would be no permanent VOC presence at
the court. The issues which Batavia had hoped to resolve through Tack’s
embassy were left where they were. Png. Anom of Cirébon, for instance,
had not even entered the presence of Amangkurat II before leaving Kar-
tasura with the Europeans. Nor had the king seen the lords of East Madura
whom van Vliet had brought along to settle the succession dispute there.™
In the bloody dénoument of 8 February 1686, the first phase of the
vexed relations between the Kartasura empire and the trading, and increas-
ingly territorial, empire of the Dutch East India Company came to a close.
Whatever the future relationship between these two forces might become,
it could never again be what it was before. As a throneless king in 1677,
Amangkurat II had been obliged to turn for support to the Company. The
latter naively thought that through the victory of its arms, it would win
THE CRISIS OF 1686 99

profit, security, the repayment of its expenses and the gratitude of the
House of Mataram and its hangers-on, for most of whom the Europeans
felt nothing but contempt. For his part, the king could hardly have guessed
what indignities and affronts, what interfering demands and financial bur-
dens would follow his enlistment of these merchant mercenaries. The
killing in Kartasura of the VOC ambassador to the court and his soldiers
meant that VOC-Kartasura relations, already marked by much suspicion
and contempt, were now marked also by blood. The abandonment of the
Company’s post in Kartasura symbolised this new stage in kraton-
Company relations. As the VOC’s survivors returned to the north coast, no
one knew whether the future held war or peace. But it was certain that
Javanese-European relations had changed irrevocably.
6
Waiting for War,
1686-95

After the killing of Tack and his companions, both Amangkurat II and
the VOC assumed and feared that the other was likely to initiate hos-
tilities. With their eyes thus firmly fixed upon each other, they hardly
noticed the growth of Surapati’s empire in East Java at the expense of both
their interests. If eventually they were persuaded that, after all, alliance
served their interests more than enmity, the roots of distrust were too deep
to be overcome. Neither wished to return to the difficult relationship which
obtained before 1686, nor could they, yet neither knew how to refashion
an alliance which had led to so much hatred and bloodshed. So they
circled like fighters at the start of a match which both would have pre-
ferred never to have entered.
While maintaining his pose of innocence in Tack’s killing, Amangkurat
II sent messages along his network of Southeast Asian diplomatic relation-
ships in search of allies against the VOC.' The Company intercepted letters
sent by the king and Anrangkusuma a few days before the killing of Tack
to the Minangkabau royal pretender and adventurer Raja Sakti (Ahmad
Syah ibn Iskandar), who also aimed to form a widely based anti-Dutch
alliance. Other letters which the VOC believed to have been spread by the
Susuhunan’s followers and which called upon Muslims to unite were found
in public places in Cirébon. Kartasura also sent ambassadors to or received
emissaries from Siam (where a specific request for gunpowder was re-
ported to have been rejected), Palembang and Johor. The VOC even
suspected for a time in 1689—and fifteen years later found these sus-
picions at least to be consistent with statements made by Png. Pugér—that
the English East India Company was approached by Kartasura to join an
anti-Dutch plot.” The latter conspiracy (if indeed it existed) and the con-
tacts with the Buddhist kingdom of Siam clearly suggest that this was a
search for anti-VOC allies wherever they could be found rather than an

100
WAITING FOR WAR 101

exclusively anti-kafir conspiracy inspired by Islamic sentiments. Although

some of these states may have made friendly gestures, none joined
Amangkurat II in an alliance of any substance.
The VOC took defensive measures in its seven pasisir posts (Tégal,
Sémarang, Démak, Jépara, Rémbang, Grésik and Surabaya). Coastal forces
were raised to about 1400 men, of whom one-half or two-thirds were re-
ported to be Europeans. The Company now regarded the Javanese interior
as an area not to be entered.’ It saw Javanese society in general as a
potentially dangerous environment and in at least some garrisons ordered
restrictions on the movement of VOC soldiers outside the posts’ walls.‘
Gestures of friendship from the Kartasura court were regarded with
suspicion. According to Babad Kraton, Amangkurat II was persuaded by
Png. Pugér (whose role thus becomes even more obscure) to seek re-
conciliation with the Dutch: although they were kafirs, they were former
allies and should not be deceived, Pugér is reported to have said. So a
senior court official, Ky. Ng. Jiwaraga, was sent to Jépara where he won
over J.A. Sloot (who in fact went to Jépara to take charge as Commander
on the north coast only in November 1686)° and was consequently made
governor (bupati) of Jépara with the title Tg. Martapura.° Certainly Mar-
tapura was governor of Jépara in May 1686. He cooperated with the VOC
by supplying provisions for a Company fleet which called there and which
lingered long enough for the Javanese to become nervous about a possible
invasion.’ But the VOC did not believe that Kartasura genuinely
sought reconciliation. The Company declined requests for forces to assist
Cakraningrat II and Jangrana I against Surapati* and also declined
Amangkurat II’s disingenuous suggestion that the VOC withdraw from
Surabaya and Grésik for the garrisons’ safety while Surapati was still at
large in East Java.? Meanwhile, reports received by the Europeans con-
cerning Javanese military action against Surapati suggested that the pros-
pects of the Balinese condottiere’s demise were small.'°
Trouble between Indonesians and Europeans occasionally flared on a
small scale,'! but was less significant than the king’s apparent testing of
the reality of Company jurisdiction over Sémarang and the nearby village
Kaligawe, jointly ceded with their dependencies in January 1678."* Ky.
Rongga Yudawongsa, who governed Sémarang with VOC authorisation,
found his position threatened by rumours of murder plots, the excision of
villages from his jurisdiction by the Patih R.A. Sinduréja and a proposal
from Kartasura that his jurisdiction be cut in half and shared with another
court appointee. Batavia ordered that for the time being Yudawongsa should
spend his nights in the safety of the VOC fortress.'* Questions over juris-
diction also arose in Jépara and, later, Cirébon.'*
Almost immediately after the killing of Tack, the Susuhunan sent an
emissary named Ng. Nalajaya to Batavia to present his version of events
to the Governor-General and Council of the Indies. Reports from VOC
102 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

sources and the discovery of Amangkurat II’s conspiratorial correspon-

dence contradicted Nalajaya’s account, however, which thus only deep-
ened VOC suspicions.'* In December 1686, Nalajaya again came with an
embassy to Batavia. This mission was rather mysterious from the begin-
ning. Amangkurat II had consulted the VOC chief at Jépara about the
personnel for the mission, but his ambassadors had then set sail on their
own ships without awaiting Company passes: another jurisdiction issue
lurked here, perhaps. They had called at Tégal but departed in the night
without taking leave of the VOC Resident. In Batavia they delivered a
royal letter which, according to the VOC, inanely expressed the king’s
concern that he had received no news from Batavia for so long and pro-
fessed continuing affection for the Company. The ambassadors were pre-
sumably charged to spy out what they could of Batavia’s intentions, while
the Company hoped to use them to ascertain the court’s. Batavia was
evidently concerned also to show the emissaries just that degree of cordi-
ality and respect which its strained relationship with their master dic-
tated. Accordingly, despite the king’s wish that his people be sent back
promptly, they were passed back and forth among VOC officials and kept
at Batavia for seven months. The ambassadors apparently grew increas-
ingly suspicious that they were in fact being held as prisoners or hos-
tages.'° It was during these months that the VOC and its Banténese ally
discovered some of Raja Sakti’s correspondence in South Sumatra, includ-
ing more letters linking him to Amangkurat II. The VOC also suspected
that Javanese rice was being shipped to Raja Sakti. Reports from Cirébon
even said that a Kartasura attack upon the VOC would follow the return
of ambassadors which Amangkurat II had sent to the Minangkabau adven-
turer.!”
The VOC believed the worst of Amangkurat II. Sinduréja met at his
own request with Sloot in Sémarang in April 1687. The Patih said that the
king feared the Company’s anger over Tack’s death but Sloot replied that
the VOC did not regard the king as the guilty party. The Governor-General
and Council of the Indies referred to this meeting as a “parade with great
pomp and mutual distrust” and saw in it no grounds for hope.'* It was
rumoured from Kartasura, where the Company no longer had sources of
intelligence which it trusted, that the followers of Png. Wanakusuma from
Gunung Kidul were yet again in rebellion and that Amangkurat II had
turned to none other than Surapati for help.'? An uprising at about this
time by followers of Kajoran and Wanakusuma which culminated in a
fight at Taruwongsa, a village at the foot of Gunung Kidul, seems confirmed
(albeit wrongly dated) by Babad ing Sangkala.”
Surapati came to Kartasura again in mid-1687, but Amangkurat II claimed
that he did so only in order to escort emissaries from Gusti Panji Sakti,
lord of the north Balinese kingdom of Buleleng. Sinduréja said that
Amangkurat II had plotted to kill Surapati, but the latter proved too cautious
WAITING FOR WAR 103

and had too many men for this to be done. After a stay of perhaps a month,
Surapati returned to Pasuruan in mid-July.*! Javanese sources consulted
for this study shed no further light on this episode.
Surapati’s visit to Kartasura naturally strengthened the Company’s
suspicions of the king.** Batavia sent a chilly letter with his returning
ambassadors in July 1687. Amangkurat II was chastised for harbouring
evil persons who worked against the VOC. Copies of his and Anrang-
kusuma’s incriminating letters to Raja Sakti were sent to him, “for who
knows whether the Susuhunan hasn’t knowledge of these’. All disagree-
ments could have been settled by Tack, wrote Batavia, but his murder had
prevented this. For the time being, Batavia expected the king to maintain
the Company’s privileges and dues and to punish evil advisers. When the
King’s intentions were clearer, affairs could be resolved as they would
have been had Tack lived.”
One outstanding matter the Company simply resolved unilaterally. The
heirs of the East Madurese lord Yudanagara were still in dispute over the
succession to his powers. Amangkurat II proclaimed Ky. M.A. Pulangjiwa
to be the sole heir and ordered the East Madurese to march with Cakraning-
rat II against Surapati. None of the lords wished to be involved with
Cakraningrat II, however, so they turned to the Company which over-
turned all this. It ordered early in 1687 that Suménép and Pamékasan were
to be divided equally among the heirs but the youthful R. Sudérma (whom
the VOC distrusted) was to live at Batavia, his share to be looked after by
his uncles Pulangjiwa and Ky. Brajapati. They were to follow no one’s
orders without Batavia’s prior approval.** The Company thus asserted
jurisdiction over East Madura without the slightest reference to its nominal
sovereign in Kartasura, detaching the eastern tip of his realm as it had
detached Cirébon on the west seven years before.
Amangkurat II was displeased but not prepared to abandon his pose of
innocence and deference towards the VOC. He replied to the letter from
Batavia of July 1687 with protestations of affection. He denied knowledge
of the intercepted letters to Raja Sakti and promised that his debt to the
VOC would be repaid, if not by him then by his successors. But unless
Cirébon and Suménép (East Madura) were returned to him, he artfully
said, he would lack the means to repay. The VOC paid no attention to
any of this. The Susuhunan also claimed that he was trying to entice
Surapati to court again, with the aim of killing him en route and attacking
his base in Pasuruan in his absence. The Company, however, was more
inclined to believe rumours that Kartasura forces planned to ally with
Surapati in an attack upon the Europeans; this R.A. Sinduréja claimed was
merely the lie being used to decoy Surapati. Amangkurat II urged the
VOC to withdraw its servants from both Surabaya and Grésik to avoid the
risk of an attack upon them by Surapati’s Balinese,” but this ruse the
Company did not fall for. Nor did Surapati pay another visit to Kartasura.
104 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

In November 1687 the king informed the VOC that his attempts to deal
with Surapati by trickery had failed, so he was ordering a large-scale
campaign against him. He asked the VOC to supply a few companies of
soldiers and to order the lords of Cirébon and East Madura to join in the
campaign, thus apparently acknowledging Company jurisdiction in both
places. More ambiguously, the king said that if, after the destruction of
Surapati, his “father” the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies
wished to have Cirébon and Suménép, these and still other lands would be
at their disposal, thus implying that they were not yet so. Batavia regarded
this as a plot to attack the VOC and its local allies and refused all as-
sistance.” The campaign itself appears to have fizzled out ineffectively.*
It is worth noting that it took place during the wet monsoon (approxi-
mately September-March), as did subsequent royal expeditions against
Surapati, as if to ensure their failure. There were, however, reports of
Jangrana I’s forces inflicting substantial losses on a Balinese party near
Surabaya and on allies of Surapati at Wirasaba and Jipang.”
Amangkurat II used the failure of his expedition as an excuse to urge
again the necessity of VOC military assistance. But the Company con-
tinued to believe that this was an elaborate conspiracy to deceive them*?
and kept their limited personnel in defensive posture on the coast.*! When
Amangkurat II attempted again to interfere in administrative arrangements
there by appointing new governors and syahbandars (harbour masters) in
Sémarang and Indramayu, the VOC refused to recognize the changes and
maintained the incumbents.» It is not clear whether Amangkurat II was
any more successful in his request for buttons and stockings from Sloot,
apparently persisting in the European sartorial taste which had got him
into so much trouble in 1680.** Certainly Amangkurat II’s efforts to
persuade the Company of his goodwill and thus to lower its guard were
uniformly unsuccessful.
Since the Company no longer had a Resident and garrison at court, its
estimation of Kartasura affairs rested on little more than rumour and
suspicion. A trip to the court by the Mardijker corporal Jan Paijs at the end
of 1687 seems to have produced little more solid information, although the
Susuhunan welcomed the visit as a token of possible reconciliation with
the Europeans. Png. Pugér was still regarded as its man at Kartasura by the
Company, which of course knew nothing of tales that it was he who had
killed Tack. Paijs reported that Pugér was virtually under house arrest,
several hundred guards being posted at his residence by the Patih Sin-
duréja. Other conspiracies and intrigues appeared rife, but the Company
could gather little more than that circumstances at court were very con-
fused and unclear. Along the eastern pasisir and in the interior of East
Java, internecine hostilities were reportedly breaking out over issues of
territorial control.» The king himself apparently nearly drowned in a boat-
ing accident in 1687,*° but he survived to continue exercising a doubtful
WAITING FOR WAR 105

degree of control over his troubled court and empire.

Royal forces appear to have been successful in defeating Balinese brig-
ands in the west of the kingdom in the Lurungténgah region led by one
Wongsanata, who was killed in mid-1688. But other rebels in that area led
by the Balinese aristocrat I Gusti Nyoman Karangasém and others re-
sisted forces sent by the lord of Tégal.*’ Similarly, an expedition sent
eastwards by the king against Surapati in the last months of 1688 came to
nothing.** The VOC suspected that the royal forces both to the west and
to the east were really aimed against Company posts, although these
Suspicions were not borne out by events. By now Batavia’s apprehensions
had grown into fear of a general Muslim war against Europeans.*?
Late in 1688, as J.A. Sloot was about to return to Batavia for a rest from
his duties at the coastal headquarters of Jépara, it was his opinion that the
foremost courtiers of Kartasura were still on friendly terms with Surapati
and that VOC relations with the court stood on no better footing than
when Tack was killed nearly three years before. Amangkurat II endeavoured
to get Sloot to visit the kraton before his departure. He sent emissaries in-
cluding a senior religious official, his uncle Png. Natakusuma and his
brother Png. A. Mataram to persuade Sloot to come. He sent also two pairs
of dwarfs and four black horses as gifts and even paid Rds. 5000 towards
what he owed to the Company, just when the VOC was beginning to
conclude that it would be necessary to write off the royal debt. But nothing
could persuade Sloot to go to the court.*” Foul play was feared, even more
so when Jan Paijs, after another mission to Kartasura, reported that he had
seen the “evil” former Patih Anrangkusuma there as a guest of the king.*!
Reports also said that Png. Pugér was isolated, threatened and looking to
the Company for succour.*” The only positive news was the VOC coastal
officers’ opinion that the king appeared at last to have abandoned his
claims to Cirébon, however, grudgingly.”
The VOC’s fears of a general Muslim conspiracy linked with the court
of Amangkurat II seemed confirmed in August 1689, when one of the
Company’s most trusted Indonesian officers arose in rebellion. Captain
Jonker was a Muslim aristocrat from Manipa (near Ambon) who com-
manded the VOC’s Ambonese soldiers. He had fought for the VOC in
Timor and Sri Lanka against the Portuguese, near Batavia against the
Banténese, in Sumatra against the Minangkabau, in Sulawesi and East
Java against the Makasarese and against Trunajaya in East Java. Indeed it
was Jonker to whom Trunajaya had surrendered in December 1679. In
1681 he had been especially decorated and rewarded for his services in a
ceremony in Batavia.**
In August 1689 the Dutch discovered what they believed to be a plot led
by Capt. Jonker and involving Makasarese, Bugis and Banténese in Bata-
via to slaughter the Christians there. They concluded that Jonker had been
put up to this in the name of Islam by Raja Sakti, the Minangkabau ad-
106 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

venturer, and that the court of Kartasura knew of and encouraged the plot.
The presence in Batavia of two Islamic dignitaries as emissaries from
Amangkurat II at this time deepened the VOC’s suspicions. It also seems
that Jonker was offended by the Company’s refusal to concede to him all
the influence and rewards he thought to be his due. He responded with
violence rather than allowing himself to be arrested. Jonker and his sub-
stantial following killed and burned as they attempted to flee inland, but
he and others were eventually cut down. His head was impaled on a stake
before Batavia’s Nieuwpoort as a token of the price of treason. Many of
his followers escaped and made their way to Kartasura. There they ap-
peared to be given refuge, confirming the Company’s darkest suspicions.
In February 1690, however, in response to VOC requests, Amangkurat II
turned over some fifty of the conspirators to the VOC, which crucified and
then broke the two principals upon the wheel at Jépara, executing the rest
by firing squad. Nevertheless the Company’s suspicions were not allayed:
the conviction that Kartasura had been involved in the plot remained un-
shakeable.* Jonker was succeeded as head of the VOC Ambonese by his
Christian nephew Zacharias Bintang, who was a protégé of the late
Governor-General Speelman and who served the VOC well until his death
ine l73022
Thus events continued to deepen the Company’s suspicions of the
Kartasura court. When Palembang emissaries heading for Kartasura reached
Jépara in February 1689 the VOC persuaded them not to proceed; a sec-
ond mission later in the year made the Europeans still more suspicious
that evil plots were afoot. They saw Jonker’s rebellion as one aspect of
“smouldering intrigues of the native kings hereabouts.’*’ These intrigues
included, in VOC eyes, the continuing Kartasura attempt to undermine
Company rights in Jépara and Sémarang.** That Amangkurat II claimed
some success against Balinese brigands in the interior of Central Java
and even handed several over to the Company did nothing to shake the
Europeans’ doubts of him.*” The king announced another campaign against
Surapati in late 1689, but Batavia bluntly told him that it believed that his
commanders spent their time enjoying themselves while the commoners
deserted, leaving Surapati to extend his influence undisturbed. Amongst
themselves, the Dutch suspected that the real aim of the Kartasura army
was not to attack Surapati but to ally with him against the VOC post at
Surabaya.”°
Yet the Company—deprived of the hindsight which is so useful to
historians—may have been wrong to reject Amangkurat II’s approaches
totally. It is probable that the eastern reaches of his ramshackle empire
were now disintegrating into two hostile spheres of influence. The first
was dominated by Cakraningrat II of West Madura and his son-in-law
Jangrana I of Surabaya and was, at least in theory, subject to the king’s
authority. The second was controlled by Surapati, who had expelled
WAITING FOR WAR 107

Jangrana I’s brother Onggajaya from Pasuruan (and later killed him) and
thence spread his influence into the interior. According to Amangkurat II,
by 1689 Surapati commanded the allegiance of all districts east of Kédhiri;
in other words, in the region south and east of the Brantas river as far as
the borders of Blambangan, Kartasura authority did not run. This large but
probably thinly populated area was bounded on the north by Cakraningrat
II and Jangrana I’s sphere of influence. Cakraningrat II was apparently
also pressing the king to be recognized as some sort of superior lord over
the whole of the coast.°*' It would not be surprising if, in such threatening
circumstances, Amangkurat II were to seek some restoration of relations
with the Company. If his dogged pursuit of reconciliation may have been
genuine, it nevertheless said little for his sense of political reality, for
Batavia was entirely unprepared to offer him the benefit of the doubt.
The Company’s commercial affairs on Java’s north coast meanwhile
languished. A drought in 1686—7, hoarding of silver money by nervous
ard uncooperative Javanese lords and a consequent shortage of coinage
among Javanese commoners contributed to a decline in VOC sales of such
items as textiles and in its purchases of rice and timber. One result was
increased production of local cloth to replace VOC imports. Javanese
textiles undercut the VOC’s sales of Coromandel cloth, even in Batavia.
The Governor-General and Council of the Indies told the VOC’s Directors
in Amsterdam that the root cause of pour textile sales was the poverty of
the common Javanese, which could be remedied by peace but not by more
war. There were improvements at times, notably an excellent rice harvest
in 1688, but any benefits of better commerce were wiped out by the costs
of maintaining substantial VOC defence forces. In the years before the
killing of Tack, the accounts of Jépara showed substantial profits but
thereafter losses amounting to fifty to ninety percent of expenditure were
reported into the 1690s with garrison costs accounting for all or much of
such losses.°*
One might ask why, in such circumstances, the VOC did not wash its
hands of the coast of Java. The Company’s answer was consistent through-
out the period of this study. Java’s pasisir was the source of supplies,
notably rice and timber, which were essential to Batavia.’ The city’s geo-
graphic location naturally led to a VOC interest in Java’s north coast for
security reasons as well. Without the coast of Java, Batavia must be
abandoned and along with it, so far as contemporary Europeans could see,
the best headquarters for the entire VOC operation in Asia. This gave
Javanese affairs an urgency in the Company’s councils which attached to
few other areas in its far-flung network of activities. Such considerations
were insufficient, however, to lead Batavia to seek reconciliation with
Amangkurat II, who was still regarded primarily as the architect of the
slaughter of Tack’s embassy of 1686.
108 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Three things which happened in the middle and later months of 1690
suggest that at this time the Susuhunan had a growing sense of urgency
about reconciliation with the VOC. Concerning two matters the records
are clear enough but for the third, the most crucial, they are not. Firstly,
Amangkurat II sent his brother Png. A. Mataram to Sloot at Jépara to say
that the Susuhunan wished to come personally as far as Démak to meet
with him after the fasting month (Puasa AJ 1613 ended on 8 July 1690).
Sloot made preparations for this conference but was ordered by Batavia to
have nothing to do with it, indeed not to venture outside Jépara, for a
murderous plot was suspected.* Secondly, substantial levying of coastal
Javanese took place for a campaign against Surapati under the command
of the Patih Sinduréja. The VOC refused renewed requests for Company
troops to join in this campaign.*° Thirdly, it seems that this royal ex-
pedition was badly defeated by Surapati.
The evidence for a major victory by Surapati over Amangkurat II’s
forces in 1690 is not satisfactory, as is the case with most evidence
concerning the interior of Java in this period. The Kartasura text Babad
ing Sangkala briefly records an “affair of Carat” in AJ 1613 (16 Oct. 1689
— 4 Oct. 1690); if the dating is correct this must have been at the very end
of that year. Carat is still the name of a village at the northern foot of Mt.
Pénanggungan, a mountain holy to the Hindus of East Java before Islam-
isation, located some 30 km/20 miles west of Pasuruan. According to
reports reaching the Europeans, it was there that Amangkurat II’s army
was soundly defeated by Surapati.°’ If indeed Surapati’s territorial ex-
pansion was such that the king at last ordered a real attempt to destroy
him, and if that attempt ended in disaster, Amangkurat II] may well have
had things he wanted urgently to discuss with the VOC. But from the
Company came no response other than to say that if he had matters to
negotiate he should send plenipotentiaries to Batavia.°*
When no royal ambassadors had come to Batavia by mid-1691,°° the
Company decided that now, five years after the killing of Tack and his
companions, an ultimatum was feasible. So the Governor-General and
Council of the Indies wrote to Amangkurat II that they did not believe his
protestations of innocence in the killing of Tack or his pretence of wishing
to destroy Surapati. They demanded that the king do three things. He must
employ his considerable armed forces to destroy Surapati, he must turn
over Anrangkusuma who was still at Kartasura and any other dignitaries
who had aided Surapati, and he must pay his debt to the VOC. If he failed
to do these things, the Governor-General and Council declared that they
would not be responsible for the calamities which would befall the royal
house, its lands and its people as retribution from Heaven. A reply from
the king was demanded within six weeks, otherwise the Company would
take unspecified steps to restore its honour and to recoup its financial
WAITING FOR WAR 109

losses.© The delivery of this letter to Amangkurat II on 13 September,

according to his son the Crown prince (later Amangkurat III), caused
much consternation.°!
In response to this ultimatum, on 16 November 1691, the king’s uncle
Png. Ad. Natakusuma arrived in Batavia at the head of a royal embassy,
bringing a letter in which Amangkurat II denied Batavia’s accusations. He
said that he had neither conspired with Surapati nor shown him any
favour; nor had he endorsed Surapati’s control of parts of the empire. He
claimed that Anrangkusuma was at Kartasura only so that he could be sent
with the king’s army to die in battle in expiation of his actions. Regard-
ing his contract with the Company, the king (remarkably, possibly even
truthfully) claimed that he had forgotten its contents and could not consult
it because it was in the hands of Sinduréja, then again away on campaign
in the east. Only Sinduréja and Ky. Ad. Urawan, who had supreme author-
ity over the coastal districts, knew how much each could produce. So he
asked his “father” the Governor-General to await the return of Sinduréja
and Urawan to resolve the issue of his debt. As gifts for his “father’’, he
sent two matched dappled horses.°?
Batavia received these tidings in the chilliest fashion. The king’s letter
was given no formal reception and his gifts were refused. His emissaries
were kept at Batavia until April 1692, despite their and the king’s request
that they be allowed a speedy returr,* and were then sent home with a
letter which they must have been terrified to deliver. The Company told
the king that his version of the Tack affair was a lie, that his excuses for
not having destroyed Surapati were mere fabrications and that he had in
fact supported Surapati before and after the killings of 1686. That
Anrangkusuma had been sent off on campaign with Sinduréja was also a
lie, for he had been seen in Kartasura two weeks after Sinduréja’s depar-
ture. That the king did not have the contract with the VOC was simply not
believed. The VOC post at Jépara meanwhile expressed the view to
Batavia that the bustle reported from Kartasura was just more evidence of
conspiracy against the Company among the dignitaries of the court. Given
the state of VOC-Kartasura correspondence, it would hardly be surprising
if this were so.
Batavia had been emboldened to issue an ultimatum and then to call the
king a liar to his face partly by the belief that it now had other allies who
would make possible military moves against Surapati independently of
Kartasura and who would, indeed, enable the VOC to exert some pressure
upon the court itself. One of these allies was Pulangjiwa of Suménép (East
Madura). There had been more problems over the governance of East
Madura in recent years, including an unauthorised flight from Batavia by
the troublesome young R. Sudérma in 1689. He was brought back to
Batavia and thence exiled to Banda. By mid-1691 Pulangjiwa was the
superior lord of East Madura and, the Company believed, a man who
110 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

would produce a substantial military force to fight at the VOC’s side?

They informed him immediately of the sending of the ultimatum to the
Susuhunan and asked his advice about joint action against Surapati.®
The other ally Batavia thought it had newly acquired was the kingdom
of Blambangan in the far southeast of Java. The populace of this land had
not converted to Islam, despite conquest by Sultan Agung in 1636-40.
Mataram authority there had collapsed after Agung’s death and the lord of
Blambangan, Sunan Tawangalun, had no intention of submitting to
Amangkurat II. The population was apparently Javanese and Balinese
with an admixture of adventurers from elsewhere, reflecting Blambangan’s
geographical location and delicate political situation between the Javanese
empire farther west and Balinese kingdoms across the narrow straits to the
east. In the late 1680s and 1690s, Blambangan’s immediate western neigh-
bour was Surapati, ruling his own semi-Javanese, semi-Balinese state. The
temporary absence of a powerful overlord in the region gave Blambangan
a chance for renewed independence which would, however, come to an
end with Balinese conquest in 1697.
Late in 1690 Tawangalun, who was perhaps worried by Surapati’s
expansion and victory at Carat on his west and by threats from Balinese
kingdoms to his east, sent emissaries to the VOC at Surabaya. He offered
a military alliance against Surapati which, needless to say, produced delight
in VOC circles. His ambassadors’ onward trip to Batavia was delayed by
bad weather but when they reached there in April 1691 they were regally
feted. Reports were meanwhile received of Blambangan raids which had
led to confrontation with Surapati’s forces as far west as Blitar and Kédhiri.
On 12 July 1691, the same day when the Governor-General and Council
of the Indies wrote their ultimatum to Amangkurat II, they composed a
cordial letter to Tawangalun which was to be delivered by the Surabaya
officers Capt. Lt. Jan Bervelt and Lt. Jan Francen.’”°
When Bervelt and Francen got to Blambangan in September 1691, VOC
hopes were quickly dashed. They were received by Tawangalun but the
old man died a few days thereafter. This set off a murderous struggle for
the succession among his three senior sons, Pngs. Senapati, Macannagara
and Macanpura. No discussions took place with the Company’s officers
while the princes sorted out their more urgent affairs. Senapati first took
power but despite assertions of friendship was thought by the VOC not to
be well-disposed. An embassy from him nevertheless came to Batavia and
was cordially received, partly in order to emphasize the deliberate snub-
bing of Amangkurat II’s ambassadors.’! By the end of 1691 Senapati had
been killed and Macannagara took over, professing friendship for the
Company. He was eager to attack Surapati and asked that a VOC ship
come to Blambangan to ward off a possible attack from Buleleng.” But
by August 1692 Macannagara had been killed and displaced by Macanpura.
He told the VOC that he remained its friend but that an attack on Surapati
WAITING FOR WAR ial

was now impossible. Indeed, news was soon received of Surapati and
Macanpura agreeing a border between their kingdoms just east of Pas-
uruan.”* By 1693 Macanpura’s attention was focussed on hostilities with
the Balinese lord of Badung and a civil war within Blambangan. He again
made friendly gestures towards the Company but they came to nothing.”
The combination of frustration and optimism which lay behind the
Company ultimatum to Amangkurat II of July 1691 was thus distilled by
events to pure frustration. The Company’s own affairs may have contrib-
uted to this, for just as the accession of Joannes Camphuys as Governor-
General in 1684 had caused much internal strife, so did his retirement in
September 1691. He was succeeded as Governor-General (1691-1704) by
the previous Director-General Willem van Outhoorn who was, as Stapel
coyly put it , “no strong administrator and not very scrupulous”. He was
opposed by a party led by the new Director-General Joan van Hoorn. A
combination of human emotion and Batavia-style marriage politics re-
solved this conflict. In July 1692, van Hoorn married van Outhoorn’s
twenty-year-old daughter Susanna, thereby, as J.K.J. de Jonge observed,
replacing the problems of disunity with those of nepotism.”
Relations between the Company and the court of Kartasura remained in
a sort of suspended hostility. Any reports that the king was preparing a
major campaign against Surapati were disbelieved by the Dutch, who
assumed that Javanese military action was more likely to be directed against
themselves.’° As a gesture, perhaps a genuine one, of his desire for
rapprochement, Amangkurat II sent Sp. RI. 5000 in August 1692. The
VOC accepted Sp. RI. 4800, rejecting the remainder on the grounds that
the coins were either counterfeit or clipped.”” But the king could not buy
the Company’s goodwill. It refused his request for siege artillery, which
he said he needed to deal with Surapati and which the Company believed
he would turn upon itself.”
The Europeans’ suspicion of the king was strengthened by events in
Sémarang. That town was regarded as healthier than Jépara, much better
located for commerce, endowed with better soil, and, by virtue of the
agreement of 15 January 1678, supposedly sovereign Company territory.
The VOC hoped to move its coastal headquarters there from Jépara, a
decision to do so having been taken in principle in 1685.” In October
1692 the king attempted, as he had in 1686 and 1687, to appoint Ng.
Aladalad as lord of Sémarang. Again the Company refused to recognize
this change of government.*° More ominously, in July 1693 an uprising
involving 70-100 local Chinese and compatriots from Grésik took place
in Sémarang. They apparently planned to attack the VOC post and Chi-
nese who collaborated with the Company, but their plot misfired because
of premature revelation and a providential (and unseasonal) downpour on
the day of the uprising. They were then driven off by Company forces and
fled inland to Sala. The Company was informed that the conspirators had
i WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

been put up to their plot by Amangkurat II, who now abandoned them
because they had failed to achieve the ultimate aim of expelling the VOC
from Sémarang. Such information was, like most of the intelligence re-
ceived by the VOC in this period, open to serious doubt. In any case, the
Kartasura Crown prince captured and turned over forty-eight of the
Chinese. The VOC executed the ringleaders at Jépara by the customary
hideous tortures and shot the rest. The Crown prince—shortly to join the
Company’s list of archenemies—was sent a Persian horse by way of
thanks.*!
In 1694, something significant seems to have changed at the kraton, for
the Patih Sinduréja and others came to Jépara in September with the
remarkable sum of Sp. R1. 28,000 towards the king’s debt.*? The Dutch
remained suspicious, perhaps under the influence of the doughty J.A. Sloot,
still governor and military head on the coast of Java. His death in October
1694 may indeed have removed one barrier to reconciliation on the Euro-
pean side.** Certainly his successor, the merchant Anthonij Dortsman,
was more inclined to investigate the apparently new attitude of the court.
In direct violation of Batavia’s orders, he sent a European ensign ac-
companied by ten other Europeans and twelve Indonesians to Kartasura to
deliver a letter to Amangkurat II in November 1694. He complained to the
king about misgovernment by Jiwaraga (Martapura) in Jépara and pro-
vided Amangkurat II with a statement of his debt to the VOC which
understated it by fl. 190,169 (= Sp. RI. 56,346). No wonder Dortsman felt
that friendship could be restored with the court. No wonder Batavia fired
him.*4
Batavia’s suspicions of Amangkurat II remained, but must have attenu-
ated at the end of 1695 when he said that he was gathering money in order
to pay a further Rds. 100,000.*° Already the beneficial impact of the 1694
payment upon the VOC’s account books was visible.*° Given the Company’s
slender knowledge of affairs at the court and elsewhere in the interior, it
could not guess whether such statements would prove true. Nor could it
be sure what the roots of such an apparent alteration in the kraton’s atti-
tude might be. In the light of some contemporary evidence and particularly
of the later course of events, however, it seems probable that these roots
were to be sought in a general fragmentation of the state, both at its centre
and in its eastern reaches.
There can be little doubt that a major cause of the kraton’s friendlier
gestures towards the Company in 1694-5 was the growth of Surapati’s
empire. The VOC records on the matter are, however, ill-informed, and
the Javanese sources consulted for this study are silent—possibly out of
deference to the scions of the dynasty in whose history this forms an in-
glorious chapter. In the early 1690s Surapati’s forces at Pasuruan were
reportedly strengthened by the arrival of Makasarese adventurers and the
acquisition of more Balinese fighters (possibly slaves). At the same time
WAITING FOR WAR irs}

Surapati was buying weapons, gunpowder and iron cannon balls in Sura-
baya, Grésik and Johor.*’ At the beginning of July 1695 two emissaries
from Kartasura told Dortsman’s successor as commander of Java’s east
coast Solomon Lasage that Surapati had expanded further westward, taking
Panaraga and Madiun on the Madiun river, only some 90 km/55 miles east
of Kartasura. Worse, he was said to be on the march to attack the court
itself. This report was followed and apparently contradicted immediately
by another that Surapati had been personally at Kartasura.** The Company
did not know what conclusions to draw from these reports or from another
in which Cakraningrat II claimed that the Crown prince was conspiring
with Surapati.*? But it does seem reasonable to accept, particularly in the
light of later evidence which will be described in the following chapter,
that Surapati’s domain was expanding westwards at the expense of
Kartasura’s claims to sovereignty.
A second major reason for at least some elements at the court to con-
sider turning to the Company was growing factionalism and deadly ani-
mosity within kraton circles themselves. As will be seen in the following
chapter, this was to reach even greater proportions in the next few years.
By 1695, a crumbling Javanese court and empire under a king who was
perhaps quite ill” on the one hand, and a maladministered, corrupt Dutch
East India company, beset by piracy and losing money on the coast of
Java’! on the other, might have agreed tacitly that neither of them could
afford the outbreak of war, perhaps even that they ought to consider working
together again. But there were formidable barriers between them, notably
the blood shed on 8 February 1686 and the money owed by the king to
the Company. If the VOC had held the initiative in pursuing policies
which exacerbated its relations with Kartasura down to the slaughter of its
embassy in 1686, if fear and suspicion thereafter produced a state of
frozen hostility between the two, only decisive action by the court could
now produce reconciliation. In particular, only action against Surapati,
Anrangkusuma and any others implicated in the death of Tack could expiate
the king’s own presumed guilt. And money would have to flow if the flood
of suspicion was to be countered. The following years would demonstrate
that, even if Amangkurat II wished to achieve such things, he was
insufficiently in control of his shaky empire to do so.
 VOC-Kartasura
Impasse and the
Crumbling of the
Kartasura State,
1696-1703

In the closing years of his life and reign, Amangkurat II appears to have
been increasingly anxious for the Dutch East India Company to save him
and to salvage his state, as it had at the start of his reign. The reasons for
his anxiety, however, were also among the reasons why the VOC did not
respond favourably. The disintegration of support within Javanese ruling
circles made the king anxious for outside assistance; it also meant that he
could not meet a central element in the VOC’s price for assistance, for
without the loyalty of the dignitaries of his realm, he was unable to launch
a campaign to wipe out Surapati. Similarly, his loss of control over the
parts of his empire in Surapati’s hands or in those of notables whose
allegiance to him was doubtful drove him in the direction of the VOC.
But that same loss rendered him a less formidable economic and military
power, and hence a less dangerous enemy or attractive ally for the VOC.
The Company had manifold problems, too, but they were of less direct
importance for VOC-Kartasura relations than were the affairs of the court,
for if those relations were to be restored only action by Kartasura could
achieve it. All that the kraton could, in the end, do was to produce money
towards the royal debt. This was welcome to a Company which had lost
much in putting Amangkurat II on his throne and was losing more by its
continuing presence on the fringes of his state. But money by itself was
insufficient to achieve reconciliation. In this tense time, Cakraningrat IT of
Madura and his ally the lord of Surabaya—now Jangrana II (r. 1693-1709)!
—saw an opportunity to expand their territorial influence. At his death
Amangkurat II thus left a kingdom which seemed reddy to collapse. By
that time, Cakraningrat II would be prepared for bold moves to increase
his power and the VOC would be prepared to start another war.
In the immediate aftermath of the royal payment of 1694 and Dortsman’s
unauthorised mission of 1695, there seemed to be improved prospects for

114
THE CRUMBLING OF THE KARTASURA STATE 5}

rapprochement. More money followed in 1696 and the VOC’s suspicions

of the king apparently began to waver: blood may be thicker than water
but for the VOC money was perhaps more substantial than either. In
February, Sinduréja arrived in Sémarang with twenty-six chests containing
Rds. 65,720 with more promised shortly so as to to produce a total pay-
ment of Rds. 70,000. Furthermore, the king proposed a new royal embassy
to Batavia. Batavia authorised the VOC Gezaghebber (governor) at Jépara,
Pieter Goodschalk, to inform the king that an embassy would be welcome,
and the sooner the better. Monetary relations were, however, now compli-
cated by the erroneous statement of his debt which had been given to the
king by Dortsman. Batavia was therefore anxious that when a royal embassy
came, it should bring along these faulty accounts.”
In October 1696 the king’s uncle Png. Natakusuma arrived in Batavia
at the head of a Kartasura embassy. Amangkurat II’s letter was submis-
sive, seeking forgiveness, asking a correct statement of what he owed the
Company and promising payment. At the same time, however, the
Susuhunan emphasised the poverty of his lands and people and their
consequent inability to pay excessive amounts. He also repeated his re-
quest for VOC military assistance. Batavia replied in sharp, self-righteous
terms which, when the letter was taken to Kartasura by the king’s am-
bassadors in April 1697, caused understandable consternation at court.
The Governor-General and Council of the Indies said that they were pleased
at Amangkurat II’s recognition of the good he had received at the hands
of the Company, for which he had never thanked it. He was accused of
having instead been responsible for, or an accomplice in, the killing of
Tack, against all the maxims even of barbarians. Regarding his debt, Batavia
told the king that it was prepared to ignore part of what he owed, insisting
only on the payment of its war-costs for the period November 1677—
November 1682, amounting to Sp. RI. 1,200,000 plus various other dues
for a total of Sp. RI. 1,365,071. They offered him the option of paying part
of this in rice, pepper and cotton thread.’
Subsequent events confirmed the dept of misunderstanding and distrust
between kraton and Company. By mid-1697 Amangkurat II was reported
to be carrying out some sort of mustering of the population and demanding
money from his subjects to pay his debt. In October he sent Cakraningrat
II and Sinduréja to Jépara with a letter ostensibly granting them full
negotiating powers. At the same time, however, he flatly rejected the
VOC’s calculations. The king insisted, as he had five years before, that he
had never agreed to a debt greater than Sp. RI. 310,000 and 3,000 koyans
of rice, the amounts stipulated in October 1677. If agreement could be
reached on this within twenty days, he promised to pay Sp. RI. 50,000
initially and, rather quixotically, to leave his high officials and dignitaries
(presumably meaning Cakraningrat II, Sinduréja and entourage) in the
VOC fortress in Jépara as hostages pending the settlement of the balance
116 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

of his debt. The Company was understandably less interested in having

non-paying aristocratic guests than it was in money or a restoration of its
relations with Kartasura. No more was heard of the offer of hostages, but
Cakraningrat II and Sinduréja paid Sp. RI. 30,000 before their departure
in November.* Caught in the middle of this impasse was the governor of
Sémarang, Rongga Yudawongsa, used by the VOC to spy on the royal
party (representing a king who had several times tried to unseat him) and
by the latter to communicate with the VOC. He claimed that at one point
he had said to Sinduréja that it was all like a Panji romance in which Panji
coaxed Sémar and Turas but the response came back secretly from Raden
Galuh (Candrakirana, Panji’s lover). But in this case, said Rongga
Yudawongsa, it was hard to say who was Panji and who was Raden
Galuh.> Who, indeed, was courting whom?
The VOC’s response was now more amenable. It told Amangkurat II's
emissaries that if fully empowered and experienced negotiators were sent
to Batavia, the king would no doubt find the outcome to be pleasing to
him. The Company privately intended to adhere to the principles behind
its instructions to Capt. Tack of October 1685 and, if agreement were
reached on other outstanding issues, to wipe out the Susuhunan’s debt
altogether.° But of course the king could not be sure of the Company’s
intentions and he sent no negotiators to Batavia. Another of the aims of
Tack’s instructions was to replace the king’s obligation under the agree-
ment of February 1677 to deliver 4000 koyans (approximately 14 million
Ibs avoirdupois/6400 metric tons) of rice at market prices with a Company
right to purchase whatever amounts it needed at current market prices. A
step was taken in this direction when the Company’s officers in J&épara
reached agreement with Sinduréja and Cakraningrat II to purchase at least
1000 koyans (approximately 3.5 millions lbs avoirdupois/1600 metric
tons) of rice anually. The Javanese promised to deliver 3-400 koyans after
the next harvest.’ But on the larger issues there was no progress.
While the diplomatic impasse was becoming more entrenched, it was
evident even from the VOC’s faulty sources of information that significant
changes were taking place in East Java, where two conflicting groups of
allies were emerging. On one side stood Cakraningrat II and Jangrana II.
They made friendly gestures towards the VOC, sought to buy the new
snaphaen flintlocks from it (refused for sale, but sent in small numbers as
gifts), promised loyalty and sent products. The Company was suspicious
of both of them but began to be more favourably inclined as it became
clear that among their enemies were the Company’s.*
Against Cakraningrat II and Jangrana II stood Png. Lamongan of
Keputren, to whom Amangkurat II had given control of some Surabayan
lands after the death of Jangrana I and who interfered for a time with
supplies to the VOC post at Surabaya. His nephew Png. Jagaraga lived at
Pasuruan and was thus linked with the Europeans’ archenemy Surapati.”
THE CRUMBLING OF THE KARTASURA STATE 117

The Company did not believe reports of a campaign by Cakraningrat II

against Surapati in late 1695 and early 1696 but took seriously his claim
of major action near Pasuruan, involving temporary occupation of territory
and the death of one of his own sons, in August 1696. The Dutch refused
Cakraningrat II the military support he requested, however, not least because
among his enemies was also one of its presumed friends: Pulangjiwa of
Suménép.'° There were, however, hints that Pulangjiwa was not without
his own contacts with Surapati, so the Company faced unwelcome politi-
cal complexities in East Jaya.!!
The existence of an independent kingdom of Blambangan had not
produced an ally against Surapati, as the Company had hoped in 1690-2,'”
but it had perhaps meant some brake upon his expansion. This indepen-
dence came to an end early in 1697 when Gusti Panji Sakti of Buleleng
crossed from Bali and conquered the area, apparently in alliance with
Surapati. According to Babad Buleleng, Panji Sakti’s own son Ngrurah
Panji Nyoman Danudrésta lost his life in the fighting. The king of Blam-
bangan, Macanpura, apparently fled to Bangér (modern Prabalingga) and
was killed there. Babad Buleleng says that he died in battle with Gusti
Panji but both Babad ing Sangkala and reports reaching the VOC said that
he died at the hands of Surapati’s people. Thus Blambangan’s indepen-
dence was obliterated and Surapati’s rear was, it seems, secured by an
alliance or understanding with Buleleng.'? Reports reaching the Company
from this area cannot be regarded as very reliable, but one such deepened
the impasse between Batavia and Kartasura by speaking of periodic
emissaries from Amangkurat II to Surapati.'* Babad Buleleng similarly
claims that Gusti Panji’s victory in Blambangan led to cordial relations
with Amangkurat II,'° but it is hard to know how seriously to regard this.
Relationships between the Company and indigenous power centres in
Java were a major concern for the VOC and are assumed in its records to
be a central element in the obscurely unfolding drama of local politics.
It is worth noting, by contrast, that neither Babad ing Sangkala nor
Babad Kraton makes any mention of the Europeans or the Company in the
late 1690s. This prompts the not very remarkable observation that for
Javanese courtiers the Dutch East India Company was of less concern than
those affairs which do loom large in the chronicle accounts, that is, the
domestic rivalries of the Javanese elite. In the eyes of the court, the
Europeans were as peripheral as they had become in the geography of the
island since the end of their presence in Kartasura in 1686. It is not
surprising that such a view was held in a kraton where some seventy-five
Europeans had been slaughtered and for over a decade thereafter nothing
had happened as a consequence. Unfortunately, this disparity of priorities
means that the Javanese sources consulted for this study shed little light
on Javanese-European relations and the Dutch sources offer little corrob-
oration of internal Javanese affairs.
118 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

The chronicles now introduce a new actor to the courtly scene: the
Crown prince, later to be Susuhunan Amangkurat III (r. 1703-8). Here is
Java’s parallel to England’s Richard III: a villainous, murderous cripple.
Just as Shakespeare’s picture of Richard III served the propaganda pur-
poses of the Tudors, however, so this depiction of Amangkurat III served
the purposes both of the branch of the Mataram dynasty which was to
usurp his throne (see Chapter 8) and of the VOC, which would make the
usurpation possible. A much later manuscript held in the court of
Yogyakarta, for example, describes in gold ink the perfidy of this man, his
harsh misgovernment, his arbitrariness and arrogance, his evil misuse of
his family members, his dreadful treatment of women, his surly touchiness
and horrific violence and the widespread sorrow and complaint he aroused
among all the people of the realm.'° The hyperbole is obvious, although
be may indeed have been a hyperbolic character. The unverifiable chron-
icle accounts of the late 1690s have about them the “ring of truth”, but that
is the surest sign of nothing at all. A literary tradition which can make
magic powers seem normal can readily lend verisimilitude to mere passion
and violence. Yet if these tales are true, they explain a great deal of what
was to follow.
According to Babad Kraton, the Crown prince was Amangkurat II’s
only son, despite the king having a superfluity of concubines (sélir) and
four wives. His mother the Ratu Kulon was from the house of Surabaya
(as was Amangkurat II’s own mother). The babad says that the singulari-
ty of the Crown Prince’s claim to the succession was maintained through
the. other queens bearing no sons. And as for the concubines, the chroni-
cler wrote,
It is said
that when one was pregnant
and three months had passed,
when Ratu Kulon
saw that the sé/ir was pregnant
she was then paid a visit,
visited cordially in her house,
then lo! the pregnancy disappeared,
because Ratu Kulon gave a medicine,
evil within her heart.
Upon reaching puberty, perhaps in the early 1690s, the Crown prince was
given the titles of a Mataram Crown prince, Png. Ad. [Anom] Mangkuné-
gara, and formally designated heir apparent.'’ He was beautiful (as a Crown
prince must be) but the babad later calls him “the cripple”.'® The chronicle
says nothing of his childhood or upbringing; the Dutch records suggest at
least that he was poorly educated, for he was apparently illiterate.!°
In Babad Kraton, the Crown prince’s affairs are entangled with those
of the king’s brother Png. Pugér (later the prince’s archenemy), whose
THE CRUMBLING OF THE KARTASURA STATE 119

eldest daughter R. Ay. Lémbah is very beautiful. Pugér has also a younger
daughter named R. Ay. Ipun and several sons. By his wife of the first rank
(padmi), he has three sons, the eldest of whom, R. Surya (the man who
was to become Susuhunan Amangkurat IV in 1719), is to play a major
role. Amangkurat II arranges the marriage of R. Ay. Lémbah to the Crown
prince and admonishes his son to remain on cordial terms with his uncle
Pugér, Cakraningrat II and Jangrana IJ. Upon seeing Lémbah in person on
a visit to Pugér’s house, the Crown prince falls in love with this shy
maiden of surpassing beauty. In due course the wedding festivities are
grandly celebrated but the young bride, instructed and escorted to the
kraton by the women of the court elite, still has not lost her maiden’s
fears?”
The consummation of this marriage ca. 1697-8 gives the poet of Babad
Kraton an opportunity to indulge his literary skills. With military meta-
phor he describes the end of love’s war (yudasmara):
I cannot describe
the movements of those making love;
already fallen was the fortress of Pajang,
The Young Beauty overpowered in the fight.
For long she arose not,
her garment damp with tears.
The prince observed her closely,
to the Beauteous Jewel speaking soothing words,
kissing away her trickling tears.7!
Now that his eldest child is married, Pugér gives adult names to his
sons. Two are of particular importance. R. Sudira is renamed Suryakusuma
(literally “Sun-flower”) and R. Surya is renamed Suryaputra (literally
“Sun-child”’). The Crown prince, who dislikes all of Pugér’s sons except
for Suryakusuma (Sudira), says that the name Suryaputra is unheard-of
and must be changed to Wongsatruna (literally “young relative”). R. Ay.
Lémbah protests vigorously at this, saying that a name as common as
Wongsatruna is unworthy of Surya’s birth: it is like the name of some
village chief (kaya bébékél desa). Her conflict with the Crown prince
deepens when he loses interest in her, preferring instead the Company of
two beautiful concubines. So she flees home to Pugér’s residence.”
Amangkurat II is upset by the apparently improper behaviour of his son
and heir. He sends messengers to Pugér’s residence to investigate the
marital conflict. He also asks Pugér for models (pola) of two powerful
items of regalia (pusuka) which he owns, the pike Kyai Plered and the kris
Kyai Mesanular, so that he can make copies for himself. Out of deference
to his brother the sovereign, Pugér sends the original weapons. Amangkurat
II is both frightened and furious with his messengers when they arrive
bearing Ky. Plered and Ky. Mesanular; he returns the originals, again
demanding models only. Pugér smiles at this and sends models. The
120 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

chronicler thus introduces a theme which will loom large thereafter: that
Pugér alone has the supernatural legitimacy required to own such mighty
pusakas. As for the conflict between R. Ay. Lémbah and the Crown prince,
Pugér says he knows nothing. From the Crown prince’s Patih the king
learns that there seems to be little hope of reconciliation.”
The Crown prince’s wilful violence now touches the family of the Patih
Sinduréja, whose extraordinarily handsome and popular son R. Sukra evokes
the prince’s jealousy. He has him captured, disarmed and tortured, inter
alia by putting ants into his eyes. Sukra asks what sin he has committed:
his only sin, says the chronicler, is that he is beautiful. Upon his release
and recovery he asks his father’s permission to die while running amuck
against the Crown prince. This Sinduréja rejects because of the loyalty a
common subject owes his lord. So Sukra seeks another means of revenge
and finds it in the Crown prince’s estranged wife. Winning her affections
will be a way of provoking the prince to fight him. So he spies upon R.
Ay. Lémbah in her father’s residence, where she has been for two months.
She has been denying herself food and sleep and as she has grown even
thinner her beauty has become more radiant. Sukra falls madly in love
with her. When she sees him and hears his protestations of love, she is
smitten by his beauty.** The makings of a bloody tragedy are now present.
R. Sukra does all he can to win R. Ay. Lémbah. He steals into her
quarters at night, where he is taken for a thief and pursued by Png. Pugér’s
sons. He then secretly sends her love poetry via her servant Tambakbaya,
in which he protests his preparedness for death and willingness to fight the
Crown prince. “Sukra’s fed up with living”, comments Lémbah. His pursuit
of her is now revealed by a spy to the Crown prince, who immediately
notifies Png. Pugér. Pugér orders a search of Lémbah’s quarters and Sukra’s
love letter is found beneath her pillow. Upon reading the letter, Pugér is
no longer willing to recognise Lémbah as his daughter, is indeed unwilling
even to hear her protestations of innocence, and orders his sons to kill
both Lémbah and Tambakbaya. Lémbah takes leave of her deeply dis-
tressed brothers, sends her obeisance to her mother, her father and the
king and requests the Crown prince’s forgiveness. She is then strangled
amidst much weeping on her part and that of her brothers.”
The whole of Kartasura anticipates a battle. Amangkurat II is furious at
the revelation of an amour between his son’s wife and Sinduréja’s son. He
orders an attack on Sinduréja’s residence but is persuaded instead merely
to surround the residence and to consult Sinduréja’s wife, his own sister
R. Ay. Pucang. Sinduréja is swept away by love for his son. He refuses
to surrender him and prepares for war. Pucang persuades him instead to
go to the kraton to seek forgiveness for himself and Sukra. He kisses his
son farewell and goes to the court, where he is disarmed and imprisoned.
Armed forces from Madura and the pasisir under the command of
Cakraningrat IIT and Urawan now attack Sinduréja’s residence, where Sukra
THE CRUMBLING OF THE KARTASURA STATE il

and his Bugis soldiers prepare to die in battle. But Sukra’s uncle Neg.
Mondaraka makes his way into the residence and persuades Sukra that if
he truly repents he will be forgiven. Sukra then surrenders. Urawan,
however, now puts to him a choice: does he wish to live, in which case
his father will die, or to die as required by God’s law, in which case his
father will live? He chooses his own death. Urawan gives him poison but
when repeated inquirers from the kraton have to be told that Sukra is not
yet dead, his captors lose their patience and break his neck. Sinduréja is
then released and restored to his office as Patih and the bodies of this
dreadful day are buried.*° Then, perhaps remarkably by the standards of
other times and cultures, Lémbah’s younger sister Ipun and another of
Pugér’s daughters are taken into the kraton to be raised there, a sign of
royal favour.*’ Some three years later, according to Javanese chronicles,
Ipun took her dead sister’s place as wife of the Crown prince.”
It is hardly surprising that VOC sources of the 1690s are unable to
corroborate these stories. They do, however, report conflict between the
Crown prince and the Patih Sinduréja. In 1692 there were rumours, soon
proved untrue, that Sinduréja had been murdered by the Crown prince. By
1697 the Company believed that the disharmony between the Patih and the
Crown prince was of sufficient political significance to render a Kartasura
war against the Company less likely.” Whatever the problems of corrob-
oration, it can be said that the babad tales would, if true, explain the origin
of animosities which were central in subsequent events. Conflict between
Sinduréja and the Crown prince is clearly explained thereby. So is dislike
between the sons of Png. Pugér and the Crown prince, who had mistreated
their sister and thereby set the tragedy in motion. The conflict between
Pugér and the prince, which in 1704 would flower into outright rebellion,
could have had part of its origin in such episodes. Disaffection between
Pugér and his sons, particularly R. Suryakusuma whom he had obliged to
take charge of killing R. Ay. Lémbah, would not be surprising after such
events. Suryakusuma would end his life as an exile on the Cape of Good
Hope and most of his brothers would die as rebels. And, of course, the
occurrence of a crisis so severe that it nearly led to hostilities within the
court city would explain much of the tense state of the court in general in
the closing years of Amangkurat II’s reign.*° One must not forget, how-
ever, that while the chronicle tales are believable, they remain unsupported
by independent sources.
Domestic rivalries were not the only source of tension in Kartasura.
Both VOC and Javanese records report that in the years 1698—9 Surapati
was able to raid as far west as Madiun and Panaraga, in the next main
valley east of Kartasura. Surapati was also said to be threatening other
areas, including the court city itself and Surabaya, where Jangrana II was
restoring the old city wall in anticipation of attack. The VOC was unsure
how much to believe of such reports. Babads describe this as a major
122 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

step by Surapati and say that Png. Pugér and his sons marched eastward
with Ad. Urawan and others to stop him, while the king wrote fruitlessly
to the Company for aid. Surapati was then driven from Madiun. The
details of these events remain obscure, but it seems that in both 1698 and
1699 Surapati was able to move at will along Madiun river, gathering
people and provisions, but that he did not garrison the area.”!
What is clearer from the surviving evidence is the renewed Kartasura-
VOC diplomatic activity in this period, as Amangkurat II took steps to pay
some of his debt arrears in the hope that if he met some of the costs of
the last VOC military intervention he might facilitate another. In March
1698 he wrote to Batavia promising payments and a plenipotentiary. The
Governor-General and Council of the Indies welcomed this proposal, sent
the king two Persian horses, asked him to order the production of cotton
thread and indigo to replace the Company’s Indian supplies and notified
him of the end of the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97) in
Europe,” in which the Netherlands had been engaged. Reports were soon
received of rice being collected for delivery to the VOC, but in December
1698 only 318 koyans (approximately 1.1 million lbs avoirdupois/500 metric
tons), which the VOC valued at Sp. RI. 4522'/2, was sent. The Company
concluded by now that no embassy to Batavia was in the offing.*?
Babad Kraton describes a debate within the Court about relations with
the VOC in these years which is consistent with the Dutch belief that some
courtiers did not favour further negotiation on the Company’s demands.**
Whereas the VOC placed some reliance on Cakraningrat II to give the
Susuhunan good advice and still regarded Png. Pugér as its protégé, Babad
Kraton identifies precisely these two as the main anti-VOC figures.
Amangkurat II is said to have summoned Sinduréja, Pugér and Cakraning-
rat II to advise about the VOC’s debt demands: what should he do if
another demanding letter comes from Batavia? Pugér says that it would
have been better not to have turned over Cirébon and the Priangan lands
(Pasundhan) of West Java to the Company (curiously, there is no reference
to the VOC's de facto takeover of East Madura in 1687 despite Cakraning-
rat II’s presence). Sinduréja points out that nevertheless Amangkurat II
has promised to repay the VOC for its expenses and war dead. Pugér
replies that the Company derives sufficient profit from Cirébon and
Priangan, which the king has given it. It has also been given posts on the
north coast and seaborne trade. All this, says Pugér, is the king’s doing.
If the Dutch demand more, they should be driven into the sea, for they are
foreigners in the land of the Javanese. Cakraningrat II belittles the
Company’s contribution to the victory which placed Amangkurat II upon
the throne. They were of little import on the fringes of the army, while the
Javanese bore the brunt of the fighting, he says. The VOC troops are mere
mercenaries who, when paid, should go home to Batavia, for only there do
they have permission to establish a garrison. The king concludes the debate
THE CRUMBLING OF THE KARTASURA STATE 123

by saying that if the Dutch behave well and make no further demands
upon him, he will remain mindful of the legacy of Sultan Agung (proph-
esying alliance with the VOC). But if they do bad things and make further
ambitious claims, he will expel them from Java.*
There was, however, no sign of such bravado when Amangkurat II
wrote to the Dutch at the end of 1698, reporting that Surapati had taken
Madiun and was intending to attack Kartasura. He asked the Company for
help and offered to pay an additional Sp. RI. 100,000 in recognition of
such assistance. The Dutch told him that he had enough people and re-
sources to defend himself. In fact, Surapati seems to have made no moves
farther west at this time.*°
In mid-1699 the king sent Cakraningrat II and Sinduréja to Jépara with
Sp. RI. 50,000 towards his debt*’ and sent his governor of Jépara, Tg.
Martapura, to Batavia with a letter. In this letter he proposed to empower
Sinduréja and Cakraningrat II to negotiate at Jépara if Batavia would
also send negotiators there. In addition to matters already outstanding,
Amangkurat II was anxious to reach agreement with the Company that he
should receive Sp. RI. 60,000 and gold originally belonging to Portuguese
who had been robbed of it by English pirates. Some of the pirates had
subsequently been driven by Pulangjiwa’s people from their hideout in the
islands off East Madura, the jurisdictional status of which was suspended
in the diplomatic impasse between Kartasura and Batavia. The buccaneers
had finally fallen into VOC hands at Surabaya. But the VOC continued to
insist that negotiations on all issues must take place at Batavia.** Sinduréja
and Cakraningrat II expressed some irritation that Pieter Durant, the VOC
governor at Jépara, who was of course under strict Batavia orders, would
accept money from but not negotiate with them.*” But this did not prevent
Cakraningrat II and Tg. Suranata of Démak arranging to pay several
thousand Spanish Reals more in cash as a substitute for their portion of the
rice due to the VOC, since a bad harvest meant that rice was in short
supply.*°
While relations thus remained strained, Javanese payments to the VOC
suggested that a diplomatic démarche was not entirely out of the question.
Similarly, a dispute about the boundaries of Sémarang which had been
going on for several years was not resolved, but a conciliatory gesture was
made. The Company claimed Sémarang as its sovereign territory by virtue
of the cession of 15 January 1678, but the precise boundaries of this
cession had never been clarified. The VOC’s Javanese governor there, Ky.
Rongga Yudawongsa, claimed the people living along the road (wong urut
dalan) and elsewhere in districts as far inland as Ambarawa (a distance of
some 35 km/22 miles), whose labour he said he needed, as he did the
firewood to be found there. Sinduréja and Cakraningrat II had previously
been said to support this claim and in 1699 the former reportedly still did
so, although other courtiers did not. The matter was not resolved, but in
124 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

May 1699 Amangkurat II gave Rongga Yudawongsa the new name Tg.
[Rongga] Yudanagara, a mark of royal favour. There were probably some
fears that this represented Kartasura interference in the Company’s pre-
rogatives, but Batavia decided that Yudawongsa/Yudanagara might keep
his new name.*!
But no plenipotentiary came to Batavia. After considerable confusion
about who, or whether anyone, would come to negotiate with the
Company, Amangkurat II again sent Tg. Martapura to Batavia late in 1699
with a request for military aid against Surapati. The latter was said to be
preparing to attack Surabaya, to have 800 men armed with snaphaen flint-
locks (an improbable statement) plus another 800 with other weapons near
Cilacap, another party in the Madiun river valley and yet more men on the
Sala river only three hours from Kartasura. When the impending conflict
was over, said the king, he would send a negotiator. It is not clear how
much of this was true; certainly Surapati attacked neither Kartasura nor
Surabaya. Batavia again told the Susuhunan that he had sufficient re-
sources to defend himself and that it would await the arrival of his nego-
tiators.* Among Batavia’s gifts to the king were apparently some portraits,
which inspired the witticism among Kartasura dignitaries that instead of
sending fighting men the VOC sent puppets.*?
Through 1700 and 1701 deadlock continued, as nogotiations and the
sending of plenipotentiaries were discussed but never came to pass.
Comments by Sinduréja and letters from Amangkurat II suggested that
one reason may have been senior courtiers’ fears that if they placed them-
selves in VOC hands far from Javanese territory they would personally
become the Company’s means of taking revenge for the death of Tack.
This probably lay behind the suggestion put twice that if a senior courtier
were sent to Batavia a senior VOC official should come to Kartasura. The
Company rejected this idea. In July 1700 the king also said that the practice
of arranging state affairs by consensus in gatherings of notables meant that
such weighty matters could not be entrusted to one or two individuals no
matter how senior. This was perhaps a genuine objection, but it made no
sense to the VOC. No more money was paid and no substantive dis-
cussions took place.“
The Company’s financial position on the Javanese coast was meanwhile
so poor that by 1703 the Governor-General and Council of the Indies were
moved to declare to the Company’s Directors in Amsterdam,
At Bantén and on Java’s east coast, of which one had very good
plans and hopes at the time of the most recent contracts with the
kings of 1678 and 1684, there is no trade of any significance. So
one could well prognosticate that the Company will hardly be able
to carry on long here in the Indies on this footing if the sales of
Netherlands and Asian commodities ... aren’t roused to being
THE CRUMBLING OF THE KARTASURA STATE 1S

greater and more profitable. May the good God make things turn out
otherwise.*
Being Calvinist merchants as well as soldiers, VOC officers naturally saw
God’s hand in their account books as well as in their battles, but they did
not seem predestined by Him to win a profit in Java. While the VOC’s
intra-Asian trade in General ceased to be profitable from the 1690s on-
wards,*° its losses on Java’s coast continued to be particularly spectacular,
with income covering only about seven to eleven percent of costs in the
years 1698-1702.*”
The Company’s attempt to introduce new crops in Java had so far
shown little success. Pests attacked the small indigo crop and efforts to
teach Javanese how to plant and dry it encountered local disinterest. The
cotton, pea, bean and pepper crops were so far producing only modest
yields and, at least in the case of peas, were also subject to pest attack.
Even getting timber was difficult as known stands were cut down and
disputes arose over payments.** Thus the Deity appeared not to smile upon
the VOC as a buyer of Java’s agricultural produce. Little did the Dutch
know that He was preparing a bonanza for them in West Java. In 1696 the
VOC commander at Malabar sent the first coffee-beans to Governor-General
van Hoorn. These were, however, wiped out in the Batavia flood and
earthquake of 1699, which, along with the earthquakes of 1684 and 1706,
caused extensive damage to Batavia’s waterways and thus to its sanitation,
contributing to rising death rates in this increasingly insalubrious place, as
if God’s judgement even upon the city were an unfavourable one.*” More
coffee beans were sent, which van Hoorn again planted as curiosities in
his garden. The new drink produced from these beans proved popular and
local Europeans began planting coffee for their own consumption. Its
cultivation was soon to spread, eventually transforming the uplands of
West Java, the Company’s finances in that region and the social fashions
of eighteenth-century Europe, leaving “a cup of Java” as a monument in
American slang to the international impact of those exotic beans.°° But as
the eighteenth century opened in Java, all of that lay in the future. For the
moment, the Company’s financial prospects there looked bleak.
Nor did the Europeans’ appropriated authority over East Madura, whence
they hoped to acquire several agricultural products, look very successful.
In 1700 R. Sudérma again asked the VOC to recognize him as sole heir
to his grandfather’s authority over Suménép and Pamékasan, thereby
threatening the position of the Company’s friend Pulangjiwa. In March
1702 Sudérma again left Batavia without authorisation and went to East
Madura, where open hostilities broke out between his and Pulangjiwa’s
followers, in which some Balinese (whose presence invariably signalled
danger to the VOC) assisted Sudérma. Who initiated the fighting is not
clear from the contradictory claims reaching the VOC. In any case, Sudérma
126 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

was obliged to flee to Sampang. So Cakraningrat II, to whom Amangkurat

Il had by now apparently given supreme authority over Surabaya, Grésik
and Sidayu as well as West Madura,°! was also involved, but whether as
a patron of Sudérma, a fisher of troubled waters or a neutral mediator is
not clear. When Pulangjiwa died, apparently of natural causes, in Septem-
ber 1702, his son-in-law R. A. Cakranagara asked the VOC to recognise
him as the successor, as did Sudérma. Batavia told them both to behave
themselves pending its decision, thereby bringing about a truce which was
to hold until Cakranagara’s death in 1705.°?
East Madura, coastal crops and negotiations between Batavia and the
kraton were, however, of less significance than the inescapable fact that
the reign of Amangkurat II was drawing to its close. A change of king in
Kartasura could well transform everything else. The Europeans were al-
ready persuaded that the Crown prince’s accession would make matters
even worse for them, for they believed him to be an ally of Surapati and
enemy of the VOC. This may have been true, but the VOC’s view no
doubt rested solely on the evidence of the prince’s enemies at court,
who accused him of plotting to hasten his father’s exit from the throne.
Late in 1700 the king, now in his late fifties or early sixties, was re-
ported to be seriously ill, probably with dysentery, and by 1702 to be
senile.
In September 1702 Sinduréja, one of the Crown prince’s main enemies,
went secretly (so he said) to Sémarang and there met the VOC’s coastal
Gezaghebber Anthonij Sas. He revealed all about the court, or at least
what he wished the VOC to think of as all. Amangkurat II was a true
friend of the Company, he said, no doubt to the accompaniment of raised
Dutch eyebrows, who had been misled by evil counsellors, above all by
the Crown prince. The latter was in cordial contact with Surapati and
Anrangkusuma, as were also the main anti- VOC firebrands Tg. Sumabrata,
R. Nitiyuda of Pekalongan and Tg. Martapura of Jépara. Only the Crown
prince’s uncles Png. A. Mataram and Png. Pugér and, of course, Sinduréja
himself dared to oppose the prince’s ambitions to take over even before
his father’s death. But all the court dignitaries privately feared the Crown
prince’s avarice and evil character, so his efforts to gain the throne would
precipitate a ruinous war, said Sinduréja.°> That the court was indeed in
such a state was suggested also by the Susuhunan’s request to the VOC
to return several of his heavy cannon currently in the Company’s hands.»
The Company was inclined still to pin some of its slim hopes upon the
aged Cakraningrat II and was therefore unhappy at news that he, too, was
seriously ill for a time in 1702.57
The following year saw dramatic developments at the court. In early
1703, Amangkurat II gave the Crown prince some form of supreme
authority over the empire. The prince informed the VOC of these powers
and had sumptuary regulations promulgated along the pasisir (or perhaps
THE CRUMBLING OF THE KARTASURA STATE 127)

renewed laws which had fallen into desuetude).°** On 12 April Sinduréja

died, apparently of natural causes. He was succeeded as Patih by Ky. Tg.
Sumabrata, whom he had listed the previous year among the anti- VOC
figures at court. Sinduréja’s house and goods were apparently confiscated
by the kraton, that is to say by the Crown prince, and his family and
servants mishandled.’ There was a rebellion underway in Madiun but, so
reports said (and there were so many rumours that the Europeans hardly
knew what to believe), this was a local protest against Sinduréja and came
to an end with his death.
From the coast all of the lords and their armed entourages were sum-
moned to Kartasura by the Crown prince, no doubt partly because of the
celebrations of Garébég Bésar (10 Bésar AJ 1626/27 April 1703) but even
more because of the need for them to be present when momentous changes
took place.®! Png. Pugér sent word to the VOC that the Crown prince had
invited Surapati to Kartasura as well. Cakraningrat II sent 3000 soldiers
to court as he was ordered to do but stayed away himself, professing
illness. He begged the VOC to take him under its protection, for he said
that he knew not what the new regime at court might do with him.® At
some point in the midst of all this, death apparently removed also Ky. Ad.
Urawan,™ another pillar of the old regime who had wielded much auth-
ority during his life.
Further obscure moves took place in mid-year. Now the Crown prince
announced that he had laid down his supreme authority. Png. Pugér later
said that the Susuhunan took the powers back from his son when he saw
how badly he behaved.® At about this point, Babad Kraton tells of an
interview between the Crown prince and his father in which Amangkurat
II described his fears for the future of the kingdom if the prince did not
change his ways. He advised him, says the babad, to rely upon Png. Pugér
and Cakraningrat II and to seek guidance in the Qur’dn and the Javanese
didactic works Nitipraja, Jayaléngkara, Surti (Niti Sruti) and Asthabrata
(a passage in the Sérat Rama). Amangkurat II also wrote to the VOC
asking that arrangements be made to pay off his debt.°’ Meanwhile reports
were circulating of some sort of discussion about territorial spheres of
influence going on between the kraton and Surapati.®* Apparently momen-
tous things were afoot, but the surviving evidence is inadequate to know
what they were.
In the evening of Friday, 2 November 1703, Amangkurat II died.
According to Babad Kraton he had been ill for a week, vomiting blood.
On his deathbed he is said to have handed over to the Crown prince three
particularly important items of regalia (pusaka): the kris Ky. Balabar, the
pike Ky. Baru and the jacket Ky. Gundhil. The Crown prince was im-
mediately declared to be the new monarch with the titles Susuhunan Ratu
Amangkurat [III] Senapati Ingalaga Abdulrahman Muhammad Zainulkubra.
128 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Apparently a visiting Arab dignitary whom the Javanese called Png. Sarip
(i.e. sharif, a noble descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) lent particular
majesty to Amangkurat III’s accession.” The dead king’s body was pre-
pared for burial but, as will be seen in the following chapter, before he was
laid to rest bizarre and tumultuous occurrences would set the stage for
another crisis in Java. The court’s wait for war was soon to be over.
 Politics, Culture and
Technology in the
First Javanese War of
Succession, 1704—8

The events of the years between the accession of Amangkurat III in

1703 and his exile in 1708 show both how far apart the Europeans and
Javanese were in culture and yet how close together, how little they could
share and how much. Javanese texts reveal a concern for supernatural
forces of which the phenomenal world was an echo, a shadow of Reality.
The Dutch, too, had a strong sense of the supernatural. But their God was
a Calvinist one and the phenomenal world did not veil His secret mean-
ings: it was the meaning, the working out of the predestined will of God,
Whom the Company’s merchants, soldiers and governors called the
Almighty Administrator (den Allmogenden Bestierder),' as if He ruled
from some Dutch council chamber above. The rhetoric of VOC sources
suggests that if Christ sat upon the right hand of God, surely the Dutch
East India Company sat upon His left. This is not to suggest that piety was
a conspicuous feature of European life in the Indies, rather that there were
cultural precedents which influenced European perceptions and which did
not readily encompass matters of importance in Javanese culture. Had the
Company been told the stories described below from Javanese sources, it
might reasonably have concluded that no understanding was possible with
the new allies upon whom it pinned its hopes.
This gap in understanding was mutual. The courtiers of Kartasura would
have been mystified had they thought that the Europeans came from a
culture of which it could be said, as Huizinga said of the seventeenth-
century Netherlands, that “From the church there continually came through
to the town hall the sound of a non-aristocratic popular consciousness.”
While Islam might have sent a similar signal from mosque to kraton, in
practice the social and historical setting of Islam in Java had negated the
egalitarianism implicit in Islamic doctrine. Similarly, Javanese courtiers
and nobles had yet little notion of the international economic relations of

129
130 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

which the VOC was a part and in which it sought its profits, or of how
these might lead the VOC to fight wars in Java.
Yet there was much that these two cultures shared in this age when the
Industrial Revolution had not yet carved a social and economic gulf be-
tween peoples on its either side. As has been noted previously, in practice
many Europeans in the Indies who could afford to do so lived lives of
debauchery and wanton luxury which Javanese aristocrats could under-
stand. Many had direct links with Indonesian cultures through living with
local women. Not a few had Indonesian mothers themselves, for substan-
tial numbers of children were born of liaisons between Europeans and
Javanese. The VOC on the coast felt it necessary, in order to defend the
cultural integrity of “European” stock, to take measures to prevent such
children being absorbed into their mothers’ society, culture and faith. Some
at least were sent to Batavia to be raised as Christians in the orphanage:
many tragedies must lurk there. In 1717 it was ordered that the European
fathers of such illegitimate children would be refused transfer from Java
or repatriation to Europe, a ruling which presumably did little to achieve
its aim of reducing fleeting liaisons with local women.*
These two peoples shared above all a military ethos which meant that,
while many ideas could not cross the cultural membrane which stretched
between them, military technology did. Indeed, the transfer of military
technology from the European to the Javanese side was virtually immedi-
ate. In this respect there is something of a contrast with the slower re-
sponse to European military innovations on the part of the Mughals, al-
though in general Qaisar’s remark that “response to culture is, by and
large, slower than that to technology” is true of Java as of India.* Japan
may seem to offer a still more striking contrast. Noel Perrin writes of Japa-
nese warriors first adopting and then abandoning firearms in this period,
but this view is not accepted by scholars of Japanese history.° The decline
in Japanese use of firearms in warfare was rather a function of the preva-
lence of peace. Guns continued to be used for hunting and every daimyo’'s
(lord’s) army had its musketeers. Nonetheless, it is true that there was for
some time a certain indifference to western science and technology in
Japan, in part because of Tokugawa fears of Christianity. One conse-
quence of this was that, although the Japanese had quickly adopted the
matchlock musket from the Portuguese, they did not progress to more
advanced firearms until the nineteenth century. Difficult questions of
comparative cultural history are suggested here, but there is little prospect
of offering persuasive answers at this time—beyond, that is, the elemen-
tary observations that there was in Javanese culture an openness to new
ideas which was perhaps greater than that found in some other martial
cultures of the time.
The four main innovations in infantry armaments introduced by the
Europeans to Java in the later years of the seventeenth and early years of
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 131

the eighteenth century were the snaphaen (snaphance) flintlock to replace

the matchlock musket, the pre-packaged paper cartridge, the grenade and
(apparently somewhat later than the period covered in this volume) the
bayonet. The cumulative effect of these was primarily to increase dramati-
cally the reliability, rate and accuracy of infantry fire and, after the intro-
duction of the bayonet, to make it feasible to dispense with the use of
pikes. It was many years before these innovations were in universal use in
Europe or by the VOC throughout Asia. But once they were known in
Java they were sought and employed by the Javanese.° This is reflected in
the Javanese language, where are found sinapan/ sunapan/ sénapan from
Dutch snaphaen as the standard word for a musket and terms such as
kérbin (carbine) from Dutch karabijn and gurnat/gurnada (grenade) from
Dutch granaat in texts concerning the period from the late seventeenth
century onward.’
It has already been noted above that indigenous fortress warfare in Java
was comparable to that in Europe. Trunajaya’s fortifications at Surabaya
in 1677 and Kédhiri in 1678 and Namrud’s at Mésir in 1681 seem not to
have been inferior to contemporary European fortresses. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that Javanese and VOC artillery were comparable. Cannon had
been manufactured in Java for some time, as was pointed out in the Intro-
duction above. Indeed, many of the pieces defending Company fortresses
on the pasisir belonged to the Javanese king and the VOC was unable to
determine which were his and which its own.’ The only significant inno-
vation introduced in Java by the VOC with regard to siege warfare was the
hand- or Coehoorn mortar. This was a light trench mortar for throwing
grenades into enemy trenches or fortifications, invented by the Dutchman
Baron Menno van Coehoorn.? It was apparently first used by the Company
in Java in the campaign of 1706, as will be seen below. The general
comparability of military equipment noted here extended even to what the
two sides did not have, for VOC soldiers, including Europeans, were as
likely as the Javanese to march to battle barefoot.'°
There remained nevertheless a cultural gap between Europeans and
Javanese which is exemplified by the Babad Kraton account of the events
immediately following Amangkurat II’s death in November 1703. In this
story, the dead. king’s three brothers, Png. Pugér, Png. Panular and Png.
A. Mataram, come to the kraton to pay obeisance to the body. A ritual
which is described also at the death of the founder of the Mataram dy-
nasty, Pan. Senapati Ingalaga, is now repeated when the three princes kiss
the corpse’s penis.''! When it is Pugér’s turn, however, something unusual
happens:

It is said the penis stood erect

as during life,
when about to have intercourse
BZ WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

with a woman, joining in sex.

Png. Pugér then
was awe-struck within his heart.
The prince saw
on the tip of the penis a radiant light
as large as a peppercorn.

It was quickly sucked up by the prince.

After the disappearance of this light the size of a peppercorn
The younger brother’s [Pugér’s] penis stood erect.
Now it was the wish of God
that the light of monarchy should move
to the House of Pugér.
What the prince did
and of the light none knew.
Indeed to Png. Pugér alone would change the inheritance,
the ruling of the land of Java.

The Crown prince,

if things went so far that he became king,
would be only an interregnum ruler."

Thus do Javanese chronicles establish supernatural sanction for the

usurpation which was to follow. The Dutch East India Company knew
nothing and would have believed nothing of such tales. But immediately
upon the death of the old king the VOC received reports of opposition to
the new Susuhunan on the part of Pugér and his family. Pugér was said to
have refused to recognise Amangkurat III’s succession, a story not sup-
ported by Babad Kraton, in which Pugér announces his nephew’s succes-
sion and calls upon the people of Kartasura to submit to him.'> Dutch and
Javanese sources agree, however, that the burial of Amangkurat II was the
occasion for rebellion.
Pugér’s son R. Suryakusuma, to whom Babad Kraton also ascribes super-
natural powers, accompanied the body to the royal graves at Imagiri but
did not return to the court. Instead he went westwards to his father’s old
stamping ground of Bagélen and there declared himself Prabu Panatagama
(“king, regulator of religion”) or, even more grandly, Susuhunan Waliolah
Panatagama (“king, friend of God, regulator of religion”). Pugér was
suspected of being the instigator of this rebellion and was placed under
arrest in Kartasura, unfairly according to Babad Kraton.'* Subsequent events
would suggest that Suryakusuma was indeed acting independently of his
father. His forces were soon defeated in the Mataram area, according to
Babad Kraton, although the prince himself was not yet captured.'5
Pugeér was now released from imprisonment but obliged to move from
his own residence to other, presumably less grand, lodgings.'© There
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 133

occurred another supernatural event, according to the Javanese chronicles,

perhaps the oddest of all. So this story goes, the Dutch in Batavia are
unhappy at the accession of the traitorous Amangkurat III, so they hire a
magician (ténung), a giant from overseas, to deal with him. This Dutch
magician (ténung Wélanda) travels to Kartasura and appears before a terrified
Amangkurat III in the dead of night. The king demands to know his
identity and is told, “I am the ténung Wélanda: who is the king of Java?”
Nervously, his hair standing on end, Amangkurat III replies, “It’s not I
who’s become king” and directs the ténung to the lodgings of his uncle
Pugér. The ténung—clearly inadequately briefed as to the identity of his
target—now appears before Pugér, who recognises that this is no human
being. “Are you a devil or a spirit?”, he demands. “I am the ténung: where
is the king?”, is the reply. The king, Pugér explains, is in the kraton but
the dunderheaded ténung (perhaps revealing the Javanese estimation of
what calibre of magician would work for the Dutch) shouts that he’s just
been there and been directed to Pugér. Pugér smiles and declares, “By
God’s will I am become king governing the island of Java! What do you
want?” “I have been sent’, says the ténung “to engage in a contest of
supernatural powers (sékti) with the king of Java and when the king is
defeated he’ll die at my hands”. Pugér smiles, invites the tenung to commence
and proceeds to cast spells (donga caracah, donga bésmah myang bala-
sarewu). Thereby the giant rénung is magically reduced to a slobbering,
quivering being the size of a small child. Pugér says to the ténung, “Now
you ’ve been defeated. Leave immediately from this land of Java and cause
no destruction. If you don’t want to leave, I'll stuff civet-cat shit down
your throat.” Already suffering sufficient indignity, the teénung makes a
hasty departure.'’
This bizarre ténung Wélanda story seems to have been well-remem-
bered by Pugér’s descendants and successors. Sultan Haméngkubuwana I
of Yogyakarta is said to have had it read to his sons in 1788, probably as
a lesson in the ability of a Javanese king to overcome the powers of the
Dutch.'® Professor Berg has viewed the text as a newer version of the
Bharada story of the fourteenth-century Old Javanese Nagarakértagama,
where, in his interpretation, Bharada is “converted to a dwarf on the day
and at the place of the Buddha- king’ s first abhiseka [consecration]”.'”
While this parallel is attractive, it must be said that other scholars do not
accept Berg’s reading of the Nagarakértagama passage” and there is room
for serious doubt about the transmission of the text’s contents into Islam-
ised Java. There are, however, other hints that traditions about Bha-
rada, who magically partitioned the kingdoms of Java, survived into the
nineteenth century.”! Whatever the case, it is clear that for the legitimacy
of Pugér’s rule and that of his successors down to the present day,
the ténung Wélanda story was important. Like the babad accounts of
Pugér’s killing of Tack, of Amangkurat II’s unwillingness to handle Puger’s
134 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

powerful pusaka weapons and the magical light on the dead king’s penis,”
this tale proclaimed Pugér’s supernaturally sanctioned legitimacy and denied
any taint of European patronage in his rise to power. It was an unfortunate
fact, however, that the VOC was essential to the usurpation: a fact which
perhaps made the assertion of such supernatural sanctions all the more
necessary.
In the early months of 1704, Kartasura was crowded with dignitaries
from throughout the empire. Probably many had stayed since the death of
Amangkurat II the previous November; others came for the celebration of
Gar&ébég Puasa (1 Sawal AJ 1627/8 February 1704) and the hundred-day
observance (slamétan) of the old king’s death a few days thereafter.”
Again the VOC knew little of what transpired at court, except that it ended
in Pugér’s flight. According to Babad Kraton, the tensions which in-
variably surrounded a succession were exacerbated by Amangkurat III’s
behaviour. As was pointed out above, however, the text is not necessarily
to be taken at face value in this matter.™* It says that the new king became
infatuated with a beautiful young wife of Cakraningrat II and raped her
(the VOC were told this or something similar within a few months). She
revealed this to the old Madurese lord, who declared that the king’s rule
was reverting to the level of animals. He joined forces with Jangrana II of
Surabaya, whose lands the king planned to partition, against Amangkurat
III. This alliance meant that the kingdom’s backbone (babalunge) thereby
disappeared, says the babad. Cakraningrat II and Jangrana II pressed Pugér
to rebel. When the VOC’s Bupati of Sémarang, Tg. Rongga Yudanagara,
who also felt himself to be threatened by Amangkurat III’s accession, told
Pugér that the VOC would welcome him, a powerful coalition of West
Madura, Surabaya and Sémarang was formed. A sign from God (sasmi-
taning Hyang) finally enabled Pugér to overcome his scruples about re-
bellion—which he expresses at length in the babad text—and he fled
towards Sémarang in the dead of night.*° This flight took place on 10
March 1704*° and marks the beginning of what is conventionally known
as the First Javanese War of Succession (1704-8). For the second time
(the first having been in 1677-81), Pugér was going to try to become king.
Within a few days the Dutch at Sémarang were told that Pugér was at
Lampeér just south of the town and that he sought VOC support. Amangkurat
III sent troops in pursuit of Pugér. Among their commanders was Jangrana
Il, whom the king did not suspect of being a partner to the conspiracy and
who destroyed the bridge at Tuntang, thereby ensuring Pugér’s escape,
according to both Babad Kraton and Pugér’s contemporary statements to
the Dutch. The Dutch on the pasisir referred to Batavia the question of
how to respond to Pugér. In the meantime they allowed Pugér, who was
after all a senior prince of the blood aged in his late fifties and something
of a VOC protégé, to take temporary refuge in the residence of Rongga
Yudanagara.”’ In the midst of this crisis, Amangkurat HI wrote to the
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 135

VOC that he wished to pay off the royal debt and send his Patih Suma-
brata to Batavia to negotiate a new treaty. The Company didn’t believe
him.”®
It should be noted that the VOC’s government was hardly less confused
than that of Kartasura at this time. In September 1701 the Company’s
Directors in Amsterdam, the Heren XVII, who were exasperated with the
nepotistic rule of Governor-General van Outhoorn and his son-in-law
Director-General van Hoorn, ordered van Outhoorn to retire and van Hoorn
to succeed him. Joan van Hoorn refused, however, to unseat his father-in-
law. The Heren XVII insisted and in 1702 also named a new Director-
General to succeed van Hoorn in that post. Yet van Hoorn would not
move. So for two and one half years Batavia had either two or no
Governors-General, depending on how one assesses one who was retired
but would not step down and another who would not assume the post, and
two Directors-General, one who would not resign and another who could
not therefore take up the job. Van Hoorn finally gave in and accepted the
Governor-Generalship in July 1704. His irrepressible penchant for nepo-
tism was further indulged when, after the death of his wife, he married the
daughter of the new Director-General Abraham van Riebeeck, who was to
have his own turn at being Governor-General when van Hoorn was retired
in 1708.” On the north coast of Java, the death of the Commander An-
thonij Sas on 31 March 1704 was followed by a period of dissension
among the Company’s officers there. In September Batavia, its own af-
fairs now more regularised, sent Michiel Ram to Jépara as Express Com-
missioner to sort out the Company’s affairs on the coast.*°
It was in the midst of such confusion that Pugér tried to persuade the
VOC to support him and the Company tried to make up its mind on the
matter. Pugér claimed that he had been compelled to flee Kartasura by
Amangkurat III’s injustice and denied particularly that there was any foun-
dation for the king’s suspicion that he was behind the uprising of his son
Suryakusuma.*! This seems confirmed by the events of April-October 1704:
Suryakusuma was captured, briefly imprisoned at Kartasura but then for-
given by Amangkurat III and endowed with lands and people and the
august title Png. Ng. Saloringpasar.*? When Amangkurat II sent emissar-
ies to Batavia demanding the surrender of Pugér, Batavia asserted its pro-
tection of the prince and refused to hand him over.™
Pugér told the VOC that he had wide support among the princes and
dignitaries of the realm and particularly from Cakranigrat II. The latter
was now about eighty years old and the VOC rightly saw him as a mighty
figure in Javanese affairs. When Amangkurat III summoned him from
Madura to Kartasura he refused to go; instead he travelled to Jépara in
May 1704. There he told the Europeans that it was up to them to decide
who should be king.*# The withdrawal of his support from Amangkurat III
136 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

thus became open. Since Cakraningrat II later seems to have disliked

Pugér, it is worth asking why he backed him in 1704. The answer evi-
dently has little to do with Pugér’s personal qualities. Rather, Cakraningrat
II’s main concern was probably the expansion of his already considerable
influence over East Java.*° A major obstacle to this was Surapati’s per-
sonal empire in south-eastern Java. A second obstacle would be a Susuhunan
in Kartasura who might attempt to restrict Cakraningrat II’s ambitions. If
Amangkurat III was on cordial terms with Surapati, his accession must
therefore have seemed doubly threatening to the old Madurese warhorse.*°
The Susuhunan’s rape of his young wife early in 1704 (assuming the
babad story to be true) would have added powerful personal elements to
Cakraningrat II’s opposition. Pugér, on the other hand, must have looked
a less threatening candidate, particularly if Cakraningrat II could play the
role of king-maker in his rise to the throne. Thus, for the first time since
the defeat of Cakraningrat II’s nephew Trunajaya, the house of the lords
of Madura would attempt to direct the course of the Mataram empire. It
is even possible that, despite his age, Cakraningrat II had personal am-
bitions which transcended the control of Madura and East Java.
The Europeans were impressed by Cakraningrat II’s endorsement of
Pugér’s cause and by the list of dignitaries with their thousands of men
who, they were told, would back him. Some indeed sent emissaries to
Pugér at Sémarang, in most cases doubtlessly as a means of having a bet
both ways. Pugér promised that once he was safely on the throne, a new
contract would be concluded with the Company.*’ For his part, Amangkurat
Il] continued to offer the VOC payment towards his debt and asked to
have Pugér turned over to him. Indeed, at one point he reportedly offered
the VOC commander at Sémarang, Govert Cnoll, a bribe of Rds. 20,000
to surrender him, all to no avail.*®
On 7 July 1704, the Company told Pugér that it recognised him as king.
In return, Pugér agreed that a new contract with the VOC should be along
the lines which Tack was ordered to follow in 1686, although he and
Cakraningrat II admitted that they did not know what those terms were.*?
At first Pugér used the title Susuhunan (or Susuhunan Ratu) Amangkurat,
but in October 1704 he took the name and titles by which he was sub-
sequently known, Susuhunan Pakubuwana (I) Senapati Ingalaga Ngab-
dulrahman Sayidin Panatagama (r. 1704—19).*°
It was now merely a matter of assembling that powerful coalition which,
Pakubuwana I and Cakraningrat II claimed, was eager to support this
usurpation."' Within days of his recognition as Susuhunan by the Dutch,
Pakubuwana I accepted the obeisance of Tg. Martapura of Jépara and Tg.
Mangunonéng of Pathi, who were in Sémarang as emissaries of Amangkurat
III, and received in person or through emissaries the loyalty of the lords
of Bagélen (an area with which he had old personal links), Kéndhal,
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION LSI

Kaliwungu, Démak and Kudus, and of one of the heads of the Kalang
people. Many others were said to be prepared to support him, so that his
army would exceed 92,000 men.*” Tg. Jangrana II of Surabaya left Kar-
tasura safely and was expected to constitute a major element in Pakubu-
wana I’s army.’ According to Babad Kraton, Jangrana II reported that
Amangkurat III was a wretched figure, devoid of the glow (cahya) of
kingship, looking like “a Chinaman with a hungry belly”, devoid of glory,
charm and sweetness, quite unlike his dead father.*
But when Cakraningrat II left for Madura at the beginning of August
1704,*° many of these supposed supporters fell away from Pakubuwana I’s
side. Jangrana II of Surabaya, from whom nearly 10,000 soldiers were
expected, now denied any prior knowledge of the usurper’s flight from
Kartasura, denied that Amangkurat III had any evil intentions towards the
Company and asked whether he couldn’t become a dependency of the
VOC, thereby achieving the status of East Madura since the VOC takeover
of 1687 and escaping allegiance to either side in the looming civil war.
Similar requests to become VOC dependencies came from Grésik and
Tégal.*° Tg. Mangunonéng slipped out of Sémarang one night and went
back to Kartasura. R. Tg. Suranta of Démak, the son of the VOC’s old
adversary of that name, also asked to be made a Company dependency
like Bantén or Cirébon. The lords of Kéndhal, Pathi and Kudus defected
and the first small skirmishes took place.*’ As the support for Pakubuwana
I disintegrated on the coast, the Europeans feared that they had backed a
loser.** They might well have observed that so far in Javanese history it
was only royal losers who were prepared to turn to the Company for
support. It was at least clear that whatever had previously attracted ges-
tures of obeisance, it was not unswerving loyalty to Pakubuwana I. Reports
that old Cakraningrat II was too ill to leave Madura may have been what
persuaded many Javanese that Pakubuwana I’s cause was lost.”
By late September 1704 virtually every significant region on the coast
had gone over to Amangkurat III’s side or at least ceased to support Paku-
buwana I. Substantial forces were sent from Kartasura to burn ricefields
and to isolate Pakubuwana I and his insignificant band of supporters huddled
in the VOC’s enclave of Sémarang. In early October, a Kartasura army
said to be 6,000 men strong with heavy cannon and firearms attacked
Tégal, the population of which fled. For the first time in nearly twenty
years, VOC forces undertook significant military action and drove the
enemy from Tégal, whereupon its lord asked to be made a Company
dependant.*° Meanwhile Cakraningrat II and Jangrana II made excuses
not to go to Sémarang with their armies and reports suggested that they,
too, were defecting.°'! Relations between Commander van Rheede and
Pakubuwana I, who was not quite sure whom to trust, were complicated
by the doings of two translators, one a drunken young Dutchman and the
other a dubious Bengali, for while Pakubuwana I could speak Javanese
 138 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

and at least some Malay, van Rheede could speak neither.** In these very
unpromising circumstances, the VOC and Pakubuwana I endeavoured
to lay plans for a campaign against Démak, a holy city in the history
of Javanese Islam and the centre of Amangkurat III’s coastal strength,
which Pakubuwana I insisted upon as the primary target.°?
In mid-October 1704 a Pakubuwana I-VOC army of nearly 4,000 men,
among them over 1,000 VOC soldiers (only 69 of them Europeans), drove
Démak’s defenders from their pagér and entered the deserted town. A
wooden fortress named ’t Goet Begin (“The Good Beginning”) was estab-
lished there.** After this victory the lords of Pémalang, Kudus and Pathi
offered obeisance to Pakubuwana I. More importantly, Cakraningrat II and
Jangrana II came to Sémarang in person in the first week of November.°°
Amangkurat III clearly saw the significance of these events. He appealed
to Surapati for support and promised him all the lands to the east of Mt.
Lawu in return.*° He also threw a force reported to have 30,000 men
(including people from Bagélen, upon whom Pakubuwana I had thought
he could rely) and nine cannon against ’t Goet Begin. Its 77-man VOC
garrison held out until Cnoll arrived with 500 VOC and large numbers of
Javanese and broke the siege, killing some 200 enemy, in late November.
Thereupon Tg. Suranata and his brothers offered their loyalty to Pakubuwana
I. They were reinstated over Démak but one of the brothers and all their
wives were kept in Sémarang as hostages.*’

MAJOR CAMPAIGNS OF THE FIRST

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JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION, 1704-8
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FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 139

The two victories at Démak in October and November 1704 were a

watershed for Pakubuwana I’s cause and for that of his principal supporter
Cakraningrat II. The usurping king now adopted a more confident royal
style. He announced that his son R. Wongsatruna (the former R. Surya)
was to be regarded as his Crown prince. According to Babad Kraton, he
also rewarded several loyal followers with new ranks and titles. Most
significantly, Pakubuwana I named the obese and octogenarian Cakraning-
rat II—said by the Dutch to be much improved in health since aban-
doning opium and strong drink—to be his principal adviser, his com-
mander-in-chief and his lord over the whole pasisir. Cakraningrat II asked
and received confirmation of this status from the Dutch.°* He now had a
great deal riding on the success of Pakubuwana I’s cause, just as
Pakubuwana I and the VOC had much riding on this old man’s continued
life and loyalty.
The victories at Démak were followed by a sweep westward from
Sémarang in December 1704. Nearly 900 VOC (less than 100 Europeans)
and some 1,300 Javanese drove Amangkurat III’s army from Tugu, just
west of Sémarang on the main road, and proceeded to clear his people
from the coast as far west as Wiradesa, beyond Pékalongan.* The pasisir
was now effectively in Pakubuwana I’s hands or, to be more precise, in
those of the VOC and Cakraningrat Il. Babad Kraton ascribes to one of
the Kartasura commanders the sage observation that the fall of Tugu showed
Kartasura’s lucky star to have shifted (that is, to Pakubuwana I).°°
The VOC still had many causes for worry: the fact that the influential
spiritual lords of Giri had not yet declared themselves, for example.°!
Above all, the Company feared that its poor financial position would become
even worse even faster because of the disturbed state of the coast. But
from this Batavia concluded that involvement in the Javanese kingdom
was more, not less, necessary, “because of the great benefit and returns
which reside in Java’s east coast for the Company in general and for this
headquarters in particular.’’ These benefits had much to do with products,
such as timber and rice, and with security. They had little to do with the
VOC’s balance sheets. Batavia was of course gambling again that it could
back a winner who would repay the Company’s expenses and facilitate
profitable commerce, knowing all too well that the last king the VOC had
placed on the throne had turned against it. The logic of the Company’s
position was such, however, that renewed intervention would almost
certainly have been pursued even if Batavia could have foreseen the
magnitude of the unrefunded investments of men, goods and wealth which
were to follow.
It was imperative that the momentum of victory be maintained by
marching to Kartasura to install Pakubuwana I during the dry season of
1705 (approximately March-September). In July, Batavia sent Herman de
Wilde, a member of the Council of the Indies, to Sémarang to take command
140 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

of this expedition. Michiel Ram, Govert Cnoll, Zacharias Bintang and

others were to act as his council on the campaign. They were to march
with some 1,250 European soldiers, something approaching 2,000 VOC
indigenous troops and the Javanese commanded by Cakraningrat II. In
several important respects, de Wilde’s orders departed from the policies
which had shaped Tack’s instructions in 1685. Now there was no question
of abandoning VOC sovereignty over Sémarang; rather de Wilde was to
take steps at last to move the VOC’s pasisir headquarters there from
Jépara. Nor was there to be any reduction of other VOC coastal posts. The
Company envisaged ongoing engagement with the new regime it intended
to install in Kartasura. To this end, the behaviour of VOC servants towards
Javanese was to be improved, a quixotic goal pursued in a desultory fashion
throughout the Company’s history. Various crops were to be encouraged,
especially cotton and sugar, for which the European market was now
expanding. And, of course, a satisfactory financial arrangement was to be
made with Pakubuwana I which would recompense the Company without
placing unrealistic burdens on the Javanese.®? Pakubuwana I, however,
was not concerned about accepting unrealistic burdens, for he intended to
order others to carry them. Both he and the increasingly desperate
Amangkurat III] made extravagant offers to de Wilde to ensure, on the one
hand, that the VOC did not change sides and, on the other, that it did.“
The VOC commitment to Pakubuwana I was unshakeable, and when
Pan. Cakraningrat II arrived in Sémarang in good health ca. 12 August
1705, the forces supporting Pakubuwana I acquired the look of invinci-
bility. Amangkurat III’s emissaries found it expedient to offer their obei-
sance to Pakubuwana I and then return to Kartasura to facilitate his victory
from within the kraton.® De Wilde’s first impressions of Cakraningrat II
were favourable:
This Panémbahan is an old but very fat man, of a friendly nature,
and has greater intellect than any of the Javanese. He always sits,
cannot walk, and is carried everywhere he wants to go. He
commands extraordinary respect. The dignitaries here sémbah [the
gesture of obeisance] to him as they do to the Susuhunan. I have no
doubt that I shall readily arrange all the matters of war as well as
the concluding of the contract with this awesome old prince.
As Valentyn observed, Cakraningrat II’s presence “was worth more than
ten thousand men to us.”*’ The recent months had clearly suggested that
without him, Pakubuwana I’s prospects would have been poor.
On 17 August 1705, an advance force of Javanese and VOC left
Sémarang to take Amangkurat III’s fortress at Ungaran. This fell into their
hands through the treachery of its commandant, who surrendered to Jang-
rana II. On 23 August the main force marched from Sémarang, with
Cakraningrat II], Pakubuwana I and de Wilde a day behind. This stage of
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 141

the campaign went rather less smoothly. Whereas Pakubuwana I had

claimed to have 20,000 men, by the time they reached Ungaran there were
only 7,000 and soon only 3,000. Nor was there the good road which the
Dutch were promised between Ungaran and Kartasura, so heavy artillery
had to be left behind. On 6 September the bridge at Tuntang was crossed
and Salatiga approached, where de Wilde found an estimated 40,000 enemy
drawn up for the battle. This army dispersed after a few shots were fired.
It was becoming clear that it would be difficult to find anyone very anxious
to risk his life in support of either Susuhunan. Before the attacking force
could prepare to assault Kartasura itself, Amangkurat III’s uncle Png. A.
Mataram came to his elder brother Pakubuwana I to submit and to an-
nounce that Amangkurat III had fled the kraton on 10 September. The
following morning Pakubuwana I and his allies entered Kartasura without
a shot being fired. Both Dutch and Javanese accounts note de Wilde’s
surprise that the court had not been defended with the substantial numbers
of heavy cannon found there. The Company had suffered not a single
casualty in action, but deaths from disease were heavy.®*
Pakubuwana I now had his kraton, but there was consternation when it
was discovered that the holy regalia (pusakas) were almost all missing. It
was assumed that Amangkurat III had taken them with him in his flight
from the court. Mounted VOC and Javanese parties were sent in pursuit
of the deposed Susuhunan but he made good his escape and no pusakas
were recovered.” Like his late brother Amangkurat II in 1677, Pakubuwana
I in 1705 thus had only part of what a king of Mataram ought to have. He
had an army, and as long as Cakraningrat II and the VOC remained loyal
it was a formidable one. He held the kraton and its treasury, although it
is reasonable to guess that the latter had little or nothing in it. The princes,
dignitaries and commoners of the realm recognised the expediency of
submitting to him and mostly did so.”” But the absence of the pusakas
worried court circles. Just as their presence, and with it the supernatural
powers they were said to incorporate, symbolised and confirmed the legit-
imacy of kings, so their absence suggested illegitimacy. Pakubuwana I’s
usurpation, achieved in large part through the support of what Babad ing
Sangkala called “Dutchmen without number and people from abroad of all
kinds’”’,’! was of sufficiently questionable legitimacy as it was. To make
matters worse, the pusakas were assumed to be in the hands, and thus to
convey the continuing legitimacy, of Amangkurat III. And worse still—
from the Company view worst of all—Amangkurat III did not die but took
refuge in East Java under the protection of Surapati. This was to mean that
one of the easiest marches the VOC could have imagined would be fol-
lowed in the next three years by campaigns the deadliness of which they
could not yet have guessed.
Now that the kraton was taken, the Europeans’ immediate interest was
less in pusakas than in a new contract to regulate VOC-Kartasura re-
142 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

lations. This was signed on 5 October 1705 by Pakubuwana I and his three
principal sons, de Wilde, Ram, Cnoll, van der Horst and other VOC officers.
The principal provisions of the treaty were as follows.” The Susuhunan
recognised Batavia’s eastern boundary, beginning near Cilacap on the south
coast, running north-westwards to the borders of Cirébon, thence east-
wards around these borders to the sea at Losari. Batavia’s sovereign
limits thus divided Cirébon from the Susuhunan’s lands. There was there-
fore a touch of redundancy about Article Three, in which Pakubuwana I
recognised Cirébon as an independent land under VOC protection. The
Company’s de facto protectorate over East Madura was recognised de
jure. The king confirmed VOC jurisdiction over Sémarang and nearby
Kaligawe and ceded the coastal villages Torbaya and Gumulak, but in
return the VOC recognised the Susuhunan’s sovereignty over many (perhaps
all) of the disputed interior villages south of Sémarang. Sémarang was
thereby reduced to an area which prove unable to provision its own popu-
lation.’ Company goods remained free of import and export duties but the
tariff on VOC subjects engaged in their own trade could be increased.
Pasisir lords were to supply at reasonable wages whatever labourers the
Company needed but the Kalang people (the woodcutters) would be under
VOC jurisdiction. The VOC could purchase at market prices whatever rice
it required. The Susuhunan would admit no Makasarese, Bugis, Malay,
Balinese, Butungese, Moors (non-Indonesian Muslims), Chinese or other
foreigners to his lands unless they had Company passes and all such persons
were subject to VOC jurisdiction, except in certain circumstances. The
Company’s monopoly on the import of opium and textiles was reconfirmed;
both sides agreed to measures for dealing with smugglers. In Article Twelve
the Susuhunan’s subjects, once one of the major seafaring nations of the
archipelago, were forbidden (at least in theory) to sail farther east than
Lombok, north than Kalimantan or west than Lampung (S. Sumatra) unless
they had VOC passes, in which case their westward range could extend
further along the Straits of Malacca.
The financial sections of the treaty were of particular importance. In
Article Thirteen the Susuhunan’s inherited debt was declared to total over
Sp. RI. 1.261 million plus the costs of placing (herstellinge, “restoration”,
the treaty discreetly called it) Pakubuwana I on his throne. All of these
debts were abolished so long as the rest of the contract was adhered to and
the Susuhunan delivered at Batavia on his own ships 800 koyans (approxi-
mately 1300 metric tons/3 million lbs avoirdupois) of rice free of charge
for twenty-five years; the VOC had originally demanded 1000 koyans but
had had to compromise.” On 11 October Pakubuwana I and Cakraningrat
II signed a further agreement whereby Sp. RI. 15,600 would be paid annually
to the Company for the costs of the 200-man VOC lifeguard which the
Susuhunan was given.” Pleased with his victory and these sweeping new
agreements, de Wilde returned to Semarang on 13 October.”°
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 143

Babad Kraton says that Pakubuwana I now set up court in Kartasura

and distributed appanages among his followers.

It is said, in Kartasura
at peace were the hearts of the common people.
And of the king:
all in order, generous
his character, at peace the soul of
His Highness,
without interruption putting in order:
relieved were the hearts of commoners.”

Despite such formalistic professions of tranquillity being achieved, war

was in fact a main topic of discussion in European and Javanese circles.
In June 1706, Govert Cnoll went to Kartasura to plan for the campaign
against Amangkurat III and Surapati. Pakubuwana I promised 25,000 men
for the expedition, of whom 700 were said to have firearms.’”*
The expedition which marched against Surapati in 1706 is described in
detail in Dutch sources, notably in the letters of its commander Govert
Cnoll and the famous Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién (1724-6) of pastor
Valentyn. The latter was sent as chaplain on the campaign and shared a
tent with Cnoll, leading to hearty mutual contempt. It would be difficult
from this distance in time to judge which of these two gentlemen was the
more unpleasant; certainly Cnoll was more bloodthirsty. A good deal of
what was written by “our pipsqueak, pedantic parson” (as de Haan called
Valentyn, inter alia)’ concerned himself, his personal courage, his fevers
and the state of his bowels.®° It is nonetheless a first-hand account, unlike
much of what he recorded about Java, and merits attention.
Indigenous VOC soldiers numbering 2500, 930 Europeans, an artillery
train of 24 cannon (the largest being 6 six-pounders), 3 mortars and 25
Coehoorn mortars, with 10,000 Javanese and Madurese under Cakraning-
rat II and Jangrana II moved southwards from Surabaya on 9—11 Septem-
ber 1706, already very late in the campaign season.*! Valentyn reported
that many of the royal troops had snaphaen flintlocks. Jangrana II selected
the campaign route, which proved so disastrous that it marked him as a
traitor and would eventually lead to his murder. As they approached the
River Porong, these forces found extensive marshes and few provisions.
Moving at least 13,000 men (Valentyn says 30,000 altogether), the 200
water buffalo pulling the artillery train, the cavalry and pack horses, and
provision wagons through this terrain required the building of five bridges
over the river and fourteen through the marshes. Pakubuwana I’s and the
Company’s forces faced desertions, bad water, shortages of rice, illness,
punishing heat, a mighty army of insects and enemy fire. On 25 Septem-
ber, Surapati’s works across the river were taken with few losses on either
144 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

side. The enemy main force, said by Valentyn to consist of Balinese,

Malays, Minangkabaus and Javanese, fell back to Surapati’s fortress at
Bangil. Once across the river, rice became available to the invaders from
nearby villages, but porters continued to desert and sickness to spread.
The attackers marched to Dérma, 1.5 German mylen (approximately
11kms/7mi) from Bangil, and there suffered a defeat which nearly ended
the campaign. On 28 September Javanese and Madurese were out widen-
ing the road with three companies (some 150 men) of VOC Indonesian
soldiers to defend them. The VOC were enticed into combat by Surapati’s
men, the labourers fled and the VOC companies were defeated and scat-
tered. Cnoll sent sixteen companies (some 800 men) and a goodly number
of armed Javanese under Capt. W.H. de Bevere to rescue the scattered
VOC, but de Bevere exceeded his orders. When he saw a splendid mounted
warrior with a mere forty men challenging him in the gathering dusk from
the midst of the rice fields, he left the cover of the forest in the belief that
he saw Surapati himself and could end the war then and there. As his men
moved into the fields, however, a thousand enemy rose from hiding places
in the tall rice. The VOC soldiers’ discipline broke. In the ensuing melee
sixty-nine European and sixty-one indigenous VOC soldiers were killed
and some seventy snaphaen muskets were lost, a greater debacle even than
the killing of Tack and his men in 1686. Valentyn claims that the VOC
commanders were ready to turn back now and that only the determination
of old Cakraningrat II kept the army moving forward.”
No one was now prepared to move beyond the range of artillery cover,
so in standard European style, fortifications were inched forward and
artillery moved up each day. For twelve miserable days, plagued by ants,
flies, renewed provision shortages, terrible heat and increasing desertions
(of Europeans as well as Indonesians),** the attackers worked their way
forward until they were within a pistol-shot of Surapati’s fortress on one
side and a musket-shot on the other. On 16 October 1706 the general
attack took place. Surapati was present and led the furious resistance.
Capt. de Bevere demonstrated again that foolhardy courage which had lost
him so many men in the rice fields by grasping bamboo trunks protruding
from the enemy’s fortress as gun loopholes and scaling the walls with their
aid. Remarkably, the VOC had not thought to bring scaling ladders.
Valentyn said that eighty of de Bevere’s men were killed in following
him. Out of one Madurese force of 200, sixty were killed or wounded. In
total the Company side suffered some 4—500 casualties, but after furious
fighting Bangil fell. The thousand Surabayans under Jangrana II, however,
performed poorly during this battle, as they had in the marshes around
Kali Porong. This confirmed to the satisfaction of Cnoll and Cakraningrat
II that Jangrana II was secretly allied with Surapati, along with the Bali-
nese lord Gusti Bedahulu, who had come to Surabaya in 1704 claiming
that he wished to become a Muslim and a friend of the VOC.*
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 145

Surapati was fatally wounded during the fighting at Bangil. Contempo-

rary VOC and later Javanese sources relay the Javanese story that Sura-
pati was hit by musket balls (the chronicles say by a golden ball) and
shrapnel but that no wound was visible. He was taken to Pasuruan and
died there a month later. In the hope of preventing his infidel enemies
from disturbing his eternal rest, Babad Kraton says Surapati ordered that
his grave be unmarked.*>
Despite the death of Surapati and the conquest of Bangil, the 1706
campaign was no success for Pakubuwana I and the Company. Both had
lost large numbers of men and the rains were by now well established, so
no attempt was made to march upon Pasuruan itself. The sick, the artillery
and the forces who could still march were evacuated northwards to Sura-
baya within a week to avoid being marooned in Bangil. Surapati’s sons
took over his domain, which reverted to them the moment their enemies
had withdrawn, leaving not a single occupying soldier behind. Similarly,
a VOC-Kartasura force which had marched eastwards from the court to
near Kédhiri, accepting submissions to Pakubuwana I as it went, was
ordered back to the court before attempting to take Kédhiri itself. This
army, too, had suffered miserably from illness and shortage of provisions.
Amangkurat III had apparently been in Kédhiri when these forces ap-
proached. He now joined with Surapati’s sons to prepare for the next
campaign season.*° Batavia laid most of the blame for the unsatisfactory
outcome of the 1706 campaign at the feet of Jangrana II, reprimanded
Cnoll for not having seen through his treachery sooner and decided that
the command of the next campaign should be in the hands of Herman de
Wilde.*’ Cnoll was ordered to arrest Jangrana II but was unable to do so,
for the latter always went about with a substantial armed entourage and
never entered the VOC fortress at Surabaya.**
Surapati’s eldest son took the name Ki Ad. Wiranégara and succeeded
his father. Javanese sources say that an immoral sexual life dissipated his
supernatural powers. The VOC heard reports that after a period of conflict
among themselves, Surapati’s sons were reunited by an Arab named Syaikh
Abdullah. This was probably the same as one Encik Abdullah who wrote
letters to the lords of East Madura in early 1707 urging them to unite
behind Amangkurat III in the name of Islam and to reject Pakubuwana I,
“for who proclaimed him other than the Hollanders?” These events are
obscure, but certainly in October 1706 the anti-Pakubuwana I side re-
sumed the offensive in East Java. Forces led by Jangrana II’s brother
Naladika razed and burned villages around Surabaya and in Naladika’s
former appanage of Grésik.*? The VOC might well have concluded that
the costs of that year’s campaigning had been utterly in vain, except for
the sweet taste of revenge at Surapati’s death.
In May 1707 de Wilde went to Kartasura to lead a new campaign, with
Cnoll as his second-in-command. Again the plan was for one (on this
146 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

occasion the main) force to march eastwards through the interior from
Kartasura and another to march southward from Surabaya. With nearly
700 VOC soldiers, artillery and some 25,000 Javanese under the command
of Pakubuwana I’s son Png. Purbaya, de Wilde marched east from the
court in July. The enemy avoided contact as this army approached. It
reached Kédhiri four and one-half weeks later, thence marched to Carat on
the flanks of Mt. Pénanggungan. On 8 September it was joined there by
15,000 Madurese and Surabayans under Jangrana II and VOC forces under
Capts. van der Horst and Sergeant. With a total of 3,000 VOC soldiers and
3,000 Jépara troops, there now existed according to Valentyn a fighting
force of 46,000 (plus at least 14,000 bearers) to attack Pasuruan. On 15
September a furious battle drove the enemy from his fortifications at Carat.
Two weeks later his works before Pasuruan were taken after heavy fighting.
Surapati’s sons and Amangkurat III fled southwards to the Malang high-
lands; when de Wilde and Purbaya entered Pasuruan they found it de-
serted. Both Babad Kraton and the garrulous pastor Valentyn say that as
a final act of revenge de Wilde discovered Surapati’s grave and had the
remains disinterred and burned.”
Jangrana II and his soldiers performed admirably on this campaign while
the Madurese did poorly, reflecting how two deaths had altered the politics
of East Java. The first was that of Surapati in 1706, for with him had
apparently died whatever understandings he had with Jangrana II. The
raids by his son’s forces upon Surabayan territories in October 1706 had
apparently incensed Jangrana II and spurred him into action.°!
The second death marked the passing of an age. On 4 August 1707 Pan.
Cakraningrat II, the aged and corpulent lord who had played a major role
in Java’s affairs for over a quarter-century, the man who was largely re-
sponsible for placing Pakubuwana I upon the throne of Kartasura, died at
Kamal in Madura. By the time of his death, as well as being lord of West
Madura he dominated much of East Java as a quasi-independent lord.
Sidayu was his personal fief, he had detached villages from Grésik and
settled Madurese there, his grandson had taken over Pathi, he had ejected
from Juwana the man sent by Pakubuwana I to be its bupati, he controlled
numerous toll-houses along the Sala river and was the Susuhunan’s over-
lord of the entire pasisir.°* While Pakubuwana I and the Company had
greatly depended on him, neither mourned his passing. Both were anxious
to prevent his heirs reestablishing such influence.
With reason to be pleased with the outcome of the campaign season, de
Wilde erected three fortresses around Pasuruan and left for home. He
appointed two sons of the former bupati Onggajaya (Jangrana I’s brother)
to be joint lords of Pasuruan and installed Jangrana II’s younger brother
Ki Panji Surengrana as lord of Bangil. There seemed little point in at-
tempting to pursue Amangkurat III, Surapati’s sons and the few followers
said still to be with them into the impenetrable highlands where Trunajaya
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 147

had been hunted twenty-eight years before, so this task was left for
another season.”*
De Wilde had intended to confer with Pakubuwana I at Kartasura on his
return, but was too ill to travel to the court so the Susuhunan came to
Sémarang to see him at the end of October. Already by the second day of
this conference, de Wilde was too ill to attend and matters were left in the
hands of Cnoll and van der Horst. The aim of the conference was prima-
rily to ensure that Cakraningrat II’s successor, his relatives and other
Madurese were removed from East Java. It was agreed that the dead
Panémbahan’s eldest son, a man in his early forties who was described ten
years later as being “lazy, effeminate and of a variable humour with haughty
conceits”,”* should succeed as Png. Cakraningrat III (r. 1707-18). But part
of his father’s estate was granted to two grandsons and the Madurese
holdings in East Java were liquidated. The Company and Kartasura were
to discover, however, that it was not so easy to contain the influence of the
Cakraningrat line. Arrangements were also made for the VOC lifeguard of
200 Europeans for the Susuhunan, for the supply of various products to
the VOC, particularly of the annual rice deliveries of which the Company
had so far received almost nothing,» and to exclude European (notably
English) smugglers.”° Pakubuwana I then returned to Kartasura. De Wilde,
sick and exhausted, reached Batavia on 7 November; a week later he was
dead.”’
As well as overseeing the breaking of the power of the Cakraningrat
line, the Company took steps to restore order in its dependency of East
Madura. Since the death of R.A. Cakranagara in 1705, confusion had
again reigned there, which the VOC largely blamed upon R. Sudérma’s
continuing machinations. To make matters worse, the Dutch were certain
that Sudérma was a friend of Surapati. In August 1707 Capt. Hendrik van
der Horst travelled to Suménép with orders to have Sudérma murdered,
but no VOC servant was to dirty his hands in the task. He had no difficulty
in arranging for Sudérma’s local accusers to dispatch him with their krisses
while he briefly left the room in which they were conferring. Van der
Horst then returned to Surabaya, where he had three of Sudérma’s prin-
cipal relatives and supporters murdered. Cakranagara’s minor son was
named R. Cakranagara and succeeded as the VOC’s vassal lord over both
Suménép and Pamékasan, under the guardianship of his grandfather R.A.
Adikara.”
The VOC thought it was now a matter of rounding off the destruction
of its enemies and putting its relationship with its protégé Pakubuwana I
on a firm footing in order at last to secure “by the continuation of the
blessing of Heaven, the long-hoped-for peace and the fruits of Java for the
burdens the Company has borne”.”” But Batavia found it difficult to trust
Kartasura. Rumours suggested that Pakubuwana I was about to give weighty
appointments to men whom the VOC thought unsuitable. Cnoll intervened
148 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

with greater effect than delicacy to prevent Png. Purbaya being made Patih
or Tg. Citrasoma (bupati of Jépara) supreme governor of the coasts. At a
conference in Kartasura in April 1708, however, Cnoll had to accept the
appointment of Jangrana II as chief governor of the eastern pasisir
(although Batavia’s orders to murder the man still stood), because he
needed him as a commander in the coming campaign. The chief governor-
ship of the western pasisir went to the bupati of Pékalongan Ad. Jayaning-
rat, a Chinese Muslim with a grand Javanese name who was thought to be
a friend of the VOC. Over the years the Company was to find, however,
that this man had a commercial approach to managing his territory (one
of the major rice-producing areas of Java) which made him a major
competitor and irritant. At this conference Pakubuwana | promised to
provide some 7400 armed men and 3000 coolies from the interior and
western coastal districts for the campaign and to encourage his subjects to
produce products for the Company once peace was fully established.'°°
Before the VOC and Kartasura could launch their 1708 campaign into
the highlands of East Java, Amangkurat III wrote to the Company offering
to submit. His cause was clearly lost and, according to the Javanese
accounts, there had been dreadful illness among his followers. His con-
ditions were that he not be required to submit to Pakubuwana I, that he be
allowed to remain as a prince in Java under Company supervision and that
he keep the holy pusakas of the realm. There is little room for doubt that
Cnoll assured him his conditions would be met. On 23 July Amangkurat
III surrendered to Cnoll near Japan with several courtiers and about 600
commoners. He was taken to Surabaya, where further promises were made
to him, this time in writing. Babad Kraton and Babad ing Sangkala observe
that Amangkurat III was deceived by the Dutch: this episode did nothing
to enhance European honour in Indonesian eyes. Cnoll began to worry that
the deposed king might inspire a dangerous degree of loyalty in Surabaya,
so he was dispatched to Batavia after a month. VOC and Javanese sources
confirm that the pusakas, which Pakubuwana I was most anxious to have,
were believed to be with Amangkurat III.'°!
Pakubuwana I was disturbed that the holy regalia had gone to Batavia
with his nephew, for they had thereby, in Javanese reckoning, left the land
of the Javanese and gone to the foreign territory of the Sundanese and
Dutch. Javanese historical tradition says that the Susuhunan put a brave
face on the matter by saying to Cakrajaya,

“It is my feeling, Patih,

that even if all the pusakas of the land of Java
are taken to Jakarta,
those which are pikes and krisses,
it concerns me not
just as long as there are still
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 149

the graveyard of Kadilangu

and the mosque of Démak, Patih.
Yes, know
that these two
are the pusakas of the land of Java
which are essential, there are no others.’!

The king’s attempt to pretend that all was well, if the babad story is
correct, was short-lived. He would subsequently display his anxiety to
have the true pusakas back if they could be found. And the pasisir holy
sites of Démak and Kadilangu remained what they had been before: places
whose connection with the history of Islam in Java made them both revered
by all Javanese and a potential source of countervailing legitimacy to that
of the Mataram dynasty.
At Batavia there was some debate within the Council of the Indies about
what to do with Amangkurat II. Some of the edele heeren (“honourable
gentlemen’) felt that commitments made to him ought to be honoured, but
Realpolitik ruled. Amangkurat III was told that, having been a king and a
fugitive, he was about to become an exile on Sri Lanka. He objected
vigorously but to no avail at this treatment. He was also ordered to hand
over the pusakas. He surrendered several chests which were said to con-
tain them and which were sent to Sémarang for delivery to Pakubuwana
I. The Dutch would soon discover to their chagrin that, if Amangkurat III
lacked means to preserve his patrimony or freedom, he could at least
frustrate his uncle’s acquisition of the royal regalia. On 1 October 1708,
he set sail from Batavia for Sri Lanka with his three sons, several wives
and concubines, other followers and personal goods which probably in-
cluded the real pusakas.'°
As Amangkurat III was sailing into exile, Cnoll was marching into the
Malang highlands with a VOC and Javanese army, again too late in the
season. Their departure had been delayed until the beginning of September
by the late arrival of provisions, for which Batavia held Cnoll responsible.
He rejected this charge, saying that a poor harvest was to blame.'™ In
the meantime, Surapati’s eldest son R.A. Wiranégara wrote to dignitaries
who had surrendered with Amangkurat [I but had remained at Surabaya.
He admonished them as Muslims to gather together the forces of all of
Java and to stand against the infidels and the usurper who sat upon the
throne of Kartasura. A few of these dignitaries and many commoners from
Amangkurat III’s following then took to the hills.'°° When at last the army
marched from Surabaya, it encountered chill winds and rain, bad roads,
food shortages, widespread and deadly sickness among the soldiers and
swollen rivers which impeded progress into the mountains. At Kédhiri
they were joined by a force which had come from Kartasura through the
interior. On 20 October 1708, the allies put the sons of Surapati to flight
150 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

after what appears to have been minor action. Ng. Lor was killed. Wirané-
gara was severely wounded and a few months later was reported to have
died. By early November, Cnoll concluded that it was pointless to pursue
remnant bands in impossible terrain and vital to get out before the
monsoon isolated him there, so the army was evacuated. By this time
the Kartasuran forces had reportedly lost over 5000 dead and nearly
7600 were sick, while 66 VOC had died and 484 were incapacitated by
illness.'°
The challenge to Pakubuwana I from Amangkurat III and Surapati’s
family was over, although descendants of the latter ruled the Malang area
until the late 1760s.!’ The lords of all those inland districts east of Kar-
tasura whose loyalty had been so doubtful now came to court to offer
obeisance to Pakubuwana I.'°% In a pun upon the meaning of the name
Malang. (“to impede, stand in the way”, etc.), Babad Kraton says , “The
kingdom was now fine, there was nothing to stand in the way of (malanga)
His Highness the king.”’!
Thus the First Javanese War of Succession came to its costly end. No
sources allow one to calculate the price paid by Javanese society to place
Pakubuwana I on the throne. One can gain some idea, however, of the cost
to the Dutch East India Company. The VOC continued to lose money on
its intra-Asian trade throughout this period. Its offices in Java (Bantén,
Cirébon, Java’s north coast)-were among those which consistently showed
losses.''!® So a deficit was itself no surprise to the Company’s accountants,
nor need it be to historians. But this war made matters significantly worse.
Trade in most products languished or died altogether in Java during the
war years. The sugar industry around Jépara and Kudus (one of the two
main producing areas of Java, the other being Batavia) in particular was
destroyed by roving marauders and attacks on the Chinese millers.'"!
The direct military costs to the VOC are calculable, if only roughly. A
sum of fl. 3,233,112 (=Sp. RI. 957,959) was spent on soldiers’ salaries
alone on Java’s coast in 1704-8; Gijsberti Hodenpijl reckoned the ad-
ditional (i.e. in excess of normal garrison) salary costs within this amount
which were directly caused by the war to be nearly fl. 2 million (=Sp. RI.
592,593). The significance of such figures is suggested by comparing the
total cumulative loss of the VOC in the Indies account books for 1704-6
(fl. 6,962,345 = Sp. RI. 2,062,917) with the military salaries paid on Java’s
north coast in the same period (fl. 1,488,599 = Sp. RI. 441,066).'” In other
words, over twenty percent of the losses of the Company in the Indies in
these years can be attributed to the salary costs of its military operation in
East and Central Java. This does not include, of course, the cost of pro-
visions and munitions, of buildings and ships, of administrative and trade
personnel, of transportation or other expenses. Of lives a partial calcu-
lation is possible. Gijsberti Hodenpijl reckoned that in 1705-8, 2,013 VOC
Europeans died through enemy action, disease or other causes in the area
FIRST JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION iPeyal

covered by its Java coastal office—roughly one-quarter of those em-

ployed.''* By contemporary world standards the military operations in
Java had not always been large. Although the campaign of 1707, if it had
the 46,000 men reported by Valentyn, was in the same league as the Allied
army of 52,000 led by Marlborough at Blenheim in 1704, the other
campaigns of the First Javanese War of Succession were smaller, while
the armies involved in the great contemporaneous battles of the War of the
Spanish Succession were much larger.''* But the Java campaigns had
certainly been expensive of manpower through losses in action and the
spread of diseases in the army.
The First Javanese War of Succession was a central episode in Javanese
history, and in that of Javanese-European relations. The cultural gap between
Javanese and Europeans was not at all bridged by these years, but the
fighting undoubtedly facilitated that transfer of military technology and
techniques from the European side to the Indonesian which was such a
feature of the age. Warfare in Java became thereby deadlier, costlier and
more intractable. This demanded greater commitment from those who
engaged in war—a commitment which bound the VOC and its new Java-
nese allies more tightly together and did so at greater cost to both. Their
enemies, too, embraced the new instruments of war and shared in their
cost. Thus did war devastate the countryside of East Java in particular. As
if in reply to this outrage, nature unleashed epidemic diseases to decimate
the marauding armies. The outcome of all this was a change in the line of
succession in Kartasura, and with it questions about the legitimacy and
acceptability of the new arrangements. But the result was more than this
successful usurpation. For a renewed and closer bond had been forged
between Kartasura and the Company—a bond not of understanding but of
debt and need. This alliance would remain a central feature of coming
decades, at great cost to both sides and to the society in which their
relations were set.
 Politics and Economics
in the Quieter Years of
Pakubuwana I,
1709-17

Pakubuwana I was now secure upon the throne which he had usurped
principally with the aid of the Dutch East India Company and the princely
house of Madura. As had been true in the early 1680s, again the parties
to this alliance set out to reap the fruits of victory. The Europeans ex-
pected political stability which would give rise to profitable trade and, in
particular, a sure flow of money and products from the Susuhunan’s empire
to make the VOC’s investment in him pay off. For the lord of Madura,
now Cakraningrat II, and his allies, notably the house of Surabaya, it was
time to reap that greater wealth and power which could be expected from
having been so vital to the king’s victory. Pakubuwana I and his courtiers
sought to legitimise, stabilise and exploit their occupation of the kingdom’s
centre, an aim inconsistent with allowing subordinate lords greater auton-
omy or seeing the kingdom’s wealth drained off for foreigners at un-
acceptable rates. These various ambitions were to a significant degree mu-
tually exclusive. Each of the parties wanted a bigger slice of a political and
economic cake which showed no signs of getting larger. They could achieve
their aims only by one or both of two means: by squeezing peasant pro-
ducers harder or by coming into conflict with each other. The tensions
which surfaced after victory are thus unsurprising.
The period analysed here, less than a decade, is the longest period of
what passed for stability in Java from the 1670s to the 1720s, and even
this was punctuated by modest rebellions. The court politics of the period
consisted primarily of dynastic intrigue, which is hardly surprising in a
court ruled by a usurper already in his late fifties or early sixties whose
legitimacy and abilities were open to question. Regional politics were
dominated by disaffection in the eastern boundaries of the kingdom, a
disaffection with roots at least as old as Sultan Agung’s conquests of the
early seventeenth century and which was to be hardened by the events of

152
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 153

these years. The VOC meanwhile sought its money, its crops and its trade,
probably placing demands upon Javanese social, economic and political
structures which they were unprepared to bear. Thus the quieter years of
Pakubuwana I prepared the stage for yet more war.
Some of the tone of these years was set by the VOC Commissioner
Govert Cnoll’s visit to Kartasura in early 1709. He was determined to
arrange the kingdom’s political and economic affairs to the Company’s
liking and willing to employ murder to achieve this. The visit began,
however, in farce. The chests of weapons and other objects which had
been confiscated from Amangkurat III in Batavia, and which were as-
sumed to contain the royal pusakas, were escorted to Kartasura by Cnoll
and there opened ceremoniously on 20 January 1709 in the presence of
him, Pakubuwana I and senior courtiers. With the exception of one small
gong (béndhe), two horns and a pike, the contents were all declared not
to be the true pusakas. At the kraton hope turned to embarrassed dismay.
In Batavia, satisfaction at having dealt successfully with Amangkurat III
no doubt turned to anger: orders were sent to Sri Lanka to get the true
regalia from the exiled king.!
Cnoll turned to other matters, among them the final reckoning with
Jangrana II of Surabaya for treachery during the 1706 campaign. Cnoll
pressed Pakubuwana I to have him murdered but the Susuhunan temporised.
Babad Kraton depicts the king’s anger and dismay at this demand: “This
is my left arm’, he says to his advisers; “Madura [i.e. Cakraningrat II] was
my right but he has died, so there remains only the left.”? The capital was
full of dignitaries from throughout the empire, there to celebrate Garébég
Bésar (10 Bésar AJ 1632/21 February 1709) and to arrange matters with
the VOC: no doubt the pressures upon the king were therefore all the
greater. In a gathering of courtiers on 23 February, Jangrana II reportedly
objected to the Company imposing burdens upon the Javanese peasants
and paying inadequately for their produce; he asked that an ambassador be
sent to Batavia to argue these matters there. These were not views which
Cnoll would tolerate or the new Susuhunan greatly welcome. Babad Kra-
ton says that the Surabayan lord was informed by the Susuhunan of the
VOC demand for his life. At first he and his brothers wished to go to war
against the infidels (kapir), but a counsellor persuaded him that this would
mean the ruin of his princely house. Upon Pakubuwana I’s assurance that
his brothers would inherit his domains, Jangrana II therefore agreed to
become a sacrifice to the peace he had helped to achieve.*
In the morning of 26 February 1709, Jangrana II was summoned from
a public tiger fight (rampog macan) to a private audience with the
Susuhunan. As he entered one of the kraton’s outer courtyards he was set
upon and stabbed to death in the presence of the Susuhunan’s sons Pngs.
Mangkunégara, Purbaya and Blitar. This murder caused considerable
commotion among the assembled dignitaries. Jangrana II’s brothers
154 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

mobilised their troops on the alun-alun, but the battle which was feared
did not take place. They were disarmed, assured by Pakubuwana I of his
favour and appointed joint governors of Surabaya under the names Jang-
rana III and Jayapuspita, their former appanages at Bangil and Pasuruan
being given to others. They governed Surabaya until their rebellion in
1717. Cnoll reported that Jangrana II’s murder had been achieved “with-
out me or anyone on behalf of the Company being concerned in it or being
found on the streets”. His superiors, among them his friend and mentor
Governor-General van Hoorn, were delighted with his handling of this
affair. The atmosphere at court was now thick with suspicion of the
Europeans and their new Susuhunan: if the latter would arrange murder
for them, what would he not do?
In such a tense setting the assembled dignitaries arranged the payments
of cash and crops demanded by the king’s 1705 treaty with the Company.
Very little had been paid towards the 800 koyans and Sp. RI. 15,600 to be
turned over each year, so the royal debt already amounted to Sp. RI.
61,100 and 3019 koyans (equivalent to a cash total of Sp. Rl. 121,480).
The king paid Rds. Holl. 10,000 (= Sp. RI. 8889) immediately and shortly.
delivered over 650 koyans of rice. As can be seen from the table below,
however, although the Susuhunan may have made a serious attempt to
meet his contractual obligations until his kingdom collapsed again in the
closing years of his reign, he never paid off his arrears.

Table | Pakubuwana |’s debts and repayments 1708-20 (in Sp. RI.)>

Year annual annual annual cumulative cumulative cumulative

total payment portion total total portion
due paid due paid paid

1708/9 22,009 121,480 22,009 0.18

1709/10 31,600 21,034 0.67 153,080 43,043 0.28
1710/11 31,600 18,258 0.58 184,680 61,301 0.33
1711/12 31,600 32,862 1.04 216,280 94,163 0.44
1712/13 32,789 Chl evi 0.95 249,069 125,440 0.50
1713/14 32,800 31,183 0.95 281,869 156,623 0.56
1714/15 31,621 32,360 1.02 313,490 188,983 0.60
1715/16 31,600 32,955 1.04 345,090 221,938 0.64
1716/17 31,600 31,900 1.01 376,690 253,838 0.67
1717/18 31,900 27,655 0.87 408,590 281,493 0.69
1718/19 31,600 0 0.00 440,190 281,493 0.64
1719/20 31,600 0 0.00 471,790 281,493 0.60

In 1709/10 Pakubuwana I paid two-thirds of the rice and cash he owed

for that year. Thereafter he never paid less than fifty-eight percent of a
year’s dues, and in four years (1711/12, 1714/15, 1715/16, 1716/17)
marginally exceeded what was called for, until 1717/18. Thereafter his
payments collapsed along with the political structure of his realm. By that
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 595)

time the king had paid off nearly seventy percent of what he owed. Or, to
look at it another way, the VOC had yet to be repaid for nearly one-third
of its costs in intervening in his kingdom’s affairs and maintaining a
garrison at the kraton since 1709, the unpaid amount reckoned by 1717/
18 to be equivalent to Sp. RI. 127,097.
In 1709 Cnoll could not know that the VOC’s search for repayment and
profit would prove less than fully successful: he simply demanded that the
kingdom’s dignitaries arrange to pay what was owed. In the wake of the
VOC’s military victories of 1705-8 and the murder of Jangrana II, no one
was prepared to say no, although more than a few lords undoubtedly knew
that they could not, or intended not, to deliver what they promised. The
burden was distributed among the various regions by the dignitaries them-
selves. This distribution, which can be seen in Tables II and II, provides
important if crude evidence of the relative economic capacities of the
various areas of the realm. Among pasisir territories, Pekalongan (supply-
ing fourteen percent of the pasisir rice and cash or six percent of that from
the entire kingdom), Surabaya and West Madura (each supplying thirteen
percent of the pasisir payments or six percent of the total) were clearly of
particular significance. Small wonder that Jayaningrat, the Jangranas and
the Cakraningrats were such powerful lords. But no pasisir territory could
compare with the productivity of the districts around Kartasura itself,
which were to deliver one-third of the total rice and cash due to the VOC,
over five times as much as Pékalongan, and almost twice as much as
Pékalongan, Surabaya and West Madura put together.
The VOC was interested in more than rice and cash. Orders were given
for the Javanese to attempt to produce for sale to the Company cotton
thread, buffalo hides, peas, beans, sappanwood, pepper, saltpetre, indigo,
sugar and coffee. The last was generally unsuccessful in Kartasura terri-
tories, except in Pékalongan where Ad. Jayaningrat spotted a money spinner
and developed plantations. The VOC also needed to cut new stands of
timber: the trees of Rémbang had been so heavily felled that the nearest
heavy timber was now twelve days’ transport by buffalo inland from the
coast. So the forests of Pathi, Juwana, Lasém, Tuban, Sidayu and Jipang
were declared open to the VOC.°
Cnoll again attempted to influence the internal government of the
Kartasura state but in this he encountered limits to his influence.’ He failed
to prevent the murdered Jangrana II being replaced as chief governor of
the eastern pasisir by Tg. Citrasoma of Jépara. Jayaningrat remained chief
governor of the western coastal districts. Cnoll also wished to object to
Pakubuwana I naming his sons Png. Mangkunégara, Png. Purbaya and
Png. Blitar to be three of the four chief governors of the moncanégara
districts in the interior. Placing princes in such a position was, indeed,
unusual if not unheard-of in Java and something of an invitation to re-
bellion. Cnoll said, however, that he was unable to put his objections
156 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Table Il Pasisir deliveries March 1709°

i

Cc D =
A B rice @ total cash portion
cash rice Sp.RI.20/ equivalent of
(Sp. R1.) — (Koyan) koyan (A + C) total

Brébes 24 6 120 144 .0103

Tégal 578 29.75 595 1173 .0838
Pémalang 437 21.25 425 862 .0616
Pékalongan 999 50 1000 1999 .1428
Batang 248 12°75 255 503 .0360
Wiradesa 140 VIS 155 295 0211
Kéndhal 206 10.5 210 416 .0297
Kaliwungu 256 12275 255 Sill .0365
Démak 487 25 500 987 .0705
Jépara 268 13.5 270 538 .0384
Kudus 179 9 180 359 .0256
Pathi 179 9 180 359 .0256
Céngkalsewu 25 1 20 45 .0032
Juwana 171 S745} 75 246 .0176
Lasém 179 9 180 359 .0256
Tuban 240 WAS) 250 490 .0350
Sidayu 179 9 180 359 .0256
Grésik 358 18.5 370 728 .0520
Surabaya 894 46 920 1814 1296
W. Madura 894 46 920 1814 .1296
TOTAL (by contract) 6933 354.75
TOTAL of rounded
figures 6941 ohere} 7060 14001 1.0001

Table Ill Deliveries of March 1709: Summary figures for Kartasura,

Moncaneégara and Pasisir®

A B Cc D E
cash rice rice@Sp.Rl. total cash __ portion
(Sp. Rl.) — (Koyan) 20/koyan equiv.(A&C) of total

Kartasura 5200 268 5360 10560 .3342

pasisir (by contract) 6933 354.75 7095 14028 .4439
pasisir (by rounded
totals) [6941] [353] [7060] [14001]
moncanegara 3467 Wires) 3545 7012 2219

TOTAL (using pasisir

contract figures) 15600 800 16000 31600 1.0000

because of the incompetence of his young translator. He subsequently got

Tg. Kartanégara to raise his objections with the Susuhunan, who there-
upon dropped the idea of appointing the princes to such positions. In 1705
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 1 5)7/

Cnoll had objected to there being two Patihs, but the Susuhunan neverthe-
less maintained Tgs. Kartanégara and Cakrajaya in these posts. Having
thus encountered limits to its influence, Batavia nonetheless reported to
Amsterdam that the governmental arrangements were what the Company
wanted.!°
Cnoll’s visit ended with appropriate symbolism. Contests between buf-
faloes and tigers were often staged at the Javanese courts. Evidence from
the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shows that, unknown to
the Europeans, the Javanese viewed these contests as allegorical battles in
which the tiger represented the Europeans and the buffalo themselves. The
latter almost invariably won. On 11 March 1709 such a contest was staged
for Cnoll’s entertainment. This time, however, the tiger nearly killed the
buffalo before the Susuhunan intervened and ordered the cat driven back
to its cage.'' There must have been much allusive discussion among the
Javanese that night. Cnoll shortly left Kartasura, returned to Batavia and
sailed off to retirement in the Netherlands. He died a few days after reach-
ing his home town of Delft, leaving behind a modest fortune and a coating
of particular nastiness on the history of the early eighteenth century in
Java."
Pakubuwana I evidently did not feel very secure in the wake of Cnoll’s
visit. He asked the Dutch East India Company to maintain its garrison at
the court at 200 men until it could be seen how various courtiers and
officials would behave.'* He betrayed concern about the legitimacy of his
rule by proposing to move the kraton from Kartasura to Mataram where,
he said, the good fortune of the dynasty resided. Six days after Garébég
Mulud (12 Mulud AJ 1633/21 May 1709), he went to Mataram with his
sons, further family members and a large entourage and spent seven weeks
there. What transpired during this visit is unclear. Babad ing Sangkala
describes it as a pleasure trip to Pamancingan, near Java’s south coast.
There are found several holy sites, including the cave Guwa Langse, still
known today as a place where the most powerful local deity of Java, Ratu
Kidul, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, may appear. Perhaps the
Susuhunan received supernatural messages there telling him not to remove
his kraton. The VOC certainly urged him not to do so. In September,
Pakubuwana I wrote to Batavia saying that he would accept this advice,
but the Dutch reported that this decision also had to do with local super-
stitions, the nature of which the VOC was unlikely to have known. At the
same time the Susuhunan asked again that the VOC garrison maintain its
strength and thanked Batavia for ordering Amangkurat III in Sri Lanka to
turn over the pusakas.'*
There were signs of localised, small-scale opposition to the king. In
March 1710 a rebellion broke out in Mataram when a commoner named
Pun (or Si) Dana gathered several hundred men and, after defeating royal
forces, made a stand at the ruins of the eighth-century Buddhist temple
158 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Barabudhur. He was captured, transported to Kartasura and there executed

by the novel and brutal means of being stabbed with needles by the
commoners upon the alun-alun. Dana’s father-in-law Ki Gédhe Pacukilan
was taken shortly thereafter.!° The roots and significance of these episodes
are, however, unclear.
Relations between the Susuhunan and his VOC mentors were also
strained, but the details are not clear. It is possible in the light of later
evidence!® that Pakubuwana I suspected the Company of refusing to hand
over some of the pusakas which he thought to be in its possession, or at
least of exerting itself insufficiently in searching for them. Pieter Metsue
was the new Gezaghebber of the VOC’s pasisir operation (1709-14), the
headquarters of which had at long last been transferred from Jépara to
Sémarang in 1708.'’ He believed that his dealings with the Susuhunan
were bedevilled by incompetent translations. It is difficult to demonstrate
that the quality of translations in this period was poorer than in others
since there are no documents available for comparison in both Dutch and
Javanese versions, but the number of curious expressions and inaccurate
dates in VOC translations from Javanese lend the idea some probability.
Metsue was pleased to receive an invitation from Pakubuwana I to come
to Kartasura to discuss matters in person.'*
When Metsue went to Kartasura in May 1710, he took along thirty-three
krisses and six pikes which the VOC had got from Amangkurat III in Sri
Lanka in the belief that this time they were the true royal regalia. At the
kraton the Susuhunan, his sons, his Patihs, some old courtiers and the
Dutch examined the seals on the chests and then opened them. Inside they
discovered one kris which was declared to be a minor pusaka; the six
pikes and thirty-two other krisses were not pusakas, said the Javanese.
What might strike a modern reader as a farce concerning the lost regalia
was by now a serious drama. The Patihs Cakrajaya and Kartanégara told
Metsue that the king did not blame the VOC for having been twice de-
ceived by Amangkurat III, but one may wonder if the court did not suspect
the Company of being party to the Susuhunan’s discomfiture. Pakubuwana
I asked the Company to try again to recover the regalia, which of course
Metsue agreed to do.'” The VOC’s position in this matter was difficult: it
was searching for objects which few Javanese and no European could
recognise, which it believed to represent superstitious nonsense, yet upon
which hung much of the quality of its relationship with Kartasura.
The Susuhunan was still at work on the structures of his administration.
Metsue seems not to have interfered as Cnoll had in his time; at least, he
reported no interference and organized no murders. Pakubuwana I restored
an arrangement which his father Amangkurat I had attempted but failed to
implement near the end of his reign, according to the Patihs. This involved
dividing the state into two large regional groupings under two Patihs.
Cakrajaya was responsible for what were called the Panumping lands,
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 159

consisting of the interior districts to the south of the capital and the eastern
pasisir. Kartanégara was responsible for the so-called Bumi Gédhe dis-
tricts, the lands north of Kartasura and the western pasisir. The coastal
chief governors Citrasoma and Jayaningrat retained their posts beneath the
Patihs. Later in the year Jayaningrat’s jurisdiction was extended to cover
Madura as well, but this arrangement did not last long.*? Thus the govern-
mental structure was bifurcated, as was the administration of the kraton
itself, which was conventionally split into left and right parts (gédhong
kiwa and gédhong téngén).*' Symmetry and multiple layers of responsi-
bility (and hence of wealth-extraction) typefied this structure.”* It is not
clear to what degree it was implemented in the provinces and whether it
brought greater order or less. But it can only have increased the burdens
upon the peasantry who were expected to pay for it all. It was probably
fortunate for them that the experiment did not survive long.
Relations between Metsue and the Susuhunan (“that good old king”)
were smoothed by this visit. The reasons for Pakubuwana I’s previous
displeasure were not clarified, but were said to have had something to do
with the royal scribe (who would have handled correspondence with the
VOC) being incompetent because of opium addiction.** The VOC’s con-
tinued failure to discover and turn over the pusakas probably remained
nevertheless a cause of suspicion in court circles towards the Europeans,
for Pakubuwana I’s usurpation still needed all the legitimacy it could get.
Later in the year the king sent Cakrajaya to Batavia to felicitate the new
Governor-General Abraham van Riebeeck (1709-13) and to deliver a list
of the missing pusakas. Batavia promised to do what it could to get them
from Amangkurat III.”
For the next two years, court affairs appeared fairly placid. The rise of
powerful persons and cliques could be observed but was not unusual. The
Susuhunan’s wife Ratu Pakubuwana was believed by the VOC to wield a
particularly powerful influence over the old man. She was thought to
favour especially her son Png. Blitar, to whom the Susuhunan gave control
of the substantial lands of Saréngat and Blitar in 1711. The VOC at-
tempted but failed to dissuade Pakubuwana I from giving him so much
power, and he held these lands until 1716.*° Concerning the regalia there
was a small advance with the return of a pusaka bridle in 1711, but
nothing more was heard about recovered pusakas in the reign of
Pakubuwana I.”° The Susuhunan now found himself with sufficient leisure
to construct a rest house and hunting lodge (pasanggrahan) for the princes
and himself in Mataram in 1712. He had an older pasanggrahan moved
from Garjitawati (now Yogyakarta) to a new site further east in Mataram,
brought the mosque from his father’s ruined court of Plered there and
named the new place Kartawinata. Although there is no evidence of any
plans to move the court to Mataram, Kartawinata would have had much
of the air of a kraton about it. The VOC rather feared that the princes
160 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

might use the new site as a base for misbehaviour:?’ seven years later
Pngs. Blitar and Purbaya would in fact use it as a base for rebellion.
Probably of greater significance was the emergence of Cakrajaya as the
sole Patih, a further step in his rise to being one of the most powerful
figures in the state until 1733. In September 1711 the Susuhunan informed
the VOC that he was abandoning the system of two Patihs. Kartanégara
was demoted to a still-senior, but clearly less significant, place in the
kraton administration. Babad ing Sangkala says that he fell from favour
because of an incident involving Png. Purbaya’s people, but the details are
obscure.”* A year later Cakrajaya again led an embassy to Batavia, arrang-
ing the annual deliveries of rice and cash before he left and promising the
VOC to sort out difficulties it was encountering in acquiring other prod-
ucts. The Susuhunan ordered him to negotiate a higher price for cotton but
Batavia refused, saying instead that paying the growers directly would cut
out parasitic officials and assure the peasants of sufficient profit. He was
also ordered to get an increase in the Sémarang tolls paid to the Susuhunan,
and in this succeeded.”? Matters were meanwhile looking up for the Java-
nese peasantry. The rice harvest of 1712 was particularly good. Rice prices
were extraordinarily low throughout Java, although there were significent
variations among regions, reflecting poor transport conditions which iso-
lated markets from one another.*® The next year, however, a drought pro-
duced a poor harvest.*!
If political and economic matters in the kingdom’s centre and on the
coast seemed fairly satisfactory both to the Company and to the Kartasura
court, in the south-eastern marches trouble was brewing. These lands,
where Europeans and Indonesians had suffered so much in the campaigns
of 1706-8, retained their notoriety for epidemic diseases severe enough to
disrupt agricultural production. Local people and VOC servants in the
Company’s post at Pasuruan suffered dreadfully from fevers, probably
malarial. The lands running eastward to Panarukan were populated by
mixed Javanese, Makasarese and Balinese populations, including remnants
of Surapati’s followers; these people had inadequate foodstuffs. When the
highlands around Malang were searched in 1709, they were reported to be
devoid of living humans, although many bodies were found.” Five politi-
cal forces sought the crumbs of this desolate table: two Balinese kings, the
lord of Blambangan, Surapati’s sons who dominated the coast between
Pasuruan and Panarukan and R. Tirtakusuma, a nephew of Ratu
Pakubuwana and lord of the land of Winongan.* In October 1709 a VOC
and Kartasuran force moved along the coast east of Pasuruan and occupied
both Démung (Bésuki) and Panarukan. Ninety people (over one-third
women and children) were captured and nearly 300 Balinese, Makasarese
and Chinese were killed. Valentyn (whose reliability in this is, as ever,
open to doubt) claimed that these deaths resulted from a massacre or-
dered by the VOC commander Capt. Willem Boreel after his enemies had
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 161

surrendered. These accusations were later denied. Whatever the case,

Surapati’s sons made good their escape.
From 1705 to 1711 a civil war between two of Gusti Panji Sakti’s sons
enervated the north Balinese state of Buleleng. This enabled the south
Balinese kingdom of Méngwi under its lord Gusti Agung Sakti or Gusti
Agung Anom (Gusti Panji Sakti’s son-in-law) to supplant Buleleng as
overlord of Blambangan. Gusti Agung Anom was reported to have led
personally an army of 10,000 men across to Java’s eastern corner to achieve
this 1711. Never again did Buleleng exercise authority in Blambangan,*
although as will be seen in Chapter 10 Buleleng was to join in the fighting
in East Java after 1717.
In 1713 the lord of Blambangan despatched emissaries with a retinue of
nearly sixty people towards Kartasura to offer his submission to Pakubuwana
I, undoubtedly in total violation of his obligations to his overlord in Méngwi.
The Susuhunan wanted nothing to do with the turbulent Blambangan folk
or their Balinese overlords. He ordered the emissaries to wait at Kédhiri
and asked the VOC at Sémarang what to do. Before orders could come
back, Pakubuwana I’s governor of Kédhiri, Ng. Katawéngan, suddenly
died. Although subsequent events are obscure, it appears that without
Katawéngan to protect them, the Blambangan ambassadors thought it best
to flee for home. So, according to some reports, did some descendants of
Surapati. They were all involved in a skirmish with 400 Kédhiri troops, of
whom they killed several, and continued their eastward flight only to be
captured by Tirtakusuma of Winongan. He took the Blambangan emissar-
ies to the VOC at Pasuruan, where they were treated like injured inno-
cents. The Company’s officers were then rebuked by their superiors for
dealing thus with enemies and the Susuhunan ordered the massacre of the
Blambangan embassy. The Company persuaded him, however, that this
was no way to treat ambassadors. They were escorted by the VOC back
to Blambangan’s borders.*° This left Méngwi in charge of Blambangan,
Blambangan without a friend in either Kartasura or the VOC, the sons of
Surapati under the protection of Tirtakusuma in Winongan, and Pakubuwana
I and the VOC wondering what would happen next.
In June 1713, the Company’s confidence that all was well at least at the
court and on the pasisir was shaken by accusations on the part of Cakraning-
rat III which it dared not believe. He had refused to go to Garébég Mulud
at the kraton for two years running (12 Mulud AJ 1636/19 April 1712 and
12 Mulud AJ 1637/9 April 1713) because, he said, he feared for his well-
being there. No doubt memories of the murder of Jangrana II still rever-
berated. According to Cakraningrat III, Ad. Jayaningrat of Pékalongan
and his brother Tg. Puspanégara of Batang, both officials of Chinese an-
cestry whom the VOC regarded as friends, were intriguing with the Patih
Cakrajaya to attack the Europeans in Java. They had supposedly promised
to write to the Qing emperor Kangxi (r. 1661-1722) for assistance. The
162 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

plotters reportedly had the idea that the VOC was refusing to turn over to
Pakubuwana I pusakas which it held, thereby betraying its alliance with
the Susuhunan. Once revenge had been taken upon the VOC, they were
supposed to have said to Cakrajaya, the contracts with Batavia could be
torn up and the Patih would no longer suffer the shame of seeing the
Javanese people treated like slaves by the Europeans. In these circum-
stances, Cakraningrat III begged to be made a vassal of the VOC.”’
Metsue refused to believe these accusations, but admitted with regard to
the pusakas that “among the Javanese notables, indeed on the part of the
Susuhunan himself, there has always been a suspicion that the Company
is hiding some of these ornaments or that it is not applying itself properly
to get hold of them.” He ascribed this tale of plots primarily to Cakraning-
rat III’s own machinations and to his hatred of Jayaningrat and his brother.**
Within six years, however, the VOC would come to believe that
Pakubuwana I, Cakrajaya and all the lords and officials of Java except for
the Crown prince (Amangkurat IV) and Kartanégara, had conspired to
expel the Europeans from Java, and that the apparent disaffection of
Surabaya and Madura was merely part of the conspiracy, designed to lure
VOC troops into a massacre.*”
In August 1713 a localised rebellion broke out in the heartland of
Surapati’s former empire. Its origins are rather obscure. It appears that
local conflict between R. Tirtakusuma of Winongan and Dm. Onggayuda,
the head of Gombong, led to the former being summoned to Kartasura by
Pakubuwana I. Tirtakusuma went to Pasuruan to meet the Susuhunan’s
heralds but refused to accept the royal letter they bore. Instead he attacked,
forcing the king’s people to take refuge in the VOC fortress. With three
of Surapati’s sons, some sixty Blambangan folk and a hundred Balinese,
Tirtakusuma set out to control the territories from Pasuruan to the west.
He was repelled from Wirasaba and soon faced over 9000 pasisir soldiers
commanded by Kartanégara and Cakraningrat III, over 800 of them armed
with snaphaenen, according to the VOC. Early in September this army
took Winongan but Tirtakusuma escaped with Surapati’s sons to Blam-
bangan (or, according to Babad Kraton, to Lumajang). He was never
heard of again. The Susuhunan ordered a pagér (palisade fortress) erected
at Carat to attempt to police this area. That deeper conflicts lay behind
these events was suggested by accusations that A. Jayapuspita and Ng. (or
Tg.) Jadita, the lord of Pasuruan, had been disloyal to the Susuhunan in
the campaign. Jadita was executed for this at Kartasura in April 1714.
Jayapuspita and Jangrana II now joined Cakraningrat III in refusing to go
to court for Garébég Mulud (12 Mulud AJ 1638/29 March 1714).*°
The rebellion in Winongan seems not to have captured much of the
Susuhunan’s attention. During these months two other closely related issues
appeared more pressing. The first was the probable duration of his own
life. Pakubuwana I was now in his sixties. He travelled to Mataram in
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 163

August-September 1713 partly in order to oversee the construction of his

own gravesite at the royal tombs of Imagiri. In December he was indeed
sufficiently ill that for a time the VOC feared his death.*! The second
matter was the intrigues among his sons. From 1712 to 1714 the Company’s
officers tried to ascertain what was going on among the princes, their
mothers and entourages, all of which remained largely obscured from
foreign eyes. The Susuhunan insisted, despite some rumours to the con-
trary, that Png. Ad. Mangkunégara remained his first choice as successor,
followed in order by Png. Ad. Purbaya and Png. Ad. Blitar.*? Relations
with the VOC meanwhile remained outwardly amicable. The Susuhunan
and his sons all took to wearing Dutch-style dress when visiting the
Company’s post in Kartasura. In 1714, thus attired, they joined the VOC
in celebrating news of the settlements which ended the War of the Spanish
Succession on the other side of the world.*? Just below the surface calm,
a second Javanese war of succession was meanwhile brewing.
The first major princely crisis of Pakubuwana I’s more tranquil years
came to a head in 1714. Neither Dutch nor Javanese sources give an
entirely satisfactory picture of the background to this affair. In the midst
of it, the VOC Gezaghebber on the pasisir, Cornelis Jongbloet, was moved
by frustration to observe that in Kartasura, “nothing is more permanent
than impermanence.”** Apparently the Crown prince’s mother Ratu
Pakubuwana identified Png. Ng. Saloringpasar (or Loringpasar), who under
his previous name Suryakusuma had initiated the rebellions at the end of
Amangkurat II’s life, as a threat to the succession of her son. The VOC’s
and the Susuhunan’s fears of Balinese meddling in Java’s affairs were also
involved, for the discovery (or allegation) that Saloringpasar was harbour-
ing Balinese provided an excuse for his being placed under arrest in his
residence in Kartasura in October 1714. He was also accused of being in
contact with the recalcitrant lords of Surabaya.
In December 1714, Saloringpasar fled from Kartasura to Sémarang,
where he requested the Company’s protection. It can hardly have escaped
Pakubuwana I’s uncomfortable notice that his son’s position was now
similar to his own in 1704. The king repeatedly requested that the prince
be turned over for execution in Kartasura, which the VOC in Sémarang
refused to do pending orders from Batavia. Jongbloet went to Kartasura
for Garébég Mulud in March 1715—a particularly grand occasion that
year, being Garébég Mulud Dal.*° The fugitive prince was no doubt a
major topic of discussion there. Shortly afterwards the Susuhunan requested
that, rather than being turned over for killing, Saloringpasar be exiled to
the Cape of Good Hope. He specifically asked that he not be sent to Sri
Lanka, no doubt because Amangkurat III and, so everyone assumed, the
missing pusakas were there. In September 1715 a sorrowful Saloringpasar
sailed off into exile in southern Africa.*’ It is not clear why the VOC
preferred his exile to his execution, for the Company usually cavilled
164 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

neither at execution nor at murder. Perhaps it felt, as Pakubuwana I doubtless

suspected, that it could gain some leverage over the kraton by being known
as a safe refuge for recusant princes. Whatever the cause, this cannot have
assuaged the Susuhunan’s doubts about an ally which had perhaps pre-
vented him from having the royal pusakas and now certainly prevented
him from executing a rebellious son.
There were further signs that Pakubuwana I’s health and sense of secur-
ity were shaky. In February 1715 he suffered some sort of attack, perhaps
coronary, but recovered.** In March he made another public declaration
that Png. Ad. Mangkunégara was to be his successor; all officials and
princes were required to swear loyalty to him publicly.” Later reports
claimed (perhaps erroneously), however, that shortly thereafter the
Susuhunan agreed secretly to a partition of his realm among his sons the
Crown prince, Png. Blitar and Png. Purbaya and his brother Png. A. Ma-
taram.~° Ritual steps of unclear significance followed. In September 1715,
in the midst of the fasting month (Ramélan), the king had his head cer-
emoniously shaved in front of the court while the great cannon Gunturgéni
was fired three times. All the men of the kingdom were ordered to shave
likewise but princes might choose whether to do so. The VOC reported the
everyone shaved except the Crown prince, who feared that this might
exacerbate his headaches and eye complaints. Such ritual head-shaving
was known throughout the Indonesian archipelago and seems generally to
have been of Islamic significance, but it is difficult to say more than this.
Pakubuwana I shaved his head a second time in February 1716 and again
the men of his realm did likewise. Babad ing Sangkala confirms the ritual
significance of the first head-shaving by dating it precisely and in full
detail. Both this text and Babad Kraton associate it with the Susuhunan’s
adoption three months before of the wearing of a sash and fez, perhaps
also for some Islamic reason.*! According to Babad ing Sangkala, the
fenced waringin (ficus Indica) trees before the court, objects of consider-
able ritual importance, were replaced in the same month as the second
head-shaving.*” There is thus little doubt that these were major ritual steps,
but their precise significance is no longer retrievable.
Then followed an awesome omen: while Pakubuwana I was on one of
his regular tours of Mataram, on 20 July 1716, Mt. Kélut (southeast of
Kédhiri) erupted mightily and caused white ash-rain at the court and along
the pasisir. The VOC officers at S€marang reported that it looked like a
European snowfall and that no one could venture out for fear of ash in the
eyes. Babad ing Sangkala dates the ash-rain with the apposite and enig-
matic chronogram “without appearance were the movements of men”
(meaning AJ 1640/ Dec. 1715—Dec. 1716) and begins its next stanza with
the words, “The destruction of Java then began”.*?
These years of relative peace, about to come to an end, were probably
the most propitious for the Dutch East India Company’s trade since the
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 165

intervention of 1677, yet the VOC still made no profit out of its pasisir
involvement. Its coastal accounts for 1711-17 show that it never covered
more than fifteen percent of its costs except when, with that eccentricity
found throughout the Company’s financial records, the Susuhunan’s debt
repayments were treated as income. Even in such years the VOC’s pasisir
“income” did not exceed sixty percent of expenditure. There was difficulty
in getting various products, especially cotton and pepper. The VOC’s
attempt to encourage coffee production in Kartasura was a complete fail-
ure, although by 1717 Jayaningrat of Pékalongan (being more commer-
cially inclined than his Javanese peers, perhaps partly because of his Chinese
background) was beginning to produce reasonable volumes of coffee beans.
There were also problems surrounding timber. Deforestation along the
coast was so severe by 1717 that the Susuhunan agreed to allow felling of
heavy timber farther inland in Kartasura districts.>
Getting the annual 800 koyans of rice delivered to Sémarang was a
matter of dispute with Javanese lords. In fact the 1705 treaty called for it
to be delivered at Batavia, but this the VOC never insisted upon. In 1716,
bupatis who found it difficult to deliver their rice were told that they could
instead send cash at the standard rate of Sp. RI. 20/koyan. Rice prices were
in fact below this and the Javanese could spot a bad bargain: from 1711/
12 to 1717/18 annual rice deliveries averaged nearly 800 koyans and
shortfalls in particular years were not met by additional cash payments.*°
It was indeed probably more difficult for the Javanese to collect cash than
rice. Javanese lords’ complaints notwithstanding, it is hard to know whether
the treaty obligations represented a significant burden upon the Javanese
economy. In the eastern outer districts (moncanégara), however, this may
have been true. In 1716 Png. Blitar handed back his territories of Saréngat
and Blitar to the king partly on the grounds that they could not meet their
cash and rice obligations. He was replaced by the Tuménggung of Jaga-
raga, who was himself removed shortly thereafter as chief lord (bupati-
wédana) of the moncanégara for failing to meet these same obligations
and replaced by the Démang of Kédhiri, a brother of the Patih Tg. Cakra-
jaya.”’ It is possible, of course, that these changes had as much to do with
the Patih’s machinations as with economic stresses.
Whatever the degree of burden imposed upon Javanese society by the
VOC treaties, it was primarily domestic politics and the stresses imposed
in this area by the VOC presence with brought Pakubuwana I’s quieter
years to an end. By 1714 Ad. Cakraningrat III of West Madura, along with
A. Jayapuspita and Ng. Jangrana III of Surabaya, stood in clear, but still
non-violent, opposition to Kartasura. All three approached the VOC to be
made independent protégés of the Company and were refused. Cakraning-
rat III claimed that the Patih Cakrajaya, in alliance with Ad. Jayaningrat
of Pékalongan and Tg. Puspanégara of Grésik, was scheming to promote
Cakraningrat III’s nephews Tgs. Sasrawinata and Suryawinata at his
166 WAR. CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

expense. The Europeans pressured the Susuhunan to remove these

nephews from Madura, which he did in 1716 when they were placed in
charge of Grobogan. Yet Cakraningrat III still would not come to court for
the Garébégs, despite promising to do so. The Surabaya brothers simply
feared that they would be murdered at the kraton as Jangrana II had been
murdered at Cnoll’s behest in 1709. Nothing said or done by the Company
or Pakubuwana I could bring them to travel to Kartasura.*
Cakraningrat III was now in his early fifties and, according to the Dutch,
“lazy, effeminate and of variable humour with haughty conceits”. He
reportedly gave himself over to idleness and opium, spending much of his
days asleep, while West Madura was administered by his eldest son R. Tg.
Sasranégara. Cakraningrat III absolutely refused to go to Kartasura, partly
because he accused Cakrajaya of plotting against his life and placing
unprecedented burdens upon Madura (presumably to meet treaty obli-
gations to the VOC), partly because an old hermit living in a cave on Mt.
Sumeru (south of Pasuruan) prophesied his imprisonment if he went there.”
Ky. A. Jayapaspita of Surabaya was in his mid-forties and, according to
the VOC, rather on the “refined and religious side”. His brother Ng. Jangrana
III was reportedly forty-two and “more resolute and upright”. Their fiery
younger brother Ky. Panji Surengrana, the lord of Lamongan, was about
thirty and “freer of humour”. The Surabayans’ ancestry being at least
partly Balinese or Blambangan (the distinction being moot) may have fa-
cilitated their contact with Balinese warriors, who were always ready to
pillage East Java. These were the men who were about to lead Madura
and East Java yet again into rebellion.
The VOC sent its Sémarang administrator to Surabaya and Madura in
February 1717 to attempt to stave off the inevitable uprising. The Suraba-
yans told him that they would not go to Kartasura: they would rather die
with weapons in their hands than be murdered at court.*! Reports that they
were in league with Buleleng for a joint attack on Kédhiri may have
seemed improbable at the time, given the reported war in Bali of Buleleng
and Méngwi against Sukawati,® but it was later discovered that there were
indeed Surabayan links with Buleleng and other Balinese lords. Pakubuwana
I began to collect an army said to total 20,000 at Kédhiri with the apparent
intention of chastising the Surabayans and Cakraningrat III. The VOC
took defensive measures in Surabaya, ordered its officers there to sleep
inside the fortress and asked for reinforcements from the Netherlands
and India as fast as possible.”
On 6-8 August 1717, Panji Surengrana sent out 2,000 men to attack
Grésik. There are suggestions of Islamic inspiration in this move.
Surengrana’s commander at least was dressed “in a white garment upon
which various characters were written” (probably Arabic phrases acting as
amulets, jimat) and the spiritual lord Png. Giri was believed to have urged
Surengrana on against Puspanégara of Grésik. The VOC’s Surabaya officers,
QUIETER YEARS OF PAKUBUWANA I 167

however, successfully persuaded him to recall his soldiers. To try to buy

time, Batavia decided to send a senior officer as commissioner to Karta-
sura and thence to Surabaya and Madura. After every member of the
Council of the Indies had refused this assignment, the task fell to Joan
Frederik Gobius, a former Resident of Cirébon and a man whose career
was studded with important assignments carried out badly. He was simul-
taneously named commander and Gezaghebber on the pasisir. When he
got to Kartasura he found the court split by intrigue and suspicion. And
there was little time to be bought, for before Gobius could get to Surabaya,
the first hostilities began there.
As war again erupted, it could be seen that the relatively stable years of
Pakubuwana I had brought few benefits to anyone. The VOC had not
found profit. Cakraningrat III and the lords of Surabaya had not found
greater wealth or power. Indeed, Jangrana II had found only an early
grave. The Susuhunan and his supporters could see what stability they had
achieved falling apart both in the east of the empire and in the centre, as
princes and dignitaries manoeuvred for advantage in the face of the war
that was now even more imminent than the death of the ageing king.
Having gained so little from peace, some parties were ready to seek more
from war. Meanwhile, unrecorded and virtually unregarded, Javanese
villagers had been ordered to repay the Dutch East India Company and
their own dignitaries for the previous wars fought in their midst; now they
would be expected to fight again and pay more.
10
Religion and War in
the East and the
Outbreak of the
Second Javanese
War of Succession,
1717-19

The Surabaya War (1717-23) and the Second Javanese War of Suc-
cession (1719-23), which coalesced in their later years to give Java two
wars for the price of one, had roots in structural problems of the Javanese
state. One of these problems was economic and geographic in character.
The Mataram dynasty could exercise no greater control or influence over
outlying regions than communications permitted.' In much of the moun-
tainous and sparsely populated moncanégara lands east of Kartasura and
south of the Sala river, communications were very poor. The Sala river
facilitated much better links with Surabaya and West Madura for much of
the year, but even there the kraton could exercise little direct control
unless it were prepared to send out military expeditions. Surabaya and
West Madura were rich territories’ which in economic terms gained little
from—indeed paid much for—the overlordship of Kartasura. This was
probably true of the moncanégara lands as well.’ When such geographic
and economic considerations were reinforced by longstanding traditions of
local autonomy and cultural diversity, the potential for regionally based
rebellion was considerable. It will be seen below that all of these terri-
tories were involved in the uprisings covered in this chapter. The second
structural problem had to do with dynastic and harem politics of a kind
found in monarchies of the ancien regime around the world. Princely
competition for power, wealth and the throne itself made instability in-
herent. Both of these structural problems were exacerbated in Java in the
second decade of the eighteenth century because the throne was occupied
by an aged usurper of dubious sagacity or legitimacy, who ordered his
lords and their peasants to produce crops and money to pay the VOC for
assisting his usurpation, whose reign had brought little benefit to crucial
political forces and whose court some of his most important lords would
not visit for fear of being murdered. These exacerbating circumstances

168
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 169

were largely a consequence of the intervention of the Dutch East India

Company. That intervention also encouraged greater opposition by Java-
nese to foreign intrusion, opposition which could locate its identity and
justify its appeals in the Islamic faith.
The Company now intervened again, initially in the hope of postponing
military action for which it was not prepared.’ In the night of 22-3 August
1717 Panji Surengrana again attacked Grésik with 3000 men, most of
them armed with pikes and krisses but a few with snaphaenen. Puspa-
négara’s 700 defenders and his light bronze cannon (bassen) held off a
three-hour attack, after which the Lamongan forces sat down to a siege.
VOC officers saw preparations for war throughout Surabaya and slowly
came to the conclusion that A. Jayapuspita, Ng. Jangrana III and Png.
Cakraningrat III all stood behind Panji Surengrana. Early in September
skirmishes took place when several hundred Kartasura and pasisir forces
arrived in the area upon the Susuhunan’s orders; the two senior princes
of Surabaya told the VOC that they would help Panji Surengrana to
resist them. Meanwhile there were renewed reports of Surabayan links
with Balinese princes and Cakraningrat III again sought the Company’s
protection.°
On 1 October, Pakubuwana I gave Gobius letters of pardon for the three
Surabayan lords and Cakraningrat III if they would come to Kartasura.
Armed with these documents, Gobius and his wife travelled to Surabaya.
There Cakraningrat II, Jayapuspita, Jangrana III and Panji Surengrana all
received them graciously and promised to go to court. A toast was drunk
in wine to seal these empty promises: European ritual for Javanese dis-
simulation. Gobius even got Panji Surengrana and Puspanégara to engage
in another European and equally empty ritual of reconciliation by shaking
hands.°
This peace-making was all nonsense: no one went to Kartasura and war
soon erupted. There were reportedly already 2-300 disguised Balinese
among the Surabaya forces. Within a week of Gobius’s departure on 4
November, up to 1200 Balinese under Dewa Kaloran of Badung (south
Bali) landed at Surabaya. On 16 November, several hundred of these and
1000 of Surengrana’s own men took and plundered Grésik, putting
Puspanégara to flight. Three days later they burned Sidayu to the ground.’
Cakrajaya now ordered a general mobilisation on the pasisir, of which the
Europeans hoped much but expected little. In November some 5000 rebels
moved westward along the coast to besiege and then take Tuban. Mean-
while Panji Surengrana and Dewa Kaloran led 3000 men up the Sala river
to take Jipang, where 4000 defenders took to their heels. Japan on the
Brantas river submitted without a battle. Further upstream Wirasaba and
Kédhiri fell. In the latter, 10,000 were reportedly put to flight by a smaller
attacking force.* In other words, this was less a matter of rebels winning
major battle victories on the pasisir and along the two main rivers of East
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Java than of the collapse of the Susuhunan’s administrative and military

arrangements at the first serious challenge. By the beginning of 1718
rumors spread in Kartasura that the rebels were already at Madiun and
preparing to march on the capital.’
By late November 1717 it had become clear that Cakraningrat III was
allied with the Surabayans and had designs on East Madura. An attack by
him on Pamékasan was apparently repulsed. He appears to have contacted
Ki Gusti Panji Danudrésta of Buleleng (north Bali), who was no doubt
anxious for compensation for his loss of Blambangan to Gusti Agung
Sakti of Méngwi in 1711. They apparently planned an attack upon Sumé-
nép, while Gusti Agung Sakti sent reinforcements to Blambangan to pre-
vent Buleleng landing there. Cakraningrat III’s younger brother R. Tg.
Suradiningrat decided that his future looked brighter elsewhere and turned
to the VOC at Surabaya to profess his loyalty to the Susuhunan and the
Company, and to offer to assassinate his brother. Kartasura placed a price
on the main rebels: Rds. 1000 for the capture alive of Png. Cakraningrat
III or A. Jayaspuspita or Rds. 500 for their heads, half those rates for Ng.
Jangrana III and Panji Surengrana.'®
Military operations against the rebels were imperative, but that made
them no easier to achieve. By December 1717 a joint VOC-Kartasura
campaign was being planned. The Company named Gobius as its com-
mander but the Susuhunan’s choice of commanders created acrimony. All
of the princes wanted to command, possibly because each had ambitious
ideas of what could be achieved at the head of a great army. The VOC
wanted no princes in charge at all or, if it must have them, tried to ascer-
tain which could be trusted—a futile exercise since it seemed that none
could be. It must have been difficult for Pakubuwana I to figure out where
he stood with the Company. He apparently feared that the VOC might
refuse to join forces unless he agreed to send no princes, but the VOC’s
Resident at Kartasura, the Merchant (Coopman) Christoffel Walling,
reassured him. Then Walling had to tell the Susuhunan of Gobius’s order
that, indeed, the VOC would not march without a satisfactory agreement
on the matter.'!
Finally, in January 1718, the VOC and Kartasura armies marched. From
Sémarang Gobius set out eastwards along the pasisir on 6 January in
command of a VOC force totalling 650 Europeans and 700 Indonesian
soldiers. With him went Tg. Cakrajaya, who had come to S€marang to pay
what he could of the annual rice and cash dues, and Ad. Jayaningrat.
These two along with Tg. Citrasoma were to command 6000 of the king’s
pasisir soldiers. On 20 January 6000 Javanese pikemen and 500 fusiliers
(presumably armed with snaphaenen) headed downstream along the Sala
river from Kartasura under the command of Tg. Kartanégara and R. Sinduréja.
No princes went with them; the Susuhunan made it clear that this was
solely because of the VOC’s objections. These forces from Kartasura were
172 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

to join contingents already sent to Kédhiri and were followed two days
later by VOC companies from the court.’
Before fighting began, in mid-January 1718 a fateful and extraordinary
episode occurred aboard a VOC ship off the east Javanese coast. Cakraning-
rat III’s younger brother Suradinigrat and his ally the lord of Pamékasan
attacked Cakraningrat III in his capital at Tanjung and put him to flight.
The VOC counted the latter among its enemies but Babad Kraton suggests
that this was to some extent a conclusion from false evidence given by his
brother. Cakraningrat III still professed loyalty to the Company and Gobius
sent word that, in that case, he should come aboard one of the VOC ships.
On 16 January, two of his wives, his daughter R. Adikara (the wife of the
lord of Pamékasan, over which lady much of the dispute arose, says Babad
Kraton)'? and others came aboard, followed shortly thereafter by Cakraning-
rat III himself and his son Sasranégara. The VOC records say that they
were followed in turn by Suradiningrat, who was ignorant of his elder
brother’s presence; when Sasranégara spotted Suradiningrat he was so
alarmed that he ran amuck and was cut down on the deck. His father was
in the cabin, came out upon hearing the commotion and stabbed the guard
at the door with his kris. The VOC captain now appeared, sword in hand,
but was stabbed twice by Cakraningrat II before killing the Madurese
lord, and died himself later that night. Babad Kraton’s version of the fight
is more romantic but no less bloody. Both the Javanese and Dutch ac-
counts say that the heads of the dead lords of Madura were severed for
presentation to the Susuhunan and the bodies dumped into the sea.'4
Suradiningrat now succeeded his dead brother over West Madura and
his titles rose in their eminence. In 1720 the Susuhunan retitled him Png.
Ad. Cakraningrat IV (r. 1718—46).'° He was to become one of the most
powerful men of the Kartasura era. By 1719 there was already evidence,
however, that the House of Mataram had again failed to find a vassal lord
of West Madura whose loyalty was unequivocal. In that year Cakraningrat
IV wrote to the VOC asking both to purchase snaphaenen and to be taken
under the VOC’s wing like East Madura, rather than continuing under the
authority of Kartasura.'®
With Cakraningrat III out of the way, the Company and Kartasura forces
set out on what was to be one of their most disastrous campaigns yet, in
the face of enemies whose command of strategy, tactics and technology
was the equal of anything they could offer. On 19 January 1718, Gobius
landed at and took Grésik and thence marched to Surabaya. The Sura-
bayan rebels now summoned the bulk of their forces to defend the city,
weakening their hold on some coastal and interior areas and facilitating
the Kartasura victories there which are described below. The Surabaya
alun-alun was heavily fortified, defended by artillery and perhaps 10,000
well-armed men. On 25 January, Gobius and Cakrajaya repeated Speelman’s
tactic of May 1677 by taking Ampel on.the rebels’ right flank, which was
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 173

only lightly defended. This was the end of their victories. The VOC’s
troops totalled something over 1800 men, no match for the much larger
Surabayan forces, so the only possible tactic was careful forward move-
ment of siege works. Suménép and Pamékasan reinforcements were de-
layed by threat of invasion from Buleleng but 1700 finally arrived in early
February, by which time the opposing works were a mere 200 paces apart.
The Surabayan side had, it was believed, over 12,000 men by then, whereas
Gobius and Cakrajaya commanded less than 4000.!’
On 9 February, Gobius ordered a foolhardy general attack which was
vehemently resisted. The VOC’s veterans of the First Javanese War of
Succession reportedly “had never encountered such long and hard resist-
ance or seen such heavy fire from the enemy’s side”: this, at least, was
what Gobius wrote in explaining to Batavia why he ordered a retreat.
Certainly to have attacked such a large number of well-armed and fortified
defenders with a much smaller force was folly. Both sides suffered losses.
On the Surabaya side, Dewa Kaloran was wounded and died three weeks
later, as a result of which some 500 Balinese followers sailed away, either
to go home or to raid elsewhere, in either case for 118 of them to become
the victims of a VOC massacre at sea.'* Gobius ordered more siege works
constructed until hand grenades could be tossed into the enemy works.
These works were formidable, “with heavy barriers and palisades filled
with earth, and heavy palm-trunks as decking and for the security of their
recesses against our bombs and hand grenades, the effects of which they
learned to know in previous campaigns”, fortifications “which will not be
susceptible to demolition without heavy cannon.”
By March 1718 the Company’s siege of Surabaya was running out of
momentum. The Surabayan defenders could even spare 4,000 men (many
armed with snaphaenen) and light artillery to attempt to retake Grésik,
albeit without success, for there artillery fire from a VOC ship helped to
repel them. Six hundred Balinese allies of Surabaya landed at Pasuruan
and thereby secured the rebel rear. Enemy numbers seemed to the Euro-
peans to be constantly growing.*? The VOC presumably continued to believe
that God was on its side, but Lady Luck’s predilection was debatable:
while Gobius was inspecting a slippery bridge in April his horse fell and
his leg was broken. *! The commander was bedridden for weeks, but given
his lacklustre command skills this was perhaps not an unequivocal misfor-
tune.
The Surabaya rebels now appealed to Javanese on the other side in the
name of Islam to come over to them. A. Jayapuspita took the title Adipati
Panatagama (“regulator of religion”). With Jangrana III and Panji Sureng-
rana, he wrote to the Susuhunan’s pasisir forces, of whom barely over
3,000 at last reached Surabaya in March, after retaking Tuban and Sidayu
for the king.”? The rebels’ letters asked Jayaningrat in particular whether
he was not nauseated to be in league with infidels. Others were admon-
174 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

ished to be mindful of God and His Prophet.*? Babad Kraton also empha-
sises the role of Islamic leaders on the Surabaya side. It tells of the support
of the religious folk (para kaum) all dressed in white, the scholars (para
ulama) and the Pangulus and calls this a war of the students of religion
(prang santri).2* Similar Islamic appeals had been employed in the First
Javanese War of Succession,?> but now they were both more prominent
and more curious, given the Surabayans’ alliance with Balinese who, as
Hindus, were properly kafirs (infidels) in Islamic terms whereas the Christian
Europeans were at least among the “People of the Book”, recipients of
God’s revelations.”° This seems to evince a sense of identity which was
ostensibly Islamic but not strictly so, one which could justify opposition
to Europeans but not require it to Balinese.
Such appeals may reflect progress towards a sense of Javanese ethnicity
defined in opposition to Europeanness, labelled Islamic because this was
a categorisation with divine authority and Javanese experience behind it,
but which recognised consanguinity in other Indonesians even if they were
not Muslims.’ It also admitted Muslims who were not (or not fully)
Indonesian in descent, for one of these appeals was directed to the Sino-
Javanese lord Jayaningrat. In the face of the VOC’s interventions in Java,
in other words, provincialism may have been giving way to larger catego-
ries of identity.
If Babad Kraton is to be believed, however, these views were not
universally endorsed on the Surabaya side. It is said that Jayapuspita differed
from his brothers in worrying about having the support of Balinese kafirs,
and that at least some of his soldiers were opposed on the grounds that this
would mean they would not be fighting an Islamic Holy War (prang
sabil). One religious official (kétib) is said to have drawn a distinction
between Balinese kafirs who were helping and Dutch kafirs who were evil.
Eventually the text says that God turned against the Surabayans because
they employed Balinese soldiers,” but it does not say specifically that this
was because the Balinese were infidels. Indeed, to have done so might
have raised thorny questions within this kraton text as to why God should
have favoured the Kartasura side, with its own infidel European allies. It
is of course difficult to assess from the surviving evidence the real force
of Islamic sensibilities in generating support for the Surabayan cause. Cer-
tainly substantial numbers of Javanese were rallying to it. But it must not
be forgotten that the rebellion was still largely regional in character, with
Surabaya and the eastern interior districts (moncanégara) standing against
Kartasura and its coastal and Company supporters.
The overland column from Kartasura meanwhile had success at the
outset but then found itself in very serious trouble. It enjoyed a victorious
sweep through the interior, retaking Kédhiri, Saréngrat, Kalangbret and
Rawa in the upper Brantas valley in March. There was some but not much
resistance, probably because the opposing side was withdrawing to resist
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 175

Gobius at Surabaya. Down the Brantas the VOC and Kartasurans marched,
repelling an enemy attack on | May 1718 and reaching Wirasaba by 12
May. On 29 May they won a major victory (at the cost of ninety-five dead)
at Térusan, where the Brantas divides into the Kali Mas and Kali Porong.
Following the Kali Mas downstream towards Surabaya, however, they
soon found themselves blocked by enemy forces.’
Instead of a pincer closing on the Surabayan rebels, the latter had the
benefit of interior lines of communication in resisting both prongs of attack
by forces much smaller than themselves, and no better armed or com-
manded. The Surabayans at Sépanjang attacked the VOC and Kartasurans
across the river at Warugunung with 5—6000 men in late June. The king’s
Javanese were put to flight and the VOC commander Capt. Simon Ceesjong
regarded his mens’ survival as a divine miracle. With the river crossing at
Sépanjang blocked by 1200 Balinese, Ceesjong begged for reinforcements
and supplies from the VOC at Surabaya. Desertion and illness were rife,
medicines were exhausted and Ceesjong was down to his last two casks
of gunpowder when 120 VOC Balinese got through to him in July. On
19 July Tg. Surawijaya joined him, having successfully retaken Jipang in
mid-March. Three weeks later Jangrana II and Panji Surengrana person-
ally commanded an attack upon this force. Surawijaya himself was killed
and all conceivable supply or escape routes were apparently cut off: the
VOC feared they would now die of starvation.*°
The encirclement of Ceesjong and his forces was virtually total: he
could get messengers out to Gobius in Surabaya but no replies could get
back in. By mid-August there remained only a week’s supply of rice, the
Javanese soldiers were eating their horses and the number of dead, starv-
ing and sick was mounting. Only 66 Europeans and 250 Indonesians
remained in the VOC force. The Javanese were deserting and the VOC
near to mutiny. There was no question of getting to Surabaya so Ceesjong
decided to head north to Grésik. He had no porters to haul the king’s five
heavy cannon so he buried them and attempted a desperate escape in the
night of 18 August. He was led by his Javanese guides into a muddy field
where his men bogged down and enemy Balinese attacked. His own
Balinese repulsed them. The VOC and Kartasuran remnants marched on
under enemy fire. They left behind sick men, most of their artillery,
snaphaenen, side-arms and all other baggage. Exhausted and devoid of
provisions, they reached Branjangan (near Tambaklangon), about halfway
to Grésik, the following afternoon. All that remained of Tg. Kartanégara’s
army was forty men fit enough to wield a pike. They evaded another
attempt to cut them off and got through to Grésik.*! The great Kartasura
campaign through the interior had become an utter debacle, the army
scattered and much of it gone over to the rebel side. Pakubuwana I’s
commanders returned to Kartasura, leaving his only forces in the area the
176 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

3000 men under Cakrajaya who were with Gobius, among whom 500
carried snaphaenen.»
Batavia had little tolerance left for Gobius’s lack of success. From June
1718 it sent three things necessary for victory at Surabaya: heavy guns to
destroy the enemy’s works, more men to overpower them and a better
commander. The last was-Maj. Hans Frederick Bergman, who had led
Company forces successfully in India and would arrive in Surabaya in
July with orders for him and Gobius to share command.** Before he could
arrive, however, another disastrous attack on the Surabaya fortifications
was ordered, ostensibly because enemy numbers were growing, food
supplies were dwindling, Ceesjong’s force was believed still to be advanc-
ing and Cakrajaya was anxious to attack**—but doubtless also because
Gobius hoped to claim victory before Bergman could get there.
At dawn on 11 June, after an artillery barrage, some 1000 of the
Susuhunan’s forces and several VOC companies stormed through a breach
in the rebel revetment made by cannon. The Surabayans fell back. Once
the assault force was well inside the works the Surabayans counter-at-
tacked on its flank. Pakubuwana I’s soldiers panicked and blocked the
breach in their flight, leaving the Company’s forces, unable to retreat or
to be relieved, in the midst of the Surabayan works. Capts. Andreas
Roseboom and Stephan van der Lelij were cut down, as was Capt. Béban-
dém of the VOC’s Balinese. Seventy-three VOC soldiers were killed and
seventy-seven wounded. Nine of the Susuhunan’s officers (mantris) and
230 commoners died. The Surabayans obligingly threw the bodies into the
river, whence they were retrieved as they floated past the Company’s
position. Another VOC force and 1000 Javanese attacked enemy works on
the east side of the river equally fruitlessly; Tg. Wiranégara of Tégal died
there. Batavia blamed Gobius for this fiasco but he and the survivors
blamed the dead captains’ excess of enthusiasm and the cowardice of the
Javanese.”
Once again the VOC resorted to the tedious but surer methods of siege
warfare, as did their opponents. Heavy guns were put to work blasting a
breach in the opposing works. By the time Bergman arrived with re-
inforcements on 6 July, the fortifications were only twenty-five paces apart
and brisk exchanges of grenade-mortar fire were under way. Coehoorn
mortars would have been employed for this purpose, this relatively new
weapon having been observed by the Surabayans when it was first used by
the VOC in the campaign of 1706. It was only just being adopted in the
armies of Europe and the VOC were apparently surprised to find it had
already been copied by the Surabayans. They were surprised also by the
volume of other munitions in the rebels’ hands, which the Europeans
believed to be purchased from Chinese suppliers.*° And they continued to
be impressed by the enemy’s fortifications, “for they carry on untiringly
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION Wa

with their works against us, the like of which in practice and sufficiency
all those who took part in the wars in Europe declare never to have seen’’.3”
The VOC works now encroached upon the Surabayans’ as, in the for-
tress warfare style of that age, advancing fortifications effectively crawled
over and consumed the opponents’ works. By late July, the VOC had
engulfed 20 roeden (75—80m/247-265 ft) in length of the enemy works.**
Sickness and enemy fire took a constant toll on both sides, but undoubt-
edly the Surabayans had the better of the numbers game, with the constant
influx of Balinese fighters in particular. In early August the VOC at
Surabaya had under 2000 men, of whom only 1557 were fit to fight; by
mid-August those numbers had climbed to 2226 and 1959 respectively.
Throughout the months of the siege, the European officers in command
constantly implored Batavia to send more reinforcements and to get
Pakubuwana I to assemble a new army.*” Another attack was planned for
18 August as an attempt to break through to Ceesjong at Sépanjang but
was cancelled when news of Ceesjong’s desperate escape was received.*®
More reinforcements arrived shortly thereafter. Since late 1717, Batavia
had sent nearly 5000 soldiers to Surabaya, of whom about 2100 survived
and were fit to fight in September 1718. By mid-October the VOC had
2500 men (1000 of them Europeans) there, but many of them were poorly
trained.*!
More Balinese were meanwhile reinforcing the Surabayan rebels and
their works moved forward again, with an estimated 10—12,000 soldiers to
man them. On 7 September the tide turned, however, when through further
encroachment and sapping the VOC occupied a great part of the Suraba-
yans’ forward works. The Company erected a battery there with six or
eight heavy guns and proceeded to pound away at the opposition. The
Surabayans now damned the river upstream and thereby obliged their
opponents to attack or die where they sat. On 12 September, six VOC
companies (perhaps 300 men) and 1000 Javanese stormed and took Ampel,
which had fallen again to the rebel side. On 20 September more enemy
works were overpowered.”
Finally on 21 October 1718, the VOC carried out a victorious assault on
the Surabayans’ fortifications. Dutch sources report that many of the de-
fenders were then upstream of their main works, at a place called Képutren.
Babad Kraton explains that this was because Jayapuspita had sent his
brothers Panji Surengrana and Panji Kartayuda there to meet Gusti Panji
Danudrésta (or Gusti Murah Panji) and his fighters from Buleleng. In a
battle in which Jangrana III himself was killed, 2000 Company soldiers
and some 1600 Javanese under Cakrajaya put the Surabayans and the
Balinese to flight, capturing the Surabaya fortress and a hundred pieces
of artillery. The losers reassembled at Képutren, however, and when the
VOC pursued them there the following day the rebels counterattacked and
compelled the VOC to retreat with thirty-two dead and twenty-four
178 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

wounded. The Company commanders noted how Europeans were picked

out for attack and Indonesians ignored.” As will be seen below, the war
was far from being over, but the fall of Surabaya was clearly a very major
defeat for the anti-Kartasura and anti-VOC side. Bergman returned to
Batavia on the grounds of advanced age and infirmity and Gobius went to
Sémarang where he hoped that his broken leg might at last heal properly.
As the wet monsoon closed in, both could feel that the Surabaya campaign
had ended more favourably than anyone would have dared to hope earlier
in the year.*°
During these months a sideshow had taken place on Madura. From
about March 1718, some 2000 Balinese invaded the island and devastated
much of it. Cakraningrat IV’s younger brother R. Tg. Cakranagara joined
the Balinese and thereby attracted local support. A small VOC force was
sent from Surabaya to deal with this in May but it was soon surrounded
and nearly starved, and escaped only through a disorderly night-time evacu-
ation by sea on 2 July. A larger force of VOC and Madurese returned in
August. After a hard-fought campaign against a well-armed enemy,
Pamékasan, Sampang and finally in early September the enemy’s head-
quarters at Tanjung were taken (in the last, at the cost to the VOC of its
commander and twenty-two other Europeans dead and to the Balinese of
all their heavy cannon lost). Then the rains hit and all campaigning ended.
Cakranagara and most of the Balinese fled to Pasuruan. In December,
some 150 Balinese made the mistake of surrendering to the VOC, which
arranged a massacre of them.*® Madura remained free of rebel or Balinese
forces thereafter.
Outside of Surabaya and Madura, there was much to cause concern
among those who sought profit for the Company and victory for
Pakubuwana I and his heirs. The Susuhunan was now doddering, forgetful
and changeable as he approached his seventies. In June 1718 he was so
seriously ill that his death seemed certain, yet he recovered. His son the
Crown prince, described by the VOC as attractively meek and pliable but
too languid and lumbering of intellect to be effective, occupied a doubtful
standing in his father’s estimation. The king’s principal wife, Ratu
Pakubuwana, who was the Crown prince’s mother, seems to have lent her
favour and influence increasingly to her son Png. Purbaya, whom the VOC
deeply distrusted: the VOC thought her vengeful and ambitious, and him
too cunning, intelligent, shrewd, proud and too devout a Muslim to be
trusted.*’ The VOC resident at the kraton, Christoffel Walling, stumbled
about in these intrigues disastrously. While Pakubuwana I was still ill
in June, Walling managed to get him to remove from Png. Purbaya
his enormous appanage of 15—20,000 households.** Walling—himself
seriously ill much of the time—probably penetrated little of what was
afoot at court. Having a scribe whose vision was so weak that he could not
write and a translator who understood little Javanese cannot have aided
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 179

him in his work.*? By August, Pakubuwana I was so angry with Walling

(perhaps under the influence of Purbaya and Ratu Pakubuwana) that he
demanded his replacement, to which the Company immediately agreed.
The new Resident, Josua van Arrewijne, got to Kartasura on 19 September
in the company of Lt. Simon Ceesjong and Tg. Kartanégara, just returned
from Surabaya. They found that much of the population had fled in antici-
pation of hostilities but returned after their arrival.*°
By September 1718 the moncanégara regions through which Kartané-
gara and the VOC had marched: victoriously towards the debacle at
Sé€panjang had reverted to the enemy side. In letters to the VOC, Paku-
buwana I listed the following regions as having rebelled: Jagaraga,
Kémagétan, Caruban, Madiun, Panaraga, Kalangbret, Rawa, Saréngat,
Blitar, Kédhiri, Kartasana, Wirasaba and Japan.*! In other words, virtually
wherever anyone lived on the Sala and Brantas river basins there was
rebellion, except at Kaduwang and Jipang.
The king decided to send more armies out against these rebels and to
put princes in command of them. The VOC still had little enthusiasm for
princely commanders but could hardly press the point since it trusted none
of the non-princely courtiers more, except for Kartanégara whom it wished
to remain at Kartasura as an ally and informant. So on 8 September, Png.
Ad. Dipanagara and Png. Dipasonta (said by Walling not to have all his
wits about him) marched to Jagaraga. Three days later Pakubuwana I’s
youngest son by the Ratu, Png. Blitar, marched to Kaduwang with only
300 men. He was reinforced a month later with 3000 soldiers and was
loaned three Europeans to assist him in fortress construction. When the
king proposed to send Blitar’s elder full brother Png. Purbaya as well,
however, the VOC’s suspicions were too much to be overcome: van
Arrewijne talked the feeble Susuhunan into postponing the order.*
Suspicions of Png. Purbaya would in due course prove well-founded,
but in late 1718 Pakubuwana I and the Company would have done better
to concentrate on Png. Ad. Dipanagara. This prince’s age is unknown, but
he was one of the elder of the Susuhunan’s children by wives of the
second rank (garwa pangrémbre).** He had been in trouble in 1714 for
keeping Balinese in his residence but had been pardoned.*? Otherwise he
appears rarely in VOC or Javanese sources before 1718. He was appar-
ently of a literary and religious bent. In November 1716 he personally
copied a text of the Old Javanese kakawin Dharmasunya (NBS 95: Darma
Sunya Kéling), a philosophical treatise of Siva-Buddhist mysticism.* This
is one of several pieces of evidence showing that both the Old Javanese
language and the Hindu-Buddhist literature of which it was the vehicle
continued to be patronised in Kartasura.°’ There may have been particular
significance in Dipanagara’s interest in such literature. In the colophon of
his Darma Sunya Kéling he claimed descent from one Bima Cili of Tu-
ban.°® There are at least two legendary figures of this name, although
180 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

neither had to do with Tuban, so far as is known. One was a prince of

Hindu Blambangan who fled to Islamised Pasuruan (apparently in the
sixteenth century), the other a fisherman (apparently of the seventeenth
century) who saved the life of the ancestor of the Surabayan lords now in
rebellion.®’ Either way, Dipanagara perhaps felt, or chose to assert, that he
was a prince who could bridge the distinctions between the royal house
and the rebels, and between Islam and the Hindu-Buddhist ideas still alive
in Bali.
In the night of 17-18 October 1718, Dipanagara took sixty soldiers with
snaphaenen and crossed over to the rebel side at Kiping. Thence he trav-
elled with the rebels to Panaraga. When news of these events reached
Kartasura, the Susuhunan was said to be deeply disturbed by this rebellion
of one of his best-loved sons. Pakubuwana I had his sons’s residence
demolished and imprisoned his retainers and family members left behind
in Kartasura.” Later, however, the VOC came to suspect that the king had
had foreknowledge of the rebellion.®' Indeed, Babad Kraton says that the
prince bore a letter from his father approving the rebellion and Babad ing
Sangkala claims that Png. Blitar conspired in his elder brother’s defec-
tion,” although other babad passages seem inconsistent with these state-
ments.®? There is no satisfactory explanation in any source why the king
or other princes might have endorsed Dipanagara’s actions, but it is not
inconceivable that they did so in the hope of achieving one or both of two
possible goals: to expel the Europeans in the name of Islam and thereby
end the rebellion, or to forestall the accession of the Crown prince. Babad
Kraton tells of the joy with which this scion of the royal house was
received by the rebels.“ By the end of 1718 Dipanagara was near Sura-
baya, whence he wrote to the commanders of the Kartasura army to submit
or prepare to do battle with him and his Balinese friends.®
Dipanagara was now proclaimed king by the rebels. He took a rare and
momentous title by which he claimed supernaturally sanctioned authority
and prefigured the uprising of his more famous nineteenth-century name-
sake, the prince Dipanagara of the Java War (1825-30), for he called
himself Panémbahan Erucakra. This is the title borne by the messianic Just
King (Ratu Adil) in the Javanese prophecies of Jayabaya which are as-
cribed to a twelfth-century king of Kédhiri (another bridging of the Hindu/
Buddhist-Islamic distinction). Babad Kraton also gives this new Just King
further titles of the Mataram royal house: Senapati Ingalaga Abdurahman
Sayidin Panatagama. The regional rebellion of the Surabayans and their
Javanese and Balinese allies had now become a princely rebellion as well,
fuelled by religious sensibilities whose significance can hardly be doubted
even if their precise contours remain obscure in the sources.
As the wet monsoon took over East Java in late 1718 and early 1719,
it was not at all clear who held the upper hand there. The VOC forces in
Surabaya suffered dreadfully from enemy harassment and particularly from
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 181

disease in these wet months. The commander reported that as many as

fifteen to twenty men sometimes collapsed in a day from the heat and
febrile delirium. At the beginning of November 1718, there were some
4400 fit VOC soldiers and nearly 600 sick and wounded in Surabaya,
Grésik, Pasuruan and Bangkalan (Madura). Of the 2500 healthy VOC
combatants at Surabaya, however, many were new enlistees who needed
basic firearms drill. During January 1719, 270 VOC soldiers died at
Surabaya, leaving only some 1750 fit and over 1100 sick and wounded
men at the end of the month. In February over 200 died, leaving about
1570 fit soldiers and over 1100 in hospital. Batavia refused to reinforce
Surabaya, largely out of concern for the survival of its soldiers. As VOC
numbers declined, it became impossible to man the Company’s extended
Surabaya fortifications, the perimeters of which were therefore reduced in
January.®’ The rains did, however, bring one benefit to the VOC. For over
two months the Surabayans had successfully dammed the river at Képutren,
forcing the VOC and Kartasurans to rely on unhealthy well water. As the
river rose, the rebels had to open their own dam or be washed away.®
At Surabaya, rebel numbers were estimated to be around 5—6000 (about
half of them Buleleng Balinese) with another 4-5000 deeper inland. In
December 1718, over half of the rebel forces withdrew from Képutren to
new fortifications south of Surabaya at Wanakrama. There conflict re-
portedly grew between the Javanese and Balinese; disagreements are
also told of in Babad Kraton.”” Pakubuwana I meanwhile levied more
men from the pasisir and sent them to Surabaya, so that by December
1718 a total of some 10,000 Javanese were there under Cakrajaya. But
the VOC reported that only one-tenth of the grand army of 20—25,000
men which the Susuhunan proposed for the next dry season would be
trained soldiers and no more than one-half would be armed (the rest being
labourers and porters).”!
Perhaps surprisingly, things looked worse for the rebels in those inland
districts where they had acquired Png. Dipanagara (Pan. Erucakra) as their
figurehead. They apparently decided to consolidate their forces in the wake
of the loss of Surabaya, so withdrew from their positions before Kiping
and Kaduwang to Jagaraga, Panagara and Madiun. Some 2000 soldiers
were sent from Kartasura to join Png. Blitar’s royal army. In December
1718, Blitar took Panagara and then Jagaraga, where the enemy, including
Dipanagara, fled at his approach. The rebel forces in the moncanégara
then concentrated at Madiun. With 2000 more reinforcements, Blitar
marched towards them, burning and devastating everything en route.”
One report said that the ruins of the old Hindu-Buddhist court of Maja-
pahit were being prepared as a final rebel stronghold.’? This was accessible
both to the rebels at Wanakrama and to those at Madiun, was holy both
to the Javanese and to the Balinese (who traced the ancestry of their royal
families to its kings) and bridged the Hindu/Buddhism-Islam transition in
182 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Javanese cultural history.’ No more appropriate capital could have been

imagined for this particular rebellion.
In the capital of Kartasura, the reign of Pakubuwana I blundered to its
end. From November 1718 onwards the king was often ill and the Crown
prince apparently offended him by seeming too eager to take over. Gobius
went from Sémarang to the kraton in December 1718—January 1719. While
there he achieved little and made something of a fool of himself. Neither
he nor van Arrewijne seemed able to penetrate the intrigues of Ratu
Pakubuwana, her sons and the senior courtiers. Png. Purbaya appeared to
be popular, a regular mosque-goer and his father’s current favourite. Indeed
Pakubuwana I intended to restore to him the great appanage of 15—20,000
households which had been taken away in June at the instigation of the
VOC. Png. Blitar, still on campaign, also seemed popular. But the Crown
prince did not. Gobius paternalistically admonished the old Susuhunan to
maintain the Crown prince as his chosen successor when he indicated that
he would rather partition the realm between Purbaya and Blitar. Gobius
observed that princes or courtiers who were favourably inclined towards
the VOC “were constantly made suspect and hated among the commoners
by malcontents and Islamic religious, through the foulest inventions they
could ever devise.” He left Kartasura to return to Sémarang without having
Batavia’s authorisation to do so. On his way, Gobius encountered gifts for
the Susuhunan being brought from Batavia which he was ordered to deliver
personally, so he was obliged to retrace his journey to the kraton, deliver
the gifts and take leave a second time.”
As Garébég Mulud AJ 1643 (3 Feb. 1719) approached, an episode took
place which probably hardened the animosity of devout Muslims towards
Pakubuwana I and all who were associated with him. Less than two weeks
before this observance of the Prophet’s birth, when notables from through-
out the kingdom (or from those parts still loyal to Kartasura) gathered at
court, a son-in-law of Ad. Jayaningrat of Pékalongan named Haji Muham-
mad Ali or Suratman arrived at court with an Arab Sayid (Sayyid) called
Magqallawi from Hadramawt, who had spent several years travelling around
Java. The Sayid was arrested by the VOC at Kartasura because he lacked
a VOC pass and was packed off to Sémarang, but he and Haji Muhammad
Ali escaped from their escort and returned to Kartasura. There Png. Pur-
baya and the VOC Resident van Arrewijne failed to persuade them to
surrender again. Pakubuwana I then ordered them to leave but the Sayid
still refused and shut himself up in a small mosque belonging to the court
Pangulu (chief mosque official). On 29 January the Susuhunan ordered an
attack on the Sayid’s refuge, in which the Sayid and two of his servants
were shot down. Muhammad Ali was arrested and only saved from ex-
ecution by the Susuhunan through the intercession of his father-in-law
Jayaningrat and, consequently, of Gobius and van Arrewijne.’° Gobius
was severely reprimanded by Batavia for preventing this execution “for he
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 183

knows well that such doings by His Highness are always welcome to
us.”’’ The significance of this event is suggested by its description in
Babad ing Sangkala:

The destruction of Java now began

with the death of the Sayid, for he was shot
upon the wish of the king.
There were many who said
that they were shocked that he was killed.
Three days later
the king fell ill.”

The end now came rapidly. On 8 February, Pakubuwana I fell ill and
was unconscious for over an hour. He had a message sent to Png. Blitar
to return from the campaign, thereby halting the advance upon Madiun.
Many of Kartasura’s citizens packed their goods and fled the city in
anticipation of a succession crisis. The VOC’s garrison of over 500 men
was put on defensive alert. On 17 February the Company’s worst fears
were realised when the dying Susuhunan told van Arrewijne that he wished
Png. Blitar rather than the Crown prince to succeed him. The Company
had considerable respect for Blitar but felt that it could not be seen to
abandon its sworn support for the succession of the Crown prince. On 20
February Png. Blitar arrived back at court. The following day the Susuhunan
received him and, so Blitar said, told him that he was now his father’s
choice as the next Susuhunan. At sunset on 22 February 1719 Pakubuwana
I died.”
Valentyn commented that Pakubuwana I died “after having achieved
little that was memorable.’*° Certainly it would be hard to conceive a
standard by which Pakubuwana I could be judged a great, or even a good,
king, but his reign had been memorable enough. In dynastic history he had
altered the line of succession, a matter perhaps of less import to modern
students of history than to his heirs and their subjects and courtiers down
to modern times. Greater memorability attaches to the more intensive
involvement of the Dutch East India Company in Javanese domestic af-
fairs which his usurpation both required and facilitated. The price paid by
the VOC for this was high and soon to become higher. The Javanese
domestic consequences can be discerned in the heightened political conflict
associated with Pakubuwana I’s questionable legitimacy and competence.
It can also be seen in resistance to the new order represented by the
kraton-VOC alliance, resistance grounded in and defined by regional,
cultural and religious appeals. With the old king dead, there was little to
restrain a collapse of the realm so total that its reconstruction would seem
improbable. In the event, this collapse was delayed for four months for
reasons which were primarily meteorological, for the annual rains were
now well established.
184 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

The new king was immediately escorted to the kraton by van Arrewijne
in the name of the VOC, but for over two months he refused to have
himself formally declared the successor. At first this somewhat discon-
certed the Europeans and probably produced mystification among many
Javanese. But the move may have been sagacious. The Crown prince must
have known how little firm Javanese support he had, so he told Batavia
that he would not take the royal titles until his “grandfather” the Governor-
General and the Council of the Indies bestowed them upon him, thereby
tying the Company even more to his cause.*' There was no immediate
rebellion, as the princes and courtiers awaited events and watched the rain.
The Crown prince ordered that Pngs. Purbaya and Blitar be given the
pusaka pikes Ky. Kéboabang and Ky. Kalanada, in conformity with his
father’s wishes.*? Since the court city seemed quiet, by April 1719 many
commoners had returned to their homes.*? On 3 May the long-awaited
letter from Batavia, blessing the Crown prince’s accession, was formally
received at court. The great cannon Gunturgéni was fired, there were further
salutes, cups of tea, delicacies and glasses of wine as the VOC and royal
house celebrated the accession of the new Susuhunan, who took the name
Amangkurat IV (r. 1719-26) and the further titles Senapati Ingalaga
Ngabdulrahman Sayidin Pantagama, the same as those adopted by his
father in 1704. Only now did he accept the pusakas (whatever ones there
still were) which he had asked his mother Ratu Pakubuwana to look after
until then. On Friday 5 May he was consecrated as king by the court’s
Islamic dignitaries. Two days later the VOC letter was read in public by
Tg. Kartanégara and the assembled dignitaries paid obeisance to the new
Susuhunan.™ Batavia told the Heren XVI/ in Amsterdam that it hoped that
by God’s grace “all manner of peace and advantage in their affairs on this
island ’would attend this new reign, “for this matters in the utmost degree
to the state of the general Company.’
During these months of suspended political animation, while the wet
monsoon drenched Central and East Java, the warfare to the east of the
court became a matter of who could longest survive food shortages and
epidemic diseases. Kartasura forces at Kiping and Jagaraga returned to the
court in March.*° Early that month a rebel army, reduced from 4—5000 to
7-800 by disease, attempted to take the strategic point of Jipang but was
repulsed by Tg. Mataun.*’ Everywhere were rain, mud, famine and terrible
disease. Png. Dipanagara was reported to be ill and to have only a small
following. Gusti Panji Danudrésta was ill and took his surviving Balinese,
said to be down to 300 by May, from the Surabaya area to Bangil and
Pasaruan. Many Panaraga commoners who had supported the rebels
appeared at Kartasura in April and May to submit and, no doubt, to get
some food. A good rice harvest was predicted from planted fields
along the pasisir and in the interior, but the drain of manpower for royal
armies meant that many fields were not planted at all. The royal army at
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 185

Surabaya dwindled from about 10,000 to 1,700 survivors by June.** Dis-

ease was so virulent among Europeans that, according to the Surabaya
commander, even the strongest fell ill and died within two to three days.*?
As the rains came to an end, so did the inactivity at the kraton.
Amangkurat IV took steps to establish the structures of his new reign. He
restored the system of two Patihs, with Kartanégara as Left Patih and
Cakrajaya (still with the royal army at Surabaya) as Right. At about the
same time, Kartanégara was renamed Ad. Mangkupraja. The Susuhunan
may have restored the system of two Patihs and raised Kartanégara/
Mangkupraja’s status partly because he regarded Cakrajaya as a supporter
of Pngs. Purbaya and Blitar and therefore wished to reduce his powers, yet
dared not depose or arrest him while he was so far away and in command
of an army.” The status of these two senior princes was suddenly dimin-
ished, for instead of being sons of the sovereign they were now reduced
to being brothers of the king. Purbaya’s vast appanage (reportedly nearly
18,000 households) was again removed from him, as was Blitar’s com-
mand over the Jagasuras, a company of professional soldiers. Each was to
be allowed a modest 2000 households. They were reportedly offended,
embarrassed and apprehensive; van Arrewijne warned the Susuhunan of
the dangers of these steps, but he persisted. The king promoted relatives
and courtiers to various new titles and made his eldest son by a secondary
wife a Pangeran with the name Mangkunégara.®' This name had pre-
viously been reserved for a Crown prince, so it is not clear whether
Amangkurat IV intended thereby to bestow this status upon Mangkuné-
gara. This prince (the ancestor of the subsidiary princely house of the
Mangkunégaran of Surakarta) was seventeen years old and had close links
with Pngs. Purbaya and Blitar, having been raised since infancy in the
household of the former and being married to a daughter of the latter.°? His
career was to be a turbulent one.
Among the king’s brothers was Png. Dipasonta, who had been sent out
on campaign with Dipanagara in September 1718. A month later he was
recalled to court because of commoners’ complaints about his behaviour;
there he was disarmed and kept under watch. In February 1719 he fled the
court but his rebellion lasted less than a month. He was brought back in
a cage, seriously wounded and apparently insane. There was debate in the
court about what should be done with him. In the absence of consensus,
Amangkurat IV asked for Batavia’s judgement, which it refused to give
for fear that involvement in the execution of a prince could “generate
calumny and hatred, which is already so advanced towards the Nether-
landers among the Muslims.” In the night of 11 May Dipasonta was
quietly strangled on the Susuhunan’s orders. The king’s other brothers
reportedly grew even more uncertain of their own futures in the wake of
this execution.”
186 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

On 5 June a grand five-hour dinner was held at the Company post at

Kartasura. The new Susuhunan, his uncles Png. A. Mataram and Png. A.
Panular (the last surviving sons of Amangkurat I), his brother Png. Pur-
baya, his son Png. Mangkunégara, Ad. Mangkupraja (Kartanégara) and
other dignitaries attended. Png. Blitar was absent through illness. After
initial stiffness and no doubt plenty of strong drink, the party grew cordial.
There was much embracing, hand-shaking and profession of loyalty. The
VOC expended 190 (Amsterdam) Ibs (94 kg/107 Ibs avoirdupois) of gun-
powder for cannon salutes. Amangkurat IV gave Png. A. Mataram a Persian
horse and several hundred Spanish Reals and Png. Purbaya a kris named
Si Turunsih (“descending love”). On 19 June, less than a week before the
utter collapse of the new king’s realm, and again on 23 June, the day
before the events, van Arrewijne confidently told his superiors that all was
peaceful at Kartasura.”*
Dutch and Javanese sources give detailed accounts of the events of 24
June 1719, when Amangkurat IV’s shaky regime disintegrated. These
accounts agree in broad outline and most details.*> Png. Blitar was appar-
ently inspired by his own fears and ambitions and by Islamic dignitaries
at Kartasura to plot an armed coup. His uncle Png. A. Mataram was reluc-
tant to join him but promised neutrality. His brother Purbaya, for various
reasons including his sense of responsibility for Blitar, agreed to support
the coup. The VOC garrison was cautiously sounded out. Babad ing
Sangkala says that the VOC promised not to interfere, the Surakarta Major
Babad that Kapitan Jaswa (Josua van Arrewijne) himself promised neu-
trality, and a letter written by Purbaya and Blitar to Gobius that van
Arrewijne had discussed everything in advance with the princes. Even the
VOC’s own records say that the plotters erroneously believed they would
have the support of the VOC’s Balinese and Makasarese companies. At
sunrise on 24 June, Blitar’s people attacked the kraton, dressed in white
and urged on by Islamic notables. To their surprise, they were met by
cannon fire from the VOC watch on the Sitinggil and two of their com-
manders were killed. Blitar and others were then driven from the alun-
alun by fire from the Company’s post. Purbaya joined in and an attempt
was made to blast and then hack a way through the southern gateway to
the kraton, but VOC hand grenades and mortar grenades drove them
back. There is no suggestion in the sources that Amangkurat IV’s own
soldiers did much to defend him; indeed his Kap&dhak lifeguards at the
southern gate joined the uprising.
Unable to take the kraton, Purbaya and Blitar fled for Mataram. They
had clearly not contemplated the possibility of defeat and the need to flee.
They left behind horses, supplies and munitions, but took with them a
large number of followers, including the Susuhunan’s son Png. Mangkuné-
gara, Sinduréja and the entire religious establishment of the court. They
SECOND JAVANESE WAR OF SUCCESSION 187

occupied their late father’s rest house and hunting lodge at Kartawinata,
which they renamed Kartasari Diningrat and turned into a rebel kraton.
There religious leaders, notably Kyai Wanagiri according to the babad,
consecrated royal (and more obviously Arabic) titles for Png. Blitar, who
is called Sultan Ibnu Mustapa Pakubuwana Senapati Ingalaga Ngabdul-
rahman Sayidin Panatagama in the babad and variations of this in let-
ters preserved in Dutch translations in the VOC archives. Purbaya was
renamed Panémbahan Purubaya Senapati Ingalaga.”°
Png. A. Mataram took no part in the uprising of 24 June but left the
court the following day and went north to establish himself at Pathi.?’
Many courtiers and soldiers followed these rebels. The VOC estimated
that Amangkurat IV could muster no more than 2—3000 men. Png. Blitar
had a similar number at Banyudana and Bayalali, threatening and at times
cutting the road from Kartasura to Sémarang, the court’s most likely source
of succour.”®
Thus began the Second Javanese War of Succession, which was to last
until 1723. Until this time Pakubuwana I and his successor Amangkurat
IV had faced regional rebellions eastwards of the court. These were very
serious challenges, all the more so insofar as they were generated and sus-
tained by regional and religious animosities. Yet they did not touch the
kraton itself. A turn for the worse had been taken when Png. Dipanagara
rebelled in 1718, providing the eastern rebels with a princely figurehead.
Yet even then it seemed as if the kraton could endure long enough for
famine and disease to destroy the rebels. Now, however, with three senior
princes in rebellion to the west and north of the kraton, Amangkurat IV
and the VOC garrison at court were isolated and threatened much more
seriously than before. Not for nothing did Batavia describe Amangkurat
IV as “an emperor who was deserted by all his people and had acquired
virtually the whole of the Javanese world as his enemy.” He was also a
monarch upon whose survival and victory depended the future of the VOC
in Java.
11
The Victory of the
Kartasura-Company
Alliance, 1719-23

The Surabaya War beginning in 1717 and the Second Javanese War of
Succession which began two years thereafter seriously challenged the new
order in Java based upon the alliance between the kraton and the VOC
since 1704. This alliance rested mainly on two propositions: that the Dutch
East India Company would be the arbiter of Kartasura dynastic affairs and
that in return Java’s economy would be redirected to serve the Company’s
interests. Those who opposed this new regime may not have analysed it
in such terms. Their ire was perhaps more specific: towards the kings who
gained the throne and the foreign infidels who put them there and de-
manded payment for doing so. Whatever the nature of their analysis, their
rebellion represented a testing of the limits of this new order.
By the early 1720s the Kartasura-Company alliance would prove capa-
ble of victory and would thereby initiate a period of peace, the longest
such between 1675 and 1757. Victory did not, however, guarantee the im-
plementation of those propositions upon which the alliance rested, for they
demanded that a king installed by the Company be effective enough to
govern his realm to the benefit of the VOC. Yet a king who needed the
Company ipso facto lacked effectiveness, and the Company’s intervention
itself rendered it less likely that a monarch could claim the domestic
loyalty and support needed to be effective. Since there were few insti-
tutional structures of administration, the destruction of rebels and control
of the kraton did not mean control of the kingdom.
In mid—1719, the Kartasura-VOC alliance looked an abject disaster.
Most of the population of the court city had fled, the markets were empty,
the capital was surrounded by fires set by rebels and the Susuhunan had,
at most, a thousand soldiers who had served him while he was Crown
prince upon whom he could rely. Among the officials still at court, only
the Patih Mangkupraja (Kartanégara) seemed to the Europeans to be truly

188
THE KARTASURA-COMPANY ALLIANCE 189

loyal. The other Patih, Cakrajaya (still with the army at Surabaya), they
regarded as being a party to the anti-Amangkurat IV conspiracy. Batavia
was angry when the Susuhunan agreed to Cakrajaya’s request that his wife
and four children be permitted to go from Kartasura to Sémarang for their
safety: a public indication both of the parlous security of the capital and
of Cakrajaya’s dubious intentions. Ratu Pakubuwana, who according to
the Surakarta Major Babad had contemplated suicide at the sight of her
sons in mortal combat, was kept under watch. The VOC immediately got
forty reinforcements and more ammunition through to its Kartasura garri-
son. By July, this totalled 747 men (68 of them ill), but Kartasura re-
mained blockaded by the rebels. The Company’s fortifications were ex-
tended and several of the Susuhunan’s cannon were employed to defend
these works. In July and August supply convoys got through from Séma-
rang. By this time the fact that the court had not fallen to a rebel attack
led the capital’s citizens to begin to return and once again the markets
resumed some activity.!
Batavia told the Company’s Directors (the Heren XVII) in Amsterdam
that the resistance to Amangkurat IV appeared to spring from a plot boiled
up under Pakubuwana I (“that old fox’’) at the end of his reign. All the
princes and dignitaries of the realm, excepting only Kartanégara (now
Mangkupraja) and the Crown prince (Amangkurat IV), had supposedly
sworn to this conspiracy. Its aim was to lure VOC forces into the field, to
divide and weaken them and then to launch a general assault which would
purify Java of “the red stain” of the Europeans. Yet, said Batavia, trying
to persuade the Heren XVII that the balance sheets were less disastrous
than in fact they were, Java remained of great value to the Company
because of its products, and the Company’s servants would continue to
work for peace.’
The countryside meanwhile fell to the rebels. Png. A. Mataram estab-
lished himself in the Pathi-Kudus-Grobogan area. This elderly prince called
himself Susuhunan Panutup (“the final emperor’) or Sunan Kuning (“the
yellow emperor”). Much of the fighting on his behalf was led by a subject
of Pan. Purbaya named Ki Mangunonéng (alias Abrunata). The VOC
reported that Png. A. Mataram “put on a religious cloak” and achieved
much popularity with common Javanese. Chinese, however, were attacked.
Madiun and Panaraga reportedly offered their obeisance to this rebel
Susuhunan. In August he took villages in the Jépara area and Mangun-
onéng’s brother took charge of Juwana. By then Png. A. Mataram was
said to have an army of 1200, 200 of whom carried snaphaenen. On 18
August his forces bloodily repulsed an attempt by the lord of Jépara to
retake Kudus.*
Purbaya and Blitar attacked north-westwards from their Mataram base
into Kédhu in July 1719. Banyumas submitted and brought them a rich
190 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

rice harvest. Témbayat, a holy place to Javanese Muslims, also submitted

to them. The two princes had an estimated 10,000 armed followers but,
reflecting the unexpected nature of their flight from Kartasura, they were
thought to have only fifty to sixty snaphaenen. They did, however, appar-
ently have light artillery. Amangkurat IV had one loyal champion in R.
Tg. Natayuda, the lord of Kédhu. He won several limited engagements
with the rebels, but told Amangkurat IV and the VOC that he desperately
needed ammunition and reinforcements to maintain his resistance.*
The rebel princes tried to split the Company and Amangkurat IV from
each other. They wrote to the former that they had been compelled to flee
because the Susuhunan had plotted their murders, and professed affection
for the VOC. They said that Pakubuwana I had wished Png. Blitar rather
than Amangkurat IV to succeed him and stories again circulated that
Pakubuwana I had wanted to divide his realm among his sons; in both
cases other evidence exists to support these claims, as has been seen
above. The rebels told Amangkurat IV that the VOC intended to exile him
and invited him to flee to them for protection. But neither the hapless king
nor the Europeans were swayed by these approaches.° Their main priority
was to keep the road open between Sémarang and Kartasura. This necessi-
tated cooperation between Sura Adimanggala of Sémarang, who claimed
jurisdiction over the people living along the road (wong urut dalan) as far
as Bayalali but was suspected of being sympathetic towards Purbaya and
Blitar, and the kraton, which had jurisdiction from Bayalali to Kartasura
and had frequently challenged Sémarang’s jurisdictional boundaries. With
some difficulty a degree of cooperation was achieved and the road was
held open. On 13 August, 120 Company soldiers with a Kartasura force
of 8-900 succeeded in driving the rebels from a well-fortified palisade
fortress (pagér) controlling the road from Kartasura to Mataram. Later in
the month a second pagér in this area was taken.°
The main advantage enjoyed by the Amangkurat [V-Company alliance
in the middle months of 1719 was that the various rebels did not unite.
Png. A. Mataram was separated from princes Purbaya and Blitar and none
of these was apparently cooperating with Png. Dipanagara (then near Kiping
on the Sala river)’ and his Surabaya allies. The Company would have been
ill-prepared to face any united onslaught on its coastal posts,
although Kartasura seems to have been well defended. An inspector of the
VOC's fortifications reported in 1719 that the Jépara fortress was virtually
invincible and the Pasuruan fortress quite good, but the Sémarang fortress,
a pentagon of heavy timbers, stood in a marsh and was being consumed
by white ants. At Démak some twenty-two VOC soldiers occupied an old
sawmill with nine cannon in the loft, at Grésik and Bangkalan the VOC
had only palm-trunk fortresses of little merit and the Surabaya post had a
wall on three sides but the fourth was a rotten palisade. A later report said
THE KARTASURA-COMPANY ALLIANCE 191

that the Pasuruan and Bangkalan fortresses were both wrongly situated,
being two hours from the sea, and described the Grésik pagér as a useless
burden.®
The VOC and Javanese army at Surabaya was meanwhile seriously
weakened by disease but nevertheless won a major victory in August
1719. When news arrived of the princely rebellion of June, hundreds
more Javanese deserted. The rebels, however, suffered equally from ill-
ness; as it turned out, they may have suffered more. When they offered
negotiations in July the VOC commander, Sergeant-Major M.E. Peijsen,
decided instead to go on to the offensive. This was a bold move, since he
had less than 2000 Company soldiers and Cakrajaya commanded only
5500 Javanese and Madurese. On 2 August, they successfully drove the
rebels from their works at Kupang and Képutren. On 11 August, the Java-
nese and Madurese who formed the flanks of the VOC-Kartasura army
drove Panji Surengrana and Jayapuspita’s men from their main fortress
at Wanakrama with field artillery. Surengrana was reportedly wounded in
this action. The rebels now withdrew farther inland. Relatively few fol-
lowers were .still with them, many of them reported to be ill. The VOC
was rather surprised at the ease with which these victories had been won,
although they apparently cost substantial casualties among Cakrajaya’s
soldiers.’ This success was perhaps, at least in part, predetermined by the
ravages of disease on the rebel side, but the Surabayans’ loss of a hundred
pieces of artillery when their main fortress fell in October 1718 may have
been decisive.'®
As the rains again came to Central and East Java in late 1719, there was
evidence that further military failures for the rebels might drive them into
each others’ arms. In September, rebel parties from the eastern moncané-
gara were repulsed by royal forces along the Sala river near Kartasura
itself. On the 27th of that month, a major new pagér at Klépu (on the way
to Mataram) fell to a Kartasura army and 132 VOC soldiers; serious rebel
losses there reportedly led to much consternation, desertion and disunity
in Purbaya’s and Blitar’s camps.'! Shortly thereafter the first reports reached
the VOC of contacts between Purbaya and Jayapuspita of Surabaya.’* In
October, R. Tg. Surabata of Panaraga offered through emissaries to come
over to the VOC-Kartasura side and shortly thereafter was reported to
have engaged in a major battle against Kartayuda of Surabaya." The latter’s
death on 9 November was subsequently reported, but it is unclear whether
he died in action or from natural causes.'* According to the Surakarta
Major Babad, Purbaya and Blitar approached their half-brother Dipa-
nagara to join them but found it necessary to arrange for rebel forces from
Jagaraga and Madiun first to attack him in Sokawati before he could he
persuaded to do so. VOC sources also reported contacts between these
princes as well as a moncanégara attack upon Dipanagara late in October.
Dipanagara was wounded and fled through the hills to Témbayat, says the
192 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

chronicle, whence he was carried by palanquin to his brothers in Ma-

taram.'°
More rebel setbacks followed in November and December 1719. On 11
November, Cakrajaya’s royal forces at Surabaya drove the enemy from
their positions south of Wanakrama near Sidaarja.'° This coincided with a
local rebellion in the Kudus-Démak area which was put down after only
two days. Png. Kidul of Kudus had taken Démak—according to the Sura-
karta babad because locals were in awe of his magic powers. When 500
VOC soldiers and a Javanese force attacked him, the chronicle claims that
he said, “That’s not the Company, those are pigs arriving”, vituperation
with deep resonance in an Islamic society. Pigs or no, Png. Kidul was cut
down."”
The rebels were not without some successes, but they were few. Those
around Surabaya reoccupied their old works at Wanakrama, the VOC and
Kartasura forces having too few men to hold what they had won, but were
driven out again on 10 December.'* Pan. Purbaya took important forts in
Kédhu in November.’? But clearly the rebel side had, at best, failed to
generate the momentum or unity necessary for total victory. So it was
behind a cause which looked less and less likely to succeed that the rebels
began to unite. In December, Madiun submitted to Amangkurat IV, leav-
ing the Madiun river valley effectively in Kartasura hands,” at least for the
moment.
Png. A. Mataram was not involved in the developing unity among the
rebel forces. Instead, in early November 1719 he submitted to the VOC in
Grobogan with his six sons and other followers. He was courteously
received, disarmed as a token of his submission but then given his kris
back. It would not be unreasonable to suppose that he had some assurance
from the Company of his welfare: the babad certainly says that the VOC
gave him false promises. He was taken to Jépara and kept in the VOC post
pending orders from Batavia. These were that he be turned over to
Amangkurat IV. The old man was understandably reluctant to leave the
security of the Company fortress to go to the residence of Tg. Citrasoma,
but on 9 January 1720 he did so in order to hear from Tg. Kartanégara
what the Susuhunan’s judgement was. Before he and his sons could sit
down, they were bound and strangled by the Javanese.?!
By this time the VOC felt that decisive action was needed if it were to
restore the authority of Amangkurat IV, who was “hated by many and
whose works are undermined and secretly opposed by his own mother the
Ratu”.** Again the aged H.F. Bergman was asked to command an ex-
pedition. He was authorised to act without reference to Gobius and the
council at Sémarang if he wished, thereby bypassing an apparent bottle-
neck of incompetence in the VOC structure. Amangkurat IV was delighted
at Bergman’s appointment and assured the Company that he would repay
its military costs. On 16 September 1719, Bergman arrived in Sémarang
THE KARTASURA-COMPANY ALLIANCE 193

and began to plan a campaign against the princes in Mataram. He concen-

trated his forces by bringing nearly 2,000 men from Surabaya (where
dysentery was taking a dreadful toll) and taking nearly 600 from Sé-
marang and Jépara. Cakrajaya brought Javanese forces of indeterminate
number from Surabaya. These forces marched with Bergman to Kartasura,
where he arrived on 8 December.”*
A brief campaign into Mataram followed, with some 2,000 Javanese
marching beside the Company soldiers. The forces of Purbaya, Blitar and
Dipanagara were defeated in a major action at Taji (near Prambanan) on
20 December 1719. The next day their kraton Kartasari was entered, the
princes having fled.**
Both VOC and Javanese sources emphasise the continuing support given
by Islamic leaders to the rebels. According to the Surakarta Major Babad,

The ulamas (religious scholars) and hajis (Mecca pilgrims)

all wished to wage Holy War,
the kétibs (lesser religious officials) and modins (mosque attendants);
their leader in this affair was
the Pangulu (chief religious officer) of Kartasura,
following the two [sic] princes,
Kyai Tangkilan
seeking death in the path of God.”

Death he found: when the battle commenced, says the chronicle,

It was the wish of God

that they should all be destroyed;
of the religious folk only a few remained,
the rest dying in Holy War against the
kafirs (infidels).”°

The Pangulu and four other religious leaders were captured alive. They
were taken to Kartasari, krissed, then while still alive hung upside down
inside the rebel kraton which was burned down around them.’ Whatever
such measures lacked in refinement and sensitivity, they may have been
effective in beheading networks of support which were important to the
rebels. Bergman refused to pursue the fleeing princes for fear of being
trapped by the rains. By 31 December he was back in Sémarang.”* As soon
as he left, Purbaya, Blitar and Dipanagara reestablished themselves in
Mataram.
The confusion attending the affairs of the Javanese and their relations
with the Company at this time is well illustrated in the VOC arrest of the
Patih Cakrajaya in Sémarang. He had been suspected of sympathy with the
rebel princes for some time. In November 1719 van Arrewijne, whose
record for penetrating the affairs of the court where he was posted was
194 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

hardly impressive, reported from Kartasura that the Susuhunan feared

Cakrajaya’s pro-rebel sympathies. On the basis of this report Bergman
ordered Cakrajaya arrested and held in the VOC post at S€marang, where
he had arrived from Surabaya. This was done on 2 December. Sub-
sequently, while he was in Kartasura, Bergman consulted with Amang-
kurat IV about Cakrajaya’s fate. He was surprised to learn that the king
intended to maintain Cakrajaya as one of his two Patihs along with Ad.
Mangkupraja. To what extent this apparent change of heart came about, as
Batavia seems to have thought, because of the influence of Cakrajaya’s
patron Ratu Pakubuwana or, as the Major Babad says, because the king
was persuaded that his suspicions of Cakrajaya rested on false evidence,
cannot now be known. Upon Bergman’s return to the coast, Cakrajaya was
set free. In January 1720, he travelled to Kartasura with his family. There
he surrendered his weapons and regalia of office as Patih to the Susuhunan
and sat alone on the alun-alun to await his fate at the king’s hands: a
practice known as pepe, followed by suppliants in search of royal justice.
Amangkurat IV received him, restored his regalia and declared him to be
co-Patih. He was renamed Ad. Danuréja, by which he was known for the
rest of his days.” In subsequent years he was to show little liking for the
Europeans, an attitude presumably not unrelated to his arrest (and thus,
necessarily, near-exile or near-death) at their hands. Not surprisingly, the
Company’s distrust of the court and the whole Javanese nation was further
confirmed by this episode.
Military activity on the Mataram-Kartasura border carried on into early
1720, partly because the rains were meagre that season. The rebel princes
constructed a fort at Marébung which the Europeans later found to be most
impressive. Amangkurat IV built opposing works at Klathen. The
Company’s forces in the area were now considerable: over 1000 soldiers
(about half Europeans), of whom 440 were detailed to Klathen in February
despite the Company’s nervousness about dividing its military among the
Javanese, none of whom it trusted. On 22 February, a major attack was
launched against the enemy’s works which ended in defeat. The VOC took
heavy casualties and had to retire for want of munitions.*° Thereafter the
Company sent further reinforcements, bringing its military numbers at
Kartasura to over 600 and those before Marébung to 700. But the VOC’s
officers turned down flat a proposal by Danuréja (the former Cakrajaya)
and Mangkupraja, who had barely 1300 Javanese soldiers, for another
frontal assault on the rebel positions.*' Except for subsidiary actions in
March in which the holy site at Témbayat was taken and burned and the
enemy was repelled from Wédhi,” hostilities became largely a matter of
artillery duels between opposing works. Inside their lines, Purbaya and
Blitar drilled their troops in European fashion.*?
In the night of 15-16 April 1720, however, the rebels mysteriously
abandoned their fortifications at Marébung, much to the surprise of the
THE KARTASURA-COMPANY ALLIANCE 195

Europeans.** The Surakarta Major Babad perhaps holds the explanation. It

says that one of the Susuhunan’s main commanders, Ky. Tg. Kandhuru-
wan Wilatikta, was sufficiently unsure of the outcome of this war that he
turned to soothsayers to discover who would win and hence to which side
he should adhere. He was told that Sultan Blitar would never become king
but that Pan. Purbaya’s grandson would one day rule at Kadipala. He sent
news to Purbaya of this prophecy. The latter got his own fortune-teller,
with the same result. If the rebel princes consequently believed that their
cause was doomed but regarded surrender as impossible, it is not surpris-
ing that they abandoned their works and fled.*° The probability of this
story being contemporaneous with the events of 1720 is enhanced by the
details of the prophecy. The later Susuhunan Pakubuwana III (r. 1749-88)
was indeed a grandson of Purbaya through his mother.** Yet this seems
not to be an ex post facto prophecy interpolated during Pakubuwana III’s
reign or later, for Kadipala was not chosen to be the site of the new court
in the 1740s. According to Babad Giyanti, it was considered but passed
over for the village of Sala, which became Surakarta.*’ A prediction
concocted after the accession of Pakubuwana III and inserted into the
chronicle account of 1720 would surely have got the site of the new kraton
right.** The prophecy may therefore be contemporary with and truly explain
the otherwise inexplicable flight of the rebel princes from Marébung.
Purbaya, Blitar and Dipanagara fled eastwards to join the Surabaya and
moncanégara rebels. In December 1719, some 2000 men commanded by
Panji Surengrana had expelled a VOC forward guard from Waru, south of
Wanakrama, and occupied the place. According to the Surakarta Major
Babad, Surengrana had ordered offensive action out of a desire to avenge
the death of his brother Panji Kartayuda a few weeks before. He aban-
doned Waru after only a few days, however, when it was approached by
Sasrawinata and Suryawinata, the young Madurese lords whom the
Susuhunan had named joint bupatis of Surabaya after its reconquest in
October 1718 and whose military skills favourably impressed the VOC.*?
Except for this brief occupation of Waru and Tg. Surabrata of Panaraga
again reverting to the rebels in early 1720,*° their cause experienced only
setbacks. Having cleared rebel positions in northwest Mataram, west pasi-
sir forces under Tg. Puspanégara of Batang marched through to Kartasura
in April 1720. The Amangkurat IV-VOC forces were withdrawn from
Marébung in May. With the districts to the west of Kartasura effectively
free of rebels, more Company and kraton soldiers were sent to reinforce
positions at Jipang and elsewhere in the eastern moncanégara."' The fleeing
princes got to Madiun in June and called A. Jayapuspita to join them. On
his way to answer this summons, however, Jayapuspita fell ill and died.”
Thus the rebels lost the man whom the Europeans regarded as the shrewd-
est of the Surabayan lords.*? Of the original rebel brothers of Surabaya
only Panji Surengrana now survived. Jayapuspita was but one of many
196 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

victims of terrible epidemic diseases sweeping East Java. The streets of

Surabaya were full of the sick and starving; similarly, the Company’s
soldiers continued to fall ill and die at a dreadful rate. By the middle of
1720 a substantial number of people were submitting at Surabaya, but
their physical condition was pitiable.™
For the 1720 dry season, Bergman arranged again a two-pronged
campaign. About half the available VOC soldiers would sail under Bergman
himself to Grésik and thence march up the Sala river to Jipang. The other
half of the Company’s troops would march down the Sala valley from
Kartasura under Major Georg van Spree with Amangkurat IV’s Javanese
under the command of Ad. Mangkupraja. After combining at Jipang, these
forces would pursue the rebels wherever they then were.* The Company
was again convinced that Mangkupraja’s co-Patih Danuréja and the king’s
own mother Ratu Pakubuwana were in league with the rebel princes and
therefore insisted that Danuréja not command the royal army.*°
On 9 July 1720, van Spree and Mangkupraja left Kartasura. On 22 July,
Bergman marched from Grésik upriver through districts “lying entirely
deserted and untilled”’; his artillery followed by water up the swiftly flowing
river. Van Spree and Mangkupraja, too, found nothing but deserted vil-
lages which they burned as they passed. By the end of July these armies
had joined and turned south towards Madiun, which the rebels were for-
tifying. On 29 August the VOC-Kartasura army took the main rebel pagér
just outside Madiun, where Purbaya, Blitar, Dipanagara, Surengrana and
a reported 10,000 men were put to flight. The next day, Madiun was found
to be deserted. The rebel were pursued to Kémagétan, where were cap-
tured several of their women. Tg. Surabrata of Panaraga and others now
decided that submission to the conquering army was advisable.*”
The rebels next fled east to the highlands of Mt. Wilis, whence they
were driven further east to Kédhiri by Javanese and VOC military under
Simon Ceesjong. Leaving a Javanese garrison at Madiun, the main force
with its artillery skirted around the north of Mt. Wilis and marched through
wild, uncultivated districts to Kédhiri, where it arrived at the end of
September 1720. The rebel princes avoided battle and withdrew to the
impenetrable mountain wilderness around Malang. Twice Company units
destroyed major rebel stockpiles of rice, making the rebels’ plight yet
more desperate. The VOC and Kartasura Javanese, too, were short of
provisions and suffering much illness. So with the wet season again loom-
ing, a VOC-Kartasura garrison with ten cannon was left at K&édhiri and the
main army evacuated to the coast in October.** Other VOC troops had
meanwhile been razing the area around Bangil and Pasuruan. Having
precipitated significant submissions by the pro-rebel population of that
area, this force was withdrawn to Surabaya on 1 November.*? The rebel
cause was now truly near to collapse. This, says the Surakarta Major
Babad, was the will of God.
THE KARTASURA-COMPANY ALLIANCE 197

Amangkurat IV and others no doubt believed that final victory was

inevitable. Several important dignitaries and many commoners surrendered
to the Susuhunan’s forces.°'! At Garébég Mulud on 12 January 1721
Amangkurat IV put on a great show with over 20,000 soldiers on the alun-
alun of Kartasura, 1000 of them with snaphaenen with which they fired
salutes.*” But the rebel leaders were not ready to concede defeat. Purbaya
and Blitar wrote to Amangkurat IV’s commanders at Kédhiri reminding
them that they were all of the same Islamic faith and asking whether they
did not feel that they were being treated like animals by the unbeliever
Europeans.’ Again Batavia ordered H.F. Bergman to lead a campaign to
wipe out the rebel remnants. He was reluctant because of his age and
infirmity, and Batavia was subsequently to perceive in him an elderly
fickleness of disposition. But he accepted the task.‘
There is little need for a detailed description of the June-October 1721
campaign.*° It was a miserable affair characterised by misinformation,
shortages of provisions, desperate marches through difficult mountain
terrain, hostile weather, epidemic diseases and desertions. The strategic
aim was to attack the rebels in Malang from three approaches with combined
Kartasura and Company forces, thereby sealing off all escape routes. Some
13,000 men were committed by the Susuhunan and at least 2400 by the
VOC; these troops marched from their various directions in June and met
near Malang on 5 August. There were several significant contests of arms.
The rebels had again taken Japan, Wirasaba and Bangil in March-April but
evacuated or were driven out of these areas by June. Png. Blitar attacked
Kédhiri but was beaten off in the same month. In July, an advance party
of Kartasura and Company soldiers was mauled in a brief action. But
essentially the campaign consisted of a search for rebels who knew the
territory better than did the invaders and who avoided contact.
Much of the success which fell to the VOC-Amangkurat IV side was
caused by weather and disease. Starvation led many people to leave the
hills and submit. Several major individuals were lost by the rebels. Ng.
Katawéngan of Kédhiri surrendered to the Susuhunan and, after appearing
personally in Kartasura, was reinstated as lord of Kédhiri.°° Of even greater
apparent significance was the surrender on 10 July near Malang of a man
identified as the last of the rebel Surabaya lords, Panji Surengrana.*’ Either
there was some deception involved here or Surengrana again escaped,
however, for the true Surengrana finally submitted only in 1723, as will
be seen below. It is sure, however, that Purbaya’s commander Sinduréja
was killed in action on 11 September.** The rebel princes fled to Lumajang,
on the borders of Blambangan. There Png. Blitar died of illness.*” Princes
Purbaya and Dipanagara were now the main surviving rebels from the
royal family. Surapati’s son R. (or M.) Bérahim (or Ibrahim) was report-
edly with them,” as was still Amangkurat IV’s son Png. Mangkunégara.
The Kartasura side had its losses, too, notably the Patih and commander
198 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Mangkupraja who fell ill and died on 16 September.*! It was a bedraggled

and depleted army which withdrew from the rain-soaked highlands of
Malang in October 1721.
There was no campaign against the rebel remnants in 1722. The VOC
paid off some of its locally recruited soldiers and kept the rest in canton-
ments around the coast. There the soldiers bided their time, falling ill and
getting into conflicts with or abusing local Javanese and Madurese, while
their military commanders argued with the Company’s senior officers
(Opperhoofden) about who had authority over whom.® The VOC set about
repairing its dilapidated fortresses ©“ during this lull in the fighting and
looked to various personnel problems. Both Gobius and van Arrewijne
were summoned to Batavia without salary. The former was replaced as
Commissioner for the Company’s affairs in Central and East Java by
Jacob W. Dubbeldekop, who had previously been in charge of VOC posts
on the pasisir. Van Arrewijne was replaced by Simon Ceesjong as head
of the post in Kartasura.™ Medical provision at the latter post required
urgent attention, with one surgeon a drunkard inclined to scandalous acts
in the marketplaces, another plain incompetent and the senior surgeon
prone to losses of memory.® The Company was also nearly devoid of
Javanese translators; several young men were posted to Kartasura in 1721
and subsequent years to learn the language.®°
The Europeans felt no more secure in the cultural environment of Java
than they ever had. Bergman, who had devoted much of his ageing energy
to fighting beside Javanese armies, regarded all Javanese as dissemblers
and liars.°’ As will be seen below, Javanese chronicles continue to depict
the Europeans in a similar light. The Javanese were an ungrateful nation,
said Gobius, partly because of their nature and upbringing, partly because
they were misled by their Islamic “priests”.®* Dutch fears of Islam were
heightened by the revelation in December 1721 of a conspiracy suppos-
edly involving one Pieter Erbervelt, a wealthy Mestizo landowner in Batavia,
the son of a German father and a Siamese mother. He was accused of
conspiring with Javanese and other Indonesians to slaughter the Christians
of Batavia. This charge was apparently trumped up by Governor-General
Hendrik Zwaardecroon (1718-25) as a means of getting hold of Erbervelt’s
lands. Erbervelt confessed under torture. He was hideously executed by
torture and dismemberment in April 1722 along with several fellows.©
The strength of feeling whipped up by this episode is suggested by a
contemporaneous poem posthumously addressed to Erbervelt, which in
part read,

Here you forged the piece with your damned souls,

the Islamic race, thirsting for Christian blood
were it not mercifully spared by Heaven’s power.”
THE KARTASURA-COMPANY ALLIANCE 199

The Dutch were also disconcerted to discover that in Sémarang—their

town in the sense that they claimed sovereignty over it on the basis of
treaties with the Javanese monarch—the Catholic mass had been secretly
celebrated.’! Whether in Calvinist eyes Catholicism was a greater or lesser
threat than Islam is a moot point. In either case, the Dutch continued to
feel themselves surrounded by enemies, within Batavia, in Sémarang, and
in the contryside of Java.
The king’s rebellious brothers in Lumajang were no longer a serious
threat to the Company or the kraton. They and the Surabayans led by Panji
Surengrana were reported to be in dreadful circumstances in late 1721 and
early 1722, short of both followers and provisions. There were even tales
that Surapati’s sons had turned on the rebel princes and robbed them of
women, children and property.”? The circumstances of the population of
East Java generally were hardly better. Most of the Chinese of Surabaya
were said to be dead and the rest of the populace utterly ruined,” while
Madiun reportedly had at the most half of what was regarded as its normal
population.”
Amangkurat IV tried to get messages through to Lumajang to induce
the surrender of one of Purbaya’s women, of his own sons Png. Mangkuné-
gara and R.M. Lindhu, or of Purbaya himself, but these efforts came to
nothing.’> Cakraningrat IV’s rebel brother Png. Jimat (the former R. Tg.
Cakranagara) did, however, leave the Malang highlands in December 1721
and surrender to the VOC. He was unwise to do so: he was sent to Kartasura
where he was strangled on the Susuhunan’s orders in April 1722.’° The
king was anxious that the dry season of 1722 not pass without a final effort
to destroy the rebels and offered a reward of Sp. RI. 1000 to whomever
would kill Purbaya, but the VOC ruled out a campaign.”’ Indeed, late in
the year the Company brought over half its soldiers on the pasisir back to
Batavia, leaving only 1000 in its various coastal garrisons.’* Thereupon
the king ordered most of his own forces to withdraw from Kédhiri so that
the manpower could be employed for agriculture. The VOC saw this as a
premature move and sent fifty more of its own soldiers to Kédhiri, where-
upon the Susuhunan countermanded his original withdrawal. Dubbeldekop
observed that Amangkurat IV seemed to be becoming as fickle as his late
father.”
Early in 1723 the rebellion collapsed without further military measures
by the Company or the Susuhunan. In March, a representative of R. Tg.
Surapati (III: this name now being used by the eldest surviving son of the
original Surapati) came to the VOC commandant at Pasuruan to discuss
surrender terms. According to the Surakarta Major Babad, the rebel princes
were now in a sorrowful state and could get only empty promises of
support from the kings of Bali. So Purbaya employed Surapati to sound
out the Dutch.*® In April, Dubbeldekop travelled east to Pasuruan to over-
see negotiations in person. With him went sixty European soldiers,
200 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Cakraningrat IV and Citrasoma.*! Dutch and Javanese accounts of what

followed agree in many respects but differ on one central point. Dub-
beldekop claimed that he assured the rebels of his favour and friendship,
of the security of their persons and that he would employ his influence
with the Susuhunan and the Company in their interest, but said that he had
promised nothing more. The babad account says that he promised Surapati
III control of Pasuruan and Sp. RI. 2000 a year, and Purbaya that he could
return to Kartasura, where he would have an appanage of 20,000 house-
holds, or that he and his heirs could live as independent lords under the
Company’s protection.® Since Surapati III subsequently protested to the
Governor-General and Council of the Indies that he had been promised
control of Pasuruan,** the chronicle should probably be regarded serious-
ly at least as evidence for what the rebels understood the arrangements to
be. The babad portrays the entire episode as an exercise in deception by
the Europeans. It is interesting in this connection that the text inserts here
(entirely out of chronological sequence) a reference to the exile of Png.
Ng. Saloringpasar in 1715 which it depicts also as a case of the VOC
deceiving that prince.** There is a nice symmetry here with the European
view of the Javanese as dissemblers and liars.
Dubbeldekop’s negotiations with the rebels (or, as the babad has it, his
deception of them) succeeded: by the end of June all had surrendered. On
2 May, Dubbeldekop met with Surapati III’s emissary. On 8 May he
received letters seeking pardon from Mangkunégara, who used the Crown
princely title Png. Ad. Anom. Twelve days later Surapati II, his brother
M. Wahyu and others came to Pasuruan and submitted. The Major Babad
says that Purbaya sent Surapati III to test the sincerity of the Company’s
promises. After further negotiation, on 25 June Purbaya, Dipanagara,
Mangkunégara, the latter’s five-year-old brother R.M. Lindhu, Panji Sureng-
rana and five more sons of Surapati I surrendered to Dubbeldekop in
Pasuruan. Purbaya was seriously ill and had to be carried in a palanquin.
With them came over thirty wives, children and servants. Despite reports
that before their surrender the rebels retained only a handful of followers,
1,500 people followed them from Lumajang, 800 of whom melted away
en route to Pasuruan.®°
Most of the leading rebels were sent off to Semarang on 27 June. Four
of the sons of Surapati were allowed to remain in Pasuruan, for what
reasons is not clear. Mangkunégara stopped at Sémarang, for his father the
Susuhunan was anxious to have him back in Kartasura. The rest were sent
on to Batavia.*° The Surakarta Major Babad says that the Susuhunan
wanted Purbaya killed and was angry when the Company rejected this on
the grounds that he had merely followed his younger brother Blitar into
rebellion and had never attempted to become king himself.®’ It was indeed
true that Purbaya had not assumed the title of Sultan or Susuhunan upon
the death of his brother Blitar, who had called himself Sultan, but this is
THE KARTASURA-COMPANY ALLIANCE 201

unlikely to have lessened Amangkurat IV’s wish to see Purbaya punished

with death. As will be seen in the following chapter, Mangkunégara and
Lindhu were returned to Kartasura at Amangkurat IV’s request. With the
exception of Purbaya, the other rebels were sent abroad either to the Cape
of Good Hope or Sri Lanka. Purbaya was allowed to live under VOC
Supervision at Tangérang to the west of Batavia. The Susuhunan was
dissatisfied at his brother’s continued presence on the island of Java.**
There can be little doubt that the Company kept him there precisely as a
potential tool for exerting some leverage over Amangkurat IV.
Thus the Surabaya War and the Second Javanese War of Succession
came to an end after nearly six years. In Batavia a day of thanksgiving
was proclaimed on 10 July 1723.” On about the same day in Kartasura,
Amangkurat IV had his hair cut short (but not shaved, as had his father),
and all his courtiers were ordered to do the same.” Such ritual steps were
matters of significance, in this instance perhaps, like the thanksgiving in
Batavia, a ritual means of marking the end of the rebellions. At the next
Garébég Mulud (12 Mulud AJ 1648/11 Dec. 1723), Amangkurat IV
appeared in state wearing what Ceesjong called “the imperial crown” (de
keijserl. kroone), which neither he nor his late father had worn before.’!
This was, one may assume, the golden crown of Majapahit. Its wearing
must have been another ritual act of significance, but it is not recorded in
the Surakarta Major Babad. One can do no more than guess at its meaning
in 2723.
It is impossible to assess the full cost to the Company and to the Java-
nese of these years of warfare. VOC records only reflect a fraction, but at
least suggest the scale, of the financial implications. Since the fiscal year
1717/18 the Susuhunan had contributed towards his debt to the Company
in only one year (1720/1), when he delivered 508 koyans of rice. Other-
wise neither cash nor rice had been delivered. The total royal debt to the
VOC under the treaty of 1705, which did not of course reflect the cost of
the fighting since 1717, now amounted to Sp. RI. 126,257 plus 5854
koyans of rice, equivalent to total accumulated arrears of Sp. RI. 243,337.
This was twice what Pakubuwana I had owed the Company in 1709 and
nearly forty-six per cent of the total accrued royal debt under the treaty
arrangements of 1705.°? The Company’s records of its own affairs for the
war years speak for themselves:
‘202 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Table IV VOC accounts for Java’s East Coast, 1717-23 (in Sp. Rl.)

income as proportion
Year expenditure income of expenditure

1717/18 50,068 8,542 0.171

1718/19 96,106 8,415 0.088
1719/20 78,311 9,137 0.417
1720/1 110,369 9,164 0.083
1721/2 210,627 15,465 0.073
1722/3 138,139 16,618 0.120

TOTAL 683,620 67,341 0.099

During these years income thus never exceeded about 17 per cent of
expenditure and over the whole period it covered less than 10 per cent.
In mid-1723, Amangkurat IV was burdened with even greater debts and
obligations to the Dutch East India Company than his father had faced. He
ruled a kingdom vast stretches of which were near to ruin. The Company’s
finances were worse than ever and the prospect of reaping a profit from its
intervention in the Kartasura empire still more remote. Much blood had
been shed on all sides, many debts of obligation and of hatred acquired,
much distrust and suspicion deeply rooted. On such bases peace was to be
built. Small wonder that the new order of Javanese-Dutch relations and the
internal relationships of the Javanese state would soon prove to rest upon
rotting foundations.
 1
The New Order in
Pacified Java, ca.
elo

Although the Surabaya War and the Second Javanese War of succession
ended in East Java only in 1723, much of the territory claimed by
Amangkurat IV was pacified before then. Kartasura itself and the districts
to the west of the court had been cleared of rebels since April 1720. The
western pasisir, dominated by its bupati Ad. Jayaningrat, had suffered as
a source of manpower levies but there had been no significant fighting in
the area. Similarly, West Madura under Cakraningrat IV had supplied men
but had itself been cleared of rebels since 1718. The last major campaign
against the rebel forces in East Java took place in 1721. From that time
onward, therefore, the relationship between the Dutch East India Company
on the one hand and the Javanese state on the other, and the domestic
relationships on both sides, ceased to be overwhelmingly influenced by the
facts of war or the parlous circumstances of the new Susuhunan. It thus
became possible for participants to see what the latest victory of the
Company-kraton alliance meant: if there was at last a new order, what it
was to be.
The relationship between the VOC and Javanese society in general con-
tinued to be shaped by mutual distrust. Manifold illustrations of this have
been offered in previous pages. Successful joint action against Amangkurat
IV’s enemies left neither the Europeans nor the Javanese with enhanced
faith in one another. For its part, the VOC did little to improve relations
with the court by insensitivity to the Susuhunan’s prerogatives. These
were defended by Ky. Ad. Danuréja, who became the kingdom’s sole
Patih after the death of Mangkupraja on campaign in September 1721.
Danuréja was no admirer of the Europeans, not least because of his own
arrest on Bergman’s orders in December 1719.'
Two issues were of particular importance in VOC-Kartasura relations in
1721, the first having to do with the Company’s sovereignty over Sémarang.

203
204 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

There was no doubt that the Javanese governor (bupati) of Sémarang was
primarily responsible to the VOC. Given the centrality of this position in
Company-Kartasura relations, however, the Susuhunan, too, was concerned
about who held the post. Ad. Sura Adimanggala, who had been bupati of
Sémarang for nearly four decades, died in July 1721. Oblivious of
Amangkurat IV’s interest in the identity of his successor, Gobius unilat-
erally named Sura Adimanggala’s grand-nephew Ng. Martayuda as the
next bupati.2 The kraton was not pleased. The Surakarta Major Babad
depicts this appointment as an infringement of the Susuhunan’s rights,* but
there may have been more to the affair than this. According to Babad
Kraton, Martayuda had served Pakubuwana I as his scribe while the king
was in Sémarang in 1704-5. During this time the Crown prince, the man
who was now Susuhunan Amangkurat IV, had been caught in adultery
with Martayuda’s wife.* So personal matters may well have been an element
in the kraton’s objections to Martayuda. By May 1722 Martayuda’s juris-
diction over some of the road-dwellers south of Sémarang (wong urut
dalan) was being denied by the Susuhunan’s judges (jaksa). The VOC
stood behind Martayuda and Amangkurat IV declared that the problem
could be left to be resolved when the new commissioner, Dubbeldekop,
came personally to Kartasura.° Martayuda’s tenure of office was to be
brief.
The second issue also had a familiar ring: in November 1721, Cakraning-
rat IV told the VOC that he wished West Madura to be annexed to Company
territory like East Madura. In Sémarang, Bergman was favourably in-
clined towards Cakraningrat [V. When Danuréja sent a summons to the
Madurese lord to come to court for Garébég Mulud (12 Mulud AJ 1646/
1 January 1722), Bergman bumptiously intercepted the letter-bearers and
sent them back to court with their unopened royal summons. He told
Cakraningrat IV that he could stay in Madura and he did so, merely
sending representatives to Mulud.° But the VOC had no intention of an-
nexing West Madura at this stage.
New problems in Javanese-European relations arose on the western pasi-
sir, where the Company, accustomed to dealing with Javanese lords who
understood little of the VOC’s commercial requirements, now found itself
facing lords who understand too much. Peace enabled the Sino-Javanese
governor there, Ad. Jayaningrat of Pékalongan, and his brother Tg. Puspa-
négara, the bupati of Batang and Wiradesa, to organise the area’s econ-
omic affairs to their greater profit, which was frequently not the Company’s.
Three products of the western pasisir were particularly in demand by the
VOC: timber, rice and coffee. Jayaningrat was the key to all three and
reputedly became very rich through his successful manipulation of their
supply.
For many years the VOC had been searching for new stands of timber,
as it exhausted one area after another along Java’s coast. Late in 1719 it
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA 205

discovered a forest called Pénaruban at Wéleri. The Company hoped to get

ten ship-loads of heavy beams a year for twenty years from this forest,
assuming of course that the woodcutters of the pasisir were ordered by
their lords to do the work. Cutting began in 1720, in the face of local
superstitions which were presumably like those of forty-five years before
about the forest being haunted. In 1721, however, it became clear that
barely one-quarter of the required foresters was being levied to work there.’
The VOC’s Tégal Resident, Jan Marchant, believed that coastal dwell-
ers escaped work for the VOC by taking refuge in pradikan villages (sites
of holy graves and religious schools, the inhabitants of which escaped
corvée) or in villages whose services were due to the Susuhunan rather
than to the coastal bupatis. Such villages may indeed have contained as
much as thirty percent of the population of Tégal, for example. During the
wars which began in 1717, many villagers had apparently escaped military
duty in this way. Marchant pressed local Javanese to end this abuse of
pradikan status. He thereby provoked vigorous protests from the jurukunci
(keeper of the kevs, guardian) of Amangkurat I’s grave at Tégalwangi,
both to the Susuhunan and to Gobius at Sémarang, that his manpower
was being taken from him. Marchant called the jurukunci a liar, and
Danuréja instituted an investigation, the outcome of which is unknown to
this writer.*
Later in 1721 the timber supply improved, as did the rice harvest on the
western pasisir. But now Marchant found himself short of cash to pur-
chase these products and Jayaningrat refused to extend credit to the
Company.’ Coffee cultivation was meanwhile expanding in Jayaningrat’s
two plantation sites. He said that he planted 20,000 trees in 1720, bringing
his total to 40,000, and pointedly told Batavia that this commitment should
be recognised through VOC support for his continued tenure of office over
the western pasisir. In 1720 he supplied 1000 (Amsterdam) Ibs (494 kg/
1089 lbs avoirdupois) and in 1721 2750 (Amsterdam) Ibs (1359 kg/2995
lbs avoirdupois) of coffee beans to the Company, small amounts but holding
the promise of better things to come.'°
In 1722, Jayaningrat put his financial schemes into higher gear. The rice
harvest of mid-1722 in Central Java was a good one, as agriculture improved
with the end of large-scale levying of men for military service. From a
high of Sp. Rl. 70/koyan, the rice price dropped to Sp. RI. 25-30 by June
and Sp. RI. 21-2 in August.''! Jayaningrat received an estimated 700
koyans (approximately 1100 metric tons/2.5 million Ibs avoirdupois) of
rice in tax from his subjects. He supplemented this and drove the price up
by buying more in the markets, thereby apparently achieving control of
much of the local rice supply. Then Jayaningrat and Puspanégara pro-
ceeded to deal to their advantage with Chinese and other rice buyers from
outside Java, in violation of the VOC’s treaty rights and to its great anger.
Other Chinese were in the market as well, and by October competition had
206 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

driven the rice price back as high as Sp. RI. 23—6/koyan; as supplies were
exhausted, by December it was Sp. RI. 35 in Surabaya.'* The Company
was the only buyer of coffee available, so Jayaningrat sold it his 5100
(Amsterdam) Ibs (2520 kg/5554 Ibs avoirdupois) of coffee beans in 1722.
This was less than one percent of the coffee the VOC purchased in Java
that year, for the production of the Priangan highlands was now expand-
ing greatly. But at a price of about Rds. Holl. 20/50/— per pikul of 125
(Amsterdam) Ibs, this would have brought Jayaningrat the not insignifi-
cant sum of Rds. Holl. 850 (= Sp. RI. 756).'? There was clearly money to
be made on the western pasisir, but it seemed more likely to flow into
Jayaningrat’s coffers than the VOC’s.'*
In September 1722, Marchant retired as Resident of Tégal, glad to be
finished dealing with Jayaningrat. He advised his successor that Jayaning-
rat and Puspanegéra of Batang were thorough scoundrels and liars, but had
one great advantage for the VOC. Because they were hated by other Java-
nese officials and so oppressed the commoners that they were hated by
them, too, neither lord could afford to turn against the Company. This did
not, of course, prevent Jayaningrat manipulating the rice market and thereby
reputedly becoming the richest official in the Javanese state.'° But at least
it could be assumed that he would not initiate a war against the Company,
whence much of his profits came.
As the war in East Java was drawing to a close in 1722, Amangkurat
IV sent his Patih Danuréja at the head of an embassy to Batavia. It was
normal for lavish gifts to be exchanged on such occasions, but Amang-
kurat IV’s offerings to Batavia were so extravagant that they may be
taken as symbolic of the degree of his dependency upon the Company. To
Governor-General Zwaardecroon he sent twelve gold krisses, four gold
pikes, one gold comb, one gold plate, one gold box, eight gold spoons, a
gold “steenbokje” (ibex: perhaps a copy of the lesser royal ornament
[upacara| Ménjangan), Sp. RI. 3000, eight horses, ten baskets of birds’
nests and seventy koyans (approximately 110 metric tons/250,000 lbs
avoirdupois) of rice. To the Councillors of the Indies and other Company
officers he sent a further eight gold krisses, eight silver combs, eight gold
spoons, Sp. RI. 3000, eight horses, seventy koyans of rice and 4000 hanks
of cotton. The Company needed Amangkurat IV as much as he needed it.
Batavia’s reciprocal dependency was symbolised in the gifts it sent the
Susuhunan: a new state coach with a Dutch coachman (a second carriage
was also promised), a hundred ordinary snaphaenen, four gilded
snaphaenen, four engraved or carved (uijtgekapte) snaphaenen, six long
snaphaenen, four braces of gilded pistols, four braces of engraved or carved
pistols, one Arab horse and two Persian horses.!°
The issues settled by this embassy were few and of limited significance.
The Susuhunan wanted the small VOC detachment withdrawn from the
Sitinggil at the front of his court, an area meant for royal use on grand
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA 207

occasions but which had been occupied by a VOC watch since 1719: the
Javanese objected to the general filthiness of the post and apparently to the
smells of European cooking. Batavia agreed that the post could be re-
moved, for the VOC still had a guard house near the Sitinggil and its main
fortress across the alun-alun.'’ Cakraningrat IV had asked the court to
remove his relatives Suryawinata and Sasrawinata as bupatis of Surabaya,
for they interfered with his aspirations to reclaim that influence over East
Java which had been exercised by previous Cakraningrats. Amangkurat IV
informed the Madurese lord’s mentors in Batavia that he would summon
Suryawinata and Sasrawinata to Kartasura to investigate the matter. This
was no doubt crucial in persuading Cakraningrat IV at last to visit the
kraton for Garébég Mulud in December 1722 (AJ 1647, a Dal-year and
hence celebrated in particularly grand fashion), when for the first time he
personally paid obeisance to Amangkurat IV, over three and one-half years
after the latter’s succession.'®
The major issues in Kartasura-Company relations were left for dis-
cussion during Commissioner Dubbeldekop’s visit to the court in January
and February 1723.'? At Dubbeldekop’s first audience, Amangkurat IV
asked about Martayuda’s status as governor of Sémarang and was told that
the Company had not yet confirmed him in this position, since Gobius had
appointed Martayuda without authorisation. The Susuhunan reportedly said,
after some quibbling, that so long as Martayuda was removed he would
leave the choice of another bupati of Sémarang to Batavia and allow the
successor to have the 1800 households of road-dwellers (wong urut dalan)
granted to the late Sura Adimanggala. For his part, Amangkurat IV re-
ported that Sasrawinata and Suryawinata were deposed as bupatis of
Surabaya and replaced by a son of Citrasoma and a brother-in-law of
Danuréja. The Susuhunan ordered Danuréja to see that an adequate supply
of wood-cutters and other labourers was provided to the VOC for the
felling of the Pénaruban forest, and said that he would do whatever Bata-
via wanted about a new contract to recognise the burdens borne by the
Company in the war then coming to an end. In the event, however, no new
treaty was drawn up during Amangkurat IV’s reign. Danuréja was less ac-
commodating. He wanted prior notification if VOC officers travelled in-
land to purchase local products but Dubbeldekop refused to give such
notification. Danuréja had to back down and fit in with the generally
convivial tone of these negotiations.
The cordiality of Dubbeldekop’s visit to Kartasura was evident also in
its protocol and social arrangements, but somewhat marred by signs of
plots against Amagkurat IV. Dubbeldekop was met at Bayalali by Da-
nuréja and at Banyudana by the Susuhunan. He was invited to the circum-
cision of the Crown prince (later Susuhunan Pakubuwana II, r. 1726-49)
and of three other Pangérans.”” He was the king’s guest at tiger-buffalo
fights and at wayang (shadow puppet) and dance performances. On the
208 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

night of 1-2 February, however, over a dozen Javanese dressed in white

were refused passage by the Company watch at the kraton and then
apprehended by Javanese guards as they tried to enter the court, apparently
intending regicide. They were said to be agents of a plot by “unruly
priests”. Two women and two children were taken into the court as ser-
vants, ten commoners were executed and the two ringleaders were sen-
tenced to do battle with tigers. Dubbeldekop witnessed the “horrible
spectacle” of this means of execution.”!
Almost immediately after Dubbeldekop’s departure from the court,
however, there were signs that the cordiality in VOC-kraton relations
might be fleeting phenomenon. This probably reflected a successful re-
assertion of influence over the king by Danuréja. The Patih came to the
Company’s Resident Simon Ceesjong and demanded “in accordance with
the old custom” that pales bearing the VOC’s arms be erected where they
had stood at some time in the past, so as to indicate areas which were off
limits to VOC personnel, a measure intended to avoid conflict between
VOC and Javanese. Ceesjong agreed and the pales were set, but it is not
clear how much of the court city was thereby closed to the Company’s
personnel.”
When Dubbeldekop wrote to the Susuhunan in March 1723 to announce
the deposition of Martayuda as bupati of Sémarang and his replacement
by Sastrawijaya (or Astrawijaya, a man apparently of Chinese ancestry),”
the Susuhunan was of course pleased. But he said that he now expected
the 1800 households of road-dwellers (wong urut dalan) ceded to the late
Sura Adimanggala to be returned to him. Dubbeldekop told the king
forcefully that this was out of the question, but Batavia had agreed that the
jurisdiction of Sémarang’s judges (jaksa) should not reach beyond Sala-
tiga, rather than extending to Bayalali. In acknowledging this jurisdic-
tional concession, the Susuhunan said that the matter of the wong urut
dalan could be discussed further when Dubbeldekop returned from East
Java where, as was seen in the previous chapter, he had gone to oversee
the surrender of the leading rebels.”
In the matter of greatest immediate importance to the Company, the
delivery of Javanese rice and cash and the purchase of Javanese products,
however, relations still appeared promising. In July 1723, in the wake of
the surrender of the main rebels in East Java, Amangkurat IV ordered his
officials to assist the Company in its rice purchasing.*> Danuréja himself
went to the pasisir in July to oversee the delivery of the 800 koyans of rice
and Sp. RI. 15,600 due to the VOC each year. He appears to have stayed
there until November, by which time 555 koyans of rice and Sp. RI.
14,540 had been handed to the VOC at Sémarang. A further 106 koyans
of rice from more easterly areas was delivered to the Company at Sura-
baya.”° Thus, by the beginning of 1724 about eighty-three percent of the
rice due to the VOC for a year and ninety-three percent of the cash was
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA 209

paid. While this did not reduce the king’s arrears of debts to the VOC
(Sp. RI. 126,257 and 5854 koyans of rice) and indeed marginally increased
them, and of course did not recognise the additional burdens borne by the
Company during the most recent years of warfare, it was particularly sig-
nificant for being the first payment received at all since the 508 koyans
of rice delivered in 1720/1.”’ The royal rice collections had the ironical
effect of removing so much grain from the ordinary markets that the
Company found it difficult to purchase what it wanted. Presumably this
drove up prices as well.” At Garébég Mulud AJ 1648 (11 December
1723), the Susuhunan ordered the assembled notables of his realm to
produce crops, particularly coffee, pepper and indigo, for the Company to
purchase.” The Company officials could thus find reasons for optimism.
From time to time the Company’s own inefficiencies disturbed its deal-
ings with the court. As VOC forces were withdrawn from East Java and
Madura in 1723, the fortresses at Kédhiri, Bangkalan, Grésik and Jipang
were evacuated and in some cases demolished. Artillery from these posts
was brought to Surabaya, including at least ten pieces belonging to the
Susuhunan and others claimed by Cakraningrat IV and Tg. Mataun of
Jipang. The Susuhunan’s request for his cannon appears to have languished
in the Company’s war-weary administrative machinery. Not until March
1724 did Dubbeldekop organise the return of the king’s guns and not until
May did he receive them.*° Not until April 1724, and after having had to
remind the Dutch, did the Susuhunan receive the second coach promised
by the Governor-General in 1722.°!
The return of the two sons whom Amangkurat IV wanted back at the
court rather than exiled, his eldest son Png. A. Mangkunégara and the
child R. M. Lindhu, was fortunately handled with greater dispatch. They
were home by October 1723 and were generously received by their father.
In November they paid a visit to the VOC’s Kartasura Resident Ceesjong,
attired in Dutch dress of velvet and gold.»
The increasing power of Danuréja over the kraton’s affairs did not bode
well for the Company. He seemed to have three main domestic opponents:
Png. Ad. Cakraningrat IV of West Madura, Ad. Jayaningrat of Pékalong-
an and a senior courtier named Ki Tg. Mangunnagara. The first of these
again petitioned the VOC to be taken under its dominion like the East
Madurese and again refused to travel to Kartasura for Garébég Mulud (12
Mulud 1648/11 December 1723).** By early 1724 there were rumours
throughout Surabaya and West Madura that Cakraningrat IV’s power was
about to be undermined by the appointment of his hated relatives Sasra-
winata and Suryawinata to positions in Madura. Danuréja denied this. It
is not clear whether Cakraningrat IV spread the rumours in order to have
an excuse not to go to court, or Danuréja spread them to upset Cakra-
ningrat IV and his subjects.** Danuréja’s conflict with Mangunnagara was
apparently serious but its roots were somewhat obscure to the Europeans.
210 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

It is also unreported in the Surakara Major Babad. Whatever its nature, it

was resolved by Mangunnagara’s death late in 1724.
In November 1723 Amangkurat IV informed Danuréja that he no longer
wished to concern himself with administrative matters and gave full power
over them to the Patih. The latter told Dubbeldekop this and said that in
future the Company should address any complaints to him,” thus effec-
tively downgrading the Company’s protocol status in this protocol-con-
scious age. (This arrangement would however, be of short duration, as will
be seen below.) Then Danuréja undertook the clipping of Jayaningrat’s
wings. This man’s control over the western pasisir, as was pointed out
earlier in this chapter, made him a central consideration in the VOC’s
commercial dealings on the coast. His increasing wealth was also noted at
court. It appears that one of his sons controlled tollgates through which
trade products flowed to the Company, but the location of these is unclear.
In January 1724, Danuréja moved against this branch of Jayaningrat’s
operation by taking control of these tollgates himself.*’
Jayaningrat’s activities continued to make difficulties for the VOC and
now led to steps by the kraton which were still more troublesome. For
over a decade, Jayaningrat had accepted in payment of taxes from his sub-
ordinates only Dutch coins from the Hollandia mint, rejecting those from
Westfrisia or Gelderland (Geldria). As a consequence, his subjects would
accept only Hollandia coins from the Company in payment for their own
products. The VOC was running short of this coinage and objected to the
kraton. In April 1724 Amangkurat [V—that is to say, Danureja—counter-
manded Jayaningrat and ordered that all VOC coinage was to be accepted
everywhere as legal tender. But as part of this order, the court unilaterally
devalued the Company’s currency. Whereas previously Hollandia dub-
belde stuivers (two-stuiver pieces, also called dubbeltjes) had been pre-
ferred over other dubbelde stuivers in the Kartasura empire and had been
reckoned at 28 to the Spanish Real, all VOC dubbelde stuivers were now
to be accepted, but at 30 to the Spanish Real, thereby devaluing the
Company’s currency within the Susuhunan’s territories by 7.1 percent.**
Not only would the kraton’s unilateral devaluation of the Company’s
currency immediately increase the price of all VOC purchases in Java, but
the Europeans also saw in this a stratagem to lighten the royal burden of
debt to the Company. It is not at first obvious how this could be done,
since the debt was fixed in the 11 October 1705 treaty in Spanish Reals.
But it seems that the accounts were presented to the court in Dutch
Rijksdaalders (the normal unit of account for the VOC in this period), the
annual amount thus being expressed as Rds. Holl.17,550 rather than Sp.
RI. 15,600. If, however, the court actually paid with Spanish Reals, then
devaluing the Dutch currency would have the effect of dropping its annual
cash obligation calculated in Dutch Rijksdaalders but paid in Spanish Reals
from Sp. RI 15,600 to Sp. Rl. 14,564 and its cash arrears (as of 1723)
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA 211

from Sp. RI. 126,257 to Sp. RI 117,875. The VOC objected to the new
exchange rate but decided it must nevertheless post the king’s decree in
May 1724.*° Royal orders against speculation in VOC currencies followed
and were posted along the pasisir in Dutch, Javanese, Chinese and Ma-
lay.*' The VOC’s suspicions about the kraton’s intentions were confirmed
when Danuréja went to Sémarang in July-September 1724 to arrange the
annual deliveries. The Company received 722 koyans of the contracted
800 koyans of rice and, indeed, (Sp.) Rds. 14,560.** So the rice payments
were continuing to fall behind and the devaluation was used to reduce the
kraton’s cash obligation to the VOC. The rapidly decreasing ignorance on
the part of some Javanese about how the VOC economy worked thus gave
little cause for celebration in Batavia.
Speculation in VOC currency was paralleled by the emergence of what
appears to have been a sort of futures market in rice, as the Company’s
purchasing encouraged commercial agriculture on the western pasisir. The
Company did not apparently offer futures contracts to farmers and, as was
noted previously, under Jayaningrat’s regime was not even allowed to
purchase on credit. Other dealers, however, who were presumably mainly
Chinese, Javanese and Malay, paid for farmers’ rice in the months before
the harvest, when shortages were common and standing crops could be
bought for delivery after harvest at an attractive price. In August 1724 the
rice harvest began in Tégal, Pekalongan and Batang and was excellent, so
that prices were as low as Rds. Holl. 18 3/4 (= Sp. RI. 15.6 at the new
exchange rate) per koyan. Even at this price, traders who had bought
futures in June and July at prices as low as Rds. Holl.17 1/2 (= Sp. RI.
14.5 at the new rate) per koyan turned a profit; as prices rose their profits
increased. Jacques de Laval, the VOC’s Resident at Tégal, was ordered by
his superiors to purchase rice for stockpiling, which he did on this rising
and apparently well-controlled market. Even at harvest time he contracted
for 200 koyans from Jayaningrat at a high price of Rds. Holl. 20 (= Sp.
Rl. 16.6 at the new rate). By the end of the year he had bought too much
at a price forced too high by the other traders, and had to apologise to his
bosses.** It should be noted that there is little reason to think village rice
growers gained from this commercial activity. Indeed some evidence
suggests a relative decline of population on the western pasisir ca. 1709-43,
which may also have been an absolute decline. Villagers may thus have
moved out of this area in search of less commercialised—and less ruth-
lessly administered—places to live.”
The Europeans and local traders on the western pasisir were undoubt-
edly aware both of the symbiotic nature of their competition and of the au-
thority structures upon which it rested. Without the VOC, demand for rice
would probably have been insufficient to create the market conditions
favourable to other merchants. Without those merchants to organise and
stimulate rice production, the Company would have found it more difficult
OND WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

to purchase grain on the scale it required. It is notable in this regard that

with other products like pepper, cardamom, peas, beans and indigo, which
the VOC seems mainly to have purchased by sending officers into the
interior to deal directly with village producers, greater difficulties were en-
countered in both quantity and regularity of supply.* Ultimately the com-
mercialised rice market of the western pasisir rested upon two crucial
structural features. It was close to Batavia, the centre of European demand.
And it was administered by Jayaningrat and his brother Puspanégara,
gentlemen who combined commercial and administrative interests like the
merchant-oligarchs of Amsterdam. It was largely for this reason also that
coffee was successful only where Jayaningrat governed.* In no other region
of the Kartasura empire did comparable commercial developments occur
at this time, so far as is evident from the sources consulted for this study.
The coincidence of commercial and administrative interests on both the
European and Javanese sides made it unsurprising that trading competition
was reflected in accusations through both administrative hierarchies of
corruption, oppression, fraud and lying.*’ It can hardly be doubted that
there was much shady dealing on this commercial “Wild West” of the
Javanese coast by Europeans, Indonesians and Chinese. But the prospects
of penetrating the accusations and counter-accusations to achieve a confi-
dent view of who was more dishonest than whom are slim, and not worth
pursuit here. Amangkurat IV appears to have taken little interest in (and
probably derived little benefit from) those commercial developments,
beyond ordering his people to grow the crops desired by the Company.*®
In his increasing confidence, the king gave higher priority to the assertion
of his prerogatives and displays of his authority.
Both the kraton and the VOC were particularly curious about Cakranin-
grat IV’s intentions. Danuréja told Dubbeldekop that Cakraningrat IV had
better come to the next Garébég Mulud (12 Mulud AJ 1649/29 November
1724) if he wished to avoid royal displeasure, for he had not appeared the
previous year. Not only did the Madurese lord come, but he also presented
the Susuhunan with an elephant to replace one which had died. Amang-
kurat IV was pleased, for the loss of one of his four elephants had meant
that he could not have a matched pair standing on either side of the alun-
alun on tournament days. After presenting the animal, Cakraningrat IV
was showered with signs of royal favour.*? Tg. Citrasoma of Jépara re-
ceived similar signs of royal grace, including a very valuable Arabian
horse and the title Adipati, already held by Jayaningrat, his counterpart on
the western pasisir. Citrasoma seems not to have shared the latter’s
commercial instincts, but both of them also supplied Amangkurat IV with
new elephants, so the Susuhunan then had six of the beasts to display on
tournament days.*°
Display was important to Amangkurat IV, as it was to all Javanese
rulers. He ordered everyone to adopt red jackets on tournament days and
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA PHAN}

punished with public ridicule three courtiers who failed to turn up wear-
ing the new fashion.*' To his son Mangkunégara he gave new outfits for
seven bédhaya dancers. In September 1724, he undertook a grand royal
tour to Mataram to visit sites holy to the dynasty and to commune with the
Goddess of the Southern Ocean, the first such royal tour since his father’s
of 1716. The Susuhunan was accompanied by Mangkunégara, R. M. Lindhu,
the king’s mother Ratu Pakubuwana, the old Tg. Kandhuruwan Wilatika
and various other dignitaries and women. Danuréja and other senior fig-
ures stayed behind to administer the state. The king and his companions
were carried in palanquins rather than employing the new state coaches,
for which the roads were in too poor a condition. With them marched a
guard of seventy-five VOC Europeans and Javanese soldiers and further
entourage probably amounting to thousands. Dr de Graaf published a full
account of this tour,’ which took the king to (among other places) Kar-
tawinata/Kartasari (the site of his rebellious brothers’ kraton of 1719)
which he renamed Madegonda, to the graves of his royal ancestors Pan.
Senapati Ingalaga and Pan. Seda ing Krapyak at Kutha Gédhe, to the
tombs of subsequent members of the dynasty at Imagiri and to the coastal
cave of the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, Guwa Langse, which the king
entered alone. Of this last place, the Dutch Lt. Hendrik Coster observed,
“IT could not find out what was to be seen there or what the Emperor did
there’”’:** such things were almost never explained to Europeans. This God-
dess is a figure without Islamic justification. It is worth noting de Graaf’s
observation that the VOC account of this tour made no mention of any
Islamic observances whatever, not even of attendance at a mosque on
Fridays.* Seventeen salutes from the VOC’s cannon welcomed Amang-
kurat IV back to Kartasura after a month’s absence.
The king’s exercise of his prerogatives extended beyond display and
ritual. Despite his statement to Danuréja the previous November that he
wished not to burden himself with administrative affairs, late in 1724
Amangkurat IV intervened decisively to replace a number of regional
lords in East Java. Danuréja claimed to Ceesjong that, contrary to custom,
the Susuhunan had not even consulted him about these changes. Among
those dismissed by royal decree was Danuréja’s own brother Dm. Ranuita
of Kédhiri. The lords of Juwana, Kémagétan, Kalangbret and Rawa also
lost their posts.°° More changes followed affecting the administration of
Pathi, Démak, Jagaraga, Blitar, Saréngrat, Kartasana, Caruban and
Grobogan.*” There was a decisiveness and determination in those moves
of a kind which had been visible at the start of Amangkurat IV’s reign in
1719,°8 but there was also an arbitrariness which apparently increased the
sense of insecurity among the Javanese elite. Pasisir lords returning home
from Garébég Mulud, including Cakraningrat IV and Citrasoma, spoke to
Dubbeldekop about the king’s administrative changes. According to
214 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Dubbeldekop, they were of the view that Amangkurat IV had abused his
powers.”
Amangkurat IV’s depositions arose in part out of renewed hostilities by
remnants of the Surapati family. After Surapati III’s surrender in mid-
1723, four of his brothers remained behind at Pasuruan. Supported by
Balinese soldiers camped on the alun-alun, these men apparently awaited
a letter from Surapati III that all was well and that they, too, should sur-
render. No letter came, not surprisingly since, as was seen above, Sura-
pati III concluded that the VOC had deceived him into surrendering. In
August 1723 the VOC commandant at Pasuruan, Jan Menut, led a disas-
trous attack on this group with four companies of VOC European soldiers
(approximately 200 men). Menut lost thirty-one killed and twenty-one
wounded and the rest were lucky to escape to the VOC fortress with their
lives. Surapati’s family and their Balinese allies occupied the alun-alun
and bupati’s dalém (residence), the Company forces being effectively be-
sieged. Dubbeldekop and Danuréja hastened personally to Pasuruan in
September to try to reverse this disaster. They were joined there by other
commanders, notably Cakraningrat [V. With 600 VOC, 400 Pamékasan
and 2000 Amangkurat IV soldiers, on 20 September this new force put
Surapati’s sons and their followers to flight. They moved to the mountains
around Malang. There various rebel remnants took advantage of the fact
that the wet monsoon made mountain roads impassable, giving them free-
dom from challenge by royal or Company forces, to engage in small-scale
hostilities.°! There were troubles at Dringu, near Prabalingga, too,°? but
there were also continuing surrenders of former rebels.°?
As soon as the rains cleared in 1724, Amangkurat IV ordered Tg.
Surabrata of Panagara and Tg. Mataun of Jipang to lead a campaign against
the rebel remnants in Malang. They marched through lands so wild that
they reported the loss of 150 people to tigers within the first few weeks.
There were indirect verbal offers to submit from Surapati’s sons, but no
letters because the rebels said no one among them was literate. These
offers appear not to have been in earnest. Having failed to contact the
enemy, the Susuhunan’s forces withdrew from the mountains in July.™ It
was in the wake of this campaign that Amangkurat IV ordered the changes
described above in the administration of several Madiun and upper Bran-
tas valley regions, in some cases explicitly, and in others implicitly, be-
cause of insufficient displays of zeal in pursuing rebel remnants.° The
last to be fired was A. Dikara, the lord of Pasuruan, who was summoned
to Kartasura and dismissed by the Susuhunan in July 1725.%
The Susuhunan ordered another campaign against the Surapati family in
Malang for the following dry season. Some 3400 men were commanded
by the aged Ky. Tg. Puspanégara of Gresik and Ng. Asmaradana, the
new lord of Kédhiri. In August-September 1725 this army succeeded in
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA 215

driving the rebels from Malang, but not without losses: in one ambush the
royal forces lost some ninety casualties. Amangkurat IV was furious with
Puspanégara for this. When the Grésik lord arrived at court the king rep-
rimanded him sharply but then pardoned him out of consideration for his
advanced age and past loyalty in the darkest early days of Amangkurat
IV’s reign.®’ The rebel remnants continued to roam the wilderness around
Malang thereafter, but caused no significant troubles during the remaining
time of this king.®®
An incident in Kartasura at this time deserves notice, for it suggests that
modern firearms were widespread in Central Java, reflecting the society’s
positive response to new technology. One night in April 1725, numerous
snaphaen shots could be heard from the VOC fortress, whose soldiers
consequently stood to arms. The Europeans were then informed that a
spirit had been seen, so shots had been fired and rice-blocks stamped to
scare it off. The Susuhunan was angry about this tumult in the night. He
therefore imposed a fine of Rd. 1 on anyone who had fired a snaphaen:
these fines brought Rds. 1000 to the king.® Since presumably not every-
one who owned one of these guns had fired it, it would seem that more
than 1000 villagers around the kraton had their own snaphaenen. In the
same year, the arsenals of Puspanégara of Grésik and the lords of Sura-
baya, Sidayu and Lamongan included nearly 600 snaphaenen.” Thus there
were substantial numbers of these new model weapons in Javanese hands.
The number of firearms in Indonesian hands in the Priangan highlands
behind Batavia also worried the VOC at this time.”! It is not clear whence
these weapons came. Some were certainly purchased by notables from the
VOC itself but it is possible that many were of local manufacture.”
European military technology had clearly found such a receptive market
in Java that the Europeans were growing concerned. This paralleled their
concern at the great skill shown by some locals in understanding and
manipulating the Company’s commercial and financial affairs.
Commercial and administrative matters were influenced by Amangkurat
IV’s determination to keep affairs in his own hands and by a growing
chill in Kartasura-Company relations as the king grew more confident
and assertive. He rarely consulted the VOC’s Resident Ceesjong and point-
edly chose ambassadors to Batavia who did not include his highest official,
the Patih Danuréja.”’ Danuréja instead travelled to Sémarang in June-
August 1725. There he paid Sp. RI. 14,633 and delivered 559 koyans of
rice which, with 159 koyans delivered at Surabaya, meant that the court
paid ninety percent of the annual rice due and, by its own new exchange
rate, just over the amount of cash due (but only ninety-four percent of the
cash according to the 1705 treaty arrangements).’* This meant that, what-
ever exchange rate one adopted, the total arrears of royal debt under the
1705 agreements continued to grow.
Ad. Citrasoma, Tg. Suradipura of Banyumas and Tg. Puspanégara of
216 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

Batang (who was particularly useful for his ability to speak Portuguese
and some Dutch) spent July-October 1725 as the king’s ambassadors in
Batavia. There they presented royal requests for better order in the VOC’s
purchasing of Javanese products, for better payment for these goods, for
the return of the wong urut dalan (the road dwellers south of Sémarang)
to royal jurisdiction and for the investigation of corrupt and exploitative
practices by various VOC officers at Kartasura and on the pasisir.” Bata-
via told the king that the wong urut dalan issue could be reviewed when
a new VOC-Kartasura treaty was negotiated. The charges against the
Company’s officers were investigated urgently. The latter of course de-
fended themselves. Commander P.G. Noodt, the Company’s senior officer
at Sémarang, reported that the complaints arose in large measure out of
Javanese lords’ wish to stop direct purchasing from villagers by the VOC
so as to control the supply and prices of products themselves. He did,
however, admit that some VOC Residents had been immoderate and ill-
natured in their dealings with Javanese officials. The Javanese also ac-
cused the Europeans of underpaying producers; the VOC officers responded
that Javanese notables raked off too much of the payments and oppressed
their subjects. That villagers were in the end paid so little that it was often.
unattractive to produce products for the Company is one of the few points
on which the Javanese and European evidence agrees, and which his-
torians may accept.’°
There were other contradictions and difficulties in commercial re-
lations. The king told Batavia that he was ordering his subjects to plant
coffee and pepper. The Company, however, was now concerned about an
oversupply of coffee and its inability to pay for what was produced, so the
last thing it wanted was more Javanese coffee.’”’ In 1725 Jayaningrat
produced 8000 Amsterdam Ibs (3952 kg/8713 lbs avoirdupois) of coffee
beans” but, fortunately for the VOC, the coffee trees planted elsewhere in
Amangkurat IV’s domains all died and in response to Batavia’s request
the Susuhunan ordered his lords to plant something else.” To solve its
twin problems of too much coffee and too little cash and to reduce the
wealth of coffee producers in West Java, in 1726 the VOC imposed a
dramatic cut in coffee prices; this was to have a major impact in Cirébon
and Priangan but was of little significance for Amangkurat IV’s domains.°*°
In November 1725, Garébég Mulud was celebrated at Kartasura in an
atmosphere increasingly influenced by an arbitrary king and the intrigues
swirling around him. Jayaningrat’s star appears to have been rising; it
would be reasonable to presume that some of his great wealth was finding
its ways into the Susuhunan’s hands. Amangkurat IV deposed the two bu-
patis of Tégal for various faults which may or may not have been genu-
ine and replaced them with a son of Jayaningrat, who was renamed Dm.
Tirtanata.*' With his brother Puspanégara in charge of Batang and Wira-
desa and his son now in control of Tégal, Jayaningrat had west pasisir
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA Pay,

commercial rice agriculture firmly in hand. He apparently found further

powerful allies at court. At least his principal enemy, Cakraningrat IV,
claimed that Danuréja and Tirtawiguna, the increasingly influential royal
scribe, were backers of Jayaningrat.*
Cakraningrat IV travelled from Madura to Kartasura for the Garébég
and there found himself at the centre of dangerous intrigues. He had ap-
parently gone confident that the royal favour he seemed to have won at the
last Garébég Mulud would continue. Indeed, according to Cakraningrat’s
side of the story, he was promised one of the ultimate marks of such
favour, a daughter of the Susuhunan by a principal wife for his bride.
When he arrived at court, however, the offer of this girl, R. Aj. Sitisundari,
was withdrawn and replaced by that of the daughter of a concubine (sé/ir).
The Madurese lord politely refused this new proposal and the king said
that in that case he could have neither wife. Cakraningrat IV raged pri-
vately at this insult, which he ascribed principally to the machinations of
Jayaningrat, Danuréja, Tirtawiguna, Puspanégara of Batang and Tg. Tir-
tawijaya of Sidayu, who was also from Jayaningrat’s family. Apparently
the first of these had hopes (which were in the end to fail) of getting
Sitisundari for his newly elevated son Tirtanata. Cakraningrat IV claimed
further that the conspirators had persuaded the king to attempt to poison
him, but that he had been forewarned. The Madurese prince left Kartasura
as quickly as he could. Once safely out of the king’s reach he poured out
his hatred of his enemies to the VOC, swore that he would never go to
court again and begged to become a vassal of the Company. Referring to
Jayaningrat and his family, Cakraningrat IV said that never before had
there been Chinese in the government of Java like these, who sought
solely to spread discord.*?
The Company’s Resident at court, Simon Ceesjong, continued to be told
nothing through official channels about the intrigues there but was the
recipient of much clandestine information, the value of which was ques-
tionable. Noodt told him to remain neutral and keep spying.** The Java-
nese chronicle consulted for this period, the Surakarta Major Babad, is
exceedingly brief on the years 1724-6, shedding little light on the affairs
of the court before the death of Amangkurat IV.*° Much uncertainty there-
fore surrounds the court’s affairs in late 1725 and 1726, but there can be
little doubt that serious games were being played. It is not clear to what
extent the role of the VOC was important in these intrigues. Cakraningrat
IV told Batavia that one of his enemies’ accusations against him was that
he was on the side of the Company rather than of the king.*° Naturally this
evidence cannot be accepted at face value. There were, however, other
signs of the Susuhunan chafing under the VOC treaty yoke. Since 1723 the
Company had been hoping to open negotiations for a new treaty with the
Susuhunan which would recognise the VOC’s costs in saving his throne
and kingdom for him. Amangkurat IV always replied politely. But he also
218 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

said that he and his people could bear no more obligations to the VOC
than those already accepted, and successfully postponed negotiations.*’
The Company thus had grounds for fearing that for the third time in half
a century, victory in war would not lead to success in peace. Like Amang-
kurat II and Pakubuwana I, perhaps Amangkurat IV would prove at best
ungrateful and unprofitable to the Europeans, at worst murderous. The
VOC again looked to the readiness of its war-weary men and equipment
in Central and East Java. While Indonesian military companies were paid
off, European soldiers were kept in various cantonments even beyond the
expiry of their contracted periods of service. This provoked widespread
and understandable dissatisfaction, for every further day in Java increased
a soldier’s prospects of dying from disease before he could get home to
Europe.** In October 1725, this led to a mutiny by twenty European
soldiers in Pasuruan,*’ which was apparently the worst-run VOC post in
Java, with a record of internal conflict, violent behaviour and unsatis-
factory commandants, including one who went mad and tried to commit
suicide.” Around the pasisir and in Kartasura itself, Company fortifications
and other buildings were found to be rotten, eaten by white ants or other-
wise dilapidated.?! By 1727 the fortress in Kartasura could hardly fire
cannon salutes without the vibration causing large pieces to fall out of the
masonry walls.” The last thing the Dutch East India Company could afford
was another war in Java.”
Further development of the kraton’s relations with the Company, and of
internal affairs within the Javanese state, was arrested when Amangkurat
IV fell seriously ill in March 1726.4 He had been suffering from swelling,
stomach pains, chills and flatulence for several days and had missed three
audience days before Danuréja informed Ceesjong on 6 March. He prob-
ably did so at this time because the Susuhunan had found some relief from
drinking Dutch anise and wanted more. Ceesjong had none but gave the
king some aniseed oil to help his flatulence. Amangkurat IV had moved
from the kraton to his former residence as Crown prince (the Kadipaten),
because he thought there he could escape the evil spirits which had been
waking him in terror at night (perhaps indicating attacks of sleep apnea).
His suspicions about the cause of his illness apparently shifted from spirits
to his wives, but he could not decide which one might have infected or
poisoned him.
The Susuhunan’s first priority now was to fix the succession. He
definitively passed over his eldest son Png. A. Mangkunégara, now about
twenty-four, and chose his sixteen-year-old-son by his principal wife®
named R.M. Prabayasa. The latter apparently already bore the Crown
princely titles Pangeran Adipati Anom but the name Mangkunégara,
usually reserved for the Crown prince, had remained with the original
Mangkunégara, the king’s son by a secondary wife. There had thus
been some ambuity about who was the chosen successor. Unquestionably
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA 219

Mangkunégara still had hopes of succeeding to the throne. Both VOC

letters and the Surakarta Major Babad record the concern felt by some
courtiers at the Susuhunan’s nomination of a successor who was not yet
adult. The Susuhunan was no doubt aware that his choice lacked universal
support and must also have been mindful of the fact that it was only the
VOC which had preserved him when his own succession was challenged.
He therefore asked urgently for Batavia’s agreement to his choice of heir.
It took more weeks than remained of the king’s life for Batavia to receive
and reply to this request, but in the meantime Noodt gave him general
assurances on the strength of his authority as the senior VOC officer on
the pasisir.
Amangkurat IV’s next most pressing concern, as he grew convinced
that he was the victim of poisoning or black magic, was to decide whom
to blame. He required oaths of innocence and loyalty from Jayaningrat,
Citrasoma, Cakraningrat IV, Puspanégara of Batang and Ky. Jayaséntika
of Kudus; probably Danuréja was also required to give such an oath.”° The
king’s suspicions also fell at times upon his mother Ratu Pakubuwana
who, to put it mildly, had never much cared for her royal son, and upon
his brother Png. Purbaya, still living under VOC supervision in Batavia.
The king became increasingly convinced, however, that it was Jayaningrat
who was somehow doing him in. He commanded that the elephant given
the year before by Jayaningrat be tied up in the forest so that it would
starve to death, and ordered the murder of a girl whom Jayaningrat had
presented to him. Danuréja saw to it that both disappeared from the king’s
sight, but he secretly fed the elephant and hid the girl.
For three weeks the king seemed better. He moved back to the kraton
and relied upon the medicaments of a famed hermit and dhukun named
Damarjati, who was brought to Kartasura from Jagaraga.°’ But on 3 April,
Amangkurat IV collapsed again. He fainted, vomited painfully and then
came out in red and blue spots and pustules. He also suffered from car-
diac arrhythmia. It was now discovered that his wife R. Aj. Brébés”* was
suffering from leucorrhea; she was therefore put out of the kraton, but the
king’s suspicions about the origins of his illness remained fixed primarily
upon Jayaningrat and Purbaya. Amangkurat IV now secluded himself with
the women of the court and accepted medicines only from—of all people—
his unloving mother Ratu Pakubuwana, who was now totally blind and
had long been ignored by her unloveable son. He sought a new dhukun
from Sidayu, asked the VOC Resident for Dutch medicine (a healing plas-
ter was sent), various breads and sweet white wine, and welcomed the
arrival of Cakraningrat [V’s mother with Madurese dhukuns. These last
seem to have helped him. He told Cakraningrat IV’s mother that her son
could after all have R. Aj. Sitisundari for a bride and that he much wanted
to see Cakraningrat IV before his own life ended. By now Kartasura was
crowded with the wives of dignitaries from throughout the empire who, as
220 WAR, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN JAVA

was required by custom, left their husbands to attend to the king in his
illness. Other dignitaries stood watch at the kraton and on the alun-alun.
The number of Europeans was also increasing discreetly, as the Company
brought in reinforcements in small parties so as not to cause alarm.
At midday on 20 April 1726, Amangkurat IV died. Within two hours
an entourage perhaps exceeding 300 senior courtiers, kraton soldiers and
servants, commoners and religious figures led by the Pangulu left the
kraton taking the king’s body, shaded by eight umbrellas, to the royal
graves at Imagiri. There it was buried the following day.” The VOC’s
kraton watch occupied the Sitinggil at the front of the court but all seemed
quiet.! According to the Surakarta Major Babad, of the court dignitaries
only Danuréja and Mangkunégara were in the kraton when the king died.
Danuréja persuaded Mangkunégara to leave if he wished to become king,
for first the other courtiers (punggawas) and the VOC Governor-General
must be consulted. Reluctantly, Mangkunégara left the court. The text says
that Danuréja then ignored the views of several influential courtiers and,
with the agreement of the VOC, installed Amangkurat IV’s chosen Crown
prince as Susuhunan Pakubuwana II (r. 1726-49).'°' There can be little
doubt that one of the attractions of Pakubuwana II to Danuréja was his
very youth (he was just sixteen), for this would give the Patih enhanced
scope for controlling the affairs of state. It is clear from VOC evidence,
however, that this announcement of the succession was not in fact made
until several tense weeks had passed at court.
Thus after a half-century of violent and ambivalent interaction, the
alliance of the Dutch East India Company and the empire of Kartasura
culminated in a dead, probably poisoned,'”’ king. All the tensions and po-
tentialities of a succession crisis were again present. Such a crisis attended
the first VOC intervention in 1677. In 1703-4, another propelled the
Europeans and Javanese into the First Javanese War of Succession. That
war was over less than a decade when the Surabaya War and then the
Second Javanese War of Succession broke out. That a third succession war
did not erupt in 1726 was probably due in large measure to the youth of
most of the princes and, perhaps, to a reluctance among Javanese notables
to start yet another civil war.
The gains and losses of the main participants since 1677 can be assessed
roughly by seeing how their affairs stood in the few peaceful years of
Amangkurat IV’s reign. If the Mataram dynasty’s main aim was merely its
own preservation, then it had achieved its goal. Indeed a branch of the
dynasty which would not have gained the throne otherwise had done so by
alliance with the Europeans in 1704. But the kraton paid a high price in
rice and cash, and in general political and economic interference, for this
survival. The Cakraningrats of West Madura still ruled their land, but their
attempt to operate in the political interstice between Kartasura and Batavia
left them not quite trusted by either side. Cakraningrat II had wielded great
THE NEW ORDER IN PACIFIED JAVA DPA

power and influence, but Cakraningrat III was killed aboard a Company
ship and Cakraningrat IV occupied a most dubious position at Kartasura
(or, as he preferred, not at Kartasura). The princely house of Surabaya,
caught in a three-way crush among Kartasura, the VOC and the Cakraning-
rats, was utterly destroyed, its last scion, Panji Surengrana, sent into exile
in 1723. Similarly, although Surapati’s descendants would roam the wilds
of southeast Java for several decades, they were finished as a significant
force. The VOC intervened in Java in search of security, stability, particu-
lar products and profit. One could perhaps argue that the security of Batavia
was indirectly enhanced by the troubles of the Kartasura empire and cer-
tainly considerable timber and rice were gained from Java’s pasisir. But
the Javanese state was not visibly more stable (indeed, was perhaps less
so) than before the European intervention and this cannot have been with-
out undesirable implications for Batavia’s security. And of financial profit
for the Company there was no sign.
There must have been some people for whom the VOC-Kartasura al-
liance was an unalloyed benefit, but they do not appear in the records
studied for this volume. Certain individuals achieved great wealth. One
thinks of Speelman on the European side and Jayaningrat on the Javanese.
On the other hand, the former was denounced at his death for massive
dishonesty and maladministration and the latter was suspected by his king
of being his murderer. The Susuhunans of Kartasura themselves may have
gathered significant wealth.'* At the bottom of the social structure, however,
the peasants of Java can safely be assumed to have found little cause for
rejoicing in the events of the last half-century. They had fought and died,
grown their crops in order to turn them over to the Company or to their
lords, suffered famine and disease and doubtless sought to escape to places
quieter, richer, healthier than wherever they were. One can hope that some
made it, but certainly many did not. Vast tracts of East Java in particular
were devastated and virtually devoid of population in 1726, and would
remain so for many years. Readers should consider in their imaginations
those ordinary Javanese people who appear so rarely in the chronicles and
archives, and whose experiences form the unwritten history of the Karta-
sura period.
Conclusion:
War, Economy and
Cultural Reinforcement

In the 1670s in Java, Asian and European imperial forces collided in a

clumsy embrace of self-interest. Thereafter, this embrace powerfully
influenced the fates of the Dutch East India Company, of the Mataram
dynasty, of the Cakraningrats of West Madura and of lesser actors such as
the lords of Surabaya, Surapati and multiple local leaders, officials, re-
ligious luminaries, scions of the royal house, Javanese peasants and vaga-
bonds from far afield. Half a century later, it would be difficult to say
whether anyone had clearly benefitted from this confluence of interests,
but equally hard to deny that its fruits were profound.
Trunajaya, a prince of the house of Madura, led the rebellion of the
1670s which toppled the Mataram king from his throne and precipitated
the intervention of the VOC (Chapter 1). Over three years and much hard
campaigning were required before the alliance of Amangkurat II and the
VOC succeeded in establishing the former in his new kraton of Kartasura
(Chapter 2). Two further years of fighting finally ended the challenge to
Amangkurat II from his brother Pugér and other lesser figures in the
interior of Central Java (Chapter 3). In the success of this alliance, how-
ever, lay the roots of its destruction, for Amangkurat II was unwilling to
tolerate the dominating position within his kingdom’s affairs which the
VOC demanded in recognition of its centrality in his victory (Chapter 4).
In 1686, the unhappy alliance of kraton and Company was blown apart
by the massacre of Capt. Tack’s embassy to the court, there being little
room for doubt that Amangkurat II himself was a central figure in the con-
spiracy (Chapter 5). For nearly eighteen years thereafter, the VOC and
Amangkurat II feared the outbreak of war between themselves, war for
which neither was prepared and which essentially for that reason did not
occur. While the Company and the Susuhunan thus waited in anticipation,
Surapati and Cakraningrat II carved out large areas of East Java for their

aoe
CONCLUSION O98

personal empires. At the same time, intrigues among the kraton elite reached
deadly proportions (Chapter 6-7). The death of Amangkurat II in 1703
provoked the First Javanese War of Succession, which ended in the joint
victory of Prince Pugér (Pakubuwana I) and the VOC, the exile of
Amangkurat III, the death of Surapati and an attempt to break the power
of the Cakraningrats in East Java (Chapter 8).
The renewed VOC-Kartasura alliance represented by Pakubuwana I’s
occupation of the throne failed to produce either the political and eco-
nomic benefits or the stability hoped for by its main supporters (Chapter
9). Within less than a decade, the Surabaya War (1717-23) and the Sec-
ond Javanese War of Succession (1719-23) severely tested the restored al-
liance (Chapter 10). Years of desperate campaigning again ended in vic-
tory for the VOC-Kartasura alliance (Chapter 11). Yet once again, this
victory brought few of the benefits expected by the Company and the
Kartasura elite, and subsequent events showed how limited in fact was the
congruence of their self-interests (Chapter 12).
These five decades of European-Javanese involvement caused signifi-
cant and enduring developments on both sides. This book has chosen to
highlight the themes of war, culture and economy. The introduction to
this volume briefly described the social, cultural, economic and military
settings of the Europeans in Java and of the Asian actors there, particu-
larly of the Javanese, on the eve of the 1670s. It is appropriate now to
draw together the military, cultural and economic outcomes of these fifty
troubled and violent years.
War had been a major feature of both European and Javanese society
long before the 1670s, but in Java for most of the half-century thereafter
it can probably be called the central social fact. Its costs were very high.
All sides in the campaigns described in preceding chapters lost heavily in
manpower (much of it through disease as well as enemy action) and in
material resources. The social and economic burdens borne by Javanese
society for these wars are difficult to assess, but can safely be regarded as
serious. It is easier to establish that this fighting was a substantial financial
burden for the VOC. The treaties between the kraton and the Company
which established military cooperation failed utterly in their aim of ensur-
ing that in the longer term the VOC would profit from its intervention in
Central and East Java.
A striking outcome of the military history of this period was the rapid
transfer of technology from the European to the Javanese side. Before the
1670s, Javanese and European siegecraft, artillery, firearms and other
weapons appear to have been comparable, although in 1651 van Goens
commented critically upon certain aspects of Javanese processes of manu-
facture.! When Speelman’s forces attacked Trunajaya’s at Surabaya in
1677, there appears to have been no significant technological gap between
them.? Subsequently the VOC introduced some of the new weapons
224 CONCLUSION

developed in seventeenth-century European warfare, notably the snaphaen

to replace the matchlock musket, pre-packaged paper cartridges and the
grenade, followed after the period of this study by the bayonet. Javanese
adopted these weapons as soon as was practicable. Their requests for
snaphaenen began in the 1680s and 1690s, when they were first being
introduced for VOC forces on a more general scale.’ By the 1720s,
snaphaenen were apparently widely owned in Javanese society and were
probably being manufactured locally.* In the field of siege warfare, the
VOC introduced only the Coehoorn mortar, a small “hand mortar” for
throwing grenades. This may have been invented by Menno van Coehoorn
as early as 1673,° but was apparently introduced by the VOC into Java for
the first time in the campaign of 1706. In Java’s next major war, in 1718,
the Company’s officers were evidently surprised to find that their Sura-
bayan enemies had copied the weapon and were putting it to effective use
against them.®° At the end of the fifty years studied here, Javanese and
European military technology had changed, but had done so in tandem and
thus remained as comparable to one another as before.
A major question is whether the professionalisation of military training,
that “decisive point [which] is outwardly drilling, inwardly discipline”,’
which was a characteristic innovation of Maurits van Nassau, had an impact
upon Javanese warfare. Certainly the vast majority of any Javanese army
remained conscripts who brought little or no training to the field of battle.
In time of war, however, this was often true of the European armies of the
age as well.’ What, however, of the professional companies of soldiers
who served Javanese lords or of the conscripted peasants during lulls in
the fighting? On this there is only little evidence, but it is persuasive.
Babad Kraton describes Cakraningrat II imposing European-style military
exercises upon his soldiers on the eve of the First Javanese War of Suc-
cession in 1704.? And the VOC reported in 1720 that the rebel princes
Purbaya and Blitar were “having their military do watches and march
according to the striking of the clock and the beating of the drum in the
European fashion.”!° It cannot be asserted with absolute confidence that
the Javanese had evolved no forms of military drill of their own before
they encountered Maurits van Nassau’s military heirs, but it seems un-
likely that they had. It is worth noting, by way of comparison, that drill
was evidently unknown in the army of the Indian Mughals in the same
period.'' Thus, there are grounds for thinking that drill was an innovation
for Javanese soldiers, a development of perhaps even greater significance '
than the adoption of new technology, for it suggests changes in the social
organisation of warfare.
Cultural aspects of the period differ strikingly. Whereas the Javanese
borrowed what they learned of European technology, and probably of
military drill as well, it would not be too simplistic to say that the more
familiar they became with European culture in general, the less they saw
CONCLUSION 225

to like or borrow. At the start of their close association, the VOC and the
Javanese state were deeply ignorant of one another, of each other’s re-
ligion, customs, modes of operation and aspirations. Each side regarded
the other as unreliable at best and treacherous at worst. The subsequent
half-century of misunderstandings, insults and betrayals merely served to
entrench such stereotypes. Cultural identities appear to have drawn even
further apart, differences to have become even more sharply defined, as
familiarity across this cultural gap grew. It was suggested above that there
may have been a growing sense of Javaneseness as a consequence of the
foreign interventions in Java in this period, one which was labelled Islamic
but which in fact departed from abstract Islamic definitions by recognising
Hindu Balinese as being somehow related. Yet this sense of Javaneseness,
if indeed it was growing and displacing more provincial identities, appears
still to have had regionalist aspects to it and did not, on the evidence
available, attract universal endorsement.'”
With regard to cultural change, Java in the period 1677-1726 does
present one, perhaps small, conundrum. Cultural change being one of the
most elusive of historical phenomena, one is inclined to turn to evidence
of external, visible matters as indicators of deeper developments. Clothing
is, for example, an external marker of cultural identity in most societies,
and certainly was in the VOC and Javanese societies of this period. It is
therefore puzzling to note that, while suspicions and negative stereotypes
reigned in Javanese-European relations, the Javanese king and male mem-
bers of his family took to wearing European dress on some occasions from
an early time. The most remarkable story in this regard is the babad tale
of Amangkurat II dressing in European fashion in 1680 so that he “looked
like the Governor-General of Batavia”, thereby deepening the reigning
confusion about whether he was truly Javanese at all. VOC sources do not
confirm this tale, but verify that Dutch dress was worn on other occasions
by senior figures in the court.'? This suggests a contrast with seventeenth-
century India where, according to Qaisar, Indians were indifferent to
European dress and Europeans saw the advantages of some Indian ap-
parel.'* In Java, European men—so far as is known to this writer—main-
tained their dress as a mark of identity while at least some Javanese were
prepared occasionally to dress like Europeans. Perhaps this is parallel to
the Javanese openness to European military technology, which was also
apparently greater than the Indians’. In any case, clothing does not appear
to have represented a bridge of any substance between Javanese and VOC
cultures.
The economic outcome of these fifty years of interaction is the easiest
to assess and describe. The VOC became deeply entrenched as an eco-
nomic actor in Java. Its role in the coastal shipping trade has hardly been
considered above, and would require study of a new range of VOC evi-
dence, but was undoubtedly significant. As the aspiring licensing agent for
226 CONCLUSION

trade through its system of passes, the VOC touched much of Java’s ex-
ternal commerce. It took valuable products from Java for its own needs,
leading to major deforestation along the pasisir and encouraging impor-
tant developments in Java’s commercial rice industry in particular.'° The
Susuhunans also paid large amounts of cash to the Company by taxing
their subjects. This entrenchment of the Company in the local economy
arose from the Mataram dynasty’s recurrent need for VOC military sup-
port, which could only be had in return for such arrangements.
Both sides manipulated these circumstances as best they could, the
Company to get more products and cash out of Java, the Javanese to
deliver less. It is hard to assess who played this game best. The kraton’s
devaluation of the Company’s currency in 1724 was astute, and another
indicator of how much the Javanese had learned about European affairs.’®
As for the VOC, although it certainly took much out of the Mataram
empire, it seems reasonably clear that its involvement there remained a
financial disaster. For the Javanese economy as a whole, and for many of
the peasants and traders who were its foundation, these decades were hard.
Manpower levies, the destruction of passing armies and raiding parties,
compulsory labour and taxes took a heavy toll, and undoubtedly left Java
poorer than before.
In assessing the changes consequent upon the events of 1677-1726 in
Java, however, one must remember that some important things remained
unchanged. European and Javanese hierarchical social structures survived,
the Javanese administrative system was hardly more regularised than before
and the martial style of both societies persisted. The deeply rooted
differences and animosities which set the interests of the pasisir, East Java
and Madura at odds with those of the Central Javanese interior remained.
And at the end of this period, just as at the beginning, opponents of the
Mataram dynasty and of the intervention of the European kafirs grounded
much of their political action in their perceived identity as Muslims.
The embrace of self-interest which brought the Dutch East India Company
and the Mataram dynasty together in the 1670s, and which involved also
the lords of West Madura and other forces, was thus a tragic one. At the
end of the period, all sides knew each other better, but liked each other no
more. What they shared was, however, clearer to each, as was what they
did not. Above all, they shared a culture of war, a military ethos central
to the life of both the VOC and the Javanese court. They shared also the
search for a stable new order in Java, which they sought in their alliance. °
What they did not share included a vision of what that new order should
be, for both desired benefits and advantages so great that the war-torn
society and economy of Java could not satisfy them. Both paid a heavy
price for the irreconcilability and impracticability of their aspirations. Their
cultural identities meanwhile remained unbridgeable, sharing little more
than mirrored negative stereotypes of one another.
CONCLUSION OOF

When set in a larger comparative context, the episodes studied here

raise major historical questions deserving further pursuit. The main emphasis
here has been upon European and Javanese societies which were very
different from each other. But because both were pre-industrial, their
experience may shed light on what kinds of interchange may be possible,
of what may constitute the barriers between, two societies not separated
from one another by the industrial revolution. Here it has been argued that
profound cultural barriers did not inhibit technological transfer. With social
formations which were comparable and war as a central engine of change,
military technology and new economic ideas rapidly crossed the cultural
divide.
Yet it is notable that in other pre-industrial Asian societies, culture may
have impeded the transfer of European technology in the same period. The
case of Japan may not have been an attempt to turn back the technological
clock as Perrin depicts it, but there was certainly a general indifference to
western technology.'’ In India, as Qaisar remarks, the central fact is the
selectivity of the Indian response to European technology.'* On the whole,
in the areas of concern in this study, the Japanese response to European
innovations appears to have been fairly negative and the Indian, while
more positive, was slower than the Javanese. It must be emphasised,
however, that comparative research more directly focussed on this issue
would make it easier to draw such conclusions. When one compares three
cases but is familiar with the primary sources for only one of them, one
cannot be certain how far contrasts among the cases represent real distinc-
tions among historical experiences rather than differences in the types of
sources which are available or have been studied, in the priorities and
assumptions of other writers, or even in one’s own understandings of these
writers.
The question obviously arises why Javanese society should seem to
have been more open to new ideas coming from Europe in this period.
Given the gaps in the evidence and the subtlety of the question, only
tentative answers can be suggested. One is bound to be struck at the outset
by the consistent impression of cultural flexibility from the earliest times
in Java, at least among the literate elite who left the bulk of the evidence.
In the pre-Islamic period, as Professor Zoetmulder has shown, Javanese
poets turned to Sanskrit literature for their narrative styles, characters and
plots. Yet the resultant works of literature were indubitably set in Java,
the characters became Javanese, the seasons, flora and fauna were those
of Java.'? A foreign literary world was appropriated and used without
apparently attenuating the Javaneseness of those who used it. Similarly,
when Islam was adopted many significant changes came with it, notably
such rituals as circumcision and burial. Yet the Javanese elite managed to
become Muslims while retaining what they wished of earlier ideas,
adopting what they desired of the new doctrines while keeping what they
228 CONCLUSION

wanted of the old, with no evident uncertainty about their J avaneseness.””

A society which can make such religious and cultural adaptations and
transitions is perhaps one which would find new technology simple to
absorb. The observation that there was long-standing cultural flexibility in
Java does not itself, however, explain why this should be so.
An explanation for the evident flexibility and openness of Javanese
culture—or, at least, of the literate elite of Java—should perhaps be sought
in Java’s long involvement in international trade. This was a direct func-
tion of its geographic position, near the trade routes between China and
Indonesia’s “spice islands” (Maluku) in the east and India, the Middle East
and the Mediterranean in the west.
The early history of this trade is obscured by a general paucity of
ancient records and frequent uncertainties over toponyms in foreign
sources. There can, however, be no doubt of the antiquity of Java’s exter-
nal trade. Chinese evidence suggests regular trading contacts with Java
from at least the early fifth century AD.”! Similarly, Java was known to
early Arab traders and is described in detail in Arab records of the fifteenth
century.” Tenth-century inscriptions from Java itself confirm the presence
there of foreigners from other areas of Southeast Asia and India, and of
foreign trade items.** By the early sixteenth century Tomé Pires could say
of Java—that “prosperous and proud and rich and chivalrous island’”—that
it “gathered together such great merchants with so much trade along its sea
coasts, that nowhere else so large and so rich was known. Some of them
[the merchants] were Chinese, some Arabs, Parsees, Gujeratis, Bengalis
and of many other nationalities, and they flourished ... greatly.”*
A significant degree of cosmopolitanism and sophistication could
reasonably be expected of a society with such a lengthy history of in-
volvement in international trade, but showing that Java’s trade had long
facilitated cultural openness is insufficient to explain the specific phenom-
ena observed in the half-century after the 1670s. One must consider also
the character of the imperial forces which collided in the territories of the
Mataram dynasty in that period. These European and Indonesian imperi-
alisms may be considered in their cultural, military and economic aspects.
The Europeans’ general aims were clear. Through alliance with the
Mataram dynasty, the Dutch East India Company sought military victory
over their mutual enemies. The Company’s economic goal was profit,
which it sought through arrangements to extract products and cash from
the Javanese economy, through concessions which would favor VOC trade
and through the achievement of general security and stability in Central
and East Java. It is worth remembering that the Company did not seek
extensive territorial control within Kartasura’s dominions. When several
pasisir lords offered their obeisance to the VOC in 1704, Batavia refused
them.” Only the region of S€marang (the VOC’s coastal headquarters)
and East Madura were under VOC sovereignty, while Cirébon was a VOC
CONCLUSION 229

protectorate. Through victory and profit, the Company sought to secure its
role as a dominant, but independent, economic actor in Central and East
Java. It wanted success within its own financial and commercial arrange-
ments, not naturalisation within indigenous Javanese economic and social
systems. Its cultural aim may be described as autonomy and integrity for
its own culture, for its enclave of Europeanness on the fringes of Javanese
society.
The Javanese who allied with the Company also thereby sought victory
over their shared enemies. From their point of view, the relationship was
perhaps less one of alliance than of indigenous monarchs who struck a
bargain with the motley mercenary army which marched under the
Company’s flag. Their economic goal was control of the Kartasura king-
dom’s wealth through domination of its state systems. This was only partly
a matter of institutions, for there were few institutionalised structures in
this empire. Rather, the state was held together primarily by personal re-
lationships, including the omnipresent threat or exercise of violence, and
by cultural axioms which rendered unquestionable the existence of the
monarchy. The continuing autonomy and integrity of Javanese culture, as
defined by previous practice and contemporary need, was thus a central
aim of the VOC’s Javanese allies. Without it, their control of the state and
its resources was bound to be tenuous. Hence the urgency of proving, in
1680, that Amangkurat II was not the son of Admiral Speelman in dis-
guise.” Hence Pakubuwana I’s desire to regain the missing pusakas and,
when it became clear that they were not to be recovered, his need to create
other forms of legitimation to replace them.’
Madura’s lords were important if subsidiary actors. They sought al-
liance with the VOC or the Kartasura dynasty or both so as to share in
their victory. Thus might they share also in the political and economic
benefits of victory. The ambitions of the Madurese were largely restric-
ted to maximum dominion over East Java, but twice they conquered the
kraton itself and seemed poised to establish a Madurese imperium in
Java’s heartland. The first occasion was in 1677, when Trunajaya took the
court. The second, well after the period covered in this volume, was when
Cakraningrat IV conquered the court in 1742.8 In both cases, the victory
was short-lived. The cultural goals of the Madurese were essentially those
of the Javanese dynasty, for this elite shared in the cultural values of the
Javanese state.
For the VOC, its Javanese allies and the lords of Madura, the outcome
of these fifty years was a combination of victory and frustration, of suc-
cess and failure. Their alliances brought victories on the field of battle, but
these merely precipitated continuing opposition and, thus, endemic war-
fare, requiring yet more military action. The economic costs were high for
all parties, even if it is difficult to measure these with much precision. So
the military victories were transient and the economic aims frustrated. Yet,
230 CONCLUSION

and at first glance ironically, the cultural aims of all sides were achieved,
if achievement is the appropriate term in such matters. For cultural integ-
rity was preserved, indeed perhaps entrenched. Cultural boundaries were,
it seems, more sharply drawn, the cross-cultural stereotypes solidified, by
these years of violent alliance and opposition. On the Javanese side, cultural
values may have been emphasised with even greater urgency than before
by the victorious kings and their entourages, for this may have offered a
means to allay doubts about the legitimacy of these monarchs who re-
quired the armed support of the kafir Company.
There was interchange across ethnic categories, evinced mainly on the
Javanese side and primarily in the field of military technology and drill.
The Javanese also increasingly understood the Company’s financial sys-
tems and succeeded in manipulating them. Military affairs were, however,
undoubtedly the area in which the greatest innovation was visible, as
Javanese eagerly took to the new weapons and techniques born of the
ravages of European warfare.
Of cultural rapprochement, however, there was little sign. This was true
among the Javanese, save the problematic adoption of Dutch dress by
royalty on some occasions, as noted above. There were, for example, no
Javanese Christians to be found in Kartasura’s domains. The Europeans of
Batavia were in fact an ethnic and cultural amalgam, but this mix had little
to do with the culture of Central and East Java. Some Europeans in the
latter area must have adopted traits from the dominant Javanese culture
which surrounded them and provided them with wives and concubines,
but there is little sign of such adaptation in the surviving evidence. The
VOC maintained a self-consciously separate identity which it regarded as
Dutch.
Nor was there any question of large-scale accommodation of economic
systems. The VOC sought cash, products and favourable trading arrange-
ments through treaties with Javanese kings. But it did not attempt to become
a taxer of the Javanese peasantry any more than the court of Kartasura
sought to become an international seaborne trading enterprise. Rather,
they competed with one another for the surplus production of the Javanese
economy, neither the VOC nor the kraton and its supporters gaining all
that they wanted. Neither could achieve clear dominion or independent
hegemony in the Javanese heartland, so neither could satisfy its competing
economic demands at the other’s expense.
The precise circumstances and processes of cross-cultural interchange
in Java from the 1670s to 1720s must be remembered. The occasion for
VOC intervention was the deeply rooted, late-seventeenth-century crisis of
the Mataram dynasty. The process was warfare, that ubiquitous and dread-
ful engine of change in human history.
It is not perhaps surprising that military need on the Javanese side
should lead to a borrowing of military technology. To return to the
CONCLUSION BESS |

comparison with Japan, clearly one of the reasons why the Japanese elite
had little interest in new military technology in this same period was the
Pax Tokugawa: one needed no new technology for wars which were not
being fought. Similarly, when Javanese society was demilitarised by the
Pax Neerlandica of the nineteenth century, the Javanese elite turned from
new weapons to aesthetic refinements of protocol and etiquette, perhaps
including an increasing cultural valuation of krisses paralleling the Japa-
nese veneration of swords. The main exception to this generalisation was
the Mangkunégaran principality, which established a European-trained
Mangkunégaran Legion in 1808 upon the orders of the Governor-General
in Batavia. This contained infantry, cavalry and artillery units.”
Just as military necessity encouraged the transfer of military ideas, so
economic needs facilitated some new economic activities. The Company’s
need for cash and products led to experimentation with new crops in Java,
among which the sole significant success in the period covered here was
coffee grown in the West Java highlands, outside Kartasura’s dominions,
and that only at the end of this period. Treaty arrangements with the court
aimed to produce cash for the Company’s depleted coffers and to guaran-
tee its trading hegemony along the pasisir. The Javanese elite needed to
maximise their control of the local economy, which meant not only calling
in the VOC but thereafter devising means to avoid repaying the Company’s
costs. They delivered much to the Europeans, but doubtless could have
delivered more had they had the will to do so. By 1724, devaluation was
used by the court to reduce its obligations to the VOC. At the lower social
levels, peasants appear to have moved locations in large numbers. Some,
indeed perhaps many, did so in order to escape the burdens imposed by
VOC-Kartasura treaties,” burdens which were passed down from the kings
who had signed the treaties to the producing peasants.
There was, however, no need for cultural borrowing on either side.
Neither the Europeans nor the Indonesians felt any sense of cultural inad-
equacy. The ostensibly Dutch but in fact Mestizo culture of the Company
in Java perceived little need for such things as Islam or the aesthetic
values of Javanese art, dance, music or drama. The Javanese were equally
secure in their cultural identity and could see little worth having in Company
culture, beyond its military offerings and, on some occasions, European
dress. This was true irrespective of what side one was on or of victory or
defeat. Neither those Javanese who fought with the Company nor those
who fought against it, neither those who triumphed nor those who were
beaten, were moved to abandon their own cultural paradigms. It can
therefore be said that the military conflicts in Java in the later seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries were culture-reinforcing. They
did not challenge cultural norms but rather maintained, and probably
strengthened, them.
In the course of the nineteenth century, all this was to change, both in
22 CONCLUSION

Java and throughout much of the rest of Asia, Africa and the Pacific. As
the nations of Europe industrialised and spread their colonial empires across
the globe, new kinds of conflicts emerged. Into places where once the
technology of the flintlock musket or the bayonet might readily have been
borrowed,2! there now came conquerors armed with weapons which re-
quired different sorts of societies to produce and maintain them: steam
engines, rifled breech-loaders, repeaters and machine-guns, high explo-
sives, the telegraph and barbed wire. Europeans still allied with, or en-
listed, one local group against another in their colonial wars and their
campaigns were often very costly, but the outcome was unquestionably
European dominion. The colonised found themselves facing, not vexatious
European allies, but European masters. The fact that Europeans had won
power and their Asian, African and Pacific opponents had lost it could
hardly be gainsaid.
Clausewitz observed that “in a lost battle, the strength of the army is
broken, the moral even more than the physical”.*? The truth of this can-
not be denied. Of course there is a chicken-and-egg quality to this matter
which the great General’s comment obscures, for the moral strength of an
army—or, more generally, of a people—may be a substantial element in
determining whether they win or lose an armed conflict. In the wake of the
lost battles and wars of imperial conquest, colonised peoples naturally
wondered what might have been the moral and cultural roots of their
defeat.
Thus, the colonial wars of the nineteenth century were not, like the
wars studied in this volume, culture-reinforcing. Rather, they typically
strengthened cultural identities on the victorious European side but chal-
lenged them on the defeated, colonised side. The response of the colonised
was often, as Michael Adas says, “bewilderment and insecurity [which]
compounded the colonized peoples’ deep sense of social and economic de-
cline.”*? There arose, in other words, questions about the cultural roots of
the all-too-obvious political defeat of the peoples of Asia, Africa and the
Pacific. Out of this arose millenarian movements of the type studied by
Adas, which sought to restore idealised pre-colonial golden ages, and which
were invariably defeated. Some people sought refuge in cultural obscuran-
tism. But there arose also modernising reform movements which were
often central to the eventual overthrow of colonial rule.
The modernising movements of the colonised world took many local
forms, but a large number shared certain basic features. They began
from the belief on the part of colonised elites that their subservience to
European authority was rooted at least partly in shortcomings in their
own cultural heritage. It was necessary therefore to rid that heritage of
deviations, corruptions and rigidities so as to rediscover a more original
and vital form. This could then be the base to which a superstructure of
borrowed European technology and learning could be grafted, thereby
CONCLUSION Boa

producing a culture both indigenous at heart and equal to the colonisers’

in strength. Such culture-reforming elites appeared very early in the Bengal
Renaissance of the early nineteenth century, and thereafter in such move-
ments as India’s Arya Samaj, in Islamic Modernism (including its
twentieth-century Indonesian variants such as Muhammadiyah, the All-
Aceh Union of Ulamas [PUSA] and Persis), in the Young Men’s Buddhist
Association in Burma and in Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh in
Vietnam. In China—not colonised but very much threatened—similar ideas
were expressed by Kang Yuwei. In Siam, like China not a colony but a
state threatened by European powers, such thoughts underlay the modern-
isation of the monarchy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In these movements were found leaders who sought to maintain cultural
roots but who were obliged to recognise—as the elite of Kartasura were
not—that some cultural rethinking was now necessary in order to master
the advances of European learning. Throughout the colonised world was
found a minority among the indigenous elite who even seemed prepared
to abandon their traditions altogether in order to embrace the cultural para-
digms of London, Paris, Amsterdam or New York, and with them the
secrets of Western power.
In Java, this reconsideration of cultural roots in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was complicated by its coincidence with inter-
national Islamic reform. This coincidence raised the question whether
the cultural base for Javanese should be a purified Islam or a revived
pre-Islamic culture. One party, at least, saw Islam as part of the cultural
corruption which had to be got rid of before successful accommodation
with western learning would be possible. Against them stood devout
Muslims, to whom older Javanese traditions represented mere ignorance
and superstition.** Thereby began a tension in twentieth-century Javanese
society, less about how to maintain indigenous cultural roots than about
what they were.
Thus the wars of the first fifty years of Kartasura were not like the
colonial wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were
not like the Dutch conquest of Aceh or Bali, not like the British conquest
of Burma nor the French of Vietnam. Still less were they like the war of
whites upon Amerindians or Australian Aborigines. Rather, these late
seventeenth— and early eighteenth-century conflicts in Java were wars where
the socio-economic circumstances on the Asian and European sides were
comparable enough for military technology and associated ideas to be
readily transferred. Military exigencies therefore raised no challenges to
cultural identities. Indeed, they probably reinforced them.
The Kartasura wars were, in this respect, more like the conflicts of post-
World War II Asia and Africa, where again levels of education and
development on the “Third World” side have facilitated transfer of mili-
tary technology and, in many cases, successful armed resistance. France
234 CONCLUSION

and the United States in Vietnam, the Netherlands in Indonesia, the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan and South Africa in Angola have all demonstrated
that the assumptions of late-nineteenth-century empires no longer necess-
arily apply. And those people in whose territory such interventions have
taken place have not seen in them challenges to their cultural identities
or—to give a more contemporary label to such ways of life—their politi-
cal ideologies and allegiances. Rather, as was true of the Kartasura wars,
these modern interventions have probably reinforced such identities. By
doing so, they have rendered more intractable those conflicts which the
interventions were designed to resolve.
It is not the intention here to propose a sort of Ricklefs’ Rule of cross-
cultural influence in conditions of armed conflict: that where social and
economic circumstances on both sides are such as to facilitate the transfer
of military technology, foreign intervention will reinforce rather than
challenge cultural (and political) identities, thereby exacerbating rather
than resolving the conflict which was the occasion for intervention. Such
generalisations inevitably conceal many exceptions and qualifications. It is
proper, however, to note the existence of a general pattern of some appli-
cability. Here analysis of the period of armed conflict in Java from the
1670s to the 1720s has led to the view that there was a significant link
between the transfer of military technology and questions of cultural identity.
A glance at more recent conflicts, after that period of world history when
western powers enjoyed an apparently unbridgeable technological advan-
tage over non-western peoples, suggests that such a link between tech-
nology and culture is perhaps discernible in other times and places. This
idea may therefore be relevant to cross-cultural history in general. In any
case, it helps to elucidate the violent first half-century of the history of
Kartasura, when Indonesians and Europeans entangled themselves bloodily
in one of the most significant episodes of cross-cultural contact in the pre-
industrial world.
Appendix |
Principal members of the House of Mataram in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
Susuhunan
Amangkurat |
: 1 +———
(r. 1646-77)
Susuhunan Png. Pugér/ Png. A.
R.M. Tapa/ R. Ay.
Amangkurat || Susuhunan Panular
Png. A. Klatingbiru
R. Ay. (r. 1677-1703) Png. Png. Ingalaga/
Mataram/
Klatingkuning | Martasana Singasari Susuhunan
Susuhunan
Susuhunan Pakubuwana |
Panutup/
Amangkurat III (r. 1704-19)
Sunan Kuning
(r. 1703-8) |
Pascal ta Me
R.M. Sudama/
Png. Ad. R.M Png. Pamot R. Ay
led Ie
R.M. Papak/
R.M. Mésir/
R. Martakusuma/
eee
R. Ay.
Lémbah A.M. Surya/
i
R.M. Kawa R.M. Teja/
|pun R. Natawirya/ R. Martataruna/ R. Suryaputra R.M. Ontawirya/ R.M. Sudira/
Blitar/ Songka/
R. Dipataruna/ Png. A. Dipasonta/ R. Wongsatruna/ R. Wiryatruna/ A.M. Suryakusuma/
Sultan Png. Ad.
Png. Ad. Pan. Ingalaga Png. Ad. Png. A. Susuhunan
Ibnu Mustapa = (Pan.)
Dipanagara/ Mangkunégara/ Prangmadana_ Waliolah
Pakubuwana Purbaya
Pan. Erucakra Susuhunan Panatagama/
Amangkurat IV Png. Ng.
li 1719-26) Saloringpasar
I
Png. A. R.M. Lindhu R.M. Prabayasa/ R. Aj. Sitisundari Sultan

1726-49)
Mangkunégara Susuhunan Haméngkubuwana |
Pakubuwana II (r. 1749-92)

(r.
Appendix 2

Major officials of the VOC in the later seventeenth

and early eighteenth centuries.

Governors-General—1653-1729

Joan Maetsuycker 1653-78

Riklof van Goens 1678-81
Cornelis Janszoon Speelman 16814
Joannes Camphuys 1684-91
Willem van Outhoorn 1691-1704
Joan van Hoorn 1704-9
Abraham van Riebeeck 1709-13
Christoffel van Swoll 1713-18
Hendrik Zwaardecroon 1718-25
Mattheus de Haan 1725-9

Senior VOC officers on Java’s north coast!

1677-1730

Cornelis Janszoon Speelman Commander Dec. 1676—Jan. 1678

Isaac de Saint-Martin
Anthonio Hurdt
Christiaen Poolman
Jacob Couper
Cornelis Bartelsz. Marchier
Hendrik van den Eeden
Commander Jan.—July 1678
Superintendent, Admiral, Campaign— & War-
Commander July—Dec. 1678
Campaign— & War-Commander Dec. 1678—
July 1679
Commander, Campaign— & War-Commander
Nov. 1679-Novy. 1682
Opperhoofd (Senior Officer) by July 1680—
Mar. 1683
Commander Noy. 1682—Nov. 1683

236
APPENDIX 2 250

Joannes Cops Opperhoofd Apr.—Nov. 1684

Joannes de Hartogh
Jan Albert Sloot
J. Struijs
Anthonij Dortsman
Solomon Lasage
Arnoldus Hackius
Meijndert de Roij
idem
Pieter Goodschalk
Pieter Ws. Hogerlinde
Pieter Durant
Pieter Ws. Hogerlinde
Anthonij Gerardus Sas
Bitter van Rheede
Andries Jansz. van de Schelde
Michiel Ram
Herman de Wilde
Govert van Wijngaarden
Govert Cnoll
Govert van Wijngaarden
Andries Meesters
Herman de Wilde
Hendrik van der Horst
Govert Cnoll
Willem Drost
Willem Lampe
Francois van der Ebb
Pieter Metsue
Cornelis Jongbloet
Armoldus van Tets
Georg Frederik van Beijlwits
Caspar Hertog
Joan Frederik Gobius
Hans Frederik Bergman
Pieter Wybers
Gerv. van Kervel
Hans Frederik Bergman
Jacob Willem Dubbledekop
Pieter Gijsbert Noodt
Willem Tersmitten
Opperhoofd Jan. 1685—Sept. 1686
Gezaghebber (Governor) & Head of Military
Nov. 1686—Oct. 1694
Gezaghebber Aug.—Oct. 1692
Gezaghebber Oct. 1694—Mar. 1695
Commander & Oppergezaghebber (Senior
Governor) Mar. 1695—Feb. 1696
Opperbevelhebber (Senior Commandant) Dec.
1695—Jan. 16967
Gezaghebber Mar.—Apr. 1696
Head of Military Jan. 1696—-May 1697
Gezaghebber Apr. 1696—July 1698
Head of Military May 1697— ? Mar. 1701
Gezaghebber July 1698—Oct. 1700
Gezaghebber Oct. 1700—Mar. 1701
Gezaghebber Mar. 1701—Mar. 1704
Gezaghebber Mar. 1704—May 1705
Gezaghebber May—July? 1705
Express Commissioner Sept. 1704—Oct. 1705
Campaign—Commander July—Oct. 1705
Gezaghebber July 1705?—Oct. 1705
Commander & Gezaghebber Oct. 1705—
Dec. 1707
Gezaghebber July—Dec. 1706
Gezaghebber Dec. 1706—Nov. 1707?
Campaign-Commander May—Nov. 1707
Gezaghebber(?) Nov. 1707—ca. Apr. 1708
Commissioner Feb. 1708—May 1709
Gezaghebber 1708—May 1709
Gezaghebber May 1709
Gezaghebber May-July 1709
Gezaghebber July 1709—June 1714
Oppergezaghebber June 1714—Apr. 1715
Gezaghebber ca. Mar. 1715
Oppergezaghebber May—Oct. 1715
Gezaghebber Nov. 1715—? May 1717
Gezaghebber, Commissioner & Campaign-
Commander May 1717—Sept. 1722
Commander July—Nov. 1718
Gezaghebber 1717—Sept. 1718
Gezaghebber (?) Sept. 1718-ca. Dec. 1719
Commander Sept. 1719—Dec. 1721
Commissioner & Commander Sept. 1722-
Aug. 1725
Commissioner & Commander Aug. 1725—
Oct. 1726
Commander Oct. 1726—July 1730
Appendix 3

Weights, measures and currencies

The units and currencies employed in Java in the period covered by this study
are not always easily converted to standard modern measures, nor related to one
another with absolute confidence, because of imprecision in their application and
disagreements among contemporary sources. The discussion below offers reason-
able approximations rather than exploring all the difficulties of the evidence.
Weights
1 Amsterdam lb = 494 g = 1.09 lbs avoirdupois
125 Amsterdam Ibs = 1 pikul = 100 kati = 61.75 kg = 136.14 lbs av.
1 koyan = | last = minimum 3000 Amst. lbs = 1482 kg = 1.482 metric tons =
3267 Ibs av.
= maximum 3500 Amst. Ibs = 1729 kg = 1.729 metric tons = 3811
Ibs av.

It should be noted that the koyan varied even more widely depending upon
where the weight was assessed. See the regulations of 3 Jan. 1708 and 16 Oct.
1744 in van der Chijs, Plakaatboek, vol. Ill, pp. 585-6; vol. V, pp. 165-6.
Measures of distance
1 Rijnlandse voet = 31-34 cm = 12.2-13.4 inches
12-16 Rijnlandse voeten = 1 Rijnlandse roed = 3.7-5.4 m = 12.2-17.8 ft
1 Duytsche myl (German mile) = approximately 7.5 km/4.7 mi
1 snaphaen shot was estimated at 60 roeden, or approximately 2-300 m/700-
1100 ft.
There was also an Amsterdam roed of 13 or 16 voeten (@ 28 cm) = 3.6 — 4.5
m = 11.9-14.7 ft.
Currencies

The complexities of the currencies used in Java are formidable. The works by

238
APPENDIX 3 239

Netscher and van der Chijs (Munten) and Scholten (Coins) will provide readers
with further information. The three basic coins were the florin or Guilder (of which
there was only a Dutch variety), the stuiver (of which there were two Dutch
varieties, the heavy and the light), and the Rijksdaalder or Real (of which there
were both Dutch and Spanish or Mexican varieties). In this work, the silver Spanish
Real (also known as “piece of eight”) has been adopted as the standard unit of
currency. Dutch units related to one another as follows:
16 penning = 1 stuiver
2 stuivers = 1 dubbelde stuiver or dubbeltje
20 (light) stuivers = fl. 1
fl. 3 = 1 Rds: Holl:
60 (light) stuivers = 1 Rds. Holl.
48 (heavy) stuivers = 1 Rds. Holl.

Conversion rates between Dutch and Spanish currencies were changed by the
Kartasura devaluation of VOC coinage in April 1724 (see p. 210 above). Before
that time the following conversion rates generally applied, although as is noted in
the discussion of the April 1724 decision, some local variation appears to have
existed:
Sp. Rl. 1 = Rds. Holl. 1.125 = 54 heavy stuivers
Rds. Holl. 1 = Sp. RI. 0.888
After the unilateral Javanese devaluation, the following rates applied in Karta-
sura territories:
Sp: RIP = Rds? Holl) 1.205
Rds. Holl. | = Sp. RI. 0.830
What the VOC called the Spanish Real the Javanese called “the old Real” (reyal
sépuh).' Although Valentyn refers also to the use of a Rupiah (Ropia) of 30
stuivers in Batavia and Java,’ a letter from Tégal says that in 1732 Rupiahs (Ro-
pijen) were unknown and hence not accepted as currency there.”
Glossary

(note: only those meanings which are relevant to the above study are given here).

alun-alun great square before the court

amuk frenzied attack
babad Javanese chronicle
bathik intricately designed dyed fabric
bédhaya a form of court dance in Java
béndhe small gong
bupati governor
cacah household, counting unit
dhukun healer
gamelan Javanese orchestra consisting almost entirely of percus-
sion instruments
Garébég thrice-annual Javanese Islamic festivals, consisting of
Garébég Mulud in celebration of the birth of the Prophet
Muhammad, Gar&ébég Puasa to celebrate the end of the
fasting month, and Garébég Bésar in commemoration
of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son and of the
pilgrimage to Mecca
garwa pangrémbe wife of the second rank
gedhong literally “building”; a term used for a class of court ser-
vants, usually divided into a right and left portion
(gédhong téngén and gédhong kiwa)
Gezaghebber Governor
guru teacher
Haji one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
Heren XVII the Seventeen Gentlemen, the Directors of the VOC in
Amsterdam
kafir unbeliever
Kapédhak a class of court servants; in the Kartasura period these
were apparently young men used as lifeguards of the
king
kliwon a title for administrative officers
Koopman (Coopman) Merchant
krama “high Javanese”, one of the two basic forms of Modern
Javanese (see ngoko)

240
GLOSSARY 241

krapyak hunting enclosure

kraton court
kris dagger
lurah head
Mardijker non-European Christian (see p. 271 n.15)
Mestizo person of mixed ancestry
moncanégara literally “foreign” or outer lands, the interior districts to
the east of the court
Moor non-Indonesian Muslim
ngoko “low Javanese”, one of the two basic forms of Modern
Javanese (see krama)
Onderkoopman Junior Merchant
Opperhoofd Senior Officer
Opperkoopman Senior Merchant
padmi wife of the first rank
pager palisade
pangeran prince
pangulu the chief religious official in a mosque, in an administra-
tive district, or in the court
pasisir north coast of Java
pasanggrahan rest house, hunting lodge
Patih chief administrative officer of the kingdom
péranakan a person of foreign ethnic background but with local roots
pésantren Islamic religious school
pradikan a term for villages which were free of the usual corvée and
tax obligations, being sites of holy graves and religious
schools
priyayi aristocrat
pusaka holy regalia, heirloom
Sarip, sharif descendant of the Prophet Muhammad; in the Indonesian
archipelago the term was usually used for people de-
scended through the Prophet’s grandson Hasan
Sayid, sayyid descendant of the Prophet Muhammad; in the Indonesian
archipelago the term was usually used for people de-
scended through the Prophet’s grandson Husain
sélir concubine
séngkala chronogram, in which words bear numerical values and
thereby express a date
snaphaen early form of flintlock musket
Sufi, Sufism Islamic mystic, mysticism
wali semi-legendary apostle of Islam in Java, of whom there
are usually said to have been nine.
wayang Javanese puppet theatre of several types, e.g. wayang kulit
employing flat leather puppets and wayang golek using
wooden puppets; also wayang topeng, a masked dance
wédana a title for high administrative officers, used both for officials
within the court and those administering the country-
side.
Bibliography

Primary sources

The primary sources for this study are mainly in the Dutch and Javanese
languages, with other references in German, Old Javanese, Middle Javanese, Ma-
lay, English and in translations from Portuguese and Chinese. These are set out in
sections below. Some comments on the major Javanese and Dutch primary sources
preface those sections.

Javanese primary sources

Few Javanese manuscripts survive from the late seventeenth or early eighteenth
centuries. There are enough such sources, however, to proceed with some of the
confidence which historians gain from the use of contemporary evidence. When
one turns to later eighteenth- or early-nineteenth-century materials which describe
the early Kartasura period, one faces a plethora of evidence and choices must be
made about which works to employ.
The MS Babad ing Sangkala (IOL Jav. 36 B) was written in AJ 1663 (AD
1738), almost certainly at the court of Kartasura, and is an invaluable source, but
it is quite brief and breaks off in AD 1720. It was thus necessary to choose also
another, fuller, babad account covering the Kartasura period. There were two
obvious candidates among the major verse chronicles. The MS Babad Kraton
(BL Add. MS 12320) was written in the court of Yogyakarta in AJ 1703-4 (AD
1777-8). It is 717 ff. in length, of which approximately one-half cover the Karta-
sura years. The Surakarta Major Babad (LOr 1786, 9094 pp.) was begun in Sura-
karta in the reign of Pakubuwana IV (AD 1788-1820), finished and recopied there
in AJ 1764 (AD 1836), and published in 31 vols. by Bale Pustaka under the title
Babad tanah Jawi; six of these volumes cover the Kartasura years.
It is significant that both Babad Kraton and the Surakarta Major Babad contain
pre-Kartasura episodes which are shared with a fragmentary babad MS from the
1730s (IOL Jav. 36 A, which is contemporaneous with Babad ing Sangkala but
unfortunately breaks off where this study begins, with the fall of Plered in AD
1677). Both share passages with each other concerning the Kartasura period, as

242
BIBLIOGRAPHY 243

well. Such shared segments almost certainly represent recopied traditions the original
versions of which predated the division of Java between Surakarta and Yogyakarta
in the 1750s. Where the two texts differ, there are no satisfactory grounds for
regarding either variant as earlier, more original or more reliable for a study of the
Kartasura period than the other (see further my article “Evolution of Babad tanah
Jawi texts”). The choice between these two chronicles was thus essentially neutral:
either was as likely as the other to represent chronicle accounts composed during
the Kartasura period.
I chose to concentrate on Babad Kraton simply because its Kartasura portion
appeared to be shorter than the Surakarta Major Babad variant. And so it is, but
only because—as I subsequently discovered—on f. 63lr. the scribe of Babad
Kraton interrupted his copying at the end of Canto 150 (concerning the year AD
1719), intending next to employ a canto in Asmaradana metre. But when he began
the next canto (at which point he perhaps took up a new exemplar), he clearly
copied the wrong canto, for Canto 151 is in Asmaradana metre but concerns events
of AD 1741. Thus I had after all to turn to the Surakarta Major Babad version to
fill this gap of over two decades, which is covered in vols. XIX—XXII, with the
death of Amangkurat IV in 1726 being found in vol. XXI, p. 14.
There is very little reference above to the so-called Meinsma babad, an ab-
breviated prose version of the Babad tanah Jawi family written in the colonial
government’s Java Institute (1832-43) in Surakarta. Its authorship is not certain.
It is commonly ascribed to one of the Javanese teachers there, Ng. Kértapraja, but
it may have been written by C.F. Winter Sr. (1794-1859). In any case, it was
edited by J. J. Meinsma (1833-86) of the Delft Academy and censored by the co-
lonial government before its first publication in 1874. It is clearly of limited value
for historical research. Since the appearance of the Meinsma version in a ro-
manised edition with Dutch translation by W.L. Olthof in 1941, however, it has
become the most accessible Javanese chronicle for the years before AD 1721,
when its text ends. Readers who command Dutch but not Javanese may wish to
consult Olthof’s edition of the Meinsma babad, aided by A. Teeuw’s Register op
de tekst en vertaling van de Babad tanah Djawi (uitgave 1941) {’s-Gravenhage,
1946]. Olthof’s text and translation and Teeuw’s Register have recently (1987)
been reprinted by KITLV with an introduction by J.J. Ras.
In recent years there has been some discussion of Javanese chronicles by
students of literature, suggesting that their self-evidently literary nature renders
them unsuitable for use by historians. Such views seem to rest upon ignorance of
the difficulties which surround all forms of historical evidence, whether literary or
not, and have had little influence upon historians who have studied passage after
passage of babad materials which have proved consistent with other contemporary
sources—just as, of course, there is often conflict of evidence, a normal state of
affairs in the study of history. Chronicles are essential to the study of Javanese
history in this period. Without serious attention to them, one is doomed to seeing
developments primarily through the eyes of Europeans alone.

MS Javanese and Old Javanese primary sources

Arsip Nasional R.I. Solo 52 no. 2.5. “Volmaght van Martapoera voor de Heer
Admirael Cornelis Speelman, dato 16° [sic] Maart 1677”, dd. Sunday 16 Muhar-
244 BIBLIOGRAPHY

ram Be 1600 (21 Mar. 1677), in Malay (Arabic script) and Javanese with a
Dutch ratification and red lacquer seal of Wangsadipa.
Arsip Nasional R.I. Solo 52 no. 8. “Papieren gehorende tot de contracten van 8
November 1733”. Sérat pemut / Memorie of Pakubuwana II to F.J. Coijett,
Kartasura, 16 Rabingulawal Jimakir AJ 1658 / 29 Aug. 1733. Javanese original
of 8 pp., with the Susuhunan’s seal at the beginning; on European paper, water-
marked with the monogram ‘HMG’. Accompanied by a Dutch translation of 20
pp. signed A.v. Gils.
Babad Kraton. BL Add. MS 12320. A chronicle of the Babad tanah Jawi genre,
so far as is presently known the earliest dated text to have survived which
extends from Adam to the fall of Kartasura (AD 1742), but with a major lacuna
at f. 631r. (see the introductory comments to this section above). Written by R.
Tg. Jayengrat in Yogyakarta in AJ 17034 (AD 1777-8). 717 ff., 41.5 x 25 cm.
European paper. From the collection of John Crawfurd (1783-1868; in Java
1811-16), sold to the British Museum (now BL) in 1842.
Babad Mangkubumi. LOr 2191. A chronicle account of the history of the Yogyakarta
Sultanate from 1755 to 1792, apparently written by the Crown prince (later
Sultan Haméngkubuwana II). Dated at the beginning Jumadilawal AH 1187
(Aug. 1773), with further cantos added after 1792. 549 pp., 33 x 21 cm. Dutch
paper, watermarked ‘VG’. Presented to Leiden University Library in 1874 by
W.H. de Jong, having been acquired by him in Banyumas.
Babad Sangkalaning Momana. Extending from the year | to AJ 1761 (AD 1833-4).
Completed in Yogyakarta in Ruwah 1842 / July 1912 by R. Atmamarta, with
a further note dating a death in AJ 1857 / AD 1928 [sic; AJ 1857 was AD
1926-7]. Based on an original text by Png. A. Suryanagara of Ruwah 1793 /
Jan. 1865 / AH 1281; revised by Png. A. Adiwijaya in Nov. 1882, by R. Tg.
Cakraningrat in Sapar 1812 / Jan. 1883, and by R. Lurah Mangkudigdaya (n.d.).
Romanised typescript copy made by Dr H.J. de Graaf, and given by him to the
author, of an original MS in Museum Pusat, Jakarta. Another copy in KITLV
One25i-
Berlin Staatsbibliothek MS Or. fol. 402. Compilation consisting largely of ro-
mances and legal and moralistic texts, partly in Javanese script, partly in Arabic
script (pegon). According to a note on p. 14 the MS was copied by a mantri
lébét named Ki Asmaradana in AJ 1661 (AD 1736-7). Originally owned by
Png. A. Purbaya of Kartasura. 414 pp., 32 x 21 cm. Javanese paper. Originally
belonging to the K6nigliche Preussische Bibliothek, acquired from an unknown
source sometime before 1850.
Darma Sunya Kéling. NBS 95, Leiden University Library. A text of the kakawin
Dharma Stnya in Old Javanese. Written by Png. Ad. Dipanagara, a son of
Pakubuwana I, in Dulkaidah 1640 (Nov. 1716). 74 pp., 31.5 x 20.5 cm. Euro-
pean paper (Javanese paper used in the binding). Originally from the collection
of J. F. C. Gericke (ca. 1800-57) held by the Netherlands Bible Society, on loan
to Leiden University Library since early in this century.
India Office Library Jav. 36
A: A fragmentary and misbound text of the Babad Mataram or Babad tanah
Jawi tradition, extending from early Mataram times to AJ 1600 (AD 1677).
Undated but contemporary with text B. Vol. I, ff. 1-216; vol. II, ff. 217—-348v.
B: Babad ing Sangkala, the MS edited and translated in Ricklefs, Tradition.
Dated AJ 1663 (AD 1738). Vol. II, ff. 349v.-373v.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 245

At the end of the MS, 14 full-page pawukon illustrations, rather crudely done.
The whole MS is 2 vols. (386 ff.), 25.75 x 18.5 cm. Dutch paper, watermarked
‘LVG’. Acquired in Yogyakarta in June 1812 (at the fall of the court) by Colin
Mackenzie (ca. 1753-1821; in Java 1811-13); sold to the English East India
Company after Mackenzie’s death, in 1823.
Lamenipun panjénéngan kitha kawit Ratu Panjajaran etang lajéngipun dumugi
Kangjéng Susuhunan Pakubuwana kaping 4. BL Add. MS 12323 (B), ff.
30v.-59v. A prose séngkala list with chronograms and numerals, the last date
being AJ 1743 (AD 1815). No clear provenance, but since Surakarta affairs are
emphasised it is probably from there. 25 x 19 cm. European paper. From the
collection of John Crawfurd (1783-1868; in Java 1811—16), sold to the British
Museum (now BL) in 1842.
LOr 6249. Letter of Amangkurat IV, Kartasura, to Governor-General de Haan, 15
Mulud Jimakir 1650 (21 Nov. 1725). Leaves joined to form one sheet of paper
130 x 22 cm. Imported paper in a gold silk envelope. Presented to Leiden Uni-
versity Library by Jonkheer E.H.E. Teding van Berkhout in 1924.
Sajarah Régen Surabaya. MS Museum Pusat Br. 474. Dated Surabaya, 7 Apr.
1893 / 20 Ramalan 1822. 9 pp. Typed transcription provided by Prof. Heather
Sutherland.
Sérat Candranipun para Panjénéngan-dalém Nata. Yogyakarta kraton MS C 48.
Dated AJ 1783 /AD 1855. Written with gold ink. 36 ff., 19.5 x 31.5 cm. Euro-
pean paper.
Sérat Menak. MS Museum Pusat KBG 613. Written by M. Ng. Narawita in AJ
1639 (AD 1715). The property of Ratu Mas Blitar, a wife of Pakubuwana I.
1188 pp., 35 x 24 cm. Javanese paper. Purchased by the Koninklijk Bataviaasch
Genootschap in 1924.

Published Javanese and Old Javanese primary sources

Bale Pustaka. Babad tanah Jawi. 31 vols. Batawi Sentrum: Bale Pustaka, 1939-41.
Brandes, J.L.A., and D.A. Rinkes (eds.). Babad Tjerbon, uitvoerige inhoudsop-
gave en noten. VBG vol. 49, pt. 2, Ist section. Batavia: Albrecht & Co.;
*s-Hage: M. Nijhoff, 1911.
Carey, Peter B.R. (ed. & transl.). Babad Dipanagara: An account of the outbreak
of the Java War (1825-30): The Surakarta court version of the Babad Dipana-
gara with translations into English and Indonesian Malay. Malaysian Branch of
the Royal Asiatic Society monograph no. 9 Kuala Lumpur: Art Printing Works
Sdn. Bhd. for the council of the MBRAS, 1981.
Drewes, G.W.J. (ed. & transl.). The admonitions of Seh Bari. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1969.
(ed. & transl.). An early Javanese code of Muslim ethics. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
(ed. & transl.). Een Javaanse primbon uit de zestiende eeuw. Leiden: E.
J. Brill, 1954.
Kumar, Ann (ed. & transl.). Surapati, man and legend: A study of three babad
traditions. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976.
Olthof, W.L. (ed. & transl.). Babad tanah Djawi, in proza, Javaansche ge-
schiedenis. 2 vols.’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1941.
946 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pigeaud, Theodore G.Th. Java in the 14th century: A study in cultural history. 5
vols. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960-3.
(ed. & transl.). De Tantu Panggélaran: Een Oud-Javaansch prozageschrift
uitgegeven, vertaald en toegelicht. ’s-Gravenhage: Nederl. Boek- en Steen-
drukkerij, 1924.
Ricklefs, M.C. (ed. & transl.). Modern Javanese historical tradition: A study of an
original Kartasura chronicle and related materials. London: School of Oriental
and African Studies, 1978. (See the entry for India Office Library Jav. 36B in
the preceding section.)
Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo and M.C. Ricklefs (transl.). “The establishment of
Surakarta: A translation from the Babad Gianti’. Indonesia no. 4 (Oct. 1967),
pp. 88-108.
Yasadipura I. Babad Giyanti. 21 vols. Batawi Sentrum: Bale Pustaka, 1937-9.

Middle Javanese primary sources from Bali

Berg, C. C. (ed.). Kidung Pamancangah: De geschiedenis van het rijk van Gelgel.
Santpoort: C.A. Mees, 1929.
(ed.). Babad Bla-Batuh: De geschiedenis van een tak der familie Jélantik.
Santpoort: C.A. Mees, 1932.
Worsley, Peter John (ed. & transl.). Babad Buleleng: A Balinese dynastic geneal-
ogy. ’s-Gravenhage: H.L. Smits; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.

Dutch primary sources

Dutch primary sources are indispensable for the study of Javanese history in the
Kartasura period, but may not be accepted at face value any more than other kinds
of evidence. VOC writers frequently were ignorant of or misunderstood events in
Javanese society, or had reasons to misrepresent what they knew. The same was
true of their recording of developments within European circles. To curry the
favour of their superiors, to conceal incompetence or dishonesty, to disguise
ignorance, to condemn their enemies or for other reasons, the authors of VOC
documents produced material which must be read with a critical eye. Yet the VOC
sources exist in such abundance—indeed, superfluity—that conflicts and con-
sistencies within them may provide valuable tests of historical reliability. More-
over, when they are employed beside Javanese sources, the prospects of attaining
a more rounded picture of the past are greatly enhanced.
It should also be noted that VOC sources sometimes contain Dutch translations,
and occasionally the originals, of Javanese documents, thereby offering access to
indigenous evidence.

MS Dutch primary sources

As explained in the Preface to this book, I was given extensive notes from the
VOC archives by the late H. J. de Graaf, which were invaluable in the completion
of this study. In order to indicate the degree of my indebtedness to de Graaf, I have
asterisked below those records which were wholly or mainly consulted via his
notes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 247

Arsip Nasional R. I., Jakarta:

*Java’s Noord Oostkust 166. “Memorie weegens den staat van Java, overgegeven
door . . Gesaghebber Willem Tersmitte aan . . . Frederik Julius Coijett”, Séma-
rang, 25 July 1730. Another copy in VOC 2169 (OB 1731).
*Solo 42. “Rapport Verijssel & Theling 1743.”
Solo 52 no. 2.9. AR II nader verzoek, Jépara, 29 Oct. 1677.
Solo 52 no. 2.11. Batavia to AR II, 27 Aug. 1684.
Solo 52, no. 5. Dutch and Malay copy of treaty of 5 Oct. 1705.
Solo 52 no. 8. “Papieren gehorende tot de contracten van 8 November 1733.”
Solo 53%. “Copie contracten acten enz. 1646-1746.”
*Batavia Dagregister volumes 1683-1705.
*Batavia Secreete Resolutien, 1704—-8

Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague:

Overgekomen brieven en papieren:

VOC 1325 (OB 1678) | VOC 1715 (OB 1706) *VOC 1948 (OB 1721)
VOC 1329 (OB 1678) | VOC 1733 (OB 1707) *VOC 1965 (OB 1722)
VOC 1330 (OB 1678) |=VOC 1748 (OB 1708) *VOC 1984 (OB 1723)
VOC 1340 (OB 1679) VOC 1764 (OB 1709) *VOC 2000 (OB 1724)
VOC 1349 (OB 1680) | VOC 1780 (OB 1710) VOEC20I(OBW725)
VOC 1360 (OB 1681) *VOC 1798 (OB 1711) =*VOC 2035 (OB 1726)
VOC 1362 (OB 1681) *VOC 1813 (OB 1712) *VOC 2056 (OB 1727)
VOC 1368 (OB 1682) *VOC 1829 (OB 1713) |*VOC 2080 (OB 1728)
VOC 1380 (OB 1683) *VOC 1844 (OB 1714) = *VOC 2107 (OB 1729)
VOC 1385 (OB 1684) = *VOC 1857 (OB 1715) =*VOC 2139 (OB 1730)
VOC 1389 (OB 1684) *VOC 1871 (OB 1716) *VOC 2169 (OB 1731)
VOC 1440 (OB 1688) | *VOC 1886 (OB 1717) =*VOC 2203 (OB 1732)
VOC 1456 (OB 1689) *VOC 1898 (OB 1718) *VOC 2204 (OB 1732)
VOC 1680 (OB 1704) *VOC 1914 (OB 1719) *VOC 2257 (OB 1733)
VOC 1695 (OB 1705) *VOC 1929 (OB 1720)

Resoluties Heren XVII, 1663: VOC 105.

Published Dutch primary sources

Brascamp, E.H.B. “De memorie en instructie voor Jacobus Couper als hoofd der
expeditie tegen Soeropati uitgezonden in het jaar 1684”. BKI vol. 75, nos. 1-2
(1919), pp. 28-35.
Chijs, J.A. van der (ed.). Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, 1602-1811. 17 vols.
*’s Hage: M. Nijhoff, 1885-1900.
Colenbrander, H.T., and W.Ph. Coolhaas (eds.). Jan Pietersz. Coen: Bescheiden
omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indié. 7 vols. ’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff: 1919-53.
Coolhaas, W. Ph. (ed.). General missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden
aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. 8 vols. ’s-Gravenhage:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960-85.
Dagh-Register, gehouden int casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als
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over geheel Nederlandts India. 31 vols. ’s-Hage: M. Nijhoff; Batavia: G. Kolff

& Co., 1887-1931.
Dam, Pieter van. Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie. Ed. F.W. Stapel
and C.W. Th. Baron van Boetzelaer van Asperen en Dubbeldam. 4 vols. in 7.
*s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1927-54.
Graaf, H. J. de (ed.). De expeditie van Anthonio Hurdt, Raad van Indié, als Admiraal
en Superintendent naar de binnenlanden van Java. Sept—Dec. 1678, volgens het
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(ed.). De vijf gezantschapsreizen van Rijklof van Goens naar het hof van
Mataram, 1648-1654. ’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956.
Heeres, J.E., and F.W. Stapel (eds.). “Corpus diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum:
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Schouten, Wouter. Oost-Indische voyagie, vervattende veel voorname voorval-
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German primary sources

Frike, Christoff. Christoff Frikens Ost-Indianische Reisen und Krieges-dienste. Ed.
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Schweitzer, Christoph. Reise nach Java und Ceylon, 1675-1682. Vol. X¥ of
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Malay primary sources

Ricklefs, M.C. “Bantén and the Dutch in 1619: Six early ‘pasar Malay’ letters”.
BSOAS vol. 39, pt. 1 (1976), pp. 128-36.
Skinner, C. (ed. & transl.) Sja‘ir perang Mengkasar (the rhymed chronicle of the
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 249

Primary sources in other languages

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Maps from Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague

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VEL 1164. “Aftekeningh van de mars van den Commandeur Couper, met het
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VEL 1255. “De vestingh Missier en desselfs buyten-wercken by de E: Comp*
verovert onder het beleijd van den Comm! Couper op 16 Decemb: 1681.”
VEL 1271. “Kaarte van ’t fort en stad Japara, mitsgaders de aanwysing der posten
so als deselve op ordre van den Heer Cornelis Speelman in den jare 1677 beset
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VEL 1279. Map of Surabaya and surroundings [1677].
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baya” dd. 1719 in Leupe, /nventaris.
VEL 1286. “Affbeeldingh ofte aanwysing der optoght en marsch, gedaan van
Sourabaya naar Passourawang, onder ’t hooger gezagh van den E. Aghtb: H!
Govert Cnoll, Commandeur en chef. ... September 1706.”

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Notes

Notes to Preface

1. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 46.

Notes to Introduction

1. The most important works are Bertram Schrieke, /ndonesian sociological

studies: Selected writings of B. Schrieke (2 vols.; The Hague & Bandung: W. van
Hoeve Ltd., 1955-7), vol. Il; and Soemarsaid Moertono, State and statecraft in old
Java: A study of the later Mataram period, 16th to 19th century (revised ed.;
Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1981). Little historical in-
sight is to be gained from either Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, “The idea of power
in Javanese culture” pp. 1-69 in Claire Holt et al. (eds.), Culture and politics in
Indonesia (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1972); or G. Moedjanto,
The concept of power in Javanese culture (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University
Press, 1968).
2. Leonard Blussé, Strange company. Chinese settlers, Mestizo women and the
Dutch in VOC Batavia (VKI vol. 122; Dordrecht & Riverton: Foris Publications,
1986); C.R. Boxer, The Dutch seaborne empire, 1600-1800 (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1973); Jean Gelman Taylor, The social world of Batavia: European and
Eurasian in Dutch Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). Relevant
but briefer observations are made in P. Geyl, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse
stam (6 vols.,; Amsterdam & Antwerpen: Wereldbibliotheek, 1961—2), vol. III, pp.
772-9.
3. Schrieke, Sociological studies,vol. I, p. 4: “The assumption which is basic
to these studies ... is that the structure of the Java of around 1700 was not appre-
ciably different from that of the Java of around 700 ....” Moertono, State and
statecraft, p. 6: “During these four hundred years [the sixteenth century to the
present] no basic changes seem to have taken place in the structural organization
of the Mataram state, nor in the ideological bases of state-life.”

260
NOTES to pp. 14 261

4. An exception is Williard A. Hanna, Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and its

aftermath in the nutmeg islands (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human
Issues, 1978), part of which discusses the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but
none of which, of course, concerns Java.
5. H. J. de Graaf (ed.), De vijf gezantschapsreizen van Rijklof vans Goens naar
het hof van Mataram, 1648-1654 (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956). See
especially pp. 163 n. 7, 185 n. 4.
6. Published in M. C. Ricklefs, Modern Javanese historical tradition: A study
of an original Kartasura chronicle and related materials (London: School of
Oriental and African Studies, 1978); references to the text below use the abbreviation
BS followed by the relevant canto and stanza numbers.
On the dating of this part of the MS, see ibid., pp. 174-89, especially p. 187.
My argument rests upon the observation that the content of the MS, when compared
with VOC sources, seems remarkably accurate down to 1670, whereas for the
period 1670-7 it is very inaccurate, so far as can be judged. Thus it seems that this
MS of 1738 must preserve “a version of events probably originally compiled
before 1670 and available for copying after the wars [of the 1670s] were over. The
description of the years before 1670 could hardly have been composed anew after
the 1670s, for in that case one would expect the whole of this section of the text
to have a degree of confusion similar to that of the 1670s.”
7. J. C. M. Warnsink (ed.), Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaff gedaan naar alle
gewesten des werelds, beginnende 1639 to 1687 incluis (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1930). In Warnsinck’s edition the Oost-Indise spiegel is separately pagi-
nated and given a title page saying that it was first published in Hoorn in 1703.
The 1701 Hoorn, Amsterdam & Utrecht edition of the reisen, however, also in-
cluded the spiegel: see Nicolaus de Graaff, Reisen ... na de vier gedeeltens des
werelds als Asia, Africa, America en Europa .... Hier agter is by gevoegd d’ Oost-
Indise spiegel (Hoorn: Feyken Ryp; Amsterdam & Utregt: Hendrik Antoni Schou-
ten & de Wed. Dirk Boom, 1701); this title page is also photographically repro-
duced at p. [xxxv] of Warnsink’s edition. I am unable to resolve this bibliographic
confusion.
Since the reisen and spiegel are separately paginated, footnote references below
indicate which of the two works is meant. For references to the studies by Blussé,
Taylor and Boxer, see n. 2 above.
8. L. W. C. van den Berg, De inlandsche rangen en titels op Java en Madoera
(s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1902), p. 28. As will be seen in Chapter 10
below, the reduction in status of two sons of PB I after his death and the succes-
sion of their brother in 1719 was part of the background to the Second Javanese
War of Succession.
9. This practice is attested in de Graaff, Van Goens, p. 259.
10. See Stanley J. O’Connor, “Iron working as spiritual inquiry in the Indone-
sian archipelago”, History of Religions vol. 14, no. 1 (Aug. 1974), pp. 173-90;
idem, “Mettalurgy and immortality at Candi Sukuh, Central Java”, /ndonesia no.
39 (Apr. 1985), pp. 53-70. For a description of more modern beliefs with particu-
lar reference to musical instruments, see J. Kunst, Music in Java. Its history, its
theory and its technique (3rd enlarged ed.; ed. E.L. Heins; 2 vols.; The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), vol. I, pp. 137-9.
11. H.J. de Graaf, De regering van Sunan Mangku-Rat I Tegal-Wangi, vorst
van Mataram 1646-1677 (2 vols.; VKI vols. 33,39; ’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff,
262 NOTES to pp. 4-7

1961-2), vol. I, pp. 32-4. For primary sources, see de Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 202,
238, 248-50, 254; BS I: 60.
12. For more details, see Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo, “Javanese speech
levels”, Indonesia no. 6 (Oct. 1968), pp. 54-81.
13. Armando Cortesao (ed. & transl.), The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires and
the book of Francisco Rodrigues (2 vols.; London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944),
Wolk, I, fe GE).
14. See M. C. Ricklefs, “Some statistical evidence on Javanese social, eco-
nomic and demographic history in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”,
Modern Asian studies vol. 20, no. 1 (1986), pp. 6-7.
15. Java had a population of nearly ninety-one million in the 1980 census.
16. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 181.
17. Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”.
18. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 182. On the earlier textile trade, see Cortesao,
Pires, vol.l pp. 180, 194; M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European
influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 99, 158, 244, 276, 349 n. 188. Much of the cloth trade
consisted of imported textiles, but local Javanese cloth was also produced.
19. J. G. de Casparis, /ndonesian chronology (Handbuch der Orientalistik, dritte
Abteilung, erster Band, Lieferung 1; Leiden & Koln: E.J. Brill, 1978), pp. 2-6.
20. Cortesdo, Pires, vol. I, p. 181; E. Netscher & J. A. van der chijs, De munten
van Nederlandsch Indié beschreven en afgebeeld (VBG vol. 31, pt. 2,1864), pp.
130-43.
21. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 191, 202; BS I: 76, 83, 92; Schrieke, Sociologi-
cal studies, vol. I, p. 148; Haasbroek, Kartasura, to Tersmitten, Semarang, 31 May
1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Blussé, Strange Company, pp. 46-7. See also
p. 319 n. 48 below.
Picis is an old term, deriving from Old Javanese pisis (coins, money): see P.J.
Zoetmulder with the collaboration of S.O. Robson, Old Javanese-English diction-
ary (2 vols.; ’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), vo. II, p. 1371. On the
monetary history of Java before the seventeenth century, see Robert S. Wicks,
“Monetary developments in Java between the ninth and sixteenth centuries: A
numismatic perspective”, /ndonesia no. 42 (Oct.1986), pp. 42-77.
22. See AN Solo 52, no. 8 “Papieren gehorende tot de contracten van 8 Novem-
ber 1733”, Sérat pemut / memorie of PB II to Coijett, Kartasura, 16 Rabingulawal
Jimakir 1658 / 29 Aug. 1733, where the Javanese text gives reyal sépuh where the
Dutch reads Rds. Sp*.
23. Moertono, States and statecraft, p. 112.
24. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 178, 185, 222.
25. See de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, especially chaps. VII, X, XIV.
26. See the references in the Ndgarakértagama of AD 1365 to Sang Apatih,
Mantryapatih or Sang Mapatih Gaja(h)mada at Nag. 19:2, 2, 63:1, 3, 65:2, 2, 66:2,
1, in Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud, Java in the 14th century: A study in cultural
history (5 vols.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960-3). For further Old Javanese
references, see Zoetmulder, Old Jav. dictionary, vol. Il, pp. 1324-5.
27. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 226, 229. References to this official are found
ina Je7SS URSKO), SVB, FL.
28. On the roads and rivers, see de Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 256-6. See also P.
W. Milaan, “Beschouwingen over het 17e eeuwse Mataramse wegennet”, Social
NOTES to pp. 7-9 263

geographische mededeelingen, vol. 4 (1942), pp. 205-39; and Schrieke, Sociologi-

cal studies, vol. I, pp. 102-20.
29. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 202; BS 1:76.
30. BS 1:40, 46-7, 49, 66-7, 68-9, 71-3, 88; II:6, 19.
31. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 227, 258-9.
32. Ibid., pp. 218-21.
33. See Soeripto, Ontwikkelingsgang der vorstenlandsche wetboeken (Leiden:
N.V. Boek- en Steendrukkerij Eduard Ijdo, [1929]; M.B. Hooker, “The law texts
of Muslim South-East Asia”, pp. 347-433 in M.B. Hooker (ed.), Laws of South-
East Asia, vol. 1: The pre-modern texts (Singapore, etc.: Butterworth & Co.[Asia]
Pte. Ltd., 1986), especially pp. 357-8, 411.
34. The word’s etymology is Old Javanese; see Zoetmulder, Old Jav. diction-
ary, vol. II, p. 1835.
35. H. J. de Graaf, De regering van Sultan Agung, vorst van Mataram 1613-1645
[sic], en die van zijn voorganger Panembahan Séda-ing-Krapjak 1601-1613 (VKI
vol. 23; *s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), pp. 264-8.
36. The evidence for the existence of such villages is, however, from a later
period: see p. 386 n. 8 below.
At least some of the royal soldiers apparently lived in villages far from the court
when not or active service; at least the Jagasgura did so in the second decade of
the eighteenth century: see p. 370 n. 91 below.
37. The evidence here is from a later chronicle written in Yogyakarta in AD
1777-8 and concerns the year 1703 when AR II died: BK f. 504v. refers to an
amount of Sp. RI. 1000 which was kaskayan ing Nata pribadi / dudu wétuning
praja / reyal muklis wau / saking karingét Sang Nata (the private wealth of the
king / not the product of the kingdom: / this modest amount of Reals / was from
the sweat of the king).
38. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 262.
39. Ibid., pp. 87-8, 217, 229-33.
40. BS 1:70 apparently refers to a rampog. A description of rampog macan is
to be found in Thomas Stamford Raffles, The history of Java (2nd. ed.; 2 vols.;
London: John Murray, 1830), vol. I pp. 387-8; this is partially quoted in M. C.
Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: A history of the divi-
sion of Java (London, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 275.
41. Warnsink, De Graaff reisen, p. 205.
42. On the Garébégs, see Soedjono Tirtokoesoemo, De garebegs in het Sul-
tanaat Jogjakarta (Jogjakarta: H. Buning, 1931); J. Groneman, De garébég’s te
Neajogyakarta (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1895.
Islamic tradition has it that it was Ishmael whom Abraham was willing to
sacrifice (based on Qur’dn 37:99-111) whereas the Bible says that it was Isaac
(Genesis 22:1—19). For the Islamic tradition, see English translations in Ahmed Ali
(transl.), Al-Our’
dn: A contemporary translation (2nd revised ed.; Karachi: Akrash
Publishing, 1986), pp. 381-2, 384n.; or Arthur J. Arberry (transl.), The Koran
interpreted (2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), vol. Il, pp. 153-4;
see also W. Montgomery Watt, Companion to the Qur’dn, based on the Arberry
translation (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1967), p. 205.
43. BS I: 48, 65-7; de Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 216, 238.
A later description of a royal tiger hunt is presented in Fr. Valentyn, Oud en
264 NOTES to pp. 9-12

van
nieuw Oost-Indién: Vervattende een naaukeurige en uitvoerige verhandelinge
... (8 vols.;Dord recht & Amsterdam : J.
Nederlands mogentheyd in die gewesten
van Braam & G. onder de Linden, 1724-6), vol.IV [pt.1], pp. 203-4.
44. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 238.
45. Ibid., p. 184.
46. See I. Kuntara Wiryamartana. Arjunawiwaha: Transformasi teks Jawa Kuna
lewat tanggapan dan penciptaan di lingkungan sastra Jawa (Yogyakarta: Duta
Wacana University Press, 1990), especially p. 462; and Barbara McDonald, Old
Javanese literature in eighteenth-century Java: A consideration of the process of
transmission (Clayton: Monash University Center of Southeast Asian Studies
Working Paper no. 41, [1986], especially p. 9. See also Ricklefs, Tradition, pp.
152-6, 214-19.
47. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 184, 238.
48. Ibid., pp. 236, 237-8.
49. Ibid., pp. 229-30.
50. Ibid., p. 256.
51. Ibid., p. 67. See also BS 1:48 et seqq.
52. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 54, 85, 256-8.
53. A brief survey of the evidence concerning Islamisation in the Malay-Indo-
nesian area is to be found in M. C. Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia, c.1300
to the present (London & Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), Ch.I.
54. See p. 366 n. 74 below. In Ténggér (East Java) a form of Hindu-Buddhism
has survived until today; see Robert W. Hefner, Hindu Javanese: Tengger tra-
dition and Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
55. G.W.J. Drewes (ed. & transl.), Een Javaanse primbon uit de zestiende eeuw
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954); idem (ed. & transl.), The admonitions of Seh Bari (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
56. G.W.J. Drewes (ed. & transl.), An early Javanese code of Muslims ethics
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978). Drewes argues for a sixteenth-century date
for this text, but the evidence for this is slight and his arguments are open to
debate.
57. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 237, 260-1, 263.
58. For Nag. references, see the index in Pigeaud, Java in the 14th century, vol.
V, p. 381. For other citations, see Zoetmulder, Old Jay. dictionary, vol. I, p. 2361.
59. For Nag. references, see the index in Pigeaud, Java in the 14th century, vol.
V, p. 247. For other citations, see Zoetmulder, Old Jav. dictionary, vol. Il, p. 1851.
60. Theodor Gautier Thomas Pigeaud (ed. & transl.) De Tantu Panggélaran:
Een Oud-Javansch prozageschrift uitgegeven, vertaald en toegelicht (’s-Graven-
hage: Nederl. Boek- en Steendrukkerij, 1924), pp. 64, 135; on the dating of the
Lex PeSconp mo Us
61. Drewes, Code, pp. 36-7.
62. Cortesao, Pires, vol. I, p. 182.
63. E.g. “DR 1696”, 24 May, | Aug.; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang,
21 May 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Verijssel & Theling, kort bericht, Sémarang,
14 Dec. 1743, in AN Solo 42, “Rapport Verijssel & Theling 1743”.
64. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 146, 153, 156.
65. There are many descriptions over long periods of Javanese history of amuk
incidents. E.g. see those in Cortesdo, Pires, vol. I, p. 176; Warnsinck, De Graaff
NOTES to pp. 13-14 265

reisen, pp. 222-3. John Crawfurd rather charmingly said that this phenomenon
sometimes originated in “disorders of the digestive organs”; see his A descriptive
dictionary of the Indian islands and adjacent countries (London, 1856; reprinted
with intro. by M. C. Ricklefs; Kuala Lumpur, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1971),
paLe:
There is more than sufficient evidence upon which to reject the assertion of the
early-seventeenth-century observer Edmund Scott that the Javanese were “very
loth to fight if they can choose” and to regret that Professor Geoffrey Parker should
have accepted its authority. Similarly, Parker is entirely wrong to conclude that
“by 1650 the West had achieved military mastery in ... the islands of Southeast
Asia’. See Geoffrey Parker, The military revolution: Military innovation and the
rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
pp. 117-18. -
66. According to de Graaf, Van Goens, p. 190, the Javanese learned to make
gunpowder from the Portuguese ca. 1624, which corresponds (hardly surprisingly,
since van Goen’s sources would have been Javanese courtiers) with the statement
in BS 1:30 that the court began to make cannon in 1622-3. Evidence suggesting
greater antiquity for the Javanese armaments industry is considered in S. O. Robson,
“Note on the cultural background of the kidung literature”, in Nigel Phillips &
Khaidir Anwar (eds.), Papers on Indonesian languages and literatures ({London)):
Indonesian Etymological Project & Association Archipel, 1981), pp. 113-16. See
also Schrieke, Sociological studies, vol. I, p. 122.
67. Robson, “Notes”, pp. 113-14.
68. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 190; BS 1:30, 43, 46; Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen,
p. 205. Van Goens’s visit to the kraton gun foundry in 1651 is described below.
69. See van Goens’s report immediately below. See also DR 1682, vol. Il, p.
1016, reporting that AR II had presented to ambassadors from Johor “een parthij
Javaans geweer”. For some general references on the firearms of this age, see p.
324 n. 6 below. ;
Coen reported as early as 16t5 that the Javanese aristocrats of Bantén were
using muskets (“mosquetten en roers”, but the second term cannot, | think, refer
to snaphaenen at this early date), gunpowder and shot supplied to them by the
English; Coen, aboard ship, to H. XVII, 22 Oct. 1615, in H.T. Colenbrander &
W.Ph. Coolhaas (eds.), Jan Pietesz. Coen: Bescheiden omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indié
(7 vols.; *s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1919-53), vol. I, p. 132.
70. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 84-5.
On European techniques for making cannon, see David Chandler, The art of
warfare in the age of Marlborough (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1976), p. 179;
Trevor N. Dupuy, The evolution of weapons and warfare (London, etc.: Jane’s,
1980), p. 98. On the manufacture of musket barrels, see J. R. v. d. Neut, Buskruit,
roermaker en schutter (Deventer: Almfort, [1981]), pp. 83-6.
71. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 123.
72. See K. C. Crucq, “De kanonnen in den kraton te Soerakarta”, TBG vol.78
(1938), pp. 94-6 and the plates between pp. 100-1.
73. Wouter Schouten, Oost-Indische voyagie, vervattende veel voorname
voorvallen ... (2 vols. in 1; Amsterdam: J. Meurs en J. van Someren, 1676), book
Ill, p. 158. For some later references regarding Javanese cannon, see p. 325 n. 8
below.
266 NOTES to pp. 14-17

74. See especially pp. 130-1. AR I asked van Goens about European cannon—
casting techniques in 1651, and the latter explained as much as he knew about the
subject; see Graaf, Van Goens, p. 85.
75. Schouten, Voyagie, book III, p. 153. See also Schrieke, Sociological stud-
ies, vol. Il, p. 123. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 25 June 1719, in VOC
1929 (OB 1720), mentions two bows with arrows among a collection of Javanese
weapons, but I know of no other such report. Similarly, BS 1:58 contains a refer-
ence to the wearing of mail armour in 1647, but this seems not to have been a
common Javanese practice. Schrieke, Sociological studies, vol. Il, p. 127, gives
several references to armour in his discussion of Javanese warfare, but none of
these unequivocally refers to Javanese, several refer specifically to Makasarese
and, in fact, all of these references, except for one relating to Chinese, may have
to do with Makasarese. The Bugis of South Sulawesi, too, used mail armour; see
Leonard Y. Andaya, The kingdom of Johor, 1641-1728 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1975), p. 233.
76. De Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 191, 225.
77. See de Graaf’s comments in ibid., p. 224 n. 4.
78. On VOC sumptuary regulations, see Taylor, Social world, pp. 66-9.
79. Warnsinck, De Graaff spiegel, pp. 43-6.
80. J. A. van der Chijs, “Hoe men in de 17° eeuw Gouverneur-Generaal werd”,
TBG vol. 30 (1885), pp. 596-602; W. Ph. Coolhaas, “Gegevens over Antonio van
Diemen”, BK/ vol.103 (1946), pp. 469-546.
81. Warnsinck, De Graaff spiegel, p. 45.
82. A further 5000 Javanese were not included in this count; DR 1674, pp.
28-30. See also Susan Abeyasekere, Jakarta: A history (Singapore, etc.: Oxford
University Press, 1987), pp. 19-20; Blussé, Strange Company, pp. 18-19. On the
Mardijkers, see p. 271 n. 15 below.
83. E.g. Warnsinck, De Graaff spiegel, p. 47; Boxer, Dutch seaborne empire,
pp. 79-81, 88-90.
84. See J.R. Bruijn, “Dutch men-of-war: Those on board, c.1700—1750”, Acta
Historiae Neerlandicae: Studies on the history of the Netherlands vol. 7 (1974),
pp. 93, 95.
85. The major study remains Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade 1620-1740
(Copenhagen: Danish Science Press; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958).
86. Notably Ambon (since 1605), Malacca (1641), Hitu (1640s) and Térnate,
Tidore, South Sulawesi and Minahasa (all from the 1660s).
87. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade, p. 13.
88. Blussé, Strange Company, p. 18.
89. De Graaf, Van Goens, p. 201.
90. E.g. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 208, calling
Java Batavia’s “koorn-schuure” and “rijst-kamer”. See also Batavia to H. XVII, 6
Dec. 1741, in dJ IX, p. 395, referring to “het ons hier tot een spyskamer ver-
strekkende Java”.
91. J.R. Bruijn, “Schepen van de VOC en een vergelijking met de vaart op
Azié door andere compagnién”, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden vol. 99, no. | (1984), p. 9:
92. Blussé, Strange Company, p. 17.
93. Cf. the comment by Dr de Graaf that in a military sense “the Company
NOTES to pp. 17-19 267

was capable of nothing against Java in the land itself without important allies”; H.
J. de Graaf, De moord op Kapitein Francois Tack, 8 Febr. 1686 (Amsterdam: H.
Ua Paris! 935) sepa 1465
94. See especially Warnsick, De Graaff spiegel, pp. 13-22.
95. Blussé, Strange Company, Chaps. VII-VII.
96. Taylor, Social world, p. 71 et passim; Boxer, Dutch seaborne empire, pp.
250-2.
97. Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen, p. 184.
98. D. Schoute, De geneeskunde in den dienst der Oost-Indische Compagnie
in Nederlandsch-Indié (Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy, 1929), p. 172. Scurvy was of
course a major problem during voyages to and from the Indies; see Boxer, Dutch
seaborne empire, pp. 84-5.
99. Boxer, Dutch seaborne empire, pp. 234-5.
100. J.C.H. Pater, De tachtigjarige oorlog (vol. IV of Geschiedenis van Neder-
land, ed. H. Brugmans; Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschappij “Joost van den Von-
delz 1936) pns23:
101. Blussé, Strange Company, pp. 5,163; see also Geyl, Nederlandse stam,
VOM Dae Te
102. He was a major military figure in the area, Governor of Ambon 1647-50
and Superintendant over Ambon, Banda and Térnate 1652-6. Se H.J. de Graaf,
De geschiedenis van Ambon en de Zuid-Molukken (Franeker: T. Wever B.V.
1977), pp. 108 et seqq.
103. See F.W. Stapel, De Gouverneurs-Generaaal van Nederlandsch-Indié in
beeld en woord (Den Haag: W.P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1941), p. 19.
104. Boxer, Dutch seaborne empire, pp. 148-61, 163; Blussé, Strange Com-
pany, p. 163; Taylor, Social world, p. 22.
105. Taylor, Social world, pp. 6-8, 18-19 et passim.
106. See Warnsinck, De Graaff spiegel, p. 14; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-
Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 366-7; Taylor, Social world, pp. 18-19; Blussé, Strange
Company, p. 165; Boxer, Dutch seaborne empire, p. 251; Geyl, Nederlandse stam,
VoOIMIL pag 77:
107. E.g. Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen, p. 10.
108. Boxer, Dutch seaborne empire, p. 259, says that Dutchmen were “often
condescending or openly contemptuous” of Eurasians, but Blussé, Strange Com-
pany, p. 188, says that “nothing seems to have stood in the way of these ‘natural’
children being fully accepted within Dutch society, either in the Indies or in
Holland”, and gives examples.
109. Standard histories of the Netherlands say that Dutch commoners had little
in the way of a military ethos, the force that fought for the independence of the
Netherlands from Spain consisting heavily of foreigners. See, for example, Jan
Romein, De lage landen bij der zee: Geillustreerde geschiedenis van het Neder-
landsche volk van Duinkerken tot Delfzijl (Utrecht: W. de Haan, 1934), pp. 271-2;
J. Huizinga, Nederland’ sbeschaving in de zeventiende eeuw: Een schets (Haarlem:
H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N.V., 1941), pp. 53-6. This theme recurs in Simon
Schama, The embarrassment of riches: An interpretation of Dutch culture in the
golden age (London: Collins, 1988), pp. 238-53. It is interesting that these sources
contrast the armies of the Dutch Republic, in which foreigners were conspicuous,
and the navy, in which the manpower was “predominantly people of our own land”
(Huizinga, Nederland’s beschaving, p. 55). More recent research has, however,
268 NOTES to pp. 20-1

shown that nearly 60 percent of seamen who appear in Amsterdam mariage registers
in the years 1651—5 were not of Netherlands origin and that in 1720-33 foreigners
predominated among the men on Amsterdam war ships (i.e. at least 36 percent of
petty officers, 50 percent of sailors, 67 percent of soldiers); see Bruijn, “Dutch
men-of-war’, pp. 93, 95.
The point made about the national origins of army personnel is not, of course,
invalid, but perhaps has an element of anachronism about it in being applied to a
period before the rise of modern European nationalism. As is already clear to
readers, the Dutch East India Company was not very Dutch by modern definitions,
either. Yet it was governed by men who, with few exceptions. may be called
Dutchmen, just as the great commanders of the armies and navies of the Nether-
lands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were also Dutch. At least to that
extent, I believe that one can say that the VOC inherited military as well as
commercial traditions of Dutch origin. It is relevant also to note H. Brugmans’
discussion of the central importance in Dutch towns ca. 1700 of the militia, a large
armed force raised from the bourgeoisie; see his Niewwe geschiedenis (vol. V of
Geschiedenis van Nederland, ed. H. Brugmans; Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschap-
pij “Joost van den Vondel”, 1936), pp. 294-7. Here, too, one finds in a Netherlands
context that combination of military and commercial interests which seem to me
central to the VOC in the period analysed in this book.
110. Coen, Bantén, to H. XVII, 27 Dec. 1614, in dJ TV, pp. 24-5: and in Co-
lenbrander & Coolhaas, Coen, vol. I, pp. 97-8.
111. Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen, p. 142.
112. George Clark, The seventeenth century (2nd. ed.; London, etce.: Oxford
University Press, 1972), p. 98.
113. For an overview of these developments, see R. Emest Dupuy & Trevor N.
Dupuy, The encyclopedia of military history, from 3500 BC to the present (New
York & Evanston: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), ch. XIV.
114. D. de Iongh, Het Krijgswezen onder de Oostindische Compagnie
(‘s-Gravenhage: N.V. Uitgeverij W.P. van Stockum en Zoon, 1950), p. 90.
115. See Christopher Duffy, Fire and stone: The science of fortress warfare
1660-1860 (Newton Abbot, etc.: David & Charles, 1975), especially pp. 187, 190-1.
116. On VOC weapons, see de Iongh, Krijgswezen, pp. 88—94.
117. A later incident of this kind is reported in Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia,
10 July 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727): a soldier named J. Jz. Richardt shot dead
the sergeant of the watch Frans Heijneman at Kartasura. For this his hands were
cut off and he was hanged.
118. VOC record are full of such incidents. See also Warnsinck, De Graaff
reisen, p. 223: Jurrien van Goor, Kooplieden, predikanten en bestuurders overzee:
Beeldvorming en plaatsbepaling in een andere wereld (Utrecht: H.E.S. Uitgevers,
1982), p. 121; de Iongh, Krijswezen, p. 87. Wamsinck, De Graaff reisen, pp.
222-3, has somewhat far-fetched tales of the torture-executions of Balinese slaves
who asked for their pipes and drinking water while they slow expired.
In 1727 the VOC commandant at Sémarang requested a new set of torture
instruments which were “necessary to be able to carry out a complete torture
according to the usual practice”. His old instruments were so worn out that they
were, he said, dangerous to use (the danger presumably being to the torturer); the
screws (schroeven) were in particularly bad condition. Tersmitten, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 21 Dec. 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728). He submitted a further request
NOTES to pp. 21-31 269

in Mar. 1729 and finally received new instruments in Sept. 1729; idem, 29 Mar
1729 & 25 Sept. 1729, in VOC 2139 (OB 1730).
119. See Blussé, Strange Company, especially Chaps. IV—V.
120. DR 1674, p. 28; see also Abeyasekere, Jakarta, p. 19; Blussé, Strange
Company, p. 19.
121. See Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen, pp. 205—6, for a description of a Chi-
nese religious festival at Jépara and the conflict caused by the antics of drunken
VOC sailors.
122. See Blussé, Strange Company, p. 52.
123. I cannot prove that either of these usages was common in 1650-70, but
have a report from Surabaya dd. 1692 concerning three Chinese referred to by the
VOC as Intzick Bandjar, Intzick Thousong and the “parnackan” Intzinck Lauwt.
Banjar and Laut are clearly Malay personal names, but I do not recognise Thousong
and assume it to be Chinese. See “DR 1692”, 29 Sept. Such exarnples are common
in later records.
124. E.g. see Both, Makean, to H. XVII, 26 July 1612, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
I, p. 9; Batavia to H. XVII, 3 Feb. 1626, in ibid., p. 202.
125. For a detailed study, see Leonard Y. Andaya, The heritage of Arung Palakka:
A history of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the seventeenth century (VKI vol. 91; The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
126. Buddhist priests (padanda Buddha) are still found in Bali alongside the far
more numerous padanda Siva. See C. Hooykaas, Balinese Bauddha brahmans
(Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd.
Letterkunde new series vol. 80; Amsterdam & London: North-Holland Publishing
Company, 1973).

Notes to Chapter 1
1. For details on the early reigns of the Mataram dynasty, see H.J. de Graaf, De
regering van Panembahan Sénapati Ingalaga (VKI vol. 13; ’s-Gravenhage: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1954); idem, Sultan Agung; Ricklefs, History, pp. 37 et seqq. An English-
language summary of these works by de Graaf is to be found in Theodore G.Th.
Pigeaud & H.J. de Graaf, Islamic states in Java 1500-1700: Eight Dutch books
and articles by Dr. H.J. de Graaf as summarized by Theodore G.Th. Pigeaud (VKI
vol. 70; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).
2. De Graaf, Mangku-Rat J. Unless other sources are cited, the narrative here
down to the fall of Mataram relies upon de Graaf’s account. See also Pigeaud &
de Graaf, /slamic states. pp. 53 et seqq.
3. Literally “wheel of the world”. Cakra has significant resonances from the
Javanese wayang theatre and other legends; see J.F.C. Gericke & T. Roorda,
Javaansch-Nederlandsch handwoordenboek (revised ed.; ed. A.C. Vreede & J.G.H.
Gunning; 2 vols.; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1901), vol. I, p. 266. It is related to Buddhist
ideas of the world ruler, the cakravartin (see J. Gonda, Ancient Indian kingship
from the religious point of view [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966], pp. 123-8) and has
echoes in the title Erucakra assumed by some Javanese rebels (see particularly
Theodore Pigeaud, “Erucakra-Vairocana”, pp. 270-3 in India antiqua: A volume
of Oriental studies presented by his friends and pupils to Jean Philippe Vogel,
C.LE., on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of his doctorate (Leiden: E.J.
270 NOTES to pp. 31-5

Brill, 1947]). For further references, see p. 365 n. 66 below.

4. See H.D. de Graaf, “De opkomst van Raden Troenadjaja”, Djdwa vol. 20, no.
1 (Jan. 1940), p. 57. It should be noted that in this first attempt to unravel the early
history of the Cakraningrat line, de Graaf apparently confused the deaths of
Cakraningrat I and R.Dm. Mélayakusuma. He later changed his views; see idem
(ed.), De expeditie van Anthonio Hurdt, Raad van Indié, als Admiraal en Super-
intendent naar de binnenlanden van Java, Sept.-Dec.1678, volgens het journaal
van Johan Jurgen Briel, Secretaris (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 4.
See also idem, Mangku-Rat I, vol. 1, p. 29; vol. Il, pp. 46-8, where the identities
of these early Madurese figures are described in a confusing and contradictory
fashion. I have here followed de Graaf’s views as given in his Expeditie van Hurdt.
De Graaf’s reconstruction differs somewhat from that in Silsilah Raja-raja di
Madura Barat, a photocopied typescript genealogy provided by the juru kunci
(guardian of the graves) at Aer Mata, Arosbaya, which I visited in Oct. 1987. This
genealogy says that R.Dm. Mélaya (=Mélayakusuma) was the son of Cakraningrat
I by a sélir (concubine), whereas his son by a queen (the Ratu Ibu) was R. Undakan
who succeeded as Cakraningrat IT and ruled from 1648 to 1707. I respect the
accuracy of such local genealogical traditions, but would not assume them to be
authoritative as far back as the seventeenth century. The death of the lord of
Sampang in 1656 is also recorded in BS 1:78.
5. De Vallé, Jépara, to Batavia, 30 June 1670, in dJ VI, p. 185.
6. On the background of the Makasarese, see Andaya, Arung Palakka, espe-
cially pp. 208 ef seqq.
7. Chandler, Warfare in the age of Marlborough, p. 11, referring to the years
between 1688 and 1748.
8. Speelman er a/., aboard ship before Tégal, to Batavia, 9 Jan. 1677, in dJ VII,
p. 76; Couper, report to Speelman, 25 Mar. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 110; James C.
Ingram, Economic change in Thailand, 1850—1970 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1971), p. 23 (citing an English source); Theodor Ritter von Oppolzer, Canon
of eclipses (Canon der Finsternisse) (transl. Owen Gingerich; New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1692), chart 138; de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. Il, pp. 77-9.
9. See Ricklefs, Mangkubwmi, pp. 176 et seqq.
10. Poolman report, Batavia, 29 Sept. 1676, in dJ VI, p. 206; see also DR 1676,
pp. 235-6.
11. For further biographical information on these figures, see Stapel, Gou-
verneurs-Generaal, pp. 29-33; idem, Cornelis Janszoon Speelman (’s-Gravenhage:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1936); Willem Martin Ottow, Rijckloff Volkertsz van Goens: De
carriére van een diplomaat, 16]9—1655 (Utrecht: Stichting Pressa Trajectina, 1954);
W. Wijnaendts van Resandt, De gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op
hare buitencomptoiren in Azié (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Liebaert, 1944), pp. 56-7,
59-60, 99-100.
12. See L. Andaya, Arung Palakka, pp. 73 et seqq.

vol. Il, pp. 146 et seqq.

14. A company or “flag” of VOC troops varied in size from around 40 to
around 150 men and officers, with the usual figure being in the vicinity of 50 men.
In the Netherlands, Maurits van Nassau had set the size of a company at something
over 100 men plus officers but often in fact used companies of lesser strength,
 NOTES to pp. 35-7 ay

while Jan van Nassau put the normal strength of a company at 135 men; Hans
Delbriick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (7
vols.; Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke, 1900-36), vol. IV. p. 187.
15. Mardijker was the term for a group of people descended from native Chris-
tian troops of the Portuguese and Spanish who were captured by the VOC and then
freed after serving the Company for several years, but who still owed paid military
service if it was required of them. Most originally were of non-Indonesian origin;
some were black slaves from Angola, for instance. They spoke a bastardised
Portuguese but were encouraged ‘to speak Dutch from the late seventeenth century.
Most wore Portuguese-style dress and had Portuguese (later Dutch) names. In due
course, Indonesian and Indo-European Christians were included within the Mar-
dijker group so that the category came to mean roughly Christians of indigenous
or part-indigenous descent. See de longh, Krijgswezen, pp. 62-3; Taylor, Social
world, pp. 47-8; Paramita R. Abdurachman, “Atakiwan, casados and tupassi:
Portuguese settlements and Christian communities in Solor and Flores (1536—1630)”,
Masyarakat Indonesia vol. 10, no. 1 (1983), p. 88; Batavia to H. XVI, 31 Jan.
1679, in dJ VII, pp. 4-5.
16. A map of the VOC fortress and the town of Jépara dd. 1677 is to be found
in ARA map VEL 1271, “Kaartje van ‘t Fort en stad Japara . . .”. This shows walls
on the sea-side of both the town and the Danaréja fortress, with the rest of the
fortress defended by palisades. See also the description of Danaréja’s strategic
location in de Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 266-7.
17. J.E. Heeres and F.W. Stapel (eds.), “Corpus diplomaticum Neerlando-Indi-
cum: Verzameling van politieke contracten en verdere verdragen door de Neder-
landers in het Oosten gesloten, van privilegebrieven aan hen verleend, enz.”, vol.
I (BKI vol. 57, 1907), pp. 483-5.
18. Text and ratifications in ibid., vol. Ill (BKI vol. 91, 1934), pp. 39-47, and
in dJ VI, pp. 79-83. See also Speelman et al., Jépara, to Batavia, 10 March 1677,
in dJ VII, p. 77.
19. The last or koyan was of variable weight in differing circumstances (see
Appendix 3), but generally ranged between 3000 and 3500 Amsterdam lbs =
approx. 1480-1730 kg or 1.48-1.73 metric tons = 3270-3810 lbs avoirdupois.
20. Speelman et al., aboard ship before Sémarang, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1677, in
dJ VII, p. 138; AR II verclaringe, 19-20 Sept. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 154.
21. On Couper see F. de Haan, Priangan: De Preanger-regentschappen onder
het Nederlandsch bestuur tot 1811 (4 vols.; [Batavia:] Bataviaasch Genootschap
van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 1910-12), vol. I, pp. 202-5. Couper was one of
several VOC officers who were said to be proficient in Malay or Javanese; for
some general scepticism towards these claims, see J. Gonda, “Eenige grepen uit de
geschiedenis der beoefening van de Maleische taal- en letterkunde”, Verslag
Provinciaal Utrechtse Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen 1935, pp.
93-113.
22. AN Solo 52, no. 2.5, “Volmaght van Martapoera voor de Heer Admirael
Cornelis Speelman, dato 16° [sic] Maart 1677”, dd. Sunday 16 Muharram Be 1600
[21 Mar. 1677], in Malay (Arabic script) and Javanese with a Dutch ratification
and red lacquer seal of Wangsadipa. Wangsadipa was later renamed Martapura
(see de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 12 n. 3) and the document presumably bears
this name for that reason. Speelman is referred to in this document as Amral
Wg, NOTES to pp. 37-40

Kurnilis Ispilman. A Dutch translation is in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplo-

maticum”, vol. III (BK/ vol. 91, 1934), pp. 48-51. The confusion surrounding the
date of this document (16 or 21 Mar. 1677) is not easily resolved; Stapel’s expla-
nation in “Corpus diplomaticum”, vol. III, p. 50 n. 2, is erroneous.
23. The court’s reluctance was understandable. It was proposed to move the
border from the Krawang to Pamanukan rivers (i.e. from Kali Blubuk to Kali Cu-
punagara). This would have been a movement of over 80 km/50 miles and, since
the border extended thence due south to the Indian Ocean, would have meant the
excision of a substantial area from the king’s domain, however little benefit he
may then have obtained from it. It will be seen below (p. 47) that this was never-
theless agreed to in October.
24. Speelman et al., aboard ship before Rémbang, to Batavia, 30 March 1677,
in dJ VII, p. 94.
25. Ibid., pp. 93-4; Couper report to Speelman, 25 Mar. 1677, in dJ VII, pp.
95-113. On the Rds. 10,000, see also de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. I, pp. 154, 159.
26. Couper report to Speelman, 25 Mar. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 101.
27. C. Skinner (ed. & transl.), Sja‘ir Perang Mengkasar (the rhymed chronicle
of the Macassar War) by Entji' Amin (VKI vol. 40; *s-Gravenhage: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 78-9.
28. 0.6 “Duytsche mylen”; the German mile was, like most other measures,
variable in this period, but was generally around 7.5 km/4.7 miles in length.
29. See ARA map VEL 1279 “Plan van Sourabaya en omstreken”; this is re-
produced in G.H. von Faber, Oud Soerabaia: De geschiedenis van Indié’s eerste
koopstad van de oudste tijden tot de instelling van de gemeenteraad (1906)
({Surabaya:]) Gemeente Soerabaia, 1931), p. 11. [P.A. Leupe], /nventaris der
verzameling kaarten berustende in het Rijks-Archief, vol. | (s-Gravenhage: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1867), merely dates this map “17de eeuw” but it is clearly a contemporary
depiction of the battle ground of 1677.
30. Cited in Stapel, Speelman, p. 97. On the Johorese see also Andaya, Johor,
pp. 108-9.
31. Speelman et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 May 1677, in dJ VII, p. 118. The
only ruler of the Mataram house to have used the Sultan title, Sultan Agung,
received it from Mecca in 1641; see de Graaf, Sultan Agung, pp. 264-8.
32. Speelman instructions to de Saint-Martin, Jépara & Sémarang, 23 Mar.
1678, in dJ VII, pp. 198-9. See also dJ VII, p. xxi-xxii, xxiv, xlvii-xlix. It should
be noted that the other non-Javanese involved, the Madurese and Makasarese, had
reputations as firm Muslims.
33. AR II, [Tégal], to Batavia (“Cap. Moor”), n.d., rec’d end of July 1677
(under date 1 Aug. 1677), in VOC 1329 (OB 1678). The letter says that the three
reasons for the fall of the court were (1) AR I’s cousin Png. Purbaya had joined
with Kajoran and other rebels, (2) AR II was unable to get the people of Mataram
to fight, (3) “om dat in de Mattaram gesien wierdt dat myn h! ons te heuse quam
off met ons gingh”. The VOC translator noted that the third point was obscure but
seemed to say that VOC assistance to Mataram had helped to push Purbaya towards
the rebel side. In the version of the letter in dJ VII, pp. 130-2, the third point has
been amended to read “... ons te hulp quam... ”.
34. See n. 33. See also AR II, [Tégal], to Speelman, n.d., rec’d Grésik 16 Aug.
1677 (under date 3 Sept. 1677), in VOC 1329 (OB 1678).
NOTES to pp. 41-5 ZT

35. BS I: 24.
36. BK f. 354v.; BTJ(BP), vol. XII, pp. 31-2.
37. See de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. I, pp. 188-91; and Ricklefs, Tradition,
pp. 184-6.
38. De Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. Il, pp. 192-4. The south Sumatran state of
Palembang still professed loyalty, but this was of little practical consequence; see
ibid., vol. Il, pp. 184-5; Batavia to H. XVII, 24 Nov. 1677, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Masse peel 933
39. BK, ff. 355r.—357v.; cf. BTJ(BP), vol. XII, p. 32 et seqgq.
40. See also AR II, [Tégal}, to Speelman, n.d., rec’d Grésik 16 Aug. 1677
(under date 3 Sept. 1677), in VOC 1329 (OB 1678), where AR II identified those
who overran Mataram as R. Kajoran and the people of Madiun, Pathi, Kudus and
Grobogan and the followers of Png. Purbaya. Cf. n. 33 above. The absence of any
reference to Trunajaya or to Makasarese or Madurese is remarkable.
41. BK, ff. 357v.—358r.; cf. BTJ(BP), vol. XII, pp. 39-40. AR II later told
Speelman that his father had advised him to rely upon “my younger uncle” the
“Captain Admiral” (Speelman) and “my elder uncle the Captain Moor” (the
Governor-General); see AR II, [Tégal], to Speelman, n.d. rec’d Grésik 16 Aug.
1677 (under date 3 Sept.1677), in VOC 1329 (OB 1678).
42. De Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. U, p. 189.
43. His date of birth is uncertain, but was probably ca. 1637-43. See Batavia
to H. XVII, 5 July 1677, in dJ VI, p. 166; Speelman instructions to de Saint-
Martin, Jépara & Sémarang, 23 Mar. 1678, in dJ VII, p. 190.
44. Speelman et al., aboard ship before Sémarang, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1677, in
dJ VU, pp. 137-9; AR II verclaringe, Jépara, 19-20 Sept. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 154.
45 Van Outers, daghregister, under date 12 July 1677, in VOC 1329 (OB 1678).

Notes to Chapter 2

1. BK ff. 3611.-362r. Later, in 1679, the VOC also reported that AR II had the
idea of going to Mecca; Couper et al., “negory Sollo”, to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1679,
in dJ VII, p. 278; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov./11 Dec. 1679, in dJ VII, p. 35. In
1680 they reported that he had abandoned such ideas; Couper et al., Surabaya, to
Batavia, 14 May 1680, in dJ VII, p. 306; DR 1/680, p. 325.
2. BK ff. 362v.—365v. The official was Ki Pranantaka, later (ibid., f. 368r.) re-
named Sinduréja. He became one of the foremost courtiers of AR II’s reign. The
titles ascribed in the chronicle differ from those used later in the reign and there
is probably a case of anachronism here; e.g. see Susuhunan Ratu Amangkurat
Senapati Ingalaga Abdulrahman Muhammad Zainulkubra, Kartasura, to Jépara,
rec’d 17 July 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704).
Dr. Pigeaud (letter of 15 Apr. 1985) suggested that Ngabdulrahman may have
been the personal name of the founder of the Mataram dynasty, whose title was
Senapati Ingalaga. He regarded Zainulkubra as a Javanese form of Arabic Zainu’l
Qurabd, “ornament of those who stand near (to God)”, and suggested that Muham-
mad Zainulkubra might have been a personal name of AR II.
3. BK f. 363v.
4. Examples are too numerous for citation. For one set of stereotypes, see
274 NOTES to pp. 45-6

Valentyn, who said that Javanese were not only murderous, dissembling and
treacherous, but also vengeful to a degree not even exceeded by “the best Italian”;
Oud en nieuw Oost Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 53-4, 61.
Such stereotypes were old and persistent: Pieter van Dam’s description in 1701
of the Javanese as being “of a very malicious and faithless nature” was based upon
van Goens’ 1656 description of them; Pieter van Dam, Beschrijvinge van de
Oostindische Compagnie (ed. F. W. Stapel & C. W. Th. Baron van Boetzelaer van
Asperen en Dubbeldam; 4 vols. in 7; ’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1927-54),
vol. II, pt. 3, p. 379; de Graaf, Van Goens, p. 184.
It was only in the course of the nineteenth century that these ideas were replaced
by the colonial stereotype of the Javanese as “calm, docile, submissive, cordial and
hospitable, . .. good-natured and quiet”; this example is from T. J. Bezemer (ed),
Beknopte encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indié, naar den tweeden druk der en-
cyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indié (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff; Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1921), p. 212. For a selection of nineteenth-century stereotypes, see J.H.
M. Kommers, Besturen in een onbekende wereld: Het Europese binnenlands bestuur
in Nederlandsch-Indié: Een antropologische studie (2 vols.; Meppel: Krips Repro,
1979), vol. I, pp. 283 et seqq.
5. Speelman et al., aboard ship before Sémarang, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1677, in
dJ VII, p. 136; idem, Jépara, to Batavia, 14 Oct, 1677, in dJ VU, p. 157; see also
GA WYN os XOX,
6. Speelman ef al., Jépara, to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 180; Speel-
man instructions to de Saint-Martin, Jépara & Semarang, 23 Mar. 1678, in dJ VU,
pp. 190-1.
7. BK ff. 358r.-v. Pugér later told AR II that AR I had given him the title
Senapati Ingalaga, but AR II denied this, saying that their father had merely named
Pugér Senapati over that part of the army then in his command; AR II, [Kartasura],
to Pugér, [Mataram], 30 Sept. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681).
8. E.g. Susuhunan Ingalaga to AR II, and idem to Speelman, n.d. (under date
2 Nov. 1677), in VOC 1329 (OB 1678).
9. BK ff. 358v.—360v.
10. AR II verclaringe, 19-20 Sept. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 153; Speelman et ai.,
Jépara, to Batavia, 22 Oct. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 161.
11. Martajaya report, under date 3 Sept. 1677, in VOC 1329 (OB 1678); AR II
verclaringe, 19-20 Sept. 1677, in dJ VII, p. 154; Speelman er al., J&para, to Bata-
Vide OC im ON /emnn cue y Leap emlOse
Natabrata was the child of Ratu Malang, the centre of one of the greatest causes
célébres of AR I’s reign (see de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. Il, pp. 15-22); Speel-
man instructions to de Saint-Martin, Jépara, 23 Mar. 1678, in dJ VII, p. 191.
12. Speelman, Jépara, to Pngs. Pugér, Singasari, Martasana, 24 Sept. 1677, and
AR II to Susuhunan Ingalaga [Pugér], Pngs. Martasana & Singasari, n.d. (both
under date 10 Oct. 1677), in VOC 1329 (OB 1678); Speelman et al., Jépara, to
Batavia, 22 Oct. 1677, in dJ VII, pp. 161-2; Susuhunan Ingalaga to AR II, under
date 2 Nov. 1677, in VOC 1329 (OB 1678); Speelman et al., Jépara, to Batavia,
30 Nov. 1677, in dJ, VII, pp. 175-6, 178-9. See also BK f. 369v.
13. Susuhunan Ingalaga [Pugér], to Speelman, under date 2 Nov. 1677, in VOC
1329 (OB 1678); Speelman et al., Jépara, to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1677, in dJ VII, p.
Ig).
NOTES to pp. 46-8 0 bs)

14. Speelman et al., Jépara, to Batavia, 14 & 22 Oct. 1677, in dJ VII, pp. 158,
162.
15. De Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. I, p. 193, equates Elduwelbeh with Speel-
man, which seems questionable in the light of the numerous examples of Speelman’s
name being given as Sapilman, Ispilman, etc. in both contemporary and later
Javanese sources (e.g. see p. 271 n. 22 above). Everaert Verschuyr/van der Schuer/
van der Schuur seems more likely, particularly since it was he who brought AR
II from Tégal to Jépara in Sept. 1677; see de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 8 n.
On the other hand, BK f. 373r. et seqq. ascribes to Elduwelbeh command of the
whole VOC force, which would support identifying the name with Speelman. Ann
Kumar (ed. & transl.), Surapati, man and legend: A study of three babad traditions
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), p. 340, equates the name (appearing as Amral An-
duwelbeh) with the later commander Herman de Wilde, which makes no sense in
this context.
16. BK ff. 367r.-v.
17. Speelman ef al., Jépara, to Batavia, 18 Sept. 1677, 6 Oct. 1677, 14 Oct.
1677, 22 Oct. 1677, in dJ VII, pp. 145-7, 156, 158-61.
18. BK ff. 370r.—372v., 373v. et seqq. The first of these sections also contains
a fanciful tale of French and English forces being deceived and then sunk by the
VOC to prevent them joining the war in support of AR II.
19. AR I act, Jépara, 19 Oct. 1677/22 Syaban Be 1600; text to be found in AN
Solo 53° “Copie contracten acten enz. 1646-1746”; dJ VII, pp. 163-6; and Heeres
& Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum”, vol. III (BK/ vol. 91, 1934), pp. 70-4. See also
DR 1677, pp. 365-7; AR II open letter, Jépara, 13 Nov. 1677/18 Ramadan AH
1088, in AN Solo 535 “‘Copie contracten acten enz. 1646-1746”; and in Heeres &
Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum”, vol. III (BK/ vol. 91, 1934), pp. 98-100.
20. AR II act, Jépara, 19-20 Oct. 1677/22 Syaban Be 1600, in dJ VII, pp.
166-9; and in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum”, vol. III (BAT vol. 91,
1934), pp. 74-9. See also DR 1677, pp. 369-70.
21. AR II act, Jépara, 15 Jan. 1678/19 Dulkangidah AH 1089 [sic; i.e. 1088 =
12 Jan. 1678], in AN Solo 53° “Copie contracten acten enz. 1646-1746”; and in
Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum”, vol. III (BK/ vol. 91, 1934), pp. 123-5.
22. Cession by Ad. Martapura, Jépara, 15 Jan. 1678/19 Dulkangidah AH 1089
[sic; i.e. 1088 = 12 Jan. 1678]; AR II ratification, n.d., both in AN Solo 53° “Copie
contracten acten enz. 1646-1746”; and in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum”,
vol. III (BKI vol. 91, 1934),pp. 121-3.
23. Speelman instructions for de Saint-Martin, Jépara & Sémarang, 23 Mar.
1678, in dJ VII, pp. 199-200.
24. DJ VII, pp. xxxvii-xxxviil; Stapel, Speelman, p. 107.
25. See dJ VII, pp. xvi-xvii, xl.
26. AR II nader verzoek, Jépara, 29 Oct. 1677, in AN Solo 52 no. 2.9; another
copy in VOC 1329 (OB 1678) under date 2 Nov. 1677; and in Heeres & Stapel,
“Corpus diplomaticum”, vol. III (BK/ vol. 91, 1934), pp. 79-83. See also DR 1677,
pp. 391-2.
27. DJ VII, pp. xlii-xlv; Speelman et al., Jépara, to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1677, in
dJ VII, pp. 174-7, 179; de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 25-6. The appointment
of Mértapura as governor over the east coast and of Mértalaya over the west coast
is announced in AR II open letter, Jépara, 13 Nov. 1677/18 Ramadan AH 1088,
276 NOTES to pp. 48-52

in AN Solo 53° “Copie contracten acten enz. 1646-1746”.

28) BK ff. 3761-37 7t.
29. For Sultan Agéng (r. 1651-83) of Bantén’s denunciation of AR II for
abandoning the religion of his forefathers, behaving like someone who was neither
Muslim nor Christian and becoming a subject of the VOC, see his letter to AR II,
rec’d at Jépara 22 Apr. 1678, in dJ VII, pp. 209-11; see also DR 1678, p. 214.
30. DJ VII, pp. xlv-xlvii; BK ff. 376v.-377v. DR 1677, p. 440, describes the
failed attempt to suborn Mértapura.
31. AR II act, Jépara, 24 Feb. 1678, in AN Solo 53° “Copie contracten acten
enz. 1646-1746”.
32. De Saint-Martin ef al., Jépara, to Batavia, 13 June 1678, in dJ VII, p. 213;
DR 1678, p. 313; dJ VII, p. lx. BK f. 361r. appears to place Singasari’s death in
1677.
33. DJ VII, pp. liv, lix, 1x—Ixiii; Stapel, Speelman, pp. 118-19. On Hurdt, see
de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 34, 52-3, 54; in 1688 he was fired for corrup-
tion (ibid., p. 246 n. 3).
34. DR 1678, pp. 158-60, 378-9. On the later use of the title eyang (grandfa-
ther) for the Governor-General, see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 372-3, 410-12.
35. The VOC force was to consist of 600 Europeans, 200 Mardijkers, 100 Ba-
linese, 100 Malays, 300 Batavia Javanese, 50 Bugis and 50 Makasarese. The force
already on the coast consisted of 600 Europeans and 300 Indonesians; dJ VII, p.
Ixiv. Arung Palakka and his men were to join later.
36. DR 1678, p. 401; see also ibid., p. 567.
37. Isaac de l’Ostal[e] de Saint-Martin (ca. 1629-96) was presumably of Hu-
guenot background. He had long served in VOC military positions. He was also
a collector of Asian MSS and had a reputation (perhaps undeserved) for compe-
tence in Malay. See de Haan, Priangan, vol. I pt. 2, pp. 15-21; de Graaf, Expeditie
van Hurdt, pp. 53-4; Gonda, “Eenige grepen”, pp. 94-6. On his library of Arabic,
Persian, Sinhalese, Malay, Javanese and Makasarese MSS, see F. de Haan, “Uit
oude notarispapieren I”, TBG vol. 42 (1900), pp. 297-308 (the original compilers
of this list apparently knew no Javanese, so titles are not given for volumes in that
language).
38. De Saint-Martin er al., Jépara, to Batavia, 29 July 1678, in dJ VII, pp.
215-16.
39. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of the campaign here is based upon
de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt.
40. On Tack, see de Haan, Priangan, vol. 1, pp. 266-8; de Graaf, Expeditie van
Hurdt, p. 56. On his death, see Chapter 5 below.
41. De Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 22-4.
42. Van Renesse and Mulder in fact left a garrison behind at Blora contrary to
Hurdt’s orders; ibid., p. 170 n. 4.
43. Ibid., p. 96 n. 5.
44. Ibid., p. 96 n. 5, pp. 235-6 n. 5; see also p. 170 n. 4.
45. Ibid., pp. 252-3.
46. BK ff. 374v.-375v., 380v.—38Ir., regards Galesong’s submission as genuine
and goes on to describe his consequent assassination on Trunajaya’s orders at
Kédhiri before its fall to Hurdt. According to VOC records, Galesong was at Képér
when it later fell to VOC forces. He fled and died several weeks later; see Couper,
NOTES to pp. 52-4 PLT

Surabaya, to Jépara, 7 Jan. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 279; H.J. de Graaf, “Gevangen-

neming en dood van Raden Truna-Djaja, 26 Dec. 1679-2 Jan. 1680”, TBG vol. 85
pt. 2 (1952), pp. 276-80. See also p. 55 above. It is possible that Galesong was
killed on the orders of Trunajaya at Ngantang, in which case BK has merely
confused the timing of his death.
47. See Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 19 Mar. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719),
where 50 lasts (=koyans) are said to be enough for 1838 men for 3 months; van
Alsem, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 20 Dec. 1721, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723), where
1459 men are said to consume 59,800 Ibs (=17.09 koyans @ 3500 Ibs) per month;
and Sémarang to Batavia, 20 May 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723), where 400 lasts
are said to be sufficient for 3000 men for 12 months.
48. The figures are in de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 199. I have checked the
original dagregister and confirmed de Graaf’s reading.
49. The matchlock was the standard VOC infantry firearm at this time. There
are a few references to snaphaen (snaphance) flintlocks in VOC records from as
early as 1641, but the earliest record of the VOC making arrangements to ship
snaphaenen to the Indies in significant numbers, so far as I know, is in the Reso-
luties Heren XVII for 3 & 7 Apr. 1663 (VOC 105), which establish standard
dimensions and calibres for “musquettens van de nieuwe inventie” (i.e. snaphaenen)
sent out by the various VOC cameren to the Indies. (I am grateful to Dr B.J. Slot
for providing me with the texts of these resolutions, which are missing from the
Monash University microfiche set of the Resoluties). It seems, however, that the
VOC began a general replacement of its matchlocks with snaphaenen only in the
1680s and they were not in general use in Batavia until ca.1700. Even in the mid-
eighteenth century, matchlocks were still found in the VOC’s more remote posts
in Indonesia. See van Dam, Beschrijvinge, vol. I pt. 1, p. 640; de Iongh, Krijgswezen,
pp. 91-2. On the transition from matchlock to flintlock in Europe in roughly the
same period, see Chandler, Warfare in the age of Marlborough, pp. 75-81. See
further pp. 130-1 above.
50. BK f. 384v.
51. De Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 96 n. 5, pp. 235-6 n. 5.
52. Ibid., p. 241. Both Dutch and Javanese sources record the death of Tg.
Mangkuyuda (BK f. 385r.) in the fighting on the alun-alun, but there is disagree-
ment on the name of the second dead commander, the VOC calling him Tg.
Mélayu, Dm. Mangunjaya or Tg.Mataram.
53. In addition to de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 246-7, see also the ex-
change of letters between AR II and Batavia in DR 1679, pp. 149, 309.
54. On Ny. Sétomi, see K.C. Crucq, “De drie heilige kanonnen”, TBG vol.70
(1930), pp. 196-201; idem, “Kanonnen in den kraton”, pp. 98—100. In the latter,
Crucq reports seriously the fanciful babad account of the recovery of Ny. Sétomi
from the enemy by one of AR II’s dignitaries (Onggawongsa, later Jangrana I) at
Surabaya. This is also found in BK ff. 379v.-380r. Here the cannon is clearly
regarded as a holy Mataram heirloom, being called mriyém bérkat and wasiyat
Mataram.
55. De Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 240, 246-7; DR 1678, pp. 748-9; DR
1679, p. 267; DR 1680, pp. 331-2. For the fifteenth-century report, see Ma Huan,
Ying-yai Sheng-lan: “The overall survey of the ocean's shores” (1433) (ed. &
transl. J.V.G. Mills; Cambridge: University Press, 1970), p. 87.
When AR II failed to pay Tack, tlt: VOC at Sémarang decided in 1681 to deduct
278 NOTES to pp. 54-5

the Rds. 1000 premium from revenues owing to AR II and to pay it directly to
Tack; Sémarang resolutions, 9 Aug. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682).
Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt.1], pp. 70, 111-12, claims that
AR II’s anger with Tack arose from the absence of a large ruby from the crown,
which Valentyn implies Tack had stolen. Given Valentyn’s general unreliability
(see dJ VII, p. Ixxxii n. | on this story or, more generally, de Haan, Priangan, vol.
I, pp. 270 et seqq.), one should probably disregard this. But there is sufficient simi-
larity between the physical description of the crown given by Valentyn (p.111:
“the shape of two intertwined dragons .. . with the heads facing forward, of pure
worked gold, very elegantly made Manila-fashion from thick filigree and set with
splendid pearls and diamonds”) and that given in BK f. 437r. and BTJ(BP) vol.
XIV, p. 70 (“a crown of gold, Garudhas facing front and back, striking their
breasts, with ear ornaments”: makutha mas / Grudha mrép mungkur ika / tébah
jaja anting-anting) to make one wonder whether both Valentyn’s unknown source
and his reporting of it may merit some consideration.
56. H.J. de Graaf, “Over de kroon van Madja-Pait”, BK/ vol. 104 (1948), pp.
573-603.
57. The number of Europeans who deserted to Trunajaya’s side is not known
with certainty, but may have been about seventeen. Ten were eventually recap-
tured and nine of them were hanged. See de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 173,
183, 186-7, 201-2, 206, 213-14, 215, 219, 222, 229-30, 253, 259, 262-3, 267-8.
Ses, NG. jay, ZIT
59. Ibid., p. 47.
60. See DR 1678, p. 704.
61. E.g. DR 1679, pp. 305-8; Couper et al., “negory Sollo”, to Batavia, 13 Nov.
1679, in dJ VII, p. 278; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov./11 Dec. 1679, in dJ VII, pp.
29, 35; DR 1680, p. 156.
62. Poolman et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1679, in dJ VII, pp. 265-6;
DR 1679, pp. 150, 365-7, 522; DR 1680, pp. 78, 152-3, 171-3, 329; Couper et
al.,“negory Sollo”, to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1679, in dJ VII, p. 278; Batavia to H.
XVI, 30 Nov./I1 Dec. 1679, in dJ VII, pp. 27, 36; Couper, Surabaya, to Batavia,
12 Jan. with PS 19 Jan. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); de Iongh, Krijgswezen,
pp. 124-5; Andaya, Arung Palakka, p. 227; dJ VII, pp. xcix—.
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, p. 527 n. 4, says that the Képér of 1679 was probably
not the same as the present-day Képér, but I do not see why this should be so.
On Capt. Jonker, see de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp. 228-31; de Graaf, Ambon
en de Zuid-Molukken, pp. 157-63; and pp. 105—6 above.
63. See p. 31 above. Jan (or Joan) Albert Sloot (or Sloet) came to the Indies
with his father, the Jonkheer Timon Sloot (1613-80) in 1663. Jan seems to have
returned to the Netherlands for some period, then to have come back to Java as a
Lt. in the VOC military in 1671. In Nov. 1686 he was appointed governor
(Gezaghebber) and military head on the north voast of Java. He died in J&épara in
Oct. 1694, See de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 55-6; Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V,
joy, ISTO) Say, IF
64. Sloot & Taalbeecq, Wanakarta, to Jépara, 20 Sept.1679, in dJ VII, pp. 271-4;
Batavia to H. XVII, 10 Oct. 1679, in dJ VII, p. 22; dJ VII, pp. civ-cv; H.J. de
Graaf, “Het Kadjoran-vraagstuk”, Djdwd vol. 20 (1940), pp. 273-325.
65. Unless otherwise indicated, this account of Trunajaya’s end is taken from
de Graaf,“Gevangenneming en dood”.
NOTES to pp. 55-8 279

66. See n. 46 above.

67. De Haan, Priangan, vol. I, p. 203. |
68. De Graaf, “Gevangenneming en dood”, pp. 289, 301, 306, 307-8.
69. The full text is in Trunajaya to AR II, transl. Surabaya 11 Jan. 1680, under
date 19 Jan.1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681). Most of the text is printed in de Graaf,
“Opkomst van Troenadjaja”, pp.85-6; and summarised in idem, “Gevangenneming
en dood”, pp. 290-1. For reasons which are not clear to me, Trunajaya calls
himself Nilaprawata in this letter; ni/a means dark blue, indigo; prawata means
mountain.
70. On the role of consensus, see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 21-5, and p. 8
above.
71. Briel’s description cited in de Graaf, “Gevangenneming en dood”, pp.
299-300.
72. BK ff.389v.—391r. See also the accounts summarised in de Graaf, “Gevangen-
neming en dood”, p. 304.
73. De Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. Il, p. 111.
74. BK f. 391v.
75. Couper et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1680 & 14 May 1680, in dJ VI,
pp. 284, 298-304; DR 1679, p. 520; DR 1680, pp. 306, 323-5, 330-1; BK ff.
391v.—393v.; BS Il: 30; dJ VU, pp. cii—ciii.
76. Jépara to Batavia, 25 June 1678, in dJ VII, p. 214; DR 1678, pp. 396-7,
487, 508, 559, 564; de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 90; van der Meer, aanteken-
ingh gehouden .. . op syn rys int heen en weder coomen van de Mataram, Jépara,
23 Sept. 1679, in VOC 1349 (OB 1680); Jépara to Batavia, 26 Sept. 1679, in dJ
VII, pp. 274-5; Batavia to H. XVII, 10 Oct. 1679 & 30 Nov./ 11 Dec. 1679, in
dJ VII, pp. 22, 33; DR 1679, pp. 150, 255, 304, 308, 319-24, 374, 444-5; 448-50;
Sloot & Taalbeecq, Wanakarta, to Batavia, 6 May 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681);
Couper et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 14 May 1680, in dJ VII, pp. 305-6; AR II to
Png.Pugér, under date 14 May 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); DR 1680, pp. 325,
328, 452; Jépara to Batavia, 11 July 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Soetadjaja
alias Kaloerahan report, under date 26 July 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681; Sémarang
to Batavia, 27 July 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681).
These contacts included in particular a mission in Aug.-Sept. 1679 to Pugér in
Mataram by Benjamin van der Meer, who was born in Mataram to a VOC officer
held captive there after 1632 and a Javanese mother; van der Meer later ac-
companied Tack to Kartasura in 1686 and was killed with him there; see de Haan,
Priangan, vol. I pt. 2, pp. 234-5 on van der Meer.
77. BK f. 394v. See also de Graaf, Sultan Agung, p. 209.
78. Since the end of the major campaigns in East Java, the VOC had wished to
reduce its forces as rapidly as possible. Illness was also taking its toll among VOC
soldiers. As of Mar. 1680 the VOC had the following forces located in Java:
Europeans indigenous total
at Batavia: 1379 140 1519
elsewhere in Java: 500 14-1500 1900-2000
plus plus auxiliaries
auxiliaries
TOTAL 1879 1540-1640 plus 3419-3519 plus
auxiliaries auxiliaries
280 NOTES to pp. 58-61

(Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Mar. 1680, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, p. 401). See also
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov./11 Dec. 1679, in dJ VII, pp. 27, 36; Couper, Sura-
baya, to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1680 with PS 19 Jan. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681);
Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Oct. 1680, in dJ VU, p. 37.
79. Couper & van Vliet, aboard ship Japan, to Sémarang, 7 July 1680; Grinnel
& Grevinck, Tégal, to Batavia, 31 July 1680; Sémarang to Batavia, 15 Aug. 1680;
Sloot & Bastincg, Sémarang, report to Couper, 17 Aug.1680; Grinnel & Grevinck,
Tégal, to Batavia, 30 Aug.1680; Sémarang to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1680; all in VOC
1360 (OB 1681). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Oct. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 38.
80. See the VOC sources in n. 81.
81. See Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 182 nn. 22, 23; BS I[:31-2. The fasting
month (Pasa) began on 25 Sept. 1680 and any rituals or formalities associated with
the foundation of the court would presumably have been completed before then.
The title Kartasura Adiningrat is found in contemporaneous VOC as well as Javanese
sources. Couper et al., Kartasura Adiningrat, to Jépara, 19 Feb. 1681, in VOC
1362 (OB 1681), is the first such reference so far as I am aware. It is interesting
that in an appendix to Willemssoon, Tégal, to Batavia, 4 Nov. 1681, in VOC 1368
(OB 1682), Kartasura is twice called Surakartadiningrat.
There are some conflicts within VOC sources about the precise timing of the
march to Wanakarta/Kartasura. See Jépara to Batavia, 18 Sept. 1680 & 14 Oct.
1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Oct. 1680, in dJ VII, pp.
39-40; Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct.1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 52 (but see Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. IV, p. 419).
82. Jépara to Batavia, 14 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Couper ef ai.,
Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Batavia to H.
XVII, 29 Nov.1680, in dJ VII, p. 52; DR 1680, p. 687; BK ff. 395r.-v.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov./11 Dec. 1679, in dJ VII, p. 29; DR 1679, p.

309; de Graaf, “Opkomst van Troenadjaja”, p. 69.
2. De Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 64, 195, 247, 256; DR 1680, p. 326; BK
ff. 359v., 386r.—387r. On the tigers of Lodhaya, see also J.W. Winter, “Beknopte
beschrijving van het hof Soerakarta in 1824”, BK/ vol. 54 (1902), p. 85.
3. Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”, pp. 14-16.
4. Ibid.
5. DR 1680, p. 326; de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 201 n. 2; BK f. 382v.
In Moord, p. 51, de Graaf says that Jangrana I and Onggajaya are reported in
VOC sources to be Balinese. This may be only partly true; in 1707 Jangrana I’s
mother was said still to be alive in Surabaya and to be Balinese; A.K.A. Gijsberti
Hodenpijl, “Govert Cnoll, Commander en Oppergezaghebber ter Oostkust van
Java, 1705-1709”, Tidjschrift voor geschiedenis, land- en volkenkunde vol. 33
(1918), p. 181. Gobius & Bergman, memorie for Paijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718,
in VOC 1914 (OB 1719), say that the great-grandmother of the lords of the Surabaya
line was a commoner from Blambangan, taken as war booty ca. 50-60 years
previously and thereafter a slave of AR I (i.e. one of the group of people called
Pamanggir). A Blambangan babad described in Kumar, Surapati, p. 149, ascribes
NOTES to pp. 61-2 281

more elevated Blambangan ancestry to the Surabayans. Under his previous name
of Onggawongsa, Jangrana I is said to have single-handedly carried off the pusaka
cannon Ny. Sétomi from behind enemy lines; BK ff. 379v.—380r. The later MS
Sajarah Régen Surabaya (Museum Pusat Br. 474) says that Onggawongsa/Jang-
rana I and his brother Onggajaya were given their positions because of past loyalty
to AR IL.
6. Mechelen er al., Surabaya, to Couper, 5 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681).
7. Couper et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1680; Couper et al., Sémarang,
to Batavia, 15 Aug. 1680; both in VOC 1360 (OB 1681). On the Ratu Malang
episode, see de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. II, pp. 15-22.
8. Couper ef al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 282; idem,
13 Mar. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); DR 1680, p. 326.
9. Couper ef al., [Kartasura], to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1680 (P.S. to letter dd. 20
Oct. 1680), in VOC 1360(OB 1681); DR 1680, p. 745.
10. Couper et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 14 May 1680, in dJ VII, p. 306; Jépara
to Batavia, 11 July 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Couper er al., Sémarang, to
Batavia, 15 Aug. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Couper et al., Wanakarta, to
Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681).
11. On Témbayat, see H. J. de Graaf and Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, De eerste Moslimse
vorstendommen op Java: Studién over de staatkundige geschiedenis van de I5de
en l6de eeuw (VKI vol. 69; *s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 61-2;
Darusuprapto ef al., Laporan penelitian: Kekunaan di Bayat, Klaten (Yogyakarta:
Fakultas Sastra dan Kebudayaan, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1974).
12. On Urawan’s previous career, see de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 65-6.
13. Couper et al., Sémarang, to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681);
Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680 with P.S. dd. 25 Oct. 1680, in
VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Couper ef a/., resolutie, Kartasura, 6 Nov. 1680, in dJ VU,
pp. 307-8; Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB
1681) (see also dJ VII, pp. 307-8); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VI,
p. 57; DR 1680, pp. 743, 771; Grinnel & Grevinck, Tégal, to Batavia, 30 Nov.
1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681).
See de Graaf, “Kadjoran-vraagstuk”, p. 89, on the identity of Wanakusuma and
Wanasari. See also de Graaf, Moord, pp. 15-16.
14. Couper et al., Sémarang, to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681);
Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Oct. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 40; DR 1680, p. 596.
15. Jépara to Batavia, 14 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Couper et ai.,
Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Batavia to H.
XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 52; DR 1680, p. 687.
16. Couper, [Kartasura], to Sunan Ngalaga, [Mataram], 16 Sept. 1680; AR II,
[Kartasura], to Sunan Ingalaga, [Mataram], 21 Sept.(under date 14 Oct. 1680); AR
II, [Kartasura], to Susuhunan Ingalaga, [Mataram], 30 Sept. 1680; J. A. Sloot
Galiazza Visconto d’Aragona, report, Wanakarta, 30 Sept. 1680; Couper er al.,
Wanakarta, to Jépara, 2 Oct. 1680; Jépara to Batavia, 14 Oct. 1680; Couper et al.,
Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680; all in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Batavia to H.
XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 52; BK ff. 395r.—398r.
In the BK version, Natabrata is Pugér’s emissary to AR II, whereas the VOC
records report the opposite. The VOC also report that Natabrata told Pugér that AR
II was who he claimed to be, but of course that does not rule out private dis-
282 NOTES to pp. 63-4

cussions consistent with BK’s account. VOC records entitle Natabrata Png., AR
II’s letter of 21 Sept. 1680 calls him M. Ang., BK calls him R. In BK f. 413v., AR
II kills Natabrata in early 1682 after the reconciliation with Pugeér.
17. See Joan Albert Sloot Galiazza Visconto d’Aragona, report, Wanakarta, 30
Sept. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); see also de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, pp.
55-6. The combined names Sloot-Galiazza may be the origin of the curious Javanese
name Sélup Driansah for J. A. Sloot, although this does not explain why he is
called Selut Hendrik Ansah or Sélut Hendrik Yansah in some sources. See Ricklefs,
Mangkubumi, p. 384n.
I do not know why Sloot chose to call himself after the aristocratic Milanese
Visconti family, several of whose leading members bore the name Galeazzo. I am
grateful to my colleague Dr L.F. Green for consulting Pompeo Litta, Famiglie
celebri italiane (10 vols.; Milan, 1819-74), fasc. 9, tavole VIII, XI, XVI, XX, to
confirm that there is no evidence of a genuine genealogical link with the Visconti
family.
18. Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. with P.S. dd. 25 Oct. 1680,
in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); idem, 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Couper
et al., Mataram, to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Batavia to
H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 58.
19. Couper ef al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB
1681); BK ff. 395v., 405v.
20. Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, P.S. of 25 Oct. to letter dd. 20 Oct.
1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Couper ef a/., resolution, Kartasura, 6 Nov. 1680,
in dJ VII, p. 308; Couper ef al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC
1362 (OB 1681) (see also dJ VII, p. 308, where one of these letters is partially
quoted with some inaccuracies); dJ VII, pp. cvi-cvii. Anrangkusuma fell from his
horse on the alun-alun and when his servants came to his assistance they dis-
covered the five letters. The VOC did not wonder whether Anrangkusuma him-
self might have been carrying them.
21. Couper ef al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. with P.S. dd. 25 Oct. 1680,
in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); idem, 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); DR 1680,
pp. 742-3, 745, 771.
22. Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681).
23. Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681); idem, 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681) (see also dJ VII, p. 308);
Couper et al., Mataram, to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681)
(summarized in dJ VII, pp. 309-10); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII,
p. 57. Although some sources give 12 Nov. as the date of the march, the letter of
18 Nov. gives the date as 13 Nov. and is presumably authoritative.
24. BK f. 402r., Canto 100 (Pangkur):

3. Sri Naranata Méngkurat/ gya (a)ngrasuk busana cara Wélandi/ akakaos

akarépus/ rasukan lampis [sic] tiga/ bélah jaja baludru rinendra murub/ mojah
rinujit toyamas/ kina timang mas sinangling
4. ababadhong susun tiga/ titirahe sinawud(i) kang widuri/ ujyalanira sumunu/
arja kuluk jan[ng]kangan/ tinatrapan ing renda Wélonda murub/ yen tinon saking
mandrawa/ kadya Gurnadur Batawi
NOTES to pp. 64-5 283

5. anyuriga pédhang usar/ a[ng]garnya bra binalasong mas adi/ tan montra
putra Matarum/ pinarak ing dhadhampar ....

Cf. the parallel but not identical text in BT/(BP), vol. XIII, pp. 42-3.
25. See also BS 1:67, 72, II:14; Ricklefs, Tradition, p. 181 n. 124.
26. Couper et al., Mataram, to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681)
(partly summarized in dJ VII, pp. 309-10); Couper er al., River Praga, to Grinnel
& Grevinck, Tégal, 18 Dec. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); DR 1680, pp. 771,
815; Batavia to H. XVII, 4 Jan. 1681, in dJ VII, p. 59; dJ VII, pp. cvii-cviii.
27. BK ff. 397v.407v. (quotation from f. 407v.). The BK account emphasises
the role of Islamic religious leaders (Ki Pangulu with the kétibs and modins) in
resisting AR II and the VOC and exaggerates the scale of the fighting. See also the
cursory record of these events in BS II: 31-2.
28. Couper et al., Mataram, to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681);
Batavia to H. XVII, 4 Jan. 1681, in dJ VU, p. 59.
29. Couper et al., Mataram, to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681)
(this passage summarized in dJ VII, p. 310); Grinnel & Grevinck, Tégal, to Bata-
via, 24 Dec. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); DR 1680, pp. 814-15; DR 1681, p.
18. The return from Mataram to Kartasura over swollen rivers was difficult and the
toll of dead and sick among VOC forces continued to climb; Couper, Kartasura,
to Jépara, 26 Feb. 1681; Couper & Sloot, Kartasura, to Jépara, 9 Mar. 1681;
Sémarang to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1681; all in VOC 1362 (OB 1681) (the last para-
phrased in dJ VII, pp. 310-11).
30. DR 1680, pp. 336-7, 532, 743, 818-19; DR 168/, pp. 109, 155-6, 270,
500-1, 505, 528-9, 557. According to Couper ef al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20
Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681), the Galunggung mountains were reckoned to
reach from Bantén in the west to Watés in the east.
31. Sloot & Talbeecq, Wanakarta, to Batavia, 6 May 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, pp. 57-8; idem, 4 Jan. 1681,
in dJ VII, p. 60; DR 1680, pp. 326, 596, 687-8, 797; DR 1681, pp. 18-19; dJ VI,
p. cviii. It should be noted that Map B in Ricklefs, Tradition, shows Slinga too far
south and east: it should be north of the river Sérayu and farther west, as is
confirmed by contemporary VOC records. It is clearly the same as present-day
Slinga (Kaligondang, Purbalingga).
32. Couper, River Umpak, to Png. Pugér, 15 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB
1681); Couper et al., River Praga, to Grinnel & Grevinck, Tégal, 18 Dec. 1680,
in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Grinnel & Grevinck, Tégal, to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1680,
in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Batavia to H. XVII, 4 Jan. 1681, in dJ VII, pp. 60-1;
DR 1680, p. 797; DR 1681, pp. 12, 18, 19-20, 223-4; dJ VII, p. cviii. The dig-
nitaries of Bantén were later reluctant to believe the reports of Pugér’s submission
to AR II: DR /68/, p. 786.
33. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Jépara, 19 Feb. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681);
Couper & Briel, Smarang, to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681);
Couper et al., Jépara, to Batavia, 17 Apr. 1681, 26 May 1681, 15 July 1681, in
VOC 1368 (OB 1682); DR 1681, pp. 109, 177, 223-4, 269, 410; dJ VII, pp.
ceviii-cix; BK ff. 407v.409r. BK, f. 414r., appears to conflate the VOC with-
drawals of 1681 and 1682.
34. Couper et al., Kartasura, to van der Meer, Cirébon, Aug. 1681, in VOC
284 NOTES to pp. 65-6

1368 (OB 1682); Sémarang resolution, 9 Aug. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682);
Couper ef al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682)
(partial and inaccurate paraphrase in dJ VII, pp. 311-12); DR 1681, pp. 415, 437,
479, 490-1, 550-1, 613, 630-1; BK ff. 408v.410v. Later VOC reports claim that
it was only the intervention of the VOC lifeguard which had saved Kartasura,
which seems questionable; see DR /68/, p. 592. Fleeing Wanakusuma rebels were
again put to flight in the Démak area in Sept.; Couper er a/., Kartasura, to Batavia,
28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); DR 1681, pp. 592-3.
35. DR 1681, pp. 288, 295, 310, 321, 411, 414-15, 509, 550, 555, 557.
36. DR 1681, pp. 555-6.
37. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB
1682); Couper et al., Pawijenan, to Batavia, 7 Nov. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB
1682); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1681, in dJ VII, p. 62; DR 168/, p. 632.
38. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB
1682) (partial and inaccurate paraphrase in dJ VII, pp. 311-12); Couper et al.,
Pawijenan, to Batavia, 7 Nov. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); Couper er al., Ka-
lijali, to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682) (paraphrase in dJ VII,
p. 312); Couper et al., Ambal, to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682);
Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1681, in dJ VII, pp. 62—3; Couper et a/., Ambal, to
Batavia, 9 Dec. 1681, in dJ VII, p. 313; Couper et al., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 18
Dec. 1681, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR 1/681, pp. 660, 708-9; 778-80; DR 1682,
vol. I, pp. 32-3. See also the brief reference to Pugér’s submission, which is given
less prominence than the subsequent destruction of Slinga, in BS Il: 32-4. The
Bagawanta fortification consisted of bamboo palisades defending packed dirt walls
6 Dutch (Rhineland) feet (1.9-2 m) thick and 8 Rhineland feet (2.5—2.7m) high,
a formidable defence work. é
39. The following account of the campaign against Namrud is based upon
Willemssoon, Tégal, to Batavia, 4 Nov. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); Couper
et al., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 18 Dec. 1681 & 25 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683); DR 1681, pp. 780, 781; DR 1682, vol. I, pp. 9, 12-15, 211, 216; BS II:
32-4; dJ VI, pp. cix—cx. BK ff. 414v.—415r. agrees with VOC records in estimat-
ing Namrud’s forces at 2000. See also “Aftekeningh van de mars van den Com-
mandeur Couper . ..”(ca. 1681) (VEL 1164 in ARA), a map of the expedition’s
route.
Another force of 79 Europeans and over 1600 Javanese marched southwards
from Tégal on 1 December; it destroyed Namrud’s positions and burned villages
and ricefields en route but arrived too late to take part in the conquest of Mésir;
Willemssoon, Tégal, to Batavia, 3 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682): Grevinck
& Tabbert, Wanayasa, to Willemssoon, Tégal, 7 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB
1682); Couper et al., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 18 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683); DR 1681, pp. 660, 778, 781; DR 1682, vol. I, p. 15.
Spaanse ruyters, known in German as Schweinsfedern (boar-spears) or Spani-
sche Reiter, were also arranged cross-wise through holes in beams and stood on
the ground as obstructions, especially against cavalry (see Delbriick, Geschichte
der Kriegskunst, vol. IV, p. 20). | am grateful to Dr Christopher Duffy of RMA
Sandhurst for helping to clarify this terminology for me.
40. Curiously, on the contemporary drawing of “De vestingh Missier en desselfs
buyten-wercken by de E: Comp® verovert onder het belijd van den Comm! Couper
NOTES to pp. 66-8 285

op 16 Decemb: 1681” (VEL 1255 in ARA), the fortress is also called “de vesting
Madiapaid” (Majapahit), but this may of course be a scribal error.
41. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683); DR 1682, vol. I, p. 471.
42. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683); DR 1682, vol. I, p. 471. On Suranata’s background, see p. 286 n. | below.
43. BK ff. 271v.—272v. (text in Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 356—7n.); cf. BTJ(BP),
vol. X, pp. 15-16.
44. BK f. 357v.; BTJ(BP), vol. XII, p. 39. See p. 42 above.
45. BK ff. 414v.415v.; BS I1:32-4; BTJ(BP), vol. XIII, pp. 76-7.
46. DR 1682, vol. I, pp. 15-16.
47. Grinnel & Grevinck, Tégal, to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB
1681).
48. Couper ef al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683); DR 1682, vol. I, pp. 471-3 (this refers to the above letter but diverges in
some respects from the archival copy of the letter). See also BS II:35.
49. Couper et al., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 25 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683);
Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR
1682, vol. I, pp. 216, 473.
BK ff. 410v.413v. tells of the steps in Pugér’s submission. According to this
account, his formal letter of submission was sent to AR II from Kuwél (said to be
south of Péngging and northwest of Masaran [Cawas] i.e. near the main road to
the south of Klathen; Balé Poestaka, Babad Gijanti: Pratélan namaning tijang lan
panggénan [Batavia: Balé Poestaka, 1939]). The court occasion when he was
received by AR II is said to have taken place on a Monday (Soma), but the VOC
date 26 Feb. 1682 was a Thursday. BK claims that momentary confusion and near-
conflict were caused by AR II again wearing Dutch dress on this day. The chro-
nogram is given as jaladri lang [sic: presumably for walang] rétune jagat (AJ
1604/21 Jan. 1681-10 Jan. 1682), which is inconsistent with the date of 26 Feb.
1682. The VOC confirm, however, that Pugér’s first formal offer of submission
was sent from Kuwél: Couper ef al/., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 25 Dec. 1681, in VOC
1380 (OB 1683). Perhaps there is some confusion of different occasions in VOC
and Javanese sources.
R. A. Panular was with Pugér when he surrendered but changed his mind en
route to Kartasura. He headed instead for the north coast, ostensibly to visit the
grave of AR I at Tégalwangi. He was caught and escorted to Kartasura firmly but
politely by the VOC. Couper et al., Wanagiri, to Grevinck et al., Tégal, 25 Dec.
1681, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); Couper er a/., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682,
in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR 1682, vol. I, pp. 470-1.
50. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683); DR 1682, vol. I, p. 473. Lurungténgah appears no longer to be used as a
toponym. The “Loerantengers” or “Lourantengase ingesetenen” are named as the
inhabitants of the area held by Namrud (near Purbalingga) in VOC records; e.g.
Couper et al., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 25 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR
1682, vol. I, pp. 12, 216; “DR 1683”, 27 Dec. Batavia to H. X Vii, 14 Mar. 1690,
refers to “het lant van Baggaleen off Loerentenga agter Tagal” (Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V, p. 371).
Lurungténgah means “the central road”; the term must have applied to the route
286 NOTES to pp. 68-70

from Mataram westwards, through the mountain pass east of Mt. Slamét and
thence to Tégal, and apparently to the area of the pass in particular. De Graaf, Van
Goens, p. 266, referred to this route, which was later taken by AR I in his flight
from Mataram in 1677. Thus, in Namrud’s time this was a strategic part of the
Javanese road system. The term “central road” or “central pass” presumably served
to distinguish it from the more easterly route from Mataram north to Sémarang
(see de Graaf, Van Goens, pp. 265-6) and the more westerly road to the coast
around the west of Mt. Slamét (see Milaan, “Beschouwingen”, p. 218, which,
however, omits the Lurungténgah route). Although this is no longer the site of a
major road, I understand that it was much used by Indonesian guerillas during the
1945-9 Revolution. The name also appears in Babad Giyanti, but Balé Poestaka,
Gijanti pratélan, seems to propose a location too far east in describing it as “Loe-
roengtengah, bawah Kalibeber?”.
51. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683).

Notes to Chapter 4
1. Speelman, Instructions for Saint-Martin, Jépara & Sémarang, 23 Mar. 1678,
in dJ VII, pp. 206-7; DR 1679, p. 445; Marchier, Démak, to Batavia, 7 May 1680,
in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Sémarang to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681); Marchier, Jépara, to Batavia, 14 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681);
Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680 & 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1360
(OB 1681); DR 1680, pp. 238, 688, 744-5.
Suranata’s appointment over Démak is recorded in BK f. 372r. (ca. 1677); he
had offered his allegiance to AR II at Tégal according to BK f. 366r., at which
point he was named Mértajaya. Mangunonéng was formerly named Wijah and had
served AR II while the latter was Crown prince; his retitling and appointment over
Pathi is recorded in BK f. 377v (ca. 1678). On both these men, see also de Graaf,
Expeditie van Hurdt, pp. 67-8.
Four years later Narapaksa was still living in Batavia; “DR 1684”, 13 Apr. AR
II complained about the VOC’s protection of Narapaksa in 1681; Couper et al.,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682).
2. AR II, Surabaya, to Batavia, 11 Dulkangidah Jimakir [AJ 1602], in DR 1680,
p. 177. The meaning of this letter is somewhat obscure and I suspect translation
difficulties, as are suggested also by errors in the date: 11 Dulkangidah Jimakir
1602 [14 Dec. 1679] was a Thursday whereas the Dutch translation of the letter
says it was Saturday, and it seems doubtful that a letter of 14 Dec. 1679 would
only appear in DR under the date 15 Apr. 1680. That Batavia had problems with
its Javanese translations is also suggested by Couper er al., Surabaya, to Batavia,
14 May 1680, in dJ VII, p. 305.
On the dispute over Limbarawa (modern Ambarawa), see Couper ef al.,
Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681).
3. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. /11 Dec. 1679, in dJ VII, p. 28; Couper et al.,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 14 May 1680, in dJ VII, p. 307; Jépara to Batavia, 11 July
1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); DR 1682, vol. I, p. 588; Batavia to H. XVII, 19
Feb. 1684, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, p. 673 (see also dJ VII, p. vi); Christoff
Frike, Christoff Frikens Ost-Indianische Reisen und Krieges-dienste (ed. Joachim
NOTES to pp. 70-1 287

Kirchner; Berlin: Weltgeist-Biicher Verlags-Gessellschaft, [1926]), p. 63 (an Eng-

lish version of this journal is to be found in Christopher Fryke and Christopher
Schweitzer, Voyages to the East Indies [intro. & notes by C. Ernest Fayle; London,
etc.: Cassel and Company Ltd., 1929] but a comparison of one section of this with
the German original suggests that the translation is not very reliable). Frike notes
that the VOC was strictly against the use of opium by its own people.
4. Couper, Jépara, to Batavia, 4 Nov. 1675, in dJ VI, p. 193. Such superstitions
were also reported in 1720; see p. 205 above. There is also a reference to a haunted
forest along the pasisir in the 1880s in Ann Kumar, The diary of a Javanese
Muslim: Religion, politics and the pesantren 1883-1886 (Canberra: Faculty of
Asian Studies Monographs, new series no. 7, 1985), p. 21.
5. Jépara to Batavia, 11 July 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681). See also DR 1680,
pp. 325, 452.
6. DR 1680, pp. 329-30.
7. Duty of 10 per cent was fixed for timber sold to the VOC, in direct violation
of the contract of February 1677. AR II’s order dated 15 Oct. 1680 is found in
VOC 1360 (OB 1681), another copy is in VOC 1368 (OB 1682) and the text is
printed in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum” vol. III (BK/ vol. 91, 1934),
pp. 223-5 and in DR 1680, pp. 744-5. The document was signed in AR II’s name
by Ad. Urawan, R. Ang. Anrangkusuma, Tg. Suranata and Tg. Mangunonéng: two
of these were already regarded by the VOC as its enemies and in the end only
Urawan would not be so regarded. It was countersigned by J. A. Sloot and T. van
Eeuwijck. Examples of continuing problems may be found in Jépara to Batavia, 13
Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VIL,
p. 56.
8. Jépara to Grinnel & Grevinck, Tégal, 3 Mar. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB
1681); Grinnel & Grevinck, Tégal, to Batavia, 21 Mar. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB
1681), Jépara to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1681, 17 Apr. 1681, 17 July 1681, 7 Nov. 1681,
in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Apr. 1681, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. IV, p. 473; Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368
(OB 1682); DR 1681, pp. 219, 220, 269, 309, 437-8, 674.
In Apr. 1681 the VOC observed that construction of the new kraton was making
only slow progress while hostilities continued; Jépara to Batavia, 17 Apr. 1681, in
VOC 1368 (OB 1682). As late as August 1683, the construction work on AR II’s
kraton and mosque was blamed for delays in the VOC procurement of timber
around Démak; “DR 1683”, 28 Aug.
9. The Marchier-Sloot squabble went back at least to 1679. Marchier accused
Couper of also accepting a heavier duty on salt sold to the VOC. It should be noted
that J.A. Sloot had countersigned AR II’s order of 15 Oct. 1680 which fixed the
higher timber levy. DJ VII, p. 274 n. 1; Couper er al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 11
Noy. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Couper ef al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept.
1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682) (a partial and inaccurate paraphrase in dJ VII, pp.
311-12); Jépara to Batavia, 13 Oct. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); Couper et al.,
Wanagiri, to Batavia, 10 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR 1681, pp.
268-9, 270, 437-8; DR 1682 vol. I, pp. 70-1.
Marchier’s career had been an undistinguished one. He returned to Batavia in
Mar. 1683, where he was briefly imprisoned, and apparently died in 1684; his
widow was then approached in an effort to regain embezzled funds. See DR 1682
288 NOTES to pp. 71-3

vol. II, pp. 1360-1; Batavia to H. XVII, 19 Feb. 1684, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV,
p. 673; idem, 11 Dec. 1685, in ibid., p. 828; de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 35
nek
10. Jépara to Batavia, 27 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); idem, 26 May
1681 & 15 July 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682).
11. DR 1681, p. 550.
12. On the foundation and early history of Cirébon, see de Graaf and Pigeaud,
Vorstendommen, pp. 108-16.
13. See de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, p. 45 et segg.; DR 1678, pp. 159-60, 373-4,
428, 497; DR 1679, p. 376.
14. Couper et al., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 53; DR 1680, p. 743.
15. The VOC was also given various trade and other privileges like those granted
by the earlier treaties with Mataram. The treaty text of 7 Jan. 1681 with codicil of
27 Feb. and VOC ratification of 31 July is to be found in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus
diplomaticum” vol. If (BKI vol. 91, 1934), pp. 233-42; the 7 Jan. and 27 Feb.
documents are in DR 1681, pp. 240-6. See also de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp.
51*-3*.
Babad Cérbon has a charming version of this transaction, which it depicts as the
sale of Cirébon to the VOC by a Chinese named Arya Célik (“deceiver”) who had
come to dominate the state; J.L.A. Brandes & D. Rinkes (eds.) Babad Tjerbon,
uitvoerige inhoudsopgave en noten (VBG vol. 49, pt. 2, 1st section; Batavia: Albrecht
& Co.; ’s Hage: M. Nijhoff, 1911), pp. 27, 143. There was indeed an ethnic
Chinese Muslim named Réksanagara who was a power in Cirébon in this period;
see de Graaf, Moord, p. 60.
16. Jépara to Batavia, 17 Apr. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); DR 1681, p. 270.
17. DR 1681, pp. 473-4, 615; DR 1682 vol. I, pp. 608, 610-11, 750.
18. BK f. 414r.
19. Couper ef al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB
1682) (a partial and inaccurate paraphrase in dJ VII, pp. 311-12).
20. Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1681, in dj VII, p. 61; DR /68/, pp. 660,
665-7. AR II’s emissaries were in Batavia when Speelman replaced van Goens as
Governor-General in Nov. 1681 and remained until May 1682; DR /682 vol. I, p.
607. The letters from AR II and his Ratu to Batavia (DR 1681, pp. 665-7) have
erroneous dates: Friday 27 Aug. in the year “Ha” must refer to Ehe 1604 (Jan.
1681—Jan. 1682), but 27 Aug. was a Wednesday. The emissaries left Kartasura in
early Oct. 1681 and the letters were probably composed then, so even the month
seems erroneous. One possibility is Friday 27 Ramalan (10 Oct.). There are other
errors in the DR /68/ account (p. 665 says that the emissaries arrived “‘voorleden
Vrijdagh” but their date of arrival, 12 Nov., was a Wednesday) and some of the
details in the translation of AR II’s Javanese letter also seem dubious. Later AR
Il proposed four senior courtiers (Anrangkusuma, Urawan, Surawikrama, Inga-
wangga) to go to Batavia; DR 1682 vol. I, p. 471.
21. Couper er al., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 18 Dec. 1681 & 25 Dec. 1681; Couper
et al., Kartsura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682; Couper et al., Kartasura, to Willemsoon
& Grevinck, Tégal, 3 July 1682; Couper er al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 31 July 1682;
all in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR 1682 vol. I, pp. 217, 470; vol. II, p. 1282.
BK f. 414r. interprets this force of 300 as a VOC lifeguard for AR II. When
NOTES to pp. 74-6 289

Couper left Kartasura in Oct. 1682 he left Lts. Aarnout Grevinck and Floris van
Reede behind with 80 or 88 Dutch soldiers as a royal lifeguard; DR /682 vol. II,
pp. 1282, 1309.
22. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB
1682) (partial and inaccurate paraphrase in dJ VII, pp. 311-12); idem, 14 Mar.
1682, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR 1682 vol. I, p. 473.
23. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683).
24. See p. 67 above.
25. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683). A year earlier Couper had observed that the Pajangers were more pro-
Kajoran than pro-AR II; Jépara to Batavia, 17 Apr. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682).
26. Illness was, of course, the usual lot of kings as well as commoners. AR II
had been reported as having painful eye infections in the past and was now said
to have a swollen neck and leg complaint; Couper & Sloot, Kartasura, to Jépara,
9 Mar. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Jépara to Batavia, 17 Apr. 1681, in VOC
1368 (OB 1682); DR 1681/1, p. 269.
27. For the terms of the Feb. 1677 contract, see pp. 35-6 above; for the Oct.
1677 agreenient, see p. 47.
28. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 31 July 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683);
DR 1682 vol. Ul, pp. 1017-18.
29. See de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp. 51*—2*; vol. Ill, pp. 260-2. De Haan
comments (vol. III, p. 261) that Couper’s was “indeed a weak argument”.
30. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 31 July 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683).
31. Ibid.; DR 1682 vol. Il, p. 1191.
32. DR 1682 vol. I, p. 519; vol. II, p. 1019. On the 1678 cession see p. 47
above. The dead man was Tg. Aladalad. In his place the VOC appointed Rongga
Yudawongsa with the consent of AR II; DR /682 vol. I, p. 1191.
33. Couper et a/., Kartasura, to Batavia, 31 July 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683).
There were also isolated disagreements and misunderstandings over jurisdiction
issues in Priangan areas now ceded to the VOC; see DR /682 vol. I, pp. 559-60;
vol. Il, pp. 849, 878, 883-4, 1209-10.
34. DR 1682 vol. 1, pp. 448, 463; vol. II, p. 1017. On the Bantén war in general,
see dJ VII, pp. clvi et seqq.
35. See pp. 53-4 above.
36. DR 1682 vol. I, p. 561; vol II, pp. 1019, 1282, 1310. In connection with the
deer hunt, AR II also visited the royal graves at Imagiri; DR /682 vol. II pp. 1019,
1310.
37. Couper et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 14 May 1680, in dJ VII, pp. 297-8;
Jépara to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); DR 1680, p. 328; report
by Gomes, Surabaya, 3 Jan. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); report by Chinese
“Eeko” to van Mechelen, Surabaya, 13 Jan. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Jépara
to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); idem, 17 Apr. 1681, 26 May
1681 & 15 July 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); DR 1/681, pp. 220, 269; Couper
et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB 1683); DR 1682 vol.
Ly ppritol3 10;
The oral report by “Eeko” also says that small bronze cannon and gunpowder
were manufactured at Blambangan. Tawangalun had been king of Blambangan
290 NOTES to pp. 76-7

since ca. 1655 and was by now apparently approaching the age of 80; he died in
Sept. 1693; see Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, p. 587. For further information on
Blambangan in this period, see C. Lekkerkerker, “Blambangan”, De Indische gids
vol. 45 (1923), pp. 1040-2.
The VOC garrison in Pasuruan had considerable trouble with the turbulent
Balinese there. On one occasion a fight occurred during which the Balinese called
out in Malay, “Come on, you Dutch devil-dogs” (“Merij ansing Saetan Hollanda”
= mari anjing setan Walanda); van Mechelen et al., Surabaya, to Couper, Wanakarta,
5 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681).
38. Jépara to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Couper et al.,
Mataram, to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Batavia to H. XVII,
29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 58; DR 1680, pp. 772, 816; Batavia to H. XVII, 4 Jan.
1681, in dJ VII, p. 60; Jépara to Batavia, 26 May 1681 & 15 July 1681, in VOC
1368 (OB 1682); Couper et al., Wanagiri, to Batavia, 25 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1380
(OB 1683); DR 1681, pp. 269-70, 309; DR 1682 vol. I, p. 216.
A conflicting report on the deaths of Darmayuda and Sutaprana is in the report
by Nacken, Batavia, 12 Dec. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682).
39. Couper et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1682, in VOC 1380 (OB
1683); see also DR 1682 vol. I, pp. 471-2.
40. DR 1682 vol. Il, pp. 985, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1191, 1192, 1217, 1218,
1282; “DR 1683”, 1 Jan., 2 Apr., 23 Apr., 27 Apr., 15 July. On the location of
Lurungténgah, see p. 285 n. 50 above. A later report said that the Makasarese still
around Lurungténgah included Namrud’s son Janur; “DR 1683”, 27 Dec.
41. DR 1681, p. 288.
42. See de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, vol. U1, pp. 57 et seqq. On the earlier history
of East Madura, see de Graaf & Pigeaud, Vorstendommen, pp. 175-8.
43. Couper et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1680, in dJ VII, p. 283; idem,
13 Mar. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681) (the Madura passage is not included in
the excerpts in dJ VII, pp. 293 et seqq.); idem, 14 May 1681, in dJ VII, p. 304;
DR 1680, pp. 170, 322, 325, 327-8, 331; dJ VIII, p. xxviii. Png. Giri had been
attempting to foment rebellion against AR II among the Madurese; see also Couper
et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 12 Jan. 1680 with P.S. dd. 19 Jan. 1680, in VOC 1360
(OB 1681).
44. Sémarang to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); van Mechelen
et al., Surabaya, to Sémarang, 10 Sept. 1680 & 5 Oct. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681); Jépara to Batavia, 18 Sept. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681); Batavia to H.
XVII, 13 Oct. 1680, in dJ VII, pp. 38-40; Couper et al/., Wanakarta, to Batavia,
20 Oct. 1680 with P.S. dd. 25 Oct. 1680 & 11 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB
1681); Jépara to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1680, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681); Batavia to H.
XVII, 29 Nov. 1680, in dJ VII, pp. 53, 58; DR 1680, pp. 595-6, 743, 746, 771,
772; Jépara to Batavia, 15 July 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682).
Wasengrana eventually submitted in Dec. 1683 and was escorted to Kartasura
where AR II pardoned him; “DR 1683”, 27 Dec.; “DR 1684”, 15 Mar. By 1685
he was again in trouble and this time was murdered at the behest of the Dutch; see
p. 82 above.
45. Jépara to Batavia, 26 May 1681 & 15 July 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682);
Couper ef al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Sept..1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); van
NOTES to pp. 77-9 291

Mechelen et al., Surabaya, to Jépara, 3 Oct. 1681, in VOC 1368 (OB 1682); DR
1681, pp. 309, 438, 631.
46. DR 1682 vol. Il, pp. 822-3, 938-9. The exception was, in fact, the VOC
assertion of jurisdiction over East Madura, de facto in 1687, de jure in 1705; see
pp. 103, 142 above.
47. “DR 1683”, 21 July, 1 Aug., 25 Aug., 28 Aug., 30 Aug., 17 Sept.; “DR
1684”, 26 May.
48. “DR 1683”, 7 Sept., 13 Dec.; “DR 1684”, 20 Mar., 10 June. Earlier it had
been reported that AR II was on cordial terms with Pugér and other princes; “DR
1683”, 23 Apr., 30 Apr.
There is some uncertainty about the identity of Ratu Amangkurat. De Graaf,
Moord, p. 18, describes her as AR II’s wife, but this is not supported by Javanese
sources. Royal genealogical tradition as recorded in Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém,
pangiwa lan panéngén (Samarang & Surabaya: G.C.T. van Dorp, 1902), pp. 128-9,
lists Ratu Ayu Mangkurat among the wives of AR I, while AR II’s mother was
Ratu Pangayun, the princess from Surabaya, later named Ratu Kulon and Ratu
Agéng. Padmasustra does not list the wives of AR II. They are named in BK ff.
450v.451r. and a Ratu Amangkurat is not among them.
The VOC also pointed to a high incidence of robbery and murder among the
Javanese as an indicator of misgovernment; “DR 1684”, 1 May, 10 June.
49. “DR 1683”, 23 Apr.
50. Batavia to H. XVII, 19 Feb. 1684, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, p. 673; idem,
30 Nov. 1684, in ibid., pp. 711, 727.
51. “DR 1684”, 15 & 20 Mar.
52. “DR 1683”, 2 Apr., 27 Apr., 8 June, 4 July, 21 July, 1 Aug., 3 Aug., 28
Aug., 7 Sept., 1 Oct., 11 Oct., 4 Nov., 2 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 19 Mar. 1683,
in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, pp. 585-7. The campaigning appears to have been
interrupted during the fasting month (Puasa AJ 1606/24 Aug.—22 Sept. 1683).
53. “DR 1683”, 6 May.
54. BS II: 37. The text refers to a solar eclipse in AJ 1606 [31 Dec. 1682-19
Dec. 1683]; the reference is clearly to eclipse 6868 in Oppolzer, Canon (see chart
138).
55. See BK ff. 413r.—416r.
56. “DR 1683”, 30 Aug.;“DR 1685”, 8 Nov., 18 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII, 11
Dec. 1685, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, pp. 828, 836. Chinese-Javanese relations
at Kudus, where at least one Chinese was murdered, were reportedly so bad that
most of the Chinese had fled, abandoning their sugar mills; DR /682 vol. I, pp.
561-2. Fire was, of course, a common occurrence. In 1682 the Malay and Maka-
sarese quarters at Jépara and the town wall itself were heavily damaged by fire; DR
1682 vol. II, pp. 1282-3, 1309-10; “DR 1683”, 2 Apr.
57. “DR 1683”, 21 July, 28 Aug.; “DR 1684”, 13 Apr.
Don DRelOSSan28eAup 65) Oct:
59. “DR 1684”, 13 Apr.
60. E. g “DR 1684”, 15 June, 14 Aug., 18 Oct., 9 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 13
Dec. 1686, in dJ VIII, pp. 21-2; dJ VIII, pp. x—xvi. See also de Graaf, Moord, p.
52, on one VOC officer at Surabaya, evocatively described in his sources as “‘a
debauched arak-bug” and “a scabrous character able to induce a whole garrison to
debauchery”, while another officer “of a night often makes the Company’s pagér
more of a bordello than a fortress’, etc.
292 NOTES to pp. 80-2

61. DJ VIM, pp. ii—viii, xvii; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, pp.
13-14. On the VOC treasury at the time, see Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685,
in dJ VIII, p. 9.
A revival of the indigenous Javanese textile industry apparently occurred as
VOC textile imports faltered; se Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685 & 13 Dec. 1686
in dJ VIII, pp. 6, 22; dJ VIII, p. lii.
62. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 311.
63. Stapel, Gouverneurs-Generaal, p. 33.
64. Ibid.,p. 35; dJ VIII, pp. ix-x. Camphuys was born in Amsterdam in 1634
and came to the Indies in 1654. He was thrice placed in charge of the VOC post
at Deshima (1671-3, 1673-4, 1675-6); Wijnaendts van Resandt, Gezaghebbers,
pp. 146-7). After he retired as Governor-General in 1691, he spent part of his time
on the island of Edam in the bay of Batavia, which the VOC gave him as a gift,
where he had built a Japanese-style house and collected, among other curiosities,
exotic animals from throughout the Indonesian archipelago. He died in 1695.
65. “DR 1684”, 20 Mar., 10 June. The term used for brothers was probably
Malay saudara. It could be doubted whether AR II literally meant “brother” by
this. On this and other aspects of such terms of address, see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi,
Ch. XI, especially pp. 371-2.
66. “DR 1684”, 1 May. Indeed, conflicts now followed about Sémarang’s ter-
ritorial jurisdiction.
O/ie Eee DRE GS Omen Des
68. Cop’s most notable qualities were apparently a general laziness and a repu-
tation for competence in Malay. See de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 23-5.
69. Batavia to AR II, 27 Aug. 1684, in AN Solo 52, no. 2.11; dJ VIII, pp.
XXIV—XXV1.
70. “DR 1684”, 10 Oct.; dJ VIII, p. xxvi.
71. “DR 1684”, 14 Oct., 6 Dec., 15 Dec., 16 Dec., 28 Dec.; “DR 1685”, 24 Jan.,
18 Feb.; dJ VII, p. xxvi. In June 1685 another embassy from AR II arrived in
Batavia; Batavia to H. XVI, 11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, p. 5; see also p. 87 above.
72. “DR 1685”, 13 Mar., 20 June., 5 July; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685,
in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, p. 836; dJ VIII, p. xxvi.
73. On CN II and Jangrana I, see “DR 1685”, 20 June, 5 July; Batavia to H.
XVII, 11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, p. 2.
74, Jeremias van Vliet was born in Batavia ca. 1650 and was in charge of the
artillery train during Hurdt’s expedition against Trunajaya in 1678. He later served
in Ambon (1682-4) and then returned to Java. He died with Tack at Kartasura in
1686 (see Chapter 5); de Graaf, Expeditie van Hurdt, p. 55.
75. “DR 1685”, 30 Jan., 17 May.
76. “DR 1685”, 13 Mar., 21 Mar., 10 May (here it is said that Yudanagara died
on “2 Dulchadje” = 2 Dulkijah AJ 1607/10 Nov. 1684), 17 May, 20 June, 5 July;
Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685 & 13 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, pp. 2, 26-7; dJ VIII,
p. xxix. There is confusion in VOC sources about the family relationships here and
so far I have encountered nothing in Javanese sources to clarify the matter. De
Graaf, Moord, p. 49, refers to Yudanagara’s “four sons-in-law”. There were also
apparently changes of name later; see p. 303 n. 24 below.
77. “DR 1685”, 21 Mar., 17 May, 5 July; Batavia to H. XII, 11 Dec. 1685, in
dJ VIII, p. 2; de Graaf, Moord, p. 54, describes the heroic manner of Wasengrana’s
death. On Wasengrana, see p. 77 above.
NOTES to pp. 82-4 293

78. “DR 1685”, 14 Aug.; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, [2

dJ VIII, p. xxvii. See also n. 60 above.
79. Van Vliet had, however, failed to get Tawangalun of Blambangan to submit
either to the VOC or to AR II. Tawangalun replied that he wished to have nothing
to do with either of them and Blambangan depredations continued along the coast
from Bangér (Prabalingga) to the east. “DR 1685”, 21 Mar., 17 May, 20 June;
Batavia instructions to Tack, 31 Oct. 1685, in dJ VII, p. 190; Batavia to H. XVII,
11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VII, pp. 1-2; dJ VIII, p. xxvii; de Graaf, Moord, p. 56.
80. “DR 1685”, 6 May, 17 May, 14 July, 14 Aug.
81. Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, p. 4. But cf. de Graaf, Moord,
p. 44 n.2, giving a total of Rds. 27,878.
82. “DR 1685”, 13 Mar. There had been previous incidents of this kind; e.g. see
DR 1682 vol. Il, p. 1196.
83. The VOC had posts at Tégal, Pekalongan, Sémarang, Démak, Jépara, Rémbang,
Surabaya, Grésik and Kartasura. Except for the VOC headquarters on the coast at
Jépara and the post at Rémbang, where 25 Europeans were stationed to organise
the supply of timber, Batavia hoped to reduce most of the posts to only 2-3 officers
to keep an eye on local affairs and to close down Tégal and Pékalongan altogether.
It hoped that AR II might take over the costs of the VOC post at Surabaya which
policed the Straits of Madura and of the garrison at Kartasura, which Batavia
indeed hoped might be withdrawn altogether at an appropriate time. Batavia in-
structions to Tack, 31 Oct. 1685, in dJ VIII, pp. 189-91.
84. A proposal to return Cirébon to Kartasura was again put by emissaries of
AR II in Batavia July 1685; “DR 1685”, 12 July.
85. See the comments cited above, p. 16 and p. 266 n. 90.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. See further M.C. Ricklefs, “Javanese sources in the writing of Modern Java-
nese history”, pp. 336-7 in C.D. Cowan & O.W. Wolters (eds.), Southeast Asian
history and historiography: Essays presented to D.G.E. Hall (Ithaca & London:
Cornell University Press, 1976); idem, “In memoriam Dr. H.J. de Graaf, 2 Decem-
ber 1899 — 24 August 1984”, BKI vol. 141, nos. 2-3 (1985), p. 192.
2. I am not entirely persuaded by Kumar’s geographical ascriptions of her West
Javanese and East Javanese texts. Notwithstanding a colophon saying that the MS
was copied in Bantén, the former betrays East Javanese features in its language,
as was noted by Th.G.Th. Pigeaud (Literature of Java: Catalogue raisonné of
Javanese manuscripts in the library of the University of Leiden and other public
collections in the Netherlands [4 vols.; The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff; Leiden:
Bibliotheca Universitatis Lugduni Batavorum; Leiden: Leiden University Press,
1967-80], vol. II, p. 712 sub KNAW 240); Kumar’s own conclusions on this
matter seem tentative (Surapati, p. 9: “... it seems safe to describe this Babad as
‘west Javanese’, even though it may have affiliations with a wider pasisir civili-
zation.””). Her East Javanese MSS have sufficient similarity with Central Javanese
MSS (which she does not include in her study) to raise questions about her definition
of their regional identity; Kumar, too, notes this similarity in her appendix (ibid.,
p. 385).
294 NOTES to pp. 84-5

3. The following summary down to Surapati’s reception in Kartasura is taken

from BK ff. 416r.428v. Readers will note a close similarity to the version in the
Meinsma babad text; see W.L. Olthof (ed. & transl.), Babad tanah Djawi, in
proza, Javaansche geschiedenis (2 vols.; ’s-Gravanhage: M. Nijhoff, 1941), text
pp. 208 et seqq., transl. pp. 214 et seqq.
4. Kapitan Mur was a title usually reserved for the VOC Governor-General. BK
ff. 428v.—429r., however, makes it clear that in this case the Gurnadur-Jendral is
different from this gentleman, at this point called Déler Mur pamékas: “edele heer
(honoured gentleman, i.e. here a Councillor of the Indies) Mur the last”. As a title
for the Governor-General, Kapitan Mur was, according to Stapel, a bastardisation
of the Portuguese capitano-major (Speelman, p. 134 n. 2). It was used at least as
early as 1619; see the letter from Png. Gabang of Bantén to J.P. Coen in M.C.
Ricklefs, “Bantén and the Dutch in 1619: Six early ‘pasar Malay’ letters”, BSOAS
vol. 39, pt. 1 (1976), p. 133. In the 1720s the Balinese, too, used this form of
address; e.g. see Dewa Anom, Sukawati, letter in Balinese upon gold to Kapitan
Mur, Batavia, rec’d 12 Sept. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722); idem, rec’d 11 Dec.
1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
5. On the significance apparently attached to the déler rolas and the Council of
the Indies (Raad van Indié, transmuted in Javanese into, among other forms, Ratpéni,
which was used as a synonym for Kumpéni), see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 396—7.
6. It should be noted that, in this version, Surapati is clearly a Muslim despite
being Balinese. On this matter, see also Kumar, Surapati, pp. 21, 55—6, 332-3,
392%
7. The VOC was told in Mar. 1685 that Surapati’s forces had been joined by
Makasarese followers of Syeikh Yusuf (see n. 11 below) and remnants of Namrud’s
men. These were said to be in Bagélen, 5—6 days from Tégal at a village called
“Jejana”. The head of that village was named Warsadénti and the rebels had
acknowledged him as Susuhunan Amangkurat Panatagama, according to this report.
See “DR 1685”, 5 Mar. AR II later wrote to Batavia (“DR 1685”, 15 June) that
Warsadénti, three of his advisors and a woman who called herself Ratu Ibu
Panatagama had been arrested by Surapati’s Balinese and brought to Kartasura,
where all but the last had been executed.
While the name Warsadénti obviously has resonances with Saradénti/Saradénta
of the babad story, there are no villages called Cibarang or Jéjana, or likely
variants of these, in W.F. Schoel (ed.), Alphabetisch register van de administra-
tieve- (bestuurs-) en adatrechtelijke indeeling van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 1:
Java en Madoera (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1931). A village name beginning
with “Ci” would usually be located in the Sundanese area, farther west than
Banyumas.
8. Umbul Jaladriya is more commonly known in other texts under the variant
name Bun Jaladriya. He appears to have been Chinese and is known also as Kim
Bun. Kyai Jayalélana, bupati of Prabalingga from 1746 to 1768, whose grave is
among the Chinese Islamic holy sites described by Denys Lombard & Claudine
Salmon (“Islam et sinité”, Archipel no. 30 [1985], pp. 82-3), was apparently a son
of Bun Jaladriya. According to LOr 2191, Babad Mangkubumi, p. 411, the Ng. Lor
who surrendered with Png. Singasari in East Java in 1768 (see Ricklefs,
Mangkubumi, p. 135) was another of his sons. There are thus grounds for dissent-
ing from Kumar’s tentative suggestion (Surapati, p. 340) that, while Bun Jaladriya
NOTES to p. 87 295

could be a “historical figure”, he might instead be a fictitious character added to

the Surapati legends in order to fulfill a dramatic function.
9. See n. 7 above on AR II’s letter to Batavia on this matter which was
received in June 1685.
10. On the maltreatment of Untung while he was the slave of Cornelis Cnoll
(not apparently related to Govert Cnoll), see de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, p. 198;
Blussé, Strange Company, p. 195. :
A description of the insecurity of life in Batavia in 1676.is found in Christoph
Schweitzer, Reise nach Java und Ceylon, 1675-1682 (vol. XI of Reisebe-
schreibungen von deutschen Beamten und Kriegsleuten im Dienst der Nieder-
Idndischen West— und Ost-Indischen Kompagnien, 1609-1797, ed. S.P. ’Honoré
Naber; Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), pp. 25-36. There are, however, grounds for
not always accepting Schweitzer’s evidence at face value (see also p. 306 n. 44
below).
11. Syeikh Yusuf (b. ca. 1626) was from the family of the rulers of Goa and
had gone to Mecca ca. 1645, where he lived for many years. He was initiated into
the Khalwatiyah Sufi order in Damascus. Upon his return to Sulawesi, he failed in
his effort to carry out a thorough-going social and religious reform, so he left and
settled in Bantén by ca. 1672. There, too, he worked, apparently without great
success, to deepen the hold of Islam upon society. After his capture by the VOC
he was exiled to Sri Lanka and then to the Cape of Good Hope, where he again
was a central figure in the life of the Muslim community. He died there in May
1699. See Christian Pelras, “Religion, tradition and the dynamics of Islamization
in South Sulawesi”, Archipel no. 29 (1985), pp. 123-4; de Graat, Mangku-Rat I,
vol. Il, pp. 63-4; A.A. Cense, “De verering van Sjaich Jusuf in Zuid-Celebes”, pp.
50-7 in Bingkisan budi: Een bundel opstellen aan Dr. Philippus Samuel van
Ronkel door vrienden en leerlingen aangeboden op zijn tachtigste verjaardag, 1
Augustus 1950 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V. 1950); G.W.J.
Drewes, “Sech Joesoep Makasar”, Djawa vol. 6, no. 2 (1926), pp. 83-8.
12. Ruys et al., Cikalong, to Batavia, 31 Mar. 1683, in dJ VIII, pp. 165-6;
E.H.B. Brascamp, “De memorie en instructie voor Jacobus Couper als hoofd der
expeditie tegen Soeropati uitgezonden in het jaar 1684”, BK/ vol. 75, pts. 1-2
(1919), pp. 28-35 (quote from pp. 30-1); “DR 1684”, 16 Aug.; “DR 1685”, 21
Mar.; Batavia instructions to Tack, 31 Oct. 1685, in dJ VII, pp. 193-5; Batavia
to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, p. 3; dJ VUI, pp. xix—xxim; Kumar, Surapati,
pp. 18-30; de Graaf, Moord, p. 41. The number of Europeans, or Europeans and
Mardijkers, killed by Surapati in Jan. 1684 varies in different sources. Batavia
informed AR II of the Couper expedition against Surapati: Batavia to AR II, 27
Aug. 1684, in AN Solo 52, no. 2.11. The expedition coincided with Cops’s mission
to Kartasura; see p. 81 above.
13. See pp. 81-2 above.
14. “DR 1685”, 15 June, 12 July, 14 July, 26 July, 5 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII,
11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VIII, p. 5; de Graaf, Moord, pp. 43-5. In July orders were
apparently sent from the court to reclaim authority over Sémarang and Rembang
from the VOC, but the VOC somehow managed to prevent such measures being
implemented; “DR 1685”, 14 July.
The VOC reported on the generally confused state of internal court affairs at this
time, with virtually everything in the hands of Anrangkusuma and AR II’s wet
296 NOTES to pp. 87-92

nurse (“voetster”) Nyai Asém (“DR 1685”, 10 May); whether the VOC’s infor-
mation on such matters was very reliable is of course open to doubt.
55 See pps o3) 75 above:
16. AR II to Batavia, in “DR 1685”, 15 June.
17. “DR 1685”, 5 Dec. Later Anrangkusuma reportedly requested poison from
the VOC for the same purpose; de Graaf, Moord, p. 68.
18. “DR 1685”, 5 Dec.; de Graaf, Moord, pp. 42-3. The VOC garrison at court
at this time amounted to 102 soldiers.
LOM DRETGS5eeoeWec:
20. “DR 1685”, 5 Dec. For VOC reports on Sinduréja’s standing at court, see
“DR 1684”, 2 Nov.; “DR 1685”, 13 Mar., 10 May; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec.
1685, in dJ VIII, p. 3. Sinduréja, then named Pranantaka, was said to be the
courtier who gained the flower Wijayakusuma for AR II at the start of his reign
(see p. 45 above). He was soon to succeed Anrangkusuma as Patih (p. 96 above),
so there are grounds for doubting VOC reports that he was in disfavour with AR
I.
Zi DRAG Some lOMDecs
22. Batavia instructions to Tack, 31 Oct. 1685, in dJ VIII, pp. 172-95 (it is clear
that the Rds. discussed here are Spanish, equivalent to Sp. RI.). See also Batavia
to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1685, in dJ VII, pp. 5—6, and Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, p.
829; dJ VIII, pp. xxix—xxxiil; de Graaf, Moord, pp. 46-8.
On the 1677 treaty, see Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum” vol. HI (BK/
vol. 91, 1934), pp. 39-47, and pp. 35-6 above. Concerning the hoped-for reduction
of the VOC coastal establishments, see also p. 293 n. 83 above.
23. Secret appendix to Batavia instructions to Tack, 31 Oct. 1685, in dJ VIII,
pp. 195-8. De Graaf, Moord, p. 48, comments that the contents of this appendix
but not the proposals to reduce the royal debt became known at Kartasura; Kumar,
Surapati, p. 31, accepts this on de Graaf’s authority. I do not know of evidence
that the secret document but not the rest of the instructions were leaked to the
Javanese. As will be seen below, however, the Javanese chronicle version of
events certainly depicts the capture of Surapati as the sole purpose of Tack’s
mission. And VOC records suggest that once Tack was on his way to Kartasura
he did nothing to indicate to AR II that he had any other purpose.
24. “DR 1685”, 22 May, 27 May, 31 July, 3 Nov. Already by July van Vliet
had come from Surabaya to Jépara and Tack himself had been brought to Batavia
from Bantén. On van Vliet, see p. 292 n. 74 above.
25. BK ff. 428v.—429r. Etak may be a pun upon utak (the brain). In some
sources he is called pétak (scream loudly) (e.g. BS I: 38), which may also be a
pun upon péthak (white, silver).
26. DJ VIII, pp. xxxiv—-xxxv; de Graaf, Moord, p. 60. Tack found Cirébon’s
Sultan Sépuh to be nearly dead from opium addiction.
27. On the Garébég Mulud festivities, see Soedjono Tirtokoesoemo, Garebegs,
pp. 15-133; Groneman, Garébég’s, pp. 5—40.
28. BK ff. 429v.434r. describes (as summarised below) the period from the
arrival of the letter from Batavia to Tack’s final approach to the court. The direct
speech ascribed to Tack and AR II which is cited below is from f. 433r.
29. Nicolaus de Graaff, the VOC surgeon whose second-hand account of the
death of Tack was first published in 1701, also refers to the burning of what he
NOTES to pp. 92-3 297

calls “the Gompang or Emperor’s Village, located nearby or at the Seban [=pa-
sowan|] and the Emperor’s court ... which Surapati set afire at several points” and
shows this place next to the court in his depiction of the scene (see p. 86). De
Graaf, Moord, p. 62, objected to this location on the grounds that the twentieth-
century desa named Gumpang was actually 2-3 km from Kartasura. Dr de Graaf
may have been wrong to identify ““Gompang” with modern Gumpang. Rather, the
reference may be to the Gowongan (the place of the Gowong people, a group of
royal servants), a toponym which can still be located among the villages which
occupy the ruins of the Kartasura kraton, on the south of the court, just east of the
Sitinggil Kidul (see plan on p. 405). This site was recorded by G.P. Rouffaer when
he toured the Kartasura ruins in 1889 (‘“Terreinschetsen, in loco uit 1889 van
kraton’s Padjang en Kartasoera’”; Surakarta, 1889; KITLV MS H 692) and by me
when I examined the ruins with colleagues from Gadjah Mada University and the
Indonesian Archaeological Service in 1973. If Nicolaus de Graaff’s depiction of
Kartasura is from the north, then he, too, shows his ““Gompang” as being just east
of the court. There are, however, real difficulties in pinning down the orientation
of this drawing. See Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen, pp. 197-8, 202. Just to confuse
matters, it should also be noted that BK f. 436v. refers to what is called the pa-
sowan gédhong being set ablaze during the fighting on the day of 8 Febr. 1686:
is it this to which de Graaff refers?
SOME Silas S:
31. De Graaf, Moord, pp. 69-71; BK ff. 433v._434r. The version of the meeting
of 4 Feb. in the report by Leeman ef al., Kartasura, 10 Feb. 1686, in dJ VIII, p.
199, says that CN II and Anrangkusuma specifically offered to kill Surapati.
32. E.g. the river in the foreground might be the Pepe which is indeed north of
Kartasura, but the depiction seems to fit better the Janggalan to the south. De
Graaf, Moord, pp. 62-3, assumes that the depiction is from the north and observes
that this means that the eastern entrance to the court is shown on the west side;
this problem disappears if the view is from the south. There are similar problems
about the location of Surapati’s residence. It will be noted, incidentally, that Dr
de Graaf himself misplaced the location of Banyudana in this discussion. See n.
29 above for other details.
33. Except where another source is cited, the account down to the death of Tack
rests upon de Graaf, Moord, pp. 80-97. I have pointed out elsewhere (Ricklefs,
Tradition, p. 189) that all of the fifteen Javanese MSS known to me which date
the death of Tack do so wrongly, giving AJ 1608 rather than 1609.
34. BK ff. 434r.-v.
35. The VOC sources are not entirely consistent or clear on the question of
troop strengths; see de Graaf, Moord, p. 87. BK f. 435r. ascribes 500 VOC to Tack
—not a wildly inaccurate figure—but adds a fictitious force of 2000 Bugis and
Makasarese to this.
36. AR II, Kartasura, to Sloot, Jépara, in “DR 1687”, 22 Oct. BK ff. 435r.-v.
describes an apparently apocryphal meeting between Tack and AR II in which the
former announces that he has come to get Surapati and the latter asks Tack to stay
near so as to protect him, a clear attempt within the context of the BK story to
deceive Tack. Tack blusters about how he will deal with Surapati and, speaking
Malay, tells AR II not to worry (dhuh Gusti jangan susah), for Surapati is as good
as dead. When AR II’s emissary Nalajaya went to Batavia in late Feb. 1686, he
298 NOTES to pp. 94-5

said that AR II had left the kraton in the company of Tack; de Graaf, Moord, p.
117, rejects this tale.
37. De Graaf, Moord, p. 89, says this was the royal mosque on the basis of the
later report by Eygel, Kartasura, 10 [Feb.] 1686, in dJ VIII, p. 203, that he remem-
bered “de tempel in gem. hof” on fire. This is perhaps not very authoritative,
resting as it does on the memory of a Dutchman who probably knew next to
nothing of the kraton layout, about the events of one of the most desperate days
of his life. BK f. 436v. says that it was the pasowan gédhong which was set alight.
Later, BK f. 472v. describes the building of a new mosque at Kartasura, mod-
elled on the mosque of Démak, because the old mosque had burned down and was
in any case too small. The location of this episode in BK just after the construction
of the Sagara Yasa suggests that it took place after ca. 1687. BS II:41 says the old
mosque burned down in AJ 1612 (Oct. 1688—Oct. 1689). If the mosque had in fact
burned down in Feb. 1686, it would have been surprising if it had not been rebuilt
immediately. Fires were of course a constant danger at the court. Several years
later they were said to be nearly a daily occurrence in Kartasura in the dry season;
Sémarang to Batavia, 16 Oct. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718). See also Ricklefs,
Tradition, p. 172.
38. BK ff. 435v.436r. The Madurese /urah of the Saragéni troops is named Ki
Konangpasir.
39. More queries arise here over Nicolaus de Graaff’s scene. He shows the tiger
cages at point “M” which, if the view is from the north, is north and west of the
Sitinggil (and near point “N”, the “east gate” here shown on the west). This is
certainly a possible position, but given that the hunting enclosure (krapyak) which
can be identified at the ruins of Kartasura was to the south of the court (see p. 405),
the tiger cages might more logically have been there, in which case de Graaff’s
depiction is from the south and shows the cages adjacent to the Sitinggil Kidul.
40. BK f. 436v.
41. BK f. 437r.: datan cara Kumpéni/ nga[ng]e makutha mas ... lir Kom-
bakérna. The description of the crown is cited in p. 278 n. 55 above.
42. BK ff. 437r—438v.
43. Eygel report, Kartasura, 10 [Feb.] 1686, in dJ VIII, p. 204; cited also in de
Graat, Moord, p. 94. On Eygel, see de Haan, Priangan. vol. I, p. 212.
44. BK ff. 438v.—439r.
45. Eygel report, Kartasura, 10 [Feb.] 1686, in dJ VIII, p. 205.
46. De Graaf, Moord, p. 97, gives the figure as 68 but a total of 75 is given in
Batavia to H. XVII, 8 Mar. 1686, in dJ VIII, p. 17: Capt. Tack, Opperkoopman
van Vliet, Lt. Benjamin van der Meer (who appears in BK f. 437v. as Lutnan Ban
Der Pel), Lt. Dirk Vonk, Capt.-Lt. Grevinck and Vaandrigh Herfst plus 69 “blanke
koppen”. De Graaf himself later gave the total as “nearly 75” in his Geschiedenis
van Indonesia (’s Gravenhage & Bandung: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve, 1949),
p. 236. The VOC surgeon Nicolaus de Graaff reported a total of 79 dead (Warnsinck,
De Graaff reisen, p. 203).
Van der Meer had previously been fired from his post as VOC Resident at
Cirébon for misconduct; DR 1682, vol. I, pp. 587, 612-13.
47. De Graaf, Moord, p. 98.
48. R.A. Wiranégara, [Malang], to Tg. Wiraguna, [Surabaya], rec’d Batavia 2
Sept. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709).
NOTES to pp. 95-6 299

PB II’s proposal was made to Png. Purbaya. B7/(BP) vol. XXII, p. 18, Canto
CLVI (Dhandhanggula): 3. sira yayi yen bisa nglakoni / iya murweng asmara
dilaga / sun amini ing batine / laire ingsun mungsuh / kaya eyang Mangkurat
swargi / lawan si Surapatya ... See also de Graaf, Moord, p. 136.
49. BK f. 439r. The same tale is found in BT/(BP) vol. XIV, p. 73. See also the
texts in Kumar, Surapati, pp. 110, 145, 236-7, 241, 264-5, 271-2, 292, 295. On
Ky. Plered, see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 76n. and the sources referred to there.
50. De Graaf, Moord, p. 95.
51. See pp. 119-20, 1314 above.
52. De Graaf, Moord, p. 64. De Graaf cites Valentyn as his source. The surgeon
de Graaff (Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen, p. 201) also refers to the “Hollandse
Pagger” as having only “enige stukjes”. BK f. 434r. also notes that the VOC post
at this time consisted only of a bamboo palisade (taksih jaro kewala).
53. According to H.J. de Graaf’s sources, Surapati left Kartasura on 10 Feb. but
returned briefly on 11 Feb. De Graaf, Moord, pp. 97, 101, 131; Warnsinck, De
Graaff reisen, p. 204). The translator’s report about the gamélan is in Valentyn,
Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt.1], p. 134 (de Graaf, Moord, p. 97 n. 6,
gives a faulty reference to Valentyn); I have so far been unable to verify the exist-
ence of such a melody or its significance from other sources.
One of the horses was also referred to later, when it was said to have been found
wandering in the forest around Singkal (near Kédhiri); “DR 1686”, 22 May.
BK f. 440v. tells of VOC survivors trying to flee at night but being caught on
the road at daybreak and killed by villagers. These may be the same as those of
whom Nicolaus de Graaff (Warnsinck, De Graaff reisen, p. 205) says that in
addition to the dead Europeans there were “some black slaves and others who were
all very cruelly and shamefully assaulted”.
54. According to BK ff. 439v.440r. At this point AR II is also said to have
given Surapati the new name and title Tg. Wiranégara. R. Ad. Sinduréja referred
to Surapati now being called Dip. Wiranégara in a letter to Sloot in mid-1687; “DR
1687”, 10 July.
55. R.A. Wiranégara [Surapati’s son], [Malang], to Tg. Wiraguna, [Surabaya],
rec’d Batavia 2 Sept. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709). Cf. n. 56 below. See also
Batavia to H. XVII, 9 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, pp. 130-1, which raises the possi-
bility that the above letter is confused and that the lands to the east of Mt. Lawu
were promised to Surapati in 1704 by AR III (see also p. 138 above).
56. Surapati’s takeover of Pasuruan of course meant that Jangrana I’s brother
Onggajaya lost his seat as governor there. “DR 1686”, 11 Apr., 5 June, 27 Oct.;
“DR 1687”, 21 Jan.; Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Feb. 1687, in dJ VIII, p. 37; de Graaf,
Moord, pp. 132-3. BK f. 441r. says that in Pasuruan Surapati received the sub-
mission of Bangil, Prabalingga, Pajarakan, Japan, Wirasaba, Kédhiri (here called
Daha), Saréngat and Malang, indeed of all places to the east of Mt. Wilis (not Mt.
Lawu as said in the letter cited in n. 55 above).
57. “DR 1686”, 11 Apr.; BK ff. 440r.—441r.; de Graaf, Moord, pp. 131-2, 134,
137. When CN II appeared at Sémarang from Kartasura on 10 May he said that
he had been ordered to gather his Madurese forces to attack Surapati; “DR 1686”,
22 May. By this time Jangrana I had also reportedly skirmished several times with
Surapati but been defeated; “DR 1686”, 5 June.
58. BK f. 440r.
300 NOTES to pp. 96-100

59. “DR 1686”, 11 Apr. has a letter from the VOC post at Kartasura dd. 5 Mar.
reporting that Anrangkusuma was still there but that his standing at court was
obscure. This seemed still to be true on the eve of the VOC withdrawal from
Kartasura two weeks later (de Graaf, Moord, p. 108). By early May CN II reported
him to be in exile (“DR 1686”, 22 May). See also de Graaf, Moord, pp. 104,
120-1. In 1687 Anrangkusuma was reportedly in the area of Kudus (“DR 1687”,
21 Jan., 13 Oct.); see also Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V, p. 145, on the failure of the Javanese to turn over Anrangkusuma despite
promises to do so.
60. “DR 1686”, 5 June; BK f. 440v.
61. De Graaf, Moord, p. 111. “DR 1686”, 29 Nov., refers to the bonus paid to
the Makasarese Sergeant Ali for bringing the first news of the death of Tack
onwards to Batavia on 18 Feb.
62. “DR 1686”, 11 Apr., 22 May; de Graaf, Moord, pp. 101-7.
63. De Graaf, Moord, pp. 107-10, 113, 115-16.
64. Ibid., pp. 103, 109-10. A. Baskara had died en route to Kartasura, so his
claims now passed to his young son R. Sudérma; “DR 1687”, 15 Apr.

Notes to Chapter 6
1. For some previous diplomatic-cum-trading contacts between Java on the one
hand and Johor, Palembang, Jambi, Patani and Siam on the other, see DR /682,
vol. II, pp. 984, 1016, 1336; “DR 1683”, 27 Apr., 6 May, 5 June, 15 July, 4 Nov.;
“DR 1684’, 10 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.1684, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
IV, p. 745; “DR 1685”, 17 May, 14 July, 9 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec.
1685, in dJ VIII, p. 4. Visits to Java by horse-buyers on behalf of the Siamese king
were an annual occurrence well into the eighteenth century; the latest report I have
noted is from 1721: Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1721, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
VII, p. 562. Horses were also purchased there for the Trinh ruler of North Vietnam
(“DR 1691”, 28 May) and for the ruler of Japan (the Tokugawa Shogun Yoshimune,
r. 1716-45) (Noodt, Sémarang, to Ceesjong, Kartasura, 21 Mar. 1726, in VOC
2056 [OB 1727)).
2. “DR 1686”, 5 June; Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Dec. 1686, in dJ VIII, pp. 20,
23-4; idem, 13 Mar.1688 & 27 Dec.1688, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp. 171, 248;
idem, 27 Dec. 1688, in dJ VIL, p. 55; Keyts report, Batavia, 14 Feb. 1689, in VOC
1456 (OB 1689) (I am grateful to Dr G.V. Smith for bringing this document to
my attention); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.V, p.
340; Ondervraging, Sémarang, 24 July 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705); de Graaf,
Moord, p. 118.
The VOC reports are not clear whether an embassy from the Johor Sultan went
to Kartasura, but BS II: 39 lists such an embassy immediately after its report of the
killing of Tack.
On Raja Sakti, see J. Kathirithamby-Wells, “Ahmad Shah ibn Iskandar and the
late 17th century ‘Holy War’ in Indonesia”, JMBRAS vol. 43, pt. 1 (1970), pp.
48-63. Raja Sakti’s background is difficult to establish; he was apparently from the
Minangkabau royal house and claimed to be a saint of some sort.
At this time Siam was assisting Johor in protesting to Batavia about VOC
harrassment of Johor ships (Andaya, Johor, p. 146). Siam frequently sent cannon
as gifts to the Sultan of Johor (ibid., p.148) and it may have been because AR II
NOTES to pp. 101-2 301

knew this that he turned to Siam for munitions. There was substantial trade be-
tween Johor and Java (ibid., p.148).
It is perhaps surprising that there appears to have been no contact (at least
directly) between Kartasura and Perak, where a VOC ambassador and 26 other
Dutchmen were killed in 1651, a VOC party was attacked in 1679, the VOC
Resident and 11 other VOC servants were murdered in 1685 and the VOC post at
Pulau Pangkor was attacked in 1689; not surprisingly in 1690 the VOC withdrew
from there; Barbara Watson Andaya, Perak, the abode of grace: A study of an
eighteenth-century Malay state (Kuala Lumpur, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1979),
pp. 46, 50, 63 n. 64.
There were also reports of an anti-VOC plot in Bantén which was foiled by the
Sultan; Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Dec. 1686, in dJ VII, pp. 24, 28-9.
3. “DR 1686”, 29 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Dec. 1686, in dJ VIII, pp. 22,
25; idem, 28 Feb.1687, in dJ VII, p. 37; dJ VIII, pp. xxxix—xl. Batavia requested
further substantial reinforcements from Europe out of fear of a general anti- VOC
agitation among Muslims. It noted what appeared to be heightened religious
sensitivities among Muslims living in Batavia and did not trust its Balinese; an
order forbidding the import of male Balinese slaves was therefore renewed. The
city’s fortifications were also improved. See Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Dec. 1686, in
dJ VIU, pp. 25-6, 31-3. See also de Graaf, Moord, pp. 111-15 (I believe de Graaf
was wrong in saying that Grésik was abandoned at this time: see n. 27 below).
4. “DR 1686”, 27 Oct.
5. “DR 1686”, 24 Oct., 26 Nov., 29 Nov.
6. BK ff. 441v.—443r.
7. “DR 1686”, 5 June. De Graaf, Moord, p. 123, says Nalajaya and Jiwaraga
were named joint governors of Jépara immediately after the killing of Tack. On
Javanese suspicions of the VOC fleet, see “DR 1686”, 22 May. On the visit of an
earlier force in Feb. 1686, see de Graaf, Moord, p. 113.
8. “DR 1686”, 5 June, 22 Aug. See also de Graaf, Moord, pp. 121-2. VOC
officers in Surabaya even suspected that CN II was actually intending to attack
them rather than Surapati; “DR 1686”, 10 Aug.
9. Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in dJ VIII, p. 44. The small VOC force
at Grésik was moved for its own security to Surabaya in 1687: see n. 27 below.
LOS MDReIGSOe on June: 27 Oct:
11. E.g. an amuk attack in Surabaya by a Madurese in which two Dutch officers
were killed and a Mardijker was wounded; “DR 1686”, 22 Aug.
12. See p. 47 above.
13. “DR 1686”, 10 Aug., 27 Oct., 29 Nov., 2 Dec., 4 Dec., 9 Dec.; de Graaf,
Moord, pp. 127-9. The newly proposed co-governor was to be Ng. Aladalad.
14. In Jépara the matter concerned VOC and Kartasura claims to jurisdiction
over non-indigenous persons; “DR 1686”, 2 Dec. In Cirébon the princes rejected
orders from Sinduréja on the grounds that they only took orders from the VOC;
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689, in dJ VIII, p. 63.
15. De Graaf, Moord, pp. 116-18, 129-30. On p. 116, de Graaf says that Nalajaya
was a man of little distinction, but on p. 123 he says he had recently been named
co-governor of Jépara with Jiwaraga/Martapura.
16. “DR 1686”, 2 Dec., 21 Dec., 24 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Dec. 1686,
in dJ VIII, p. 33; “DR 1687”, 3 Jan., 19 June, 8 July, 10 July; Batavia to H. XVII,
28 Feb. 1687, in dJ VIII, pp. 35-6; de Graaf, Moord, pp. 125-6. The three
302 NOTES to pp. 102-3

ambassadors were Tg. Surawikrama, Ng. Aladalad and again Ng. Nalajaya; the
absence of the second from Sémarang presumably temporarily removed some of
the pressure from Yudawongsa (see n. 13 above). AR II specifically asked Batavia
to confirm Aladalad’s authority over half the government of Sémarang, which
Batavia refused to do.
17. “DR 1686”, 24 Dec. (see also 3 Dec.); Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Dec. 1686,
in dJ VIII, p. 34; idem, 28 Feb. 1687, in dJ VIII, pp. 36, 38, 40-2; “DR 1687”,
19 Apr.; dJ VII, pp. xlii—xliii; Kathirithamby-Wells, “Ahmad Shah ibn Iskandar”,
. 57-8.
PP. “DR 1687”, 19 Apr.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in dJ VIII, pp. 44-5
(quotation from p. 44) (this letter reports that the “parade” lasted from 12 Apr. to
27 July, but clearly Sinduréja was not in Sémarang for all of this time). See also
de Graaf, Moord, p. 141.
BK ff. 443r—449v. describes an embassy by Sinduréja to Sémarang but depicts
it as an elaborate plot to get Martapura (who has meanwhile fallen out with the
VOC) to run amuck against the Dutch or, if he will not, to kill him. In the end
Martapura is killed by the Javanese. The tale appears to be mostly nonsense. In
1694 Martapura was killed in Kartasura; Batavia to H. XVII, 4 Feb. 1695, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 732; de Graaf, Moord, p. 159.
Tg. Suranata of Démak (a man whom the VOC deeply distrusted) had visited
Sloot in Jépara in Feb. 1687, apparently on behalf of AR II; he had departed after
an exchange of courtesies and gifts; “DR 1687”, 28 Feb., 4 Mar.
19. “DR 1687”, 28 Feb., 4 Mar.
20. BS 1:39. A letter from Sinduréja to Sloot cited in “DR 1687”, 30 June, says
that Taruwongsa was a place at the foot of the mountains where the enemy was
put to flight. This must be the “affair of Taruwongsa” (pa-Taruwongsa) of BS II:
39. I have been unable, however, to find Taruwongsa in other sources and cannot
describe its location any more precisely. Sinduréja’s letter says that subsequently
two enemy survivors were armed and ordered to fight to the death upon the alun-
alun, thus confirming also the BS II: 39 report that “they were made to battle each
other upon the ‘great square ....”; see also de Graaf, Moord, p. 140. BS II: 38
refers to the killing of Tack, wrongly dated AJ 1608 (Dec. 1684—Nov. 1685) as it
is in all other Javanese MSS known to me (Ricklefs, Tradition, p. 189), and BS
II: 40 refers to the year AJ 1609 (Nov. 1685—Nov. 1686), so the implied dating
of the pa-Taruwongsa in BS Il: 39 is inconsistent with Sinduréja’s letter of AD
1687.
There is also a description of resistance by Pan. Kajoran (who was killed in
1679) placed in BK f. 450r.—v. at about this time, but it begins with a flashback
to 1678 and may simply be entirely out of order here and without relevance to the
resistance of 1687. There are other signs of chronological disorder in this part of
BK.
21. “DR 1687”, 19 June, 30 June, 10 July, 12 Sept.; de Graaf, Moord, pp.
139-40. In his letter to Sloot rec’d on 13 June and reporting Surapati’s presence
at Kartasura, AR II also expressed his gratitude and loyalty towards the VOC and
begged the Europeans not to believe what evil people said of him; “DR 1687”, 19
June.
On Ki Gusti Ngrurah Panji Sakti of Buleleng, see Peter John Worsley (ed. &
transl.), Babad Buleleng: A Balinese dynastic genealogy (’s-Gravenhage: H. L.
Smits; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).
NOTES to pp. 103-4 303

DOE oe DRS l6Siie 2 lunes

23. Batavia to AR II, Kartasura, 1 July 1687, in “DR 1687”, 8 July.
24" DR 1686" )227Aug..27 Sept.) 29: Sept., 15 Oct; 27 Oct.» “DR: 16877, 15
Apr., 9 July. The VOC now name the four heirs (all said to be sons of Yudanagara)
as A. Baskara, A. Pulangjiwa, A. Dikara and A. Wirasari (“DR 1687”, 15 Apr.)
whereas in 1685 there were said to be three sons-in-law named A. Baskara, Ky.
M. A. Pulangjiwa and Ky. Brajapati (see p. 82 above); yet in 1687 the name
Brajapati is also given, so there would seem to be five heirs. R. Sudérma was the
son of A. Baskara, who had died en route to Kartasura with Tack in 1686 (ibid.).
Reports were soon received that the eldest of the heirs, Pulangjiwa, was attempt-
ing to gain sole control of Suménép and Pamékasan and was oppressing the people;
see “DR 1687”, 9 July, 21 Aug., 12 Sept.
Earlier the VOC had refused a request by CN II to order the people of Suménép
to war on the grounds that they were subjects of AR II rather than of the VOC;
“DR 1686”, 28 May. Clearly this attitude was not maintained for long thereafter.
25. AR II, Kartasura, to Batavia, in “DR 1687”, 18 Sept. It is worth noting that
AR II was punctilious in informing the VOC at Jépara that he was sending two of
his subjects to Aceh or Patani to buy elephants and in asking for VOC passes.
Zo DRENGS/ eal oeseptere > SeptwissOct. 22.Oct. puNovs
27. Bervelt et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1687, in VOC 1440 (OB
1688); “DR 1687”, 22 Nov., 20 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 145. As a defensive measure the VOC personnel at
Grésik were evacuated to Surabaya in Noy. 1687 and Surabaya was subsequently
reinforced to a strength of 150—160 men; “DR 1686”, 29 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVI,
13 Mar. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 181; idem, 30 Dec. 1689, in dJ VII,
p. 60. In 1702 it was decided to reestablish a VOC post at Grésik to prevent the
English establishing themselves there; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1702, in dJ
VIII, pp. 99-100.
28. “DR 1688”, 10 Mar., 27 Mar., 2 May; Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Mar. 1688,
in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp. 190-1. Among the Javanese commanders reported
killed by Surapati was Jangrana I’s brother Onggajaya, the former royal governor
of Pasuruan; “DR 1688”, 27 Mar.
29. “DR 1687”, 6 Nov., 22 Nov.; Bervelt et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 13 Nov.
1687, in VOC 1440 (OB 1688).
30. “DR 1688”, 2 May; Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Mar. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V, p. 190. AR II’s people were also said to have been unable to deal with
a Balinese band of 300 operating west of the court; “DR 1688”, 10 Mar., 27 Mar.,
2 May.
31. In Sept. 1687, the VOC had a total of 1327 servants (914 Europeans, 413
Indonesians and Mardijkers) in its pasisir posts, not more than about 1100 of them
being soldiers. A year later these numbers had declined somewhat. Batavia to H.
XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp. 144-5; idem, 27 Dec. 1688,
in ibid., p. 248.
The VOC kepts its coastal establishment in the range of about 1100-1300 men
into the 1690s; Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1691, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp.
423-4; idem, 31 Jan. 1692, in dJ VIII, p. 75; idem, 11 Dec. 1692, in Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss. V, p. 560; idem, 8 Dec. 1693, in ibid., pp. 646-7. It is worth noting
for comparison that at around this time the Dutch population of Batavia itself was
304 NOTES to pp. 104-5

less than 2300 (out of a total of 17,600 within the walls and 11,000 in the city’s
environs); DR 1682, vol. I, pp. 1475-7.
32. The sources available to me on AR II’s attempt to install Ng. Aladalad (the
son of the governor murdered in Apr. 1682; see p. 75 above) in Sémarang in place
of Rongga Yudawongsa (as he had in 1686: see nn. 13, 16 above), along with a
new Chinese syahbandar, and to place Sédana (? “Saddana”) and then Dm. Sin-
gapradana (said to be Chinese) in Indramayu as governor and syahbandar in place
of Wiralodra, are not very detailed or complete. No doubt further research would
be possible on these matters. See “DR 1687”, 18 Sept., 13 Oct., 27 Nov.; “DR
1688’, 10 Mar.; Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Mar. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p.
182.
33. “DR 1687”, 22 Oct. Concerning 1680, see especially p. 64 above. For
further relations between AR II and Sloot, see “DR 1688”, 10 Mar., 27 Mar.
34% “DR 1687 740225Septad3 Oct3e20) Dees s DRALOSSea2 Is Feber Oo Mar:
Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in dJ VIII, pp. 46-7 and Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
V, p. 145; idem, 27 Dec. 1688, in dJ VIII, p. 53.
Paijs had been to Kartasura as an emissary before; see de Graaf, Moord, pp. 119,
125. He is sometimes referred to as a “native” (inlandse) rather than a Mardijker
soldier; e.g. Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Mar. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 286;
“DR 1691”, 30 Sept. (by which time Paijs had been promoted from corporal to
sergeant). On the use of the term Mardijker, see p. 271 n. 15 above.
35. Conflicts were reported at Lasém and Kédhiri. In the latter, it was reported
that AR II had tried to replace the local lord, Ng. Katawéngan, with his own
nominee R. Topati. The latter’s emissaries were, however, killed by Katawéngan
and the royal order was rejected. As a result, Topati fled to Kartasura and Katawéngan
to Surapati. But the VOC was unsure how much to believe of these reports. See
Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Mar. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 181; Bervelt et
al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1687, in VOC 1440 (OB 1688). Katawéngan is
said to have assisted Surapati in his flight eastward; H.J. de Graaf & Th. G. Th.
Pigeaud, “Kadiri en het geslacht Katawengan van + 1500 tot + 1700”, BKI vol.
133, no. 4 (1977), p. 429.
36. “DR 1687”, 20 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V, p. 158. Apparently AR II did not abandon his boating after this incident.
In 1688 he ordered ten small pleasure-boats made on the coast for use at court;
“DR 1688”, 1 Nov.
The construction of the Sagara Yasa (artificial lake) at the court, where AR II
was boating when the near-drowning occurred, is recorded in BK f. 472v., in a
section of the text which seems quite jumbled and confused. A Sagara Yasa had
also been created at the court of AR I in 1651 according to BS I: 68. This was
followed by the construction of a mosque (BS 1:70), as also was the building of
AR II’s Sagara Yasa according to BK.
37. Batavia to H. XVII, 13 Mar. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 182; “DR
1688”, 13 Aug., 27 Sept.; BS Il: 40 (which refers to the Wongsanata episode but
dates it a year too early). Wongsanata was apparently the same man who had
earlier been head of the Balinese at Kartasura (de Graaf, Moord, p. 66); see AR
Il’s letter to Batavia in “DR 1691”, 21 Nov. An earlier report on the Balinese of
Lurungténgah is in “DR 1686”, 3 Dec. In early 1689 it was reported that five
Balinese chiefs who had formerly lived in Bagélen had surrendered to AR II:
NOTES to p. 105 305

Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Mar. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp. 286-7.

38. The army marched after the end of the fasting month (Puasa AJ 1611 ended
on 27 Aug. 1688). “DR 1688”, 13 Aug., 26 Sept., | Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII, 27
Dec. 1688, in dJ VIII, p. 53; idem, 31 Mar. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V. p.
BSE
39. The Dutch were quick to arrest an Indian Muslim in Cirébon who had been
travelling through Siam and the Indonesian-Malay world preaching against them.
They were obliged to release him and transport him to Surat, however, when the
Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) demanded that they do so. The man
was named Sharif Habib Allah, but I know nothing more about him. Batavia to H.
XVII, 27 Dec. 1688, in dJ VIII, p. 56; idem, 30 Dec. 1689, in dJ VIII, p. 63; dJ
VIL, pp. xl-xli.
40. “DR 1688”, 9 Nov., 7 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 27 Dec. 1688, in dJ VII,
pp. 53-4; “DR 1689”, 4 Jan.; Batavia to H. XVII, 27 Dec. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V, pp. 248-9. Sloot arrived in Batavia at the beginning of Jan. 1689 and
returned to Jépara in Dec.
The religious emissary is variously said in VOC sources to have been the “priest”
Ky. Angga, the “senior priest” Si Salam or the “head priest” Kétib Kali (who acted
as an emissary to the VOC on other occasions). I cannot clarify these questions of
identity with any confidence. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689, in dJ VIII, p. 58,
refers to AR II’s emissaries “Kyai Angga [and] Kétib Kali”; idem, 31 Jan. 1692,
in dJ VIII, p. 74, refers to the “court priest” Kajib [i.e. Kétib] Kali. Kétib Kali was
murdered in Aug. 1693; “DR 1693”, 8 Sept. BK f. 457v. says that at around this
time AR II’s pangulu was named Tapsir Anom (this could well be another name
for Kétib Kali), that he had been given the sister of the late Png. Maménang for
a wife, had a large appanage of 1000 households and was a great favourite of the
king.
The VOC was sometimes confused even about the identities of princes. Batavia
to H. XVII, 27 Dec. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 249, says that Na-
takusuma was still known also as Png. Mangkubumi although the VOC knew he
had been renamed Natakusuma six years before (DR /682, vol. II, p. 1218). Batavia
to H. XVII, 27 Feb. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 281, says that until
recently Png. A. Mataram had been named Png. A. Panular. According to BK f.
440v., on the day after the killing of Tack (i.e. on 9 Feb. 1686), AR II gave the
name Png. A. Mataram to his younger brother Si Tapa along with an appanage of
1000 households. A different brother was named A. Panular and was given an
appanage of 500, while the king’s uncle Natakusuma was made wedana of the
wong gédhe. The renaming of R.M. Tapa as Png. A. Mataram is also described
in Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém, p. 132; Png. A. Panular is listed in ibid., p. 131.
41. Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Mar. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp. 286-7.
42. “DR 1688”, 1 Nov.
43. Batavia to H. XVII, 27 Dec. 1688, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 249.
44, On Capt. Jonker’s career, see de Graaf, Ambon en de Zuid-Molukken, pp.
157-63; de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp. 228-31; or de longh, Krijgswezen, pp.
115-16. See DR 1681, pp. 247-9, for the 1681 ceremony. The heroic role of the
“hot-tempered” Capt. Jonker is also recorded in Skinner, Sja‘ir perang Mengka-
sar, pp. 111, 137, 149, 151, 163-4, 167. On the action against the Makasarese at
Képér and the surrender of Trunajaya, see pp. 55, 57 above. The German soldier
306 NOTES to pp. 106-7

Christoph Schweitzer (Reisen, pp. 26-7) reported that Jonker was a man of such
prodigious strength that he could leap over a Dutchman seated on a Persian horse
(both beings of considerable stature). This purported eyewitness account was taken
seriously by Dr de Graaf but there is room for doubt. It has the virtue of suggest-
ing that it was not only Javanese who created myths in this credulous age. In
general, Schweitzer’s journal of 1676 seems to contain some serious errors con-
cerning Java and his information is to be treated with caution.
45. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689, in dJ VIII, pp. 58-9, 62-3, 65-6; “DR
1689”, 19 Sept., 5 Nov.; “DR 1690”, 23 Mar.; Batavia to H. XVII, 14 Mar. 1690,
in dJ VIII, p. 67, and Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 371; idem, 26 Mar. 1691, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 423; dJ VII, pp. xliii-xlv. On Batavia’s chilly recep-
tion of AR II’s emissaries, see “DR 1689”, 13, 14, 21, 24 June, 26 July, 25 Aug.,
30 Aug., 15 Sept.
An Islamic leader named Haji Wongsadewa from Jépara was also banished to
the Cape of Good Hope on suspicion of having corresponded with Jonker; “DR
1690”, 23 Sept. Of the two crucified and broken leaders, one named Topina was
a Bugis or Makasarese lieutenant in VOC service; nothing is known about the
other; Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 423 n. 1.
46. De Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp. 184-9; de Graaf, Ambon en de Zuid-Molukken,
pp. 163-7. Bintang was born in 1660. He had been raised in the household of
Speelman in Batavia from 1673.
47. “DR 1689”, 15 Mar., 30 June; Batavia to H. XVI, 30 Dec. 1689, in dJ VIII,
pp. 61—2. Exchanges of royal embassies were, of course, fairly common occur-
rences. In 1689 and 1691, for example, ambassadors from Bima and Patani went
to Kartasura; “DR 1689”, 5 Nov.; “DR 1691”, 30 Jan; the VOC made no attempt
to interfere in these missions, giving the latter a pass for travel to Java’s east coast,
as requested.
48. “DR 1689”, 24 June; Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Mar. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V, p. 287.
49. Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Mar. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 287; idem,
30 Dec. 1689, in ibid., p. 340; “DR 1689”, 15 Mar., 24 June.
50. “DR 1689”, 24 June, 30 Aug., 15 Sept.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689,
in dJ VIL, pp. 58-9.
51. See AR II’s letter to Batavia in “DR 1689”, 24 June. It was later claimed
that AR II’s army had regained control of Wirasaba and Kédhiri from Surapati, but
the VOC thought the report to be nonsense; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 349. The population of Surapati’s domain cannot be
known with confidence. For some information of relevance to this, see Ricklefs,
“Statistical evidence”, pp. 4-7.
I do not know the date Jangrana I’s marriage to CN II’s daughter, but CN II is
referred to as Jangrana I’s father-in-law at least av early as “DR 1687”, 18 Sept.
Onggajaya was killed in 1688 in the campaign against Surapati;*“DR 1688”, 27
Mar. Relations between him and his brother Jangrana I had not always been
amicable; one conflict is reported in Couper ef a/., Wanakarta, to Batavia, 20 Oct.
1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681). Jangarana I apparently also lost a son who was
murdered by several Dutchmen, but the details of this affair are not known to me;
see Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 349.
52. Trade matters are widely discussed in the VOC records. In particular, see
NOTES to pp. 107-8 307

Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Dec. 1683, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. IV, pp. 621-2; idem,
19 Feb. 1684, in ibid., p. 673; “DR 1686”, 27 Oct., 29 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII,
13 Dec. 1686, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp. 64-5; idem, 23 Dec. 1687, in ibid.,
pp. 104, 147; idem, 27 Dec. 1688, in dJ VIII, pp. 53-4, and Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
V, pp. 234, 248, 250; idem, 31 Mar. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, pp. 287,
289.
Local producers also complained about VOC maltreatment and underpayment
for their products; see “DR 1686”, 27 Sept., 2 Dec. Piracy was a further problem
on the coast; e.g. see “DR 1686”, 22 May; “DR 1687”, 19 Apr.; “DR 1689”, 30
Aug.
58. fortification
& garrison
costs has loss as profit as
proportion of proportion of proportion of
year total expenditure total expenditure total expenditure
1685/6 — 1.45
1686/7 0.14 0.61
1687/8 — 0.55
1688/9 0.84 0.51
1689/90 0.87 0.82
1690/1 0.84 0.90
1691 (Half-yr) 0.89 0.88
The 1689-90 figures are for a full year as at 31 Aug.; the normal financial year
was | Mar. —28 Feb. “DR 1686”, 10 Aug.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Dec. 1687, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 147; idem, 27 Dec. 1688, in ibid., p. 248; idem, 30 Dec.
1689, in ibid., p. 341; idem, 31 Jan. 1692, in ibid., pp. 487-8.
54. E.g. Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1692, in dJ VIII, p. 81. See also p. 16
above.
55. “DR 1690”, 8 July, 18 July, 19 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1691, in
dJ VIL, p. 67; dJ VUI, pp. Ivii-lviii. The following year there were rumours that
a general massacre of Company personnel would begin after the fasting month, but
when the time came nothing happened; “DR 1691”, 5 July.
56. “DR 1690”, 18 Aug., 2 Oct., 19 Oct., 20 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar.
1691, in dJ VIII, p. 67.
57. BS Ul: 42; dJ VII, pp. lvi-lvii. A report of Oct. 1690 that Sinduréja had
fallen from royal favour, if it was accurate, may also have been associated with the
failure of this campaign; “DR 1690”, 19 Oct. Later reports suggest, however, that
any such fall from favour must have been brief.
The battle must have been fought at the village Carat (Gémpol district), which
occupies a strategic point on the north of Mt. Pénanggungan (see Schoel, Register,
p. 399); see also Kumar, Surapati, p. 40. Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 55 n. 1,
however, says that Carat is now named Pintu Larat and is the pass between Mt.
Arjuna and Mt. Pénanggungan. This identification appears to rest upon Valentyn,
Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol IV [pt. 1], p. 194, which equates Carat and Pintu
Larat; I am unable, however, to find the latter in Schoel, Register.
On the pre-Islamic antiquities of Mt. Pénanggungan, see A.J. Bernet Kempers,
308 NOTES to pp. 108-10

Ancient Indonesian art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp.
65-7 & associated plates.
58. “DR 1690”, 8 July; Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1691, in dJ VIII, p. 68.
59. AR II had sought Sloot’s advice on suitable ambassadors but had been told
to make up his own mind on the matter; “DR 1690”, 20 Oct.; “DR 1691”, 21 Jan.
60. Batavia to AR II, Kartasura, 12 July 1691, in “DR 1691”, 16 July. See also
de Graaf, Moord, p. 152.
61. “DR 1691”, 30 Sept., 21 Nov.
62. This was not an unprecedented way of dealing with courtiers who had fallen
from favour. Sultan Agung dealt with Sura Agulagul, the commander of his failed
siege of Batavia in 1629, in this way in 1638; de Graaf, Sultan Agung, pp. 251-2.
63. AR II, Kartasura, to Batavia, in “DR 1691”, 21 Nov. This letter is dated
“Dulgahiedzja Ze 1614”, which would appear to be the month Dulkangidah in the
year Je 1614 (=27 July—25 Aug. 1691), but this is clearly too early for a response
to the VOC ultimatum if it wasn’t delivered until 13 Sept. Dulkijah (=26 Aug.—23
Sept. 1691) must be meant. See also Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Jan. 1692, in dJ VIII,
p. 74; “DR 1691”, 20 Nov.; and the letter from the Crown prince in “DR 1691”,
21 Nov.
The levying of coastal people for the campaign under Sinduréja and Urawan is
described in “DR 1691”, 9 Aug. This campaign was probably the one involving
the occupation of Génthong (in Pasuruan) described in BS III: 1-2, dated AJ 1614
{5 Oct. 1690-23 Sept. 1691] and AJ 1615 [24 Sept. 1691-12 Sept. 1692]. BK f.
450v. also mentions CN II holding Génthong and his frustration at the failure of
VOC troops to arrive, but the dating of this section of the text is obscure.
64. “DR 1691”, 20 Nov., 21 Nov., 29 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Jan. 1692,
in dJ VIII, pp. 74-5; “DR 1692”, 8 Feb., 5 Apr.
65. Batavia to AR II, Kartasura, | Apr. 1692, in “DR 1692”, 5 Apr. See also
de Graaf, Moord, p. 153. Later the VOC received reports that Anrangkusuma had
been ordered by AR II to live with Surapati at Pasuruan and that he again visited
Kartasura in the company of several Balinese from Pasuruan for two days but for
an unknown purpose at the end of Sept. 1692; “DR 1692”, 29 Sept., 15 Oct.
66. “DR 1691”, 11 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Jan. 1692, in dJ VII, p. 75.
67. On the affairs of Suménép and Pamékasan in the years leading up to 1691,
see especially “DR 1689”, 18 Jan., 20 Aug., 7 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 27 Feb.
1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 281; “DR 1690”, 24 Jan.; Batavia to H. XVII,
31 Jan. 1692, in dJ VIII, p. 77.
Sudérma subsequently pleaded repeatedly to be allowed to return from Banda
to Batavia, which was granted in 1698. See “DR 1690”, 4 Oct.; “DR 1694”, 20
Oct.; “DR 1696”, 21 Oct.; “DR 1698”, 15 May, 28 July, 14 July.
Me “DR 1691”, 16 July. Pulangjiwa offered 6000 men in his reply; “DR 1691”,
ct.
69. The only Javanese tale of the time of Islamisation in which supernatural
powers fail to produce a conversion, so far as I know, is that concerning the king
of Blambangan, who refuses to convert when Molana Usalam magically cures his
daughter. The child born to Usalam and the Blambangan princess is the first Sunan
Giri. See Hoesein Djajadiningrat, Critische beschouwing van de Sadjarah Bantén:
Bijdrage ter kenschetsing van de Javaansche geschiedschrijving (Haarlem: Joh.
NOTES to pp. 110-11 309

Enschedé en Zonen, 1913), pp. 23-4, 255-6; the tale is summarised also in Ricklefs,
History, p. 10. On the earlier history of Blambangan, see de Graaf & Pigeaud,
Vorstendommen, pp. 192-8; de Graaf, Sultan Agung, pp. 254-63.
70. “DR 1691”, 21 Jan., 29 Mar., 13 Apr., 19 Apr., 23 May, 28 June, 29 June,
2 July, 16 July; Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1691, in dJ VIII, pp. 68-9; idem, 31
Jan. 1692, in dJ VIII, pp. 75-6. See also de Graaf, Moord, pp. 150-2; Kumar,
Surapati, pp. 36, 357, on VOC contacts with Blambangan in 1691-2.
71. “DR 1691”, 8 Dec., 10 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Jan. 1692, in dJ VIII,
p. 76. On the Blambangan succession dispute, see also J. Brandes, “Verslag over
een Babad Blambangan”, TBG vol. 37 (1894), p. 338.
72. “DR 1691”, 19 Dec.; “DR 1692”, 12 Feb., 7 Mar., 2 Apr., 22 June, 24 June;
Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Jan. 1692, in dJ VIII, pp. 76-7; idem, 11 Dec. 1692, in dJ
VII, p. 79.
73. “DR 1692”, 20 Aug., 29 Sept., 31 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1692,
in dJ VIII, pp. 79-80. Reports reaching the VOC said that the border was fixed at
“Wodgantoeng”. This presumably refers to the village Wotgalih, near Gratitunon
to the east of Pasuruan. There is no Wotgantung listed in Schoel, Register. The
Dutch cannot have been pleased by the report that Macanpura’s emissary to Surapati
was guided by an aristocrat (priyayi) subject of Pulangjiwa of Suménép.
74. Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1692, in dJ VIII, p. 80; idem, 9 Feb. 1693, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 596; “DR 1693”, 18 Nov., 28 Dec.
75. DJ VI, pp. lx—Ixi. See also de Graaf, Moord, pp. 148-50. See p. 80 above
for the beginning of Camphuys’s period as Governor-General.
Van Outhoorn was born on Ambon, where his father was a VOC merchant, in
1635. He was sent to the Netherlands for his education and returned in 1660 to
Batavia, where he lived for the rest of his life. See Stapel, Gouverneurs-Generaal,
Dasite
Van Hoorn was born in Amsterdam in 1653. De Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp.
3-15, emphasises the importance of his family connections. His sister was married
to Francois Tack, for example. His first wife was Anna Struijs (1664-91), daughter
of one of the richest burghers of Batavia. Susanna Agnieta van Outhoorn was his
second wife; she was baptised in 1672 and died in 1703. His third marriage (1706)
was to Joanna Maria van Riebeeck, daughter of the Director-General (van Hoorn
himself being Governor-General by then) Abraham van Riebeeck, who was to
follow his son-in-law as Governor-General (1709-13). On van Hoorn’s style of
family politics, which led the H. XVII to insist on him leaving the Indies on his
retirement, see also Taylor, Social world, p. 72.
76. “DR 1692”, 4 Aug., 1 Oct., 15 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1692, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 560, & dJ VIII, pp. 80-1; “DR 1693”, 28 Sept.; “DR
1694”, 6 Mar., 19 Apr. The levying of manpower was reportedly also for the
purpose of building a new brick wall around the kraton; “DR 1692”, 15 Oct.;
Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1692, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 560. The con-
struction of such a wall is recorded also in BS III:5—6, but is there dated AJ 1620
(July 1696—July 1697); it is mentioned also but not dated in BK f. 451r.
The VOC was also concerned at news that a pagér (palisade fortress) was being
built by Kartasura officials at Cilacap. The intention was assumed to be hostile.
See “DR 1692”, 8 July, 14 July. From Cilacap came one of the most extravagant
tales of anti- VOC plotting in Kartasura; see de Graaf, Moord, pp. 154-5 n. 3.
310 NOTES to pp. 111-12

Wil, “DAR WEE SK) ANE,

78. AR Il, Kartasura, to Batavia, in “DR 1692”, 4 Aug.
79, Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1692, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 560 , &
dj VII, pp. 81-2.
The VOC engineer Marcus de Baijonville conducted a survey of coastal
fortifications and selected a site for the new Sémarang fortress in 1693. Construc-
tion began in 1695. See “DR 1693”, 7 Mar., 28 Sept., 14 Oct.; “DR 1694”, 3 Aug.;
“DR 1695”, 5 July, 22 Sept., 8 Nov., 15 Nov.; “DR 1696” 1 Sept. See also de
Graaf, Moord, pp. 153-4. In fact the VOC’s pasisir headquarters was not moved
to Sémarang until 1708.
80. “DR 1692”, | Nov. On the attempts of 1686 and 1687, see pp. 101, 104
above.
81. “DR 1693”, 6 July, 17 July, 27 July, 6 Aug., 11 Aug., 8 Sept; de Graaf,
Moord, pp. 156-8. The wives, concubines and children of the executed conspira-
tors were set free since they were of Javanese descent and free persons rather than
slaves; “DR 1693’, 27 Nov.
82. “DR 1694”, 24 Apr., 2 June, 30 July, 25 Sept.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.
1694, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 709. Earlier rumours suggested that Sinduréja’s
embassy was a plot against the VOC, but this proved untrue; “DR 1694”, 28 June.
A surprise visit to Surabaya by the Ratu Ibu Amangkurat (described by the VOC
as AR II’s mother-in-law) in May 1694 provoked alarm. The purpose of her visit
was not made clear. See “DR 1694”, 2 June. She was presumably of Surabayan
origin and the mother of AR II’s wife Ratu Kulon, the mother of AR III (see p.
118 above).
83. Sloot had been refused permission to leave his post on the grounds of ill
health; “DR 1694”, 8 Oct., 6 Nov., 7 Nov.
84. “DR 1694”, 6 Nov., 14 Dec.; “DR 1695”, 7 Jan.; “DR 1696”, 7 Apr., 29
Apr., 4 July, 22 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 4 Feb. 1695, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
V, pp. 731-2; idem, 8 Feb. 1696, in ibid., p. 773; de Graaf, Moord, pp. 158-60.
Jiwaraga was executed in Kartasura, in part because he was accused of mis-
appropriating AR II’s revenues, according to the VOC; Batavia to H. XVII, 4 Feb.
1695, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 732; de Graaf, Moord, p. 159.
Dortsman’s letter describing the mission to Kartasura and the ensign Willem
Sergeant, who had been his emissary, arrived in Batavia on 7 Jan. 1695. On 22
Mar. it was decided to replace him with Lasage; see Kasser vertoog, Batavia, 9
July 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710). Javanese also complained that Dortsman had
had many houses destroyed and coconut palms and other fruit trees cut down in
order to make way for a new road which he ordered constructed through Jépara
without authorisation from Batavia; “DR 1695”, 5 July, 23 Aug., 8 Nov. Later
Dortsman, no longer in VOC service, was chartered by the VOC to manufacture
glazed pottery; “DR 1699”, 17 July, 8 Sept.
85. “DR 1695”, 30 Dec. The Rds. in question were probably Spanish, equiva-
lent to Sp. RI. Discussions of AR II’s intention to take steps regarding his arrears
are reported in “DR 1695”, 5 July, 23 Aug.
The VOC had by now decided that if necessary it would accept payment in
timber or rice instead of cash. A drought and consequent rice shortage in mid-1695
no doubt contributed to this decision. See “DR 1695”, 9 Aug., 23 Aug., 14 Sept.
The exhaustion of some stands of timber on the pasisir was already being
NOTES to pp. 112-13 8) 1

reported by the end of 1695; “DR 1696”, 3 Mar.

86. Batavia to H. XVII, 8 Feb. 1696, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 774. I
confess, however, to being mystified by the figures quoted in this source. The “real
effects or capital which can be relied upon” is said to have increased by fl. 747,
177 (=Sp. RI. 221,386) mainly because AR II had now repaid fl. 635,458 (=Sp. RI.
188,284) out of a total debt of fl. 1,020,000 (=Sp. RI. 302,222). But I cannot
reconcile this with a repayment of Sp. RI. 28,000 in 1694, the VOC calculation of
1685 (see p. 90 above) that the king owed Sp. RI. 1,540,000 (=fl. 5,197,500) or
the 1696 statement to AR II (dJ VIII, p.Ixi) of his debt which shows Sp. RI.
176,929 having been paid.
87. “DR 1690”, 19 Sept.; “DR 1692”, 29 Sept.; “DR 1695”, 28 Jan. Chinese
intermediaries were handling most of Surapati’s arms and ammunition purchases.
Surapati also had enough seafaring forces to threaten the Straits of Madura and
require the VOC to strengthen its naval patrols there; “DR 1689”, 11 Nov.; Batavia
to H. XVII, 30 Dec. 1689, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 341. Lt. Wouter Ockers
commanded two péncalangs (large armed merchant ships) in an attempt to capture
Surapati’s people returning from Johor; the result was a battle on 19 Jan. 1695 near
the Pasuruan river in which 30 of Surapati’s people were reported to have been
killed; “DR 1695”, 28 Jan., 2 Apr., 29 Apr.
Johor did not apparently produce its own armaments, so matériel acquired there
was probably originally of Siamese or even Dutch origin (see Andaya, Johor, pp.
58, 148, 251-2, 284). Grésik, on the other hand, was well known for its manufac-
ture of brass cannon into the nineteenth century; see Raffles, History (1830), vol.
I, p. 330. For further discussion of Javanese cannon, see pp. 13—14 above, and pp.
321 n. 56 & 325 n. 8 below.
88. “DR 1695”, 12 July. There was also a report in 1692 that AR II had actually
ordered the lord of Panaraga to submit to Surapati; “DR 1692”, 29 Sept. Solomon
Lasage or Lesage had held commanderships in Sri Lanka, was Opperhoofd in
Bantén in 1686—7, commander on the west coast of Sumatra in 1687-92, and later
(1696-1700) governor of the Maluku area; Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 4.n. 1.
89. “DR 1695”, 12 May.
90. VOC sources report an ulcer or tumour on AR II’s leg in 1695. While this
may not seem a very major matter, Javanese sources also report an illness of the
king’s feet (caused by supernatural forces) which prevented him holding court for
a year; they date this, however, in AJ 1621 (AD 1697-8). See “DR 1695”, 20
Mar., 12 May; BS III:7; BK f. 500r.—v. By Mar. 1696, VOC records say that AR
II’s leg was much improved; “DR 1696”, 26 Mar. A leg complaint had also been
reported in 1681; see p. 289 n. 26 above. AR II may have suffered from some sort
of paralysis, a common tropical disease of the period: see Schoute, Geneeskunde,
jo, LIP.
91. On piracy, see e.g. “DR 1694”, 2 June; “DR 1696”, 4 Aug.(concerning
European pirates). On corruption, see e.g. “DR 1696”, 29 June, 4 Aug., 19 Aug.,
1 Sept. On extortion, see “DR 1696”, 12 Oct., 25 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23
Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, p. 93.
There were many complaints about the VOC governor of Jépara 1696-8, Pieter
Godschalk or Goodschalk; he was fired and brought back to Batavia whence he
fled to escape prosecution for corruption, probably aboard an English ship, in
1699. “DR 1698”, 28 July; “DR 1699”, 5 June; Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1698,
312 NOTES to pp. 114-16

in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 45; idem, 23 Nov. 1699, in ibid. p. 90.
The VOC was now beginning to investigate the possibilities for trade crops on
the pasisir, particularly indigo, cotton and pepper, as a means of cutting its losses;
see “DR 1694”, 18 Sept., 11 Oct. As will be seen in the following chapter, it was
some time before any success was seen.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. Jangrana I had died by early 1693; Batavia to H. XVII, 9 Feb. 1693, in

Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 596. His son Jangrana II is, for reasons unknown to me,
called Ki Adipati Panatagama (“regulator of religion”)in Sajarah Régen Surabaya.
Jangrana III (r. 1709-18) took this title in 1718, during the Surabaya War (see
Chapter 10); Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 16 Apr. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB
1719). Perhaps Sajarah Régen Surabaya confuses Jangrana II and III in this matter.
2. “DR 1696”, 22 Mar., 26 Mar., 7 Apr., 29 Apr.; Batavia to H. XVII, 8 Feb.
1696, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 773. According to de Graaf’s notes from “DR
1696”, 26 Mar., the payment was Sp. RI. 57,900 plus Rds. Holl. 7,820 for a total
of Rds. 65,720. Clearly something is wrong with the units of currency either in
“DR 1696” or in his notes. I think it reasonable to assume that Sp. RI., also known
as Spanish Rds., were concerned.
3. “DR 1696”, 4 July, 13 July, 29 July, 30 Aug., 19 Oct., 20 Oct., 22 Oct.; “DR
1697”, 20 Apr.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ VIII, pp. 84—S (it is clear
that the Rds. referred to here are Spanish Rds., the same as Sp. RI.); de Graaf,
Moord, pp. 160-1.
The figures quoted in Batavia to H. XVII, 19 Jan. 1697, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
V, p. 813, make little sense to me (like those quoted in ibid., p. 774: see p. 311
n. 86 above).
The discussion of this matter in dJ VIII, pp. Ixi-lxiii, has some confusions
concerning the date of the embassy (which arrived in Oct. 1696 rather than 1697),
the heads under which AR II’s debt was calculated and the identity of the VOC
governor on the pasisir (Pieter Godschalk/Goodschalk, not J.A. Sloot, who had
died nearly 2 years before).
En route to Batavia, Natakusuma stopped to visit the grave of AR I at Tégalwangi;
“DR 1696”, 19 Oct. The homeward journey, no doubt anxious enough because of
the VOC letter the emissaries were bearing to their sovereign, was rendered more
horrowing by a pirate attack which obliged Natakusuma and 36 companions to
leap overboard and, having got to Indramayu, thence to make their way overland;
“DR 1697”, 25 May.
4. “DR 1697”, 5 Sept., 16 Sept., 26 Oct., 28 Oct., 20 Nov., 6 Dec.; Batavia
to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ VIII, pp. 85-6, 88-9; “DR 1698”, 12 Feb.
On the Oct. 1677 agreement, see p. 47 above. On AR II’s 1682 claim that he
owed only Sp. RI. 310,000, see p. 74 above.
5. “DR 1698”, 12 Feb. Rongga Yudawongsa’s first letter here is dd. 20 Jumadi-
lawal, Jimawal (1621 / 5 Dec. 1697) but this was a Saturday whereas the Dutch
translation gives the day as Wednesday, so an error in the dating is probable.
On the Panji romances, see particularly Poerbatjaraka, Panji-verhalen onderling
vergeleken (Bandoeng: A.C. Nix & Co., 1940).
NOTES to pp. 116-17 SMe}

Rongga Yudawongsa also discussed with Sinduréja and CN II the boundaries of

Sémarang; he said that they supported his claim to the people living along the road
(wong urut dalan) as far as Sitirawi (modern Ambarawa). With VOC endorsement
he had been attempting to regain control over these areas since early 1697 in order
to have access both to the labour of the population (said to total 3000) and firewood
needed for the preparation of indigo (an experiment which was not yet very
successful); “DR 1697”, 6 Apr., 20 Apr., 15 May, 1 Oct. See also p. 123 above.
6. “DR 1697”, 28 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ VIII, pp.
86-7. Batavia’s 31 Oct. 1685 instructions to Tack are in dJ VIII, pp. 172-98
(financial aspects on pp. 179-85); see also p. 90 above. Tack was authorised to
reduce AR II’s debt to Rds. 250,000, thus writing off Rds. 1,290,000, which was
little more than the king now owed.
7. “DR 1697”, 9 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 2 Feb. 1698, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Missa Vi pao:
8. “DR 1694”, 9 Nov., 17 Dec.; “DR 1695”, 28 Jan., 4 Nov.; “DR 1696’, 23
Oct., 14 Nov.; “DR 1697”, 19 Mar. (it is of some interest that the scribe of
Jangrana II’s Malay letter, dd. 27 Jumadilakir Ehe 1620 [21 Jan. 1697] identifies
himself as Acehnese: Maulana Zaffar from Aceh Darussalam), 23 Mar., 26 Mar.,
30 Apr., 2 Sept., 28 Sept. Pulangjiwa of Suménép also sought snaphaenen; “DR
1698”, 16 Sept.
Jangrana II’s brother Ky. Ng. Panji Surengrana was also an important figure in
Surabaya in collaboration with Jangrana II. He had been given the name Panji
Surengrana by AR II ca. 1691 (“DR 1691”, 9 Aug.).
9. “DR 1697”, 19 Mar., 19 Apr., 20 Apr., 30 Apr. The structure of administra-
tion in Surabaya in 1697 is not very clear to me. Later (“DR 1697”, 4 Oct.; “DR
1698”, 20 June) VOC records say that AR II had restored to Jangrana II some or
all of the authority previously in the hands of Png. Lamongan.
10. “DR 1695”,1 Oct., 12 Dec.; “DR 1696”, 3 Mar., 12 Mar., 22 Mar., 30 Aug.,
SySeptenlSesept,, 2310ct:
The battles of Aug. 1696 were said to have taken place at Génthong and Garudha.
The former is in Pasuruan but I have been unable to establish the location of
the latter. The toponym “Grouda” appears on the coast south of Surabaya, near
present-day Pasuruan or Bangil, on a map of ca. 1677-80 numbered VEL 1163
in ARA. Garudha may be the same as the land spelled Gamda (which could be an
editorial misinterpretation of MS Garuda, although the MS would have to be
examined to confirm this) in Tomé Pires’ early 16th-century account, which he
locates between Surabaya on one side and Canjtam (probably Kaniten, another
toponym no longer in use) and Panarukan on the other, hence in the area of
Pasuruan. See Cortesao, Pires, vol. I, pp. 196-7. Identification of Gamda with
Garudha is also proposed in S. O. Robson, “Pires’ Gamda”, BK/ vol. 133, nos. 2-3
(1977), pp. 354-6. De Graaf & Pigeaud, (Vorstendommen, p. 52) wondered whether
Gamda should be associated with the name of Gajah Mada, but if it is merely a
misreading of Garudha the question does not arise.
11. See “DR 1692”, 29 Sept., reporting that Pulangjiwa was able to provide a
guide to take an emissary from Blambangan to Surapati. VOC mediation of conflicts
between subjects of CN II and Pulangjiwa on the grounds that both were the
VOC’s friends is recorded in “DR 1697”, 25 June, 18 July, 5 Oct., 21 Oct.; “DR
169875 lo;Sept. 25) Oct:
Pulangjiwa was so ill for a time in 1695 that he was expected to die, an event
314 NOTES to pp. 117-18

which the VOC feared would cause new difficulties; “DR 1695”, 9 Aug., 12 Dec.
12. See pp. 110-11 above.
13. “DR 1697”, 4 Oct., 2 Nov.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ VIII,
pp. 83-4; idem, 6. Dec. 1698, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, pp. 43-4; idem, | Dec.
1700, in ibid p. 138; Worsley, Babad Buleleng, pp. 156-9; BS I[l:4—5 (which
appears to date events too early: AJ 1619/Aug. 1695—July 1696); HJ. de Graaf,
“Gusti Pandji Sakti, vorst van Buleleng”, TBG vol. 83 (1949), pp. 69-73; Kumar,
Surapati, pp. 357-61, 364-5. Another Balinese version of events is in C.C. Berg
(ed.), Babad Bla-Batuh: De geschiedenis van een tak der familie Jélantik (Santpoort:
C.A. Mees, 1932), pp. xvii-xviii, 23-6; here the king of Blambangan flees to
“Solo”. See also Brandes, “Babad Balambangan”, p. 339, which also says that he
fled to Méntaram; the text referred to here is Museum Pusat Jav. MS KBG 337:
see Th. Pigeaud, “Aanteekeningen betreffende den Javaanschen Oosthoek”, TBG
VO omLOS2 epee las
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 44 n. 3, is wrong to identify Bangér with modern
Bangil; see de Graaf & Pigeaud, Vorstendommen, pp. 138, 185. Bangér is also
given as the location of the battle in Babad Buleleng. BS 1:4, however, says the
fight between Blambangan and Pasuruan people took place at Pacabeyan; I am
unable to locate this toponym in the appropriate area.
14. Report of Dijang (or Daijang, i.e. Daeng) Beasa in “DR 1697”, 2 Nov. This
report also said that Surapati had only 600 Balinese and 20 Makasarese fighters
and that his total stock of fireams was 40 snaphaen flintlocks, 10 (matchlock)
muskets and several cannon.
15. Worsley, Babad Buleleng, pp. 158-9. AR II is here called the king of Sala
(Sri Bupati Solo), which suggests anachronism but the use of this name itself is not
really conclusive. Cf. n. 13 above.
16. Sérat Candranipun para Panjénéngan-dalém Nata (Yogyakarta kraton MS
C 48, dd. AJ 1783 & AD 1855), ff. 15v.-l6r. The MS is written in gold ink and
describes the characters of the kings of Java. It is described in Mudjanattistomo,
“Katalogus manuskrip Kraton Jogjakarta”, Widyaparwa vol. 3 (1971), p. 65; and
in Nikolaus Girardet et. al., Descriptive catalogue of the Javanese manuscripts and
printed books in the main libraries of Surakarta and Yogyakarta (Schriftenreihe
des Siidasiens-Instituts der Universitat Heidelberg, vol. 30; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag GMBH, 1983), pp. 655—6 (entry 40245) but with a slightly altered title and
an erroneous kraton MS number (A 48). The text on AR III reads:
Sékar Naga Bonda // Sunan Mangkurat Mas watékane / tumpangso parentah
dahwena sru mangidak / angkah yasan tuladir daksura / tan krameng bawana / pan
kogung kumlungkung tanpa ringa / gumunggung yan raja angrong pasudaran /
melikan Dyah Ayu / tan kéna yan dolana prasétya / sétyaning wadyalit wasika
kalangkung // sikara léngus cugétan galih / adigung-adiguna tan mirib kang rama
/ sakarsanya pan agora goda / wong sak-praja manglih manglah mangleh mangluh
/.... (It is interesting to note the use of kawi miring metre here.)
17. BK ff. 450v.451r. The chronological setting of this part of BK is difficult
to establish. It also describes CN II holding post at Génthong, which BS III:1—2
dates AJ 1614-15 (AD 1690-2), and the building of a brick wall at the kraton,
which BS III:5—6 dates AJ 1620 (AD 1696-7) whereas the VOC received reports
of such a wall in 1692 (“DR 1692”, 15 Oct.; Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Dec. 1692,
in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V, p. 560).
If AR III reached puberty in the early 1690s, it seems logical to guess that he
NOTES to pp. 118-19 315

must have been born ca. 1680. This seems confirmed when Pugér tells him (BK
f. 455r.) that R. Ay. Lémbah is about the same age as he and was born while Pugér
was in Mataram (probably meaning between 1677 and 1680).
The quote is from BK f. 506r., Canto 130 (Dhandhanggula):
56. atanapi i[ng]kang para sélir / pan kacatur yen kala awawrat / jangkép ing
tigang wulane / yen Ratu Kulon wau / amiarsa wawrat kang sélir / anulya pi-
naranan / sinanjan wismeku / duk madak wawratan ilang / iya saking Ratu
Kulon ajampeni / dursila jroning driya.
AR II’s wife the Ratu Kulon was perhaps the same as the Ratu Wetan earlier
said by the VOC (see the sources in p. 289 n. 22 above) to be exercising too much
influence over AR II’s government. According to Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém,
p. 129, one of AR I’s wives was originally named Ratu Wetan and then renamed
Ratu Kulon. AR II’s own mother, the princess from Surabaya, was successively
renamed Ratu Pangayun, Ratu Kulon and Ratu Agéng (ibid., p. 128). Unfortu-
nately Padmasusastra does not list the wives of AR II, so cannot offer support for
the identification of Ratu Wetan and Ratu Kulon (meaning, respectively, the eastern
and western queens). So far as I am aware, nowhere does BK assign the name Ratu
Wetan to one of AR II’s wives.
18. BK f. 579v. The words are put into the mouth of Png. Blitar ca. 1708. He
calls him si kéced, i.e. kécet/kéncet. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV
[pt. 1], p. 146, also says that AR II had a somewhat crippled right leg. I am left
uncertain, however, whether the Crown prince was a cripple at the time of his
succession in 1703; see also n. 55 below.
19. Secret resolution, Batavia, 17 Sept. 1708, in dJ VIII, p. 339.
20. BK ff. 451v.-460r. Pugér’s four sons not from the padmi are named (BK f.
451v.) R. Teja, R. Mésir, R. Papak and R. Kawa. In BK f. 466r. they are named
as Sudira, Mésir, Papak and Kawa, so R. Teja appears to be the same as R. Sudira,
who was to become a major figure in court affairs. This identity is also given in
Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém, pp. 133-5, where he is said to be from a garwa
pangrémbe (wife of second rank) M. Ay. Tejawati from Wotgaleh in Mataram,
who was also the mother of Papak, who was to become the prince Dipanagara who
rebelled in 1718, but not the other princess. On Sudira/Suryakusuma’s mother see
also p. 326 n. 14 below. Padmasasustra may be wrong about Papak / Dipanagara’s
mother. In a MS written by Dipanagara himself in 1716, he refers to his mother
as being from Kéndhal on the pasisir and a descendent of one Bima Cili of Tuban
(NBS 95, Darma Sunya Kéling, text cited on p. 365 n. 58 below). Padmasusastra,
Sajarahdalém, p. 136, says R. Ay. Impun (sic) was from a different mother, garwa
pangrémbe Rétnawati from Kadilangu.
BK f. 451v. says that R. Surya and his 2 brothers were born to the padmi, who
was a princess of Juminahan (putri saking Juminahan padmi). Padmasusastra,
Sajara-dalém, pp. 134, 137, 138, says they were from the padmi identified on p.
133 as Kangjéng Ratu Pakubuwana (reflecting Pugér’s later installation as PB I)
who was a putri saka ing Kablitaran. According to Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém,
p. 133, Pugér/PB I had 22 children in all.
21. BK ff. 460v.465r. On f. 468r. the marrriage is dated wong némbah rétu
atine (AJ 1621/21 July 1697-9 July 1698). BL Add. MS 12323(B), Lamenipun
panjénéngan kitha ..., f. 36v., dates it putra kalih ngrasa tunggil (AJ 1621), but
316 NOTES to pp. 119-21

wrongly converts the chronogram to the numerals 1623. The quote is from BK f.
464v., Canto 117 (Sinom):

15. tan bisa i{ng]sun amarna / solahe wong among résmi / wus bédhah kutha
ing Pajang / Sang Dyah kajodhi ing jurit / dangu datan anglilir / sinjang télés
awor kang ngluh / Pangran awas tumingal / Sang Rétna rinémih-rémih / dyan
kinusya waspa mijil ingusapan.
The reference to Pajang is presumably a pun. Pajang, the name of the district
where Kartasura was located, was also the name of the sixteenth-century kingdom
which had been situated there and which gave way to the House of Mataram. The
verb majang means to make something beautiful by draping it as, in this case, the
bridal bed (pajangan) was draped and/or the object of the siege was draped with
the garment soon to be damp with tears.
Lémbah may, of course, have had Pajang ancestry. According to Padmasusastra,
Sajarah-dalém, p. 133, her mother was the garwa pangrémbe (wife of second
rank) R. Aj. Séndhi from Séndhang. Schoel, Register, pp. 3334 list 21 villages of
that name and a further 43 with names of which it is a part.
22. BK ff. 466r.—470v.
23. BK ff. 470v.472v. Ky. Plered was reputedly the weapon of the founder of
the Mataram dynasty Senapati Ingalaga (de Graaf, Senapati, p. 39; Groneman,
Garébég’s, pp. 56, 57-8); Pugér is said to have used it to kill Tack in 1686 (see
p. 95 above). The story of Mesanular (also Maesanular, Maesapénular) goes back
to the time of the last king of Majapahit (Groneman, Garébég’s, p. 57).
24. BK ff. 472v.476v. Some insight into the state of the court at this time may
be offered by the statement (BK f. 474r.) that Sukra had personally bought 70
Bugis slave soldiers (tutumbasan wadya Bugis). On slavery in South Sulawesi in
this period, see H. Sutherland, “Slavery and the slave frade in South Sulawesi,
1660s—1800s”, in Anthony Reid & Jennifer Brewster (eds), Slavery, bondage and
dependency in Southeast Asia (St. Lucia, etc.: University of Queensland Press,
1983), pp. 268-70. In 1701 the VOC also reported that the principal kraton dig-
nitaries had bodyguards of Bugis, Makasarese, Malays, Balinese and others, all
equipped with good firearms; “DR 1701”, 25 Sept.
25. BK ff. 476v.487v.
26. BK ff. 487v.491r. Sukra’s death in AJ 1621 (21 July 1697-9 July 1698) is
also recorded in BS II:7. Babad Sangkalaning Momana (not, in general, a reliable
source for this period; see Ricklefs, Tradition, p. 200), pp. 262-3, dates the death
of the Crown prince’s wife, because of her love for R. Sukra, in AJ 1623 (29 June
1699-18 June 1700).
BK f. 458v. says that R. Ay. Pucang was AR II’s younger sister, one of two
princesses carried off to Kédhiri by Trunajaya in 1677. At that time her name was
R. Klatingbiru (cf. BK f. 387r., referring to both Klatingbiru and her sister
Klatingkuning as Trunajaya’s wives); she was renamed R. Ay. Pucang when she
was married to Sinduréja. Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém, p. 131, however, says
that Pucang was the princess formerly named Klatingkuning; this source also says
that she was Sukra’s mother.
Although BK here refers to the law of God (kukum Olah) with regard to Sukra’s
death, there is no question of this case having met Islamic legal requirements, for
there was neither an act of adultery seen by four credible witnesses nor a con-
NOTES to pp. 121-3 ply,

fession of adultery. Nor were Sukra and Lémbah put to death by stoning. When
Sinduréja is deeply upset by the sight of his son’s body, CN II adopts a less theo-
logically questionable position in saying to him (BK f. 491r.) that this was all the
will of God, that death was Sukra’s fate (takdir) and that one’s fate is determined
by God.
27. BK ff. 491r.-v. AR II also sends to Pugér Sp. RI. 20 for salawat, money to
pay for prayers for the dead.
28. BK f. 501v., dating the marriage warna bujangga ngrasa wani (1684, error
for AJ 1624/19 June 1700-7 June 1701). The same erroneous séngkala is given in
BTJ(BP), vol. XVI, p. 35; that AJ 1624 is meant is shown by the following date
in ibid., p. 36, buta kalih ngrasa tunggil (AJ 1625) for the death of Sinduréja
(which is, as it happens, the wrong year).
29. “DR 1692”, 16 Sept.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ VIII, p. 87.
By 1696 Sinduréja was presenting himself to the VOC as its friend at court, but
the VOC placed no reliance on this; “DR 1696”, 4 July.
30. Batavia commented on the difficulty of getting a clear picture of the deep
divisions at court in its letter to the H. XVII of 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, pp. 90-1.
31. “DR 1698”, 18 Feb.; “DR 1699”, 8 Jan., 14 Jan., 20 Mar., 6 Nov., 27 Nov.,
12 Dec., 16 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VII, pp. 89-90; “DR
1700”, 22 Apr.; BK ff. 491v.499v.; BS IIl:6 (dating the fall of Panaraga [to
Senapati] AJ 1621 [21 July 1697-9 July 1698) and III:9-10 (dating further fighting
AJ 1623 [29 June 1699-18 June 1700)).
The Makasarese adventurers Kr. Pammalikang, Kr. “Tompo Balang” and Kr.
Jarannika were rumoured to be with Surapati (“DR 1699”, 6 Nov., 12 Dec.; “DR
1700”, 22 Apr. The first two had been with Gusti Panji Sakti when he conquered
Blambangan in 1697 (de Graaf, “Pandji Sakti’, p. 73). Dr Leonard Andaya informs
me (personal communication, 25 Mar. 1987) that both Kr. Jarannika and Kr.
Pammalikang left Goa after its fall to the Bugis in 1677 (see his Arung Palakka,
pp. 182-7). Pammalikang also had dealings with the Minangkabau adventurer Raja
Sakti (see Kathirithamby-Wells, “Ahmad Shah ibn Iskandar”), He had roamed
widely, being found in Sumbawa in 1682, Blambangan in 1683, Bima and perhaps
Bilitung in 1687, Lombok in 1688 and Sumbawa again in 1695.
32. “DR 1698”, 12 Apr., 17 May. AR II’s letter is said to be dd. Monday, 11
Ramalan 1622, clearly a mistake for Monday, 11 Ramalan 1621 (24 Mar. 1698).
AR II was delighted with his Persian horses, reportedly because they were larger
even than one owned by the Crown prince. Because the mission to Batavia had
been so successful, AR II rewarded his emissary Kartanagara with the name Tg.
Martapura and sole governance (whereas he had previously been co-governor) of
Jépara. “DR 1698”, 11 Apr., 7 July.
335) DREL698, 30*Sept,.9 Nov: 13 Dec:
34. “DR 1698”, 9 Nov.
35. BK ff. 493v.495r. This legacy of Sultan Agung is presumably the prophecy
ascribed to him saying that in the future it would be the the Dutch who would
install the kings of Java, also referred to by Sultan Haméngkubuwana I
(Mangkubumi) of Yogyakarta shortly before his death in 1792, according to Babad
Mangkubumi. See Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 354-7, for Mangkubumi’s statement
and the prophecy ascribed to Sultan Agung (found in BK ff. 271v.—272v.).
It should be noted the VOC had some suspicions of CN II, as it did of all
318 NOTES to pp. 1234

Indonesians, at this time; see “DR 1700”, 22 Apr.

36. “DR 1699”, 8 Jan.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, pp.
89-90.
37. “DR 1699”, 5 Aug. But see Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII,
pp. 91-2, referring to a payment of Sp. RI. 60,000. By now the VOC calculated
AR II’s debt to be down to Sp. RI. 58,867, plus the Sp. RI. 1,200,000 war-costs.
The VOC was still willing to write off the debt, maintaining its claim only as a bar-
gaining counter.
38. “DR 1699”, 20 May, 16 June, 17 June, 5 Aug., 27 Aug., 7 Sept., 9 Sept.,
30 Sept.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, p. 90. AR II was sent gifts
which included 3 more Persian horses, the 2 previous ones having been such a
success; “DR 1699”, 7 Sept., 9 Sept., 30 Sept. and see n. 32 above. The VOC was
also asked to intervene in the matter of the wife of Tg. Suranata of Démak who
was a Cirébon princess and who had fled home. Not only the cash and gold, but
also 2 bronze and 14 iron cannon and 2 heavy anchors from the English ship were
the object of disputed claims to ownership. On the complex and confusing tale of
the English pirates see, “DR 1699”, 8 Jan., 20 Mar., 20 May, 16 June, 5 Aug., 27
Aug., 30 Sept.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, pp.
90-1. Englishmen were also smuggling opium into Java in violation of the VOC's
claim to monopoly; Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1698, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI,
pp. 34, 46; “DR 1698”, 30 Apr.
39. “DR 1699”, 5 Aug., 30 Sept. Durant was promoted to Opperkoopman and
named Gezaghebber to replace Goodschalk in June 1698; he arrived in Jépara on
2 July 1698. He was said to speak Malay and to be knowledgeable in Javanese
customs (“DR 1698”, 3 June, 28 July; “DR 1699”, 5 Aug.).
40. “DR 1699”, 5 Aug., 27 Aug., 30 Sept. Some accounting errors resulted; see
“DR 1700”, 16 Aug., 24 Aug. :
41. “DR 1699”, 20 May, 31 July, 6 Sept., 27 Nov., 8 Dec. On the recent history
of this dispute, see n. 5 above. It appears that the boundaries claimed for Sémarang
did not stop at the town of Lémbarawa (modern Ambarawa) but rather encom-
passed the entire Ambarawa district, which would mean a further extension of
boundaries southwards towards Salatiga, which Speelman had believed to form the
boundary of the cession (see above, p. 47).
42. “DR 1699”, 12 Oct., 6 Nov., 27 Nov., 16 Dec., 18 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII,
23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, pp. 92-3; “DR 1700”, 15 Jan., 22 Jan. Sinduréja also
sent a chest to Batavia said to contain Sp. RI. 10,000 worth of gold towards AR
II’s debt. Batavia sent it back to Jépara to be either valued there or returned to AR
II with its seals intact. Eventually it was returned to him. The matter is rather
obscure to me. See “DR 1699”, 14 Oct.; “DR 1700”, 22 Apr.
AR II said (“DR 1699”, 18 Dec.) that Surapati’s people were at “Pakattingan”,
which I take to Pakétingan (near Maos in Kroya district) and at “Wolak Walikan”
on the river of Kiping, which I cannot identify but assume to be near Kiping (on
the Sala river across from Jénar); it might be Walikukun but any location in this
area would, I think, be a good deal more than 3 hours from Kartasura. For a
markedly different report on Surapati’s manpower and armaments from two years
before, see n. 14 above.
43. “DR 1700”, 22 Apr.
NOTES to pp. 124-5 319

44. “DR 1700”, 22 Apr. 6 July, 2 Aug., 5 Aug., 14 Oct.; “DR 1701”, 15 June,
21 July, 4 Aug., 25 Sept. AR II’s letter in “DR 1700”, 5 Aug., is dated Monday
23 Muharram Be 1623 (the date is repeated in “DR 1701”, 21 July), apparently a
mistake for Monday 24 Muharram Be 1624 (12 July 1700).
The main VOC-Kartasura affair to arise in this period concerned the Chinese of
Sémarang. In Oct. 1701 the Chinese toll-farmer had attempted to search goods
being carried inland to Sinduréja. Fighting broke out in which Sinduréja’s brother-
in-law and others were wounded and Chinese were killed. Furthermore, the Chi-
nese Syahbandar of Sémarang, Hoeko, was accused of extortion and cheating in
his accounting of port duties paid over to the VOC. So AR II proposed to place
the collection of tolls in the hands of Javanese, a matter touching upon VOC sov-
ereignty there and which the VOC rejected. “DR 1701”, 15 June, 15 Nov., 27
Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Dec. 1701, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, pp. 174, 184.
45. Batavia to H. XVIII, 1 Dec. 1703, in dJ VIII, p. 103.
46. J.P. de Korte, De jaarlijkse financiéle verantwoording in de Verenigde
Oostindische Compagnie (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), pp. 31-2, 47, 51, 74-5;
Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade, pp. 248-9; J.J. Steur, Herstel of ondergang: De
voorstellen tot redres van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, 1740-1795
(Utrecht: HES Uitgevers, 1984), p. 257. See also Tafel ofte verthooninge van de
general gedragen lasten en behaalde voordelen ..., Batavia, 10 Feb. 1708, in dJ
VII, p. 144.
47. “DR 1701”, 7 Jan., 22 Nov.; “DR 1702”, 4 Dec. For VOC accounts for the
years 1685-91, see p. 307 n. 53 above. The VOC still maintained substantial
military forces on the pasisir, totalling 877 officers and men in 1702 (Batavia to
H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1702, in dJ VII, pp. 96-7). Opium smuggling by the English
and Malays of Johor was a particular problem in these years. See Batavia to H.
XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 81; idem, 1 Dec. 1700, in
ibid., p. 139; idem, 31 Dec. 1701, in ibid., p. 165.
48. Information on these products is found widely in VOC records. The follow-
ing references are a sample of this material.
On cotton, see “DR 1696”, 4 Aug.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ
VIII, p. 88; “DR 1699”, 7 Aug., 12 Oct.; “DR 1700”, 6 July; “DR 1701”, 11 Feb.,
14 Mar., 25 Nov.; “DR 1702”, 28 June, 8 Aug., 22 Dec.; “DR 1703”, 3 Jan., 5 Feb.
On indigo, see “DR 1696”, 4 Aug.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ
VIII, p. 88; “DR 1698”, 21 Nov.; “DR 1699”, 7 Aug., 12 Oct., 12 Dec.; “DR
1700”, 13 July, 21 July; “DR 1701”, 11 Feb., 14 Mar.; “DR 1702”, 28 June, 8
Aug.; “DR 1703”, 3 Jan., 6 July, 17 Aug.
On peas and beans, see “DR 1699”, 12 Dec.; “DR 1700”, 28 June, 21 July; “DR
1701”, 11 Feb., 14 Mar., 25 Nov.; “DR 1702”, 24 Apr., 28 June, 8 Aug., 3 Oct.,
DN Oees AD IIEi, Bcifeval, 2) letclop
On pepper, see “DR 1696”, 4 Aug.; “DR 1698”, 15 Dec.
On timber, see “DR 1699”, 27 Aug.; “DR 1700”, 6 July, 9 July, 21 Oct.; “DR
WO Sale Dec DRT O3s0 July
At least some of the cotton was spun into thread by the Chinese of Sémarang.
A fire in the Chinese quarter there on 20 Mar. 1701 burned down 150 houses,
including many belonging to these spinners. See “DR 1701”, 23 Apr.
There were also currency problems on the coast. CN II complained that the tin
coins (picis) which he minted were being driven out of circulation in East Java by
320 NOTES to pp. 125-6

the VOC’s copper picis; “DR 1700”, 31 Oct., 11 Nov. Also someone—according
to one report a Javanese of Suranata of Démak’s own household—was making
counterfeit Spanish Reals and other coins which were in wide circulation along the
pasisir, but the VOC was unable to get Suranata or any other Javanese dignitaries
to investigate; “DR 1700”, 22 Apr. Suranata’s main interest at this time was the
recovery of his wife, one of Trunajaya’s widows, who had fled to Cirébon with
women and valuables which reportedly belonged to AR II. Batavia advised him
that he was too old to worry about such things. On this matter, see “DR 1700”,
8 June, 21 July, 11 Oct.; “DR 1701”, 15 June, 16 June, 6 Aug. Suranata died in
Mar. 1701; “DR 1701”, 23 Apr., 16 June. His death is recorded in BK f. 515r., but
is there erroneously placed after the death of AR II and the accession of AR III
in 1703. His eldest son succeeded to his father’s title as Tg. Suranata.
49. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt.1], p. 231; Schoute,
Geneeskunde, pp. 196-8. Batavia gained increasing notoriety for being “the most
unhealthy spot almost in the world,” as the acerbic Joseph Arnold called it in 1815.
To his brother he wrote, “This place is dreadfully sickly for strangers, who die like
rotten sheep.” See John Bastin (ed.), “The Java journal of Dr. Joseph Arnold”,
JMBRAS vol. 46, pt.1 (1973), pp. 40, 75, and p. 31 n. 157 on Batavia’s reputation
for unhealthiness in the 18th century in particular. See also James L. Cobban,
“Geographic notes on the first two centuries of Djakarta”, JMBRAS vol. 44, pt. 2
(Dec. 1971), pp. 143-9. Blussé, Strange Company, pp. 17—19, however, argues
that Batavia was “a perfectly heathy city” until the 1730s, when the development
of its environs for sugar cultivation destroyed the local ecological balance, in
his view. I understand that forthcoming publications will lend support to this
argument.
Schoute, Geneeskunde, p. 203, observes that European death rates in Batavia
were so high that it is surprising that some individuals, like the Governors-General
G. W. Baron van Imhoff (1743-50, born 1705), J. Mossel (1750-61, born 1704)
and P. A. van der Parra (1761-75, born 1714), survived so long there: “It goes
without saying that these men became Governor-General in part precisely through
this staying power”, he comments.
50. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1707, in dJ VII, p. 139; dJ VIII, pp. cxxxiv—cxl.
See also Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade, Ch.X.
51. In a letter to CN IH, Batavia addressed him as AR II’s “groot gouverneur”
over these areas; “DR 1700”, 11 Nov. (see also 31 Oct.).
52. “DR 1700”, 17 Nov.; “DR 1702”, 22 May, 29 May, 6 June, 17 June, 28
June, 18 July, 28 July, 3 Oct., 8 Oct., 10 Oct., 30 Oct., 1 Nov., 2 Nov., 17 Nov.:
Batavia to H. XVI, 30 Nov. 1702, in dJ VIUI, pp. 94-6; “DR 1703”, 19 Apr., 24
Sept.; dJ VIII, pp. Ixxviii-lxxix. Sudérma’s standing in the eyes of Batavia was not
enhanced by rumours that he had links with Surapati through the Makasarese
adventurer Kr. Pammalikang; “DR 1703”, 17 Aug., 10 Sept. Brajapati, too, died
in this period, being murdered by one of his servants late in June 1701; “DR
W7Ol 23m sept.
53. Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, pp. 90-1; “DR 1699”, 27
Nov.; “DR 1702”, 25 June.
54. “DR 1700”, 24 Oct., reports AR II suffered from severe bloetgang (haem-
orrhage). While this probably refers to dysentery (one of the most common
ailments of the age: see Schoute, Geneeskunde, p. 172), it is worth noting that
NOTES to pp. 126-7 321

BK f. 503v. says that at his death he vomited blood (luntak rah). The report of AR
II’s senility is said to have come from Kartasura, but it is not clear from whom:
“DR 1702”, 25 June. AR II was probably born ca. 1637-43; see p. 273 n. 43
above.
55. Jépara to Batavia, 25 Sept. 1702, in dJ VIII, pp. 97—9n. See also Batavia to
H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1702, in dJ VIII, pp. 97-9; dJ VIII, pp. Ixiv-Ixv. It is interesting
to note that Sinduréja reportedly said that the Crown prince’s eldest son could not
be considered for the succession because he was physically deformed, having been
born with paralyzed fingers, yet apparently he did not make the same point about
the Crown prince himself (cf. n. 18 above). A nineteenth-century source saying
that a cripple could not succeed to the throne is cited in Vincentius Johannes
Hubertus Houben, Kraton en Kumpeni: Surakarta en Yogyakarta 1830-1870
(Doctoral thesis, Leiden University, 1987), p. 197.
In 1702 Martapura caused much trouble for the VOC, complaining that he was
denied full payment for timber and apparently causing the death of the head of the
péranakan Chinese at Jépara. When the VOC officers went to complain, they
found Martapura’s residence sealed against them; “DR 1702”, 25 Oct.; Martapura,
Jépara, to Batavia, rec’d 30 Oct. 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704); Jépara to Batavia,
16 Nov. 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704).
I know little about Sas (or Zas). He was promoted to Captain and placed in
charge of the VOC’s post at Surabaya in 1698 (“DR 1698”, 26 Aug.) and was
appointed to Jépara in Dec. 1700 (Kasser, vertoog, Batavia, 9 July 1709, in VOC
1780 [OB 1710]), taking up the post in Mar. 1701 (“DR 1701”, 5 Apr.).
56. AR II, Kartasura, to Jépara, 3 Ruwah Jimakir 1626 (23 Dec. 1702), red’d
3 Jan. 1703; Jépara to Batavia, 9 Apr. 1703 & 16 Nov. 1703; all in VOC 1680 (OB
1704).
These were the cannons Kumbarawa and Kumbarawi, plus two more called
“Coemwana” and ““Saswanakoemba” or “Coemwana” and ““Caswana” in the Dutch
transcriptions (Kumba and Kinumba?). On these see Crucq, “Kanonnen in den
kraton”, pp. 101-8; idem, “Nog eenige gegevens omtrent de kanonnen te Soerakarta”,
TBG vol. 80 (1940), pp. 57-8. According to the 16 Nov. 1703 letter, these were
48-pounders, the heaviest caliber then in use in Dutch armed forces. Such a gun,
called kartouw by the Dutch, weighed some 3500 kg (7600 lbs avoirdupois) and
could fire over a distance of some 3.5 km (2.2 miles), according to C.M. Schulten
& J.W.M. Schulten Het leger in de zeventiende eeuw (Bossum: Fibula-van
Dieshoeck, 1969), p. 47. Crucq, however, described all four as halve kartouwen of
24 Ibs.
There were other cannon belonging to the kraton being used by the VOC on the
pasisir. The VOC did not know which pieces belonged to the Javanese so agreed
to a joint survey of the artillery in its coastal posts in 1705; Memorie for de Wilde,
Batavia, 3 July 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 234.
57. “DR 1702”, 7 Aug., 21 Aug., 26 Oct. CN II was by now apparently nearly
80 years old; see Batavia to H. XVII, 10 May 1705, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI,
p. 343. On the contradictory information reaching the VOC about his attitudes, see
Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, pp. 90-1. In 1702 he was said to
be opposing the Crown prince and intending to take refuge with the VOC, along
with Sinduréja, if this landed them in trouble; “DR 1702”, 25 June.
58. Png. Ad. Anom, Kartasura to Jépara, 13 Dulkangidah 1626 (said to be
322 NOTES to p. 127

Thursday, which it wasn’t; probably an error for Thurs. 11 Dulkangidah or Sat. 13

Dulkangidah/29 or 31 Mar. 1703), rec’d 7 Apr. 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704);
Jépara to Batavia, 9 Apr. 1703, in VOC (OB 1704); “DR 1703”, 16 Apr. The
prince outlawed upon pain of death the wearing of black hats and of krisses with
hilts either of the pattern called Tunggak Sémi or of red lacquer. (On Tunggak
Sémi later in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi,
p. 164 n. 72.) BS III:15 records the prince’s assumption of authority with the
chronogram “two feelings caused uproar among the people” (rasa kakalih arétu
jalma, AJ 1626 / 28 May 1702-17 May 1703).
59. Jépara to Batavia, 16 Apr. 1703 & 1 May 1703; AR II & Png. Ad. Anom,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 11 Sura 1627 (28 May 1703), rec’d 1 June 1703; AR II,
Kartasura, to Jépara rec’d 16 July 1703; Sumabrata, Kartasura, to Jépara, rec’d 16
July 1703; Jépara to Sumabrata, Kartasura, 18 July 1703; all in VOC 1680 (OB
1704). See also BK ff. 502r.-v. Sumabrata had formerly been the Patih Jéro and
now became Patih Jaba. His replacement as Patih Jéro was Ki Ongga Suranata,
who was renamed Tg. Wiraguna. See also BS UlI:14 and Ricklefs, Tradition,
jo. ISO.
At the time the VOC suspected that Sinduréja had been poisoned, but later even
PB I (who had reason to wish to blacken the reputation of AR III) said that he had
died of natural causes; van Rheede et al., ordervraging, Sémarang, 24 July 1704,
in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
60. Jépara to Batavia, 9 Apr.1703 & 1 May 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704);
“DR 1703”, 16 Apr., 4 July, 6 July.
61. Even before Sinduréja’s death, coastal forces were being levied, ostensibly
to march against the rebels in Madiun. Jépara to Batavia, 9 Apr. 1703, in VOC
1680 (OB 1704); “DR 1703”, 16 Apr., 4 July; CN II to Batavia, rec’d 3 July 1703,
in VOC 1680 (OB 1704).
62. Jépara to Batavia, | May 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704).
63. CN II to Batavia, rec’d 3 July 1703, in VOC 1680(OB 1704); “DR 1703”,
4 July, 20 July.
64. This is recorded only in Javanese sources: BS III:15; BK f. 502v. Later
Pugér confirmed Urawan’s death but gave no date for it; van Rheede ef al.,
ondervraging, Sémarang, 24 July 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
65. Png. Ad. Anom, Kartasura, to Jépara, 1 July 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB
1703); van Rheede er al., ondervraging, Sémarang, 24 July 1704, in VOC 1695
(OB 1705) (since, however, PB I said here that when AR II took governmental au-
thority back from the Crown prince after S—6 months he gave it to Sinduréja, it is
clear that PB I’s account of the events was confused as well as self-serving).
66. BK ff. 502v.—503r. On these Javanese works, see Pigeaud, Literature, vol.
I, pp. 105-6, 230, 240; Poerbatjaraka, Kapustakan Djawi (Djakarta: Djambatan,
1964), pp. 97-102 (on Sérat Nitisruti and Serat Nitipraja), Poerbatjaraka, P.
Voorhoeve & C. Hooykaas, Indonesische handschriften (Bandung: A.C. Nix &
Co.,1950), pp. 17-25 (summarising & describing a Jayaléngkara MS from Palem-
bang); Moertono, State and statecraft, pp.147—S0 (translating an Astha Brata text).
Javanese literary traditions as recorded in C.F.Winter, Sr., Javaansche zamen-
spraken, vol. I (Sth ed.; T. Roorda; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1911), p. 353, ascribe the
authorship of Jayaléngkara to Png. Pékik of Surabaya (AR II’s grandfather), of
Nitisruti to Png. Karanggayam of Pajang, and of Nitipraja to Sultan Agung (AR
NOTES to pp. 127-30 Bo

II’s other grandfather). Other traditions ascribe the authorship of Nitisruti, too, to
Png. Pékik; Pigeaud, Literature, vol. I p. 106.
67. AR II, Kartasura, to Jépara, rec’d 17 July 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704).
AR II here said his debt consisted of Rds. 302,000 plus 3000 koyans of rice (cf.
p. 115 above). There had been rumours earlier in the year that the kraton was
collecting money to pay off the debt; Jépara to Batavia, 1 May 1703; Yudanagara,
Sémarang, to Jépara, transl. 15 July 1703; both in VOC 1680 (OB 1704).
68. Yudanagara, Sémarang, to Jépara, transl. 15 July 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB
1704).
69. There are 24 hours of uncertainty about the precise timing of AR II’s death;
the Dutch and Javanese evidence is discussed in Ricklefs, Tradition, pp. 190-1.VOC
sources on this matter are: Sémarang to Batavia, 5 Nov.1703, 10 Nov. 1703, 14
Nov.1703, 16 Nov. 1703, 25 Nov. 1703, all in VOC 1680 (OB 1704); see also
AR III, Kartsura, to Batavia, rec’d 3 Dec. 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704). See also
Batavia to H.XVII, 1 Dec.1703, in dJ VIII, pp. 100-1; dJ VIII, pp. Ixvi-Ixvii. For
Javanese accounts, see BK f. 503v.; BS III:16—18; and the other texts listed in
Ricklefs, Tradition, pp. 190-1 n. 159.
The presence of the Sarip was mentioned in a letter from AR III (dd. 12 Rabi-
ngulakir Jimawal 1629 [4 Aug.1705], in Sémarang to Batavia, 12 Aug.1705, in dJ
VII, pp. 248-9) and in Png. Pugér, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5 May 1704, in VOC
1695 (OB 1705); it is also recorded in BK f. 5O5r., where he 1s described as a noble
(priyayi) from Arabia who was AR II’s guru. In the Indonesian archipelago, the
term sharif was usually used for a descendant of the Prophet through his grandson
Hasan; see C. Snouck Hurgronje, The Acehnese (transl. A.W.S. O'Sullivan; 2
vols.; Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906), vol. I, pp. 153-4.
Ky. Balabar, Ky. Baru and Ky. Gundhil were later identified as being among
the four pusaka agéng (great pusakas) of the court; see M.C. Ricklefs, “The
missing pusakas of Kartasura, 1705—37” in Sulastin Sutrisno et al. (eds.), Bahasa-
sastra-budaya: Ratna manikam untaian persembahan kepada Prof. Dr. P.J.
Zoetmulder (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985), p. 604. On the
traditions regarding the origins of Ky. Baru and Ky. Gundhil, see Groneman,
Garébég’s, pp. 60, 63. Ky.Balabar was said to be the weapon with which AR II
personally killed Trunajaya; see p. 57 above. The names of the pusakas are garbled
in the VOC records: Talalabar/Tabalabar, Ki Boro/Boroen, Tigondir)
On the royal titles, see also p. 273 n. 2. above.

Notes to Chapter &

l=E-s-DR 1681, p. 297.

2. Huizinga, Nederland’s beschaving, p. 76.
3. See “DR 1680”, 4 Oct.; Sémarang to Batavia, | Oct. 1716 & 14 Jan. 1717,
in VOC 1886 (OB 1717); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1716, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. VII, pp. 256-7; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 229-30.
4, Ahsan Jan Qaisar, The Indian response to European technology and culture
(A.D. 1498-1707) (Delhi, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 139. See Wil-
liam Irvine, The army of the Indian Moghuls: Its organization and administration
324 NOTES to pp. 130-31

(London: Luzac & Co., 1903), pp. 57, 90-1, on the Mughals’ continued preference
for bows and arrows and weapons of cold steel over firearms and pp. 105—6 on the
slowness with which the matchlock was replaced by the flintlock. On this matter,
see also Qaisar, Indian response, pp. 46 et seqq.; Irfan Habib, “Changes in tech-
nology in medieval India”, Studies in history vol. 2, no. 1 (1980), p. 36; idem,
“The technology and economy of Mughal India”, The Indian economic and social
history review vol. 17, no. 1 (1980), pp. 16-20. It is worth noting that the snaphance
was perhaps available in India by 1609, much earlier than in Java (Qaisar, /ndian
response, p. 146). The use of bows and arrows by Javanese is reported occasion-
ally in this period: e.g. Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 25 June 1719, in VOC
1929 (OB 1720); BK f. 605v. (referring to 1718).
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the greatest of the Maratha military
leaders, Mahadji Scindia, adopted European military innovations more readily,
developing “European-style infantry and artillery wings”; C.A. Bayly, The new
Cambridge history of India, Il. 1: Indian society and the making of the British
empire (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 100-1.
5. Noel Perrin, Giving up the gun: Japan’s reversion to the sword, 1543-1879
(Boston: David R. Godine, Publisher, 1979). Perrin is described on the dust jacket
as “a teacher, writer and farmer ... currently Professor of English at Dartmouth
College.” I am grateful to Prof. Harold Bolitho and Prof. W.G. Beasley for advice
in this matter. On Japanese attitudes to western learning in general, see Donald
Keene, The Japanese discovery of Europe, 1720-1830 (revised ed.; Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1969), Ch. I. See further Edwin O. Reischauer & Albert
M. Craig, Japan: Tradition and transformation (Sydney, etc.: George Allen &
Unwin, 1979), pp. 75, 91-2, 101.
6. On these weapons in the European context, see Chandler, Warfare in the age
of Marlborough, pp. 75-84. One shot a minute was considered a good rate of fire
for a matchlock; this figure was doubled by the introduction of the snaphaen and
paper cartridge (ibid., pp. 76-7). On the VOC context, see de Iongh, Krijgswezen,
pp. 91-3; van Dam, Beschrijvinge, vol. I, pt. 1, p. 640. A technical description of
the matchlock, snaphaen and bayonet may be found in y.d. Neut, Buskruit,
roermaker en schutter. Paper cartridges were also in use for artillery by 1706 but
were less suited to conditions in Java than bamboo cartridges; see Gijsberti
Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, p. 226.
As was pointed out above (p. 277 n. 49), the VOC apparently began the general
replacement of matchlocks with snaphaenen only in the 1680s. Requests for
snaphaen muskets by Javanese in the 1690s are found above, p. 116. AR II in fact
asked (pointlessly, given his relations with the VOC at the time) to purchase 20
snaphaenen in 1686, at about the time of their introduction on a general scale in
Java; “DR 1686”, 27 Oct. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1],
p. 156, says that he visited Tg. Puspanégara of Grésik in Aug. 1706 and found that
his armoury contained a great many snaphaenen, blunderbusses and other weapons
(see also p. 215 above).
Cartridges were stored at the VOC Kartasura garrison at least by 1718; van
Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). Refer-
ence to the supplying of both snaphaenen and cartridge bags to the lords of Surabaya
is found in Bergman & Dubbeldekop, Jépara, to Sémarang, 28 Nov. 1719, in VOC
1948 (OB 1721).
NOTES to p. 131 625

As early as the campaign against Kédhiri in 1678, the VOC used grenades in
Java; see p. 53 above.
I do not know when the VOC introduced bayonets to Java. In 1732 the VOC
pasisir military had 50 bayonet scabbards and required 50 more for the following
year; Coijett et al., eijsch van contanten, kleeden, buskruijt, provisien en verdere
benodigtheeden op Javas Oostcust voor den jare 1733 ..., Sémarang, 29 June
1732, in VOC 2257 (OB 1733). Since at that time there were nearly 800 soldiers
and over 100 seamen under the Sémarang office (plus 182 military and 37 seamen
at Surabaya, whose needs are not covered in the above requisition), provision for
a mere 100 bayonets suggests that this was an early stage of their introduction (on
1732 garrison numbers, see Coijett, memorie for Duijvensz., Sémarang, 20 Oct.
1732, in VOC 2257 [OB 1733]). The earliest Babad Kraton reference to bayonets
of which I am aware is at f. 685r., concerning the period ca. Jan. 1742, where are
mentioned 40 carbines with bayonets (kérbin bainet). De Iongh, Krijgswezen, p.93,
cites Valentyn (but without providing a page reference) to the effect that in 1710
soldiers in the Indies already carried the bayonet as a side arm; I have not encoun-
tered this reference in Valentyn myself, but have no reason to doubts its presence.
Nor do I know how quickly and to what extent the VOC changed from plug to ring
to socket bayonets. As late as 1759, VOC Malays sent to Negapatam in Bengal to
fight the English used plug bayonets; H.H. Dodwell, “Clive in Bengal, 1756-60”,
in H.H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge history of India, vol. V: British India
1497-1558 (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd., n.d.), p. 155.
7. E.g. BK ff. 4771., 488v., 512r., 524v. (kérbin, karbin); 570v., 576v. (sinapan,
sunapan); BS Wl:41, 1V:41 (gurnat, gurnada); 1V:35, 36 (sinapan). There are of
course many military terms which are of Javanese origin. The word bédhil (firearm)
is probably from Tamil (Robson, “Notes”, p. 114).
8. Memorie for de Wilde, Batavia, 3 July 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 234. See pp.
13-14 above on Javanese manufacture of cannon. In 1681 it was reported, perhaps
erroneously, that small broze cannon were being cast in Blambangan and that gun-
powder was manufactured there; oral report by the Chinese “Eeko” to van Meche-
len, Surabaya, 13 Jan. 1681, in VOC 1362 (OB 1681). Grésik was well-known for
the manufacture of brass cannon into the nineteenth century; see Raffles, History
(1830), vol. I, p. 330. It is worth noting that one of the Javanese words for a
rampart or fortress is baluwarti, which comes not from Dutch but from Portuguese
baluarte (boulevard, bulwark); Gericke & Roorda, Handwoordenboek (1901), vol.
II, p. 723. See also p. 321 n. 56 above.
9. On the Coehoorn mortar, see Chandler, Warfare in the age of Marlborough,
pp. 280-1. I am grateful to Mr Chandler (personal communication, 16 June 1987)
for confirming my view that what the VOC sources call “hand mortars” are the
same as Coehoorn mortars, the former term presumably referring to their port-
ability, since the mortar was actually fired from the ground, not the hand. See also
Schulten & Schulten, Leger, p. 47, referring to Coehoorn mortars as handmor-
tiertjes.
10. Frike, Reisen, p. 105; Warnsinck, De Graaff spiegel, p. 45; de longh,
Krijgswezen, pp. 81-3.
11. The kissing of Senapati’s penis is described in BT/(BP) vol. VII, p. 47; and
in IOL Jav. 36 (A), a text of the Babad Mataram or Babad tanah Jawi tradition
which is undated but apparently contemporaneous with BS (IOL Jav. 36 [B]), with
326 NOTES to pp. 132-3

which it is found, and thus written ca. AJ 1663 (AD 1738), at f. 135v. This detail
is omitted from the version in BK f. 185r. On the dating of Senapati’s death ca.
AD 1600, see Ricklefs, Tradition, pp. 168-9.
12. BK ff. 504r.—v., Canto 130 (Dhandhanggula):
40. ... sigra nu[ng]kémi pada / Pangran kalih wau / Pangran Pugér duk
sémana / aningali kang raka kadya duk urip / nungkémi ngaras-aras
41. kalanangan i[ng]kang densu[ng]kémi / pan kacatur pangadég ing kalam
/ apan kadya duk gésange / mangsane arsa pupul / lan pawestri mu[ng]geng
jinémik / Pangran Pugér sémana / eba(wa)t jroning kalbu / paningalira Pangeran
/ pucuk kalam ana cahya anélahi / gédhene samarica
42. dyan cinécép ing Pangeran aglis / saicale cahya samarica / kalam ari
pangadége / wus karsaning Ywang Luhur / yen nurbawatira angalih / marang
ing Kapugéran / Pangran ri[ng] karyeku / tan ana wikan ing cahya / iya amung
Pangran Pugér génti waris / améngku tanah Jawa
43. Putra Kanjéng Pangeran Dipati / lamun kongsiya madég Narendra / pan
ratu wéwéla bae /....
A parallel section is in BTJ(BP) vol. XVI, pp. 40-1.
13. BK ff. 505r.-v.
14. Jépara to Batavia, 14 Nov. 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704) (see dJ VIII, pp.
101-2n.); Batavia to H. XVII, 1 Dec. 1703, in dJ VIII, pp. 100-1; AR III, Kar-
tasura, to Batavia, rec’d 3 Dec. 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704); BK ff. SOOv.,
504v.—510r. (giving Suryakuma’s title as Prabu Panatagama); BS III:18—21 (giving
the title as Susuhunan Waliolah Panatagama, which is also the version found in
Padmasusastra, Sajarah—dalém, p. 134). Suryakusuma’s brother R. Subékti took
part in this rebellion according to the VOC sources.
Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém, p. 133, says Sudira/Suryakusuma’s mother was
a wife of the second rank (garwa pangrémbe) named M.Ay. Tejawati from Wotgaleh
in Mataram. VOC sources say that she was “een priesters doghter” from a family
from Gunung Lawu but was born in Lipura in Mataram; Sémarang to Batavia, 3
Sept. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705); idem, 22 May 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB
1709).
15. BK ff. 511r—S12v.
16. BK ff. 513r.—v.; BS I:21-2.
17. BK ff. 513v.—515r. Cf. the parallel text in BTJ(BP) vol. XVI, pp. 52-5,
where there are two major variants: instead of casting spells, Pugér wus anyipta
rasaning tunggil / gusti lawan kawula / anunggil sawujud and rather than threat-
ening the fénung with tai lingsang, he says he’ll dadi wréjit cacing / dadi gadibal
ingwang.
18. Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 310
19. C.C. Berg, Maya’s hemelvaart in het Javaanse Buddhisme (3 vols.; Verhan-
delingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd.
Letterkunde new series vol. 74, nos. 1-2, vol. 102; Amsterdam, etc.: N.V. Noord-
Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1969-80), vol. IB, p. 521. For text, English
translation and commentary on the Nadgarakértagama, see Pigeaud, Java in the
14th century; on the abhiseka in general, see Gonda, Ancient Indian kingship, pp.
87 et seqq.
20. Berg’s interpretation depends upon Nag. 68:4d referring to Bharada rather
NOTES to p. 133-4 327

than to the tamarind (kamal) tree being cursed to become small (sindpa dadyalita).
Pigeaud understands this to refer to the tree. See Berg, Maya’ s hemelvaart, vol. 1A,
pp. 50, 182; vol. IB, p. 521; and, for Pigeaud’s translation, his Java in the 14th
century, vol. III, p. 80. Earlier Berg, too, understood the text to say that it was the
tree which was made small by Bharada; see his Herkomst, vorm en functie der
Middeljavaanse rijksdelingstheorie (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse
Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde new series vol. 59, no. 1; Amster-
dam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1953), p. 37.
Prof. P.J. Zoetmulder, S.J., advises me (personal communication, 19 Apr. 1987)
that he is not persuaded by Berg’s change of interpretation of this passage and that
he sees grammatical and contextual objections to it. Berg’s later interpretation is
also rejected in Soewito Santoso, “The ‘Samaya’ of Baradah and Kuturan”, /ndo-
nesia no. 17 (Apr. 1974), pp. 53-5, and in S.O. Robson’s forthcoming translation
of the Nagarakértagama.
In BK f. 514v. the ténung is reduced to the size of a lare bajang, which I have
treated as “a small child”. Berg, Maya’s hemelvaart, vol. IB, p. 521, translates rare
alit (found in the Meinsma text: Olthof, BT/, text p. 265) as “a dwarf’, which
makes the parallel with his reading of the Nag. text closer. There is room for
further argument here. The first edition of the Javanese dictionary by J.F.C. Gericke
& T. Roorda (Javaansch-Nederduitsh woordenboek |Amsterdam: Johannes Miiller,
1847]) gives bajang as “klein van postuur, dwerg” and the 1901 edition (Hand-
woordenboek) gives “klein, dwergachtig, dwerg”. In Old and Middle Javanese
bajang is given simply as “young (child)” and occurs in the combination rare
bajang in the Middle Javanese Malat (a Panji text): see Zoetmulder, Old Jay.
dictionary, vol.l, p. 190.
21. M.C. Ricklefs, “Dipanagara’s early inspirational experience”, BK/ vol. 130,
nos. 2—3 (1974), pp. 234-5 n. 24.
22. Pp. 95—6, 119-20, 132 above.
23. Jépara to Batavia, 9 Dec. 1703, in VOC 1680 (OB 1704); Hogerlinde et al.,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Mar. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). BK f. 515v. refers
to a gathering at court 100 days after AR II’s death; if he died in the night of 22
Jumadilakir AJ 1627 / 2 Nov. 1703 (see Ricklefs, Tradition, pp. 190-1), the
100—day slamétan would have fallen on 4 Sawal AJ 1627/11 Feb. 1704. Javanese
slamétan cycles are described in Clifford Geertz, The religion of Java (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1964).
24. See p. 118 above.
25. BK ff. 515v.—525r. A report by Jangrana II’s emissaries under the date 26
Aug. 1704 in VOC 1695 (OB 1705) says that CN II opposed AR III because the
latter “pretendeert” a woman from him.
It is interesting to note that in BK ff. 522r—523r., CN II’s troops are described
as engaging in European-style military exercises, one of the main innovations in
European warfare credited to Prince Maurits van Nassau (see Delbriick,
Geschichte der Kriegskunst, vol. IV, pp. 181 et seqq.). See also p. 223 below.
26. On this date and the confusions concerning it in Javanese sources, see Rick-
lefs, Tradition, p. 191 n. 160.
27. Sémarang to Batavia, 16 Mar. 1704; Jépara to Batavia, 17 Mar. 1704; Png.
Pugér, Sémarang, to Jépara, rec’d 19 Mar. 1704; Jépara to Batavia, 31 Mar. 1704;
Sémarang to Batavia, 18 Apr. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also Batavia
328 NOTES to p. 135

to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1704, in dJ VIII, pp. 103-4; BK ff. 525r.—528r. (here the VOC
reception is depicted as being more cordial); BS I[:22-3.
In July 1704 Pugér said that he was 58 years old (van Rheede et al., ondervrag-
ing, 24 July 1704, in VOC 1695 [OB 1705]): one must assume these to be AJ
years, equivalent to about 56 AD years, so he would have been born ca. 1648. This
is consistent with the statement that he was about 30 years of age in 1677-8
(Batavia to H. XVII, 5 July 1677, in dJ VI, p. 166; Speelman instructions to
Saint-Martin, Jépara & Sémarang, 23 Mar. 1678, in dJ VII, p. 190). Valentyn, Oud
en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol IV [pt. 1], pp. 206, 209, says that he was about 60 in
1712 and 71 at his death in 1719, thus dating his birth ca. 1648-52.
Jangrana II’s emissaries later denied that he had foreknowledge of Pugér’s flight;
see their oral report under the date 26 Aug. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
28. AR III, Kartasura, to Jépara, rec’d 12 Mar. 1704; Jépara to AR III, Karta-
sura, n.d.; Jépara to Batavia, 31 Mar. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). AR III
described his debt, as AR II had consistently, as amounting only to Sp. RI. 310,000
and 3000 koyans of rice. On this matter, see also pp. 74, 115 above.
29. DJ VIII, pp. Ixvii-lxviii, cxv. See also p. 309, n. 75 above on van Hoorn’s
family politicking.
30. Bitter van Rheede succeeded Sas as Commander on the pasisir, but his
authority was subject to that of Ram; Jépara to Batavia, 1 Apr. 1704 & 28 June
1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1704, in dJ VIII, p.
105.
Michiel Ram came to the Indies as a soldier in 1682. After various other tasks,
in 1689 he was placed in charge of the garrison at Cirébon, in 1696 he was made
Opperhoofd at Surabaya, in 1698 Commandant at Makasar. In 1700 he returned
to Batavia where he occupied senior posts before being sent to Java’s coast in
1704—5. In 1707 he repatriated to the Netherlands. See de Haan, Priangan, vol. I,
pp. 254-6.
I know little about van Rheede. In 1705 he was made Commander in Bantén,
in 1707 he was moved to Batavia and in 1709 sailed for the Netherlands; Cool-
haas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 473 n. 1. He said that he had no knowledge of local
languages; Sémarang to Batavia, 8 Oct.1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
31. Pugér, Sémarang, to Batavia, rec’d 5 May 1704; van Rheede et al., on-
dervraging, Sémarang, 24 July 1704; both in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
32. Sémarang to Batavia, 18 Apr. 1704; Yudanagara, Sémarang, to Batavia,
rec’d 14 June 1704; Jépara to Batavia, 1 July 1704; Png.Ad. Blitar, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 11 Sept. 1704; Suryakusuma, Kartasura, to Susuhunan
Pugér, Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 11 Sept. 1704; Réksanagara & Tisnajaya, secret
berigt, Jépara, 5 Oct. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also BS III:24; BK
ff. 523r., 528v., 533v. (here it is said that every time AR III tried to have
Suryakusuma killed, Mt. Mérapi erupted, so AR III decided to forgive him and
rename him Png. Ng. Saloringpasar).
Saloringpasar had been born as a title by the founder of the Mataram dynasty,
Senapati Ingalaga; de Graaf, Senapati, pp. 22, 70.
33. AR III, Kartasura, to Batavia, rec’d 23 May 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705);
dJ VIII, p. xix. The VOC also refused to force Pugér to speak to AR III’s repre-
sentative in Sémarang; Sémarang to Batavia, 18 Apr. 1704; AR III, Katasura, to
Sémarang; both in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). -
NOTES to pp. 135-6 329

34, Pugér, Sémarang, to Batavia, rec’d 5 May 1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 18

Apr. 1704 & 24 Apr. 1704; CN II, Madura, to Jépara, 26 Dulkijah 1627 (2 May
1704), rec’d 5 May 1704; CN II, [Jépara], to Batavia, rec’d 27 May 1704; all in
VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 10 May 1705, in Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss.VI, p. 343; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. TV jor, Wf, joy, Woes
CN II may have been referring to the prophecy ascribed to Sultan Agung at the
time of the sieges of Batavia that the VOC would in the future choose the kings
of Java; see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 356.
35. The progress of CN II’s expanding control of East Java is difficult to chart.
By 1700 he held supreme authority over Surabaya, Grésik and Sidayu as well as
West Madura upon AR II’s orders (“DR 1700”, 31 Oct., 11 Nov.). By late 1705
Sidayu was apparently a personal appanage of CN II (de Wilde er al., Kartasura,
to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 260). On his influence at the time of his
death in 1707, see p. 146 above.
36. According to BK ff. 529v.—530v., one of CN II’s first steps in supporting
Pugér was to send an emissary to Surapati informing him of CN II’s intentions and
warning him not to back AR III: Surapati replied that he would remain neutral.
37. Jépara to Batavia, 31 May 1704; Pugér, [Semarang], to Batavia, rec’d 14
June 1704; Yudanagara, Sémarang to Batavia, rec’d 14 June 1704; van Rheede et
al., ondervraging, Sémarang, 24 July 1704; idem, memorie, Sémarang, 24 July
1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). BK f. 527r. says that Yudanagara advised Pugér
to tell the VOC that he could win the throne with Surabaya, West Madura and
other pasisir forces and without the VOC; as a result they would get VOC support
cheaply. On f. 532r., the VOC Commander Sélut Driansah (1.e. J.A. Sloot, who
had actually died in 1694) and Capt. Kéno/ (Govert Cnoll, see n. 38 below) say
that the VOC must back Pugér, for it will lose its profits if he becomes king
without VOC support.
38. Jépara to Batavia, 31 May 1704, 10 June 1704, 11 June 1704; Sémarang to
Batavia, 10 June 1704, 31 June 1704, 9 July 1704, 12 July 1704; Jépara to Batavia,
28 June 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.
1704, in dJ VU, p. 104; BK f. 533r.
Govert Cnoll remains one of the nastier figures of VOC history in this period,
as will be seen below, despite Gijsberti Hodenpijl’s effort to display a more attract-
ive side to his character. He was born in Delft and came to the Indies as a soldier
in 1686. In 1694 he was put in charge of the VOC at Jambi, most of whom were
relieved in 1696. In 1697 he was sent with a military expedition to Persia, in 1699
to Sukadana. He had a reputation for knowing Malay, but de Haan points out that
this is doubtful (see also Gonda, “Eenige grepen”, p. 97). In 1701 he was put in
charge of VOC military at the Sémarang post with the rank of Capt.-Lt. He was
a favourite of van Hoorn and rose rapidly during the latter’s Governor-Generalship
(1704-9). In 1705 he was made Commander and Gezaghebber on the pasisir, in
1706 head of the military expedition to East Java, in 1708 Commissioner for
Cirébon and the East Coast of Java. In 1709 he sailed home to Delft, leaving
behind a Javanese mistress. See de Haan, Priangan, vol. 1, pp. 197-200; Gijsberti
Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 130-3, 243-5.
39. Jépara to Batavia, | July 1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 12 July 1704 & 15
July 1704; van Rheede et al., ondervraging, Sémarang, 24 July 1704; all in VOC
1695 ( OB 1705). See also BK ff. 531v.—533r. (here Batavia wishes not to support
330 NOTES to pp. 136-7

Pugér because it has heard that he helped Surapati to kill Tack, but the VOC
relents when Yudanagara explains that Pugér had to accept AR II's orders to do
so); BS HI:24—S.
40. Pugér, Semarang, to Batavia, rec’d 10 Aug. 1704, 27 Sept. 1704, 14 Oct.
1704; Pugér, Sémarang, to Jépara, rec’d 12 Aug. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB
1705). PB I said that he wished to change his name so as not to be confused with
his dead brother AR II. The new titles were used by all subsequent monarchs of
the dynasty, except that the kings of Yogyakarta replaced Susuhunan with Sultan
and added Kalipatulah (Caliph of God) after the mid-eighteenth century, while the
kings of Surakarta retained both PB I’s titles and the name Pakubuwana (see
Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 78). On the meanings of these titles, see p. 44 above.
41. Both the VOC and CN II were concerned about the limited size of the
VOC’s pasisir forces, which were raised from 1182 men in June 1704 to 2255 men
(1250 Europeans among them) by late November. As of Apr. 1705 they totalled
2432, including 1130 Europeans. Success or failure of PB I’s cause thus appeared
to rest principally upon the forces he could muster in Java and Madura; Jépara to
Batavia, 1 July 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1704,
in dJ VII, pp. 108-9; Memorie for de Wilde, Batavia, 3 July 1705, in dJ VIII, p.
223; dJ VIII, p. 1xxi.
Van Rheede felt that PB I’s cause was moving forward with intolerable slow-
ness and would only advance with VOC assistance. PB I asked to have 100
European soldiers and as many indigenous VOC troops as the VOC thought fit; the
VOC had already given him a personal bodyguard of 100 Ambonese. Jépara to
Batavia, 27 July 1704 & 5 Aug. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705); PB I, Sémarang,
to Batavia, rec’d 10 Aug. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
42. Sémarang to Batavia, 12 July 1704 & 15 July 1704; van Rheede ef ai.,
memorie, Semarang, 24 July 1704; Jépara to Batavia, 27 July 1704 & 5 Aug. 1704;
all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). For details of PB I’s and CN II’s claim that 92,700
men would be available to support PB I’s cause, see Ricklefs, “Statistical evi-
dence”, pp. 7-8.
43. Jangrana II’s brother Ng. Naladika of Grésik, also subject to the overlord-
ship of CN II, left Kartasura with Jangrana; Sémarang to Batavia, 15 July 1704;
Jépara to Batavia, 27 July 1704 & 5 Aug. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See
also BK f. 529r.
44. BK f. 529v.: ... Cina lésu wéténge / datan darbe kukuwung/prak-atine sam-
pun ngunusi / solahe wus lumajar / manise kaplayu / tan wontén mantra-mantranya
/ lawan syargi rakanta Sri Narapati ....
There seems to have been considerable consternation in Kartasura when the
VOC's endorsement of PB I became known. AR III again offered to send money
to Batavia and expressed his friendship for the VOC. AR III, Kartasura, to J&para,
rec’d 22 July 1704; Puspanagara, Kartasura, to Sémarang, transl. 23 July 1704;
idem to Jépara, transl. 23 July 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). In August AR
II apparently tried without success to foment a rebellion against the VOC among
the Javanese and Balinese in Batavia; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1704, in dJ
VIII, p. 108.
45. CN II had been proposing to go home for some time and the VOC finally
gave up trying to postpone his departure. CN II, Jépara, to Batavia, rec’d 10 June
(sic: error for 10 July) 1704; Semarang to Batavia, 12 July 1704; Jépara to Batavia,
5 Aug. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
NOTES to pp. 137-8 Beil

46. Oral report by emissaries of Jangrana II, under date 26 Aug. 1704; Jangrana
II, Surabaya, to Ram [Surabaya], 8 Rabingulakir Ehe (AJ 1628 / 10 Aug. 1704),
rec’d Batavia 4 Sept. 1704; Réksanagara, Tégal, to Batavia, rec’d 14 Oct. 1704;
Jangrana II, Surabaya, to Batavia, rec’d 15 Oct. 1704; Naladika, Grésik, to Bata-
via, rec’d 15 Oct. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also Batavia to H. XVII,
30 Nov. 1704, in dJ VIII, p. 105
47. Suranata, Démak, to Batavia, rec’d 11 July 1704; Jépara to Suranata, Démak,
[4 Aug. 1704]; Suranata, Démak, to Jépara, rec’d 5 Aug. 1704; Jépara to Batavia,
5 Aug. 1704 & 14 Aug. 1704; Sémarang to Jépara, 16 Aug. 1704; PB I, Sémarang,
to Batavia, rec’d 25 Aug. 1704; oral report by emissaries of Jangrana II, under date
26 Aug. 1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 2 Sept. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
AR III’s Patih Sumabrata visited Madura and several places on the pasisir in
Sept. 1704, no doubt accelerating the disintegration of PB I’s alliances; Hoger-
linde, Surabaya, to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1704; CN II, Madura, to Sémarang, rec’d
Batavia 11 Sept. 1704; both in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also Batavia to H. XVII,
30 Nov. 1704, in dJ VIII, p. 105.
On the death of the previous Suranata, see p. 320 n.48 above.
48. Jépara to Batavia,—Aug. [ca. 17 Aug.] 1704; Semarang to Batavia, 26 Aug.
1704 & 3 Sept. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
49. Hogerlinde, Surabaya, to Batavia, 9 Sept. 1704 & 10 Sept. 1704, in VOC
1695 (OB 1705).
50. There was an earlier skirmish on 14 Sept. 1704 when 50 VOC Europeans,
a company of Balinese and 200 pro-PB I Javanese put about 2000 enemy to flight
in the rice fields around Tégal. The VOC victory of 8 Oct. 1704 on the Tégal alun-
alun was achieved by 40 Balinese (half with firearms, half with pikes) plus an
unspecified number of Mardijkers, Chinese and Javanese. Sémarang to Batavia, 12
Sept. 1704 & 22 Sept. 1704; Claasen & Hohenschilt, Tégal, to Batavia, 14 Sept.
1704, 24 Sept. 1704, 27 Sept. 1704, 3 Oct. 1704, 8 Oct. 1704, 11 Oct. 1704;
Réksanagara, Tégal, to Batavia, rec’d 14 Oct. 1704; Ram, Tégal, to Batavia, 14
Oct. 1704; Yudanagara, Sémarang, to Batavia, rec’d 14 Oct. 1704; all in VOC
1695 (OB 1705). See also BK ff. 537v.—S38v.
51. Hogerlinde, Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Sept. 1704; Réksanagara & Tisnajaya
(“Tsinagara”), secret report, Jépara, 5 Oct. 1704; Jépara to Batavia, 21 Oct. 1704;
Smit et al., Surabaya, to Jépara, 29 Oct. 1704 (erroneously dd. 29 Sept.); Sémarang
to Batavia, 29 Oct. 1704; Jangrana II, Surabaya, to Batavia, 11 Jumadilakir (sic)
AH 1116 (11 Oct. 1704), rec’d 26 Sept. (sic) 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
The VOC found no reassurance in the report that Naladika of Grésik, Jangrana II’s
brother, had married a son to a daughter of Surapati in Sept. 1704.
On 28 Sept. 1704 some 1500 of CN II’s soldiers, only about 600 of them armed,
arrived in Jépara. When they got to Sémarang they were said to total only 1000
with 5-600 armed with pikes and only 30-40 with firearms. This was hardly a
formidable force. Jépara to Batavia, 30 Sept. 1704; Semarang to Batavia, 3 Oct.
1704; both in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). BK f. 538v. also says there were only 1000
Madurese sent.
52. The VOC translator was named Timoteus Lesseur. Because of his incom-
petence and drunkenness, van Rheede had apparently attempted to rely upon the
doubtful talents of the translator of Tg. Martapura of Jépara (although van Rheede
denied this), a Bengali Muslim with the Javanese name Onggakarti (“Angakartje”).
332 NOTES to p. 138

Out of this confusion (involving translation into and out of Malay, Javanese, Dutch
and Portuguese) arose the idea that van Rheede was plotting against PB I. PB I,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 17 Jumadilawal Ehe 1628 (17 Sept. 1704), rec’d 27 Sept.
1704; Yudanagara, Sémarang, to Batavia, 27 (sic: error for 17) Jumadilawal Ehe
1628 (17 Sept. 1704), rec’d 27 Sept. 1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 8 Oct. 1704, 9
Oct. 1704, 17 Oct. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
PB I’s Malay may have been very limited. Van Rheede and Cnoll said in 1704
that he could hardly say more than ya (yes) (better in VOC eyes, one supposes,
than saying tidak, no); Sémarang to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB
1705). In 1708, Cnoll said that he spoke Malay which was translated into Javanese
for PB I, but given the doubts about Cnoll’s competence in Malay (see n. 38
above) it is hard to know whether his evidence should be taken very seriously;
Cnoll dagregister, 3 May 1708, under date 10 Apr. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709).
53. The Démak mosque was traditionally regarded as the first and foremost
mosque in Java. Suranata of Démak was sending out armed parties to take over
villages around Jépara, to demand money from Chinese sugar millers and to impose
pro-AR III heads in Kudus and Pathi; Jépara to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1704; Sémarang
to Batavia, 12 Sept. 1704 & 17 Sept. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
On the early campaign plans, see Sémarang resolutions, 3 Oct. 1704 & 7 Oct.
1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1704; PB I, Semarang, to Batavia, rec’d 14 Oct.
1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
54. Cnoll, generale corte sterckte, Semarang, 15 Oct. 1704; Sémarang to Bata-
via, 17 Oct. 1704, 29 Oct. 1704, 2 Nov. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). Some-
what different troop strengths are given in Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 161-2.
See also BK ff. 538v.—540v. (erroneously dating the taking of Démak /awang kalih
naréngi tunggil [AJ 1629 / Apr. 1705—Apr. 1706]); BS I1:26 (dating the event AJ
1628 / May 1704—Apr. 1705).
55. Claasen & Hohenschilt, Tégal, to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1704; Semarang to Claas-
en & Hohenschilt, Tégal, 22 Oct. 1704 & 30 Oct. 1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 4
Nov. 1704, 12 Nov. 1704, 13 Nov. 1704, 14 Dec. 1704, 13 Jan. 1705; all in VOC
1695 (OB 1705).
Jangrana II’s brother Naladika of Grésik took to the hills and was replaced as
lord of Grésik by Ng. Puspanégara, who offered obeisance to PB I; Sémarang to
Batavia, 13 Nov. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705).
56. Surapati is said to have sent 300 Balinese under his son Suraningrat and
other commanders and a 1700—man Javanese force under Ng. Katawéngan of
Kédhiri to Pajang (“Pandjangh”’). Yudanagara, report to Ram, [Sémarang], 13 Nov.
1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1704; both in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also
Batavia to H. XVII, 9 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, pp. 130-2.
Gusti Panji Sakti’s son and successor in Buleleng, Gusti Panji Danudrésta, said
that AR III also approached him and his dependency in Blambangan for aid;
Batavia to H. XVII, 18 Dec. 1704, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 328; de Graaf,
“Pandji Sakti”, p. 80.
57. Cnoll, Démak, to Sémarang, 18 Nov. 1704 & 21 Nov. 1704; Sémarang to
Claasen & Hohenschilt, Tégal, 20 Nov. 1704; Sémarang to Batavia, 22 Nov. 1704,
4 Dec. 1704, 13 Jan. 1705; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). See also Memorie for de
Wilde, Batavia, 3 July 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 237; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp.
163-4.
NOTES to pp. 139-40 333

58. Sémarang to Batavia, 7 Nov. 1704, 12 Nov. 1704, 13 Nov. 1704; CN II,
Sémarang, to Batavia, rec’d 2 Dec. 1704; PB I acte, Sémarang, transl. 19 Dec.
1704; Batavia acte, Semarang, 20 Dec. 1704; all in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). The text
of the VOC act confirming CN II’s status as PB I’s “veltheer over de Javaanse
volkeren en groot-gouverneur over all de Javaense zeestranden”, dd. Sémarang, 20
Dec. 1704, and signed by Ram, is published in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus Diplo--
maticum”, vol. IV (BKI vol. 93, 1935), pp. 227-8.
BK ff. 535r.-537r. appears to refer to this period, although there is some doubt
about the chronological setting; in particular this section immediately precedes a
description of the taking of Démak. A key to the dating is the reference on BK f.
535r. to the death in a shipwreck of Png. Téngah of Kadilangu; this happened
shortly after 1 Dec. 1704 (Sémarang to Batavia, 14 Dec. 1704, in VOC 1695 [OB
1705]). The text records the raising of, among others, CN II to the title Panémbahan,
Séstrajaya and Banyakpatra to be the two Patihs with the titles Tg. Cakrajaya and
Tg. Kartanégara, and Tg. Rongga Yudanagara to be Ad. Sura Adimanggala, by
which name the bupatis of Semarang were known into the 19th century (see H.J.
de Graaf, “De regenten van Semarang ten tijde van de V.O.C., 1682-1805”, BKI,
vol. 134, nos. 2—3 [1978], pp. 300 et seqq.). PB I’s sons are also renamed: R.
Martataruna becomes Png. Dipasonta, R. Ontawirya becomes Png. Prangmadana,
R. Dipatruna becomes Png. Dipanagara, R. Songka becomes Png. Purbaya, R.
Sudama becomes Png. Blitar. On these figures, see also Padmasusastra,
Sajarah—dalém, pp. 133-8. As pointed out above (p. 135), PB I’s son Suryakusuma
was in Kartasura with AR III and was renamed Png. Ng. Saloringpasar.
59. Cnoll, generale korte sterkte, [Sémarang, 25 Dec. 1704], in VOC 1695 (OB
1705); Sémarang to Batavia, 13 Jan. 1705, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705); Batavia to
H. XVII, 10 May 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 119 n. 1; BK ff. 540r. -541v. See also
Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll.”, pp. 165-6.
60. BK ff. 540r.—541r.: sampun karsaning Yyang Widi / ing Kartasura pulunge
sampun negalih.
61. Sémarang to Batavia, 6 Dec. 1704, in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). According to
BK ff. 535., 540r., the two lords of Kadilangu, the descendants of Sunan Kalijaga
whose holy grave is found there, named Png. Rongga and Pan. Wujil, had by now
offered their obeisance to PB I.
62. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1704, in dJ VIII, pp. 106, 111, 115 (quote from
p. 106); idem, 31 Jan. 1705, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 335, & in dJ VIII, pp.
116-18; idem, 30 Nov. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 120-1; idem, 31 Mar. 1706, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 406.
63. Memorie for de Wilde, Batavia, 3 July 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 222-41; Séma-
rang to Batavia, 26 July 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 242-3. On the 1685 instructions to
Tack, see p. 90 above.
De Wilde was ordered also to establish a joint commission of representatives of
the VOC and PB I to determine which of the cannon in VOC pasisir posts be-
longed to the VOC and which to the Javanese king; Memorie for de Wilde, Batavia,
3 July 1705, in dJ VII, p. 234.
I know virtually nothing about de Wilde before he was put in charge of this
expedition. He had come to Batavia in Dec. 1703 as an Extraordinary Councillor
of the Indies, in Mar. 1704 becoming an Ordinary Councillor. As will be seen
334 NOTES to pp. 140-1

below, he was involved in the campaigns in Java until 1707. He died on 14 Noy.
1707, seven days after arriving back, ill and exhausted, in Batavia. See Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss. VI, p. 538 n. 5; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, p. 228; Valentyn, Oud en
nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. TV [pt. 1], p. 197.
The VOC had held a monopoly over the purchase of sugar in Java, at least in
theory, since 1678 (see the sources cited in p. 275 n. 21 above), but sugar was then
of very limited commercial value and most of it was shipped to Persia; dJ VI, p.
Ihovat ia, Il.
64. AR III, Kartasura, to Sémarang, [rec’d before 27 July] 1705, in dJ VIII, pp.
243-5; de Wilde, Sémarang, to Batavia, 27 July 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 245-6; de
Wilde, Sémarang, to AR III, Kartasura, 28 July 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 245; AR III,
Kartasura, to de Wilde, Sémarang, 12 Rabingulakir Jimawal 1629 (4 Aug. 1705),
in dJ VIII, pp. 247-9; Semarang to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 247.
65. Sémarang to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 249; de Wilde, Semarang,
to Batavia, 13 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 249-52.
66. De Wilde, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 252.
The concluding of the contract was, however, delayed by the late arrival of de
Wilde’s Javanese translator, Hendrik van der Horst; de Wilde, Semarang, to Batavia,
13 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 249,252. Valentyn commented on van der Horst’s
knowledge of the Javanese people and says that he spoke Javanese as well as he
spoke Dutch. He had a Javanese “housekeeper” who, said Valentyn, surpassed all
others in her dress, jewelry, dancing and singing. See his Oud en nieuw Oost-
Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 162, 169, 200, 201. Van der Horst came to the Indies
as a soldier in 1689 and by 1703 was a bookkeeper and Javanese translator. In
Mar. 1704 he was made Onderkoopman (junior merchant), in May 1705 Koopman
(merchant), in May 1706 Captain. As will be seen below, he played a major role
in Java and Madura until his return to Batavia in Aug. 1708, where he died in
1715. See Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 410 n.1.
67. Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 162. Valentyn met CN II in
1706. His description of him in ibid., pp. 158, 159, 162, is similar to de Wilde’s,
adding that CN II had large eyes, nose and chin, a broad face, a lighter skin than
most Javanese and was toothless and nearly bald, but was most amicable and could
laugh like a thirty-year-old. Since Valentyn was a clergyman, his reference to CN
II being worth 10,000 men may have been an allusion to 2 Samuel 18:3, where
king David is so described.
68. De Wilde, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 252; idem,
18 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 253-4; de Wilde, Ungaran, to Batavia, 28 Aug. 1705,
in dJ VIII, pp. 254-5; idem, 2 Sept. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 255; de Wilde et al.,
Salatiga, to Batavia, 6 Sept. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 255—6; de Wilde ef al., Kartasura,
to Batavia, 12 Sept. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 256-8; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.
1705, in dJ VII, pp. 119-20; dJ VIIL, pp. Ixxv—-Ixxvi; BS II:26—30 (which appar-
ently refers to a second formal accession by PB I after his entry to Karasura); BK
ff. 548r.—S63v. (which erroneously describes the signing of a new treaty before the
march to Kartasura and talks of heavy fighting).
On 16 Aug. 1705 a force of 2000 Javanese was sent westwards under Tg.Bauréksa
of Pékalongan, supported by two VOC companies, to clear that area of enemy
forces; de Wilde, Sémarang, to Batavia, 18 Aug. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 253.
VOC records of 1705 call AR III’s commandant at Ungaran Sura Adiningrat,
 NOTES to pp. 141-3 338)

whereas the Javanese texts call him Jayaningrat. Valentyn met him at Sémarang
in July 1706 (he describes him as a man of great arrogance who was hurt by the
VOC’s continuing distrust of him) and calls him Jayadiningrat; Oud en nieuw
Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 149, 154. After coming over to PB I’s side, he was
allowed to carry on as PB I’s bupati of Ungaran.
AR III is conventionally known in Javanese historical tradition as Sunan Mas.
It is interesting to note that he is not given this title in BK until he is about to flee
the kraton: see ff. 560r. (where he is called Susunan Mékungrat [sic] Mas),
560v.(Sunan Ma[ng]kurat Mas), 561v. (Susunan Mas).
69. De Wilde ef al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 12 Sept. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 258;
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1705, in dJ VII, pp. 119-20; BS Il:29-34; BK ff.
565r.—v.; Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, pp. 601-3.
70. De Wilde & Ram, Kartasura, to Batavia, 24 Sept. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 260.
BK ff. 563v.—564r. notes in particular the submission of PB I’s son Png. Ng.
Saloringpasar. Given the turbulent subsequent career of Saloringpasar, which ended
in his exile to the Cape of Good Hope at PB I’s request in 1715, it may be assumed
that the joyful father-son reconciliation described there was of somewhat brief dur-
ation. On other submissions, see also BK ff. 565r.—S66v.
(AB SMU 272
72. Dutch & Malay copy in AN Solo 52, no.5 (on the making of the Malay
version, see de Wilde & Ram, Kartasura, to Batavia, 24 Sept. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp.
259-60; Cnoll report, Sémarang, 15 July 1706, in dJ VIII, p. 286). Dutch texts in
dJ VIII, pp. 261-8; and in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum’”, vol. [V (BKI
vol. 93, 1935), pp. 242-50. De Wilde et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1705,
said that CN II also signed the contract, but the copies noted here do not have his
signature or seal. The 3 sons of PB I who signed were the Crown prince Mang-
kunégara, Purbaya and Blitar.
73. The conceded villages are listed in the treaty but it is not known whether
there were others along the road to Kartasura which are not listed there. The tolls
from these areas continued to belong to PB I. He farmed them out annually to
Chinese Syahbandars who went to court each Mulud to pay their rents to him; see
Tersmitten memorie for Coijett, Semarang, 25 July 1730, in AN Java’s N.O.K.
166; another copy in VOC 2169 (OB 1731).
74. The Javanese complained that so much land had been ceded to the VOC
that supplying even 800 koyans would be difficult; de Wilde & Ram, Kartasura,
to Batavia, 24 Sept. 1705, in dJ VII, p. 259; de Wilde et a/., Kartasura, to Batavia,
5 Oct. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 260. This echoes the passage in BK ff. 493v.—495r., set
ca. 1698 and described above (p. 122), where Png. Pugér (PB I) says that the
cession of Cirébon and West Java to the VOC is sufficient payment for its services.
BK f. 553r. says that at Ungaran the VOC officers went to PB I, who was alone,
and asked for 1000 koyans of rice annually; PB I is said to have agreed to this but
subsequently Sura Adiménggala objected vigorously.
75. Transl. Javaans verbandschrift, Kartasura, 11 Oct. 1705, in AN Solo 53°
“Copie contracten enz. 1646-1746”. Printed in Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplo-
maticum”, vol. IV (BK7 vol. 93, 1935), pp. 250-1.
76. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 120.
77. BK ff. 565v.-566v. Quote from f. 566v., Canto 145 (Pangkur):
60. kacatur ing Kartasura / sampun téntrém manahira wadyalit / miwah sira
336 NOTES to pp. 143-4

kang Sinuwun / agélar palamarta / ambék santa budya / sira Sang Aprabu / tan
pégat denya da{n]dan—da[n]dan / eca manah ing wong cili.

78. Cnoll also attempted to influence PB I’s choice of Patih. Tgs. Cakrajaya and
Kartanégara were performing jointly as Patihs; the VOC believed them to be at
odds with one another. PB I resisted Cnoll’s pressure, however, and maintained
both of them in office. See Cnoll report, Sémarang, 15 July 1706, in dJ VIII,
pp. 285-90.
As will be seen on pp. 158-9, PB I was moving towards the restoration of a
system of government involving two Patihs which had been tried at the end of the
reign of his father AR I. PB I’s appointment of Cakrajaya (formerly named Séstra-
jaya) and Kartanégara (formerly Banyakpatra) is described in BK f. 536r., appar-
ently ca. 1704 (see n. 58 above). Cakrajaya was to become one of the most
influential courtiers of the Kartasura period, remaining at the centre of the kingdom’s
affairs until he was exiled by the VOC at the request of PB II in 1733. After 1720
he was named Danuréja.
79. De Haan, Priangan, vol. I, p. 255.
80. E.g. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 189.
81. Unless other sources are indicated, the following general narrative of the
1706 campaign rests upon Cnoll et a/., Penanggungan, to Batavia, 26 Sept. 1706,
in dJ VII, pp. 290-3; idem, Bangil, to Batavia, 18 Oct. 1706, in dJ VIII, pp.
293-6; idem, Surabaya, to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1706, in dJ VIL, pp. 297-301; Batavia
to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1706, in dJ VII, pp. 124-6; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-
Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 151-93. See also dJ VII, pp. Ixxxvii-xci; Gijsberti
Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 175—7. On hand-mortars or Coehoorn mortars, see p. 131
above.
A beautifully coloured and illustrated map of the campaign is in VEL 1286 in
ARA: “Affbeeldingh ofte aanwysing der optoght en marsch, gedaan van Soura-
baya naar Passourawang, onder ’t hooger gezagh van den E. Aghtb'. H'. Govert
Cnoll, Commandeur en chef ... September 1706”.
There is also a romanticised account of the 1706 campaigning, incorrectly dated
tirta guna angrasani wani (AJ 1634/AD 1710-11), in BK ff. 569r. et segqg. BTJ(BP),
vol. XVIII, p. 5, gives the correct date sirna guna rasaning rat (AJ 1630/Apr.
1706—Apr. 1707) at this point.
82. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 182.
83. Ibid., p. 183, refers particularly to the flight of Hillebrand Janssoon van
Alkmaar, a krankbezoeker (Visitor of the Sick, an ecclesiastical post in the VOC),
among other Dutchmen. Valentyn (of course) displayed courageous qualities and
got van Alkmaar back.
84. It should be noted that Naladika, Jangrana II’s brother and the former
governor of Grésik, was now with Surapati and may have been an important link
between them; see Cnoll er al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1706, in dJ VII, p.
298.
On Gusti Bedahulu, see Sergeant, Surabaya, to Batavia, 16 Nov. 1704, in VOC
1695 (OB 1705); Gusti Bedahulu to Sergeant, Surabaya, transl. Stmarang 21 Nov.
1704; both in VOC 1695 (OB 1705). He had apparently been born in Batavia but
arrived in Surabaya ca. Oct. 1704 from Bali after a conflict with Gusti Pamécutan.
He later settled in Batavia and fought for the VOC in several places; see D.
NOTES to pp. 145-6 53)

Lombard, “A travers le vieux Djakarta I: La mosquée des Balinais”, Archipel no.3

972) spn o8:
85. Sergeant, Surabaya, to Batavia, 24 Nov. 1706, in dJ VIII, pp. 301-2; Valen-
tyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 187, 192; BS TII:41-3 (wrongly
dating these events AJ 1631/Apr. 1707—Mar. 1708); BK ff. 572r., 573v.—574r.
86. Cnoll et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1706, in dJ VIII, p. 300; Valen-
tyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 167, 175, 182, 190, 193; BS
I1:44—7. BK ff. 566v.—S68v. tells of AR III’s life under the protection of Surapati’s
commanders Ngs. Lor and Kidul in Panaraga, Madiun and Kédhiri. On Ngs. Lor
and Kidul, see also Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 173,
176, 177-8.
On the recall of the army from Kédhiri, see BK ff. 572r.—573v. In May 1706 the
VOC had sent two Chinese to AR II] in Kédhiri to induce him to submit, without
success; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 174-5.
87. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 126; Gijsberti Hodenpijl,
“Cnoll”, pp. 177-8; dJ VIII, p. xcii. See also Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién,
vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 192-3. BS II:40 appears to refer to the 1706 campaign (wrongly
dated AJ 1631/Apr. 1707—Mar. 1708) and also describes the people of Surabaya
as traitorous. BK ff. 571v.—572r. does the same.
88. DJ VIII, pp. xci, xcii; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 178-81.
89. As was noted above (p. 299 n. 54), Surapati had probably used the name
Wiranégara since 1686. On the sons of Surapati, see BS II]:47—9; BK f. 574r.;
Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 188, 189-90, 192; dJ
VIII, pp. xce-xci, xcili-xciv. Surapati’s second son succeeded to the name R. Surapati
{II}; his third son was named Suradilaga.
A contemporary Dutch translation of the letters from “Che Abdulla”, described
as an Arab from Mecca, is in A.K.A. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “De vermoording van
den Regent van Soemenep (25 Augustus 1707)”, BK/ vol. 72 (1916), pp. 584-5.
In this letter he says that he proclaimed AR III to be king on Friday (an error for
Thursday) 29 Sawal Je AH 1118 (3 Feb. 1707). In 1708 Cnoll reported that “the
fake Arab high priest Chee Abdulla (otherwise reportedly a Javanese born in
Mataram)” was captured by VOC troops in a skirmish in the area of Panaraga;
Cnoll, Surabaya, to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709). He was
killed at the request of PB I’s sons and Patihs; Cnoll, camp south of Kédhiri, to
Batavia, 15 Sept. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709).
90. De Wilde, Pasuruan, to Batavia, 8 Oct. 1707, in dJ VII, p. 304; Batavia to
H. XVII, 9 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, p. 130; idem, 30 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, pp.
133-4; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 194-6; BK ff.
574v.—577r. (Here it is said that Surapati’s disinterred body had not decomposed;
the VOC placed it on a chair and offered it honour.); BS I1:49—64 (cf. Ricklefs,
Tradition, p. 193); dJ VII, pp. xciii-xcv; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 227-8.
While at Kartasura in June 1707, de Wilde also oversaw the execution of
Prawatasari, who had caused much disturbance for several years in the Priangan
highlands and then fled to Kartasura. The VOC called him a “Javanese priest”
from Giri. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1706, in dJ VIII, p. 128; idem, 30 Nov.
1707, in dJ VIII, pp. 133, 137-8; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. 1V
[pt. 1], p. 193; dJ VIII, pp. Ixxxi-lxxxii.
On the location of Carat, see p. 307 n. 57 above.
338 NOTES to pp. 146-7

91. De Wilde, Pasuruan, to Batavia, 8 Oct. 1707, in dJ VIII, p. 305; Valentyn,

Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 195-6.
92. De Wilde et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 5 Oct. 1705, in dJ VIII, p. 260; de
Wilde et al., report of conference with PB I, Sémarang, 2 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII,
pp. 310-11, 314; Cnoll, report, 21 Apr. 1708, summarised in dJ VIII, pp. 146-7
n. 3; dJ VIII, pp. xciii, xcvi-xevii; BK f. 577r. See also n. 35 above.
93. The new joint bupatis of Pasuruan were named Onggajaya [II] and Ongga-
diwongsa. De Wilde, Pasuruan, to Batavia, 8 Oct. 1707, in dJ VIII, pp. 304-5, 306;
idem, 14 Oct. 1707, in dJ VIII, p. 307; de Wilde et al., report of conference with
PB I, Sémarang, 2 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, p. 311; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.
1707, in dJ VIII, p. 134; dJ VII, p. xcv. Onggajaya [I] had been AR II’s governor
of Pasuruan, and was expelled from there by Surapati. In 1688 he was killed in
action against Surapati (“DR 1688”, 27 Mar.).
94. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia 13 Nov. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
95. De Wilde et al., report of conference with PB I, Sémarang, 2 Nov. 1707,
in dJ VIII, pp. 308-17. The 800 koyans of rice were described in Javanese using
the literary term dhomas for 800: béras dhomas. Consequently the term “brasdo-
mas” entered the Dutch language for some time as a technical term relating to this
agreement (e.g. see ibid., p. 315).
See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, p. 134; BK f. 582v.
The announcement that CN II’s grandsons’ names were to be changed from R.
Tg. Purbanégara and Suryanégara to Suryawinata and Sasrawinata, by which they
are known in BK, was made in Kartasura on 17 Apr. 1708, according to Cnoll,
dagregister, 3 May 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709). CN III’s previous name was
Sasranégara. The grandsons received 1700 households each on Madura, while CN
Ill got 4600 there, so all three were powerful lords by contemporary standards. PB
I also demanded back two gamélan sets and one of two elephants previously given
to CN II and ordered that CN II’s other pusakas (rycxornamenten) be divided
among his heirs.
96. The text of the agreement of 31 Oct. 1707 regarding other Europeans, de-
scribed as an act of amplification to the contract of 5 Oct. 1705, subsequently
signed and sealed at Kartasura and returned to Sémarang on 12 Dec. 1707, is in
dJ VII, pp. 317-20; and Heeres & Stapel, “Corpus diplomaticum”, vol. IV (BKI
vol. 93, 1935), pp. 270-3. See also Batavia to H. XVII, 9 Nov. 1707, in dJ VII,
p. 129. The VOC was also concerned about the activities of French, Portuguese
and Armenian traders; dJ VII, p. exviii.
97. Batavia to H. XVII, 9 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, p. 132; idem, 30 Nov. 1707,
in dJ VII, p. 132; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 197.
98. Ram, commission for Cakranagara, Semarang, 9 Apr. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp.
268-9; memorie for van der Horst, Semarang, 20 Oct. 1705, in dJ VIII, pp. 270-2;
Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Mar. 1706, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 410; idem, 30
Nov. 1706, in dJ VIII, pp. 126-7, 134; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol.
IV [pi. 1], p. 197; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Vermoording” (containing the de Wilde
& Cnoll instructions to van der Horst, his report and other documents); dJ VII,
pp. Ixxix, xcvi. J.K.J. de Jonge doubtlessly had this episode, among others, in mind
when he wrote in 1875 that “now and then in this volume one will find facts and
proceedings described which this writer would prefer to have been hidden again
in the dust of the old archives, if duty and a sense of truth had not forbidden him
NOTES to pp. 147-8 309

this” (dJ VIII, p. v); see also the episode of the murder of Jangrana II described
in the following chapter.
99. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1707, in dJ VIII, p. 134.
100. Sémarang to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709); Cnoll,
report, 21 Apr. 1708, summarised in dJ VIII, pp. 146-7 n. 3; Cnoll, dagregister,
3 May 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709); Cnoll, Surabaya, to Batavia, 15 July 1708,
in dJ VIII, pp. 327-8; dJ VIII, pp. c—ci; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 231-2.
Cnoll discovered in Apr. that there was deep distrust between Jayaningrat and
PB I. Indeed the former was afraid to appear at court and asked for VOC protec-
tion. PB I, however, shortly reconfirmed his appointment as bupati of Pékalongan
and superior governor of the western pasisir. See Jayaningrat, [Sémarang], to
Batavia, rec’d 8 May 1708; PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, rec’d 8 June 1708; Sémarang
to Batavia, 14 June 1708; Hertogh, Kartasura, to Batavia, 6 July 1708; all in VOC
1764 (OB 1709).
AR III’s appointment ca. 1703 of Ki Pusparaga, a pranakan Cina from Sémarang
married to a daughter of R. Mangunrana, to be Ki Tg. Jayaningrat, is recorded in
BK f. 506v. His grandson was still bupati of Pékalongan in the late 18th century;
see Lombard & Salmon “Islam et sinité”, p. 79. On the importance of the western
pasisir as a rice-producing area at this time, see Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”,
pp. 12-16.
PB I’s appointment ca. 1704 of Jiwasuta to be Ki Tg. Citrasuma (sic) is in BK
f. 536r. Heather Sutherland, “Notes on Java’s regent families, part I”, Indonesia
no. 16 (Oct. 1973), pp. 138-9, cites a “roneoed genealogy of the Tjitrosoman” in
private hands which ascribes Balinese ancestry to the Citrasoma line. The family
continued to provide bupatis of Jépara down to the later nineteenth century.
Two technical matters in Cnoll’s dagregister of 3 May 1708 are perhaps worthy
of note. First, by this time the VOC fortress at Kartasura was no mere bamboo
palisade, for he refers to the Company’s “steene pagger”’. Second, this source
contains the earliest reference known to me to the River Sala, previously called the
Sémanggi; the name Sala is used again in Semarang to Batavia, 6 Jan. 1709, in
VOC 1780 (OB 1710).
101. AR III, Blitar, to Batavia, 18 Sawal Dal AH 1119 (12 Jan. 1708), rec’d 9
Mar. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709) (cf. dJ VIII, p. 146 n. 2); Cnoll, Surabaya,
to Batavia, 15 July 1708, in dJ VII, pp. 328-9; Cnoll, in camp at River Landean
[?], to Batavia, 24 July 1708, in dJ VII, pp. 329-30 (a list of those who surren-
dered with AR III is omitted from the version here; see the original letter in VOC
1764 [OB 1709]); Cnoll, Surabaya, to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB
1709); Cnoll et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 24 Aug. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709);
Jangrana II, Surabaya, to Batavia, 7 Jumadilakir AJ 1632 (25 Aug. 1708), rec’d 2
Sept. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709); Cnoll, Surabaya, to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1708,
in VOC 1764 (OB 1709); Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1708, in dJ VII, pp. 145-8;
BK ff. 578r.—580r; BS II:59-60, 64-7; A.K.A. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “De onder-
werping van Pangeran Adipati Anoem, alias Soenan Mas, aan de hooge regering
te Batavia, op den 6 September 1708”, BK/ vol. 78 (1922), pp. 385-402; idem,
“Cnoll”, pp. 230, 234-6; Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, pp. 603-6.
Valentyn’s version of events (Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp.
198-9, 201-3) is extremely critical of the VOC’s handling of this affair; he says
340 NOTES to pp. 149-50

AR III particularly denounced van der Horst for mistranslating and misrepresent-
ing him.
One of AR III’s emissaries in his initial contacts with the VOC was Ng. Nala-
dika, Jangrana II’s brother and the former lord of Grésik, who then surrendered
with AR III.
The Sultan of Bantén was deeply worried about the precedent set by the VOC's
treatment of AR III and required special reassurances from Gov.-Gen. van Hoorn;
secret conversation, 4 Aug. 1708, in dJ VIII, pp. 341-8; extraordinary meeting,
Batavia, 6 Sept. 1708, in dJ VIII, pp. 348-50; acte van versekering, Batavia, 9 Oct.
1708, in dJ VIII, pp. 350-4. See also Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol.
IV [pt. 1], p. 202.
102. BK f. 581r., Canto 147 (Dhandhanggula):
27. ... Eh Patih pangrasani[ng]wang / nadyan kabeh pusaka ing tanah Jawi
/ ginawa mring Jakarta
28. i{ng]kang rupa miwah tumbak kéris / apan nora dadya galih i[ng]wang /
nanging sok-maksihya mangke / séntana Ngadilangu / lawan masjid Démak
Apatih / eh iya wruhanira / kalih prakareku / pusaka ing tanah Jawa /i{[ng]kang
a[ng]gér datan ana malih-malih ....
Essentially the same text is found in BTJ(BP), vol. XVIII, pp. 27-8. See also
Olthof, BTJ, text p. 301, transl. p. 313. Where BK refers to the pusaka . . . i[ng]kang
a[ng]gér, BTJ(BP) calls them pusaka ... ingkang agéng and Olthof, BTJ, says
ugére pusaka.
On later 18th-century views of Sunda and the significance of its occupation by
the VOC, see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 373 et seqq.
Kadilangu (near Démak) is the gravesite of Sunan Kalijaga, one of the
legendary 9 walis (apostles of Islam in Java). The mosque of Démak is tradition-
ally regarded as the first to have been built in Java.
103. Secret resolution, Batavia, 7 Sept. 1708, in dJ VII, pp. 330-41; PB I,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 7 Ruwah Be 1632 (23 Oct. 1708), rec’d 2 Nov. 1708, in
VOC 1764 (OB 1709); Sémarang to Batavia, 22 Nov. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB
1709); Batavia to H. XVI, 25 Nov. 1708, in dJ VII, p. 148; PB I, Kartasura, to
Batavia, 7 Sawal Be 1632 (21 Dec. 1708), rec’d 1 Mar. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB
1710); Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Onderwerping van Png. Ad. Anoem”; Ricklefs,
“Missing pusakas”, pp. 607-8.
104. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 232-4.
105. Cnoll, Surabaya, to Batavia, 24 Aug. 1708 & 27 Aug. 1708, in VOC 1764
(OB 1709); Wiranégara, [Malang], to Wiraguna, [Surabaya], rec’d Batavia 2 Sept.
1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709) (Tg. Wiraguna had been named Patih Jéro at the
end of AR II’s reign: see p. 322 n. 59 above); extraordinary meeting, Batavia, 6
Sept. 1708, in dJ VII, p. 350.
Some 1000 men fled under the leadership of Png. Blitar, a relative of AR III
formerly named R. Onggadiméja (this renaming is noted in BK f. 515v., ca. 1704)
and A. Manduraréja (see BK f. 506v.). They were killed by VOC troops in a
skirmish near Panaraga (the same in which Syaikh Abdullah was captured: see n.
89 above); Cnoll, Surabaya, to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709).
106. Cnoll et al., “Arara Pielau”[? nr. Malang], to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1708, in
VOC 1764 (OB 1709); Jayaningrat, [Malang], to Batavia, rec’d 8 Nov. 1708, in
NOTES to p. 150 341

VOC 1764 (OB 1709); Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1708, in dJ VIII, pp. 149,
150-1; Cnoll, Sémarang, to Batavia, 26 Mar. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710);
Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 200; BK ff. 577v.—578r.,
580r.—58 lv. (f. 578r. tells of the death of Bun Jaladriya, Ng. Lor and Ng. Kidul,
among others, but places these events before the surrender of AR III); BS Il:57-8
(cf. Ricklefs, Tradition, p. 193), 68-9; Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 236-7.
I have failed to discover a figure for the manpower initially committed to this
campaign. The total VOC military establishment on Java’s north coast in Mar.
1708 was 2004 Europeans and 2370 indigenous soldiers (Gijsberti Hodenpijl,
“Cnoll”, p. 241). Not all of these, of course, were committed to the campaign of
1708. As was pointed out above (p. 148), PB I promised over 7000 armed men for
the campaign from the interior and western pasisir; many more must have come
from the eastern pasisir. Given the casualties reported, it might be reasonable to
guess that the combined force was of the order of 20,000 or more.
Valentyn’s report that Ng. Lor was killed in the fighting around Pasuruan in
1707 appears to have been inaccurate; see his Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV
[pt. 1], p. 196. Since he also reports here the wounding of Surapati’s eldest son,
it is probable that Valentyn confused the campaigns of 1707 and 1708 to some
extent, thereby placing himself in the same class as a record of these events as BS
(see Ricklefs, Tradition, p. 193).
107. On the final VOC and Javanese conquest of the Malang area in 1767-71,
see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 129-38.
108. PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 7 Sawal Be 1632 (21 Dec. 1708), rec’d 1 Mar.
1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710). This letter lists lords who had submitted from
Kédhiri, Kartasana, Blitar, Saréngat, Kalangbret, Trénggalek, Kampak (“Kammapak”’),
Pace, Bérbek (?“Barebegh”’), Nganjuk, Caruban, Madiun, Panaraga, Jagaraga and
Kaduwang. Those of Wirasaba and Japan were expected shortly. These figures
were reinstated in their positions as PB I’s vassals; Cnoll, Semarang, to Batavia,
26 Mar. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710).
109. BK f. 582r.: Nagri-dalém pan sampun radin / datan ana malanga / marang
Jéng Sang Prabu.
110. DJ VII, pp. cxxii-cxxiv; Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade, p. 249; Steur,
Herstel of ondergang, p. 257; de Korte, Financiéle verantwoording, p. 47.
111. Various letters in VOC 1764 (OB 1709) refer to problems in getting prod-
ucts, especially rice. On the VOC’s commercial problems in Indonesia generally,
which included much trade in violation of monopolies which the VOC claimed but
could not enforce, see van Hoorn, Batavia, to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1707, in dJ VII,
pp. 135-42; Batavia to H. XVII, 10 Feb. 1708, in dJ VIII, pp. 142-5; dJ VIII, pp.
CXVii-CXxii, CXXiV-CXxxili. There was some recovery of sugar production and
other crops in 1708 (Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1708, in dJ VIII, pp. 150-2) and
demand for opium apparently revived in 1709 (idem, 30 Nov. 1709, in Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss. VI, p. 613; see also idem, 20 Nov. 1713, in ibid. VI, p. 18).
112. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 241-2; tafel ofte verthooninge van de
generale gedragen lasten en behaalde voordeelen op alle de Indische comptoiren
... 1681 tot 1705/6 (appendix to Batavia to H. XVII, 10 Feb. 1708), in dJ VIII,
pp. 144-5. Valentyn’s estimate of the total direct cost of the campaigns was fl.
2,300,000 (=Sp. RI. 681, 481); Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp.
200-1.
342 NOTES to pp. 1514

113. Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, p. 242.

114. Chandler, Warfare in the age of Marlborough, pp. 303-4, gives the fol-
lowing figures for the Allied armies: at Blenheim (1704), 52,000 against 56,000
French & Bavarians; at Ramillies (1706), 62,000 against 60,000 French, Spanish
& Bavarians; at Oudenarde (1708), 80,000 against 80,000 French & Spanish; at
Malplaquet (1709), 110,000 against 80,000 French.

Notes to Chapter 9

1. Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1708, in dJ VII, pp. 148-9; PB I, Kartasura,

to Batavia, 14 Safar Wawu 1633 (25 Apr. 1709), rec’d 3 June 1709, in VOC 1780
(OB 1710); Cnoll, dagregister, Semarang, 12 Nov. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710);
Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 203. For more detail, see
Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, pp. 608-9, 625-8. The béndhe was Ky. Bicak, the
horns Ky. Nakula and Ky. Sadewa, the pike Ky. Karawélang.
2. BK ff. 582v.587v. covers extensively the VOC demand for Jangrana II’s
death and PB I’s response. The quotation is from f. 583v. and is supposedly PB
I’s statement after receiving a letter demanding the murder but before Cnoll’s
arrival in Kartasura: iku bauni[ng]sun kang kering / kang téngén ing Mandura /
méngko uwis lampus / dadya kari bau kiwa. After the murder, on f. 587v., he again
says to his wife the Ratu Kancana that the death of Jangrana II has meant that the
Dutch have cut off his left arm; she replies that he must respect the prophecy of
Sultan Agung that the VOC would come to rule Java (also in BTJ/BP], vol. XVIII,
p. 40). On this prophecy, see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 356. It was noted above
(p. 329 n. 34) that CN If may have referred to the same prophecy in 1704.
3. Cnoll, dagregister, Semarang, 12 Nov. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710); Gijsberti
Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, p. 239; BK ff. 584r—S85v.
4. Cnoll, Kartasura, to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1709, in dJ VII, pp. 354—6 (quotation
from p. 356); PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Safar Wawu 1633 (25 Apr. 1709),
rec’d 3 June 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710); Cnoll, dagregister, Semarang, 12
Nov. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710); Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol.
IV [pt. 1], pp. 200, 203-4; BK ff. 585v.—587v.; BS III:70-2; dJ VII, pp. cix-cxiv;
Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, pp. 238-40.
Cnoll also arranged for Jangrana II’s protégé Gusti Bedahulu (see p. 144 above)
to move from the Surabaya area to Batavia. He later saw action on the VOC side
in India. Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1708, in dJ VIII, p. 149; Cnoll, Kartasura,
to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1709, in dJ VII, pp. 354-5; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1709,
in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V1, p. 636; de longh, Krijgswezen, p. 75.
There is considerable confusion over the names of Jangrana II’s brothers. Dutch
sources say that one of these brothers was already named Jangrana (III) before the
death of Jangrana II and that a second was named Wiradirja: see Valentyn, Oud
en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 157, 159; Cnoll, Kartasura, to Batavia,
28 Feb. 1709, in dJ VII, p. 355. In Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1712, in Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss. V1, p. 887, the brothers are named A. Jayapuspita, Panji Surengrana
and Ng. Jangrana (III). The same names are given in Gobius & Bergman, memorie
for Peijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
BK ff. 584v.-S85r. names the brothers A. Jayapuspita, Panji Surengrana and
NOTES to pp. 154-5 343

Panji Kartayuda, and contines to use the name Jangrana (II) for the eldest brother.
See also BK f. 592r. BS Il: 71-2 refers to Jangrana II’s successors as Ki A.
Jayapuspita and Jangrana (III). BS IV: 12-14 distinguishes Ki A. Jayapuspita, Ki
Panji (Surengrana) and Kartayuda. Sajarah Régen Surabaya says that at this point
the Surabaya house divided into senior (Kasépuhan) and junior (Kanoman) branches,
the former under Ki Tg. A. Panji Jayapuspita and the latter under Ng. Wiradirja
alias Ki Tg. Jangrana (III).
There were apparently four brothers for whom we thus have five names: Jang-
rana III, Wiradirja, Kartayuda, Jayapuspita and Panji Surengrana. VOC sources
say that Jangrana III and Wiradirja were different persons, Sajarah Régen Sura-
baya that they were the same. It does at least seem clear that Jangrana III was not
the same as Jayapuspita and that these two were Jangrana II’s principal successors,
while a third brother was named Panji Surengrana and a fourth Kartayuda.
According to BK f. 601r. (describing the early stages of the Surabaya War in
1718), Kartayuda was the younger half-brother (from a different mother) of A.
Jayapuspita and had been renamed Ng. Jangrana (IV?). In BK f. 626v. (describing
Dipanagara’s rebellion later in 1718), Kartayuda (under that name) is renamed Ad.
Sasranagara while another person named Jaka Tangkéban becomes Ki Ng. Jang-
rana (V?); this man is said in BK f. 601v. to be a nephew (kapunakan) of Ad.
Jangrana (11).
Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 159, describes Jangrana
Ill in 1706 as being 32-3 years old, of a sorrowful (droevig) character and neither
so intelligent nor so courageous as Jangrana I, but much more familiar (vee/
gemeenzaamer) than he. Wiradirja he describes as a very handsome and cheerful
fellow of some 30 years of age and rather more intelligent than his brother.
5. The table is based upon Cool & Vaver, Sémarang, to Dubbeldekop, 9 Mar.
1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). It ignores other VOC records with conflicting
figures. It has been necessary to correct scribal errors in this account, which should
show Rds. Holl. 10,000 and 656 koyans of rice being paid in 1708/9 for the totals
to be correct. On PB I’s immediate payment of Rds. Holl. 10,000, see PB I,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Safar Wawu 1633 (25 Apr. 1709), rec’d 3 June 1709;
Sémarang to Batavia, 6 May 1709; both in VOC 1780 (OB 1710).
The Cool & Vaver document gives the record of payments in Rds. Holl., which
I have converted to Sp. RI. using the factor 1.125 Rds. Holl./Sp. Rl. Rice volumes
are converted to cash equivalents at the standard rate of Sp. RI. 20/koyan (see
Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”, p. 12). The normal annual dues were thus Sp. RI.
15,600 + (800 koyans X Sp. RI. 20/koyan = Sp. RI. 16,000) = Sp. RI. 31,600. I
do not know why in some years the figure for both cash and rice due departs from
this norm.
The 1705 treaty details are described on pp. 142 above.
6. PB Lact, Kartasura, Mar. 1709, in AN Solo 53° “Copie contracten acten enz.
1646-1746”; Cnoll, dagregister, Semarang, 12 Nov. 1709, under dates 7 Mar. 1709
(published in dJ VIII, pp. 356-60) & 10-12 Mar. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710);
Gijsberti Hodenpijl, “Cnoll”, p. 241; G.J. Knaap, “Coffee for cash: The Dutch East
India Company and the expansion of coffee cultivation in Java, Ambon and Ceylon,
1700-1730”, in Trading companies in Asia 1600-1830 (ed. J. van Goor; Utrecht:
HES Uitgevers, 1986), p. 37.
The location of Jayaningrat’s coffee plantations is uncertain. Knaap says that
344 NOTES to pp. 155-7

one was “in the mountainous region of Lembarawa, to the southeast of Pekalo-ng-
an”, Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, pp. 4-5, refers to one plantation
in Pékalongan and a second in “de landen van Limberawa’”’. So far as I know,
however, the only Lémbarawa over which Jayaningrat had control was in Brébés,
unless he also governed the Lémbarawa south of Ungaran.
The deforestation of the pasisir had been under way for some time. As was
noted above (p. 310 n. 85), the exhaustion of some heavy timber stands was re-
ported as early as 1695.
7. J.K.J. de Jonge, writing in 1875, seemed to suggest that Cnoll instituted a
system of regional government in Java, a nonsensical idea in the light of the
Javanese empire’s well-established conventions of territorial administration. See
dJ VIII, p. cxv: “ Onder den invloed van Knol werd het rijk van Mataram in 43
regentschappen verdeeld ....”
8. Based upon transl. Jav. resolutie en overeenkomst, 20 Dulkijah Be 1632 (3
Mar. 1709), transl. Kartasura 5 Mar. 1709, in AN Solo 53° “Copie contracten acten
enz. 1646-1746“ (another copy of this agreement is in Cnoll, dagregister, Séma-
rang, 12 Nov. 1709, under date 5 Mar. 1709, in VOC 1780 [OB 1710]); ibid. under
date 7 Mar. 1709, in dJ VIII, pp. 360-1 (original in VOC 1780 [OB 1710)).
Rice is converted to cash at the standard contemporary rate of Sp. RI. 20/koyan.
For more detailed description and analysis of these sources, see Ricklefs, “Sta-
tistical evidence”, pp. 12-18.
It is impossible to assess the significance of this level of deliveries for Javanese
rural society as a whole, but it seems possible that the burden was not great. An
extremely crude comparison is suggested by such data as a statement of the cost
of sugar milling in the Batavia area in 1710 (dJ VIU, pp. 157-64), which reports
that a miller could hire 20 Javanese field-cleaners, plowers, etc. and 8 Javanese
porters for a total of Rds. 520 (probably Rds. Holl., so equal to Sp. RI. 462). If
so, the total contracted Sp. RI. 15,600 plus 800 koyans of rice (= Sp. RI. 31,600
cash equivalent) represented the equivalent to the annual hiring costs of less than
2000 Javanese labourers. This does not rule out the possibility that in particular
places or times the burden was heavy.
9. Sources as for Table II. See n. 8.
10. Cnoll, Sémarang, to Batavia, 26 Mar. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710); PB
I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Safar Wawu 1633 (25 Apr. 1709), rec’d 3 June 1709,
in VOC 1780 (OB 1710); Cnoll, dagregister, Semarang, 12 Nov. 1709, in VOC
1780 (OB 1710); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1709, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI,
p. 636. On Cnoll’s objections to the two Patihs in 1705, see p. 336 n. 78 above.
On his supposed linguistic competence, see p. 329 n. 38 above.
11. Cnoll, dagregister, 12 Nov. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710). The symbolism
of these contests was described in Raffles, History (1830), vol. I, pp. 386-7. See
further Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 275 and, for examples, pp. 274-5, 303-4, 345-6.
12. One cannot, at the same time, dissent from Gijsberti Hodenpijl’s obser-
vation (“Cnoll”, p. 238) that because of the murder of Jangrana II “an indelible slur
was thereby cast upon Cnoll, although the blame first and foremost concerns the
Indies government [in Batavia] which . . . repeatedly urged this business upon its
SEIVantr ae
On Cnoll’s return to the Netherlands on the same fleet as that which took van
Hoorn, see ibid., pp. 242-4.
NOTES to pp. 157-8 345

13. Cnoll, Semarang, to Batavia, 27 Apr. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710).
14. PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Safar Wawu 1633 (25 Apr. 1709), rec’d 3
June 1709; Hertog et al., Kartasura, to Batavia, 29 May 1709; Sémarang to Bata-
via, 27 July 1709; PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 12 R&jéb Wawu 1633 (17 Sept.
1709), rec’d 7 Oct. 1709; all in VOC 1780 (OB 1710). See further Batavia to H.
XVII, 30 Nov. 1709, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 636; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw
Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 203; BS II:73.
In the Dutch translation of PB I’s letter of 14 Safar AJ 1633, he says that the
“geluk” of his ancestors resided in Mataram; it is not known what the original
Javanese term was.
AR III denied that he had the pusakas with him in Sri Lanka. See AR III,
Jaffnapatnam, to Batavia, 25 Ruwah Wawu 1633 (30 Oct. 1709), rec’d 25 Feb.
1710, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711); Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, pp. 609-11, for
further details.
Guwa Langse was visited by the early-19th-century leader Dipanagara and there
Ratu Kidul appeared to him; Ricklefs, “Early inspirational experience”, pp. 239-40,
255-6. On this site, the visit to it by PB I’s son AR IV and the Europeans’
remarkable ignorance of its significance into the 19th century, see H.J. de Graaf,
“De reis van Mangku—Rat IV naar Mataram”, TBG vol. 83 (1949), p. 354. On the
special links between the Mataram dynasty and Ratu Kidul, see also Ricklefs,
Mangkubumi, pp. 13, 23, 375-6.
15. Sémarang to Batavia, 29 Mar. 1710 & 10 Apr. 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB
1711); PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 11 Jumadilawal AJ 1634 (8 July 1710), rec’d
20 Aug. 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711); BS IV:1; BK ff. 588r.—589r. H.J. de Graaf
used this episode as part of his argument for the verifiable accuracy of some parts
of the babad texts; see his “De historische betrouwbaarheid der Javanese
overlevering”’, BK vol. 112, no. 1 (1956), p. 59.
Cukilan is a village near Suruh, to the north-east of Mt. Mérbabu. BK f. 589r.
says that Ki Gédhe Pacukilan was captured there.
16. See Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas’, pp. 614-15, and p. 162 above.
17. On the construction of and move to the VOC headquarters at Sémarang,
which had been long delayed by illness among the workers, the incompetence of
European carpenters engaged on the project and even a strike by lightning in 1697,
see p. 310 n. 79 above, and Regulation of 8 Mar. 1697, in J.A van der Chijs (ed.),
Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, 1602-1811 (17 vols.; ’s Hage: M Nijhoff,
1885-1900), vol. III, p. 423; “DR 1696”, 1 Nov., 22 Nov.; “DR 1697”, 16 Apr.,
1 July, 1 Oct., 6 Dec.; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1697, in dJ VIII, p. 87; “DR
1698”, 16 Apr.; Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Nov. 1699, in dJ VIII, p. 92; “DR 1700”,
22 Apr.; Batavia to H. XVII, 1 Dec. 1700, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 138; “DR
1701”, 21 May; Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Nov. 1701, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI,
p. 159; memorie for de Wilde, Batavia, 3 July 1705, in dJ VII, pp. 229-30;
Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1708, in dJ VIII, p. 150.
The Sémarang fortress was made of timber. By 1711 the palisades were already
said to be completely rotten; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1711, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V1, p. 798. A proposal by the VOC to have the fortress rebuilt in stone in
1733 was rejected by PB II; Coijett, Kartasura, to PB II, 17 Sept. 1733; PB II,
Kartasura, to Coijett, 29 Rabingulakir AJ 1658/10 Oct. 1733; both in AN Solo 52,
no. 8 “Papieren gehorende tot de contracten van 8 November 1733”.
18. Metsue, Sémarang to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1710, in VOC 1798 (OBIE
346 NOTES to pp. 158-9

Sémarang to Batavia, 24 Jan. 1711, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711), referring to a letter
from PB I “which can’t be very well translated after the original meaning by the
translator here.”
I have little information about Metsue. According to Coolhaas,Gen. Miss. VI, p.
426 n. 2, he first went to Sémarang as Onderkoopman and Fiskaal in 1702 and in
Aug. 1704 became senior administrator there. He was then posted to Palembang
as Opperhoofd. In July 1709 he became Opperkoopman and Gezaghebber on
Java’s pasisir.
19. Sémarang to Batavia, 18 Mar. 1710 & 11 July 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB
1711); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1710, in dJ VIII, p. 155; Ricklefs, “Missing
pusakas”, pp. 611-13.
20. S&marang to Batavia, 9 May 1710 & 11 July 1710; Kartanégara [calling
himself “Wester regent over alle des Sousouhounangs Cartasourase mitsgaders
bovenland en zeestrandsche mantries”], Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 Jumadilakir Jimakir
1634 (6 Aug. 1710), rec’d 16 Sept. 1710; Citrasoma [calling himself “groot
gouverneur over de oostersche stranden”’], Jépara, to Batavia, rec’d 26 Sept. 1710;
all in VOC 1798 (OB 1711). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1710, in dJ
VAIS lise
Because of disputes between Jayaningrat and CN III, the former’s authority over
West Madura was removed by PB I in 1712; Sémarang to Batavia, 8 June 1712,
in VOC 1829 (OB 1713); Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1712, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. VI, p. 887.
For Javanese accounts of this new administrative structure, see BK f. 588r.;
BTJ(BP), vol. XVUI, p. 41; BS I:74—-5, IV:1. The latter two sources use the
terms Panumping and Bumi Gédhe, but BK says Panumping and Bumi Gédhong.
It should be noted that there is some room for uncertainty about which of the two
regional groupings was called Panumping and which Bumi Gédhe. These terms are
also known in other contexts. In later periods Bumi Gédhe referred to north-
central Java and Panumping to Sokawati and Pajang. In Sérat Pustaka Raja Puwara
(a text of unclear provenance, probably from the 19th century: see Ricklefs, “Sta-
tistical evidence”, p. 3), it is said that Sultan Agung introduced new territorial di-
visions in AJ 1555 (AD 1633-4), among which were Siti Bumi for half of Kédhu
(the other half being Siti Bumija) and Siti Panumping for half of Pajang (the other
half being Siti Panékar); J. Brandes, “Register op de proza-omzetting van de Babad
Tanah Jawi (uitgave van 1874)”, VBG vol. 51, pt. 4 (1900), p. 152.
AR [had attempted several administrative reforms, mostly with disastrous results.
See de Graaf, Mangku-Rat I, especially vol. I, pp. 91-2, 107-9, 193-5.
21. BK f. 566r. says that PB I made Ki Citrasoma head (wédana) of the gédhong
kiwa and Ki Wiracana wédana of the gedhong téngén in Kartasura ca. 1705.
A convention of regarding both the pasisir and the moncanégara as consisting
of right and left halves persisted at least from this time. It is mentioned from time
to time in VOC and Javanese sources and is set out in some detail with reference
to the period ca. 1741 in BTJ(BP), vol. XXII, pp. 62-3. There each of these halves
is said to have a wédana at its head with a kliwon under him.
22. Semarang to Batavia, 11 July 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711), says that PB
I had contemplated adding a final layer at the top by placing his son Png. Blitar
over both Patihs, but that the VOC commandant at Kartasura C. Hartogh had
dissuaded him.
NOTES to p. 159 347

23. Sémarang to Batavia, 11 July 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711). According to
this source, the scribe was named “Nalladana” and was by then replaced. It is not
impossible that this is the scribe called Ki Carik Waladana who is mentioned in
the colophon of Museum Pusat MS KBG 613, Sérat Menak, dated AJ 1639 (AD
1715) and owned by PB I’s wife Ratu Mas Blitar. The colophon is printed in
Poerbatjaraka, Beschrijving der handschriften: Menak (Bandoeng: A.C. Nix &
Co., 1940), p. 30. There it is said that the scribe of the MS, Ki Carik Narawita,
was the son-in-law (ingkang mantu) of Ki Carik Waladana. L.F. Brakel argued
when he defended his 1975 Leiden doctoral thesis (Stelling XI) that ingkang mantu
Ki Carik Waladana should be understood as “helped by the scribe Waladana”’.
This understanding would be unusual, but if Brakel is right, then Waladana
(assuming him to be the same as the “Nalladana” who was reportedly fired as royal
scribe in 1710) still found some employment as a scribe in the royal family.
Brakel’s thesis is The Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyyah: A medieval Muslim-Malay
romance (s-Gravenhage: H.L. Smits, 1975).
24. PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 11 Jumadilawal AJ 1634 (8 July 1710), rec’d
20 Aug. 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1710, in dJ
VIUI, p. 154; PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 2 Bésar Jimakir 1634 (22 Jan. 1711), in
VOC 1813 (OB 1712); Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, pp. 612-13.
In his second letter cited above, PB I also told Batavia that he had fulfilled his
dues of rice and cash for that year. On the payments for this year, see also Sémarang
to Batavia, 11 Dec. 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711).
The other Patih, Kartanégara, had led an enbassy to Batavia in 1709; Batavia to
HX VIL 2 sNovenl7 LO pind Villa ps 1s 88Si 1:73:
25. Sémarang to Batavia, 24 Jan. 1711, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711); idem, 26 Feb.
1711, 12 Apr. 1711, 30 May 1711, in VOC 1813 (OB 1712); Batavia to H. XVII,
18 Feb. 1711, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 741; Semarang to Batavia, 23 Mar.
1716 & 6 Apr. 1716, in VOC 1886 (OB 1717).
Saréngat and Blitar were conventionally reckoned to have 2000 cacahs,
although the area may actually have had fewer households after the many years of
turbulence there (cf. Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”, pp. 22-8). Giving a prince
control of territories so far from the court was a significant innovation. Cakrajaya
told the VOC that one of the reasons why Blitar later surrendered the territories
in 1716 was because they could not produce their portions of rice and cash due to
the VOC; see p. 165 above.
26. Sémarang to Batavia, 24 Nov. 1711 & 16 Dec. 1711, in VOC 1813 (OB
1712). The bridle was Ky. Paramiling, but it is not said in these letters how it had
fallen into VOC hands. Batavia was of the opinion that PB I should not be so
concerned about the pusakas, “for none of these superstitious inessentials can give
him as much tranquillity and assurance as can the assistance of the Honourable
Company”; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1711, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 796.
See also Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, p. 614. The missing pusakas were report-
edly at last returned to Kartasura from Sri Lanka in 1737, after the death of AR
Ill. See Rautenberg, dagregister 5 Sept—14 Oct. 1737, in VOC 2418 (OB 1738);
BTJ(BP) vol. XXI, pp. 70-2. Neither of these sources offers any further details,
such as the names of the returned objects, which might constitute verification of
the bare assertion that the missing regalia had finally returned. BT/(BP) refers to
Kyai Bicak and to a jacket (rasukan), which must mean Kyai Gundhil, as being
Stone génthong (water container) in the ruins of Kartawinata/
Kartasari/Madegonda (present-day Maduganda).
NOTES to p. 160 349

among the pusakas whose return was sought by PB II, but when the text describes
their actual return it does so extraordinarily briefly, with no further details. More-
over, the date given in BTJ(BP) vol. XXI, p. 72, is inconsistent with the VOC
evidence. All of which suggests that perhaps none of this evidence should be taken
at face value.
27. PB I memorie for Cakrajaya, seen at Batavia Sept. 1712, in VOC 1829 (OB
1713); Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1712, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 888.
BS IV:4 describes the construction or reconstruction of the Prabayasa and Sitinggil
at the kraton at this time. BK ff. 589r.—v. says that at about the same time PBI sent
Ki Wiracana (see n. 21 above) to restore the roof of the Démak mosque but that
he died shortly after returning to Kartasura, to the king’s distress (see also Ricklefs,
“Missing pusakas”, pp. 613-14).
In PB I’s memorie cited above, he says that the new pasanggrahan was at
“Gempoll”. This suggests the Gémpol near Ponggok in the Jatinom district of
Klathen (Schoel, Register, p. 120), but this would be in Pajang rather than Ma-
taram. Later records enable one to pin down the site: BT/(BP), vol. XXI, p. 10;
Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 13 Sept. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725); and
Coster dagregister, 3 Sept—3 Oct. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725) (in de Graaf,
“Reis van Mangku-Rat IV”, p. 366), all report that in 1724 Kartawinata was
renamed Madeganda. De Graaf, “Reis van Mangku-Rat IV”, pp. 346, 347-8,
identifies this with a place called Maduganda, which from his map (p. 344) appears
to be identical with the Madugandu in Schoel, Register, p. 222. This is in kécamatan
Piyungan, east of Yogyakarta. I visited this area in Nov. 1987 and verified both
that the correct spelling is Maduganda and that de Graaf’s identification of this
with the place formerly called Madegonda is almost certainly correct, for in the
fields at Maduganda are found great volumes of antique bricks and a large stone
water container (génthong) which villagers say is still in its original position, being
too supernaturally powerful (kramat) to be moved (see preceding page). My visit
was made possible by the assistance of the late G.P. Poeroeboyo and Pak Dirjadi-
praja.
28. PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 4 Ruwah Alip 1635 (18 Sept. 1711), rec’d 30
Sept. 1711, in VOC 1813 (OB 1712); Sémarang to Batavia, 24 Nov. 1711, in VOC
1813 (OB 1712); BK f. 589r. (wrongly dating the change warna titiga ratu =AJ
1[6]34/Mar. 1710—Feb. 1711); BS 1V:2-3. PB I’s letter says that Kartanégara was
made head along with R.A. Sinduréja of “the Panumpings or our court servants at
Kartasura Adiningrat”. BK says that he was made head of the Panékar (a class of
court servants) of the gédhong kiwa. The VOC later identified Ratu Pakubuwana
as the cause of Kartanégara’s downfall; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ
XS pO:
29. Sémarang to Batavia, 14 July 1712 & 17 Aug. 1712; PB I memorie for
Cakrajaya, seen at Batavia Sept. 1712; Sémarang to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1712; all in
VOC 1829 (OB 1713). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1712, in Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss. V1, pp. 887-8; BS IV:4.
Valentyn, who had been summoned to Batavia to explain accusations he had
made about VOC affairs in Ambon, saw Cakrajaya in Batavia in Aug. 1712. He
described him as a very shrewd, friendly and jolly fellow who spoke good Portu-
guese, but it is probable that he confused Cakrajaya, whom he called Tg. of
Batang, with Puspanégara, who was really Tg. of Batang (Jayaningrat’s brother)
350 NOTES to pp. 160-1

but whom he described as Patih. Walling, memorie for Damius, Tégal, 1 Sept.
1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718), commented that Tg. Puspanégara spoke some
Chinese (being a péranakan Chinese himself), fairly good Portuguese and some
Dutch. Valentyn described Puspanégara (i.e. in fact Cakrajaya) as “uncommonly
surly and insolent”. See Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién vol. IV [pt. 1], pp.
205-6. On this stage of Valentyn’s career, which ended with him being sent home
to the Netherlands without salary, see de Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp. 278-80. The
appointment of Puspanégara (formerly named Pusparudita) over Batang by BES
ca. 1708 is described in BK f. 582r.
Among the VOC’s problems was clipping of silver coins. Citrasoma was ac-
cused of having 3-4 Javanese silversmiths employed full-time at this. Ky. A.
Wiraséntika of Kudus was said to be similarly engaged. Semarang to Batavia, 12
Apr. 1711, in VOC 1813 (OB 1712).
It will be recalled that under the treaty of 5 Oct. 1705 Sémarang and Kaligawe
belonged to the VOC but the tolls collected there belonged to PB I. See p. 335 n.
73 above.
30. Sémarang to Batavia, 17 Aug. 1712, in VOC 1829 (OB 1713). Prices varied
from Sp. RI. 6—7/koyan in inland districts from Sidayu to Jipang, Jagaraga and
Madiun to Sp. RI. 10 at Lasém and 12 at Surabaya and throughout Madura.
31. Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Jan. 1714, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 58.
32. Sergeant, Surabaya, to Batavia, 29 May 1708, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710);
Boreel, Pasuruan, to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1709 & 29 Aug. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB
1710); Sémarang to Batavia, 14 July 1712, in VOC 1829 (OB 1713).
VOC sources say the principal surviving son of Surapati was named Ky. Si
Rahman, but I cannot reconcile this with Javanese sources mentioning the names
of his sons. Ibrahim or Bérahim may be meant, since one of Surapati’s sons bore
this name. ;
The VOC force at Pasuruan amounted to 30 European and 50 Indonesian soldiers,
as compared to 200 and 50 respectively at Semarang and 60 and 40 at Surabaya;
Sémarang to Batavia, 16 Dec. 1711, in VOC 1813 (OB 1712).
33. Sémarang to Batavia, 16 Aug. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714), describes
Tirtakusuma as “een susters soon ... van de presenten Ratoe”.
34. Boreel, dagregister, Surabaya, 12 Nov. 1709, in VOC 1780 (OB 1710);
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1709, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, pp. 637-8; PB I,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 11 Sawal Wawu 1633 (14 Dec. 1709), rec’d 31 Mar. 1710,
in VOC 1798 (OB 1711); Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Nov. 1710, in dJ VIII, p. 156;
idem, 30 Nov. 1711, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 796; idem, 12 Feb. 1712, in
ibid., p. 841; idem, 25 Nov. 1712, in ibid., p. 887; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw
Oost—Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp. 206-7.
35. Sémarang to Batavia, 5 Nov. 1711, in VOC 1813 (OB 1712); Blocke, Bata-
via, to Governor-General, 4 Oct. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716): de Graaf, “Pandji
Sakti”, pp. 62, 80-1; Hendrik Gerard Christiaan Schulte Nordholt, Een Balische
dynastie: Hierarchie en conflict in de negara Mengwi 1700-1940 (Doctoral thesis,
Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam,1988), pp. 24-5.
VOC 1829 (OB 1713) contains several reports from 1712 about wars among the
lords of Bali, especially between Buleleng and Méngwi. These are mostly rumours
of uncertain reliability.
Méngwi covered territories later shared among Tabanan, Badung and Gianyar.
NOTES to pp. 161-3 351

See the map in Schulte Nordholt, Een Balische dynastie, p. 3; or that in J.L.
Swellengrebel et al., Bali: Studies in life, thought and ritual (The Hague & Bandung:
W. van Hoeve Ltd.,1960), p. 160.
Méngwi’s ambitions may not have stopped at Blambangan. Gusti Panji Da-
nudrésta, Buleleng, to Batavia, rec’d 26 Dec. 1710, in VOC 1798 (OB 1711),
claimed that Méngwi had been invited by Surapati’s sons to assist in the conquest
of Kédhiri. This may well have been nothing more than an attempt by Buleleng
to solicit VOC support against Méngwi. It should be noted, however, that in 1712
there were further rumours of Balinese and Blambangan designs on Pasuruan,
Malang, Surabaya and Kédhiri, but the VOC suspected that these were spread by
the Surabayan governors Jayapuspita, Jangrana III and Panji Surengrana so as to
have an excuse not to go to Kartasura, where their eldest brother Jangrana II had
been murdered in 1709; Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1712, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. V1, pp. 886—7. Valentyn claimed that the Balinese were seeking revenge for
the alleged massacre by Boreel in 1709; Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt.
ly pe 07:
36. Sémarang to Batavia, 18 Mar. 1713, 23 Mar. 1713, 20 Apr. 1713, 15 May
1713, 26 July 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714). There is no doubt about Méngwi’s
continuing claim to overlordship over Blambangan. A Balinese letter from Gusti
Agung [Sakti or Anom] “hooft tot Balemboangan ... uit zijn negorij Mangoeij”
is referred to in Sémarang to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714). To
replace Katawéngan, PB I agreed to the installation of the Patih Cakrajaya’s brother
Surajaya; de Graaf & Pigeaud, “Kadiri en het geslacht Katawengan”, p. 431.
37. CN III, Madura, to Batavia, rec’d 19 June 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714).
38. Sémarang to Batavia, 17 Sept. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714).
39. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 47, 50-1.
40. Sémarang to Batavia, 16 Aug. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714); van
Westreenen ef al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Aug. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714);
Sémarang to Batavia, 17 Sept. 1713, 2 Oct. 1713, 3 Oct. 1713, 3 Nov. 1713, 20
Dec. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714); idem, 14 Feb. 1714, 11 Mar. 1714, 6 May
14a SeAuc.el 7145 ins VOC 1857 (OBN15)x BK fj59lva BS [V¥:5—6.
The VOC commander at Pasuruan at this time was Lt. Dirk Geijthoorn, one of
my personal favourites among the VOC’s alcoholic eccentrics. He had been causing
trouble there since 1711. In 1713 he was reprimanded when it was discovered that
“accompanied by his assistant and a whole fleet, he sailed up and down the Gombong
river with whores, and whenever he passed the Company’s boats lying in the river
he had them fire 32—gun salutes.” The effect on the VOC’s gunpowder supplies
can be imagined. He was not removed from his command, however, until it was
ascertained that for 8—10 days in any month he was totally incapacitated by drink.
See Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Nov. 1711, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. V1, p. 887; idem,
13 Jan. 1713, in ibid., p. 907; Sémarang to Batavia, 17 Sept. 1713 & 3 Nov. 1713,
in VOC 1844 (OB 1714); Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Jan. 1714, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. VII, p. 58.
41. Sémarang to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1713, 16 Aug. 1713, 31 Aug. 1713, 17 Sept.
1713, 20 Dec. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714); BS IV:5. On the probable date of
PB I’s birth, see p. 328 n. 27 above.
42. PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 17 Jumadilakir Ehe 1636 (22 July 1712), rec’d
29 Aug. 1712, in VOC 1829 (OB 1713). For various and frequently conflicting
352 NOTES to p. 163

reports, see Sémarang to Batavia, 18 Mar. 1713, in VOC 1844 (OB 1714); Batavia
to H. XVII, 11 Jan. 1714, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 56; idem, 26 Feb. 1714,
in ibid., p. 75; Sémarang to Batavia, 14 Feb. 1714, 18 Aug. 1714, 21 Oct. 1714,
in VOC 1857 (OB 1715).
43. Sémarang to Batavia, 14 Feb. 1714, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715); Batavia to
H. XVII, 26 Nov. 1714, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 123. The VOC com-
plained, however, that PB I’s lords of the moncanégara were insufficiently assidu-
ous in meeting their master’s debt obligations; Semarang to Batavia, 21 Apr. 1714,
in VOC 1857 (OB 1715).
Some rearrangement of payment schedules was agreed between the VOC and
Cakrajaya in this period, but the details are not clear to me. In any case, these new
arrangements seem to have envisaged PB I’s debt being fully repaid within the
original term of 25 years set by the 1705 treaty, for in 1714 they set a period of
16 years for repayment. See Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Nov. 1714, in Coolhaas, Gen.
Miss. VU, p. 124; idem, 14 Jan. 1715, in ibid., p. 147.
It is worth noting that the Javanese royalty’s adoption of European dress on
some occasions, like the Javanese adoption of snaphaenen, provides a contrast
with India, where there was “a general indifference to European dress and cos-
tume”; Qaisar, Indian response, pp. 124-5. See also p. 225 above.
44. Sémarang to Batavia, 15 Nov. 1714, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715). Jongbloet
was born in the Netherlands. In Apr. 1703 he was named second-in-charge at
Sémarang, in 1706 Resident of Tégal and then of Cirébon. In June 1714 he became
Gezaghebber on Java’s east coast. In Apr. 1715 he died in Semarang. See de Haan,
Priangan, vol. I, pp. 227-8.
45. Jongbloet, Semarang, to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1714 & 15 Nov. 1714, in VOC
1857 (OB 1715). Saloringpasar had also got himself into trouble with PB I in
1708; see PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 5 Mulud [AJ 1632] (26 May 1708), rec’d
6 June 1708, in VOC 1764 (OB 1709).
The fear of Balinese was of course connected with memories of Surapati, of
other vagabonds and of the Balinese conquests of Blambangan. There were even
rumours in 1714 that Gusti Agung Anom of Blambangan and Méngwi and his
uncle the lord of Buleleng were intending to invade East Java and restore Maja-
pahit, but these proved unfounded; Sémarang to Batavia, 14 Feb. 1714 & 11 Mar.
1714, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715); Schulte Nordholt, Een Balische dynastie, pp.
27-8. By the beginning of 1715, PB I had ordered that all Balinese at Kartasura
and in the countryside be captured or killed. Small numbers of Balinese were sent
to the VOC at Sémarang in subsequent months. See Batavia to H. XVII, 14 Jan.
1715, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 147; idem, 18 Feb. 1715, in ibid., p. 159;
idem, 28 Nov. 1715, in ibid., p. 194. Early in 1715 the lord of Banyumas was
executed in Kartasura for harbouring Balinese and was replaced by a protégé of
Ratu Pakubuwana; Jongbloet, Semarang, to Batavia, 8 Feb. 1715, in VOC 1871
(OB 1716).
46. Monday-Pon, 12 Mulud, Dal 1639 = 18 Mar. 1715. Javanese believe that
the Prophet was born on Monday (in the 7-day week) -Pon (in the 5-day week),
12 Mulud in a year Dal ( in the 8-year cycle). In Dal-years down to the introduc-
tion of the so-called “Thursday calendar” in AJ 1675/AD 1749, 12 Mulud always
fell on Monday-Pon and this Garébég Mulud Dal was celebrated with special
festivities. When the “Thursday calendar” was introduced, Dal was given abnor-
NOTES to pp. 163-4 353

mal month lengths so as to preserve 12 Mulud Dal as a Monday-Pon. See Soedjono

Tirtokoesoemo, Garebegs, pp. 109 et seqq.; Ricklefs, Tradition, p. 228.
47. Sémarang to Batavia, 18 Dec. 1714, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715); Jongbloet,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 18 Dec. 1714 & 8 Jan. 1715, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715):
idem, 8 Feb. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716); Sémarang to Batavia, 5 Apr. 1715,
in VOC 1871 (OB 1716); PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, rec’d 11 Apr. 1715, in VOC
1871 (OB 1716); Sémarang to Batavia, 27 July 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716);
Beijlwits, Semarang, to Batavia, 27 July 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716); Sémarang
to Batavia, 17 Nov. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716).
PB I agreed to pay Sp. RI. 300 annually for the maintenance of Saloringpasar
and his small group of followers on the Cape. In 1723 AR IV refused Saloringpasar’s
request for a higher level of support; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 16 Feb.
1723, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
The Saloringpasar tale is also told in BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 62, 64, out of
chronological sequence and with what appears to be an interpolated section on pp.
62—4 which probably belongs on p. 65. The text says that the VOC deceived
(ambujuk) Saloringpasar.
Saloringpasar died on the Cape in 1737. The return of his body to Java for burial
is reported in BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, p. 75.
48. Sémarang to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1715 & 26 Mar. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB
1716). The VOC sent 50 European soldiers to strengthen its coastal posts at this
time.
49. Hertogh, Kartasura, to Batavia, 30 Mar. 1715; Sémarang to Batavia, 5 Apr.
1715; both in VOC 1871 (OB 1716). On this occasion PB I reportedly advised the
Crown prince to give his brothers Pngs. Purbaya, Blitar, Dipasonta and Dipanagara
4 pusaka pikes named Kéboabang, Kalanada, Karawélang and Si Macan. As was
pointed out in Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, p.615, only Karawélang had previ-
ously been identified as a pusaka, being one of the few genuine regalia returned
to the kraton in Jan. 1709. Was the court now creating (or “discovering”) new
pusakas or had the VOC Resident at Kartasura misunderstood what was said on
this occasion?
50. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 21 Aug. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720), says that this arrangement was made during PB I’s trip to Mataram in 1715.
51. Sémarang to Batavia, 21 Sept. 1715 & 15 Oct. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB
1716); idem, 6 Feb. 1716, in VOC 1886 (OB 1717); BS IV:7-8 (dating the shaving
Monday-Pon, wuku Wugu, 10 Ramélan Dal 1639 = 9 Sept. 1715, which is inter-
nally consistent and in agreement with VOC reports); BK f. 591r. (noting merely
that the king was shaved during Ramélan).
For a discussion of other evidence on ritual head-shaving in Javanese, Malay,
Bugis and Sundanese practice, see Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, pp. 616-18. See
also van Goens’s description in de Graaf, Van Goens, p. 260. On Gunturgéni, see
Crucq, “Kanonnen in den kraton”, pp. 94-8 and plates; idem, “Nog eenige
gegevens”, pp. 49-59. Crucq regards Gunturgéni and Sapujagat as the same weapon,
whereas in BK f. 562v. they are treated as two.
52. BS IV:9 See also Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”, p. 618.
53. Sémarang to Batavia, 29 June 1716, 18 July 1716, 27 July 1716, 29 Aug.
1716, 8 Sept. 1716, in VOC 1886 (OB 1717); BS IV:9-10. The VOC report that
4 villages near the eruption were buried by debris and lava and 20 people were
killed.
354 NOTES to pp. 165-6

54. Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1712, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 826; idem,
13 Jan. 1713, in ibid., p. 907; idem, 11 Jan. 1714, in ibid. VII, p. 58; idem, 14 Jan.
1715, in ibid., p. 148; idem, 28 Nov. 1715, in ibid., p. 195; idem, 15 Jan. 1717,
in ibid., p. 273; idem, 30 Nov. 1717, in ibid., p. 318.
As usual, VOC personnel caused various difficulties for the Company. The Lt.
in command at Kartasura, Jochum Fredrikse van Dresden, was such a drunk that
he had to be fired in 1717, after which he apparently reformed himself; Hertog,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 24 June 1717; Hertog, Sémarang, to PB I, Kartasura, 19
Aug. 1717; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 16 Oct. 1717 & 14 Dec. 1717; all in
VOC 1898 (OB 1718). On bastard children from liaisons with Javanese women at
this time, see Sémarang to Batavia, | Oct. 1716 & 14 Jan. 1717, in VOC 1886 (OB
1717); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1716, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, pp. 256-7.
55. Beijlwits, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Sept. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716);
Sémarang to Batavia, 5 Aug. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718); Batavia to H. XVII,
30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, pp. 4-6.
56. Beijlwits, Sémarang, to Batavia, 14 Sept. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716);
Sémarang to Batavia, 6 Apr. 1716, in VOC 1886 (OB 1717).
Cool & Vaver, Sémarang, to Dubbeldekop, 9 Mar. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB
1724), lists the following rice deliveries (in rounded koyans):

1709/10: 719 =:1714/15: 863

1710/11: 177. 1715/16: 843
IVAUIVAWZS eeketey INTAIMGYANTS BIS
TGF LS 7 Opel arylea Or
1713/14: 719 1718/19: O
The average annual rice delivery for 1711/12 to 1717/18 was thus 795 koyans. On
PB I’s debt repayments in general, see Table I p. 154 above.
57. Hertog, Sémarang, to Batavia, 23 Mar. 1716 & 6 Apr. 1716, in VOC 1886
(OB 1717); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1716, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p.
255. See also p. 344 n. 8 above on the impossibility of assessing whether the
burden of deliveries was heavy for Javanese society as a whole; some comparative
data considered there suggests that it may not have been.
Png. Blitar had been given these territories in 1711 over VOC objections; see
p. 159 above.
In 1715 the VOC also agreed to PB I’s request to lengthen his debt repayment
term beyond the 25 years stipulated in the 1705 contract, but refused to reduce the
amount of the debt itself. Beijlwits, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Sept. 1715, in VOC
1871 (OB 1716); Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Nov. 1715, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII,
yo); HEI),
58. Batavia to H. XVII, 11 Jan. 1714, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, pp. 56-7;
Jongbloet, Sémarang, to Batavia, 18 Aug. 1714, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715); Sé-
marang to Batavia, 21 Aug. 1714, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715); Batavia to H. XVII,
26 Nov. 1714, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 123; idem, 14 Jan. 1715, in ibid.,
p. 147; van Tets & van Lis, Sémarang, to Batavia, 26 Mar. 1715, in VOC 1871
(OB 1716); Sémarang to Batavia, 14 June 1715, in VOC 1871(OB 1716); Beijlwits,
Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Sept. 1715, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716); Hertog, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 26 Dec. 1715 , in VOC 1871 (OB 1716); PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia,
15 Bésar Dal 1639 (12 Dec. 1715), rec’d 22 Jan. 1716, in VOC 1871 (OB 1716);
NOTES to pp. 166-7 359

Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1716, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, pp. 211-12;
Hertog, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1716, 23 Mar. 1716, 6 Apr. 1716, 18 Apr.
1716, 6 May 1716, 29 June 1716, in VOC 1886 (OB 1717); BS IV:10-11; BK ff.
592r.—v., 594v. There are several other letters in VOC 1871 (OB 1716) concerning
the dispute between CN III and his nephews Tgs. Suryawinata and Sasrawinata in
Ney
It should be noted that there is confusion in VOC records, which say that
Jayaningrat’s brother Tg. Puspanégara of Batang was involved. The lord of Grésik
was also named Tg. Puspanégara and it is clear from later records that it was he
whom the Surabayans, and thus presumably CN III, accused. For Ky. Panji
Surengrana’s criticisms of Puspanégara of Grésik, see Sémarang to Batavia, 12
Aug. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718). Valentyn describes a meeting with this
Puspanégara in Aug. 1706 in Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 156.
On the murder of Jangrana II in 1709, see pp. 153-4 above.
59. Damius, secret report to Hertog, Semarang, 1 Mar. 1717; Hertog, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1717 & 26 Apr. 1717; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Nov.
1717; all in VOC 1898 (OB 1718). On a revered Hindu priest called Arya Sumeru
and the great Balinese pilgrimage to Mt. Sumeru in 1729, see Schulte Nordholt,
Een Balische dynastie, pp. 28-9.
60. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718);
Gobius & Bergman, memorie for Peijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914
(OB 1719).
On the Surabayans’ ancestry, see also p. 280 n. 5 above. Raids by up to 1000
Balinese were reported from Java’s eastern salient in 1717; Sémarang to Batavia,
26 Apr. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
61. Hertog, Sémarang, to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
62. Idem, 26 Apr. 1717; Torant & Blocke, Batavia, to Governor-General, 17
Aug. 1717; both in VOC 1898 (OB 1718). See also Schulte Nordholt, Een
Balische dynastie, pp. 25, 28.
63. Hertog, Sémarang, to Batavia, 24 June 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718);
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, pp. 1-3.
64. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, p. 3 VOC manpower on the
pasisir was of the order of 1000 between 1711 and 1716. In 1717 it was increased
to about 1100 and by 1718 substantial reinforcements were arriving (after suffering
about 9 percent fatalities on the voyage out). See Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.
1711, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 798; idem, 25 Nov. 1712, in ibid., p. 889;
idem, 11 Jan. 1714, in ibid. VII, p. 58; idem, 26 Nov. 1714, in ibid., p. 125; idem,
28 Nov. 1715, in ibid., p. 195; idem, 30 Nov. 1716, in ibid., p. 257; idem, 30 Nov.
1717, in ibid., pp. 318-19; idem, 6 Dec. 1718, in ibid., p. 353.
65. Van der Lelij, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 9 Aug. 1717; Sémarang to Batavia,
12 Aug. 1717; Sémarang to van der Lelij, Surabaya, 17 Aug. 1717; Sémarang to
Batavia, 24 Aug. 1717; all in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
66. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 16 Oct. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718);
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, p. 3; Gobius, Sémarang, to Walling,
Kartasura, 18 Dec.1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718); Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia,
23 Dees 1717, in' VOC1898 (OB>1718).
On the appointment of Gobius, see dJ IX, pp. i-ii. The VOC’s senior officer
(1715-17) on the coast Caspar Hertog (also known as Cornelis Hartogh or Her-
356 NOTES to pp. 168-9

togh) was old and debilitated by 1717 and was replaced by Gobius. The latter was
born in Ober Ingelheim in 1679 and came to the Indies in 1694. In 1708 he was
made administrator in Bantén, in 1716 Resident at Cirébon, in May 1717
Gezaghebber on Java’s east coast. As will be seen below, he gave little satisfaction
in this appointment. In 1723 he was made governor of Sulawesi but was recalled
from there in 1727. He was then named governor of Malacca where he died in
1730. See Wijnaendts van Resandt, Gezaghebbers, pp. 215-16. He was punished
for corruption at several points in his career; see Batavia to H. XVII, 23 Mar.
1730, in dJ IX, p. 157; H. XVII to Batavia, 14 Sept. 1731, in dJ IX, p. 165; dJ IX,
p. xi. He was said to be competent in the indigenous language, presumably meaning
Malay; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, p. 1.

Notes to Chapter 10

1. For descriptions of the Javanese road and waterway network, see Schrieke,
Sociological studies, vol. Ul, pp. 102—20; Milaan, “Beschouwingen”.
2. See Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”, pp. 14-15.
3. See p. 165 above.
4. In Nov. 1717 the Surabaya garrison had 194 men, Pasuruan 150. After sending
8 men to reinforce Rémbang, Sémarang itself was left with only 196 European and
5 Indonesian soldiers, 9 of them being in hospital. Batavia proposed to send
immediately 300-350 European and 4-500 Indonesian military plus 250 seamen
to reinforce its coastal posts. Semarang to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1717 & 23 Nov. 1717,
in VOC 1898 (OB 1718); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, pp. 8-9.
5. Van der Lelij, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 22 Aug. 1717 & 1 Sept. 1717; Panji
Surengrana, Surabaya, to van der Lelij, Surabaya, rec’d Sémarang 4 Sept. 1717;
Hertog, Sémarang, to Batavia, 6 Sept. 1717; Hertog & Gobius, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 17 Sept. 1717; CN Il, Tanjung, to Batavia, rec’d 24 Sept. 1717; CN III,
Tanjung, to Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 20 Nov. 1717; all in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
See further Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, p. 4; BK ff. 592r.—v.; BS
IV:10-11.
The Surabaya VOC provided Puspanégara with 28 European and 25 Makasarese
soldiers to help resist Panji Surengrana.
CN HI reportedly solicited the support of the Sultan of Bantén, but the details
of this are obscure. Blocke interview with Jangkewuh & Wirapaksa, Batavia, 6
Oct. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718); Sémarang to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1717, in VOC
1898 (OB 1718); Batavia to H. XVI, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, p. 4; Gobius,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 13-14; idem, 11 Feb. 1718, in
dJ IX, pp. 17-18; Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ LX, pp. 32-3.
6. PB I, Kartasura, to CN III, Tanjung, 24 Sawal Wawu 1641 (1 Oct. 1717),
rec'd Batavia 25 Oct. 1717; PB I, Kartasura, to Jayapuspita, Jangrana III, Panji
Surengrana, Surabaya, 24 Sawal Wawu 1641 (1 Oct. 1717); van der Lelij, Sura-
baya, to Sémarang, 13 Oct. 1717; Sémarang to Batavia, 16 Oct. 1717; CN TI,
Tanjung, to PB I, Kartasura, 18 Dulkangidah Wawu 1641 (24 Oct. 1717); Panji
Surengrana, Lamongan, to Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 25 Oct. 1717; Jayapuspita &
Jangrana III, Surabaya, to Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 25 Oct. 1717; Jayapuspita,
Jangrana III, Panji Surengrana, Surabaya, to PB I, Kartasura, | Noy. 1717; Sémarang
NOTES to pp. 169-71 357

to CN III, Tanjung, 12 Nov. 1717; Sémarang to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1717; Sémarang

to Jayapuspita & Jangrana III, Surabaya, 16 Nov. 1717; Sémarang to Panji Sureng-
rana, 16 Nov. 1717; all in VOC 1898 (OB 1718). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30
INfow, ALTE GU ADS jay 33 JES IDY EI.
7. Sémarang to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1717, 20 Nov. 1717, 22 Nov. 1717; Sémarang
to PB I, Kartasura, 20 Nov. 1717; Puspanégara to Sémarang, rec’d 23 Nov. 1717;
Dewa Kaloran, Grésik, to Puspadirana, rec’d S¢marang 23 Nov. 1717; all in VOC
1898 (OB 1718). See further Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1717, in dJ IX, pp. 4,
8; BS IV:12-13; BK ff. 593r.-v.
The VOC at Pasuruan reported that the Balinese had asked the Surabayan
emissaries who sought their aid what would happen if the VOC intervened and
were told in reply that there was nothing to fear, for the English were coming to
take Surabaya from the VOC. Gobius, Sémarang to Walling, Kartasura, 17 Dec.
1717; Sémarang, to Batavia, 20 Nov. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
It should be noted that in Tradition, pp. 131, 195, I was wrong to identify Dewa
Kaloran as “the Lord of the North, i.e. Buleleng”, Panji Sakti. Panji Sakti was dead
by this time in any case and VOC archival sources make it clear that Dewa
Kaloran was the man’s name (not a description of where he came from) and say
that he was from Badung. As will be seen below, Buleleng forces soon joined him
under the command of Ki Gusti Panji Danudrésta, Gusti Panji Sakti’s son.
8. Sémarang to Batavia, 22 Nov. 1717, 4 Dec. 1717, 14 Dec. 1717; van der
Lelij, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 13 Dec. 1717; Sémarang to Walling, Kartasura, 17
Dec. 1717; Sémarang to Batavia, 23 Dec. 1717; all in VOC 1898 (OB 1718). See
further BS IV:14.
9. Walling, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Jan. 1718, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
10. Van der Lelij, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 26 Nov. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB
1718); Sémarang to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1717 & 14 Dec. 1717; in VOC 1898 (OB
1718); Benzin, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 8 Jan. 1718, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718);
Adikara et al., Kabalegan, to Sémarang, rec’d 21 Feb. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB
1719). On BK’s version of the conflict between Suradiningrat and CN III, see n.
13 below.
In Dec. 1717 it was reported that the Surabaya rebels had declared their loyalty
to PB I’s brother Png. A. Mataram; van der Lelij, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 20 Dec.
1717; Sémarang to Batavia, 11 Jan. 1718; both in VOC 1898 (OB 1718). The
Dutch translation of a letter from them to Jayaningrat, under date 25 Mar. 1718,
in VOC of 1914 (OB 1719), refers to their loyalty to the descendants of the “great
Mataram lord”, which may be a translator’s attempt to translate Png. A. Mataram
literally, but it also raises the possibility that this is all a misunderstanding by the
VOC professions of loyalty to the house of Mataram, perhaps to the line of AR
III rather than to PB I.
Gobius & Bergman, memorie for Peijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914
(OB 1719), reported that the commander of 3000 Balinese then with the rebels was
said to be the lord of Buleleng “Gustij Moera Pandjie” himself. On Méngwi’s
conquest of Blambangan in 1711, see p. 161 above.
11. Walling, Kartasura, to Semarang, 9 Dec. 1717; PB I, Kartasura, to Sémarang,
6 Muharam Jimakir 1642 (10 Dec. 1717), rec’d Batavia, 19 Dec. 1717; Semarang
to Batavia, 14 Dec. 1717; Sémarang to PB I, Kartasura, 18 Dec. 1717; Walling,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 29 Dec. 1717 & 3 Jan. 1718; Gobius, Jépara, to Walling,
358 NOTES to p. 172

Kartasura, 9 Jan. 1718; Gobius, Jépara, to PB I, Kartasura, 9 Jan. 1718; Gobius,

Jépara, to Batavia, 11 Jan. 1718; all in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
Unfortunately I have no information on Walling before his appointment to
Kartasura in 1717. Png. Purbaya had acted as commander of PB I’s forces in 1707;
see p. 146 above.
12. Sémarang to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1717 & 14 Dec. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB
1718; Gobius, Jépara, to Batavia, 11 Jan. 1718, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718); Sémarang
to Batavia, 15 Jan. 1718, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718); Gobius to Walling, Kartasura,
15 Jan. 1718, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718); PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 18 Sapar
Jimakir 1642 (21 Jan. 1718), rec’d 10 Mar. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719);
Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 11 Feb. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719); Walling,
Kartasura, to Gobius, 21 Jan. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). BK ff. 593v.-594v.
makes no mention of the difficulties over who should command PB I’s forces.
Cakrajaya’s payment was just over 672 koyans of rice and Sp. RI. 13,894 for
the previous year, a total cash equivalent of Sp. RI. 27,334 or about 0.87 of a
normal year’s dues. As can be seen from Table I, p. 154 above, however, the dues
for 1717/18 were (for reasons unknown to me) somewhat higher than normal (they
may have included the annual Sp. RI. 300 for the maintainance of
Png.Ng.Saloringpasar on the Cape) and some other small payments seem to have
been made.
Among the VOC officers was Lt. Jochum Fredrikse van Dresden, now appar-
ently sober enough to be reemployed (cf. p. 354 n. 54 above); Sémarang to Bata-
via, 14 Dec. 1717 & 15 Jan. 1718, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
On the use of the term fusil (employed by the VOC’s translator of PB I’s letter
of 18 Sapar 1642 for what, in the Javanese original, was probably sinapan), see
also Chandler, Warfare in the age of Marlborough, p. 77.
13. BK ff. 607r.—v. has this episode out of chronological order, placing it in late
1718, after fighting had commenced in Surabaya. It says that Suradiningrat con-
spired with A. Dikara of Pamékasan against CN HI because Dikara’s wife, who
was CN III's daughter, had fled to CN III and was being protected by him. There-
fore Suradiningrat told the VOC that CN III had rebelled in concert with the Sura-
bayans and that he would take a stand against him. The story is possible, at least
in part: when CN III’s wives came aboard a VOC ship on 16 Jan. 1718, the VOC
records confirm that with them came CN III’s daughter R. Adikara, the wife of the
lord of Pamékasan (Gobius ef al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1718, in dJ IX, p.
9).
14. Gobius et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 9-12. The
story is also told in Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], pp.
208-9. BK ff. 608r.—v. says that when CN III's wife came on board Kapitan Kartas
took her hand and kissed her neck “for it was Dutch custom to make no difference
between men and women”. But she took this amiss and CN III responded by
drawing his Aris and running amuck. This version is not necessarily more improb-
able than the VOC account: my preference for the Dutch version rests essentially
on its contemporaneousness.
The dead VOC Capt. was Dominicus Marius Pasques de Chavonnes. A chest
containing Sp. Rl. 2000 had been brought on board by CN III and was sent by
Cakrajaya to Pasques de Chavonnes’ widow; Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 389.
NOTES to pp. 172-4 B09

15. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1718, in dJ IX, p. 13; idem, 11 Feb.
1718, in dJ IX, p. 17; idem, 19 Mar. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719); Gobius &
Bergman, memorie for Peijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719);
Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 476; BK f.
609r. Although CN IV did not gain the Cakraningrat title until 1720, I will use it
for him from this point on to avoid unnecessary confusion
16. Suradiningrat to Batavia, rec’d 21 Apr. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
17. Gobius et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 11-12;
Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 12-13, 14; Gobius et al.,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 11 Feb. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 14-15; BK ff. 594r. et seqq.
Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 19 Mar. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719), gives
VOC troops strengths as follows: 429 European military, 265 marines, 125 train
personnel of various sorts, 1019 Indonesian military (total 1838). In Jan. these
numbers would have been higher, for Gobius said that 69 Europeans had died and
108 fallen ill since the start of the campaign (see has second apart letter of the
above date). The VOC palisade at Grésik was call ’t Goet Gevolg (“the Good
Following”) with conscious reference to ’t Goet Begin set up at Démak in 1704
(see p. 138 above); Gobius et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 14 May 1718, in VOC
1914 (OB 1719).
A “Plaan van het Fort, Retrenchement en omleggende cituatie van Surabaya”,
dated 1719 by Leupe, /nventaris, is found as VEL 1280 in ARA.
18. Gobius et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 11 Feb. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 15-16;
idem, 19 Mar. 1718, 29 Mar. 1718, 9 Apr. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). It may
be this battle which is described in BK ff. 601r.—605r., dd. Jar dadi obah ing bumi
(AJ 1642/ Dec. 1717—Nov. 1718).
It is relevant to quote Chistopher Duffy’s comment that “The prudent com-
mander liked to be certain that the attacking army would outnumber the garrison
by a ration of anything between five and ten to one”; Fire and stone, p. 90.
19. Gobius et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 11 Feb. 1718, in dJ IX, p. 16; idem, 16
Apr. 1718 & 14 May 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719) (quotations from these
letters).
Earth was a major element in European fortress construction of the time because
of its capacity to absorb cannonballs. Duffy, Fire and stone, p. 49, says that a
24-Ib. siege gun could “penetrate only about fifteen feet [4. 6m] in light earth, and
twelve [3.7m] in more resistant soil (musket balls had a greatest penetration of
about thirty inches [76 cm])”.
20. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 19 Mar. 1718; Raasveldt to Gobius, Sura-
baya, 28 Mar. 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 29 Mar. 1718; all in VOC 1914
(OB 1719). The VOC garrison at Pasuruan offered PB I’s lord Rongga Pasuruan
their protection, but could do nothing to expel the Balinese and the local Javanese
who joined them.
21. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 9 Apr. 1718 & 1 June 1718, in VOC 1914
(OB 1719): in the second letter Gobius said that he hoped to stand and walk soon.
Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 18 Aug. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719),
reported that the leg was still not fully healed.
22. Gobius, Surabaya, to Ceesjong, 8 Mar. 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia,
29 Mar. 1718; both in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
23. Jayapuspita & Jangrana III to Jayaningrat, under date 25 Mar. 1718; Gobius,
360 NOTES to pp. 174-5

Surabaya, to Batavia, 16 Apr. 1718; Jayapuspita/Panatagama, Surabaya, to all

coastal Muslims, rec’d Batavia 27 Apr. 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 4
Nov. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
24. BK f. 60Ir. refers to the para kaum, all dressed in white, the 700 para
ulama, the para kétib, Ki Pangulu Akim and Pangulu Ambak Aji in this prang
santri: it is of course possible that prang santri is a scribal error for prang sabil
(holy war). BK f. 610v. refers to the religious foik of the mountains (para kaum
saking ing pagunungan) joining the Surabayan forces and says that the Surabayan
fighters all practised the Kulhu (Stra CXII of the Qur’ dn), a brief profession of the
unity of God; see the English translations in Arberry, Koran interpreted, vol. I, p.
353; or in Ali, Al-Qur’an, p. 559. In Java this Stra was used to teach children
Arabic; see Gericke & Roorda, Handwoordenboek (1901), vol. I, p. 483.
The VOC were also told by people fleeing from the rebel side that the rebels had
attempted to collect religious students so as to establish a “queekschool van
geestelijcke” (i.e. a pésantren),; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, | Oct.
1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ
IX, pp. 22-3.
25. See pp. 145, 149 above.
26. See Qur'an III:64 et seqq. See Arberry’s translation vol. I, pp. 83 et seqq.
or Ahmed Ali’s pp. 57 et seqq.
27. Note, for example, the letter from Gusti Panji Danudrésta of Buleleng to
Capt. “Daing Matara”, Surabaya, rec’d Batavia 17 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB
1719), where the Balinese lord says that he and others are crossing to Java “to help
the Javanese notables, who invited and summoned us from Bali to this end, to
eradicate and to exterminate the Dutchmen who are at Sémarang and elsewhere on
the coast of Java and at Kartasura”. See also Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in
dJ IX, p. 21. For a discussion of Hindu-Islamic accommodation and synthesis on
the Balinese side, see Adrian Vickers, “Hinduism and Islam in Indonesia: Bali and
the Pasisir world”, /ndonesia no. 44 (Oct. 1987), pp. 31-58.
Heh, WI ti, CMe, ITE, CANE.
29. Ceesjong & Benedix to Walling, Kartasura, 28 Mar. 1718; Ceesjong &
Benedix, “Penetikan”, to Gobius, Surabaya, 28 Mar. 1718 & 28 Apr. 1718; Ceesjong
& Benedix, Wirasaba, to Gobius, Surabaya, 12 May 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to
Batavia, 14 May 1718, 1 June 1718, 13 June 1718; Ceesjong & Kartanégara to
Gobius, 15 June 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 22 June 1718; all in VOC
1914 (OB 1719). See also BK ff. 594y. et seqg. On the location of Térusan, see
de Graaf, Sultan Agung, p. 95.
30. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 19 Mar. 1718; Ceesjong & Benedix, near
Sépanjang, to Gobius, Surabaya, 25 June 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 29
June 1718; Kartanégara to Gobius, Surabaya, rec’d Batavia 14 July 1718; Ceesjong
& Benedix, Sépanjang, to Gobius, Surabaya, 29 June 1718 & 6 July 1718; Gobius,
Surabaya, to Ceesjong, Sépanjang, 9 July 1718 & 18 July 1718; Ceesjong &
Benedix, Sépanjang, to Gobius, Surabaya, 19 July 1718; Ceesjong, Sépanjang, to
Gobius, Surabaya, 9 Aug. 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 18 Aug. 1718; all
in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also BK ff. 605r.—v.; BS IV:14—15 (note the mis-
translation in Ricklefs, Tradition, p. 131, of 1V:15a: “Thus they surrounded Sura-
baya” should be “Thus they were surrounded by the Surabayans” for dadya
angépung ing Surabanggi).
NOTES to pp. 175-7 361

Simon Ceesjong (or Keesjong) was said to be “knowledgeable in the land and
language” (land— en taalkundig), which usually meant Malay rather than Javanese
(van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 19 Feb. 1720, in VOC 1948 [OB 1721)).
Sometimes his name is treated as if his surname was Jong (i.e. Simon Kees Jong).
In Javanese he was called Kapitan Simong; see Puspanégara to Jayaningrat,
Pékalongan, seen at Sémarang, 12 Aug. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722); Mangku-
négara to Sémarang, 24 Muharam Be 1648 (25 Oct. 1723), rec’d 28 Oct. 1723, in
VOC 2000 (OB 1724). He rather than the VOC merchant and translator Johannes
Simong may be the origin of the same Simunan among the eleven Barons born to
the Nakoda in Sérat Sakondhar: see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 383 n. 45.
31. Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 2 Aug. 1718; Ceesjong, Sépanjang,
to Gobius, Surabaya, 13 Aug. 1718; Ceesjong et al., Branjangan, to Gobius,
Surabaya, 19 Aug. 1718; Kartanégara & Sinduréja to Gobius, Surabaya, rec’d
Batavia 27 Aug. 1718; Surabaya krijgsraad, 29 Aug. 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to
Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also Batavia to H. XVII,
6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, p. 20; BS IV:17; BK ff.605v.—606r.
32. Surabaya krijgsraad, 10 June 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719); Batavia to H.
XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 20-1.
33. Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 26. PB I, told that Bergman
had brought the hostilities in Malabar to an end, expressed his pleasure at his ap-
pointment; PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 Dulkangidah Jimakir 1642 (5 Oct.
1718), rec’d 18 Oct. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also BS IV:19; BK ff.
606r.—v. (where Bergman [Amral Baritman] expresses his wonderment at the
Surabayan fortifications he is expected to conquer). Throughout the BK account,
Gobius (Kuméndur Gobyo) is depicted as a course figure, slapping his thighs,
laughing loudly and speaking Malay (e.g. f. 613r.) on f. 619r. Bergman speaks
very critically of Gobius and his reckless use of VOC troops. Bergman’s involve-
ment in the wars in India in 1715-16 is referred to in Wijnaendts van Resandt,
Gezaghebbers, p. 188.
34. Surabaya krijgsraad, 10 June 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
35. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 13 June 1718, 22 June 1718, 26 July 1718,
18 Aug. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719); Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ
IX, p. 20; BS IV:18; BK ff. 609v.—612v.
36. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, | June 1718, 13 June 1718, 29 June 1718, 26
July 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
37. Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 6 Oct. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB
1719). See also Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718; Gobius & Bergman,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 1 Oct. 1718 & 25 Oct. 1718; in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
38. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 26 July 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). By
then PB I forces aided by 3 Europeans with hand mortars had taken the enemy
works at Lamongan by storm on 16-17 July; Vegt, Lamongan, to Gobius, Sura-
baya, 17 July 1718; Gobius et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 26 July 1718; both in
VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also BK f. 599v.
39. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 14 May 1718, 26 July 1718, 18 Aug. 1718;
Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 2 Aug. 1718, 10 Aug. 1718, 18 Aug.
1718, 3 Sept. 1718, 1 Oct. 1718, 6 Oct. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See
also Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, p. 21. The VOC at Surabaya also
asked for 1000 pairs of shoes for its barefoot Europeans to protect them against
362 NOTES to pp. 177-8

enemy mantraps (voetangels) of bamboo and iron; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya,
to Batavia, 1 Oct. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
40. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 18 Aug. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
41. Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 24 Sept. 1718, 1 Oct. 1718, 6
Oct. 1718, 25 Oct. 1718; Surabaya krijgsraad, 18 Oct. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB
1719). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, p. 23.
42. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya,
to Batavia, 17 Sept. 1718 & 24 Sept. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
43. Surabaya krijgsraad, 18 Oct. 1718; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Bata-
via, 21 Oct. 1718 & 25 Oct. 1718; Raasvelt & Strang, Grésik, to Gobius, Surabaya,
22 Oct. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec.
1718, in dJ IX, p. 20; BS IV:18, 20; BK ff. 612v.—618r. In BK Gusti Panji Danudrésta
is called pun Baleleng Murah Panji (f. 613r.) and, by a curious confusion with Kr.
Galesong of the Trunajaya War, Murah Panji Galesong (f. 611r.) or the hybrid
form Muhara Panji Galeleng (f. 610v.). He is also called Gusti Murah Panji of
Buleleng in a report by pranakan Malay éncik Silébar, Kartasura, 2 Dec. 1718, in
VOC 1914 (OB 1719) and in other VOC letters.
Gusti Panji Danudrésta’s intention to come to Surabaya was reported from at
least May 1718. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, to Batavia, 14 May 1718; van
Gangel, Pasuruan, to Gobius, Surabaya, 3 Aug. 1718; both in VOC 1914 (OB
1719). See also Batavia to H. XVI, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 21-2.
44. Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718 & 4 Nov. 1718, in
VOC 1914 (OB 1719); Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, p. 19; idem,
15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 26. Serg—Maj. Melchior Ernst Peijsen now took com-
mand in Surabaya. In Kartasura, PB I celabrated the victory at Surabaya with
cannon salutes, gamé/an and toasts; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius & Berg-
man, Surabaya, 5 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
45. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 209, said that his
good old friend Gobius wrote to him expressing the view that the war was as good
as over after the conquest of Surabaya in Oct. 1718.
46. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 11 Apr. 1718; Blom, “Goemedeng”’, to Gobius,
Surabaya, 7 May 1718; Blom, Balega, to Gobius, Surabaya, 9 May 1718; Gobius,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 14 May 1718 & 1 June 1718; Solling, “Coanjer”, to Gobius,
Surabaya, 23 June 1718 & 27 June 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Solling, “Coanjer”,
29 June 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 29 June 1718; Solling et al., “Co-
anjer”, to Gobius, Surabaya, 3 July 1718; Solling, Sampang, to Gobius, Surabaya,
7 Aug. 1718 & 11 Aug. 1718; Schouten, Tanjung, to Gobius & Bergman, Sura-
baya, 20 Aug. 1718; Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718; Peijsen, Sura-
baya, to Batavia, 24 Nov. 1718; Gobius, Smarang, to Peijsen, Surabaya, 26 Nov.
1718; Vuijstman, Madura, to Peijsen, Surabaya, 24 Dec. 1718; Peijsen, Surabaya,
to Batavia, 30 Dec. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also Batavia to H.
XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 28-30; idem, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 41; BK
ff. 618v.-619v. , 621r.-622v.
47. Walling, Kartasura, to Gobius, Surabaya, 4 Feb. 1718; Walling, Kartasura,
to Sémarang, 13 June 1718; Walling, Kartasura, to Batavia, 16 June 1718 (2
letters); Walling, Kartasura, to Semarang, 21 June 1718 & 9 July 1718; Cakrajaya’s
wife, Kartasura, to Cakrajaya, rec’d Surabaya, 17 July 1718; Sémarang to Batavia,
25 July 1718; Walling, Kartasura, to Gobius, Surabaya, 31 Aug. 1718; Gobius &
NOTES to pp. 178-9 363

Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Bata-

via, 2 Oct. 1718; Walling, memorie for van Arrewijne, Sémarang, 5 Oct. 1718; van
Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1718; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius,
Surabaya, 13 Oct. 1718; Gobius et al., Surabaya, to Batavia, 4 Nov. 1718; all in
VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, pase
The VOC feared the general influence of Islamic leaders in Kartasura; see Gobius,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
Ratu Pakubuwana was the mother of AR IV, Png. Purbaya, Png. Blitar, a daugh-
ter named R. Ay. Timur and 4 children who died in infancy; Padmasusastra,
Sajarahdalém, pp. 134-8.
48. Walling, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 21 June 1718 & 9 July 1718; Walling,
memorie for van Arrewijne, Semarang, 5 Oct. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
See also BK ff. 623v.—624.; BS IV:21.
The VOC also considered whether it might be necessary to arrest or murder
Purbaya. Walling, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 4 Aug. 1718; Gobius & Bergman,
Surabaya, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 18 Sept. 1718; both in VOC 1914 (OB
1719). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 28.
Purbaya had excavated a tunnel under the walls of the inner kraton as a personal
private entrance. This the VOC got PB I to have sealed up. Walling, Kartasura, to
Batavia, 16 June 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719), refers to the excavation of the
tunnel; its closure is described in the BK and BS passages cited above.
49. Walling, Kartasura, to Semarang, 13 June 1718 & 4 Aug. 1718; van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1718 (2nd letter): all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
50. PB I, Kartasura, to Gobius, Surabaya, 20 Ramélan Jimakir (1642/17 Aug.
1718), rec’d 29 Aug. 1718; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to PB I, Kartasura, 30
Aug. 1718; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 3 Sept. 1718; Gobius &
Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1718; Sémarang to Batavia, 15 Sept. 1718;
Walling, memorie for van Arrewijne, Sémarang, 5 Oct. 1718; Kartanégara, Kar-
tasura, to Gobius, Surabaya, rec’d Batavia 17 Nov. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB
1719).
Walling’s standing at court is not likely to have been enhanced by his asking the
right-hand man of the Ratu and Png.Purbaya what he thought would happen if the
VOC were to bring Png. Ng. Saloringpasar back from exile on the Cape of Good
Hope. Walling, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 9 July 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719),
reports this extraordinary gaffe.
Van Arrewijne claimed to be “somewhat knowledgeable” in the Javanese
language; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 21 Aug. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720).
51. PB I, Kartasura, to Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, 16 Sawal Jimakir 1642
(12 Sept. 1718), rec’d 2 Oct. 1718; PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 Dulkangidah
Jimakir 1642 (5 Oct. 1718), rec’d 18 Oct. 1718; both in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
See also BK f. 623r.; BS IV:22.
52. Walling, memorie for van Arrewijne, Semarang, 5 Oct. 1718; van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1718 (2 letters); all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
53. PB I, Kartasura, to Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, 16 Sawai Jimakir 1642
(12 Sept. 1718), rec’d 2 Oct. 1718; van Arrewijne & Walling, Kartasura, to Batavia,
24 Sept. 1718; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, 24
Sept. 1718; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 2 Oct. 1718; van Arrewijne,
364 NOTES to p. 179

Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Oct. 1718; Walling, memorie for van Arrewijne, Semarang,
5 Oct. 1718; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 6 Oct. 1718, van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also
Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, p. 20; idem, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX,
p. 23; BS 1V:22; BK ff. 623v.—624r. (note that the date there, kalih adi rasa putra,
has the correct value AJ 1642/5 Dec. 1717-24 Nov. 1718 because adi has the
Kartasura-period value “four”; on the changing values of chronogram words, see
Ricklefs, Tradition, pp. 239-44).
Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius, Sémarang, 13 Mar. 1719, in VOC 1929
(OB 1720), also described Diposanta as quite mad in his behaviour.
54. Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém, pp. 133-S, lists him as no. 6 out of PB I’s
22 children, the only older sons being Suryakusuma/Saloringpasar (by now in
exile) and the Crown prince.
55. Sémarang to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1714, in VOC 1857 (OB 1715).
56. NBS 95, Darma Sunya Kéling, is dated Tuesday-Légi, 23 Dulkangidah,
wuku Wayang, sirnna ning sagara mangsa ning bhumi (1640) Be. The date should
probably be 24 rather than 23 Dulkangidah, in which case all elements in the
dating would be consistent, equivalent to 10 Nov. 1716. See Pigeaud, Literature,
vol. II, p. 739. A photograph, excerpt and translation are to be found in ibid., vol.
Ill, pp. 32, 71-2. Pigeaud is wrong to say that Dipanagara was the son of AR IV,
which rests upon an erroneous reading of the colophon in H. H. Juynboll, Supple-
ment op den catalogus van de Javaansche en Madoereesche handschriften der
Leidsche Universiteits-Bibliotheek (2 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1907—11), vol. I, p.
165. The relevant part of the MS colophon reads:
Iti kakawin Darmasunya Kéling samakta, tlas tinular sinurat jéng ira
Pangeran Dipati Dipanagara, ingkang putra Kangjéng Susunan amangku rat
Jawa, Susunan Pakubuwana Senapati ning Alaga.
Thus, clearly PB I is referred to as the Susuhunan who “governs all of Java”
(amangku rat Jawa).
References in Sérat Cabolek also suggest that Dipanagara (along with CN III)
was regarded as a connoisseur of Old Javanese literature; see M.C. Ricklefs, “Unity
and disunity in Javanese political and religious thought of the eighteenth century”,
Modern Asian Studies (forthcoming).
On Dharmasiinya, see further Poerbatjaraka, Kapustakan Djawi, pp. 51-3, which
rests upon an unpublished MS by Poerbatjaraka: LOr 10,850(5), “Kakawin
Dharmacunya:Voorloopig bewerkt, inhoudende korte inleiding, tekst-vaststelling
en gedeeltelijke vertaling”. The beginning and end of Dharmastinya are quoted in
P.J. Zoetmulder, Kalangwan: A survey of Old Javanese literature (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 487.
57. See Ricklefs, Tradition, pp. 152-6. Another Kartasura MS, Berlin Staatsbib-
liothek MS Or.fol. 402, copied by Ki Asmaradana in AJ 1661 (AD 1736-7) and
owned by Png. A. Purbaya (not the Purbaya discussed in this chapter but rather his
son), contains (pp. 15-53) the Old Javanese Paniti Sastra with Modern Javanese
paraphrases and explanations. For a description of this MS, see Theodore G.Th.
Pigeaud, Javanese and Balinese manuscripts and some codices written in related
idioms spoken in Java and Bali: Descriptive catalogue (Verzeichnis der Orienta-
lischen Handschriften in Deutschland, vol. XX XI; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Ver-
lag GMBH, 1975), pp. 226-7. For a more general analysis, see Kuntara,
Arjunawiwaha, especially p. 462; and McDonald, Old Javanese Literature.
NOTES to pp. 179-81 365

58. NBS 95, colophon: ingkang putra Kangjéng Susunan amangku rat Jawa,
Susunan Pakubuwana Senapati ning Alaga, ibu wijil pasisir Kéndhal paragak
kang adarbe tédhak Bima Cili ing Tuban.
59. De Graaf & Pigeaud, Vorstendommen, p. 196, referring to the Balinese text
Kidung Pamancangah, see C.C. Berg (ed.), Kidung Pamafcangah: De geschie-
denis van het rijk van Gelgel (Santpoort: C.A. Mees, 1929), pp. 34, 40, 42; and
Kumar, Surapati, p. 149.
60. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 18 Oct. 1718 (with P.S. dd. 19 Oct.
1718) & 21 Oct. 1718; PB I, Kartasura, to Batavia, 26 Dulkangidah Jimakir 1642
(21 Oct. 1718), rec’d 27 Oct. 1718; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 12 Nov.
1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See also Batavia to H. XVII,6 Dec. 1718, in
dJ IX, p. 20.
61. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 46.
62. BK ff. 624v.—626v.; BS III:23.
63. BK ff. 627v.—628y. describes PB I as being upset by the rebellion and tells
of hostilities between Blitar and Dipanagara.
64. BK f. 626r.
65. Dipanégara to Cakrajaya, Citrasoma et al., rec’d Batavia 23 Jan. 1719, in
VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
66. BS 1V:24; BK ff. 626r.—v.; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Jan.
1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720) (reporting the title as “Panambahan Eroe Tsjacra
Panattagama” on the evidence of a Javanese who had been captured by the rebels;
the same title appears on the translation of a letter from Dipanagara, Sokawati, to
AR IV, Kartasura, rec’d Sémarang Oct. 1719, in VOC 1929 [OB 1720)).
In rebel letters preserved in translation in the VOC archives, Dipanagara is also
called Png. Sokawati: Pngs. Purbaya & Blitar to Citrasoma, [Kédhiri], rec’d Sémarang
13 May 1721 (in Kartasura letter dd. 8 May) (2 such letters), in VOC 1965 (OB
1722). BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, p. 46, describes Dipanagara setting up his court in
Sokawati (northeast of Kartasura along the Sala river); ibid., pp. 67, 69, 70, calls
him both Pan.Sokawati and Png. Erucakra.
On the Erucakra title in general and in connection with the rebellion of 1718,
see J. Brandes, “Jets over een ouderen Dipanagara in verband met een prototype
van de voorspellingen van Jayabaya”, TBG vol. 32 (1889), pp. 368-430; J.A.B.
Wiselius,“Djaja Baja, zijn leven en profetieén”, BK/ vol. 19 (1872), pp. 172-217;
A.B. Cohen Stuart, “Eroe Tjakra”, BK/ vol. 19 (1872), pp. 285—8; G.W.J. Drewes,
Drie Javaansche goeroe's: Hun leven, onderricht en messiasprediking (Leiden:
Drukkerij A. Vros, 1925), pp. 136-7; Pigeaud, “Erucakra-Vairocana”; Soewito
Santoso, “Hérucakra”, RIMA vol. 10, no.1 (Jan.-June 1976), pp. 82-90.
On the 19th-century Dipanagara, see P.B.R. Carey, “Pangeran Dipanagara and
the making of the Java War” (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University,
1975) or various other publications by Carey, notably his edition and translation
of Babad Dipanagara: An account of the outbreak of the Java War (1825-30):
The Surakarta court version of the Babad Dipanagara with translations into English
and Indonesian Malay (Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society monograph
no. 9; Kuala Lumpur: Art Printing Works Sdn. Bhd. for the Council of the MBRAS,
1981), or his “The origins of the Java War (1825-30)”, The English historical
review vol. 91, no. 358 (Jan. 1976) pp. 52-78; or, more briefly, Ricklefs, History,
. 111-13.
re. Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1718; Gobius & Bergman,
366 NOTES to pp. 181-2

memorie for Peijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718; Peijsen, Surabaya, to Batavia, 24

Nov. 1718, 12 Dec. 1718, 30 Dec. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See further
Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 24; Peijsen, Surabaya, to Batavia,
31 Jan. 1719 & 13 Mar. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Batavia to H. XVII, 28
Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 41.
There is considerable difficulty in reconciling the various figures in these sources
precisely; I therefore have given only rounded figures.
There was also a squabble between Peijsen and Gobius over the chain of
command. See Peijsen, Surabaya, to Gobius, Semarang, 12 Dec. 1718, in VOC
1929 (OB 1720); Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VIL,
. 408.
: 68. Gobius & Bergman, memorie for Peijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718; Peijsen,
Surabaya, to Batavia, 12 Dec. 1718; both in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
69. Gobius & Bergman, memorie for Peijsen, Surabaya, 4 Nov. 1718, in VOC
1914 (OB 1719); report of pranakan Malay éncik Silébar, Kartasura, 2 Dec. 1718,
in VOC 1914 (OB 1719); Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ IX, pp. 21-2;
Peijsen, Surabaya, to Batavia, 30 Dec. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719); van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Batavia to
H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 29-30; idem, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, pp.
39-40.
The VOC reported that conflict arose over Panji Danudrésta of Buleleng’s demand
to have wives of the late Jangrana(III); cf. n. 70 below.
70. BK ff. 622v.—623r. Here Murah Panji of Buleleng objects to the title Panji
being used by Panji Kartayuda, whose title is therefore changed to Démang. But
Panji Surengrana’s title cannot be altered since it was bestowed by the king while
he was in Sémarang (i.e. by PB I: this statement is, however, manifestly wrong,
since Panji Surengrana was given this name and title by AR II ca. 1691; see p. 313
n. 8 above).
71. Gobius, Sémarang, to Peijsen, Surabaya, 26 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB
1719); Gobius, Kartasura, to Batavia, 21 Dec. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719);
Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 18 Jan. 1719, In VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Gobius
dagregister, 8 Dec. 1718-8 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Batavia to H.
XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 41.
72. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 12 Nov. 1718; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1718 & 4 Dec. 1718; Gobius, Kartasura, to Bata-
via, 21 Dec. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See further van Arrewijne, Kartasura,
to Batavia, 28 Jan. 1719; PB I, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 20 Rabingulawal Alip
1643 (11 Feb. 1719), rec’d Batavia 21 Feb. 1719; both in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
73. Report of pranakan Malay éncik Silébar, Kartasura, 2 Dec. 1718, in VOC
1914 (OB 1719).
74. Metsue et al., Sémarang, to Batavia, 14 Feb. 1714, in VOC 1857 (OB
1715), reported (solely on the basis of hearsay evidence, it must be said) that
Majapahit was still holy to the Javanese as well as the Balinese and that Javanese
“priests” still cared for the place. Metsue was perhaps referring to the supposed
grave of the founder of Majapahit, R. Wijaya, at Sitinggil, near Trawulan, where
an Islamic grave is found (being a Hindu-Buddhist, R. Wijaya would not in fact
have been buried, needless to say). The religious in charge in the early eighteenth
century may well have been Hindu-Buddhist priests. As late as 1743 the VOC
NOTES to p. 182 367

reported “supertitieuse heydenen” in Mataram (Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Dec. 1743,

in dJ IX, p. 430). The ongoing existence of some Hindu-Buddhist religious estab-
lishments is suggested also by the Mérbabu MSS collection, which contains MSS
of Islamic and pre-Islamic texts in buda script with dates from S 1481 (AD 1559)
(no. 218: Wiswarga Sandi) to 1635 (if S = AD 1713, if AJ = AD 1711-12)
(no. 187: Kuajarakarna Sari); see [A. B. Cohen Stuart], Eerste vervolg catalogus
der bibliotheek en catalogus der Maleische, Javaansche en Kawi handschriften
van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Batavia: Bruining
& Wijt; °s Hage: Nijhoff, 1872), pp. I-III, 26-45; and W. van der Molen, Javaanse
tekstkritiek: Een overzicht en een nieuwe benadering geillustreerd aan de Kunjar-
akarna (VKI vol. 102; Dordrecht & Cinnaminson: Foris Publications, 1983), pp.
107-19; see also the Darmma Patanjala MS catalogued in Pigeaud, Javanese and
Balinese MSS, pp. 111-12, which is part of the Mérbabu collection.
It will be recalled that in 1680 Trunajaya admonished AR II to have nothing
further to do with Christians and to establish his court at Majapahit; see p. 56
above.
75. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius, Surabaya, 13 Oct. 1718; Gobius &
Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 4 Nov. 1718; PB I, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 5
Muharam Alip 1643 (29 Nov. 1718), rec’d Batavia 18 Dec. 1718; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Semarang, 4 Dec. 1718; Gobius, Kartasura, to Batavia, 21 Dec. 1718;
all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See further Batavia to H. XVII, 6 Dec. 1718, in dJ
IX, pp. 19-20; Gobius dagregister, 8 Dec. 1718-8 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720); van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720); Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719,in dJ IX, pp. 23, 26-8; Gobius, Séma-
rang, to Batavia, 18 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); PB I, Kartasura, to
Batavia, rec’d 25 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); van Arrewijne, Kartasura,
to Batavia, 28 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar.
1719, in dJ IX, pp. 37-8.
Gobius was also concerned about the cramped state of the VOC fortress in
Kartasura and the fire-prone wooden buildings there. Even the gunpowder was
kept under a wooden roof. On 28 Novy. 1718 a serious fire was caused when sparks
touched off some cartridges and grenade-tubes. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia,
4 Dec. 1718; Gobius, Kartasura, to Batavia, 21 Dec. 1718; both in VOC 1914 (OB
L719):
Gobius suffered physical discomfort as well as discomfiture. It was by now clear
that his broken leg had been badly set and was still not properly healed. Gobius
& van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719);
Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 18 Jan. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
76. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 24 Jan. 1719 & 29 Jan. 1719;
Gobius, Sémarang, to PB I, Kartasura, 4 Feb. 1719; Gobius, Sémarang, to van
Arrewijne, Kartasura, 5 Feb. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius, Semarang,
10 Feb. 1719; PB I, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 20 Rabingulawal Alip 1643 (11 Feb.
1719), rec’d Batavia 21 Feb. 1719; PB I, Kartasura, to Semarang, rec’d 12 Feb.
1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 6 Mar. 1719; AR IV, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, 14 Rabingulakir Alip 1643 (7 Mar. 1719), rec’d Batavia 20 Mar. 1719;
Gobius, Sémarang, to Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, 15 Apr. 1719; Jayaningrat, Péka-
longan, to Sémarang, n.d.; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
The title haji indicated that Muhammad Ali had completed the pilgrimage to
368 NOTES to pp. 183-4

Mecca. In the Indonesian archipelago, the term sayyid was normally used for a
descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his grandson Husain; see Snouck
Hurgronje, Acehnese, vol. I, pp. 153-4. The Sayid and his servants, as well as PB
I’s men, used snaphaenen in their brief exchange of fire, suggesting that by now
these weapons were quiet widely available in Javanese society.
It will be noted that further research in the VOC records since 1978 has dis-
proved my statement in Tradition, p. 196, that this episode “does not seem to have
made much impression on the Dutch”. It will be clear also that my discussion there
confused Sayid Magallawi and Muhammad Ali. I am grateful to Prof. G.W.J.
Drewes for helping me to restore the correct spelling of the Sayid’s name from the
VOC’s version.
77. Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 39.
Gobius was by now in trouble for various shortcomings; see ibid., pp. 37-9. On
his subsequent undistinguished career, see the sources cited in p. 356 n. 66 above.
78. BS 1V:24-5. BK omits the episode of the Sayid but it is found in BTJ(BP),
vol. XIX, p. 39, which correctly dates his death 7 Rabyulawal (AJ 1643 / 29 Jan.
1719).
79. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius, Sémarang, 10 Feb. 1719, 14 Feb.
1719, 18 Feb. 1719; Gobius, Sémarang, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 21 Feb. 1719;
van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura to
Sémarang, 23 Feb. 1719 & 26 Feb. 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See further
Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 38, 42; Png. Blitar, Kartasura, to
Cakrajaya, Surabaya, transl. 9 May 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Valentyn, Oud
en nieuw Oost-Indién. vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 209; BS 1V:25; BK ff. 629r—630r. (here
PBI declares on his deathbed that his first choice as successor is still the Crown
prince, his second Png. Purbaya and his third Png. Blitar).
Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 Feb. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720), gives VOC strength at Kartasura as 381 Europeans, 60 Balinese and 97
Bugis for total of 538. By June 1719 the total force had risen to 700; Batavia to
H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 48.
80. Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. TV [pt. 1], p. 209.
81. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 23 Feb. 1719; Png. A. Mangkunagara
[AR IV], Kartasura, to Gobius, Semarang, 3 Rabingulakir 1643 (24 Feb. 1719),
rec'd Batavia 20 Mar. 1719; Sémarang raadsvergadering, 24 Feb. 1719; van Ar-
rewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius, Semarang, 26 Feb. 1719 & 28 Feb. 1719; all in
VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See further Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX,
pp. 42-3.
It may be noted that there is perhaps some confusion in the standard reference
work on the Javanese calendar, Djidwal memindahkan tahoen Djawa dan ’ Arab
ketahoen Maséhi(Batavia-Centrum: Balai Poestaka, 1932) concerning AJ 1643. I
pointed out in Tradition, p. 197 n. 172, that Javanese texts give 2 Rabingulakir as
a Wednesday whereas it should be Thursday (according to Djidwal). The letter
above dd. 3 Rabingulakir, however, also says that 2 Rabingulakir was Wednesday
and gives 3 Rabingulakir as Thursday. So it seems possible that the Djidwal table
is somehow wrong by one day of the week at this stage of the year. Later in AJ
1643, there are letters the days and dates of which correspond with what is to be
expected according to Djidwal.
82. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius, Sémarang, 26 Feb. 1719, in VOC
NOTES to pp. 184-5 369

1929 (OB 1720). See also Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”’, p. 615. PB I’s wish was
expressed in 1715. Two other pikes were to go to Pngs. Dipanagara and Dipasonta,
but by this time both had become rebels. The pikes were not handed over to
Purbaya and Blitar by AR IV himself, but by Kartanégara and Sinduréja upon his
orders, in the VOC post.
83. Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 42; van Arrewijne, Kartasura,
to Batavia, 29 Mar. 1719, 6 Apr. 1719, 10 Apr. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
84. Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 42; van Arrewijne, Karta-
sura, to Batavia, 9 May 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). AR IV’s titles are also
given in his letter to Cakrajaya, Surabaya, rec’d Batavia 20 May 1719, in VOC
1929 (OB 1720). BK ff. 630r—v. describes AR IV’s formal accession, mentioning
the sérat jangji saking Gurnadur-Jendral, the firing of Gunturgéni and of the
cannon from the VOC /Joji (fortress), etc. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién,
vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 209, gives AR IV hybrid titles, including Zainulkubra, which was
used by AR II and III but not by PB I. According to Valentyn, AR IV was 40 years
old at his accession. On Gunturgéni, see the sources cited in p. 353 n. 51 above.
85. Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 43.
86. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 5 Mar. 1719; AR IV, Kartasura, to
Gobius, Sémarang, 14 Rabingulakir Alip 1643 (7 Mar. 1719), rec’d Batavia 20
Mar. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 21 Mar. 1719; all in VOC
1929 (OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 40. Upon
Png. Blitar’s departure, command of these forces had fallen to Ng. Sumadiréja,
Kandhuruwan Wilatikta, Tg. Mangkuyuda and R. Pringgalaya.
87. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 14 Feb. 1719; Peijsen, Surabaya,
to Sémarang, 13 Mar. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 21 Mar. 1719;
all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). Tg. Mataun’s appointment to replace Tg. Surawijaya
over Jipang (in 1718) is recorded in BK f. 622v.
88. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 21 Mar. 1719; Rangin & Lesang,
Jipang, to Peijsen, Surabaya, 25 Mar. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia,
17 Apr. 1719; Fergushil, Démak, to Sémarang, 17 Apr. 1719; Coster, Jépara, to
Sémarang, 23 Apr. 1719; Marchant, Tégal, to Semarang, 27 Apr. 1719, 12 May
1719, 2 June 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 13 May 1719 & 24
May 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 26 May 1719; Gobius & van
Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 30 May 1719; Peijsen, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 9
June 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 June 1719; Peijsen, Surabaya,
to Batavia, 25 June 1719 & 9 July 1719; Semarang to Batavia, 16 June 1719; all
in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar 1719, in dJ LX, pp.
39-40.
89. Peijsen, Surabaya, to Batavia, 25 June 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
Eighty-one soldiers died from 1 to 21 June in Surabaya. another 37 died by 9 July,
by which time Peijsen had received 118 reinforcements, all in poor condition;
idem, 9 July 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). In Apr. 1719 the VOC had 1648 fit
and 860 incapacitated soldiers at Surabaya; by May there were 1740 fit and 930
incapacitated. Peijsen wanted to attack the rebels at Wanakrama but felt that he
could not do so without reinforcements. See Peijsen, Surabaya, to Batavia, 4 Apr.
1719 & 24 May 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
90. AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9 Réjéb Alip (1643 / 29 May 1719), rec’d 28
June 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 41, 56, 63; BK f.
370 NOTES to pp. 185-6

631r. Despite Kartanégara being renamed Mangkupraja, the VOC records continue
to use his old name for some time.
Png. Blitar had written to Cakrajaya in Surabaya telling him that PB I had
chosen him as successor on the eve of his death; see his letter, transl. Surabaya 9
May 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719,
in dJ IX, pp. 45, 51.
On PB I’s introduction of a system of two Patihs in 1710 and its collapse in
1711 as Cakrajaya emerged as the single Patih, see pp. 158-60 above.
91. Notitie, Kartasura, 9 May 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9
May 1719; AR IV, Kartasura, to Gobius, Sémarang, 23 Jumadilakir Alip (1643 /
14 May 1719), rec’d Batavia 21 May 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia,
13 May 1719; Purbaya, Kartasura, to Sura Adimanggala, Sémarang, rec’d Batavia
21 May 1719; Sura Adimanggala, Sémarang, to Purbaya, Kartasura, 28 Jumadi-
lakir Alip (1643 / 19 May 1719), rec’d Batavia 30 May 1719; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Gobius, Sémarang, 24 May 1719 ; AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9
Réjéb Alip (1643 / 29 May 1719), rec’d 28 June 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB
1720). See also BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 42-3; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719,
in dJ IX, pp. 44-5.
Among AR IV’s new officials was the scribe Carik Bajra who was renamed Ng.
Tirtawiguna (see the notitie cited above and BTJ/BP], vol. XIX, p. 42). This man
became an influential member of the kraron elite and a major literary figure of the
first half of the 18th century in Java (see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, p. 224). Accord-
ing to BK ff. 598r., 599v.—600r., while still named Saratruna in 1718 this scribe
had come to the favourable notice of PB I when he brought letters from Cakrajaya
and Kartanégara in Surabaya to Kartasura; PB I then made him head of the scribes
(lurah carik) and renamed him Carik Badra (sic).
The Jagasura troops lived at Tégal under four Ngabeis as their heads, each
controlling 800 cacahs, but they were subject to the orders of the kraton. See
Walling memorie for Damius, Tégal, 1 Sept. 1717, in VOC 1898 (OB 1718).
92. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9 May 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720); BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, p. 54.
93. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1718; Gobius ef al., Surabaya,
to Batavia, 4 Nov. 1718; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Bergman et al., Surabaya,
12 Noy. 1718; all in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). See further van Arrewijne, Kartasura,
to Sémarang, 14 Feb. 1719, 18 Feb. 1719, 13 Mar. 1719; AR IV, Kartasura, to
Gobius, Sémarang, 23 Jumadilakir Alip (1643 / 13 May 1719), rec’d Batavia 21
May 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 13 May 1719 (2 letters); all in
VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 28 Mar. 1719, in dJ IX, pp.
38, 40; idem, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 46-8, 50 (quotation from p. 47); idem,
26 Mar. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 66; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 65 (where the story is far from
its proper chronological setting, these pp. covering the early 1720s).
On 17 May it was rumoured that Purbaya and Blitar were about to flee the court,
but this turned out to be a false alarm; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 26
May 1719, in VOC 1929(OB 1720).
94. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Peijsen, Surabaya, 7 June 1719; van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 June 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang,
19 June 1719 & 23 June 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
Png. A. Mataram had been suspected of links with the eastern rebels and was
NOTES to pp. 186-7 371

under surveillance in late 1718; Gobius & Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 4 Nov,
1718; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Bergman et al., Surabaya, 12 Nov. 1718; both
in VOC 1914 (OB 1719). Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 26 May 1719, in
VOC 1929 (OB 1720), however, reported that Png. A. Mataram was often in the
court and seemed to get on well with AR IV, although he had 6 sons who were
very turbulent.
AR IV’s other elderly uncle, Png. A. Panular, was of no political significance.
He died in Kartasura in Aug. 1722; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 26
Aug. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
95. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 24 June 1719, 25 June 1719, 1 July
1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 July 1719; Purbaya & Blitar,
Mataram , to Sura Adimanggala, Sémarang, rec’d 18 July 1719; Purbaya & Blitar,
Mataram, to Gobius, Sémarang, 2 Sawal Alip (1643 / 19 Aug. 1719); van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius,
Sémarang, 31 Aug. 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See further Batavia to H.
XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 48; BS 1V:26-32; BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 43-52.
Extract dagregister, 8 Dec.—31 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721), reports the
capture of Haji Warak, the “senior priest” of PB I who was said to have stirred
Purbaya and Blitar into rebellion and to have cast mortars and other ordnance for
them. BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 43, 47-8, identifies one Garwakondha as the person
who most encouraged Blitar to rebel; in Mataram he is made Patih with the name
Tg. Wiranagara (ibid., pp. 53-4). A letter from Sinduréja, Mataram, to Gobius,
Sémarang, rec’d 15 July 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720), mentions that Gar-
wakondha was among the dignitaries with the rebels.
96. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 24 June 1719 & 25 June 1719;
Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 27 June 1719; van Arrewijne, Kar-
tasura, to Sémarang, 2 July 1719 & 5 July 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to
Batavia, 10 July 1719 (enclosing letter from Purbaya and Blitar in “Cartasarij
Dieningrat”); van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1719; all in VOC
1929 (OB 1720). See further Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 46;
BS 1V:32-3; BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 52-4.
On Blitar’s titles, see Purbaya & Blitar, Mataram, to Gobius, Semarang, 2
Sawal Alip (1643 / 19 Aug. 1719), in VOC 1929 (OB 1720) (calling him Sultan
Pakubuwana Mataram Ngabdulrahman Sayidin Panatagama); Purbaya & Blitar,
Kémagétan, to Tg. Mataun, Jipang, rec’d Batavia 21 June 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB
1721) (calling him Sultan Muhammad Ngabdulrahman ing Mataram); Blitar &
Purbaya, Malang, to Citrasoma et al., rec’d Batavia 3 Apr. 1721, in VOC 1965
(OB 1722) (calling him Sultan Muhammad Ngabdulrahman Sayidin Panatagama
Mataram); Purbaya & Blitar to Citrasoma, rec’d Sémarang 13 May 1721, in VOC
1965 (OB 1722) (calling him Sultan Muhammad Ngabdulrahman Sayidin
Panatagama ing Mataram). In all sources, Purbaya is consistently entitled Pan.
Purubaya Senapati Ingalaga. According to BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, p. 54, Png. A.
Mangkunégara was named Png. Ad. Anom, i.e. Crown prince, in the rebel kraton
in Mataram.
On the foundation of Kartawinata by PB | in 1712, see p. 159 above.
97. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 24 June 1719 & 25 June 1719;
Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 27 June 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB
1720). See also BT/(BP), vol. XIX, p. 62.
Bie NOTES to pp. 187-9

98. Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 27 June 1719; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 7 July 1719, 10 July 1719, 12 July 1719; all in VOC 1929
(OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 49.
99, Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719 in dJ IX, p. 54.

Notes to Chapter 11

1. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 29 June 1719; Sémarang to van

Arrewijne, Kartasura, | July 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 July
1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Gobius, Semarang, 14 July 1719; van Arre-
wijne & Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, 17 July 1719;
van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 18 July 1719 & 20 July 1719; Gobius &
van Kervel, Sémarang, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 22 July 1719; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 27 July 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 30
July 1719 & 5 Aug. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 7 Aug. 1719;
Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 11 Aug. 1719; van
Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1719 & 22 Sept. 1719; all in VOC 1929
(OB 1720). See further Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ LX, pp. 48-52,
54; BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 50, 56-7.
AR IV had previously sent Sp. RI. 1500 as a gift to the VOC garrison,and now
offered another Sp. RI. 2000 in return for defending him; van Arrewijne, Karta-
sura, to Batavia, 10 July 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
2. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 47, 50-1, 63.
3. Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5 June 1719; Fergushil, Démak,
to Sémarang, 6 July 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 7 July 1719;
Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 7 July 1719; Gobius, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 10 July 1719; Fergushil, Démak, to Sémarang, 25 July 1719; Gobius &
van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 31 July 1719 (quote from this letter); Dallens,
Rémbang, to Sémarang, 3 Aug. 1719; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 8 Aug. 1719;
Coster, Jépara, to Sémarang, 20 Aug. 1719 & 23 Aug. 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB
1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719; in dJ IX, pp. 49, 50; BTJ(BP),
vol. XIX, pp. 52, 62-3; vol. XX, p. 15.
Many Chinese fled to Tanjung on the Tédhunan river (now called the Serang,
but there is still a village called Tédhunan on the lower river commemorating the
old name). This was the site of a major Chinese sugar mill (see Gobius, Aenwyz-
inge der suykermolens op de Noort-Oostcust van Java, Sémarang, 27 Sept. 1719,
in dJ IX, p. 35) which was later one of the Chinese headquarters during the
Chinese War in the 1740s. Other Chinese set sail for safer environs. On the lo-
cation of Tanjung, south of Kudus, see J. Noorduyn, “The Bugis auxiliaries from
Tanete in the Chinese War in Java, 1742-1744”, in C.M.S. Hellwig & S.O. Robson
(eds.), A man of Indonesian letters: Essays in honour of Professor A. Teeuw (VKI
vol. 121; Dordrecht & Cinnaminson: Foris Publications, 1986), a, Ashey 10, 22S}
(Noorduyn says the Serang river was formerly called the Tudungan, but informs
me in a letter of 2 July 1987 that he agrees the correct form is Tadhunan; I am
grateful for his advice on this matter).
Abru/Abrunata/Mangunonéng was the son of the former Tg. Mangunonéng who
had been killed on PB I’s orders (Fergushil, Démak, to Sémarang, 6 July 1719, in
 NOTES to pp. 190-1 373

VOC 1929 [OB 1720]; BK f. 550v.). In 1705-6 he had devastated the Kudus area
(van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 7 July 1719, in VOC 1929 [OB 1720]).
4. Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 11 July 1719 & 15 July 1719;
Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 16 July 1719; Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 19 July 1719; Sutawirya, report, 10 Ramélan AJ 1643 (28 July 1719),
rec'd Batavia 5 Aug. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Aug. 1719;
Natayuda, Kédhu, to Sura Adimanggala, S¢marang, 19 Ramélan Alip (1643 / 6
Aug. 1719), rec’d Batavia 11 Aug. 1719; Natayuda, Kédhu, to Kartanégara, Kar-
tasura, rec’d Batavia 11 Aug. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 29 Aug.
1719; Natayuda, Kédhu, to Gobius, Sémarang, rec’d 4 Sept. 1719; all in VOC 1929
(OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 49, 50;
BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 55-7; vol. XX, p. 28.
Témbayat was the gravesite of Sunan Bayat, the wali of Central Java; see the
sources cited in p. 281 n. 11 above.
5. Purbaya & Blitar, Kartasari, to AR IV, Kartasura (included in van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 10 July 1719); Sinduréja, Mataram, to Gobius, Sémarang,
rec’d 15 July 1719; Marchant, Tégal, to Semarang, 3 Aug. 1719; Purbaya & Blitar,
Kartasari, to Gobius, Sémarang, 2 Sawal Alip (1643 / 19 Aug. 1719), rec’d 25
Aug. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 21 Aug. 1719; all in VOC 1929
(OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 51-2. For
PB I’s previous ideas about the succession, see pp. 164, 182, 183 above.
6. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 27 July 1719; van Arrewijne, Karta-
sura, to Sémarang, 30 July 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 7 Aug.
1719; Sura Adimanggala, report, 16 Pasa Alip 1643 (3 Aug. 1719), rec’d Batavia
9 Aug. 1719; AR IV, Kartasura, to Sura Adimanggala, Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 9
Aug. 1719; Sura Adimanggala, Sémarang, to Kartanégara, Kartasura, rec’d Bata-
via 9 Aug. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 14 Aug. 1719; van
Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 21 Aug. 1719 & 29 Aug. 1719; all in VOC 1929
(OB 1720). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 49.
Sura Adimanggala claimed jurisdiction over 1800 households of wong urut
dalan on the basis of a cession to him and his successors by PB I dd. 12 Bésar Je
1630 (17 Mar. 1707), thus superseding the VOC’s concession of villages along
that road to PB I in the treaty of 5 Oct. 1705 (see p. 142 above and the sources
cited in p. 335 n. 72). The AJ 1630/ AD 1707 document was produced in 1722
when a jurisdictional dispute again arose (see p. 204 above) and is found as an
appendix to Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 20 May 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB
1723):
The rebel pagér was said to be at Lumbu, about 2 hours south of Bayalali on
the road to Mataram. Perhaps this refers to the village Lumbungkérép near Wana-
sari, district of Délanggu. Van Arrewijne (letter of 21 Aug. cited above) reported
the pagér was surrounded by “Spaanse ruijters van scherpe bamboesen”; on these
devices, see p. 66 above. The second pagér was at Wangga near Ceper, Délanggu.
7. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 10 July 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); Bata-
via to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 52.
8. Noodt, Jépara, to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1719; Bergman, bevindinge en aenmerk-
inge, Sémarang, 3 Dec. 1720; both in VOC 1948 (OB 1721). Other letters in VOC
1914 (OB 1719) & VOC 1929 (OB 1720) provide further information on the
condition of various VOC posts, on matters such as garrison discipline problems
374 NOTES to pp. 191-2

and on the proposal again to fortify the hill Danaréja at Jépara. It was pointed out
above (p. 339 n. 100) that already by 1708 the VOC garrison post at Kartasura
included a stone or brick fortress.
9. Peijsen, Surabaya, to Semarang, 21 July 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, 29 July 1719; Surabaya raadsbesluit, 1 Aug. 1719; Cakrajaya, Sura-
baya, to AR IV, Kartasura, n.d. (ca. 3 Aug. 1719); Peijsen, Surabaya, to Batavia,
3 Aug. 1719, 10 Aug. 1719, 12 Aug. 1719; Cakrajaya, Surabaya, to Sura
Adimanggala, Sémarang, rec’d 14 Aug. 1719; Peijsen, Surabaya, to Semarang, 17
Aug. 1719; Jansen, Grésik, to Peijsen, Surabaya, 18 Aug. 1719; Peijsen, Surabaya,
to Batavia, 22 Aug. 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See also Batavia to H.
XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 51, 53. Peijsen did not long enjoy the glow of
victory: he died of dysentery on 22 Sept. 1719; van Spree, Wanakrama, to Séma-
rang, 24 Sept. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
10. See above, p. 177.
11. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 9 Sept. 1719; Kartasura raadsbeslu-
iten, 25 Sept. 1719 & 27 Sept. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 29
Sept. 1719, 4 Oct. 1719, 14 Oct. 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See also
BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 71-7. Both the VOC and Javanese sources say that Pur-
baya was greatly upset at the death of his son-in-law and commander Ki Dip.
Lumarap in the action at Klépu.
12. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 4 Oct. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720).
13. Van Spree, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 15 Oct. 1719; van Spree, Rémbang, to
Batavia, 29 Oct. 1719; both in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See further Batavia to H.
XVI, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 57 (note that the figure of 12,000 men under
Surabrata is merely the conventional population figure for Panaraga; see Ricklefs,
“Statistical evidence’, p. 4).
14. Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 12 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948
(OB 1721). See also BS IV:18.
15. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 14 Oct. 1719; van Arrewijne, Karta-
sura, to Bergman, Kudus, 2 Nov. 1719; both in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). And
BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 65-71.
Dipanagara had also corresponded with AR IV, apparently offering to submit.
AR IV, however, was unenthusiastic about this prospect and it fell through. See
Dipanagara, Sokawati, to AR IV, Kartasura, rec’d S&marang Oct. 1719; AR IV,
Kartasura, to Dipanagara, Sokawati, rec’d Sémarang Oct. 1719; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 28 Oct. 1719; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Bergman,
Kudus, 2 Nov. 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
16. De Benzin, Surabaya, to Bergman, Kudus, 12 Nov. 1719, in VOC 1929
(OB 1720). The Surabayans’ fortifications were at “Ourang Agong”
(Urangagungjédung, near Suka, Sidaarja district).
17. Fergushil, Démak, to Sémarang, 13 Nov. 1719 & 15 Nov. 1719; Bergman
& van Spree, Kudus, to Batavia, 17 Nov. 1719; de la Haije, report, [16 Nov. 1719];
all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720). See further de Benzin, Surabaya, to Bergman,
Kartasura, 15 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.
1719, in dJ IX, p. 58; BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 58-61 (quotation from p. 60: pan
iku dudu Kumpéni / babi kang prapti).
18. Jépara to Batavia, 23 Nov. 1719; de Benzin, Surabaya, to Bergman,
NOTES to pp. 192-3 SiS

Kartasura, 15 Dec. 1719; both in VOC 1948 (OB 1721). See also Batavia to H.
XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 57.
19. Sémarang to Batavia, 26 Nov. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720); van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 29 Nov. 1719 & 3 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB
INPADY
20. Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Bergman, Kartasura, 12 Dec. 1719, in
VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
21. Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1719, in VOC 1929
(OB 1720); van Spree & Noodt, Kudus, to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1719, in VOC 1929
(OB 1720); Bergman, Jépara, to Sémarang, 21 Nov. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB
1720); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 57-8; Bergman, Jépara,
to Batavia, 1 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Bergman, Sémarang, to Bata-
via, 6 Jan. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Bergman & van Spree, Jépara, to
Batavia, 17 Jan. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar.
1720, in dJ IX, p. 66; Bergman, report, Batavia, 30 Dec. 1721, in VOC 1984 (OB
1723); BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 33-5 (the tale is far from its proper chronological
location and is wrongly dated winisayeng sagara obah kang wongipun [AJ 1645
/ Nov. 1720-Oct. 1721)).
22. Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 65.
23. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1719; Peijsen, Wanakrama,
to Batavia, 5 Sept. 1719; AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 18 Sawal Alip 1643 (4
Sept. 1719), rec’d 13 Sept. 1719; Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 28
Sept. 1719, 13 Oct. 1719, 18 Oct. 1719; van Spree, Rémbang, to Batavia, 27 Oct.
1719; generale korte sterkte, Rémbang, 31 Oct. 1719; Gobius, Sémarang, to Bata-
via, 31 Oct. 1719; Bergman & Noodt, Kudus, to Sémarang, 1 Nov. 1719; van
Spree & Noodt, Kudus, to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1719; all in VOC 1929 (OB 1720).
See further Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX, pp. 55-8; extract dagreg-
ister 8 Dec.—31 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Bergman & Gobius, Séma-
rang, to Batavia, 6 Jan. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp.
63-5.
Bergman was given the title Admiral (Amra/) by the Javanese, a title usually
ascribed by them to the commander of a VOC expeditionary force in Java and an
enduring legacy of Admiral Speelman’s intervention over 4 decades before. Like
AR II addressing Speelman, AR IV additionally called Bergman “father”. See AR
IV, Kartasura, to Bergman, Sémarang, 16 Jumadilawal Jimawal 1645 (16 Mar.
1721), rec’d 20 Mar. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722) and other such letters.
24. Extract dagregister, 8 Dec.—31 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); BS IV:
33-7; BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 71-9 (the dating on p. 71, wana papat rasa tunggal
[AJ 1645 / Nov. 1720-Oct. 1721], is erroneous and the text conflates this cam-
paign with that of Sept. 1719 in which Dip. Lumarap fell; see n. 11 above); vol.
XX, pp. 3-6.
25. BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, p. 78, Canto 138 (Durma):

40. .../ ngulama para kaji

41. pan sadaya nédya aprang Sabilolah / prakétib lawan modin / titindhih ing
lampah / Pangulu Kartasura / milya ing pangeran kalih / Kyai Tangkilan /
anédya mati Sabil.
BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 77, 78, says also that Blitar and Purbaya wore Arab
headgear (akuluk Arab).
376 NOTES to pp. 1934

26. BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 4, Canto 138 (Durma):

55. .../ sampun karsaning Hyang Widi / tumpés sadaya / kaum kédhik
kang kari
56. sami péjah aprang sabil lawan kopar/....

27. Extract dagregister, 8 Dec—31 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Bergman
& Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 6 Jan. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); BS IV:
37; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 6.
One of the captured religious leaders was Haji Warak; on him, see p. 371 n. 95
above. The Javanese sources say that Ratu Amangkurat was also captured on this
campaign; this can only refer to AR IV’s own principal wife. Ratu Pakubuwana,
the mother of AR IV, Purbaya and Blitar, was still in Kartasura, but apparently AR
IV’s young son Png. Mangkunégara’s mother was also with the rebels in Mataram.
Padmasusastra, Sajarah—dalém, p. 139, says that the latter was a garwa pangrémbe
named successively M. Ay. Sumanarsa, R. Ay. Sépuh and R. Ay. Kulon. She was
not, however, captured on this occasion. Instead, she followed the rebels into
East Java where she died. She was buried at Lumajang but her remains were
subsequently exhumed and taken to Kartasura for reburial; see Dubbeldekop,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 20 June 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725); Semarang raadsbesluit,
11 Mar. 1726, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
28. Extract dagregister, 8 Dec.—31 Dec. 1719, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Bergman
& Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 6 Jan. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Batavia
to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 65; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 6-7.
29. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 29 Nov. 1719; Semarang raadsver-
gadering, | Dec. 1719; Gobius & van Kervel, Sémarang, to Batavia, 12 Dec. 1719;
Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 6 Jan. 1720; Bergman, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 6 Jan. 1720; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 13 Jan. 1720 & 10
Feb. 1720; Bergman & Gobius, Semarang, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1720; all in VOC
1948 (OB 1721). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 65; BS
IV:42; BTJ(BP), vol. XIX, pp. 63-5; vol. XX, pp. 8-10, 14-17 (it is interesting to
note that in this babad version, Bergman intercedes with AR ITV on Cakrajaya’s
behalf, but it is Ki Dm. Urawan’s statement that the accusations against Cakrajaya
were false which decides the king).
30. AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 6 Rabingulawal Ehe 1644 (17 Jan. 1720),
rec’d Sémarang 22 Jan. 1720; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 19 Feb.
1720 (including memorie for Ceesjong) & 21 Feb. 1720; Bergman & Gobius,
Sémarang, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 22 Feb. 1720, 24 Feb. 1720, 28 Feb. 1720:
Ceesjong, “Maninjon”, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 22 Feb. 1720; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 23 Feb. 1720; Ceesjong, “Maninjon”, to van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, 25 Feb. 1720; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 25 Feb. 1720 &
27 Feb. 1720; Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 4 Mar. 1720; all in VOC
1948 (OB 1721). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 67; BS
IV:38-40; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 7, 10-11, 17-19, 22-5.
Ceesjong’s letter of 25 Feb. 1720 reports that 24 Europeans (13 per cent of his
force of 179) and 40 Indonesians (15 per cent of his force of 261) were casualties
in the 22 Feb. action, all but 2, however, being wounded rather than killed.
A description of the rebel works is in van Spree, Marébung, to Semarang, 24
Apr. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
NOTES to pp. 194-5 377

Both VOC and Javanese records refer to Klathen as Kamlathen. The “Maninjon”
of Ceesjong’s letters must be the Pasar Malinjon of BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 22.
31. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 17 Mar. 1720; van Spree et al.,
Marébung, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 14 Apr. 1720; Rengers & Ceesjong,
Marébung, to Sémarang, 15 Apr. 1720; all in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
The VOC continued to distruct Danuréja; see Ceesjong & Rengers, Marébung,
to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 12 Mar. 1720; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang,
18 Mar. 1720; both in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
The manpower figures are taken from the letter of 17 Mar. 1720 cited above. It
should be noted that they are inconsistent with those reported in Batavia to H.
XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 475, giving 1070 at Kartasura
out of 4555 total military manpower under the VOC coastal operation. The 4555
total is also given in Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 4 Mar. 1720, in
VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
32. Rengers & Ceesjong, Marébung, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 20 Mar. 1720
& 26 Mar. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 28-30. Three
princes of Témbayat named Pngs. Panéngah, Suméndhi and Wuragil subsequently
submitted to the VOC-AR IV forces; Rengers & Ceesjong, Marébung, to van
Arrewijne, Kartasura, 22 Mar. 1720 & 26 Mar. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
Since these names mean respectively the middle, the next-to-youngest and the
youngest, it is probable that there was a fourth prince named Png. Sépuh (the
eldest) who had not submitted. B7T/J(BP) refers only to Pngs. Suméndhi and
Wongsadriya.
33. Ceesjong, “Maninjon”’ [see n. 30], to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 25 Feb.
1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss, VII, p. 475 (partially quoted below, p. 224); BS IV:40-1; BTJ(BP), vol.
XX, p. 19. According to BS I[1:38, Dutchmen drilled Purbaya’s troops in East Java
during the First Javanese War of Succession.
34. Van Spree, Marébung, to Semarang, 16 Apr. 1720 & 24 Apr. 1720, in VOC
1948 (OB 1721); BS IV:41.
35. BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 19-22, 31-2. Kandhuruwan Wilatikta was with royal
forces operating west of Mataram in Kédhu and Bagélen.
The name or title Kandhuruwan Wilatikta, attested in VOC and Javanese rec-
ords throughout the Kartasura period, is an interesting one. Kandhuruwan goes
back to the title kanuruhan which is found in inscriptions as early as the 8th
century AD. It is used for a high official particularly in the Majapahit period,
Wilatikta itself being a synonym for Majapahit. For the location of Old and Middle
Javanese references, see Zoetmulder, Old Jay. dictionary, vol. I p. 793, vol. II p.
2281; Pigeaud, Java in the 14th century, vol. V, pp. 175—6; Louis-Charles Damais,
Répertoire onomastique de I’ épigraphie Javanaise (jusqu'a Pu Sindok Sri
I§anawikrama Dharmmotungadewa): Etude d’ épigraphie Indonésienne (Paris: Ecole
Francaise d’Extréme-Orient, 1970), pp. 477-8.
36. Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém, pp. 149-50. PB II married Purbaya’s 14—year-
old daughter at the time of his accession in 1726 and announced that he did so in
accordance with the wishes of AR IV; see Noodt, Kartasura, to Batavia, 11 June
1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727). It is of course possible that AR IV told his son
to marry Purbaya’s daughter in order to fulfill the prophecy.
37. Yasadipura I, Babad Giyanti (21 vols.; Batawi Sentrum: Bale Pustaka,
378 NOTES to pp. 195-6

1937-9), vol. I, pp. 8-9; see the text and English translation in Soepomo
Poedjosoedarmo & M.C. Ricklefs (transl.), “The establishment of Surakarta: A
translation from the Babad Gianti”, Indonesia no. 4 (Oct. 1967), pp. 93-8. Babad
Giyanti is undated, but was almost certainly composed in the second half of the
18th century; see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. xix—xx.
38. BTJ(BP) is the published version of a text which was written at the wish of
PB IV (r. 1788-1820) but recopied on the order of Pakubuwana VII (r. 1830-58),
being dated at the beginning (Canto I:6; see BTJ/BP], vol. 1, p. 8) Tumpak (Sat.)-
Wage, 5 Réjéb, windu Sancaya, mangsa Catur (Kapat), wuku Mandhasiya, Ehe
dadi rasa sabdendra (1764) (every element in this date is correct; it is equivalent
to 15 Oct. 1836.) The text certainly contains passages very much older than this
time, some parts being demonstrably the same (except for minor variant readings)
as a MS from the Kartasura period which is the earliest text available for compari-
son; see M.C. Ricklefs, “The evolution of Babad tanah Jawi texts: In response to
Day”, BKI vol. 135, no. 4 (1979), pp. 446-7.
It is interesting that the Meinsma text, which was compiled in the 19th century,
long after the move to Sala/Surakarta, alters the prophecy to Kandhuruwan so that
it refers to Adipala bawah ing Sala (Olthof, BTJ, text p. 353, transl.p. 370) and
that to Purbaya to refer to Sala utawi. . . Adipala (ibid., text p. 355, transl.p. 371).
On the composition and editing of the Meinsma babad, see M.C. Ricklefs, “A con-
sideration of three version of the Babad tanah Jawi, with excerpts on the fall of
Majapahit”, BSOAS vol. 35, pt. 2 (1972), pp. 286—9 (but note that my conclusion
that this text derived directly from the Surakarta Major Babad is wrong, or at least
not correct for all parts of the Meinsma text).
39. De Benzin, Surabaya, to Bergman, Kartasura, 19 Dec. 1719 & 21 Dec.
1719; de Benzin, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 19 Jan. 1720; all in VOC 1948 (OB
1721). See also BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 13. At first the rebels had reportedly shown
little awe for Sasrawinata and Suryawinata; see Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719,
iby (6H) IDS. Joh ii
40. Van Spree, Kartasura, to Rengers, Marébung, 27 Apr. 1720, in VOC 1948
(OB 1721). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Oct. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 67.
41. Puspanégara to Mangkupraja, Kartasura, rec’d Marébung 2 Apr. 1720; van
Spree, Marébung, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 19 Apr. 1720; Rengers & Ceesjong,
Marébung, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 24 Apr. 1720; Puspanégara to Bergman &
Gobius, Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 25 May 1720; Bergman, Kartasura, to Batavia,
28 May 1720; de Benzin, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 6 June 1720; all in VOC 1948
(OB 1721).
42. Citrasoma to Cakrajaya & Kartanégara, Kartasura, rec’d Marébung 1 May
1720; van Spree, Marébung, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 2 May 1720; Rangin et
al., Jipang, to de Benzin, Surabaya, 28 May 1720; Purbaya & Blitar, Kémagétan,
to Tg.Mataun, Jipang, rec’d Batavia 21 June 1720; Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 2 July 1720; Suryawinata & Sasrawinata, Surabaya, to Sémarang, rec’d
11 July 1720; Bergman & van Spree, Wirasaba, to Batavia, 19 Oct. 1720; all in
VOC 1948 (OB 1721). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Oct. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 67;
BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 31-3.
43. Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Oct. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 68.
44. De Benzin, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 19 Jan. 1720, 14 Feb. 1720, 6 June
1720, 30 June 1720; Suryawinata & Sasrawinata, Surabaya, to Sémarang, rec’d 11
NOTES to p. 196 379

July 1720; all in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).

45. Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 July 1720; AR IV, Kartasura,
to Sémarang, 24 Ruwah Ehe 1644 (1 July 1720), rec’d 4 July 1720; both in VOC
1948 (OB 1721). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Oct. 1720, in dJ IX, pp. 67-8;
BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 35 et seqq. (telling a version of the campaign considerably
at variance with VOC records).
AR IV’s letter promises 2000 pikemen, 1000 porters and 200 horses (or perhaps
200 horse, i.e. cavalry) for the campaign in addition to some other advance forces
which were apparently already in the field. According to Batavia to H. XVII, 15
Jan. 1721, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 531, the VOC forces surviving at the
end of the campaign totalled some 6600; death rates were said to have been less
than those experienced “in the stinking encampment of Surabaya’. Thus the total
campaign force perhaps consisted of some 10,000 combatants.
Georg van Spree (then a Capt.) had succeeded Peijsen as commander at Sura-
baya when the latter died in 1719 (Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1719, in dJ IX,
p. 56); of his career before this time I know nothing. He brought VOC Surabaya
troops to Kartasura for use against the rebels in Mataram in late 1719. He died en
route to Batavia on 24 Dec. 1720 and the scheming Gobius then attempted to lay
hands on his estate (idem, 31 Mar. 1721, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VI, p. 543).
46. Bergman, Sémarang, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 24 Apr. 1720; van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 1 May 1720; Bergman, Kartasura, to Batavia, 28
May 1720; all in VOC 1948 (OB 1721). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Oct.
1720, in dJ IX, p. 68.
47. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 11 July 1720 & 26 July 1720; Bergman,
Jipang, to Semarang, 28 July 1720; van Spree, “Sancal”, to van Arrewijne, Kar-
tasura, 28 July 1720; Bergman, Jipang, to Sémarang, 7 Aug. 1720; Mangkupraja
to Danuréja, Kartasura, rec’d Semarang 10 Aug. 1720; Bergman, Jipang, to Sémarang,
—Aug. 1720; Bergman & van Spree, Madiun, to Batavia, 5 Sept. 1720; Bergman
& van Spree, Wirasaba, to Batavia, 19 Oct. 1720; all in VOC 1948 (OB 1721). See
also Batavia to H. XVII, 29 Oct. 1720, in dJ IX, p. 68.
The women captured at Kémagétan included a sister of Ratu Pakubuwana. The
rebels also lost seven small cannon (bassen) and an elephant which Purbaya and
Blitar had taken when they fled Kartasura on 24 June 1719 and somehow had kept
with them until this time. B7/(BP), vol. XX, pp. 42-4, also tells of the capture of
this R. Ay. Rongga Kaliwungu and others; in ibid, pp. 48-9, she is married to
Mangkupraja.
According to BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 37 et seqq., R.Tg. Cakranagara (CN IV’s
brother: see p. 178 above), now called R. Jimat, was also with the rebels. By this
time, Javanese chronicles refer to Surengrana with the name Dip. Natapura.
48. Bergman & van Spree, Madiun, to Batavia, 5 Sept. 1720; Bergman & van
Spree, Wirasaba, to Batavia, 19 Oct. 1720; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 28 Oct.
1720; Bergman, Surabaya, to Batavia, 7 Nov. 1720; ali in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
In Jan. 1721 AR IV’s forces evacuated Madiun because heavy rains, sickness
and death made it impossible for them to remain in the field; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 7 Jan. 1721, in VOC 1948 (OB L721):
49. Van Gangel, Pasuruan, to Bergman, 15 Oct. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721);
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1720, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 508; Bergman,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 3 Dec. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
380 NOTES to pp. 196-7

50. As was pointed out in n. 45 above, BTJ(BP) gives a version of this cam-
paign at variance with VOC sources, notably in its description of heroic military
resistance by the rebel side. At the end (BT/[BP], vol. XX, p. 46), it observes:
Neging wus karsaning Widi / Sultan Panémbahan | kédah apés yudanya / kasoran
salir ing jurit.
51. AR IV, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 17 Safar Jimawal 1645 (19 Dec. 1720),
rec’d 22 Dec. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 5 Jan. 1721, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721); idem, 26 Feb. 1721, in VOC 1965
(OB 1722); van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 14 Mar. 1721, 26 Mar. 1721,
11 Apr. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
52. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 12 Jan. 1721, in VOC 1948 (OB
PID),
53. Purbaya & Blitar, Malang, to Citrasoma ef al., rec’d Batavia 3 Apr. 1721;
idem, rec’d Sémarang 13 May 1721 (2 letters); all in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
54. Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 10 Mar. 1721, in VOC 1965
(OB 1722); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1721, in dJ IX, p. 70.
55. Except where separately footnoted, the general depiction of this campaign
rests upon letters in VOC 1965 (OB 1722) from Mar. 1721 to Nov. 1721 (see
particularly Bergman, Bangil, to Batavia, 15 June 1721; Bergman, Sindu, to Batavia,
11 Sept. 1721) and Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1721, in dJ IX, pp. 69-72. A
slightly confusing account of the campaign (including a flashback on p. 48) is in
BTJ(BP),vol. XX, pp. 47-54.
56. Capt. Totanga ef al., Kédhiri, to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, rec’d Batavia 26
Apr. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722), already refers to Ng. Katawéngan fighting on
AR IV’s side. See further van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 7 Nov. 1721;
AR IV, Kartasura, to Semarang, 29 Muharam Je 1646 (20 Nov. 1721); both in
VOC 1965 (OB 1722); and BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 50. ©
57. Ceesjong, on campaign near Malang, to Bergman, Bangil or Kalianyar, 17
July 1721; Puspanégara of Batang, near Malang, to Jayaningrat, Pekalongan, seen
at Sémarang 12 Aug. 1721; both in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
58. Wasengrana to Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, seen at Sémarang 3 Oct. 1721;
Bergman, Jépara, to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1721; both in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). See also
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1721, in dJ IX, p. 71; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 48,
53-4. Earlier reports had suggested that Sinduréja wished to surrender; see Danuréja
& Mangkupraja, Kartasura, to Citrasoma, Kédhiri, rec’d Sémarang 13 May 1721,
in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
59. Bergman, Jépara, to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1721; Surabrata to Puspanégara of
Batang & Capt. Totanga, Kédhiri, rec’d Batavia 30 Oct. 1721; Capt. Totanga,
Kédhiri, to Bergman, rec’d Batavia 30 Oct. 1721; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia,
5 Nov. 1721; all in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov.
72s hal GM) IDS yoy, 722 Lesh (aVe)), SUN, BOK, 8) B19).
Blitar’s body was brought to Malang, thence to Pasuruan and on to Kartasura
for burial in Mataram; see van Alsem, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 6 Nov. 1721, in
VOC 1984 (OB 1723); van Gangel, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 8 Nov. 1721, in VOC
1965 (OB 1722); van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 17 Nov. 1721 & 20 Nov.
1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722); Batavia to H. XVII, 20 Jan. 1722,'in Coolhaas,
Gen. Miss. VII, p. 592; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 55-7 (which says that burying Blitar
in Mataram was Bergman’s idea, not AR IV’s). With Blitar’s body there arrived
NOTES to pp. 197-8 381

in Kartasura four other leading rebel figures, including Ki Garwakondha (cf. p. 371
n. 95 above). The execution of Garwakondha and Tg. Jayabrata at Kartasura is
described in BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 57.
60. E.g. Vogel & de Benzin, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 2 Apr. 1721, Bergman,
Sindu, to Batavia, 11 Sept. 1721; both in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
61. Wasengrana to Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, seen at Sémarang 3 Oct. 1721;
Bergman, Jépara, to Batavia, 25 Oct. 1721; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5 Nov.
1721; all in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1721,
in dJ IX, pp. 71-2; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 54.
62. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5 Nov. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). See
further idem, 17 Jan. 1722; van Gangel, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 8 Feb. 1722;
Sémarang besluit, 22 Feb. 1722; Gelskerken, Grésik, to Semarang, 6 Mar. 1722;
general orders to Opperhoofden & Commandanten of Surabaya, Pasuruan, Grésik
& Madura, Sémarang, 18 Mar. 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 8 May 1722;
van Alsem, kort verslag, Surabaya [ca. 22 June 1722]; Gobius, Sémarang, to van
Alsem & Gelskerken, Surabaya & Grésik, 20 July 1722; Gelskerken, Grésik, to
Sémarang, 21 July 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 11 Sept. 1722; Capt.
Totanga, Kédhiri, to van Alsem, Surabaya, 9 Dec. 1722; all in VOC 1984 (OB
1723). Similar problems attended the period from late 1720 to early 1721; see
various letters particularly from Jan. 1721 to June 1721 in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
63. Van Alsem, Surabaya, to Semarang, 24 May 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 4 June 1722 & 20 Aug. 1722; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 11
Sept. 1722; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Gelskerken & Coster, Jépara, 21 Dec.
1722; all in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
AR IV also ordered rebuilding projects. In Feb. 1722 he sent heralds (gandhek)
to Surabaya to break up the mosque at Képutren and to repair that at Ampel. Van
Alsem, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 31 Mar. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
64. Batavia to H. XVII, 25 Sept. 1722, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 609;
Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 27 Sept. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723); dJ IX,
p. xi. Further personnel changes are recorded in Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia,
16 Feb. 1723, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
Dubbeldekop was made Onderkoopman and Resident in Rémbang in 1711,
promoted to Koopman in 1719, then placed in charge of Jépara. He was transferred
to Batavia in 1720 to act as secretary to the government (de Hoge Regering) there.
Later, in 1725, he was made an Extraordinary Councellor of the Indies. He died
in late 1728. See Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 341. n. 2
65. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 11 Aug. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB
L23))s
66. Sémarang to van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 3 Jan. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB
1722); Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 10 Mar. 1721, in VOC 1965
(OB 1722); Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 27 Dec. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB
1723); Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Apr. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB
1726); Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Batavia, 7 Mar. 1728 & 17 Oct. 1728 & in VOC
2107 (OB 1729).
67. Bergman, rapport ... Sept. 1719 tot Dec. 1721, Batavia 30 Dec. 1721, in
VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
68. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 27 Aug. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
69. De Haan, Priangan, vol. I, pp. 210-11; vol. III, pp. 472-6; L.W.G. de Roo,
382 NOTES to pp. 198-9

“De conspiratie van 1721”, TBG vol. 15, nos. 4-5 (1866), pp. 362-97. See also
Batavia to H. XVI, 20 Jan. 1722, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 593; dJ IX, pp.
xiii-xv; Abeyasekere, Jakarta, pp. 20-1.
All of the confessions in the Erbervelt affair were obtained through torture and
are thus of little historical value. Nevertheless one intriguing statement was made
by the suspect Lay Ek (said to be Sumbawan), who said that a second major
suspect, the Javanese Kartadriya, had told him that he was in reality a Raden from
Kartasura who had been sent to Batavia six years before by “Ingabeij Loeroe Pas-
sar’. At the time this was taken to refer to one “Ingabeij Passar, zoon van Soera-
pati”, and de Roo follows this, but I know of no son of Surapati of this name. It
is more probably a reference to Png. Ng. Saloringpasar, the son of PB I who was
exiled in 1715 (see p. 163 above). See de Roo, “Conspiratie”, pp. 370, 371, 374.
Hendrik Zwaardecroon was born in Rotterdam in 1667. He came to the Indies
as a midshipman in 1685 and thereafter rose rapidly in the VOC. In 1689 he was
promoted to Koopman. After a time in Batavia, in 1694 he was named commander
of Jafnapatnam. Until 1703 he occupied this and other senior posts in India and
Sri Lanka. In 1703 he was called back to Batavia and the following year became
an Extraordinary Councillor of the Indies upon the insistence of van Hoorn. In
1715 he became an ordinary Councillor. He was an opponent of Governor-General
Christoffel van Swoll (1713-18) and was elected by the Council of the Indies to
become Governor-General the day after van Swoll’s death. After his retirement,
Zwaardecroon lived on his estate near Batavia and died there in 1728. Stapel
comments, “If Zwaardecroon was in many respects an excellent servant of the
Company, one cannot say much good about him as a person: he possessed a fierce,
vindictive character’, and refers particularly to the “Erbervelt tragedy”. Yet, as
Stapel points out, Zwaardecroon professed an attachment for the common folk of
Batavia and insisted that he be buried not amongst the grand tombs of other Go-
vernors-General but amongst the commoners in the graveyard of Batavia’s “Por-
tuguese” church. His grave may still be seen there today. See Stapel, Gouverneurs-
General, pp. 44-5
70. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 211.
71. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 26 July 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). The
perpetrators appear to have been Mardijkers or Mestizo Portuguese. They included
a vagabond name Adriaan Pintoe alias Pattana van Abessij, a native rope-maker
named Steven de Rosario who was married to Pasquila van Palembang, and the
priest Francesco Gomes. De Rosario was arrested. Fr. Gomes got away, apparently
aboard a Malay boat. The very names suggest the rich and varied ethnic and
cultural world of the VOC period.
72. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 3 Dec. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB
1722); Batavia to H. XVII, 20 Jan. 1722, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 592.
73. Van Alsem, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 27 Sept. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB
M/Z),
74, Tg. Mataun, Jipang, to Danuréja, Kartasura, rec’d Sémarang, 15 Nov. 1722,
in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
The famine in Surabaya is recorded in the large stone inscription at the grave-
yard of Ky. Tg. Puspanégara of Grésik. See Hasan Muarif Ambary, “Epigraphical
data from the 17th—19th century Muslim graves in East Java,” in Cultural contact
and textual interpretation: Papers from the fourth European colloquium on Malay
NOTES to pp. 199-200 383

and Indonesian studies, held at Leiden in 1983 (ed. C.D. Grijns & S.O. Robson;
VKI vol. 115; Dordrecht & Cinnaminson: Foris Publications, 1986), pp. 27-31.
Note, however, that Ambary misunderstands (p. 29) the phrase jénénge putrane
Susuhunan Pakubuwana titiga kakasih Susuhunan Amangkurat aparébatan lan
dhereke Pangeran Purbaya Pangeran Blitar as “this was at the time that the son
of Susuhunan Pakubuwana II], who was called Susuhunan Hamangkurat, was in
dispute with the followers of Pangeran Purbaya and Pangeran Blitar. . . .” The ref-
erence is to the three warring sons of PB I who were Susuhunan AR IV and the
latter’s brothers Png. Purbaya and Png. Blitar. PB III did not rule until 1749-88
and his son was called PB IV (r. 1788-1820).
75. Van Gangel, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 8 Feb. 1722; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, 27 Oct. 1722; Danuréja, Kartasura, to Puspadirana, Pasuruan, rec’d
Sémarang 31 Oct. 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5 Nov. 1722; Dubbeldekop,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 29 Dec. 1722; all in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
76. Van Alsem, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 27 Nov. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB
1722); van Gangel, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 9 Dec. 1721, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723);
van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 19 Dec. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722);
idem, 7 Jan. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723); Gobius, Sémarang, to van Alsem,
Surabaya, 23. Jan. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723); van Gangel, Pasuruan, to
Sémarang, 2 Feb. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723), van Alsem, Surabaya, to Sémarang,
11 Feb. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723); Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 23 Feb,1722
& 12 Apr. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723); van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang,
16 Apr. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723); Batavia to H. XVII, 31 Mar. 1722, in
Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 602; idem, 30 Nov. 1722, in ibid., p. 632; BTJ(BP),
vol. XXI, p. 4,7 (the tale is wrongly placed chronologically).
77. AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 4 Sawal Je 1646 (19 July 1722), rec’d 15
Aug. 1722; idem, 11 Sura Dal 1647 (22 Oct. 1722), rec’d 12 Nov. 1722; both in
VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
78. Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1722, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 632.
79. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 19 Feb. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 13 Mar. 1723; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 15 Mar. 1723;
Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 11 Apr. 1723; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
80. Menut, Pasuruan, to Semarang, 19 Mar. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724);
Surapati (III) alias Mas Lémbu, Lumajang, to Lt. Commandant Pasuruan, rec’d
Batavia 14 May 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724); BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 65-77.
Since Surapati I’s son Ad. Wiranégara appears to be called Surapati (II) in some
contexts (see BS I[I:58) and he died in late 1708 (see p. 150 above), the son who
now bore this name should presumably be called Surapati III (see also BS III:69).
BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 72, comments that it was God’s wish that Surapati II
should forget Surapati I’s curses regarding the VOC and adds that it was VOC
custom not to keep its word (adat Kumpéni linuhung / yen asung ujar tan yukti).
81. Cool, Sémarang, to Batavia, 21 Apr. 1723; Dubbeldekop er al., Pasuruan,
to Batavia, 21 May 1723; both in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). See also BTJ(BP), vol.
20:6 je, ah
82. Dubbeldekop, Pasuruan, to Surapati (III), Lumajang, 5 May 1723 & 9 May
1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724); Dubbeldekop er a/., Pasuruan, to Batavia, 26 June
1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724); BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 72-4, vol. XXI, p. 4.
83. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1724; in VOC 2017 (OB
384 NOTES to pp. 200-1

1725). Here Dubbeldekop denies Surapati III’s claims.

84. BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 62. The story is specifically identified as a flashback
in the text. On this episode, see p. 163 above.
85. Png. Dip. Anom Mangkunégara, Lumajang, to van Arrewijne (sic), rec'd
Pasuruan 8 May 1723; Dubbeldekop et a/., Pasuruan, to Batavia, 21 May 1723 &
26 June 1723; Cooster & Melchior report to Dubbeldekop, Pasuruan, 26 June
1723; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). See also Batavia to H. XVII, 21 Sept. 1723,
in dJ IX, p. 82 n. 1; BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 74-9; vol. XXI, pp. 34. On prior
reports that Purbaya and Dipanagara had no more than 11 followers and Sureng-
rana only 15, see particularly Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 19 Mar. 1723, in
VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
86. Dubbeldekop, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 26 June 1723; Dubbeldekop et al.,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 7 July 1723 & 15 July 1723; naemrolle, Sémarang, 15 July
1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to AR IV, Kartasura, 21 July 1723, all in VOC
2000 (OB 1724). See also BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 5-6.
According to the letter and naemrolle of 15 July 1723, R.Tg. Surapati (III) and
his brothers Suradilaga and Suramanggala were sent to Batavia, but brothers named
Tirtanata, Surayuda, Sasranagara and “Malion” (?) were left in Pasuruan. Some
confusion arises over these names. BTJ(BP), vol. XX, p. 45, names 3 of Surapati
I’s sons as Surapati (II), Suradilaga and Tirtanata. /bid., p. 78, says that the son
of Surapati I named R. Bérahim did not go to Pasuruan to submit because he was
ill. Peijsen et al., Surabaya, to Sémarang, 19 Nov. 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719),
refers also to “den nog overgebleven soon van den mordenaar Sourapattij, thans
gen Maas Ibrahim”. Dubbeldekop ef a/., Pasuruan, to Batavia, 21 May 1723, in
VOC 2000 (OB 1724), says that another name for Surapati (III) was M. Lémbu.
See also p. 393 n. 60 below.
87. BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 4-5. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Apr.
1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727), also reports AR IV as saying that he had always
thought Purbaya would be killed or exiled.
88. AR IV, Kartasura, to Semarang, 22 Sawal Dal 1647 (26 July 1723), rec’d
30 July 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5 Aug. 1723; AR IV, Karta-
sura, to Batavia, 2 Bésar Dal 1647 (3 Sept. 1723), rec’d 16 Sept. 1723; Dub-
beldekop, Sémarang, to AR IV, Kartasura, 9 Oct. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 17 Oct. 1723; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). See also Batavia to H.
XVII, 21 Sept. 1723, in dJ IX, p. 82 n. 1; idem, 3 Dec. 1723, in dJ IX, p. 83n.;
Zwaardecroon memorie, 7 Aug. 1725, in dJ IX, p. 96; BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 6-7.
Until the end of his life AR IV expressed his unhappiness at Purbaya’s presence
in Batavia and even suspected at the end that Purbaya had managed to arrange to
poison him. See Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 3 Apr. 1726, in VOC 2056
(OB 1727); Batavia to H. XVII, 5 Dec. 1726, in dJ IX, p. 112.
Purbaya outlived AR IV, dying in Batavia on 11 Nov. 1726. His body was then
sent back to Kartasura for burial. It was escorted to the court by Ky.Tg. Kandhu-
ruwan Wilatikta and a VOC detachment, and was buried at the royal graves of
Imagiri. See Batavia to H. XVII, 5 Dec. 1726, in dJ IX, p. 113; and the follow-
ing documents in VOC 2056 (OB 1727): Tersmitten, Stmarang, to Ceesjong,
Kartasura, 19 Dec. 1726; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 22 Dec. 1726; PB II,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 27 Rabingulakir Alip 1651 (23 Dec. 1726), rec’d 26 Dec.
1726; Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Ceesjong, Kartasura, 28 Dec. 1726; Tersmitten,
NOTES to pp. 201-4 385

Sémarang, to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1726; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 6 Jan.

2a
R.M. Lindhu had originally been sent along to Batavia because Purbaya had
asked to have him along and AR IV had expressed no wish for him at that stage;
Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 15 July 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724);
BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, p. 6, 8.
AR IV sent the Sp. RI. 1000 reward for Purbaya’s capture to Dubbeldekop; AR
IV, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 13 Muharram Be 1648 (14 Oct. 1723), rec’d 16 Oct.
1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
89. According to Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 212.
90. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 12 July 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724),
reporting merely that this had been done a few days before. On PB I’s headshaving
of Sept. 1715 and Feb. 1716 see p. 164 above. It will be noted that at that time
AR IV (then Crown prince) did not shave his head for fear of exacerbating his
headaches and eye complaints. This was perhaps why he had a haircut rather than
a shave in 1723.
91. Ceesjong et al., Kartasura, to Semarang, 16 Dec. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB
1724).
92. Cool & Vaver, Semarang, to Dubbeldekop, 9 Mar. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB
1724). On the currency and rice conversion values employed for this source and
PB I’s debt in 1709, see pp. 154, 343 n. 5 above. For VOC records concerning the
1720/1 rice (“brasdomas’”’) deliveries, see van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Bergman,
Madiun, 10 Sept. 1720; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Bergman, on march in E.
Java, 21 Sept. 1720; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 1 Nov. 1720; Bergman &
Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1721; all in VOC 1948 (OB 1721).
93. Based upon Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in dJ IX, p. 31; Sémarang
to Batavia, 26 Nov. 1719, in VOC 1929 (OB 1720) (containing different figures
from the preceding source for 1717/18, which would show 0.199 of expenditure
having been covered by income); idem, 25 Jan. 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB 1721);
idem 27 Dec. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722); idem, 1 Feb. 1724, in VOC 2000
(OB 1724). These accounts are all given in fl., which I have converted to Sp. RI.
using the rates explained in Appendix 3.

Notes to Chapter 12
1. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 7 Nov. 1721; AR IV, Kartasura, to
Bergman, Sémarang, 17 Muharram Je 1646 (8 Nov. 1721), rec’d 10 Nov. 1721;
both in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). See also BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 57-8. See above
pp. 193-4 on Danuréja’s imprisonment and pp. 197-8 on Mangkupraja’s death.
2. Gobius, Smarang, to Batavia, 9 July 1721 & 23 Aug. 1721, in VOC 1965
(OB 1722); de Graaf, “Regenten van Semarang”, p. 300.
For several years Ng. Martayuda had effectively done the bupati’s job during his
ageing uncle’s illnesses, but according to Gobius Sura Adimanggala hadn’t much
liked him.
Sura Adimanggala was appointed by the VOC with AR II’s consent in early
1682 (see p. 289 n. 32 above). As that time he was named Rongga Yudawongsa.
In 1699 he was renamed Rongga Yudanagara and in 1704 Sura Adimanggala (see
above p. 124 and p. 333 n. 58).
386 NOTES to pp. 204-5

3. BTJ(BP), vol. XX, pp. 58-60.

4. BK ff. 542v.—548r. See also de Graaf, “Regenten van Semarang”, pp. 301-2.
5. Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 20 May 1722; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, 29 May 1722; AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 11 Sura Dal 1647 (22 Oct.
1722), rec’d 12 Nov. 1722; all in VOC 1984 (OB 1723). The dispute concerned
particularly a village called Watupanganten, the location of which is unknown to
me.
6. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 17 Nov. 1721; CN IV to Batavia,
rec’d 18 Nov. 1721; Bergman & Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 25 Nov. 1721;
Danuréja, Kartasura, to CN IV, Madura, rec’d Batavia 20 Dec. 1721; van Arre-
wijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 14 Dec 1721; all in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
7. Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 27 Nov. 1719 & 17 Mar. 1720; Bergman, Kar-
tasura, to Batavia, 28 May 1720; Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 27 July 1720, 3 Oct.
1720, 9 Nov. 1720; all in VOC 1948 (OB 1721). Further, idem, 7 May 1721 & 3
July 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). On the 1675 superstitions, see p. 70 above.
The VOC records describe the Pénaruban forest as being in the area of Batang.
Since Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 16 Feb. 1723, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723),
refers to the ““Walerise of Panaroebanse bossen’, this is clearly the same as the
Pénaruban located at Wéleri, westward from Kéndhal listed in Schoel, Register, p.
285, although it seems curious for this to be described as being in the Batang area.
8. Marchant, Tégal, to Semarang, | June 1721 & 3 July 1721; van Arrewijne,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 25 Sept. 1721; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 3 Oct.
1721; Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 12 Oct. 1721; all in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
For a list of pradikan and royal villages in Tégal, see Marchant, notitie van
soodanige keijserlijke negorijen ... mitsgaders pape negorijen ... in de districte
van Tagal, Tégal, 28 June 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722). This lists 38 royal
villages with a total of 2007 cacahs and 8 pradikan desas with 264 cacahs and 528
individual papen (probably religious student, santri). Tégal was conventionally as-
cribed a population of 7500 cacahs and in 1717 was said to have 7200 (Ricklefs,
“Statistical evidence”, p. 8); if one uses those figures as a crude indicator of
population, then the royal villages had over a quarter of Tégal’s population and the
pradikan desas over 3 percent.
9. Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 13 Sept. 1721, 27 Sept. 1721, 5 Dec. 1721, in
VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
Marchant also faced difficulties because the European rice miller at Tégal was
a drunkard. He was replaced by Noy. 1721. Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 27 Sept.
1721 & 15 Nov. 1721, in VOC 1965 (OB 1722).
10. Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, to Batavia, rec’d 19 May 1720, in VOC 1948 (OB
1721); Jayaningrat, Pekalongan, to Sémarang, rec’d Batavia 25 May 1720, in VOC
1948 (OB 1721); Jayaningrat, Semarang, to Batavia, rec’d 15 Oct. 1721, in VOC
1965 (OB 1722).
11. Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 6 Feb. 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia,
4 June 1722; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Semarang, 9 June 1722, 24 June 1722,
1S Aug. 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 24 July 1722 & 27 Aug. 1722; all
in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
In Lumajang, however, there was serious damage to the rice crop by vermin
leading to famine and flight. Half of the population of 1000 had reportedly fled by
Apr. See van Gangel, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 2 Apr. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB
1723).
NOTES to pp. 206-8 387

12. Marchant, Tégal, to Batavia, 26 June 1722, 30 July 1722, 20 Aug. 1722;
Marchant, memorie for Stavius, Tégal, 22 Sept. 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia,
7 Oct. 1722; Stavius, Tégal, to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1722 & 20 Nov. 1722; van Alsem,
Surabaya, to Sémarang, 1 Dec. 1722; all in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
See also the reports on 22 ships (4-5 of them large) of Malay, Bantén and
Javanese traders discovered near Juwana without VOC passes: Gobius, Sémarang,
to Ducerceau, Juwana, 3 July 1722; Ducerceau, Juwana, to Sémarang, 19 July
1722; Gobius, Semarang, to Ducerceau & Dallens, Juwana & Rémabang, 31 July
1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 Aug. 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Ducer-
ceau, Juwana, 29 Sept. 1722; all in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
13. Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, to Batavia, rec’d, 1 Oct. 1722, in VOC 1984 (OB
1723). Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade, p. 208, shows 618,765 Amsterdam lbs of
coffee purchased and delivered during the fiscal year 1721/2.
The price paid for Jayaningrat’s coffee is not given in the records. I have cal-
culated it on the basis of the figures in de Haan, vertoog, Batavia, 15 Jan. 1726,
in dJ IX, pp. 102-5, which show the price paid for coffee before the reductions at
that time to have been, with some minor variations, Rds. Holl. 20/50/-per pikul.
14. Cf. the VOC accounts in Table IV, p. 202 above.
15. Marchant, memorie for Stavius, Tégal, 22 Sept. 1722; Marchant, Tégal, to
Batavia, 24 Sept. 1722; both in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
16. AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia 4 Sawal Je 1646 (19 July 1722), rec’d 15 Aug.
1722; idem, 11 Sura Dal 1647 (22 Oct. 1722), rec’d 12 Nov. 1722; both in VOC
1984 (OB 1723). On the upacara, see Groneman, Garébég’s p. 81 & pl. VII.
17. Van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 6 July 1722; Gobius, S¢marang, to
van Arrewijne, Kartasura, 20 July 1722; van Arrewijne, Kartasura, to Sémarang,
7 Sept. 1722; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 19 Oct. 1722; AR IV, Kartasura,
to Batavia, 11 Sura Dal 1647 (22 Oct. 1722), rec’d 12 Nov. 1722; all in VOC 1984
(OB 1723).
18. CN IV, Madura, to Danuréja, Kartasura, seen Sémarang 20 June 1722;
Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 3 Oct. 1722; AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 11 Sura
Dal 1647 (22 Oct. 1722), rec’d 12 Nov. 1722; Gobius, Sémarang, to Batavia, 5
Nov. 1722; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 19 Dec. 1722 & 27 Dec. 1722; all
in VOC 1984 (OB 1723). On Garébég Mulud Dal, see p. 352 n. 46 above; 12
Mulud Dal 1647 fell on 21 Dec. 1722.
19. The description of Dubbeldekop’s visit rests upon Kereeke, aanteekeninge
14 Jan.—8 Feb. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 16 Feb. 1723; both in
VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
20. The other 3 princes are identified as Pngs. Ngabei, Martasana and Danupraja.
Padmasusastra, Sajarah-dalém, pp. 140-2, list a R.M. Sandeya who was renamed
Png. Ngabei, a R. M. Budiman who was renamed R.M. Régu and finally retitled
Png. Danupaya, and a R.M. Utara who was renamed Png. A. Martasana (and later
Png. A. Dipanagara and Adinagara), but all of the these new titles are said to have
been given by PB II. There is no Danupraja in Padmasusastra: probably Danupaya
is meant in the VOC report. In the light of these 1723 VOC reports, clearly Pad-
masusastra is wrong about these Pangerans’ names not being employed before the
reign of PB IL.
21. Quotations from Koreeke, aanteekeninge 14 Jan—8 Feb. 1723, in VOC 1984
(OB 1723). The ringleaders were grievously wounded by the tigers, then finished
off by kris. The tigers were killed by Javanese pikemen (rampog: see p. 9 above).
388 NOTES to pp. 208-9

It is possible that this is the same episode as that described in BTJ(BP), vol.
XXI, pp. 11-12, which appears, however, to be placed ca. 1724-5. Cf. the date on
p. 11 for a previous event, Jumadilawal, Wawu lawang sakawan kawayang bumi
(AJ 1649 = 30 Jan—28 Feb. 1725); the text says that this episode occurred in the
same year (AJ 1649). The babad describes the conspirators as simple mountain
folk from Gunung Kidul misled by a holy man claiming to be from Nusa Témbini
(on this location, which had considerable legendary and supernatural significance,
see Ricklefs, Mangkubumi, pp. 376, 386 n. 48, 391, 392). It says 7 ringleaders
were obliged to fight tigers with no weapons other than short cudgels. Chronologi-
cal disorder is characteristic of the BTJ(BP) text in this period as has been com-
mented on at several points above.
22. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Dubbeldekop, 19 Feb. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB
1724) By 1728 the pales were either rotted or stolen and were then replaced;
Coster, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 13 Apr. 1728, in VOC 2107 (OB 1729).
Dubbeldekop had little faith in Ceesjong’s ability to discover the plots of
Kartasura’s courtiers. Among all the VOC military at the court, he felt that one
could rely only upon Lt. Vertangen, whom he therefore made commander of the
VOC watch at the kraton. In May 1724, Vertangen died after a prolonged illness.
See Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Mar. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724);
Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 12 May 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
23. According to de Graaf, “Regenten van Sémarang”, p. 302, citing the author-
ity of Soekimo, Para boepati di Semarang, published in 1956.
24. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Mar. 1723; AR IV, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, 11 Jumadilakir Dal 1647 (19 Mar. 1723), rec’d 24 Mar. 1723; Dub-
beldekop, Semarang, to AR IV, Kartasura, 2 Apr. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 11 Apr. 1723; AR IV, Kartasura, to Dubbeldekop, 9 Réjéb Dal 1647
(15 Apr. 1723), rec’d Pasuruan 9 May 1723; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
It is interesting that BT/(BP), vol. XX, pp. 59-62, 64, depicts the replacement
of Martayuda with Sastrawijaya as an attempt by Dubbeldekop to curry favour
with Danuréja.
Dubbeldekop had written to Batavia that the boundary of Sémarang/Kartasura
legal jurisdiction at Bayalali was too close to Kartasura, and suggested that Sala-
tiga would make a better boundary; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 16 Feb.
1723, in VOC 1984 (OB 1723).
Martayuda was sent to Batavia under guard in Apr. 1723 with 4 of his sons.
Further family members followed later. He lived there under VOC supervision for
18 years. Dubbedekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 11 Apr. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB
1724); naemrolle der wijven, bijwijven, kinderen... van... Ng. Marta—Joeda... ,
Sémarang, 20 Aug. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724); de Graaf, “Regenten van
Sémarang,” pp. 302-3.
25. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 12 July 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
26. Idem, 25 July 1723; Dubbeldekop, Semarang, to Batavia, 1 Sept. 1723;
Cool, Semarang, to Batavia, 11 Sept. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Semarang, to Batavia,
17 Oct. 1723 & 11 Nov. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to van Alsem, Surabaya,
24 Jan. 1724; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). The payment of Sp. RI. 14,540 may
reflect a decision by the kraton to devalue VOC currency; see pp. 210-11 above.
27. See p. 201 above.
28. De Laval, Tégal, to Batavia, 2 Aug. 1723, 3 Sept. 1723, 12 Sept. 1723, 14
 NOTES to p. 209 389

Oct. 1723, 8 Dec. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). There were also problems with
vermin attacking the rice on the western pasisir.
29. Ceesjong, Kartsura, to Sémarang, 16 Dec. 1723; AR IV, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, 14 Rabingulakir Be 1648 (12 Jan. 1724), rec’d 17 Jan. 1724; both in
VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
30. CN IV, Madura, to Sémarang, rec’d 10 July 1723; Tg. Mataun, Jipang, to
van Alsem, Surabaya, rec’d Semarang 26 July 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to
Batavia, 5 Aug. 1723; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 30 Jan. 1724; Dub-
beldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 Mar. 1724; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). See
further Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 6 May 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
On the VOC withdrawal, see Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Mar. 1723
& 11 Apr. 1723; Pasuruan raadsvergadering, 18 June 1723; all in VOC 2000 (OB
1724).
31. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 16 Dec. 1723 & 2 Mar. 1724, in VOC
2000 (OB 1724); idem, 12 Apr. 1724 & 15 Apr. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725);
AR IV, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 29 Réjéb Be 1648 (24 Apr. 1724), rec’d 28 Apr.
1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725). Along with the belated coach and its appur-
tenances, AR IV was sent a chest of clothing, 3 firearms, 4 vats (balijse) of
Japanese soy sauce (keetjap) and 4 vats of Japanese sake (sakki/).
32. AR IV, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 24 Muharram Be 1648 (25 Oct. 1723),
rec’d 28 Oct. 1723; Mangkunégara, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 24 Muharram Be
1648 (25 Oct. 1723), rec’d 28 Oct. 1723; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 25
Oct. 1723 & 29 Oct. 1723; Sémarang to Batavia, 11 Nov. 1723; Ceesjong, Kar-
tasura, to Sémarang, 13 Nov. 1723, 16 Nov. 1723, 19 Nov. 1723, 16 Dec. 1723;
Sémarang to Batavia, 16 Dec. 1723; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). See also BTJ(BP),
vol. XXI, pp. 6-7, 8-9.
Mangkunégara was given 1000 cacahs for his maintenance and the dalém of
Png. Purbaya (where he had been raised) to lived in.
Ceesjong’s letter of 25 Oct. 1723 reports that Lindhu was renamed “Mas Bakti”.
This suggests that the information in Padamasusastra, Sajarah-daleém, p. 143, may
be inaccurate in saying that R.M. Lindhu died as a child (seda timur). According
to ibid., there was another son of AR IV who was named R.M. Subékti; he should
not be confused with R.M. Bakti. BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 18-19, lists AR IV’s
children (PB II’s siblings) at the start of PB II’s reign and also appears to distin-
guish R. M. Lindhu from R.M. Subékti. See also Lijst der tans in weesen sijnde
broeders en susters van den soesoehoenang Pacoeboeana ..., Kartasura, 28 Oct.
1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728), which clearly distinguishes a 6—year—old R.M.
Bakti from a 10-year-old R.M. Subékti.
In June 1724 AR IV had the body of Mangkunégara’s mother exhumed at
Lumajang and brought to Kartasura for reburial. Dubbelkedop, Sémarang, to Batavia,
20 June 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725); Sémarang raadsbesluit, 11 Mar. 1726, in
VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
33. CN IV, Madura, to Batavia, rec’d 26 Oct. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Semarang,
to Batavia, 16 Dec. 1723; both in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). See also Batavia to H.
XVII, 30 Nov. 1724, in dJ IX, p. 87n.
34. CN IV, Madura, to Sémarang, rec’d 16 Apr. 1724; Dubbeldekop, Semarang,
to CN IV, Madura, 18 Apr. 1724; Dubbeldekop, Semarang, to Batavia, 20 Apr.
1724; van Alsem, Surabaya, to Sémarang, 28 Apr. 1724; Danuréja, Kartasura, to
390 NOTES to pp. 210-11

Sémarang, rec’d 22 May 1724; all in VOC 2017 (OB 25):

35. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, | Apr. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725);
Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 12 Apr. 1724, in’ VOC 2017 (OB) 1725):
Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1724, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VU, p. 738. BTJ(BP),
vol. XIX, pp. 41-2, reports the appointment of Ki Tg. Mangunnagara as head of
the gédhong ca. 1719.
36. Danuréja, Kartasura, to Sémarang, | Dec. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
It was pointed out in the preceding chapter that 1723 was marked by apparently
major ritual acts on AR IV’s part, notably the cutting of his hair in July and his
wearing what seems to have been the crown of Majapahit at Garébég Mulud in
Dec. (see p. 201 above). These may reflect some change in the king’s perception
of his status which was consistent with his giving Danuréja greater control of
administration while the monarch himself adopted a loftier role.
37. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Mar. 1723; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, 12 Jan. 1724; both in VOC 2000 (OB 1724). Jayaningrat’s son was
named Dm. Jayanagara. There were other administrative changes at the same time
affecting the governance of Jagaraga, Pasuruan and Madiun.
38. De Laval, Tégal, to Batavia, 7 Nov. 1723 & 23 Jan. 1724, in VOC 2000
(OB 1724). See further AR IV, Kartasura to Sémarang, 29 Réjéb Be 1648 (24 Apr.
1724), rec’d 28 Apr. 1724, AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 29 Réjéb Be 1648 (24
Apr. 1724), rec’d 7 May 1724; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
24 Apr. 1724; all in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
There was an ongoing problem with the counterfeiting of dubbelde stuivers and
the clipping of VOC coins. See Menut, Pasuruan, to Semarang, 26 Sept. 1725, in
VOC 2035 (OB 1726); Haasbroek, Kartasura, to Semarang, 31 May 1727 & 18
July 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728).
On VOC coinage of this period, see C. Scholten, The coins of the Dutch over-
seas territories 1601-1948 (Amsterdam: J. Schulman, 1953), pp. 38 et segq. &
plates; Netscher & van der Chijs, Munten, pp. 4 et seqq.; Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic
trade, pp. 50 et seqq.; Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién,vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 356.
As will be clear from these sources, currency conversion rates in the VOC were
a matter of much complexity; see also Appendix 3 below.
Jayaningrat continued to sell coffee to the VOC, but only offered 4000 Ibs in
1723 because of poor production that year (Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, to Batavia,
rec’d 4 Nov. 1723, in VOC 2000 [OB 1724]). He was, however, in conflict with
the VOC Resident at Tégal, de Laval, over the supply of woodcutters for the
Pénaruban forest (Jayaningrat, Pekalongan, to Sémarang, rec’d 10 Apr. 1724, in
VOC 2017 [OB 1725). On this matter, Dubbeldekop decided that de Laval’s
demands were unreasonable; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to de Laval, [Tégal], 19
Apr. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
39. The figures in Cool & Vaver, Sémarang, to Dubbeldekop, 9 Mar. 1723, in
VOC 2000 (OB 1724), giving the Susuhunan’s debts and payments 1708/9-1721/
2, are expressed in Rds. Holl. The annual cash dues are given as Rds. Holl, 17,550
(except for a few years) and the total arrears as Rds. Holl. 142,039/18/8 (= Sp. RI.
126,257 at the old rate of exchange but 117,875 at the new).
40. Semarang raadsbesluit, 1 May 1724; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Ceesjong,
Kartasura, 5 May 1724; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 19 May 1724; Dub-
beldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 20 June 1724; all in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
NOTES to pp. 211-12 391

41. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 19 May 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725);
idem, 7 Mar. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). The second letter reports that unknown
culprits had torn the notices down, uprooted the posts and thrown them across the
roads. Ceesjong spoke to Danuréja, who told AR IV. The king ordered a search
for the perpetrators whose hands feet were to be cut off if they were found, as an
example to others.
42. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 10 Sept. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB
1725); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1724, in dJ IX, p. 87n.
The VOC records refer to the payment as being in Rds. at 54 heavy stuivers
each. Since the Rd. Holl. was calculated at 48 heavy stuivers (or 60 light stuivers),
it is clear that these payments were in Sp. RI. (or Spanish Rds.) normally calcu-
lated by the VOC as being worth 1.125 Rds. Holl. (1.125 x 48 =54). By the VOC’s
own calculations, it thus received not Rds. Holl. 17,550 (x 48 stuivers = 842,400
st.) but Rds. Holl. 16,380 (x 48 st. = 786,240 st. + 54 = Sp. RI. 14,560), reflecting
the devaluation by 7.1 per cent.
It was noted above (n. 26) that the payment of Sp. RI. 14,540 in 1723 may show
that the court had already decided to devalue VOC currency. See also n. 74 below.
I am grateful to Drs. F. S. Gaastra’s advice about VOC currency in this period.
43. De Laval, Tégal, to Batavia, 9 Aug. 1724, 13 Sept. 1724, 13 Jan. 1725, in
VOC 2017 (OB 1725). De Laval became Resident at Tégal in 1723 (de Laval,
Tégal, to Batavia, 29 June 1723, in VOC 2000 [OB 1724]) but I know nothing of
him before this time.
44. Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”, pp. 18-22, 31. Danuréja placed some of the
blame for people fleeing the area upon oppression by de Laval, which the latter
denied; Danuréja, Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 30 Dec. 1724; de Laval, Tégal, to
Sémarang, 20 Feb. 1725; both in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). See also Ricklefs, “Statistical
evidence”, p. 10.
45. E.g. de Laval, Tégal, to Batavia, 7 Nov. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724)
idem, 13 Sept. 1724 & 24 Sept. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725); idem, 20 Sept.
1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726); Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 17 Nov. 1725, in
VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
46. In 1724 Jayaningrat supplied 6200 Amsterdam lbs of coffee (3063 kg / 6752
Ibs avoirdupois); Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, to Batavia, rec’d 27 Oct. 1724, in VOC
2017 (OB 1725).
47. E.g. Puspanégara, Batang, to Sémarang, rec’d 20 Nov. 1724; Danuréja,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 30 Dec. 1724; de Laval, Tégal, to Smarang, 20 Feb.
1725; all in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). See also n. 38 above.
48. E.g. see Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Dec. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB
12>):
49. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1724 & 9 Nov. 1724 in VOC
2017 (OB 1725); Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1724, in dJ IX, p. 87n. (the refer-
ence here to CN IV not attending Garébég Mulud of course refers to AJ 1648 / AD
1723); Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Dec. 1724 & 20 Dec. 1724, in VOC
2017 (OB 1725).
50. Danuréja, Kartasura, to Semarang, rec’d 18 June 1724; Ceesjong, Kartasura,
to Sémarang, 3 Dec. 1724 & 20 Dec. 1724; all in VOC 2017 (OB 1725). See
further Nyai Mas Raden, Bantén, to Citrasoma, Jépara, n. d. (ca. Jan—Feb. 1725),
in VOC 2035 (OB 1726), saying that an elephant was ready for him and asking
392 NOTES to p. 213

for horses for the Bantén Sultan. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 2 Apr. 1726,
in VOC 2056 (OB 1727), refers to an elephant presented to AR IV by Jayaningrat
a year before. Citrasoma and Jayaningrat had been ordered to find a replacement
elephant for AR IV, but CN IV apparently acted without receiving a direct order
in this regard.
51. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 14 Dec. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
52. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Dec. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
On the bédhaya in general, see Pigeaud, Literature, vol. I, pp. 252-3; idem,
Javaanse volksvertoningen: Bijdrage tot de beschrijving van land en volk (Batavia:
Volkslectuur, 1938), pp. 513-15; B. Helsdingen-Schoevers et al., Het serimpi
boek: 20 gekleurde platen en 20 autotypieén van serimpi— en bedajadansen, met
toelichtenden tekst (Weltevreden: Volkslectuur, 1925), pp. 16-23; J. Groneman, /n
den kédaton te Jogjakarta; Oepatjara, ampilan en tooneeldansen (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1888), pp. 17 et seqq.; Wasisto Surjodiningrat, Gamelan, dance and wayang
in Jogjakarta (Jogjakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1971), pp. 14-16;
Soedarsono, Wayang wong: The state ritual dance drama in the court of Yogyakarta
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1984), pp. 79-83.
In more modern times, this sacred court dance has always been performed by
9 female dancers, but this was not always the case in the Kartasura period, for
there are other contemporary references to bédhaya dancers in groups of 7. On 11
June 1726 Noodt saw 14 such groups perform at the kraton, followed by a group
of 9 who were the king’s dancers, then another 7 royal bédhaya dancers; see
Grootestraat dagregister, 28 May—26 June 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727). Raffles,
History (1830), vol. I, p. 381, refers to the bédhaya dance being performed by 8
persons (often boys); Pigeaud, Volksvertoningen, pp. 260-1, also refers to a case
in West Java in 1847 where 8 bédhayas were reported.
53. De Graaf, “Reis van Mangku-Rat IV”. See also BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp.
9-10; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to S¢marang, 3 Sept. 1724 & 9 Sept. 1724, in VOC
2017 (OB 1725). During AR IV’s absence there was a minor uprising reportedly
involving only 40 people at a village to the north of Kartasura; Ceesjong, Karta-
sura, to Sémarang, 13 Sept. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
54. Coster dagregister, 3 Sept—3 Oct. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725), in de
Graaf, “Reis van Mangkurat-Rat IV”, p. 368.
In know nothing of Hendrik Coster before he succeeded van Arrewijne in charge
of the VOC post at Jépara in 1718. It was said of him as it was of other VOC
officers, that he was “land— en taalkundig” (knowledgeable about the land and
language [of Java]). In 1724 he was posted to Kartasura to command the VOC
watch on the Sitinggil. By 1727 he was said to enjoy “a remarkable intercourse”
with the Javanese. In 1730, however, he was obliged to apologise to his superiors
for misunderstanding the content of Javanese letters: he said that they were read
out to him in Malay (apparently the only Indonesian language he could in fact
claim to understand) and that he had no competent Javanese translator to turn to.
He died in Kartasura in Nov. 1731. See Semarang to Batavia, 15 Sept. 1718, in
VOC 1914 (OB 1719); Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1719, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss.
VII, p. 390; Sémarang to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725); idem,
8 May 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Coster, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 22 Apr.
1730, in VOC 2169 (OB 1731); Sémarang to Batavia, 24 Nov. 1731, in VOC
2203 (OB 1732).
 NOTES to pp. 213-14 393

55. De Graaf, “Reis van Mangku-Rat IV”, p. 354.

56. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 3 Dec. 1724 & 26 Dec. 1724, in VOC
2017 (OB 1725); BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, p. 10. Danuréja’s brother returned to Kar-
tasura and lived there with Danuréja; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 17 Feb.
1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). The new lord of Kédhiri was Ng. Asmaradana,
who was later the scribe of Berlin Staatsbibliothek MS Or. fol. 402 (see p. 364 n.
57 above).
57. Danuréja, Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 4 Jan. 1725, in VOC 2017 (OB
1725); Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 7 Mar. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
58. See p. 185 above.
59. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1725, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
60. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Menut, Pasuruan, 16 July 1723; Menut, Pa-
suruan, to Sémarang, 3 Aug. 1723; Semarang raadsbesluit, 7 Aug. 1723; Pasuruan
raadsvergadering, 23 Aug. 1723; list of dead and wounded, 23 Aug. 1723; Menut,
Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 25 Aug. 1723 & 26 Aug. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 1 Sept. 1723; Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 1 Sept. 1723; AR IV,
Kartasura, to Batavia, 2 Bésar Dal 1647 (4 Sept. 1723), rec’d 16 Sept. 1723;
Tirtanata er a/. to Suradirana, Surabaya, rec’d Batavia 17 Sept. 1723; Dubbeldekop,
Pasuruan, to Batavia, 21 Sept. 1723 & 2 Oct. 1723; Pasuruan raadsbesluit, 2 Oct.
1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 7 Oct. 1723 & 11 Nov. 1723; all in
VOC 2000 (OB 1724). See also BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 7-8; Batavia to H. XVII,
PiSSeptesl/ 23410 Gl EXS pas2ns Uarderrel a Octe l23: Sas, Decs 1723" imnydJiLXe
p. 83n.
In the wake of their Pasuruan victory, Bangil, Garudha and “Jerjassa” (?) also
fell to the rebels. They abandoned these places after 20 Sept. Menut, Pasuruan, to
Sémarang, | Sept. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Pasuruan, to Batavia, 21 Sept. 1723; both
in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
On Surapati II’s complaints in 1723, see p. 200 above.
There is continuing confusion surrounding the names of the Surapati family. As
was noted above, p. 384 n. 86, VOC records call the leader of Surapati’s sons
Tirtanata while Javanese sources say it was R. or M. Bérahim (or Brahim). The
latter name is found in contemporary Javanese letters as well as in babad passages;
in early 1725 it also begins to appear in VOC letters. Cf n. 68 below, suggesting
that Tirtanata and M. Brahim were different persons.
Among the dead on 20 Sept. was Ng. Kidul, who reputedly had been guru to
Surapati’s children when they were young and was the main cause of their con-
tinuing recalcitrance; Dubbeldekop, Pasuruan, to Batavia, 2 Oct. 1723, in VOC
2000 (OB 1724).
61. Ducerceau & Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 27 Oct. 1723 & 22 Dec. 1723;
Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 18 Jan. 1724; all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
62. Menut, Pasuruan, to Dubbeldelkop, 2 Sept. 1723; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 19 Oct. 1723; Ducerceau & Menut, Pasuruan, to Batavia, 25 Jan. 1724;
all in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
63. Ducerceau & Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 27 Oct. 1723, in VOC 2000
(OB 1724).
64. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 Mar. 1724, in VOC 2000 (OB 1724).
See further Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Smarang, 13 Mar. 1724; Surabrata et al. to
Danuréja, seen at Kartasura 3 May 1724; Danuréja, Kartasura, to Surabrata & Dm.
394 NOTES to pp. 214-15

Kédhiri, seen at Kartasura 5 May 1724; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 3

July 1724; AR IV, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 10 Dulkangidah Be 1648 (1 Aug.
1724), rec’d 5 Aug. 1724; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1724 &
10 Sept. 1724; all in VOC 2017 (OB 1725).
See further Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 10 Dec. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB
1725); idem, 14 Jan. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
65. Both VOC and Javanese sources say that this was the reason for Ranuita of
Kédhiri’s dismissal. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 26 Dec. 1724, in VOC
2017 (OB 1725); BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 8, 9-10.
66. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 2 May 1725; Menut, Pasuruan, to Semarang,
14 May 1725; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 25 May 1725; Ceesjong,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 26 July 1725; AR IV, Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 28
July 1725; all in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). There is considerable correspondence
concerning Dikara’s affairs from June 1724 to April 1725 in VOC 2017 (OB 1725)
and VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
67. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 26 Dec. 1724; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 23 Jan. 1725; both in VOC 2017 (OB 1725). Also idem, 30 June 1725;
Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 13 Sept. 1725; Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang,
26 Sept. 1725; Danuréja, Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 21 Nov. 1725; Ceesjong,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 22 Nov. 1725; all in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). See also
Batavia to H. XVII, 22 Oct. 1725, in dJ IX, p. 89 n. 1. The attack on Cémpaka
Maling is also mentioned in BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, p. 10.
68. See Zwaardecroon memorie, 7 Aug. 1725, in dJ LX, p. 96; Batavia to H.
XVII, 27 Mar. 1726, in dJ IX, pp. 89-90 n. 1; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 29
Aug. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727); Batavia to H. XVII, 21 Oct. 1726, in dJ IX,
p. 91n.; idem, 5 Dec. 1726, in dJ IX, p. 114.
Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 27 Sept. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727), relays
reports of the death through illness of R. Tg. Tirtanata, whom he distinguishes
from M. Brahim (cf. n. 60 above) (see also Batavia to H. XVII, 5 Dec. 1726, in
dj IX, p. 114).
The Balinese Cokorda of Méngwi (Gusti Agung Made Alangkajeng) visited
Java for a hunting trip in 1726, but no problems appear to have resulted. See letters
from Jayengrana, Pasuruan, & Puspadiréja, Bangil, to Danuréja, shown at Karta-
sura 10 Aug. 1726; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 29 Aug. 1726; Menut, Pasuruan,
to Semarang, 27 Sept. 1726; all in VOC 2056 (OB 1727). See also Schulte Nordholt,
Een Balische dynastie, p. 28.
69. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 15 Apr. 1725 & 2 May 1725, in VOC
2035 (OB 1726). In some cases villages Were fined Rd.1 for every snaphaen found
there, regardless of whether or not they had been fired.
Rice blocks are made of wood with hollowed-out sections in which the rice is
stamped with long wooden sticks as a means of threshing and husking the grain.
70. Puspanégara, Grésik, to Sautijn, Surabaya, 10 Dulhijah Wawu 1649 (20
Aug. 1725), rec’d Sémarang 21 Aug. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726), listing 585
snaphaenen and 2835 pikes; 275 snaphaenen belonged to Puspanégara himself.
71. De Haan vertoog, Batavia, 15 Jan. 1726, in dJ IX, pp. 105, 107; Batavia to
H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1726, in dJ IX, p. 109; verbaal 26 June 1727, in dJ IX, 19), SI).
72. Citrasoma, Jépara, to Sémarang, 1 June 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726),
mentions the cutting of timber “for the making of snaphaen stocks’, but this
clearly refers to manufacture by the VOC.
NOTES to pp. 215-16 593

In theory there were prohibitions on the scale of firearms to non-Christian

Indonesians by VOC servants. See de Haan vertoog, Batavia, 15 Jan. 1726, in dJ
IX, p. 107; Batavia to H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1726, in dJ IX, p. 109; verbaal 26 June
1727, in-dJ IX; p. 94,
73. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 2 May 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
See also idem, 26 Dec. 1724, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725), reporting that AR IV did
not consult Ceesjong about the orders for the 1725 dry season campaign. Accord-
ing to the 2 May 1725 letter, Ceesjong was informed by someone other than
Danuréja that the Patih had tried hard to be picked as chief ambassador to Batavia.
It is possible that AR IV did not wish him to go for fear that he would contact Png.
Purbaya there (cf. p. 384 n. 88 above).
The noticeable chill in VOC-AR IV relations may be contrasted with Governor-
General Zwaardecroon’s pretence that relations were good: Zwaardecroon memor-
it, JL NWS IEZS), TO GNP IDC, yn), SIs).
74. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 30 June 1725; Dubbeldekop & Noodt,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 26 Aug. 1725; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 28 Sept. 1725,
12 Oct. 1725, 2 Nov. 1725; all in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). Danuréja’s payment is
again recorded as being in Rds. at 54 heavy stuivers, i.e. in Spanish Reals; see n.
42 above.
75. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 7 Apr. 1725; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 26 June 1725, 30 June 1725, 8 July 1725; aparte commissie on behalf
of AR IV, submitted Batavia 13 Aug. 1725; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 Nov.
1725, 7 Nov. 1725, 17 Nov. 1725; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 14 Nov.
1725; all in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). On Puspanégara’s language skills, see pp.
349-50 n. 29 above. See also Batavia to H. XVII, 22 Oct, 1725, in dJ IX, p. 89
nye
76. Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 Nov. 1725; Noodt, Sémarang, to Ceesjong,
Kartasura, 9 Nov. 1725; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 14 Nov. 1725; Noodt,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 23 Nov. 1725; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 30 Nov.
1725 & 1 Dec. 1725; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 1 Dec. 1725 & 8 Dec. 1725;
AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, rec’d 13 Dec. 1725; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia,
25 Dec. 1725; all in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). Regarding other complaints from
Citrasoma, see Citrasoma, Jépara, to Semarang, | June 1725; Dubbeldekop, Sémarang,
to Batavia, 30 June 1725; both in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
Pieter Gijsbert Noodt replaced Dubbeldekop as Commissioner and Commander
on Java’s east coast in 1725 and was made an Extraordinary Councillor of the
Indies at that time. In 1726 he was appointed as head of the VOC post at the Cape
of Good Hope. See Batavia to H. XVII, 22 Oct. 1725, in dJ IX, p. 89 n. 1;
Sémarang to Batavia, 23 July 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726); idem, 15 Aug. 1726,
in VOC 2056 (OB 1727).
77. AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 6 Sawal Wawu 1649 (18 June 1725), rec’d
23 July 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726); verbaal 24 May 1726, in dJ IX, p. 88.
In 1725 Priangan coffee production peaked at over 3.15 million Amsterdam Ibs
(1.6 million kg / 3.4 million lbs avoirdupois). By this time the VOC was producing
50-75 per cent of the world’s coffee supply. Whereas in 1721, 90 percent of the
VOC’s coffee came from Mocha and 10 percent from Java, by 1726 the ratios
were reversed. See Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade, p. 206; Knaap, “Coffee for
cash”, pp. 33-4, 36, 38, 40.
396 NOTES to pp. 216-17

78. Jayaningrat, Pékalongan, to Batavia, rec’d 9 Oct. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB
1726).
79. AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 15 Mulud Jimakir 1650 (21 Nov. 1725), LOr
6249; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 1 Dec. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
AR IV’s letter attracts particular interest, being the only original Javanese letter
surviving from the reign of AR IV, as far as I am aware. It is written on imported
paper with a silver floral pattern and encased in a gold silk envelope.
80. De Haan vertoog, Batavia, 15 Jan. 1726, in dJ IX, pp. 99-108; Batavia to
H. XVII, 15 Jan. 1726, in dJ IX, pp. 108-10; Batavia resolution, 5 Mar. 1726, in
dJ IX, pp. 110-11. Further documents follow in dJ IX which are relevant to this
matter. See also Knaap, “Coffee for cash”, p. 41.
81. Jayaningrat, Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 22 Nov. 1725; Ceesjong, Karta-
sura, to Sémarang, 22 Nov. 1725; both in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
At this time the Susuhunan also ordered changes in the governments of Madiun,
Pathi, Jagaraga and Winongan. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 14 Nov. 1725,
22 Nov. 1725, 13 Dec. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
One of the new bupatis of Pathi was the son of Tg. Mangunonéng of Pathi, who
died on 16 Nov. 1725 of illness at Kartasura. The son was named Abru but now
succeeded to his father’s name. The other bupati was Dm. Suraménggala. These
appointments are also reported in BTJ (BP), vol. XXI, p. 11.
In the case of Jagaraga, Dm. Sémalang Sémirang, whom AR IV had appointed
there in 1724 (Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 3 Dec. 1724, in VOC 2017 [OB
1725]), apparently was replaced at his own request by Ng. Malangyjiwa.
Garébég Mulud (12 Mulud AJ 1650) fell on 18 Nov. 1725S.
82. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 25 Nov. 1725; CN IV, Kartasura, to
Sémarang, rec’d 19 Dec. 1725; both in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). On Tirtawiguna, see
p. 370 n. 91 above.
83. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 25 Nov. 1725 & 1 Dec. 1725; CN IV,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 19 Dec. 1725; Noodt, S¢marang, to CN IV, Karta-
sura, 21 Dec. 1725; Sautijn, Surabaya, to Semarang, 31 Dec. 1725; CN IV, Madura,
to Sémarang, rec’d 12 Jan. 1726; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 9 Mar. 1726; all
in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). See further Batavia to H. XVII, 27 Mar. 1726, in dJ IX,
p. 90n; CN IV, Madura, to Batavia, rec’d 1 Apr. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727);
Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 2 Apr. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727).
VOC sources consistently call the promised daughter by a principal wife R. Ay.
“Bingkreeg” or “Binkreeng” or, in one case, R. Ay. Alit. In calling her R. Aj.
Sitisundari I am following BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 18, 23, and Padmasusastra,
Sajarah-dalém, pp. 142-3. In 1726, after AR IV’s death, she was given in mar-
riage to CN IV. According to Ceesjong’s letter of 2 Apr. 1726, the sélir’s daughter
was only 8 years old at the time she was offered to CN IV.
Tirtawijaya is identified as member of Jayaningrat’s family in Tersmitten,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728).
84. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 25 Nov. 1725; Noodt, Sémarang, to
Ceesjong, Kartasura, 26 Nov. 1725; both in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
85. See BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 11-14. As was noted above (n. 21), the episode
on pp. 11-12 concerning a holy man claiming to be from Nusa Témbini may refer
to the incident reported by the VOC in early 1723. The pleasure trip to Bétah on
p. 12 took place in July 1725.
NOTES to pp. 217-18 397

86. CN IV, Madura, to Batavia, rec’d 1 Apr. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727).
87. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 13 Mar. 1723, in VOC 2000 (OB
1724); verbaal 5 May 1724, in dJ IX, p. 79; Batavia to H. XVII, 30 Nov. 1724,
in dJ IX, p. 87n.; AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 5 Réjéb Jimakir 1650 (9 Mar.
1726), in VOC 2035 (OB 1726).
88. Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 22 Sept. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726);
Noodt, Semarang, to Batavia, 15 Oct. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726); verbaal 24
May 1726, in dJ IX, p. 86.
In this period, soldiers coming from Europe had 5—year periods of enlistment
but could be reengaged in the Indies for further 3-year terms; see plakaat of 7 Dec.
1699 in van der Chijs, Plakaatboek, vol. Ill, pp. 476-8. Incentives were later
offered to military men who would sign up in the Indies for further 5—year terms
(see plakaat of 6 Sept. 1740 in ibid., vol. IV, p. 510) and in 1742 officers coming
from the Netherlands had 10-year contracts (plakaat of 28 Aug. 1742 in ibid., vol.
IV, p. 546).
89. Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 9 Oct. 1725; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia,
15 Oct. 1725 & 8 Dec. 1725; all in VOC 2035 (OB 1726). After this, the records
in VOC 2035 (OB 1726) suggest that the VOC made haste to repatriate European
soldiers whose terms had expired. There were also other sorts of discipline prob-
lems, as one would expect. The most serious was the killing of the sergeant of the
VOC watch at the kraton by a VOC soldier (Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 10 July
172610 VOC 2050) (OB 1727):
90. Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 2 Oct. 1724, 3 Nov. 1724, 20 Jan.
1725, in VOC 2017 (OB 1725); Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 17 Apr. 1725 &
19 May 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726); Dubbeldekop, Sémarang, to Batavia, 24
Apr. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726); Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 7 July 1727,
in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Batavia, 31 July 1727, in VOC
2080 (OB 1728); Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 13 Aug. 1727 & 14 Aug. 1727,
in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Sémarang raadsbesluit, 26 Aug. 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB
1728); Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Paradijs & Menut, Pasuruan, 5 Sept. 1727, in
VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Batavia, 15 Sept. 1727, in VOC
2080 (OB 1728).
91. Menut, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 3 Nov. 1725, in VOC 2035 (OB 1726);
Sautijn, Surabaya, to Sémarang, | Oct. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727); Noodt,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 3 Oct. 1726 & 6 Oct. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727); Noodt
& Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727);
Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Batavia, 6 Apr. 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Sautijn,
Surabaya, to Sémarang, | Aug. 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Tersmitten,
Sémarang, to Batavia, 21 Dec. 1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728); Dallens, Jépara, to
Sémarang, 4 Jan. 1728, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728).
92. Tersmitten, Sémarang, to Batavia, 15 Sept. 1727 & 4 Dec. 1727, in VOC
2080 (OB 1728). A comparable problem existed in Pasuruan because of damage
to that wooden fortress by white ants; Paradijs, Pasuruan, to Sémarang, 18 Nov.
1727, in VOC 2080 (OB 1728).
93. But cf. Zwaardecroon’s memorie of 7 Aug. 1725 in dJ IX p. 97 the glow-
ing optimism of which is hardly consistent with the evidence available to me.
94. The general description of AR IV’s illness and death rests upon the fol-
lowing sources: Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 6 Mar. 1726 & 8 Mar. 1726;
398 NOTES to pp. 218-220

AR IV, Kartasura, to Batavia, 5 R&éjéb Jimakir 1650 (9 Mar. 1726), rec’d 19 Mar.
1726; Sémarang raadsbesluit, 11 Mar. 1726; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 12
Mar. 1726; Noodt, Sémarang, to Batavia, 14 Mar. 1726; all in VOC 2035 (OB
1726). Also Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 16 Mar. 1726.2 Mar, 1726, 2
Apr. 1726, 3 Apr. 1726, 6 Apr. 1726; CN IV, Madura, to Sémarang, rec’d 7 Apr.
1726; Noodt, Sémarang, to Ceesjong, Kartasura, 8 Apr. 1726; Ceesjong, Kartasura,
to Sémarang, 9 Apr. 1726; Kartasura raadsbesluit, 9 Apr. 1726; Ceesjong, Karta-
sura, to Sémarang, 11 Apr. 1726 & 12 Apr. 1726; Noodt, Sémarang, to Ceesjong,
Kartasura, 12 Apr. 1726 & 14 Apr. 1726; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 16
Apr. 1726 & 20 Apr. 1726; Noodt, Semarang, to Ceesjong, Kartasura, 20 Apr.
1726; Danuréja, Kartasura, to Sémarang, rec’d 23 Apr. 1726; Ceesjong, Kartasura,
to Sémarang, 25 Apr. 1726; all in VOC 2056 (OB 1727); and BTJ(BP), vol XXI,
pp. 13-16. See further Batavia to H. XVII, 27 Mar. 1726, in dJ IX, p. 90n.; idem,
5 Dec. 1726, in dJ IX, pp. 112-13, and in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VIII, pp. 91-2.
95. The mother was Ratu Amangkurat. According to Padmasusastra, Sajarah-
dalém, pp. 138-9, she was from Kudus and was called Kangjéng Ratu Kéncana,
later Kangjéng Ratu Agéng.
96. A sample of these oaths is in Jayaséntika, Kudus, to Danuréja, Kartasura,
shown at Kartasura 2 Apr. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727). Jayaséntika swore that
he worked only for AR IV’s long and stable government, that he had no part in
causing AR IV’s illness, that he had given no gifts to mountain hermits to win AR
IV’s favour and had taken no part in any disloyalty. If this were not true, said
Jayaséntika’s oath, may the fury of God and his Prophet descend upon him as
upon a kafir and may he enjoy no prosperity, rather may he fall into the abyss of
hell in the hereafter and may the same happen to his children and grandchildren;
if it is true, may he, his children and grandchildren enjoy blessings in the service
of the king.
97. The choice of Damarjati seems somewhat odd, since he had formerly lived
at Kartasura but had fled in the Company of Png. Purbaya in 1719. He now lived
as a hermit in Jagaraga, eating no rice, meat or anything else but a few greens
which he grew himself (see Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 16 Mar. 1726, in
VOC 2056 [OB 1727]). A similarly odd choice was made when AR IV placed
himself in the hands of his mother Ratu Pakubuwana in his final two weeks.
98. She was formerly the wife of Png. Blitar. She returned to Kartasura with
Blitar’s body in Nov. 1721 (see p. 380 n. 59 above) and was taken as a wife by
AR IV in Jan, 1722; Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Sémarang, 2 Apr. 1726, in VOC
(2056 OB 1727).
99. Ceesjong, lijste van zodanige mantris, hoffdienaaren, gemenen en Javaanse
geestelijken welke het doode lighaam van den Soesoehoenang Amancoerat ... na
Magirie ... hebben gebragt en gedragen, Kartasura, 20 Apr. 1726; Ceesjong,
Kartasura, to Sémarang, 21 Apr. 1726 & 25 Apr. 1726; all in VOC 2056 (OB
1727). See also BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, p. 14.
100. Ceesjong, Kartasura, to Semarang, 20 Apr. 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727).
101. BTJ(BP), vol. XXI, pp. 14-17. This account of Mangkunégara’s ambitions
is consistent with what Danuréja himself told Noodt on 6 June; see Grootestraat
dagregister 28 May—26 June 1726, in VOC 2056 (OB 1727).
102. It should be noted, however, that the king’s symptoms would not be incon-
sistent with a diagnosis of typhoid.
 NOTES to pp. 221-7 399

103. Danuréja presented Noodt with a list of cash, jewels and other effects
found in the kraton after the death of AR IV. There are many objects listed here
to which it is impossible to assign a value. But from the observation that diamond
rings of the lesser sort were worth Sp. RI. 2-300, it seems reasonable to assign an
average value of at least Sp. RI. 300 to each of 134 diamond rings (=SP. RI.
40,200). Cash to the amount of Sp. RI. 56,000 was also reported and Sp. RI. 1500
had been given by AR IV before his death to PB II. So the king had diamond rings
and cash to a value of nearly Sp. RI. 100,000 just before his death. It was further
said that Sp. RI. 600,000 in cash was found in the court, but it was not clear
whether this report was reliable. See Grootestraat dagregister 28 May—26 June
1726 (under date 16 June), in VOC 2056 (OB 1727). By way of comparison, it
may be recalled that the kraton treasury was reported to contain some Sp. RI.
300,000—350,000 in 1677 (see the sources cited on p. 271 n. 20 above).

Notes to Conclusion
. See pp. 13-14 above.
. See pp. 37-9 above.
. See p. 277 n. 49, p. 324 n. 6 below.
. See p. 215 above.
. Chandler, Warfare in the age of Marlborough, pp. 280-1.
. Gobius, Surabaya, to Batavia, 29 June 1718, in VOC 1914 (OB 1719).
. Delbriick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, vol. IV, p. 181. See also William H.
NNDMNFWNY
McNeil, The pursuit of power: Technology, armed force and society since A.D.
1000 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp.. 128-35. On the limitations of drill in
the VOC’s army, see de Iongh, Krijgswezen, p. 94.
8. See Chandler, Warfare in the age of Marlborough, p. 102.
9. BK ff. 522r.—523r.
10. Batavia to H. XVII, 26 Mar. 1720, in Coolhaas, Gen. Miss. VII, p. 475. BS
III:38 refers to Dutchmen drilling Purbaya’s troops during the First Javanese War
of Succession.
11. Irvine, Army of the Moghuls, pp. 182, 185. The same observation is made
in Wolseley Haig, “Muhammad Shah”, in Richard Burn (ed.), The Cambridge
history of India, vol. 1V: The Mughul period (planned by Wolseley Haig; New
Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd., 1979), p.375, but this may rest upon the author-
ity of Irvine, despite his Army of the Moghuls not being listed in Haig’s biblio-
graphy for this chapter.
12. See pp. 173-4 above.
13. See pp. 64, 104, 163, 209 above.
14. Qaisar, Indian response, pp. 124-5.
15. See especially pp. 204-6, 211 above.
16. See pp. 210-11 above.
17. See p. 130 above and the sources cited there. It was at about the time when
this study closes that renewed interest was shown in Japan in “barbarian learning”,
the main purveyors of which were the VOC officials at Deshima, as a consequence
of decisions taken by the Shogun Yoshimune; see Keene, Japanese discovery of
Europe, pp. 14-15.
18. Qaisar, Indian response, especially pp. 130-9.
400 NOTES to pp. 227-36

19, P.J. Zoetmulder, Kalangwan: A survey of Old Javanese literature (The

Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), especially pp. 8-18, 187-214.
20. These generalisations encompass vast and sometimes hotly debated issues,
but I believe that they are reasonable. The Jocus classicus on this subject is P.J.
Zoetmulder’s Pantheisme en monisme in de Javaansche soeloek-litteratuur
(Nijmegen: J.J. Berkhout, 1935).
21. See O.W. Wolters, Early Indonesian commerce: A study of the origins of
Srivijaya (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), especially pp. 35—6, 213-18.
22. G.R. Tibbetts, A study of the Arabic texts containing material on South-East
Asia (Leiden & London: E.J. Brill, 1979), pp. 151, 211, 251-3.
23. Antoinette M. Barrett Jones, Early tenth century Java from the inscriptions:
A study of economic, social and administrative conditions in the first quarter of the
century (VKI vol. 107; Dordrecht & Cinnaminson: Foris Publications, 1984), pp.
23 et seqq.
24. Cortesdo, Pires, vol. I, pp. 166, 174. It should be said, however, that Pires
was not entirely averse to hyperbole.
25. See p. 137 above.
26. See p. 59 above.
27. See pp. 141, 148-9, 153, 158, 159, 164 above; Ricklefs, “Missing pusakas”,
pp. 615-18.
28. See Ricklefs, History, pp. 88-90.
29. Ibid., pp. 107, 121; Houben, Kraton en Kumpeni, pp. 106-7; A.K.
Pringgodigdo, Geschiedenis der ondernemingen van het Mangkoenagorosche rijk
(s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 19-20.
30. Ricklefs, “Statistical evidence”, pp. 14-15, 16, 19, 20, 21-2, 26-8.
31. Java was not the only area to embrace enthusiastically the new firearms
introduced by Europeans. From the mid-seventeenth to the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the English and Dutch East India Companies in particular sold thousands of
guns, especially flintlocks, in West Africa—indeed, up to 394,000 per annum. This
had important local political consequences. See Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the
people without history (Berkeley, etc.: University of California Press, 1982), pp.
210-12.
32. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (4th ed.; 3 vols.; Berlin: Ferd. Diimmlers
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1880), vol. I, p. 310.
33. Michael Adas, Prophets of rebellion: Millenarian protest movements against
the European colonial order (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1979), p. 42.
34. See G.W.J. Drewes, “The struggle between Islam and Javanism as illus-
trated by the Sérat Dérmagandul”, BK/ vol. 122, no. 3 (1966), pp. 309-65.

Notes to Appendix 2
1. Based upon Kasser vertoog, Batavia, 9 July 1709, in VOC 1780(OB 1710);
Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p.27; de Haan, Priangan,
vol. I, pp. 3 et seqq.; as corrected and supplemented from other VOC records.
There was little in the way of a fixed hierarchy among VOC officers on the pasisir
in this period. In times of war in particular, there were often overlapping, indeed
conflicting, spheres of authority.
NOTES to pp. 237-9 401

2. Hackius never got to his post. He was appointed in Batavia in Dec.1695 but
died while still there in Jan. 1696.

Notes to Appendix 3

1. See AN Solo 52, no. 8 “Papieren gehorende tot de contracten van 8 Novem-
ber 1733”, Sérat pemut / memorie of PB II to Coijett, Kartasura, 16 Rabingulawal
Jimakir 1658 / 29 Aug. 1733.
2. Valentyn, Oud en nieuw Oost-Indién, vol. IV [pt. 1], p. 356.
3. Thierens, Tégal, to Batavia, 12 Apr. 1732, in VOC 2257 (OB 1733).
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Index

(Please note: where a subject is mentioned in both the text and the notes to the
text, this index will not provide a separate reference to the notes. It is assumed here
that readers consult the notes for relevant pages of text. Subjects mentioned in the
notes are, however, indexed if they do not appear in the corresponding portion of
the text.)

Abdullah, Syaikh / Encik, 145, 340 O15 G672.76, LOL 12381525 308
n.105 MO2 BO! Ml OOM lo lS 484
Abessij, Pattana van, 382 n.71 346 n.20
Abraham, 9 Agung Made Alangkajeng, Gusti, 394
Abru, Abrunata (a), 189 n.68
Abru (b), 396 n.81 Agung Sakti / Agung Anom, Gusti,
Aceh,, 233;,003.0.25,.513, 1.8 L6le 171s 352 0:45
Adas, M., 232 Ahmad Syah ibn Iskandar, see Raja
adat, 46 Sakti
adat Kumpéni, 383 n.86 Aladalad, Tg. (a), 289 n.32
Adikara, R.A., 147, 172 Aladalad, Ng. (b) 111, 301 n.13, 30!
Adil, Ratu, 180 n.16, 303 n.32
Adinagara, Png., 387 n.20 ralrerolovelkyAwabover, 1, WiFi, @AOS S/S Tia)
Adipala, 378 n.38; see also Kadipala 139, 169, 184, 186, 219, 351 n.40,
Aer Mata, 270 n.4 362 n.44, 389 n.31
Afghanistan, 234 Ali, Sgt., 300 n.61
agama Sélam, 12 Alit, R. Ay., 396 n.83
Ageng, Ratu (mother of AR II), 291 Alkmaar, H.J. van, 336 n.83
n.48, 315 n.17 All-Aceh Union of Ulamas, 233
Agéng, Kj. Ratu (mother of PB II), Allmogenden Bestierder, den, 129
398 n.95 alun-alun, 53, 92, 94, 96, 154, 172,
Agéng, Sultan (of Bantén), 71, 75, 186, 194, 197, 207, 212, 214, 220,
Slee 1Omn29 302 n.20, 331 n.50
Agung, Sultan (of Mataram), 8, 30-1, Amangkurat, Ratu (wife of AR IV),

407
408
376 n.27, 398 n.95
Amangkurat, Ratu / Ratu Ayu (wife
of AR I), 78, 291 n.48
Amangkurat, Ratu Ibu (mother-in-law
of AR II), 310 n.82
Amangkurat I, Susuhunan, 4, 7, 8,
B0=425AGml58a 205" 5 12enS
Amangkurat II, Susuhunan: as Crown
prince, 31-4, 37, 40-2, 286 n.1; as
king, 42-127, 134, 163, 218,
222-3, 225, 367 n.74; rumoured to
be son of Speelman, 57, 58, 59,
62-3, 80, 225, 229; treatment of
body, 131-2
Amangkurat III, Susuhunan: mother
of, 310 n.82; as Crown prince, 109
COPS eS =2 2622
n.57; as king, 127-49; in exile,
1535 157—=8) 1635 223, 347 1.26;
birth, 314-5 n.177
Amangkurat IV, Susuhunan (R.
Surya, Suryaputra, Wongsatruna;
Png. Ad. Mangkunégara): before
accession of PB I, 119; as Crown
prince, 1397 1535163) 1645 178;
180, 182, 183-4, 189, 204; as king,
184-220, 345 n.14
Amangkurat Panatagama, Susuhunan,
294 n.7
Ambal, 65
Ambarawa (Lémbarawa, Limbarawa),
12323020 o one 440
Ambon, Ambonese, 17, 20, 35, 43,
AS 50102054 7 1l05—0" 200
n.86, 267 n.102, 292 n.74, 309
n.75, 330 n.41
AIMDel SOM Zenli iOo leno
Amral, Javanese use of title, 375 n.23
amuk, 12, 85, 93, 120, 301 n.11, 302
n.18
Andaya, L.Y., 317 n.31
Angga, Ky., 305 n.40
Angola, 234, 271 n.15
anise, 218
Anjasmara, Mt., 57
Anom, Png. (of Cirébon), 91, 98
Anrangkusuma, R., 63, 74, 77, 78,
81, 82, 85-8, 92, 96, 100, 103,
INDEX
105, 108-9, 126, 287 n.7, 288 n.20,
295 n.14
appanages, 3, et passim
Arab horses, 206, 212
Arabic language, 11, 276 n.37
Arabs, 12, 21, 145, 182, 228
Arjuna, Mt., 307 n.57
Arosbaya, 76-7 270 n.4
Arrewijne, J. van, 179, 182, 183, 184,
185, 186, 193, 198
artillery, passim; Javanese
manufacture of, 13-14, 131, 289
OSM AmsWarvibten oii nee
Arya Samaj, 233
Asém, Ny., 295 n.14
Asmaradana, Ki/Ng., 214, 364 n.57,
393 n.56
Asthabrata, 127
Astrawijaya, 208
Aurangzeb, 305 n.39
Australian Aborigines, 323
Babad Buleleng, 117
Babad Cérbon, 288, n.15
Babad ing Sangkala, 2, 242, et passim
Babad Kraton, 242-3, et passim
Badung, 111, 169, 350 n.35
Bagawanta river, 65
Bagélen, 41-2, 45, 63, 64, 65, 68,
132 IS65188 5294 n 7304 neon
Baijonville, M. de, 310 n.79
Bajra (Badra), Carik, 370 n.91; see
also Tirtawiguna
Bakti, R.M., 389 n.32
Balabar, Ky., 44, 57, 127
Balega, 76-7
Bali, Balineses 125) 5.07, 22. 3oera5e
65, 81, 84-5, 87, 88, 93-5, 101-6,
LOW UT 25 aoe aas
160-86 passim, 199, 214, 233, 268
n.118, 276 n.35, 280 n.5, 290 n.37,
294, n.4, 301 n.3, 303 n.30, 308
n.65, 316 n.24, 330 n.44, 331 n.50,
332 n.56, 339 n.100; see also
individual kingdoms and persons
baluwarti, 325 n.8
Banda, 109, 267 n.102
Bangér, see Prabalingga
INDEX 409

Bangil, 144-6, 154, 184, 196, 197, beras dhomas, 338 n.95
299 n.56, 313 n.10, 314 n.13, 393 Berea ©: Crmias
n.60 Berg, L.W.C. van den, 2
Bangkalan, 181, 190-91, 209 Bergman, H.F., 176, 192-3, 196, 197,
bang wetan, 42 198, 203, 204
Banjar, Encik, 269 n.123 Bervelt, J., 110
Bantén, Banténese, 12, 16, 40, 48, 49, Bescherming, de, 72
65, 74-5, 83, 87, 102, 105, 124, Bésuki, 160
1375, 1505 283.05309293 in 25294 Bétah, 396 n.85
n.4, 301 n.2, 311 n.88, 328 n.30, Bevere, W.H. de, 144
340 n.101, 356 n.66, 356 n.5, 387 Bharada, 133
n.12 Bicak, Ky., 342 n.1, 347 n.26
Banyakpatra, 333 n.58, 336 n.78; see Bilitung, 317 n.31
also Mangkupraja Bima (place), 306 n.47, 317 n.31
Banyu Banjir, 96 Bima Cili, 179, 315 n.20
Banyudana, 92, 93, 187, 207, 297 Bintang, Zacharias, 106, 140
n.32 birds’ nests, 206
Banyumas, 44, 65, 85, 189, 215 Blambangan, 75—6, 77, 84, 107,
Barabudhur, 158 110-11, 117, 160-1, 162, 166, 171,
barefoot soldiers, 131, 361 n.39 180; 197, 280.5, 293) n. 795313
Baritman, Amral, 361 n.33 Mol, SiG Sl, Zi wes)
Baru, Ky., 127 Blenheim, 151, 342 n.114
Baskara, A., 82, 300 n.64, 303 n.24 Blitar (place), 60, 110, 159, 165, 179,
Bastinck, W., 50, 52 213, 341 n.108
Batang, 156, 161, 204, 206, 211, 216, Blitar, Png. (relative of AR II), 340
217, 219, 349 n.29, 386 n.7 n.105
Batavia, passim Blitar, Png. Ad. (son of PB I), 153,
bathik,, 9-10 155, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165,
Batu, 56 179-87, 189-97, 200, 224, 315
Bauréksa, Tg., 334 n.68 n.18, 333 n.58, 335 n.72, 346 n.22,
Bavarians, 342 n.114 353 n.49, 363 n.47, 383 n.74, 398
Bayalali, 187, 190, 207, 208, 373 n.6 n.98; titles of, 371 n.96
bayonet, 20, 131, 224, 232 Blitar, R.M. (wife of PB I), 347 n.23;
beanse ss l25.6 155; 212 see also Pakubuwana, Ratu
Beasley, W.G., 324 n.5 Blora, 5, 276 n.42
Bébandém, Capt., 176 blow-pipes, 14
Bedahulu, Gusti, 144, 342 n.4 Blubuk, Kali (river), 272 n.23
bédhaya, 213 Blussé, L., 2, 14, 16, 17, 21
bédhil, 325 n.7 Bolitho, H., 324 n.5
béndhe, 153 Boreel, W., 159
Bengalis, 12, 137 Bort, B., 79
Bengal, Bengalis, 228, 325 n.6 bows and arrows, 266 n.75, 324 n.4
Bengal Renaissance, 233 Boxcrmi@e 24 le
Bengkring, ‘Bingkreeg’, ‘Binkreeng’, Brajapati, Ky., 82, 103
see Sitisundari Branjangan, 174
Bérahim, R./M., 197, 350 n.32, 384 Brantas river, 5, 50, 52, 55, 107, 169,
n.86, 393 n.60, 394 n.68 174 =5 lO 213
Bérbék, 341 n.108 Brébés (place), 156
410
Brébés, R. Aj., 219
Buddhism, 269 n.3
Budiman, R.M., 387 n.20
buffalo hides, 155
Bugis, 17, 22, 49, 55-6, 85, 105, 121,
142, 266 n.75, 276 n.35, 306 n.45,
SING) et SHA Sk. BIS) HLS!
Buleleng, 102, 110, 117, 161, 166,
A, Wa, GL, IMs, Be MANSY, State
n.70
Bumi Gédhe, 159
Bumi Gédhong, 346 n.20
bupati, passim
Burma, 233
Butungese, 142
Cabolek, Sérat, 364 n.56
cahya, 44, 137
cakra, 269 n.3
Cakrajaya, Tg., see Danuréja
Cakranagara (I), R.A. (of East
Madura), 126, 147
Cakranagara (II), R. (of East
Madura), 147
Cakranagara, R. Tg. (of West
Madura), 178, 199, 379 n.47
Cakraningrat I, 31
Cakraningrat II (Png. Sampang),
31-2, 41, 51, 60-147 passim, 153,
220, 222, 224, 314 n.17, 319 n.48,
330 n.43
Cakraningrat III, Png., 147, 152,
161-2, 165-7, 169, 171-2, 221,
364 n.56
Cakraningrat IV, Png. Ad. (R.Tg.
Suradiningrat), 171-2, 178,
199-200, 203, 204, 207, 209, 212,
213-14, 217, 219, 221, 229
cakravartin, 269 n.3
Calvinism, 18-19, 129
Camphuys, J., 80-1, 111
Candrakirana, 116
Canjtam, 313 n.10
cannon, see artillery
Cape of Good Hope, 16, 121, 163,
ZOUN 295 mi S0Grna oS Oee0)
358 n.12, 363 n.50, 395 n.76
Carat, 108, 110, 146, 162
INDEX
cardamom, 212
Carey, P.B.R., ix, x
cartridge, paper, 131, 224
Caruban, 179, 213, 341 n.108
Catholicism, 18, 199
Ceesjong, S., iq WG? 15a S79;
196, 198, 208, 209, 213, 215, 217,
218, 391 n.41
Célik, Arya, 288 n.15
Cémpaka Maling, 394 n.67
Céngkalsewu, 156
Ceper, 373 n.6
Chandler, D., 32, 325 n.9
China, 228, 233
Chinese, 5, 15, 16, 43, 70, 79,
111=12; 137, 142, 148, 150, 160,
161, 165, 176, 189, 199, 204, 205,
208, 211-12, 217, 228, 266 n.75,
288 n.15, 294 n.8, 304 n.32, 311
n.87, 319 n.44, 319 n.48, 321 n.55,
33). n-50363321935835 in. as3e
n. 86
Chinese Christians, 21
Chinese language, 211, 350 n.29
Chinese Muslims, 12, 21, 147, 288
n.15, 294 n.8
Chinese War, 372 n.3
Cibarang, 85
Cikalong, 87
Cilacap, 124, 142, 309 n.76
Cimanuk river, 90
Cirébon, 7, 34, 54, 71 et seqqg. passim
Citrasoma, Ki (of Kartasura), 346
n.21
Citrasoma, Tg.Ad. (of Jépara), 148,
155, 159 91719192,.200) 2072 12)
213, 21562199850) 129
Clarke, G., 20
Clausewitz, C.von, 232
Cnoll,,G. 136, 1383140) 1425 14355:
147-8, 149-50, 153-7, 329 n.37
Cnoll, C., 295 n.10
Coehoorn, Menno van, 19, 131, 224
Coehoorn (hand) mortar, 131, 143,
176, 224, 361 n.38
Coen, J.P., 19-20, 294 n.4
Coffees 125785 8165502049205—6.
209, 212, 216, 231, 390 n.38
INDEX 411

coinage, 6, 107, 111, 210-11, 320 Dharmastinya kakawin, 179

n.48, 350 n.29 dhukun, 219
comet, 67 diamonds, 42, 399 n.103
concubines, see sélir Diemen, A. van, 15
consensus, 8, 57, 124 Dikara, A. (of Madura), 303 n.24
Cops, J., 81 Dikara, A. (of Pasuruan), 214
Coromandel, 107 Dipanagara, Png. A. (son of AR IV),
Coster He) 213 387 n.20
Cortonse S22 2a 40 eS5ee60! Dipanagara, Png. Ad (R. Papak, son
165, 206, 312 n.91 of PB I), 179-81, 184, 185, 187,
Couper, J., 36-7 40, 48, 55-7, 58, 190, 191, 193, 196, 197, 200, 315
65-6, 70-5, 81, 87 n.20, 333 n.58, 343 n.4, 353 n.49,
Cukilan, 345 n.15 369 n.82
Cupunagara, Kali (river), 90, 272 n.23 Dipanagara, Png. (of Java War), 180
Curing, 53 Dipasonta, Png., 179, 185, 333 n. 58,
353 n.49, 369 n.82
Daha, 299 n.56 Dipatruna, R., 333 n. 58
Damarjati, 219 Dirjadipraja, Pak, 349 n.27
Damascus, 295 n.11 diseases, 17, et passim; see also
Dana, Si/Pun, 157-8 individual diseases
Danaréja, 35, 36, 98, 374, n.8 divorce, 3
Danes, 15, 49 donga caracah, bésmah, balasarewu,
Danudrésta, Ngrurah Panji Nyoman, 133
117 Dortsman, A., 112, 113, 114-15
Danupaya, Png., 387 n.20 Dresden, J.F, van, 354 n.54, 358 n.12
Danupraja, Png., 387 n.20 Drewes, G.W.J., 11-12, 368 n.76
Danuréja, Ky. Ad. (Tg. Cakrajaya), drill, 194, 224, 230, 327 n.25
148, 158-9, 160, 161-2, 165-6, Dringu, 214
NS), TAL G/Sy, NGKSy, AIG/AK, Altes Asta) Dubbeldekop, J.W., 198, 199-200,
189, 191, 192, 193-4, 196, 204, 207-8, 209, 212, 213-14
203,—20, 333 n.58, 336 n.78, 352 Duffy, C., 284 n.39
n.43, 388 n.24, 391 n.41, 399 n.103 Durant, P., 123
Darma Sunya Kéling, 179 Dutch, passim; called pigs, 192;
Darmayuda, 76 called dogs, 290 n.37; dress worn
Darwinism, 19 by royal family, 64, 104, 163, 209,
David, king, 334 n.67 225, 230, 231, 285 n. 49; language,
Délanggu, 373 n.6 18-19; language, Javanese
Delft, 157, 329 n.38 knowledge of, 216, 349 n.29;
Démak, 66, 69, 70, 79, 101, 108, 123, stereotypes of Javanese, 274 n.4, ef
137-9, 149, 156, 190, 192, 213, passim
287 n.8-293 n.83, 298 n.37, 302 dwarfs, 105
n.18, 318 n.38, 320 n.48, 349 n.27, dysentery, 17, 51, 193, 320 n.54, 374
Boone n.9
Démung, 160
Dérma, 144 earthquakes, 32, 125
Deshima, 399 n.17 eclipses, 32, 79
devaluation of VOC currency, Edam (island), 292 n.64
210-11, 226, 231, 389 n.26 Edler rolas, 84

412
Eeuwijck, T. van, 287 n.7
Egypt, 66
Elduwelbeh, 46, 67, 73
elephants, 64, 212, 219, 303 id 25),
338 n.95, 379 n.47
Emur, Kapitan, 84-5
éncik (title), 21, 145
English, 15, 17, 20, 34, 100, 123, 275
n.18, 303, n.27, 311 n.91, 319 n.47,
325 n.6, 400 n.31
Erbervelt, P., 198
Erucakra, 180, 181, 269 n.3
Etak, 91
Eurasians, 267 n.108
eyang, 276 n.34
Eygel, A., 95, 98
‘father’ as term of address for
Governor General, 73, 80-1, 104,
109; see also grandfather
fevers, 17, 160, 181
fortress design, Dutch school of, 20
France, French, 70, 233, 275 n.18,
342 n.114
Francen, J., 110
Gaastra, F.S., 391 n.42
Gabang, Png., 294 n.4
Gajahmada, 7, 313 n.10
Galesong, Kr., 32, 34, 39, 50, 52,
54-5, 68, 362 n.43
gamelan, 3, 9-10, 52, 96, 338 n.95,
362 n.44
Galiazza Visconto d’Aragona, 62-3
Galuh, R., 116
Galunggung, 64, 87
gama Jawa, 1\2
Gamda, 313 n.10
Garébég, 9, et passim
Garébég Mulud, 7, et passim
Garjitawati, 159
Garudha (mythical beast), 278 n.55
Garudha (place), 313 n.10, 393 n.60
Garwakondha, Ki, 371 n.95, 381 n.59
garwa pangrémbe, 179, 315 n.20, 316
OPAL, So i Mel. Shae ey 27)
gédhong kiwa, 159, 349 n.28
gédhong tengen, 159
INDEX
Geijthoorn, D., 351 n.40
Geldria mint, 210
Gémpol, 307 n.57, 349 n.27
génthong, 349 n.27
Génthong (place), 308 n.63, 313 n.10,
314 n.17
Germans, 15, 198
Gianyar, 350 n.35
Gijsberti Hodenpijl, A-K.A., 150
Giri, 337 n.90
Giri, lords of, 4, 40, 58, 68, 77, 139
166, 308 n.69
Goa, 49, 295 n.11, 317 n.31
Gobius, J.F., ix, 167, 169, 171-3,
175-6, 178, 182, 186, 192-3, 198,
205, 207, 362 n.45, 366 n.67
Gobyo, Kuméndur, 361 n.33
Godong, 50
Goens, Rijklof van, 2, 5, 8, 9-13, 16,
22, 34, 48-9, 72, 73, 223
Goet Begin, *t, 138, 359 n.17
Goet Gevolg, ’t, 359 n.17
Gogodog, 33
Gombong, 162
Gomes, F., 382 n.71
Goodschalk, P., 115, 311 n.91, 312
Moly Silke) Sie,
Gowongan, 297 n.29
Graaf, H.J. de, ix—x, 30, 41, 54, 56,
84, 93, 95, 213
Graaff, Nicolaus de, 2, 9, 14-15, 17,
20 N225-98
‘grandfather’ as term of address for
Governor-General, 49, 184; see
also father
Gratitunon, 309 n.73
Greeny Paes 2inely
grenades, grenadiers, 53, 93, 131,
173, 176, 186, 224
Grésikee/ 7 LO] OSM merle Gs
137, 145, 146, 156, 166, 169, 172,
173, 175, 181, 190-91, 196, 209,
214-15, 293 n.83, 303 n.27, 325
M95) 329 35) 40 0mu43S lenoile
332 n.55, 336 n.84, 340 n.101, 382
n.74
Grevinck, A., 78, 81, 82, 88, 92-4,
289 n.21, 298 n.46
INDEX 413

Grobogan, 166, 189, 192, 213, 273 227, 228, 233, 305 n.39, 342 n.4,
n.40 352 n. 43, 382 n. 69
Gujeratis, 12, 228 indigo, 125, 155, 209, 212, 279 n.69,
Gumpang, 297 n.29 SW? mI, Sule! aS
Gumulak, 142 Indramayu, 90, 104
Gundhil, Ky., 127, 347 n.26 Ingalaga, Susushunan, see Pakubuwana I
gunpowder, 13, et passim Ingawangga, Tg., 91, 288 n.20
Gunturgéni, Ky., 164, 184 Ipun (Impun), R. Ay., 119, 121, 315
Gunung Kidul, 62, 65, 76, 78-9, 102, n.20
388 n.21 Irish, 15
gurnat, gurnada, 131 Islam: 10-11 et passim; communities,
3-4; as sense of identity among
Haan, F.de, 143 PEDelS a+OM ON OL LOO wml 5 —4 elo.
Habib Allah, Sharif, 305 n.39 2226
Hadramawt, 182 Ispilman, Amral Kurnilis, 271-2 n.22
Haji, Sultan, 71-2, 75 Italians, 274 n.4
Haméngkubuwana I, 133, 317 n.35
Hartogh/Hertog/Hertogh, C., 346 n.22, Jadita, Ng./Tg., 162
355 n.66 Jafnapatnam, 382 n.69
Hasan, 323 n.69 Jagapati, Ky., 36
head shaving, hair cutting, royal, 164, Jagaraga (place), 76, 165, 179, 181,
201, 390 n.36 184, 191, 213, 219, 341 n.108, 350
Heijneman, F., 268 n.117 n.30, 390 n.37, 396 n.81
Heren XVII, 16, et passim Jagaraga, Png., 116
Herfst, L., 298 n.46 Jagasura soldiers, 185
Hindu-Buddhism, 10-11, 22, 108, Jaksa, 204, 208
179-80, 181 Jaladriya, Umbul/Bun, 85-6, 341
Hitu, 266 n.86 n.106
Hoeko, 319 n.44 Jambi, 75, 300 n.1, 329 n.38
Hollandia mint, 210 Janggalan river, 297 n.32
Holy War, see prang sabil Jangrana I, Ang., 61, 67, 76, 79,
Hoorn, J. van, 111, 125, 135, 154, 81-2, 91-2, 101, 104, 106-7, 116,
329 n.38, 340 n.101, 344 n.12 146, 277 n.54; 299 ne 56,, 299 m7.
Horst, H. van der, 142, 146, 147, 334 303 n.28, 311 n.1
n.66 Jangrana II, 114, 119, 121, 134, 137,
Huguenot, 276 n.37 138, 143-6, 148, 153, 155, 161,
Huizinga, J., 129 167, 339 n.98, 340 n.101
hunting, 9, 75, 92, 394 n.68 Jangrana III, 154, 162, 165-6, 169,
Hurdt, A., 48-54, 58, 80, 292 n.74 (AL, 9S), IB) I, SH sot, Sis
Husain, 368 n.76 n.35, 366 n.69
Japan (island chain), 16, 130, 227,
Ibrahim, see Bérahim 231, 292 n.64, 300 n.1, 389 n.31
Ibu, Ratu (of Madura), 270 n.4 Japan (place in Java), 148, 169, 179,
Ibn Panatagama, Ratu, 294 n.7 197, 299 n.56, 341 n.108
Imagiri, 132, 163, 213, 220, 289 n.36, Jarannika, Kr., 317 n.31
384 n.88 Jaswa, Kapitan, 186
Imhoff, G.W. Baron van, 320 n.49 Jatinom, 349 n.27
India, Indians, 34, 130, 176, 224, 225, Java War, 180
 INDEX
414

Javanese language: Dutch knowledge of, 62, 64, 65, 78, 102
of, 2, 36, 158, 178, 198, 286 n.2, Kalamunyéng, Ky., 58
331 n.52, 334 n.66, 363 n.50, 392 Kalanada, Ky., 184
n.54; social levels in, 4-5, 73 Kalangbret, 174, 179, 213, 341 n.108
Jayabaya, 180 Kalang people, 70-1, 137, 142
Jayabrata, Tg., 381 n.59 Kali, Kétib, 305 n.40
Jayalélana, Ky., 294 n.8 Kaligawe, 47, 90, 101, 142, 350 n.29
Jayaléngkara, 127 Kaligondang, 283 n.31
Jayanagara, Dm., 390 n.37 Kalijaga, Sunan, 340 n.102
Jayaningrat, Ad. (of Pékalongan), 148, Kalimantan, 142
155, 159, 161-2, 165, 171, 173, Kaliwungu (place), 137, 156
174, 182, 203, 204-6, 209-12, Kaliwungu, R.Ay. Rongga, 379 n.47
216-17, 219, 221; formerly Kaloran, Dewa, 169, 173
Pusparaga, 339 n.100 Kamal, 146
Jayaningrat (of Ungaran), 335 n.68 Kamlathen (Klathen), 377 n.30
Jayapuspita, A., 154, 162, 165-6, Kampak, 341 n.108
MG), NW, WS, GG, WIT, WS, sy. Kancana, Ratu (wife of PB I), 342
Stoll MES n.2
Jayaséntika, Ky., 219 Kandhuruwan Wilatikta, Ky. Tg., 195,
Jéjana, 294 n.7 213, 369 n.86, 384 n.88
Jénar, 41, 318 n.42 Kang Yuwei, 233
Jépara, passim Kangxi, 161
Jerusalem, 66 Kaniten, 313 n.10
jimat, 167 kanuruhan, 377 n.35
Jimat, R./Png., see Cakranagara (of Kapédhak, 186
West Madura) Karanganyar, 41
Jipang, 5, 48, 104, 155, 175, 179, Karangasém, I gusti Nyoman, 105
184, 195-6, 209, 214, 350 n.30 Karanggayam, Png., 322 n.66
Jiwaraga, Ky. Ng., 101, 112 Kartadriya, 382 n.69
Jiwasuta, 339 n.100 Kartanagara (a), see Martapura
Johor, 40, 75, 100, 113, 319 n.47 Kartanégara, Tg. (b), see
Jongbloet, C., 163 Mangkupraja
Irony, WIKI, @le, INT Kartanégara, Tg. (c), 192
Jonker, Capt., 55, 57, 105-6 Kartas, Kapitan, 358 n.14
Juminahan, 315 n.20 Kartasana (place), 76, 179, 213, 341
Jurukunci, 205, 270 n.4 n.108
Juwana, 48, 146, 155-6, 189, 213, Kartasana, A., 76
Sovmuee Kartasari, 187, 193, 213
Kartasura, passim; foundation of,
Kadilangu, 149, 315 n.20, 333 n.58 58-9
Kadipala, 195 Karawélang, Ky., 342 n.1, 353 n.49
Kaduwang, 76, 179, 181, 341 n.108 Kartawinata, 159, 187, 213
kafir, kapir, kopar, 40, 42, 45, 48, 85, Kartayuda, Panji, 177, 191, 195, 343
101, 153, 174, 193, 226, 230, 398 n.4, 366 n.70
n.96 kartouw, 321 n.56
Kajoran (place), 31 Katawéngan, Ng., 161, 197, 304 n.35,
Kajoran, R., 4, 31, 40, 48, 49, 54, 55, 332 n.56
68, 273, n.40, 302 n.20; followers kaum, 174
INDEX 415

Kawa, R., 315 n.20 n.59, 332 n.53, 350 n.29, 398 n.95
Kawi miring, 314 n.16 Kulhu, 360 n.24
Kéboabang, Ky., 184, 353 n.49 Kulon, R.Ay. (mother of
Kédhiri, 5, 39, 41, 42, 44, 49-55, 60, Mangkunégara), 376 n.27
(2 AORSTe MOT ean Oe Sia Ss Kulon, Ratu (mother of AR II), 291
146, 149, 161, 165, 166, 169, 172, n.48, 315 n.17
174, 179, 180, 196, 197, 199, 209, Kulon, Ratu (mother of AR III), 118,
213, 299.n.53, 299 n.56, 304 n.35, B11Om 8203 bonne l7
SIG mrZOe s32 mm56654n 085 kuluk Arab, 375 1.25
n.35, 394 n.65 kuluk jangkangan, 64
Kédhu, 189-90, 192, 346 n.20 Kumar, A., 84
Kélawing river, 66 Kumba, Ky., 321 n.56
Kélut, Mt., 164 Kumbakarna, 94
Kémagétan, 76, 179, 196, 213 Kumbarawa, Ky., 321 n.56
Kéncana, Kj. Ratu (wife of AR IV), Kumbarawi, Ky., 321 n.56
398 n.95 Kuning, Sunan, 189
Kéndhal, 136-7, 156, 315 n.20, 386 Kupang, 191
n.7 Kutaarja, 41
Kéndhéng mtns., 39 Kutawinangun, 65
Kénol, 329 n.37 Kutha Gédhe, 213
Képér, 50, 52, 55, 305 n.44 Kuwél, 285 n.49
Képutren, 116, 177, 181, 191, 381 kyai, 4, et passim
n.63
kérbin, 131 Lamongan (place), 166, 169, 215
kétib, 174, 193, 283 n.27, 305 n.40 Lamongan, Png., 116
Khalwatiyah, 295 n.11 Lampung, 142
Kidul, Ng. (follower of Surapati [), Lasage, S., 113
337 n.86, 341 n.106, 393 n.60 Lampér, 134
Kidul, Png. (of Kudus), 192 Langse, Guwa, 157, 213
Kidul, Ratu (Goddess of the Southern Lasém, 155-6, 304 n.35, 350 n.30
Ocean), 157, 213, 345 n.14 Laut, Encik, 269 n.123
Kim Bun, 294 n.8 Laval, J. de, 211
Kinumba, Ky., 321 n.56 Lawu, Mt., 96, 138, 299 n.56, 326
Kiping, 180, 181, 184, 190, 318 n.42 n.l4
Klathen, 194, 285 n.49, 349 n.27 Lay Ek, 382 n.69
Klatingbiru, R., 316 n.26 Lelij, S. van der, 176
Klatingkuning, R., 316 n.26 Lémbah, R.Ay., 119-21, 315 n.17,
Klépu, 191 Eco a
Kling, 12 Lémbarawa (Brébés), 344 n.6
krankbezoeker, 336 n.83 Lémbarawa, Limbarawa, see
krapyak, 9, 298 n.39 Ambarawa
Krawang, 272 n.23 Lémbu, M., 384 n.86
kris, 3, 13-14, 88, 119, 127, 147, Lesseur, T., 331 n.52
158, 169, 172, 186, 192, 206, 231, leucorrhea, 219
322 n.58 Lindhu, R.M., 199-201, 209, 213
Kroya, 318 n.42 Lipura, 326 n. 14
Kudus, 48, 66, 137-8, 150, 156, 189, literacy, 9
192, 219, 273 n.40, 291 n.56, 300 Lodhaya, 60, 61

416
Lombok, 142, 317 n.31
Lor, Ng. (a), 150, 337 n.86
Lor, Ng. (b), 294 n.8
Losari, 142
Lumajang, 75, 162, 197, 199, 200,
376 n.27, 386 n.11, 389 n.32
Lumarap, Ki Dip., 374 n.11
Lumbu, 373 n.6
Lumbungkérép, 373 n.6
Lurungténgah, 68, 76, 105
Macannagara, Png., 110
Macanpura, Png., 110-11, 117
Macanwulung, 76
Madeganda, Madegonda, 213, 349
n.27
Madiun, 5, 76, 113, 121-2, 123, 127,
7, WIAD, West, IRIS. tess), IML. GI
195-6, 273 n.40, 337 n.86, 341
n.108, 350 n.30, 390 n.37, 396 n.81
Madiun river, 5, 113, 122, 124, 192,
214
Madura, East, VOC sovereignty over,
LOS LOA IDI 25 alse aD lee
204, 209, 228, 291 n.46
Madura, West, 5, ef passim
Madurese, passim
Maetsuycker, J., 18, 34-5, 48
Magétan, see Kémagétan
Ma Huan, 53
mail armour, 266 n.75
Majapahit, 56, 181, 285 n.40, 316
yas MT WSIS)
Majapahit, golden crown of, 53-4, 72,
75, 87, 94, 201, 390 n.36;
described, 278 n.55
Makasarese, 12, 22, 32-6, 39, 41, 43,
44, 47, 49, 53, 54-7, 62-5, 67, 73,
Tike tol, SH, MM), vA. eh).
186,266 neo, 272 n.52273 M40)
276 n.35, 291 n.56, 306 n.45, 316
ines Sula ESN, SAN inSwe. SEYS Se
language, 276 n.37
Malabar, 34, 125, 361 n.33
Malacca, 266 n.86, 356 n.66
Malang (place), 55—6, 76, 146,
149-50, 160, 196, 197-8, 199,
214-15, 299 n.56, 351 n.35
INDEX
Malang, Ratu, 61, 274 n.11
Malangjiwa, 396 n.81
Malay language, 19, 21, 37, 138, 211,
O71 1:21, 276 137/290 ni eee
n.65, 297 n.36, 318 n.39, 329 n.38,
332 n.52, 356 n.66, 360 n.30, 361
n.33, 392 n.54
Malays, 12, 15, 20, 35, 40, 43, 51,
65, 81, 142, 144, 211, 276 n.35,
291 n.56, 316 n.24, 319 n.47, 353
n.dl, 382 nel, 387 nl2
Malinjon, Pasar, 377 n.30
“Malion’, 384 n.86
Malplaquet, 342 n.114
Maluku, 228, 311 n.88
Maménang (Ménang), Png., 61—2, 305
n.40
Mandaraka, Ad., 48, 60
Manduraréja, A., 340 n.105
Mangkubumi, Png. (Png.
Natakusuma,), 305 n.40
Mangkunégara, Png.A. (son of AR
IV), 185, 186, 197, 199-201, 209,
213, 218-20, 376 n.27; mother of,
376 n.27, 389 n.32
Mangkunégaran principality, Legion,
231
Mangkupraja, Ad. (Tg. Kartanégara),
156-7, 158-9, 160, 162, 171, 175,
179, 184-9, 194, 196, 198, 203,
333 n.58, 336 n.78, 347 n.24
Mangkuyuda, Tg. (commander of
Trunajaya), 42, 61
Mangkuyuda, Tg. (d. 1678), 277 n.52
Mangkuyuda, Tg. (of early 18th
century), 369 n.86
Mangunjaya, Dm., 277 n.52
Mangunnagara, 209-10
Mangunonéng (1), Tg. (of Pathi), 69,
136-7, 372 n.3, 287 n.7
Mangunonéng (II) Ki, 189
Mangunonéng (III), Tg. (of Pathi, d.
1725), 396 n.81
Mangunrana, R., 339 n.100
Manipa, 105
mantraps, 361 n.39
mantri, 176
Manukan, 52
INDEX 417

Maos, 318 n.42 Mérbabu, Mt., 345 n.15

Magqallawi, Sayyid, 182-3 Mérbabu MSS, 367 n.74
Marchant, J., 205-6 Mértajaya, 286 n.1
Marchier, C.B., 71 Mértalaya, Rd.A., 44-6, 48
Mardijkers, 15, 16, 17, 35, 43, 49, Mértapura, Rd.Ad., 48
OSM O7in/55 L042 76m. 355 30! Mesanular, Ky., 119
mili, StOB) sul. SiNb este Shee a7 Mésir (place), 66-7, 73, 131, 284
Marébung, 194-5 n.39
Marlborough, duke of, 151 Mésir, R. (son of PB I), 315 n.20
Martapati, R., 39 Mestizos, 15, 16, 17, 198, 382 n.71
Martapura, Tg. (Ky. Ng. Jiwaraga, Metsue, P., 158, 159, 162
Kartanagara), 101, 112, 123, 124, military technology, 13-14, 20, 37-8,
PAG. Who, SLO sauIs), SO es. Shy 130-31, 151, 215, 223-4, 225,
m32,,03 nls2 230-31, 234, et passim; see also
Martapura (Wangsadipa), 271 n.22 names of particular weapons
Martasana, Png. (son of AR I), 37, Minahasa, 266 n.86
41-2, 45-6, 48, 68 Minangkabau, 100, 105, 144, 300 n.2
Martasana, Png. (son of AR IV), 387 Mocha, 395 n.77
n.20 modin, 193, 283 n.27
Martataruna, R., 333 n.58 moncanégara, 6, et passim
Martayuda, Ng., 204, 207-8 Mondaraka, Ng., 121
Mas, Kali (river), 38, 175 Moors, 15, 35, 142
Mas, Sunan, 335 n.68; see also Mossel, J., 320 n.49
Amangkurat III Mughals, 224, 305 n.39, 324 n.4
Masaran, 285 n.49 Muhammad, the Prophet, 7, 9, 91, 95,
Mataram (place), passim; royal visits 128, 174, 323 n.69, 352 n.46, 368
to, 157, 162-3, 164, 213 n.76
Mataram, Png. A., 105, 108, 126, Muhammad Ali, H., 182
131, 141, 164, 186, 187, 189, 190, Muhammadiyah, 233
192, 357 n.10 Mulder, F.H., 49-50
Mataram, Tg. (a), 7 Mur, Kapitan (Captain Moor), 273
Mataram, Tg. (b), 277 n.52 n.41, 294 n.4
Mataun, Tg., 184, 209, 214 Murah Panji, 177, 357 n.9, 362 n.43,
matchlocks, 13, 52, 95, 130, 131, 314 366 n.70
n.14; see also musket musket, 13-14, et passim; see also
Mecca, 40, 44, 62, 295 n.11, 337 matchlock, snaphaen
n.89 mutiny, 218
Mediterranean, 228
Meer, B. van der, 93, 95, 279 n.76 Nagarakértagama, 11, 133, 262 n.26
Mélayakusuma, R.Dm., 31 Nakula, Ky., 342 n.1
Mélayu, Tg., 277 n.52 Naladika, Ng., 145, 330 n.43, 331
Menak, Sérat (KBG 613), 347 n.23 n.51, 332 n.55, 336 n.84, 340 n.101
Ménang, Png. see Maménang Nalajaya, Ng., 101-2, 297 n.39, 301
Méngwi, 161, 166, 171, 352 n.45, n.7
394 n.68 Namrud, Raja, 64-6, 68, 76, 79, 131,
Menut, J., 214 294 n.7
Mérapi, Mt., 32, 328 n.32 Narapaksa, 69-70

418
Narawita, Ki Carik, 347 n.23
Nassau, Jan van, 19, 271 n.14
Nassau, Maurits van, 19, 224, 270
aah, SWI) ia)!
Nassau, Willem Lodewijk van, 19
Natabrata, Png., 46, 61, 62
Natakusuma, Png. (brother of AR J),
105, 109, 115, 305 n.40
Natapura, Dip., 379 n.47
Natayuda, R. Tg., 190
Negapatam, 325 n.6
négara, 6
négaragung, 6
Ngabdulrahman, 273 n.2; see also
titles of kings
Ngabei, Png., 387 n.20
Ngampel-Dénta, Sunan, 39
Nganjuk, 341 n.108
Ngantang, 55-6, 277 n.46
Nilaprawata, 279 n.69
Nitipraja, 127
Niti Sruti, 127
Nitiyuda, R., 126
Noodt, P.G., 216, 217, 219, 399
n.103
Norwegians, 15
Ober Ingelheim, 356 n.66
Ockers, W., 311 n.87
oedema, 17
Old Javanese language and literature,
LOM LSS 79 227 2622 hark
n.26, 263 n.34, 377 n.35
Onggadiméja, R., 340 n.105
Onggadiwongsa, 338 n.93
Onggajaya (I), Ang., 61, 107, 146,
299 n.56, 303 n.28
Onggajaya (II), 338 n.93
Onggakarti, 331 n.52
Ongga Suranata, Ki, 322 n.59
Onggawongsa, 277 n.54, 281 n.5
Onggayuda, Dm., 162
Ontawirya, R., 333 n.58
Opak (Umpak) river, 64
opium, 11, 45, 47, 49, 70, 75, 78, 80,
82, 139, 142, 159, 166, 296 n.26,
319 n.47
INDEX
Oranje, Willem van, 19
Oudenarde, 342 n.114
Outhoorn, S.A. van, 111
Outhorn, W. van, 111, 135
Outshoorn, A. de V. van, 18
Pacabeyan, 314 n.13
Pace, 341 n.108
Pacukilan, Ki Gédhe, 158
Paijs, J., 104, 105
Pajang, 49, 55, 58, 74, 119, 322 n.66,
332 n.56, 346 n.20, 349 n.27
Pajarakan, 299 n.56
Pakétingan, 318 n.42
Pakubuwana, Ratu, 159, 160, 163,
178, 179, 182, 184, 189, 192, 194,
196, 213, 219, 315 n.20, 349 n28,
352 n.45, 376 n.27, 379 n.47, 398
n.97; children of, 363 n.47; see
also Blitar, R.M.
Pakubuwana I, Susuhunan (Png.
Pugér, Susuhunan Ingalaga), 32, 37,
41-2, 45-6, 54-136 passim, 222-3,
315 n.17, 322 n:59; as king;
136-83, 187, 189, 190, 201, 204,
218; birth, 328 n.27; knowledge of
Malay, 137-8
Pakubuwana II, Susuhunan: as Crown
prince, 207, 218, 220, 335 n.72; as
king, 95, 220, 387 n.20
Pakubuwana III, Susuhunan, 195, 383
n.74
Pakubuwana IV, Susuhunan, 378 n.38
Pakubuwana VII, Susuhunan, 378
n.38
Palakka, Arung, 49, 55-6
Palembang, 75, 100, 106, 273 n.38,
300 n.1, 346 n.18
Palembang, P. van, 382 n.71
Pamancingan, 157
Pamanukan, 90, 272 n.23
Pamécutan, Gusti, 336 n.84
Pamékasan, 76, 103, 125, 147, 171,
WFP, WF, IFRS DANE SHOR rates)
Paminggir, 280 n.5
Pammalikang, Kr., 317 n.31, 320 n.52
Panaraga, 5, 76, 113, 121, 179, 180,
INDEX 419

181, 184, 189, 191, 195, 196, 214, Patih Jéro, 322 n.59, 340 n.105
337 n.86 & n.89, 340 n.105, 341 Pax Neerlandica, 231
n.108 Pax Tokugawa, 231
Panarukan, 160, 313 n.10 Payak, 56-7, 76
Panatagama, Ad., 173, 312 n.1 [eet S), ILS), Isto), QP
Pancawura, Ky., 13-14 Pégirian, Kali (river), 39
Panékar, 349 n.28 Peijsen, M.E., 191, 362 n.44, 366
Panéngah, Png., 377 n.32 n.67, 369 n.89, 379 n.45
Pangayun, Ratu, 291 n.48, 315 n.17 Pékalongan, 5, 126, 139, 155-6, 161,
Pangkor, Pulau, 301 n.2 165, 182, 204, 209, 211, 293 n.83,
pangulu, 193, 283 n.27, 305 n.40 334 n.68
Paniti Sastra, 364 n.57 Pékik, Png., 32, 58, 322-3 n.66
Panji Danudrésta, Ki gusti, 171, 177, Pémalang, 138, 156
184, 332 n.56, 366 n.69 Pénanggungan, Mt., 108, 146
Panji romance, 116 Pénaruban, 205, 207, 390 n.38
Panji Sakti, Gusti, 102, 117, 161, 317 Péngging, 285 n.49
Pol. Sey 17) pepe, 194
Panular, R.A./Png., 68, 131, 186, 305 Pepe rivers 297 m.32
n.40 pepper 16; SONS MI255 1555) LOos
Panumping, 158-9, 349 n.28 209-2122 2164312 neo
Panutup, Susuhunan, 189 Perak, 301 n.2
Papak, R., see Dipanagara Perrin, N., 130, 227
paralysis, 17, 311 n.90, 321 n.55 Persia, 329 n.38, 334 n.63
Paramiling, Ky., 347 n.26 Persian horses, 112, 122, 186, 206,
Parra, P.A. van der, 320 n.49 306 n.44, 318 n.38
Parsees, 12, 228 Persian language, 276 n.37
pasaran, 6 pesantren, 4, 360 n.24
Pasques de Chavonnes, D.M., 358 pétak/péthak, 296 n.25
n.14 Phan Boi Chau, 233
pasanggrahan, 159 Phan Chu Trinh, 233
pasisir, 6, et passim picis, 6, 320 n.48
pasowan kidul, 92 Pigeaud, Th.G.Th., ix
Pasundhan, 122; see also Priangan, pigs, 5; Dutch called, 192
Sunda pikes, 10m 149 205503163593), 955 127,
Pasuruan, 39, 61, 75, 96, 103, 107, 131 69M Ti 7s 1849331 mi50
HOSMU TT U2 aVest Ui -9145.9465 & n.5l
154, 160, 161, 162, 166, 173,178, Pintoe, A., 382 n.71
180, 181, 184, 190-91, 196, Pintu Larat, 307 n.57
199-200, 214, 218, 303 n.28, 308 piracy, 79, 81, 82, 113, 123, 311
n.63 & n.65, 314 n.13, 341 n.106, m9 1312 nS
Bole Sor SOO Asoo noo mea, Pires, Tomé, 4, 12, 228, 313 n.10
Patani, 300 n.1, 303 n.25, 306 n.47 Piyungan, 349 n.27
Pathi, 48, 69, 136-8, 146, 155-6, Plered (place), 40, 59, 63-4, 159
187, 189, 213, 273 n.40, 332 n.53, Plered, Ky., 95-6, 119
396 n.81 Poeroeboyo, G.P., 349 n.27
Pathi, 7, et passim; appointing of two, poison, 10, 14, 88, 121, 217, 219,
157, 158-9, 160, 185, 336 n.78 220, 322 n.59
420 INDEX

Poles, 15 pusakas (holy regalia) 42, 44, 53-4,

polygamy, 3 58, 96, 119-20, 127, 134, 141,
Ponggok, 349 n.27 148-9, 153, 157-8, 159, 162,
population: of Java, 5, 211; of 163-4, 184, 229, 277 n.54, 281 n.5,
Batavia, 15, 21, 303-4 n.31 338 n.95; see also names of
Porong, Kali (river), 50, 55, 143, 144, individual pusakas
175 Puspanégara, Tg. (of Batang), 161,
Portuguese, 6, 20, 34, 105, 123, 130, 195, 204, 205-6, 212, 215, 216,
MIAN idl, Bes? 7/1! 217, 219, 349-50 n.29
Portuguese church (Batavia), 382 n.69 Puspanégara, Ky.Tg. (of Grésik), 165,
Portuguese language, 19, 216, 271 166, 169, 214-15, 332 n.55;
aS, OZ! TaeAh, SWS) Taek}, Sie imsy., inscription of, 382—3 n.74
350 n.29 Pusparaga, Ki, 339 n.100; see also
Prabalingga (Bangér), 7, 117, 214, Jayaningrat (of Pékalongan)
293 n.79, 294 n.8, 299 n.56 Pusparudita, 350 n.29
Prabu Panatagama, 132 putri triman, 3
Prabayasa (part of kraton), 349 n.27
Prabayasa, R.M., 218 OaisareAs 13082259227
pradikan villages, 4, 205 Qing dynasty, 21, 161
Praga river, 65 Qur’ dn, 127, 360 n.24
Prambanan, 193
Pranantaka, Ki, 273 n.2, 296 n.20 Rahman, Si, 350 n.32
Prangmadana, Png., 333 n.58 Raja Sakti (Ahmad Syah ibn
prang sabil (Holy War), 63, 174, 193, Iskandar), 100, 102, 103, 105, 317
360 n.24 n.31
prang santri, 174 Ram, M., 135, 140, 142
Prawatasari, 337 n.90 Rama, Pan., see Kajoran, R.
Priangan, 72-3, 122, 206, 215, 216, Rama, Sérat, 94, 127
289 n.33, 337 n.90, 395 n.77 Ramillies, 342 n.114
Pringgalaya, R., 369 n.86 rampog macan, 9, 153, 387 n.21
Pucang, R.A., 120 Ranuita, Dm., 213, 394 n.65
Pugér (place), 75 Ratpéni, 294 n.5
Pugér, Png., see Pakubuwana I Rawa, 174, 179, 213
Pulangjiwa, M.A., 82, 103, 109, 117, Rawana, 94
123, 125-6, 309 n.73, 313 n.8 Real, see coinage
Purbalingga, 283 n.31 Reede, F. van, 289 n.21
Purbanégara, R.Tg., 338 n.95 Regu, R.M., 387 n.20
Purbaya, Png. (cousin of AR I), 272 Réksanagara, 288 n.15
n.33, 273 n.40 Rémbang, 49, 50, 100, 155, 293 n.83,
Purbaya, Png. (of Bantén), 87 295 n.14, 356 n.4, 381 n.64
Purbaya, Png. A. (grandson of PB 1), Rembrandt, 15
364 n.57 Renesse, A.D. van, 49-50, 54
Purbaya, Png. Ad. (son of PB I), 146, Rétnawati, 315 n.20
148, 153, 155, 160, 163, 164, 178, reyal sépuh, 6
179, 182, 184, 185, 186-7, 189-97, Rheede, B. van, 137, 330 n.41
1OD= 20219) 2245333 mosesco rice, 5, et passim
n.72, 353 n.49, 383 n.74, 389 n.32, Richard III, 118
Se) MG, SKS wy) Richardt, J.Jz., 268 n.117
INDEX 421

Riebeeck, A. van, 135, 159, 309 n.75 Sasrawinata, Tg., 165, 195, 207, 209,
Riebeeck, J.M. van, 309 n.75 338 n.95
Rosario, S. de, 382 n.71 Sastrawijaya (Astrawijaya), 208
Roseboom, A., 176 saudara, 292 n.65
Rotterdam, 382 n.69 sayyid, 182
Ruys, J., 87 school, see pésantren
Ruyter, Michiel Adriaansz., 19 Schouten, W., 14
Schweinsfedern, 284 n.39
sabres, 14, 20 Scots, 15, 36
Sadewa, Ky., 342 n.1 scurvy, 267 n.98
Sagara Yasa, 298 n.37, 304 n.36 Seda ing Krapyak, Pan., 9, 213
Saint Martin, I. de, 49, 52—3, 54, 75 Sédana, 304 n.32
Sakondhar, Sérat, 361 n.30 sékti, 133
Salama e953 1 4eneli sake. nels air, Dy UNS, 272, 2D m4)
Sala (Sémanggi) river, 5, 49, 124, Sélup (Sélut) Driansah, Sélut Hendrik
146, 167, 169, 171, 179, 190, 191, Ansah, Sélut Hendrik Yansah, 282
196, 318 n.42, 365 n.66; first ONT), SST 357/
reference to name, 339 n.100 Sémalang Sémirang, Dm., 396 n.81
Salam, Si, 305 n.40 Sémanggi river, see Sala river
Salatiga, 47, 141, 208, 318 n.41 Sémar, 116
salawat, 317 n.27 Sémarang, passim; VOC sovereignty
Saloringpasar, Png. Ng. (R. Sudira, over, 47, 75, 80, 90, 101, 123-4,
Suryakusuma, Susuhunan Waliolah 140, 142, 199, 203-4, 228, 295
Panatagama), 119, 121, 132, 135, n.14, 319 0.44, 350 n.29
163% 20053151120) 333m 6a35 sembah, 140
n.70, 358 n.12, 363 n.50, 364 n.54, senapan, sinapan, sunapan, 131, 358
382 n.69 riAPD
saltpetre, 155 Senapati, Png. (of Blambangan), 110
Sampang, 31, 76-7, 126, 178, 270 n.4 Senapati Ingalaga, Pan., 131, 213,
Sandeya, R.M., 387 n.20 316 n.23, 328 n.32
Sanskrit, 227 Séndhang, 316 n.21
santri, 4 Séndhi, R. Aj., 316 n.21
sappanwood, 155 Sépanjang, 175, 177
Sapujagat, Ky., 13-14, 353 n.51 Sépuh, Png. (of Témbayat), 377 n.32
Saradénta, Saradénti, 85-6 Sépuh, R. Ay. (mother of
Saratruna, 370 n.91; see also Mangkunégara), 376 n.27
Tirtawiguna Sépuh, Sultan (of Cirébon), 296 n.26
Saréngat, 159, 165, 174, 179, 213, Serang river, 50, 372 n.3
299 n.56, 341 n.108 Sérayu river, 66, 283 n.31
Sarip, Png., 128 Sergeant, W., 146, 310 n.84
Sas Amel2 Seal a5 Séstrajaya, 333 n.58, 336 n.78; see
Sasranagara (son of Surapati I), 384 also Danuréja
n.86 Sétomi, Ny., 53, 281 n.5
Sasranagara, Ad. (of Surabaya), 343 Shafi‘t School of Law, 4
n.4 Shakespeare, W., 118
Sasranégara (CN III), 338 n.95 Sharif, 128
Sasranégara, R. Tg. (son of CN III), Shields, 14
NG Gres Siam, Siamese, 32, 100, 198, 233,
422 INDEX

300 n.1, 305 n.39, 311 n.87 Songka, R., 333 n.58
Sidaarja, 192, 374 n.16 South Africa, Republic of, 234; see
Sidayu, 39, 126, 146, 155-6, 169, also Cape of Good Hope
igi, lbs, OIG, PAIS, SEAS asi Soviet Union, 234
Simong, J., 361 n.30 soy sauce, 389 n.31
Simong, Kapitan, 361 n.30 Spanish, 6, 271 n.15, 342 n.114
Simunan, 361 n.30 ‘Spanish troopers’, 66, 373 n.6
Sinduréja (a) R.A., 66, 88-90, 91-2, spears, 14; see also pikes
96-127 passim, 273 n.2, 299 n.54, Speelman, C.J., 34-40, 42, 46-9,
301 n.14, 307 n.57, 316-17 n.26, 58-9, 62, 72, 79-81, 83, 91, 106,
S17 MS so Lomi eoe Leno ae 2219223502290 6 75.2 ee ae
n.65 275 n.15, 288 n.19, 318 n.41
Sindureja (b), R.A., 171, 186, 197, Spree, G. van, 196
349 n.28, 369 n.82 Sri Lanka, 34, 105, 149, 153, 157-8,
Singapradana, Dm., 304 n.32 163, 201, 295 n.11, 311 n.88, 347
Singasari, Png. (son of AR I), 37, n.26, 382 n.69
41-2, 45-6, 48, 68 Stapel, F.W., 80, 111
Singasari, Png. (son of AR IV), 294 Steen, Jan, 15
ng Steenwijk, H.L.C. van, 17
Singkal, 50-2, 53, 299 n.53 Struijs, A., 309 n.75
Sinhalese language, 276 n.37 Subékti, R.M. (son of AR IV), 389
Siti Béntar, 94 n.32
Siti Bumi, Siti Bumija, 346 n.20 Subékti, R. (son of PB I), 326 n.14
Sitinggil (part of kraton), 186, 206-7, Sudama, R., 333 n.58
220, 297 n.29, 349 n.27, 392 n.54 Sudérma, R., 82, 103, 109, 125-6,
Sitinggil (place), 366 n.74 147, 300 n.64
Siti Panékar, 346 n.20 Sudira, R., see Saloringpasar, Png.Ng.
Siti Panumping, 346 n.20 Sufism, 4, 11, 295 n.11
Sitirawi, 313 n.5 sugar, 47, 140, 150, 155, 291 n.56,
Sitisundari, R. Aj., 217, 219 320 n 495332539 37203
Slamét, Mt., 286 n.50 Suka, 374 n.16
slaves, 15, 16, 80, 112, 316 n.24 Sukudana, 329 n.38
sleep apnea, 218 Sukawati (in Bali), 166
Slinga, 65-6 Sukra, R., 120-21
Sloot, J.A., 55, 58, 62—3, 71, 101, Sulawesi, 12, 32, 34, 73, 105,
LOZ, LOS OS Ia 2 RoR Famers lie 266 n.75 & n.86, 316 n.24, 356
n.3, 329 n.37 n.66
Sloot, T., 278 n.63 Sultan (title), 8, 40, 66, 187, 200
Slot, B.J., 277 n.49 Sumabrata, Ky. Tg., 126, 127, 135,
Smith, G.V., 300 n.2 331 n.47
snaphaen (snaphance) flintlocks, 116, Sumadiréja, Ng., 369 n.86
124, 131, 143-4, 162, 169, 171, Sumanarsa, M. Ay., 376 n.27
72, L735 VS) 176 WkO Meo e 190% Sumbawa, 33, 317 n.31, 382 n.69
197, 206, 215, 224, 265 n.69, 314 Suméndhi, Png., 377 n.32
n.14, 324 n.4, 368 n.76 Suménép, 76-7, 103, 104, 109, 117,
Sokawati (place), 191, 346 n.20, 365 125; 1475271; 1737309 nv73i3is
n.66 n.&
Sokwati, Png. (Dipanagara), 365 n.66 Sumeru, Mt., hermit of, 166
INDEX 423

Sunda, Sundanese, 11, 148, 353 n.51 Suruh, 345 n.15

Sura Adimanggala, Ad. (Tg. Rongga Suryakusuma, R., see Saloringpasar,
Yudanagara/Yudawongsa), 101, Png. Ng.
116, 123-4, 134, 190, 204, 207, Suryanégara, R. Tg., 338 n.95
289 n.32, 302 n.16, 304 n.32, 333 Suryawinata, Tg., 165, 195, 207, 209,
n.58, 335 n.74 338 n.95
Sura Adiningrat, 334 n.68 Susuhunan (title), 8, et passim
Sura Agulagul, 308 n.62 Sutaprana, 76
Surabaya, 5, et passim; battle of Swedes, 15
(1677), 38-9 Swiss, 15
Surabaya War, 168-201, 203, 220, Swoll, C. van, 382 n.69
223 syahbandar, 104, 319 n.44, 335 n.73
Surabrata, R. Tg., 191, 195, 196, 214 Syair Pérang Méngkasar, 37
Suradilaga, 337 n.89, 384 n.86 syphilis, 17
Suradiningrat, R. Tg., see
Cakraningrat IV Tabanan, 350 n.35
Suradipa, R., 51-2 Tack, F., 49-50, 53-4, 72, 75, 87-96,
Suradipura, Tg., 215 SS -=109 MIS 6s 124511337 136;
Surakarta, 185, 195 TED. OTS) TY, PEEL IE, SOS) NID
Suramanggala (son of Surapati), 384 316 n.23
n.86 Taji, 64, 193
Suraménggala, Dm. (of Pathi), 396 Tambakbaya, 120
n.81 Tambaklangon, 175
Suranata (I), Tg., 66, 69, 70, 79, 82, Tamil language, 325 n.7
OTP 235 2877. 302-18; 3iL8 tanah sabrang, 6
n.38, 320 n.48 Tangérang, 201
Suranata (II), R. Tg., 137-8, 320 n.48 Tangkéban, Jaka, 343 n.4
Surapati (I), 79, 84-96, 100-27, 136, Tangkilan (place), 63
138, 141, 143-5, 146, 147, 160, Tangkilan, Ky., 193
PIS), aveWNinesA,33510) eke, 336)! Tanjunee/ 2m O27 Zen
n.51, 352 n.45; descendants of, Tantu Panggélaran, 11
145-6, 149-50, 160-1, 197, 199, Tapa, R.M., 305 n.40
200, 214, 221, 382 n.69, 384 n.86; Tapsir Anom, 305 n.40
given name Wiranégara, 299 n.54, Taruwongsa, 102
337 n.89 Tasikmalaya, 64
Surapati (II), R., 337 n.89, 383 n.80; Tawangalun, Sunan/Mas, 75-6, 77,
see also Wiranégara 110, 293 n.79
Surapati (III), R. Tg., 199-200, 214, Daylor de) 2.) L457
386 n.86 Tédhunan, 372 n.3
Suratman, 182 Tégal, 41-2, 44-6, 67, 71, 101, 102,
Surawijaya, Tg., 175, 369 n.87 O55 1356576) 205206 nie
surawikrama, 288 n.20, 301 n.16 216, 284 n.39, 286 n.50, 293 n.83,
Surayuda, 384 n.86 352 n.44, 370 n.91, 386 n.9
Surengrana, Ky. Ng. Panji, 146, 166, Tégalwangi, 41-2, 205, 312 n.3
169-71, 173, 175, 1774. 191,.195-6, Teja, Rano lom:20
197, 199-200, 221,313 n.8, 342-3 Tejawati, M.Ay., 315 n.20, 326 n.14
n.4, 351 n.35, 346 n.57, 366 n.70 Témbayat, 61—2, 68, 78, 190, 191,
Sunt 27 194
 INDEX
424

Témbini, Nusa, 388 n.21, 396 n.85 Trunajaya, R., 30-57, 60, 61, 68, 69,
Téngah, Png., 333 n.58 T6$77, 83, OS 105ml ieisGr iG:
Téngger, 264 n.54 222, 223, 229, 273 n.40, 292 n.74,
ténung Wélanda, 133 316 n.26, 320 n.48, 323 n.69, 367
Térnate, 266 n.86, 267 n.102 n.74
Térusan, 175 Tuban, 39, 58, 155, 156, 169, 173,
Térusan, Kali (river), see Porong, 179-80, 315 n.20
Kali Tugu, 139
textiles, 6, 47, 49, 70, 80, 82, 107, Tunggak Sémi, 322 n.58
142 Tuntang, 134, 141
Thousong, Encik, 269 n.123 Turas, 116
Tidore, 266 n.86 Turunsih, Si, 186
tiger-buffalo fights, 9, 157, 207 typhoid, 398 n.102
tigers, 60, 94, 208, 214; see also
rampog macan, tiger-buffalo fights ulama, 174, 193
timber, 6, 16, et passim; VOC Umpak, see Opak
difficulties regarding, 69, 71, 79, Undakan, R., 270 n.4
107, 125, 155, 165, 204-5, 287 n.8, Ungaran, 140-1, 335 n.74, 344 n.6
310 n.85, 321 n.55, 390 n.38 United States of America, 233-4
Timor, 105 Untung, 84-5
Timur, R.Ay., 363 n.47 Urangagungjédung, 374 n.16
Tirtakusuma, R., 160-61, 162 Urawan, Ky.Ad. (courtier of AR II),
Tirtanata, R.Tg., (son of Surapati J), 48, 62, 63, 77, 91, 109, 120-1,
384 n.86, 393 n.60, 394 n.68 122, 127, 287 n.7, 288 n.20
Tirtanata, Dm. (son of Jayaningrat of Urawan, Ki Dm. (courtier of AR IV),
Pékalongan), 216, 217 376 n.29
Tirtawiguna, Ng., 217, 370 n.91 urut dalan, see wong urut dalan
Tirtawyaya, Tg., 217 Usalam Molana, 308 n.69
titles of Crown prince, 118, 185, 200, utak, 296 n.25
218 Utara, R.M., 387 n.20
titles of kings, 44, 45, 127, 136, 180,
184, 187 Valentyn, F., 80, 93, 140, 143-4, 146,
Tokugawa, 130, 300 n.1; Pax 160, 183, 336 n.83; campaigns
Tokugawa, 231 confused by, 341 n.106
Tompo Balang, Kr., 317 n.31 Verschuyr/van der Schuer/van der
Topati, R., 304 n.35 Schuur, E., 273 n.15
Topina, 306 n.45 Vertangen, Lt., 388 n.22
Torbaya, 142 Vietnam, 233, 234, 300 n.1
torture, 21, 106, 112, 120, 198 Visconti family, 282 n.17
Trawulan, 366 n.74 Vliet, J. van, 81-2, 83, 91, 93, 95, 98
Trayém, 63 VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische
treaties: of 1646, 35, 47; of Feb. Compagnie), passim
1677, 35-6, 74, 90; of Oct. 1677, Vonk, D., 298 n.46
46-7, 74, 109, 115; of Oct. 1705,
141 Wangga, 373 n.6
Trénggalek, 341 n.108 Wahyu, M., 200
Trinh, 300 n.1 Waladana, Ki Carik, 347 n.23
Tromp, Cornelis, 19 wali, 4, 39, 58, 340 n.102
Tromp, Maarten H., 19 Walikukun, 318 n.42
INDEX 425

Waliolah Panatagama, Susuhunan, see n.59, 340 n.105

Saloringpasar, Png.N¢g. Wiralodra, 304 n.32
Walling, C., 171, 178-9 Wiranagara, Tg. (rebel Patih), 371
Wanagiri, Ky., 187 n.95
Wanakarta, 55; becomes Kartasura, Wiranégara, Ki Ad./R.A. (son of
58-9 Surapati), 145, 149-50, 383 n.80,
Wanakrama, 181, 191, 192, 195, 369 see also Surapati (I)
n.89 Wiranégara, Tg. (of Tégal), 176
Wanakusuma (Wanasari) (place), 62, Wirasaba, 104, 162, 169, 175, 179,
67 197, 299 n.56, 306 n.51, 341 n.108
Wanakusuma, Png., 62, 65, 67, 74, Wirasari, A., 303 n.24
76, 78, 102 Wiraséntika, Ky. A., 350 n.29
Wanasari (Délanggu), 373 n.6; see women, 10, et passim
also Wanakusuma wong Jambudipa, 11
Wangsadipa, Ky. Ang., 34-5, 36, 47 wong urut dalan, 123, 190, 204,
Warak, Haji, 371 n.95, 376 n.27 207-8, 216, 313 n.5
waringin, 164 Wongsadewa, H., 306 n.45
War of the League of Augsburg, 122 Wongsadriya, Png., 377 n.32
War of Spanish Succession, 151, 163 Wongsanata, 105
Warsadenti, 294 n.7 Wotgaleh (Mataram), 315 n.20, 326
Wars of Succession, Javanese: First, n.14
134-51, 174, 220, 223, 224; Wotgalih (Gratitunon), 309 n.73
Second, 168, 186—201, 203, 220, 223 Wotgantung, 309 n.73
Waru, 195 Wuragil, Png., 377 n.32
Warugunung, 175
Wasengrana, 77, 82 Yawa, Yawabhimi, Yawadwipa
water-oath, 79 Yawamandala, Yawapuri, 11
Watés, 283 n.30 Yogyakarta, 84, 118, 133, 159, 317
Watupanganten, 386 n.5 n.35, 330 n.40, 349 n.27
wayang, 9-10, 92, 207 Yoshimune, 300 n.1
Wédhi, 194 Young Men’s Buddhist Association
Weéleri, 205 233
Westfrisia mint, 210 Yudanagara, Tg. (of East Madura),
Wetan, Ratu, 74, 315 n.17 76-8, 81-2, 103
Wijah, 286 n.1 Yudanagara (Yudawongsa), Tg.
Wijaya, R., 366 n.74 Rongga (of Sémarang), see Sura
Wijayakusuma (flower), 45, 296 n.20 Adimanggala
Wilatikta, 377 n.35 yudasmara, 119
Wilde, H. de, 139-42, 145-7, 275 Yudawongsa, Ky. Rongga, see Sura
n.15 Adimanggala
Wilis, Mt., 196, 299 n.56 Yusuf, Syeikh, 87, 294 n.7
wine, see alcohol
Winongan, 160, 161, 162, 396 n.81 Zaffar, Maulana, 313 n.8
Wiracana, Ki, 346 n.21, 349 n.27 Zainulkubra, 273 n.2. 369 n.84; see
Wiradesa, 139, 156, 204, 216 also titles of kings
Wiradirja, Ng., 342-3 n.4 Zoetmulder, P.J., 227, 327 n.20
Wiraguna (of Bantén), 17 Zwaardecroon, H., 198, 206, 395 n.73
Wiraguna, Tg. (of Kartasura), 322
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a.
 hon ibe Dutch Rast inca Company (voc) lend ina
war iin Java in 1667, no one knew that fifty years of inconclusive
conflict would follow. The VOC brought to Java the technologica
- advances of seventeenth century European warfare, which the
Javanese eagerly adopted. Yet this ready transfer of technology
_was not,ee byany7 ene cultural chaaee®onae :

inJava and also ppihsiyieyrelations 1

more |
] ydrawing comparisons with Japan and India in the —
aed
cee Western interventions i
in non-Western --

:This ookoe a majoreen bo theheroes -

_Indonesia and, more broadly, of Asia in the pre-colonial period
_while raising important questions cael the history of Asian
Western relations iin general. |

M.C. Ricklefs is Professor ofHistory at Monash University in

_ Melbourne and isa recognised authority on the history of—
_ Indonesia, especially Java. He is the author of the staat
textbook A History of Modern Indonesia, and the classic stuc
later eighteenth century Java Jogjakarta under Sultan
_ Mangkubumi. He is a Fellow of the Australian Academy (e)
_ Humanities and a member of the Koninklijk Instituut voorTaal
_ Land- en Volkenkunde in the Netherlands, and nen Een
has lectured at universities in Great Britain, the
: Netherlands, Indonesia and Australia. iil! |

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