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Fight-Against-Corruption-Through-Technology -The-Case-of-Morocco

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DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-5007-9.ch013

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Chapter 13
Fight Against Corruption
Through Technology:
The Case of Morocco

Hicham Sadok
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4402-0954
Mohammed V University in Rabat, Morocco

ABSTRACT
Corruption secures benefits for those with power, status, money, or protection. Corruption generally
manifests itself in the form of a tacit convention that is put in place discreetly, gradually, and cumula-
tively by feeding itself and secreting its own rules, mechanisms, and intermediaries. In Morocco, social
tolerance towards corruption is strong, influenced by a general feeling of impunity and the inequality of
citizens under the law. The force of the political discourse displayed, and which is supposed to fight it
remains unchanged without notorious effects. However, emerging technologies can serve as a remark-
able lever to transform public actions in their fight against corruption through a paperless environment,
the reduction of red tape, and highlighting the gray areas where corruption thrives. By focusing on the
Moroccan case, this chapter highlights the role that digitalization can have in the moralization of public
life by acting on three levers: publishing multiple data, mitigating risks associated with excessive discre-
tion, and creating new public-private partnerships.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is found with varying intensity in many countries and gives rise to necessarily different
analyses. For some, it is marginal, cyclical and seems to be under control thanks to the effective func-
tioning of the institutions in place and the application of the laws in force; while in others it is heavy,
structural, and systemic. It deactivates and blocks not only the political and legal control supposed to
fight and stem it but also the economic development of the country. According to a former minister of
economy and finance in Morocco, corruption costs Morocco annually 7 billion Euros, or nearly 7% of
its gross domestic product (GDP) (North Africa Post, 2020). A scourge that plagues Morocco and which

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-5007-9.ch013

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Fight Against Corruption Through Technology

is getting worse and worse despite the announcements of the authorities, the launch of several strategies
and the establishment of an authority to fight against corruption. Government efforts to tackle it ap-
pear ineffective. Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks Morocco
87th out of 180 countries on the index. Morocco thus fell seven places compared to 2019. In addition,
with a score of 39 out of 100, it lost four points compared to 2019 (Transparency International, 2021).
The results of this survey attest to the prevalence of corruption in Morocco, while political discourse
continues to show a fierce will to fight it. Hibou and Tozy (2009) sum up this ambivalence perfectly:
“How to interpret the different episodes of a fight against corruption now made visible and even almost
routine? Are we in the presence of a pure and simple staging? Or of an instrumentalization of a power
still based on the purchase, the exchange of services and corruption?” Such questions lead to several
other questions about the urgency of a political response and about the solutions to be engaged in a
visible paradox between the displayed force of its denunciation – at the level of intentions, of taking
charge of the phenomenon, and the force of daily corruption. However, if the latter generally consists
of an abuse of a power received in the delegation for private ends, to combat it is necessary to remedy
the weaknesses of the underlying processes and institutions. Among these essential weaknesses is the
main function of our bureaucratic institutions consisting in certifying the authenticity of the informa-
tion jealously guarded by the administrations (Dimant & Tosato, 2018). In The Castle, the last novel
by Franz Kafka, he deplores the fact that bureaucratic organizations exercise “the tyranny of paper”.
Indeed, most of our daily transactions are meticulously listed in ledgers. However, by opting for digital,
governments can improve the transparency and efficiency of bloated bureaucracies that often date from
another era (Kahn et al., 2018). Leaders around the world advocating for reform have appreciated how
technology can help simplify administration (Rafay, 2019) and curb corruption by reducing red tape
and illuminating the gray areas where corruption thrives (Banerjee et al., 2012). For Louis Brandeis1,
“sunlight would be the best disinfectant”.
In this respect, a bubble of expectations is forming on the contributions of digitalization for the gen-
eralization of transparency and governments are struggling to catch up. Digitally savvy citizens are much
less tolerant of bureaucracy, nepotism and corruption which remain a formidable challenge, although
the digital revolution is gradually changing the game (Rafay, 2021b). Today, new technologies allow
“corruption hunters” to reveal, prosecute, prevent and even predict questionable practices that could
previously be covered with the opacity of paper. As a result, there are heightened and even exaggerated
expectations about the potential of digital to improve public service delivery and enhance efficiency
and integrity in public action. It is therefore important to reflect on both the promises and the pitfalls of
this ongoing revolution to deal with endemic corruption in general and in Morocco in particular (North
Africa Post, 2020), by reflecting on the potential of digitalization to change the rules of governance in
place. This change in promoting transparency will first require accountability for opening and publish-
ing multiple data (Transparency International, 2021). Second, by mitigating the risks associated with
excessive discretion of power (Transparency International, 2021). This is how unlocking the potential of
the Blockchain could be an important lever in the fight against corruption (Transparency International,
2021), as well as the creation of new public-private partnerships to transform public services (Transpar-
ency Maroc, 2020).

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CORRUPTION IN MOROCCO: ALARMING AND WELL-ESTABLISHED FACTS

Different sources, both national and international, report worrying indices, facts and figures regarding
the situation of corruption in Morocco. In 2021, the CPI (corruption index perception), published annu-
ally by the NGO Transparency International, gave Morocco a score of 39/100 points and placed it in the
87th position out of a total of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2021). A score that ranked it
among the countries with “systemic corruption”. It thus lost one point and one place compared to 2020,
and 7 places compared to 2019. This result confirms the endemic nature of corruption in Morocco and
especially its stagnation in this situation for a very long time: in 2012 and 2013, Morocco had a score
of 37/100, which rose to 39 in 2014 and fell to 36 in 2015, then to 37 in 2016. A slight improvement
was recorded in 2017 and 2018 (with a score of 43/100) before this score fell to 39 in 2021(Transpar-
ency International, 2021). Over the last 10 years, Morocco’s average score is 39/100, which means that
over the past decade, the fight against corruption in Morocco has stalled and it has made no significant
progress. Yet the political discourse against corruption is strong, but so is the reality of corruption: we
have on the one hand the law made up of rules, laws, norms, and obligations, and on the other a social
practice where the possibilities of doing what the laws do not allow are developed. Non-respect for the
rule of law tends to increase, with the corollary of the disintegration of social ties. Corruption is becoming
commonplace and assumed as normal behavior, to such an extent that some of its acts are practiced in a
confident and calm manner. Thus, whole swathes of exchanges are gradually escaping legal constraint
and submitting to another normative order producing repeatedly corruptible exchanges, fueling undue
gains, distorting the game of competition and equality of opportunity, increasing state spending, and
significantly reducing its resources. The areas of law are receding and those of the shadows take their
place, feed themselves and permeate the social construct. This anchoring of corruption is done in a ra-
tional manner because arbitration in favor of corruption still denotes a form of calculating the rationality
of agents (Atia & Herrold, 2018; Becker, 1968). According to this author, the lower the perception of
the risk incurred, whether, in terms of detection or sanction, the more deterrence loses its attributes, and
the more corruption is accepted and the arbitration in its favor high (Ades & di Tella, 1997; Jain, 2001).
The American economist Robert summarized the factors favoring corruption by the famous equation
C = M + D – A, “Corruption is equal to the sum of monopoly and power (discretion), which must be
subtract responsibility (accountability)” (Robert, 1991). In other words, the state’s monopoly over pub-
lic policy-making, combined with the authority of bureaucrats over public services, creates conditions
conducive to corruption when it is neither controlled by transparency requirements nor hampered by
accountability mechanisms (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). John Waterbury wrote forty-five years ago, that in
Morocco “corruption floats free and is manipulated, guided, planned and desired”. (Waterbury, 1973)
In 2020, a survey carried out on behalf of the association Transparency Morocco, among a sample of
400 companies, revealed that only 10% of them participated regularly in public procurement and nearly
60% considered that the corresponding procedures are “complex, costly and tainted with corruption”.
In addition, 53% of respondents consider that “action by public authorities” against corruption is “very
ineffective” and 19% consider it “ineffective” (Transparency maroc, 2020).
The Economic and Social Council, a constitutional institution, also presented a study on public
procurement and corruption. In this report (Conseil Economique et Social, 2012), implicit reference is
made to the lack of transparency, the absence of calls for tenders for certain orders, the non-existence of
a joint appeal committee and the risks of conflicts of interest which could taint certain markets.

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For its part, the Observatory of Corruption set up by Transparency Morocco, lists that during the year
2021 the sectoral distribution of corruption cases reported by the Moroccan press interested in descend-
ing order local communities 34%, housing-urban planning-real estate 14%, health 7%, police 6%, justice
5%, private sector 5%, trade and industry 4%, customs 3% and education 3% (Conseil Economique et
Social, 2012).
As for the Court of Auditors, another constitutional institution, one of whose functions is to prevent the
risks incurred by public management, its annual reports are full of proven cases of corruption and other
forms of embezzlement, misuse of corporate assets, contracts that do not comply with the legislation in
force, recurring malfunctions and shortcomings in the management of public orders and contracts, lack
of traceability in the accounts, multiple forms of conflicts of interest and squandering of public funds
in a number of state agencies, establishments and services (Cour des comptes, 2021).
The Moroccan factors for this anchoring of corruption are numerous: high level of social tolerance
and corrupt behavior of actors, failing institutional mechanisms to combat it, weak prevention and ab-
sence of deterrence over time, the existence of a discretionary economic public power, predominance
informational asymmetry and low probability of sanction (Banhamza, 2016; Brachet, 1992).
In these circumstances, corruption remains a formidable challenge, although the digital revolution is
gradually changing the situation. Today, new technologies make it possible to reveal, prosecute, prevent,
and even predict dubious practices that could previously be covered by the opacity of administrative
machinery. The middle class – a growing, younger, more urban, and increasingly tech-savvy class – is
now able to shed light on facts of corruption. It requires a better allocation of resources as well as an
improvement in services. In terms of integrity and efficiency, its expectations are higher vis-à-vis the
public sector, and the gap continues to widen between these increasingly strong aspirations and the
insufficient capacities of the government to obtain results. This is also a root cause of the crisis of con-
fidence in institutions that we observe in Morocco. However, this distrust can be overcome thanks to
digitalization, thus allowing access to data is now considered a solution to be implemented to improve
the delivery of public services and strengthen efficiency and integrity within public action.

OPENING AND PUBLICATION OF DATA

The ongoing digital revolution is an opportunity to reshape the way public services work. It also makes it
possible to meet expectations and restore confidence in these services. The process of digitizing red tape
is admittedly complex, as government agencies tend to work in silos, lacking interoperability frameworks
to better communicate with each other. That said the greatest challenge of digitization remains political
in nature, rooted in the political economy of data governance in the public sector (Klitgaard, 1991).
Thus, the opening and analysis of a mass of data can encourage transparency and improve the efficiency
of the administration. More than 2.5 trillion bytes of data are produced every day (Barrenechea, 2019),
and governments are increasingly releasing their own data to meet their open government commitments.
This abundance of data, coupled with rapidly improving access and analytical capabilities, is creating
a new form of transparency that helps improve governance. Three elements are considered as prerequi-
sites that will contribute to this virtuous process:

1. First, the data must be open, then published, and finally disseminated at an appropriate time to feed
the thinking of those interested and/or developing public policies. This data allows political par-

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ties, civil parties, civil rights defenders, and oversight institutions to hold governments to account
in more effective ways than in the past. In recent years, as part of their open government agenda,
some administrations in some countries have published their data on online portals integrating an
increasing number of databases. According to the Open Data Index, which measures the degree
of openness of data on a global scale, Taiwan, Australia, Great Britain, France and Finland are the
countries that have made the most progress in this area (Global Open Data Index, 2016). By put-
ting public data online, leaders are incentivizing public officials to improve the quality of that data,
especially in subnational governments and administrations. For example, in 2016, the Colombian
government suspended transfers to 125 municipalities that had not provided it with quality public
expenditure data on time, as required by law.

To be usable, data published to the public must be easily understandable. Some administrations in
some Latin American countries have begun to use advanced techniques in the field of publication and
data processing. Thus, with the aim of establishing fiscal transparency, the Mexican Ministry of Finance
has enriched open budget data through a latest-generation computer portal (De la Mora & Garduño,
2017), which notably presents data on public procurement, payments for public works and subnational
transfers. Mexico City has become the first city to publish data on its public markets by displaying all
related data. This approach concerns more than 1,400 contracts under the supervision of 19 public
institutions and managed in collaboration with 231 service providers (De la Mora & Garduño, 2017).
In this quest for transparency, come emerging countries such as Mexico and Paraguay use georefer-
encing technologies to ensure the control and monitoring of investments, especially those concerning
infrastructure, deemed to be the most vulnerable to corruption (Kahn et al., 2018). The Development
Bank of Brazil also uses these technologies to monitor the progress of projects financed by the Amazon
Fund (BNDES, 2020), while the MapaRegalias portal launched by the Colombian government allows
the monitoring of public investments financed through mining royalties (Lauletta et al., 2019). And
in order to further strengthen transparency and limit corruption in Colombia, some start-ups, such as
Datasketch, use the information published to issue alerts (Datasketch, 2019). Also in Mexico City, and
thanks to the Torre de Control portal, the Poder project revealed that almost 70% of the contracts related
to the construction project of a new international airport had been awarded without a call for tenders. It
also made it possible to have more information on the nature of the service providers and the value of
their contracts in the total market value (Santiso, 2019). These kinds of initiatives and the creation of
these platforms imply that changes are underway in terms of data governance and information manage-
ment to implement them within bureaucracies that are accustomed to operating in silos and keeping
jealously their data.

2. Beyond the sharing and publication of data, the latter must be used effectively when developing
public policies. More and more governments offer free access to their databases, but unfortunately,
these data are rarely downloaded by the parties supposed to be concerned. The trend is that they are
most often used by civil servants to compensate for the lack of exchanges within their organizations
or between the different administrations. The idea of implementing digitalization for the open gov-
ernment will be implemented gradually through, first, the process of publishing and opening data
to the public, which mainly aims to reach a certain threshold of transparency, then, a second phase
will be juxtaposed with an objective of applying the principle of responsibility for the publication
of data with the final objective of improving services. The challenge is no longer just to publish

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useful data in a timely manner, but to know how to use this data effectively to develop policies and
enforce accountability. Often, it is associations, civil parties, start-ups and committed researchers
who take advantage of new technologies and especially open data. This accessibility sheds light on
obscure practices and trends. It is these actors, through their reports and their activism, who urge
the public authorities to find ways to improve resource allocation and service delivery.

Moving forward in this project of moralization through the implementation of digitalization requires
a real dialogue between data scientists and political decision-makers to better understand the challenges
to be met by bureaucracies. In other words, we need to build partnerships and collaborations between
those who identify the problems and those who propose digital solutions. This includes integrating digital
specialists within government departments and agencies. This kind of alliance is already made in France,
or by the establishment of an agency dedicated to digital transformation that works cross-functionally
with the various administrations, as is the case in the United Kingdom.

3. The effective exploitation of the data cannot be effective with regard to the enormous quantity
of data produced by the administrations. In order to better understand the government machine,
improve its performance and bridge the gap between the objectives of public policies and their
implementation, it would be necessary to cross-check data drawn from different databases. For
example, the implementation of this strategy has enabled the Public Expenditure Observatory of
the Brazilian Ministry of Transparency to detect irregularities in its social benefit programs (Graft
et al., 2016). The government was thus able to respond to realize significant savings and modify
its benefit allocation policies.

Tax and customs authorities are increasingly using artificial intelligence and predictive analytics
to detect fraud and prevent tax evasion (Walker-Munro, 2021; Rafay & Ajmal, 2014). Indeed, the tax
services are pioneers in the use of data analysis to simulate the effects of tax and legislative reforms on
the State budget and also on the behavior of the taxpayer. In 2019, the US Internal Revenue Service -
the agency of the US federal government that collects income tax - prevented the payment of refunds in
more than two million cases of identity theft or tax evasion. That’s about one in every hundred refunds,
or a total of over $15 billion (FBI, 2014).
In the UK, tax authorities use land records, credit card transactions, tax records data and social media
analysis to detect fraudulent or hidden activity. The Connect system device mixes data from various
sources, from the administration or from companies, which makes it possible to profile and access all
the income of each taxpayer, to highlight inconsistencies and therefore to open investigations to collect
amounts due (Sanghrajka, 2020). Thanks to this digital system, which cost 100 million pounds sterling
in 2008, this investment enabled the tax authorities in the UK to recover 3 billion pounds (Sanghrajka,
2020). Its predictive algorithm also makes it possible to identify in the future people likely to practice
tax evasion, and thus to define preventive actions, such as sending letters to remind implicitly people
at risk of their omissions or let them know directly the consequences resulting from false declarations.
Several countries have started to actively promote the reuse of open government data for further
digitization in both the public and private sectors. Since 2009, Spain has encouraged the reuse of open
public data for private purposes through the Aporta initiative (Garcia & Maldonado, 2012). In Mexico, the
federal government encourages the use of public data by the private sector through the Labora program
(OECD, 2016b). These strategies work with and thanks to start-ups, which brew a large amount of data

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and act as intermediaries to produce information that is easily understood by the public. They exploit
the information drawn from the data collected on the bases to which the government offers free access,
to create value for public information which, more and more often, is transformed into economic value.

ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF PROCEDURES

Digitization can serve as an effective strategy to limit the discretionary power of certain officials, who
misuse it and may go so far as to ask for bribes. Automating administrative procedures and digitizing
public services can reduce the risk of human-made misuse and tampering. Petty corruption has disas-
trous effects on public confidence in the administration. This form of corruption is often widespread
in developing countries. According to the organization Transparency Morocco, in 2019, one in three
Moroccan citizens had to pay a bribe (Guessous, 2020). It is customary to say that corruption greases
bureaucratic wheels.
Indeed, the automation of administrative procedures and the digitization of public services can lay
the foundations for an administration that is both more efficient and transparent. It makes services more
agile, faster and smarter, while producing new data to better understand the internal mechanisms of the
state machine (Santiso, 2019). However, the process of digitizing administrative procedures remains
complex, with government agencies tending to work in silos and lacking interoperability frameworks. But
the biggest challenge of digitization is of a political nature: the whole issue is to know who has an interest
or not in this digital transformation and who owns, controls, shares and guarantees the security of data.
Making the bureaucracy nimbler and more open has a direct impact on public trust in government, as
it improves the level of citizen satisfaction with public services. France has developed its digital services
through an integrated portal that brings together all the services offered by the government (République
Française, 2015). This approach allows citizens to access all public services through a one-stop shop.
Uruguay plans to offer online access to all of its public services this year. In Morocco, there is almost no
administrative procedure that can be carried out entirely online. The task of administrative digitization is
technically easy, but not culturally: the introduction of digital services often encounters resistance from
interest groups who fear losing the advantages, power and interest of employment (El Mesbahi, 2013).
However, the digitization of Byzantine administrative procedures will have no interest if it has not
been preceded by a simplification, a reassessment of their relevance and their costs. Bureaucrats are
often the first victims of the administrative maze in terms of the operational efficiency of the tasks re-
quired of them, and in terms of the level of productivity of the organization they represent. Moreover,
the digitization of public services can only be effective if the public services themselves are redesigned.
It is necessary to reconsider the logic of the legislation at the origin of the bureaucratic procedures.
The adoption of smarter legislation, therefore, goes hand in hand with administrative simplification.
This objective is a challenge in itself: the programs for digital transformation and better legislation are
not always mutually reinforcing, as they are often carried out by separate government entities, whose
concerns and objectives diverge.
In Portugal, the Simplex program – whose results are promising – includes a multitude of measures
aimed at redefining administrative procedures by involving civil society and civil servants (ePortugal,
2020). These targeted initiatives include various measures, ranging from simplifying the formalities for
obtaining identity documents, vehicle registration and business registration, to facilitating the payment
of taxes thanks to pre-completed declarations and passing through the registration of deaths and births.

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These innovations are not only based on the very latest technologies, but they also use the results of
behavioral science research to put the citizen back at the center of administration.
Administrative modernization through digitalization is not just a technological issue. It is also about
changing behaviors and values, taking advantage of new technologies and information extracted from the
mass of data created and assembled, with the idea of ​​making bureaucracies more agile and responsive.
It is only gradually that digital public services are entering a new phase of reform aimed at anticipat-
ing citizens’ needs and offering proactive services (pre-filled forms, interactions, suggestions, sending
instant notifications by email or SMS, etc.). Originally, the digital transformation of the administration
prioritized e-government and the automation of public services for economic reasons aimed at reducing
costs. However, over the past ten years, it has moved into a second phase of transformation – digital in
nature and open by default – which puts citizens back at the heart of public interventions. This process
is now entering the third phase of reform, in favor of an agile, responsive, smarter government, based
on data analysis and, henceforth, artificial intelligence.
In this myriad of technologies serving as support for a digital transformation, the Blockchain would
be an innovative technology that could serve as an anti-corruption remedy. Indeed, some key features
of distributed ledger technology can help curb corruption, including in the areas of protecting identities,
tracking funds, recording assets, and awarding contracts. Given its decentralized nature, the immutability
of its records and the traceability of its transactions, this technology can represent an automatic audit
trail. A growing number of proofs of concept and pilot projects are emerging in areas such as identity,
land, and property titles, as documented by New York University’s GovLab and the Center for Stanford
Social Innovation (NYU, 2022).

BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISING POTENTIAL TO BE UNLOCKED

Although many people associate blockchain technology only with cryptocurrency transactions, it can
still be used to record any type of exchange, for example, real estate sales, paperwork, identification of
identities or the chain of supply. In terms of development, blockchain is still in its infancy. According to
Forbes magazine, and already in 2017, only 0.5% of the world’s population used the blockchain, while
more than 50% of the population had access to the Internet (del Castillo & Schifrin, 2022). And just
like the Internet, it is almost certain that there will be an explosion of users and users over time; Victor
Hugo said, “Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come”.
This blockchain technology has two distinct characteristics that make it a powerful tool against fraud
and corruption:
First, it ensures an unprecedented level of information security and the integrity of the records it man-
ages, guaranteeing their authenticity. It eliminates opportunities for tampering and the risks associated
with moral failings or circumstances when handling data or carrying responsibility.
Second, blockchain provides a transparent and decentralized system to record a sequence of transac-
tions. It creates an immutable trace allowing full traceability of each transaction. It thus provides un-
wavering audit support to identify suspicious activity or wrongdoing by leaving enough digital clues to
identify bad actors. In this regard, three proposals for blockchain applications in the fight against fraud
and corruption can be put forward. This is the control of transactions carried out for the execution of
public contracts, registration and transactions of goods, and identity verification. These three applica-
tions of blockchain technology to establish transparency will be briefly developed:

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1) Current government payment systems and cash transfers in public procurement processes are par-
ticularly vulnerable to corruption. They have multiple points of human discretion that make them
susceptible to fraud and tampering and therefore create opportunities for corruption. Limiting the
physical interaction between citizens and officials, the business and the manager will reduce op-
portunities for positional rent-seeking. Every year, according to the OECD, about $9.5 trillion is
spent on public sector contracts and major public investment projects. Corruption is estimated to
account for 10% of the total cost of doing business globally and up to 25% of the cost of public
investment and procurement contracts in developing countries (OECD, 2016a). The World Bank
estimates that businesses and individuals pay $1 trillion in bribes every year, which is 2% of the
global GDP2. Thus, blockchain technology-enabled solutions now provide end-to-end moraliza-
tion and transparency in public contracts, allowing the detection of cartels, bid-rigging, and ghost
suppliers. Blockchain could add critical value to public procurement through the delivery of goods
and services, by locking down critical information at every stage of the supply chain that can be
monitored, tracked, and audited. Moreover, these “smart contracts”, which are still in the experi-
mental stage, would allow the automatic exchange of real assets to be programmed in an unalter-
able blockchain, which would run autonomously according to programmed conditions. This would
reduce the possibility of manipulating the process and will increase the speed of transactions.
2) The registration of assets and land titles in reliable and secure registers could greatly contribute
to eradicating expropriation, land predation and fraud in developing countries which are rampant
(Nakitende et al., 2021) and affect the people, often vulnerable, who own property and subsistence
land, but not yet properly registered in the land registry. By proceeding with this registration, finan-
cial institutions and banks can finance projects carried out by vulnerable owners as collateral for
these assets, and thus release the “dead” capital (Soto, 2003). Sweden is testing a blockchain-based
land registry to make details of real estate transactions visible to all interested parties. Georgia has
started registering land titles using blockchain. This technology is also being tested to create business
records and provide reliable information on ultimate beneficial ownership. It thus enables effective
monitoring for financial regulators, law enforcement and tax authorities. In the United States, the
State of Delaware has launched an initiative that will allow companies to use the blockchain for
the registration and transfer of ownership of shares.
3) Blockchain can also help improve identity verification conditions for any type of relationship
related to public services. It would thus be to verify in the form of a single register the services
and aid likely to be granted to everyone. This digital application for developing countries makes it
possible to better target and manages the allocation of public resources for the fight against poverty
and vulnerability, with a double concern for integrity in declarations and equity in the collection of
subsidies. India has taken a step forward by already providing a unique digital identity to its citizens
using biometric technology under the Aadhaar program. Estonia runs a national digital identity
system where personal information is stored on a distributed ledger that an individual controls.

However, early experiences also suggest that blockchain-based solutions will not work in all institu-
tional settings, and several prerequisites need to be met. These include that existing data must be open
and accurate, records must be digitized, and the digital identity system must be trusted. There must
also be sufficient connectivity, a technology-aware population, and existing technical support services.
Unfortunately, this is not yet the ideal situation in many developing countries, where they often must
concentrate on “the essentials”. This is why, to paraphrase Allen Schick, most developing countries in

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their digitalization process should not, from the outset, try New Zealand’s reforms by skipping critical
stages of institutional digital development (Schick, 1998).

TRANSFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION AND ACCELERATING INNOVATION

Digitization and new technologies challenge the state monopoly in certain areas and promote public-
private partnerships. Blockchain is a game changer due to its integrity and decentralized nature. In the old
systems, data, assets, and transactions were managed by centralized state institutions. Today, thanks to
the blockchain, these elements can be managed by decentralized groups of autonomous entities capable
of certifying information, encrypting data, and administering the service. Blockchain, therefore, has the
potential to enable private entities to participate in the decentralized provision of public services, which
the central state administration has traditionally monopolized. By allowing easy access, and above all
by restoring trust, the blockchain is able to reinvent the administration in a more honest and transparent
way, and can, on the occasion, introduces a public service approach in an innovative way.
Innovation labs launched by the government or in partnership with private actors can be used to in-
cubate and accelerate innovations in the public sector. Colombia inaugurated a new Public Innovation
Lab in December 2018, while Chile’s State Services Innovation Lab is incubating projects to increase the
agility of public services. Portugal, for its part, created its innovation laboratory in the same direction in
2017. All its initiatives jointly exploit digital technologies and behavioral data to find new solutions to
old problems. Public innovation labs provide a space for the emergence of a new type of public-private
partnerships to reinvent government by incubating private sector solutions to address public sector
challenges.
Governments can therefore collaborate with private companies and start-ups to uncover invisible
practices and trends or improve public services. According to the consulting firm Gartner, administrations
spend each year more than 400 billion dollars to finance digital technologies (Gartner, 2022). Private-
public partnerships can help governments become more agile, open, and innovative. They can also offer
effective solutions to those who wish to have a digitalization and data analysis service but struggle to
recruit data scientists and have the skills for implementation.
Thus, and to circumvent this handicap, private companies and start-ups working with the public
sector to improve the government machine in what is called GovTech. More and more leaders are real-
izing the transformative potential of these GovTechs vis-à-vis corruption within the administration and
are establishing new public-private partnerships to fight against it, and for some countries, accelerate
the process of digital transformation in public services. In November 2018, the city of Paris hosted the
world’s first-ever GovTech Summit. This event reflects the dynamism of public entrepreneurs and startups
that imagine the government of tomorrow in certain advanced countries such as the United Kingdom,
France, and Canada. In 2017, the British government created a “GovTech catalyst” with a specific fund.
Government officials can use it to flag a problem that will be analyzed by private companies and start-
ups, and whose solutions can then be incubated. The idea is to encourage people to think differently and
to innovate the functioning of administrations, improve public services and reduce transaction costs.

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CONCLUSION

Some experiences around the world have shown that the approaches anti-corruption through the imple-
mentation of digitalization have had more success than global political discourses of moralization. This
last approach was not very effective in the case of Morocco. However, it seems that the approach of de-
veloping and encouraging the all-digital at the level of the civil service can mitigate the level of systemic
corruption such as that which is rife in Morocco. Corruption in developing countries is not the cause of
underdevelopment, but the consequence of a mode of global political and economic management that
has shaped the feeling of impunity for a very long time.
However, digital eruption and new technologies are not only disrupting our lives but also transform-
ing the public actions of governments. The latter, by becoming more digitally appropriate and adopting
digital innovations, are not only fighting corruption but also modernizing bureaucracy and rebuilding
the relationship with citizens, whose expectations are growing in terms of quality, speed and of integrity.
This process of digitization will inevitably go through the opening and publication of data, accountabil-
ity and rendering of accounts, the effective use of data, the adaptation of laws, the implementation of
appropriate applications and the encouragement of public-private partnerships for the implementation
of adapted technologies, and the installation of good applications in the service of the administration
and the taxpayers.
However, if digitalization has tremendous potential for moralizing and modernizing public action,
governments must still protect themselves against the new threats of the digital world. The digital shift
exposes people to piracy and falsification, even as citizens are becoming more and more sensitive to the
protection of their personal data. Social media algorithms and the dissemination of false information
can contribute to polarizing debates and influence the conduct of good procedures. In short, the digital
revolution brings hope, but it should not be approached with naivety.

DECLARATION

The author declares that the manuscript follows ethical standards and there are no potential conflicts of
interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this chapter.

DISCLAIMER

The contents and views of this chapter are expressed by the author in his personal capacity. It is not
necessary for the Editor and the Publisher to agree with these viewpoints, and they are not responsible
for any duty of care in this regard.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author extends sincere gratitude to

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• The Editor and the International Editorial Advisory Board (IEAB) of this book who initially desk
reviewed, arranged a rigorous double/triple blind review process, and conducted a thorough, minute,
and critical final review before accepting the chapter for publication.
• All anonymous reviewers who provided very constructive feedbacks for thorough revision, improve-
ment, extension, and fine tuning of the chapter.
• All colleagues, assistants and well-wishers who assisted to complete this task.

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ENDNOTES
1
Former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1856-1941).
2
F o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n s e e t h e Wo r l d B a n k w e b s i t e : https://
www.worldbank.org/en/events/2021/01/27/finding-fraud
#:~:text=Finding%20Fraud%20Event%20Replay&text=According%20t
o%20the%20United%20Nations,percent%20of%20annual%20global%20
GDP.

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