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Buying Citizenship? Chinese Golden Visa Migrants in Portugal

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doi: 10.1111/imig.12621

Buying Citizenship? Chinese Golden Visa

Migrants in Portugal

Sofia Gaspar* and Fernando Ampudia de Haro**

ABSTRACT

In 2011, Portugal launched a residence permit programme to attract foreign investment from
non-EU citizens, with Chinese business migrants representing those taking most advantage of
this initiative. This paper analyses this policy measure and assesses its social consequences, as
a new way that Chinese migrants have to enter Portugal. Firstly, we characterise this pro-
gramme by identifying its principles and legal requirements, using official data from 2012 to
2018. We then describe the emergence of this type of residence permit as a response to the
financial crisis of 2011, and as part of a neoliberal political rationality that has guided a gover-
nance model since this time. Next, we characterise the profile of Chinese citizens who benefit
from this initiative and claim residence permits on the basis of their economic power. Finally,
we discuss the social and political implications of this kind of entrance to Portugal, to provide
some insights for policymakers.

INTRODUCTION

Chinese migration to Europe has increased its rate of growth as the 21st century advances. Some of the
factors driving this rise in Chinese migration to the European Union (EU) relate to the reform of state-
owned enterprises in China, new China–Europe trade negotiations, the rise of not only communications
but also of inequalities in China, and the internationalisation of higher education systems (Wu and
Latham, 2014). Even while we may identify some common pathways, however, it is generally assumed
that Chinese migrants settled in Europe come from diverse origins and backgrounds and experience
specific patterns of integration in their respective host societies (Thunø, 2007; Gaspar, 2017).
Europe, and particularly the Schengen Area, has always been considered an attractive geopolitical
space, with important administrative and economic opportunities for economic migrants (Thunø,
2007). From the 1980s onwards, ‘new immigration countries’, such as Italy (Ceccagno, 2003), Spain
(Nieto, 2003) and France (Guerassimoff, 2003), have stimulated certain pull factors that have attracted
significant numbers of economic migrants, such as opportunities for self-employment, entrepreneurial
activities, amnesties and legalisation programmes for illegal citizens. During this time, Chinese
migrants have settled in these countries, with important social, political and economic consequences
for both Chinese communities and the host societies in which they have now become established.

* Instituto Universit
ario de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Investigacß~ao e Estudos de Sociologia (CIES-IUL),

Lisboa, Portugal
** Universidade Europeia/Instituto Universit
ario de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Investigacß~ao e Estudos de
Sociologia (CIES-IUL), Lisboa, Portugal
[Correction added on 25 July after first online publication: Article title has been corrected for clarity in this version]

© 2019 The Authors

International Migration © 2019 IOM
International Migration
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. ISSN 0020-7985
2 Gaspar and Ampudia de Haro

In Portugal specifically, the number of Chinese migrants has been growing consistently since the
1980s, and more steadily still since the turn of the century. Graph 1 exhibits the variation of Chi-
nese migration to Portugal between 1980 and 2017. As we can observe in the graph, if, in 1980,
there were a small number of Chinese citizens (244), 2000 onwards has seen a significant growth
in this community, with a total of 23,197 Chinese migrants officially registered in 2017:

FIGURE 1
VARIATIONS IN CHINESE MIGRATION TO PORTUGAL (1980-2017)

25000 23197
22503
2140221329

20000 18637
17447
16785
15699
14373
15000 13313

9689
10000 8081

5278 5551
4529 4810
5000 3953
3282
1232
244
0
1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: Portuguese immigration and border service (SEF, 2018b)

It is worthy of note that the origins of Chinese migrants in Portugal are diverse and they can be
distinguished by particular migratory flows, inscribed in specific historical and economic conditions
(Gaspar, 2017). One early flow emerged between 1975 and 1999, resultant from the relation
between Portugal and its former colonies (Mozambique and Macao), which promoted the migration
of Chinese, Mozambican and Macanese citizens during these decades. However, since the 2000s,
another migratory flow has emerged, one which is inscribed with the same migration philosophy of
other Southern European countries, attracting Chinese citizens from mainland China, mostly under-
skilled and from rural areas in search of better economic and entrepreneurial opportunities (i.e.,
economic migrants). More recently, from 2012 onwards, international Chinese students and Chinese
business migrants or foreigner investors, attracted by investor immigration programmes and fiscal
policies promoted by the Portuguese Government (in consonance with other European countries
also encouraging pro-foreign investment and business migration policies), have started dominating
Chinese migration to Portugal, transforming the socio-demographic map of Chinese communities in
the country (Gaspar, 2017, 2018; Rogers and Koh, 2017; Montezuma and McGarrigle, 2018).
The aim of this paper is to analyse this recent phenomenon, i.e., the emergence of Chinese
wealthy migrants, as a specific type of business migration – looking particularly at the rise of Chi-
nese nationals who have come to Portugal under the Residence Permit for Investors (ARI) pro-
gramme (also known as the Golden Visa scheme).1 The innovative nature of this paper lies in the
fact that it addresses a hitherto unexplored issue in Portugal (and in Europe), and it may help to
design policy measures and initiatives to consolidate Chinese and other foreign investment migra-
tion programmes.
The empirical data used in this paper is mostly employed to illustrate our arguments, and it
derives from both quantitative and qualitative sources. Institutional statistical data (2012–2018) has
been drawn from official reports on immigration and governmental policies provided by the Por-
tuguese Immigration and Border Service (SEF). Alongside this, qualitative data (semi-structured
interviews) have been used to support the theoretical and critical arguments presented in the text.

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

 Chinese golden visa migrants in Portugal 3

Interviews were undertaken with 25 privileged informants, e.g., Chinese-origin citizens living in
Lisbon and in direct contact with Chinese business migrants. All interviews were recorded and
received the informed consent of the interviewees. The interviewees were accessed by means of
snowball sampling, specifically via Chinese or migrant associations or through contact initiated by
other interviewees.
The paper starts by introducing the concept of capital business migration to Portugal as a
response to the financial crisis of 2011, and as part of a neoliberal political rationality emerging in
that economic context. In the next section, we characterise the group of Chinese business migrants
who claim residence permits on the basis of their economic power, as being part of a specific group
of Chinese citizens, albeit one that is also related to the Chinese community settled in Portugal. In
the final section, we discuss the political and social implications of golden visas as an economic
model that questions the traditional notion of citizenship and requires informed policy debates and
interventions.

THE EMERGENCE OF GOLDEN VISAS IN PORTUGAL: A RESPONSE TO THE

FINANCIAL CRISIS

Golden Visa residence permits constitute an initiative in which official residence can be exchanged
for an investment in the host country. Portugal has been offering this programme, to people who
meet the criteria, since 2012 (Ministerial Order 305-A/2012 of 4 October). This investment activity
applies to third country citizens as an individual businessperson or through a company based in
Portugal that can fulfil the mandatory requirements. Golden visas are granted mainly in return for
one of the following types of investment:

(a) Transfer of capital of one million euros or more;

(b) Creation of at least 10 jobs;
(c) Purchase of real estate to an amount of at least 500,000 euros;
(d) Purchase of real estate property for a total value equal to or above 350,000 euros and whose
construction dates back more than 30 years ago; additionally, the property must be located in
an urban rehabilitation area;
(e) Capital transfer with a value equal to or above 350,000 euros, for investing in research activities
developed by public or private research or technological institutions;
(f) Capital transfer with an equal value to or above 250,000 euros, for investing in artistic output
or supporting the arts, or for reconstructions or refurbishment of national heritage;
(g) Capital transfer of at least 350,000 euros, for the acquisition of units of investment funds or
‘venture capital fund of funds’ dedicated to the capitalisation of companies – that is, capital
injected under Portuguese legislation, whose maturity, at the moment of the investment, is of at
least 5 years and where at least 60% of the investment is realised in commercial companies
with a head office in the national territory;
(h) Capital transfer for at least 350,000 euros, for constitution of a commercial society with a head
office in the national territory, combined with the creation of five permanent working jobs; or
for the reinforcement of the share capital of a commercial society with a head office in the
national territory, already existing, with the creation or retention of working jobs (with a mini-
mum of five permanent jobs) and for a minimum period of 3 years.2

In exchange, a Golden Visa residence permit allows a third country national to obtain a tempo-
rary residence permit to develop their business activities, which comes with the following rights: a)
a residence visa waiver for entering Portugal; b) the need to stay in Portugal for only 7 days in the

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

4 Gaspar and Ampudia de Haro

first year of holding the permit, and for 14 days in each subsequent year; c) visa exemption for
travelling within the Schengen Area; d) family reunification; e) applying for a permanent residence
permit; and f) applying for Portuguese citizenship (SEF, 2018b).
Between 12 October 2012 and 31 October 2018, the total investment for golden visa was
4,078,353,443.74 euros. Table 1 (below) summarises the evolution of the programme since its
start:

TABLE 1
GOLDEN RESIDENCE PERMIT PROGRAMME (ARI) IN PORTUGAL (8TH OCTOBER 2012 TO 31TH
OCTOBER 2018)

Golden visas conceded for investors Total 6,687

2012 2
2013 494
2014 1,526
2015 766
2016 1,414
2017 1,351
2018 1,134
Golden visas conceded for family reunification (family total 11,370
members) 2012 0
2013 576
2014 2,395
2015 1,322
2016 2,344
2017 2,678
2018 2,055
By criteria (n) Purchasing real estate property 6,320
Transfering capital 355
Creating at least 10 jobs posi- 12
tions
Main nationalities China 3,981
Brasil 608
Sudafrica 265
Rusia 264
Turkey 232

Source: Portuguese immigration and border service (SEF, 2018a)

As we can see in the table, according to official numbers from the Portuguese Immigration and
Border Service (SEF, 2018a), a total of 6,687 ARIs were issued in Portugal from 8 October 2012
to 31 October 2018. According to these figures, 94.5% came from property investments in real
estate markets (6320), 5.3% from transferring capital (355) and only 0.17% from creating (at least
10) job positions (12). The concession of golden visas increased until 2014, and diminished in
2015 due to a well-publicised case of corruption.3 After this year, the rate of visas granted started
growing again and has since continued to do so.4 This upward trend runs in parallel regarding the
visas conceded for family members (family reunification) up to 31 October 2018, which totals
11,370. As mentioned in previous studies (Gaspar, 2018; Montezuma and McGarrigle, 2018: 12),
the concession of visas for household reunification can be an indication that golden visas’ investors
apply for a residence permit not only for investment purposes, but that they are also motivated by
factors such as lifestyle or children’s education.
The emergence of golden visas for investment in Portugal derived from a financial context of
austerity, in which a neoliberal political rationality defined governmental incentives to attract for-
eigner investment to the country. This programme cannot therefore be regarded according to tradi-
tional economic migration theories, mobilised by economic or workforce migration, in which

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

 Chinese golden visa migrants in Portugal 5

mobility is associated with people seeking work travelling to areas with surplus capital but a short-
age of workers (Borjas, 1994). ARI mobility does not fit such a model, as it entails the movement
of individuals with capital from one country to another.
The logic underlying Golden Visa residence permits lies in the idea of the internationalisation of
capital flows (Xu et al., 2015) that circulate in a globalised economy subject to conditions of com-
petition to attract investment between different states. This perspective appears to fit with the defi-
nition of capital-linked migration that, according to Tseng (2000), can be broken down into two
main components. The first component consists of business migration programmes, which are
intended to attract immigrants who are of special economic value due to their qualifications, invest-
ment potential or their ability to create new jobs (Walsh, 2011; Wong, 2003).
The second component is foreign direct investment (FDI), which involves placing a certain
amount of capital in a recipient economy, thereby creating new business structures or acquiring
holdings in existing concerns (Xu et al., 2015). When this capital arrives, it may or may not be
accompanied by investors who decide to set up residence in this new location. In other words, it is
a type of investment that may result in migratory processes, although the length of stay in a receiv-
ing country can be minimal, depending on legal and administrative requirements. In fact, residence
in the host country does not have to be produced, which may be a contradictory characteristic of
golden visas, since they allow the investor to ‘live’ in the country without the real necessity for it.
In this context, ARI residence permits are conceived according to competitive dynamics in order
to attract foreign capital, either to allow residence permits to settle (business migration) or to invest
financial capital with no need of residence (FDI).
In sum, due to the financial crisis in the USA in 2008 that has also caught Europe, as the sover-
eign debt crisis after 2010–2011, Portugal has experienced important economic and financial prob-
lems. These problems have been approached through austerity policies (Blyth, 2013), where the
main focus has been to reduce public expenditure, and to liberalise and privatise goods and services
as a means to recover finances and to increase competitiveness. In conjunction with public budget
reduction, the attraction of foreign investment has acquired an important centrality, as a way to
obtain financial resources. In this sense, the emergence of Golden Visa residence permits in Portu-
gal cannot be detached from and understood without looking at how it appeared in the context of
the financial crisis.
In fact, the structural opportunities developed by the Portuguese political system since 2012 have
enabled the establishment of a normative and legal context extremely stimulating for promoting
policy measures capable of supporting the ‘residence for investors’ dynamic. Indeed, Paulo Portas,
Minister of State and Foreigner Affairs in the XIX Constitutional Government (2011–2015),
directly defended and promoted the Golden Visa programme. His public discourse was illustrative
of the arguments used to justify such measures within a system of global competition to attract for-
eign investment. One year after the launch of ARI, Portas announced that the programme had net-
ted 306.7 million euros, with 471 visas issued – exceeding, by 100 million euros, his initial
predictions. This demonstrated that Portugal, within the international context, was considered an
interesting country in which to invest (Agencia Lusa, 2013). Some years on, a change of govern-
ment has not represented any shift in the programme. Under the XXI Constitutional Government,
led by the Socialist Party with the parliamentary support of Bloco de Esquerda and the Communist
Party, the Golden Visa programme has continued and the Government has made a positive analysis
of its development (Agencia Lusa, 2016).
Alongside this, Portugal has been competing with other Southern European countries for substan-
tial amounts of investment (Shachar and Baub€ ock, 2014; Ampudia de Haro and Gaspar, 2019). As
mentioned before, in these times of budget cuts, attracting foreign investment has taken the lime-
light as a way of obtaining resources, not only in Portugal but also in other states with financial
difficulties (such as Spain, Ireland, Greece and Malta). Therefore, the emergence of golden visas in
Portugal can only be understood within the context of the recent financial crisis and in direct

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

6 Gaspar and Ampudia de Haro

competition with other countries that apply residence permit programmes for investment for similar
reasons (Mesquita, 2014; Mendes, 2015).

CHINESE GOLDEN VISA CITIZENS AS PRIME INVESTORS

Chinese business migrants account for the majority of applications that are submitted for Golden
Visa residence permits in Portugal, with 3,981 granted thus far, constituting 60% of the total num-
ber of 6,687 permits issued (see Table 1). But who are the Chinese citizens who invest in Portugal
through business migration programmes, and what are their motivations for investing in the
country?
Research conducted by Montezuma and McGarrigle (2018) reveals a particular type of Chinese
investor who benefits from golden visas: the safe haven investor.5 This type of business migrant
aims to achieve safe investments for their money, as well as free intra-European mobility through-
out the Schengen Area, without the need to settle residence in the country in which the visa is con-
ceded. Therefore, the main impetus to apply for an investor immigration programme is economic
and financial: e.g., to expatriate capital to safe geopolitical environments; and, to have free mobility
status throughout Schengen, in order to increase economic and business opportunities in Europe.
As shown in Table 1, up to the period 31 October 2018, from the 6,687 visas issued, 6,320 had
been obtained through buying property in Portugal (SEF, 2018a). In fact, the number of property
investments represent 94.5% of the strategies developed to acquire a golden visa, and this phe-
nomenon must be considered in the wider context of the globalisation of the housing market,
occurring not only in Europe but also worldwide (Liu and Gurran, 2017; Rogers and Koh, 2017;
Montezuma and McGarrigle, 2018).
In most of cases, property investment by Chinese citizens in Portugal is conceived as an instru-
mental tool to obtain a residence permit, allowing them to park their money in a safe haven place
or to speculate their investment by renting property in exchange for solid annual yields. Most of
the time, housing acquisition is used for future migration purposes, and not to relocate. As Liu and
Gurran maintain, “demand for housing increasingly reflects the value of housing as a source of and
repository for wealth, rather than on demographic drives” (2017: 491). This situation contributes to
the expansion of companies that focus on selling and renting properties in Portugal, with the result-
ing profits paid out regularly to their clients. At this moment, several Portuguese or China-based
firms are flourishing and being developed to intermediate business migrants and real estate agen-
cies, most of them having Chinese-origin citizens working in them (first and second generation
migrants). These enterprises seek out Golden Visa investors who plan on monetising their capital
abroad, without any need for developing close social networks with native citizens or residing per-
manently in the host country, and they have a decisive role in structuring this business by interlink-
ing Chinese investors and local clients (Rogers and Koh, 2017; Gaspar, 2019). In this context,
research findings by Gaspar (2018, 2019) reveal how an emerging area of professional activity,
interlinked with experts in intermediary golden visas businesses, is growing among Chinese descen-
dants, who specially profit from their ‘in-between’ social position to mediate several highly skilled
services amid Chinese investors who are moving to Portugal. In fact, one of the most important
factors influencing these golden visa businesses among young Chinese is the high profits returned
by the real estate market, when compared to other professional activities that are not so profitable
and well-paid.6
The coexistence of different types of Chinese business migrants in Portugal, e.g., the safe haven
investor (super-wealthy Chinese individuals) and Chinese high-middle class housing investors for
lifestyle reasons (Montezuma and McGarrigle, 2018), has also been identified in other places.
According to Liu and Gurran (2017), those groups most actively investing in Australia’s real estate

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

 Chinese golden visa migrants in Portugal 7

market are Chinese high-net-worth individuals looking to secure their wealth and savings in hous-
ing assets and an emergent Chinese middle class looking for better education for their children and
improved life quality.
The diversity of Chinese investors abroad has to be considered a developing trend, involving a
migration and investment phenomenon that is complex. In fact, the Chinese international financiali-
sation of housing has been pushed by China’s anti-speculation housing policies between 2004 and
2014, as an attempt by the Chinese Government to decrease house-price speculation, through more
heavy taxation on property investments, less favourable mortgage conditions in second-home
houses, and the creation of new ‘purchase restrictions’ limiting the number of real estate invest-
ments any one individual can acquire (Liu and Gurran, 2017). In Liu and Gurran’s opinion (2017),
the domestic restrictions imposed on the Chinese housing market has contributed to an increase in
foreigner housing assets, such as the Australian, the North American and the European real estate
markets.
However, some research has pointed to reasons other than the economic and financial that con-
tribute towards Chinese citizens deciding to apply for an investment residence permit in Portugal –
particularly those related to lifestyle migration (Benson and O’Reilly, 2009; Xu and Wu, 2016), the
education of children, legal security, prestige and a desire for better environmental conditions (Bon-
gardt and Santos Neves, 2014; Gaspar, 2017, 2018; Montezuma and McGarrigle, 2018). In the case
of the Lisbon district, the coastal area of Cascais and Estoril is extremely attractive for acquiring
villas and houses on the sea front, with luxury shops and high-quality services, and surrounded by
international English-speaking schools prepared to admit transnational students of different national
backgrounds. Therefore, not only economic or financial factors motivate these investors but, simul-
taneously, those linked to lifestyle conditions, which are salient for Chinese citizens when deciding
to acquire a property to live in Portugal with their families.
Previous research (Gaspar, 2019) has reported that Chinese Golden Visa families moving to Por-
tugal normally comprise a married, heterosexual couple with young children. However, it is fre-
quent that, after buying a house and ensuring his wife and children are settled, the man returns to
China, where he has his business. This type of family arrangement among transnational Chinese
families (also referred to as ‘astronaut families’), in which one adult member returns to Asia shortly
after immigration and leaves the rest of the family in the destination country, have also been found
in other contexts. In the late 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, Ho (2002) and Waters (2003)
reported the existence of these distinctive forms of transnational households in New Zealand and
Canada, after the establishment of Business Immigration Programmes in these countries. Among
the reasons given by these Asian families for their migration were, predominantly, the search for
improved education and job opportunities for their children, and a better and safer lifestyle within a
Western social and cultural context. However, since then, ‘astronaut families’ have raised issues in
respect of the settlement of immigrant populations, since their cyclical migration between two or
more countries questions the belief that they make an effort to become permanent settlers in the
host country (Ho, 2002).
To summarise, the attraction of Portugal to Chinese investors or business migrants is articulated
according to a variety of different motives: a) legal and administrative security for foreign invest-
ments, political stability and predictability, as a source of reduction of uncertainty and risk; b) the
favourable context of reception offered to investors, in which the conditions provided by the coun-
try allow the reproduction of the individual’s investment and the assurance of profitability; c) taxa-
tion benefits and simplification of administrative procedures; d) clear regulations that eliminate
legal arbitrariness; e) the possibility of free movement through the Schengen Area, and conse-
quently, having the opportunity to operate in other European markets; and f) favourable lifestyle
conditions related to climate, children’s education, physical security, and culture.

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

8 Gaspar and Ampudia de Haro

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE BUSINESS MIGRATION

AND INVESTMENT IN PORTUGAL

What are the social and political implications of Golden Visa programmes as a new form of Chi-
nese migrant entry in Portugal? What is the public debate around this phenomenon? There are two
main arguments developed around this issue: a first related to the idea of ‘buying citizenship’, and
another one related to the idea that golden visas are linked to a wider dimension of Chinese global
investment in Portugal.
First of all, in terms of civic and political arguments, it is important to highlight some ideas
based on the notion that business migration is a strategy of ‘buying’ citizenship. The concept of cit-
izenship establishes a type of relation between an individual and the state, mediated by a series of
reciprocal rights and duties. The principal dimensions of citizenship imply: a) the will and possibil-
ity to participate in decisions relating to the community; b) equality of all citizens in the exercise
of their legal rights and duties; c) legitimacy of the institutions that guarantee the rights and duties
of citizens; d) a sense of belonging through residence in a community; and e) loyalty of citizens to
national institutions.
Citizenship does not depend on the material and economic conditions of the individual. That is,
citizenship is constructed at the margin of the economic status of each person. However, the
Golden Visa programme in Portugal reveals how certain dimensions of citizenship – in this particu-
lar case, the residence permit – are articulated through markets in the interests of the globalisation
of capital flows, being dissociated from territory and from the physical permanence of the foreign
migrant (Ong, 2006). It is important to recall here that in the Portuguese case, the holder of the
golden visa is only obliged to stay seven days in Portugal during the first year, and 14 days in the
second year onwards. This requirement detaches business migration (in which there is a need for
residence permanency) from FDI (in which there is no need for residence in the country).
This idea corresponds with what Walsh (2011) and Pel
aez and Sanz Abad (2014) remark on con-
cerning residence permit programmes for investment, in which we assist with different definitions
of citizenship according to the dynamics of such capital flows. Under golden visas, citizenship is
understood as a competitive advantage in line with an economic view of the citizen (Shachar and
Baub€ ock, 2014), in which citizenship is ‘bought’ through investment and not by the length of stay
in a receiving country (normally required for most economic immigrants to apply for citizenship or
to obtain other, related rights). As such, golden visas are directly related to an economic conception
of citizenship (Dzankic, 2012), in which the inclusion of individuals in a particular community is
accepted and valued if their cost of inclusion does not exceed the benefits that they can represent
to the state. In this perspective, citizenship can be understood as an instrument, in which migration
to a host country is accompanied by investment or other economic activities that do not represent a
financial burden to the state, particularly in times of crisis that demand a reduction of public
budget.
This instrumentalisation tends to put under suspicion the beneficiary of the golden visa, by break-
ing with the principle of equity towards the law for all citizens, since those citizens who do not
possess capital to invest (economic migrants) are excluded from this programme (Ong, 2006). In
fact, as mentioned earlier, golden visa citizens can get residence permits in a rapid and accessible
way, simplify certain administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms, ask for family reunification, and
acquire, more easily, permanent citizenship. As such, individuals are categorised according to their
capacity for investment, and their residence is justified by the added financial value that they bring
when investing in a receiving country.
This is the reason why the binding of a golden visa holder towards the host community is under-
stood as utilitarian, posing a risk for social integration: the lack of commitment or identification
attributed towards these residents is relevant, particularly in times of collective crisis, when the rest

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

 Chinese golden visa migrants in Portugal 9

of the population is asked to make sacrifices to overcome difficulties (Shachar and Baub€ ock, 2014).
This has been a central issue in Portugal, where the virulence of the aforementioned European eco-
nomic-financial crisis, initiated in 2011, resulted in impoverishment, unemployment, social depro-
tection and an impressive loss of purchasing power for several social classes. At the same time,
austerity policies have been accompanied by a political discourse legitimated by the Government,
emphasising the idea of frugality and collective effort, to overcome a demanding social conjuncture
(Ampudia de Haro, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Alonso et al., 2016).
A second issue crucial to analyse is the relation between golden visas and Chinese direct invest-
ment in Portugal (FDI). Between 2011 and 2015, Chinese investment reached 3.3% of GDP, and
went mostly to sectors such as banking (BCP, ICBC, Bank of China), energy7 (EDP, CTIEC,
REN), health (Luz Sa
ude), football (Start), insurance (Fidelidade), the media (KNJ, Global
Not
ıcias), transport (TAP), the real estate market (Level Constellation), and tourism (Villalobos,
2017). Although Chinese direct investment abroad is part of a wider strategy of financial and eco-
nomic globalisation, in the case of Portugal it has to be understood, as mentioned earlier, as part of
the financial context of austerity policies derived from the sovereign debt crisis of 2011. The pri-
vatisation of several national enterprises (EDP, REN, TAP) has attracted Chinese capital and invest-
ment to areas considered to be of national strategic importance (energy, health, transportation, mass
media). In fact, some opinions, supported by the media, have maintained that the Chinese state has
replaced the Portuguese state, at a time when Portugal cannot get financing in external financial
institutions and has been forced to sell national companies to foreign investors (Campos and Vice-
nte, 2016). Since the crisis, the Chinese have been the biggest investor in the Portuguese economy,
somewhat replacing the state in the rule of strategic sectors.
According to a report by Baker McKenzie (2017), Portugal stands at number 10 in a list of coun-
tries to have attracted Chinese investment between 2000 and 2017. During this period, there has
been a focus on three specific areas. The first of these is Chinese investment and financial domain
over big companies established within Portugal in strategic sectors of the economy (energy, bank,
health and security). In these situations, Chinese investors have been represented by enterprises
belonging to the Chinese Communist Party (state-owned enterprises – SOEs), but maintaining the
Portuguese CEO’s and the management structure of the company, since their goal is to acquire
some know-how and to learn about the management culture of the country. In fact, Chinese inves-
tors have typically bought companies with solid profits and a structured management, through
which they can get access and economic influence to European and US markets.
The second area under focus, meanwhile, is Chinese interest in the geostrategic role of Portugal
within China’s New Silk Route – particularly the Portuguese maritime route (ports of Sines and
Azores), which is the third biggest in Europe. In fact, the New Silk Route is a new conceptual
model conceived for global economic development and whose aim is to create free trade areas
between China and other countries that cooperate, by complementing their competitive advantages.
Therefore, cooperation in investment and trade is the main goal of this initiative, in which the free
market and the elimination of barriers to the circulation of capital are essential for expanding the
connection between the countries that comprise the route.
Finally, the third area of focus is the investment of Chinese citizens in Portuguese enterprises of
medium size. This type of investment has started to flourish with Portugal gaining visibility in
China, due to the capital transferred by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to Portuguese
national companies, and also because of the interest that the Golden Visa programme has evoked
among Chinese citizens wishing to invest in the Schengen Area. In these areas of investment, there
has been a diversification not only in real estate properties, but also in respect of other economic
activities linked to the enterprises of tourism, industry, football and wine (Lopes and Pinto, 2018).
In this context, what is the content of the public debates developed by policymakers and other
business managers around Chinese investment in Portugal? The main issue centres on the fact that
Chinese companies are directly or indirectly controlled by the Communist Party, posing questions

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

10 Gaspar and Ampudia de Haro

of national sovereignty, since Portuguese national issues could be indirectly controlled by a foreign
government. This opinion is shared by both right- (CDS-PP) and left-wing (BE) parties, which ask
for caution by the Government (Socialist Party) in opening the Portuguese economy to Chinese
investment, and recommend being aware of the influence that such investments can have on
national politics. However, left-wing parties (BE) are, in general, against private control, and are
more concerned about the public (Portuguese) domain of strategic sectors by enterprises being con-
trolled by Chinese SOEs; meanwhile, right-wing parties (CDS-PP) argue against foreign control of
these companies, and demand their management by national authorities.
This debate has wider echoes in Europe (particularly in the UK and in Germany), where eco-
nomic and political reciprocity between China and Europe is demanded. In fact, arguments here are
developed around the asymmetrical relationship between China and Europe, as stated in the report
of the German think tank GPPI, entitled Authoritarian Advance – Responding to Chinas’ Growing
Political Influence in Europe (Benner et al., 2018). In this report, it has been stated that China must
reduce its protectionist policy measures in order to allow European investment in the same vein to
that which Chinese companies (and the Chinese SOE) have made in Europe. These arguments are
also mentioned by Conrad and Kostka (2017), who highlight that Chinese outbound investments
are a manifestation of China’s state-led economic system, and that the Chinese Government contin-
ues to limit access for European investments in determinant sectors of its economy.
However, Chinese foreign investment in Portugal and Europe is also seen as advantageous by
certain policymakers and business persons. At a time when Portugal has needed investment and
capital, Chinese outbound investments have helped to re-start some sectors of the economy after
the financial crisis, have saved several companies from bankruptcy, have saved jobs, and have
started to create a Portuguese–China bilateral relationship that is beneficial for both parts. As such,
China is also understood as an important global investor that offers economic and financial benefits
and political partnership for Portugal.
In sum, the social and political implications of the rise of golden visas conceded to Chinese citi-
zens is derived from the possibility of acquiring and ‘buying’ citizenship and residence permits to
settle or move in Portugal and Europe (Schengen Area), and it is also connected to a wider dimen-
sion of FDI by Chinese companies in Portugal after the 2011 financial crisis.

CONCLUSION

Since 1975, Portugal has been receiving Chinese migrants, whose evolution has been constant over
the years but marked by different flows dependent on historical, political and economic specifici-
ties. The first flow of Chinese migrants (1975-1999) mainly comprised individuals of Chinese
Mozambican and Macanese background, who entered the country due to their political position in
former Portuguese colonies (Mozambique and Macao). After the 2000s, a new migration flow
emerged, of Chinese economic migrants, part of the same trend of unskilled migration that charac-
terised Southern European countries. More recently, from 2012 onwards, Chinese business migrants
and Chinese investors have started to arrive through investor immigration programmes conceded by
the Portuguese Government (the Golden Visa scheme). The aim of this paper has been to analyse
this most recent way of Chinese migrants (and investors) gaining entrance to Portugal, by looking
to some particular issues associated with this trend:

(a) For several years now, policy programmes like the Golden Visa scheme have been adopted by
numerous states (European and non-European). The structuring principles are identical and diver-
gences are based on particular aspects: administrative procedures; volume of investment achieved;
durability; and additional possibilities related to naturalisation or citizenship. All these principles

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

 Chinese golden visa migrants in Portugal 11

and requirements should be transparent to every citizen who wishes to apply for it. In the case of
Portugal, we attest that the official sources related to the Golden Visa programme are clear and
transparent. Portugal has provided data easily accessible to each citizen interested in this question,
based on official and reliable sources, even during and after the case of corruption that eroded pub-
lic trust in 2014. As we showed in Table 1, the level of aggregation of Portuguese data related to
golden visas allows a global vision of the phenomenon in relation to certain key variables, such as
the number of concessions, criteria of concession, volume of investment captured, main nationali-
ties who apply for visas, and processes of family reunification.
(b) At an international level, the Portuguese Golden Visa programme integrates into globalisation
of capital flows and builds on the competitive dynamics that have been established to advance
its appeal to migrants/investors. More specifically, this programme was intended to smooth the
economic-financial difficulties provoked by the sub-prime crisis initiated in the USA in 2008
and transferred to Europe as the sovereignty debt crisis in 2011. The denominated policies of
austerity in Portugal and elsewhere in Europe, with its accent on the reduction of public
expenditure and on the contraction of economy as a means of once again achieving expansion,
had contributed to the search for forms of investment that do not generate a burden for the
welfare state. Within this context, Chinese direct investment was the most important source in
injecting capital within strategic sectors of the Portuguese economy and to enable beneficiaries
of the Golden Visa residence permit to migrate or circulate through Europe.
(c) The factors attracting Chinese citizens to apply for golden visas are not only those related to
financial investment and the possibility of creating business throughout the Schengen Area, but
also others linked to children’s education, lifestyle quality and the search for a Western/Euro-
pean cultural environment. In fact, if some Chinese golden visa holders have been denominated
safe haven investors, given that they are driven by expatriating money and applying it in hous-
ing investments, other types of Chinese investor belong to an emerging middle-class wishing to
settle in European countries where they can raise their children according to high standards of
life quality. Moreover, these Chinese transnational families are reproducing the same type of
household arrangements (‘astronaut families’) previously found in highly skilled Chinese fami-
lies in Canada or New Zealand.
(d) A final issue considered in this paper has concerned the social and political implications associ-
ated with the Golden Visa programme. First of all, this type of residence permit is the ‘expo-
nent’ of a type of neoliberal political rationality in which a notion of economic citizenship is
advocated that justifies affording preference to certain individuals who have capital. Institution-
ally, this type of citizenship is favoured by the state, as a basic core of the dynamisation of the
golden visa market that wants to attract investors and business migrants in which transparency
is the means to legitimate the rigorous nature of the programme. However, the political and
civic effects include the risk of the mercantilisation of central aspects of this type of citizenship.
One of these aspects is residence, which is related to notions of community, social cohesion
and participation. At the same time, this citizenship is articulated according to the dynamics of
the market, a situation that introduces inequalities in the relationship between the state and citi-
zens, based on the economic value that each individual brings to the country, and that nega-
tively affects the level of legitimacy that citizens attribute to institutions.

A second social and political implication is linked to the public debate around a wider dimension
of Chinese global investment in Portugal (Chinese FDI), which became prominent after 2011. If
certain sectors of policymakers and business persons are concerned about the domain that Chinese
SEOs hold in Portuguese sectors of the national economy, and the unfair competition and the eco-
nomic risks to the national security that this conveys, other parts of the public and private sectors

© 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM

12 Gaspar and Ampudia de Haro

look to the benefits that Chinese investment have brought to the Portuguese economy in a time
when capital and financial investment was needed to re-start the economic growth of the country.
In the future, some policy considerations and interventions are needed to consolidate and super-
vise the course of the Golden Visa programme. It is fundamental to explore the motivations of Chi-
nese business migrants in applying for golden visas, and to look to their social integration in
Portugal, not only within the Chinese migrant community but also within Portuguese society. Addi-
tionally, policymakers and public representatives should continue to conduct strict supervision of
the implementation of the Golden Visa scheme, in order to prevent corruption and other illegal
practices from the actors involved. Finally, the official statistics that are provided monthly by pub-
lic institutions, on the evolution of the programme, should be regularly disseminated through the
mass media, in order to increase social consciousness and awareness concerning this residence per-
mit policy.

NOTES

1. In this paper, we will use these names interchangeably.

2. Golden Visa residence permits are legislated by the following laws: Act 23/2007 of July 4, amended by
Act 29/2012 of August 9; Act 63/2015 of 30 June; and Act 59/2017 of 31 July.
3. In November 2014, Operation Labyrinth (Operacß~ao Labirinto) began, in which 11 members were arrested,
including high employees of the state, on suspicion of corruption, influence peddling, and money laundering
in the process of conceding ARIs. This case motivated the resignation of the Minister of Internal Affairs,
Miguel Macedo, and the temporary suspension of the Golden Visa programme. Public debate and the mass
media have focused on the reputation of the country, fearing that this case would damage Portugal as a
space for foreign investment. However, the programme would be subsequently reactivated, in March 2015.
4. The information for 2018 is still not complete, relating to data only up to 31 October 2018.
5. The other two types of investors whose profile was identified by the authors are the safe haven lifestyle and
the lifestyle income optimiser. The first type includes intra-EU movers, who ask for a permit residency in
Portugal in order to benefit from a lower tax jurisdiction to increase their consumption and quality of life-
style. The second type involves Brazilian homebuyers, who wish to share environmental, cultural and lin-
guistic affinities with the Portuguese (Montezuma and McGarrigle, 2018).
6. The commissions paid to intermediaries on the real estate market can reach 5% of the total price paid for a
house. Therefore, a real estate agent or enterprise can receive around 25,000 euros of the total commission
for selling a house for 500,000 euros (the minimum price demanded to obtain a golden visa).
7. Chinese FDI in the energy sector in Europe has been widely analysed. For an overview, see Conrad and
Kostka (2017); and for an insight on Southern European countries, see Pareja-Alcaraz (2017).

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