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Object
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Stanford Encyclopedia One task of metaphysics is to carve reality into categories.[1] Some things
could have failed to exist; they fall under the category contingent being.
of Philosophy Some are events; they fall under event. And so on. One might well wonder
—is there a category under which every thing falls? Offering an
informative account of such a category is no easy task. For nothing would
distinguish things that fall under it from those that don’t—there being,
after all, none of the latter. It seems hard, then, to say much about any
fully general category; and it would appear to do no carving or
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
categorizing or dividing at all. Nonetheless there are candidates for such a
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor
fully general office, including thing, being, entity, item, existent, and—
Editorial Board
[Link] especially—object.[2]

Library of Congress Catalog Data It is not obvious that there is any fully general category (whether object or
ISSN: 1095-5054
otherwise). Accordingly, not all accounts of object assign it to a fully
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- general category, instead allowing that there are non-objects. On those
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP views, object does indeed divide.
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distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the Accounts of object, then, differ with respect to whether there are non-
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, objects. And this is not the only fault line. Other dimensions of difference
please visit [Link] . include what objects there are and what objects are. Accordingly, this
entry will survey three broad questions about the category object:
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Copyright c 2017 by the publisher i. What, if any, is its contrast or complement?
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Center for the Study of Language and Information ii. What is its extension?
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 iii. What is its nature?
Object
Copyright c 2017 by the authors Each of these questions admits of various specifications and answers that
Bradley Rettler and Andrew M. Bailey we will consider in turn. Our focus will be largely theoretical and
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1
 Object Bradley Rettler and Andrew M. Bailey

taxonomical, so we will only occasionally refer to historical sources. Our Bibliography

topic is abstract and broad, and touches on a number of issues in Academic Tools
metaphysics that already enjoy coverage in this Encyclopedia. Our Other Internet Resources
discussion of such topics will be brief; in those cases, we will recommend Related Entries
consultation of the extant entries for a more detailed treatment.

1. Contrast 1. Contrast
1.1 No Contrast: the Umbrella View
1.2 Contrast: Objects vs. Properties The Contrast Question, as we shall call it, is this: what, if any, is the
1.2.1 Objects are Subjects; Properties are Predicates contrast or complement of the category object? With what, exactly, are
1.2.2 Objects are in Space and Time; Properties are Not objects to be contrasted? Put differently, are there non-objects, and if so,
1.2.3 Objects are Singly-Located; Properties May Multiply what kinds of things are they? Some related questions: if there are non-
Locate objects, do they form a natural class or collection? What might that class
1.2.4 Objects are Concrete; Properties are Abstract or collection be?
1.2.5 Objects don’t obey the Identity of Indiscernibles;
properties do 1.1 No Contrast: the Umbrella View
1.2.6 Objects are Sense-Perceptible; Properties are Not
On one natural reading, the Contrast Question admits of an easy answer;
1.2.7 Objects are Uninstantiated; Properties are Instantiated
fix—perhaps by stipulation—the content of ‘object’ and it will be obvious
1.3 Contrast: Objects vs. Subjects
whether there are non-objects. Unsurprisingly, then, some philosophers
2. Extension
suppose that there is a fully general category and simply define ‘object’ as
2.1 The Ontological Question
picking it out. On this Umbrella View, as we shall call it, every thing is an
2.1.1 Existence Nihilism
object (perhaps by definition of ‘object’) and the category has no contrast
2.1.2 Existence Monism
—or, if it has a contrast or complement, the contrast is unfilled and the
2.1.3 Existence Pluralism
complement unrealized.
2.2 The Extension Question
2.2.1 Ordinary Objects Is the Umbrella View true? Dispute here may appear merely verbal, to
2.2.2 Special Composition Question merely concern how to use the word ‘object’.[3] This is not quite right,
3. Nature however. So to clarify: the Umbrella View involves both a substantive
3.1 What Objects Do metaphysical thesis and a semantic thesis. The metaphysical thesis is that
3.2 What Objects Are there is a maximally general ontological category under which all things
3.2.1 Constituent Ontologies fall. The semantic thesis is that ‘object’—perhaps as a matter of stipulation
3.2.2 Relational Ontologies

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—picks out this maximally general category. Disputes over the Umbrella And Russell:
View, then, are merely verbal in part. They are merely verbal insofar as
they concern the semantic thesis. But disputes over the metaphysical thesis I shall use as synonymous with [‘term’] the words unit, individual
need not be—and in our view are not—merely verbal; they do not concern and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one,
the English word ‘object’, but rather concern the existence and extent of a while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being,
wholly general ontological category. i.e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a
relation, a chimera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure
Note, too, that the component theses of the Umbrella View are logically to be a term (1903: 43)
independent. First, the semantic thesis does not entail the metaphysical
thesis any more than the semantic thesis that ‘God’—by definition—picks And Strawson:
out a maximally great being entails the metaphysical thesis that there is
Anything whatever can be introduced into discussion by means of
indeed such a being. Second, the metaphysical thesis does not entail the
a singular, definitely identifying substantival expression….
semantic thesis; that there is a maximally general category does not entail
Anything whatever can be identifyingly referred to; anything
that it is picked out by any word at all, much less the English word
whatever can appear as a logical subject, an ‘individual’. (1959:
‘object’.
137, 227)
A consequence of the Umbrella View is that items that appear to have little
Finally, Tugendhat:
in common—universals, particulars, gods, books, possibilities, colleges,
works of music (if such there are)—are in fact all united under one Now what is meant by the word ‘object’? This word too, in the
category: object. comprehensive sense in which it is used in philosophy, is a term of
art. In ordinary language we are inclined to call only material
To be sure, not all who endorse the Umbrella View deploy the English
objects… objects, and not e.g. events or numbers… What is meant
word ‘object’ in explicating the view. Other candidates for the fully
by ‘objects’ in philosophy has its basis in … what we mean by the
general office, instead, make an appearance. So Lowe:
word ‘something’… There is a class of linguistic expressions
‘Thing’, in its most general sense, is interchangeable with ‘entity’ which are used to stand for an object; and here we can only say: to
or ‘being’ and is applicable to any item whose existence is stand for something. These are the expressions which can function
acknowledged by a system of ontology, whether that item be as the sentence-subject in so-called singular predicative statements
particular, universal, abstract, or concrete. In this sense, not only and which in logic have also been called singular terms… (1976
material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, [1982, 21–23])
and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be
Although they differ on which English word to assign to that category
accounted ‘things’. (2005: 915)
(i.e., ‘thing’, ‘term’, or ‘individual’, ‘something’), Lowe, Russell,

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Strawson, and Tugendhat all accept a fully general category under which If there are non-objects, some obvious topics to pursue include what they
all items fall and suppose that some word picks out that category. They are and what they are like. Here we may appeal to various distinctions
accept, then, the Umbrella View. metaphysicians have offered across disparate projects. These distinctions
may not map precisely onto an object/non-object divide and may not have
Some features of the Umbrella View deserve explicit attention. been formulated explicitly in those terms. But they can still offer insight
into what the contrast or complement of object might be and in turn shed
On the Umbrella View, it is unlikely that object can be analyzed in more
light on what the category of object might amount to.
fundamental terms or categories, especially if analysis of a condition or
category involves specifying the complement of that condition. Object is, We will now survey several such distinctions; in each case there is a
rather, a primitive of sorts. Frege affirms something along these lines when purportedly exclusive and exhaustive classification of items into two non-
he notes of ‘object’ that “a regular definition is impossible, since we have empty categories, one of which intuitively maps onto object and the other
here something too simple to admit of logical analysis” (1891 [1960: 32]). onto non-object.
But it does not follow from the Umbrella View that nothing at all can be
1.2 Contrast: Objects vs. Properties
said about the category object. For the above proponents of the Umbrella
View, there is clearly a connection between being an object and being a Consider these platitudes: there are things, and there are ways those things
candidate for reference (see entry) or thought—something that can be are (we might call the latter ‘properties’). There appear to be, for example,
referred to or thought about (witness Russell’s use of ‘term’ above, for tall trees; there also appear to be properties had by those trees, such as
example). We will discuss this connection—and the account of the nature being tall.[5] There appear to be, again, both things and properties.
of object that it suggests—in more detail in §3.1. Perhaps there is, then, an important distinction between things and
properties. And if there is such a distinction, it would appear to mark an
Finally, note that there may be reason to be wary of any fully general
important metaphysical divide. For it operates at a very high level of
category (whether expressed by ‘object’, ‘thing’, ‘entity’, or whatnot.).
abstraction and promises to exhaustively and exclusively divide reality
There may be reason, that is, to doubt the metaphysical conjunct of the
into categories—with trees, people, planets (for example) falling under
Umbrella View. First and perhaps most importantly, there are paradoxes
thing and green, tall, itchy, and kind (for example) falling under property.
and puzzles associated with talking about. or ‘quantifying over’, literally
The thesis that there is such a divide, we note, is distinct from purely
every thing.[4] Second, any fully general category lacks a contrast or
semantic theses about whether to use the words ‘object’ and ‘property’ to
complement. So it may appear to be idle with respect to classification or
pick out each side of that divide. Our focus here is on the metaphysical
carving or dividing—the central theoretical tasks of categories, one might
question of whether there is such a contrast in the first place, not on which
think—thus inviting suspicion on the grounds that it is of no theoretical
words might express it.
use.
Here’s how Armstrong expresses the intuitive contrast:

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It is natural to distinguish a thing, an individual, a token, from any We have thus a division of all entities into two classes: (1)
particular properties that the thing happens to have. The table is particulars, which enter into complexes only as the subjects of
hard, brown, rectangular, and so on. But it is not identical with its predicates or the terms of relations, and, if they belong to the world
hardness, brownness, rectangularity. These properties are rather of which we have experience, exist in time, and cannot occupy
naturally taken to be things it merely has… With things and more than one place at one time in the space to which they belong;
properties thus distinguished, even if very intimately connected, (2) universals, which can occur as predicates or relations in
we have what may be called a substance-attribute view. (1989: 60) complexes, do not exist in time, and have no relation to one place
which they may not simultaneously have to another. (1911: 23–24)
These platitudes and the close connection we have already observed
between object and thing suggest a hypothesis: perhaps the object/non- Russell’s remarks suggest at least three explications of the object/property
object distinction just is the thing/property distinction. One intriguing distinction—in terms of subject/predicate structure, existence in space and
consequence of this identity hypothesis is that informative content may time, and multiple-location. We will consider these three theories in that
given to the object/non-object divide—namely, by appeal to informative order, and then some others that have been offered.[6]
theories about the thing/property divide.
1.2.1 Objects are Subjects; Properties are Predicates
With this identity hypothesis in mind, we will now survey some theories
about what the thing/property distinction might amount to and how exactly One way to make the distinction between objects and properties is to look
it divides reality. to expressions that refer to them. In first-order logic, there are (among
other things) subjects and predicates. And predicates are predicated of
Our topic in this section is the thing/property or object/non-object subjects. Following Aristotle’s remarks on substance (Categories 1a20–
(henceforth, the ‘object/property’) distinction—as opposed to the precise 4b19; see also the section on category theory in the entry on Aristotle and
nature of either objects (see §3) or properties. We will thus elide some the entry on classical logic), Russell (1911) thought that these
terminological details. Instead of treating only theories of the logical/linguistic reasons were the most persuasive reasons for positing an
object/property distinction phrased precisely in those terms, we will object/property distinction. He says:
canvas several attempts to make sense of other nearby distinctions as well
—most notably the substance/attribute distinction and the Predication is a relation involving a fundamental logical difference
universal/particular distinction. between its two terms. Predicates may themselves have predicates,
but the predicates of predicates will be radically different from the
Russell offers a classic treatment of the object/property (in his hands, the predicates of substances. (1911: 23)[7]
‘particular/universal’) divide and various ways in which it may be
described: So, on this way of marking the contrast, objects can be referred to only by
subjects, and properties can be referred to by subjects or predicates.

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1.2.2 Objects are in Space and Time; Properties are Not are concrete and others are abstract. Some have it that there are concrete
objects and abstract objects (see entry). The former are usually described
Perhaps there is a particular shade of red that no object has right now, but as material and having causal powers (see entry on the metaphysics of
some objects had and other objects will have. If there is such a shade of causation), while the latter are usually thought to immaterial and lack
red—if it didn’t go out of existence when the last object that had it stopped causal powers. While usually the latter are classified as objects, it is a
having it—one naturally wonders where it is. And a natural answer is that sensible view that the concrete things are objects, and the abstracta are
it isn’t (and has never been nor ever will be) anywhere. More generally, otherwise.
universals are nowhere. Objects, by contrast, are somewhere; they are to
be found within space and time, and in this respect stand in stark and But the concrete/abstract distinction seems no more perspicuous than the
categorial contrast to universals.[8] object/property distinction, and itself cries out for explication. Nearly
everyone can agree on the things that belong in each category, but
1.2.3 Objects are Singly-Located; Properties May Multiply Locate precisely in virtue of what they belong in that category remains a matter of
debate. Perhaps this is a reason to rest content with thinking of the
It seems that many properties are shared among objects. Our copies of object/property distinction as the abstract/concrete distinction. The latter
Objects: Nothing out of the Ordinary are the same shape, and the gold hue seems intuitive, and resists analysis in more fundamental terms.[10]
of Knute Rockne’s helmet is the same as Joe Montana’s. But there isn’t
just one copy of Objects: Nothing out of the Ordinary that is multiply 1.2.5 Objects don’t obey the Identity of Indiscernibles; properties do
located; there are many copies that share a shape. There isn’t one Notre
Dame football helmet; there are hundreds. The books and helmets are Two laws are associated with Leibniz. The first is the Indiscernibility of
many; each of their properties is, perhaps, one. Identicals: for any two objects, if they’re identical, then any property that
one has, the other has. The second is the Identity of Indiscernibles (see
So one might make the distinction between objects and properties. Objects entry): for any two objects, if it’s the case that for any property one has,
are restricted to one space-time region, while properties are not. Most the other has it, then the objects are identical.
objects will occupy many space-time regions by having parts at those
regions, though. So it is better to say that objects can be wholly located at The Indiscernibility of Identicals is pretty much universally accepted. The
only one region, while properties can be wholly located at many disjoint Identity of Indiscernibles is controversial. The Identity of Indiscernibles
regions.[9] seems to entail, for example, that there cannot be two spheres that have the
same color, shape, and density, and have all their other properties in
1.2.4 Objects are Concrete; Properties are Abstract common as well.

Another attempt to analyze the object/property distinction is to subsume it Many people think there can be two exactly similar spheres. But it doesn’t
under the concrete/abstract distinction. According to some, some things seem that there could be two exactly similar properties of sphericality that

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aren’t identical. Properties, one might think, are individuated by their metaphysical correlate of the linguistic view discussed in §1.2.1. and
properties, whereas objects are individuated by some further thing. If a enjoys similar motivations. Instantiation is generally taken as primitive,
property has all the same properties as another, then the two are identical. but some things can be said about it. On one view, it’s a two-place relation
(see entry on relations), and the relata are an object and a property, or a
This is one way of marking the distinction. The Indiscernibility of property and a property. On another view, it’s a “non-relational tie” that
Identicals is true of properties, but false of objects. “glues” properties to objects and other properties (see, e.g., Strawson
1959). Objects can only be the things that instantiate; they cannot be
1.2.6 Objects are Sense-Perceptible; Properties are Not
instantiated. Properties, by contrast, can both instantiate and be
instantiated.
Strawson marks the distinction in the following way:

There is, for example, the suggestion that general, unlike 1.3 Contrast: Objects vs. Subjects
particular, things cannot be perceived by means of the senses… It
In surveying the possible contrasts or complements of object, we have thus
is not with the eyes that one is said to see hope. But one can quite
far emphasized the intuitive grouping of items into categories like object
literally smell blood or bacon, watch cricket, hear music or
(substance, individual, particular, etc.) on the one hand and property (or
thunder. (1954: 235)
attribute, universal, feature, etc.) on the other. These are standard
So properties (like hope) are the things that cannot be perceived, and metaphysical categories, and they suggest that the proper contrast or
objects (like bacon) are the things can be perceived. Presumably every complement of object includes properties or other property-like items.
thing is such that either it can be perceived or it can’t be, and nothing both
But there is another compelling usage (both in and out of philosophy) of
can be perceived and can’t, so the division is exclusive and exhaustive.
the English word ‘object’ and its cognates that suggests a rather different
But bacon also has a color and a shape, which seem to be perceived when kind of contrast. Here, the divide is between object and subject. Each
one perceives bacon. One who marks the distinction this way must say object is, roughly, an ‘it’, and each subject is a ‘you’. On this usage, it is
that we perceive only the bacon, and not its color and shape. But why do items like us that stand in contrast to objects. We are subjects; trees,
we believe that the bacon is rectangular, if we don’t see its rectangularity? universals, colleges, colors, and—well, all things not like us in relevant
Presumably we believe it because we perceive the bacon, and the bacon is respects—are objects.
rectangular.[11]
But what are the relevant respects that group us together to the exclusion
of trees, universals, colleges, and colors? Here the answer must involve
1.2.7 Objects are Uninstantiated; Properties are Instantiated
subjectivity or experience. To be a subject in this sense is, roughly, to
The final view of the object/property contrast to consider is the view that experience or to be conscious (see entry). We are subjects because we
properties are instantiated, and objects are not. This is, as it were, a experience or enjoy consciousness. But what is it to be an object and not a

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subject in the sense at hand? Reflection on this question suggests two One question to ask about the category of object is to ask what falls under
answers and thus uncovers two rather different subject/object divides. it—what is in its extension? This is the Extension Question. The extension
They differ in what category they assign to object and thus in what they of some categories is obvious. The extension of the category electron is all
contrast with subject. the electrons and no non-electrons. The extension of the category number
is all and only the numbers. The extension of the category composite
On the first divide, the relevant objectual category is just the complement things is all and only the things that have proper parts.[12] For some
of subject; to be an object, then, is to neither experience nor be conscious. categories, difficult questions arise. Some of those questions involve the
You are a subject and so am I. But an unfeeling rock is not, and so it is an question of whether certain things are in the extension of the category,
object. Since every thing would appear to be either a subject in the e.g., is the Pope in the extension of the category bachelor? Is a fetus in the
relevant sense or not, this divide would appear to exhaustively and extension of the category person? Some questions concern the nature of
exclusively classify reality. the things falling under the category. The extension of the category book
includes all and only the books. Does it include ebooks? Does it include
On the second divide, the relevant objectual category is object of
some particular and well-loved copy of Material Beings, with its stained
experience, or what is experienced (see entry on the contents of
pages and cover, or the abstract type of which this particular copy is a
perception). You—a subject—plunge your hand into a bucket of ice water.
token? Answering the Extension Question leaves many other questions
You feel just how cold the water—the object of your experience—is. As
unsettled, one of which is the nature of the things that are in the extension.
Bliss puts things:
But knowing which things are in the extension is a good start toward
The subject is that to which objects appear, have appeared, or may figuring out their nature.
appear… The object, existing external to and independent of
So, one important question to ask of the category object is which things
subjects, may appear to any subject that is so qualified and so
are in its extension. This question will admit a variety of answers. And
related as to apprehend it. (1917: 406–408, emphasis original)
depending on whether there is a contrast class, it will have a variety of
This second subject/object divide would appear to be neither exhaustive interpretations. If object has no contrast class and every thing is in its
nor exclusive; a subject may also be the object of experience (whether her extension—if both the metaphysical and semantic theses of the Umbrella
own or someone else’s), and some items may well be neither experiencers View are correct—then the question of the extension of object is
nor objects of experience (an unfeeling star outside the light cone of any equivalent to the ontological question (see below). If object has a contrast
subject, for example). class—if at least one of the metaphysical and semantic theses of the
Umbrella View is false—then the question of the extension of object is not
We note, finally, that these specifications of an object/non-object equivalent to the ontological question. Instead, it asks, “Of all the things
distinction are not in competition with the other surveyed above. there are, which ones are the objects?” If the contrast class of object is
property, then the Extension Question is, “What things are there that aren’t
2. Extension properties?” If the contrast class is universal, the question is, “What things

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are there that aren’t universals?” If the contrast class hasn’t been specified, clear whether anyone sincerely endorses the thesis that there is nothing.
and one is starting from what ordinary people accept, then the Extension However, it has been defended several times over.
Question is, “What ordinary objects are there?”
Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) speak for the nihilist thus: “the concept of
2.1 The Ontological Question an object has no place in a perspicuous characterization of reality” (p.
143). They suggest three theories on which there are no objects. The first
It widely-held that a central question in ontology—what is often called that there are just stuffs everywhere, but no objects. The second that there
‘the ontological question’—is “What is there?” Though many have asked is just one big mass of stuff.[14] The third is that there just isn’t anything at
this question, it was Quine (1948) who drew explicit attention to it. He all. This last option is what Hawthorne and Cortens defend. They do so
also said it could be answered in one word—“everything”.[13] using what they (following Strawson) call a “feature-placing language”.
They model a potential nihilist program on sentences like “it is raining”,
If the answer to the ontological question is ‘everything’, if there is a
“it is snowing now”, and “it is cold here”. Such sentences do not quantify
category under which all things fall and if that category is picked out by
over anything and have no logical subject (‘it’ functions as a dummy
‘object’ by definition (as per the Umbrella View), then there is one shared
pronoun), and so do not ontologically commit one to anything. The nihilist
answer to both the extension and the ontological questions. This is one
may then paraphrase sentences that apparently require objects (such as
consequence of the Umbrella View. But it might turn out that every thing
“there is a computer here”) with those that do not (such as “it is
is an object, even if not by definition. A physicalism according to which
computering here”). In short, the nihilist turns every putative noun into an
every thing is a material object, for example, would appear to entail that
adverb, making judicious use of spatial, temporal, and numerical adverbs
every thing is an object. But this entailment need not hold because of the
too.
definition of ‘object’; it might hold, instead, on substantive and general
theoretical grounds having nothing to do with definitions at all. Turner (2011) agrees with Hawthorne and Cortens that the chief task of
the ontological nihilist is to give paraphrases of ordinary language that
The point is this: on at least the Umbrella View, answering the ontological
don’t contain quantification over objects:
question is closely related, if not identical, to answering the Extension
Question. We will therefore briefly survey several highly abstract answers With this in mind, we demand the following of our Ontological
to the ontological question, with the understanding that many will think Nihilist: give us a systematic recipe for taking any sentence of a
that by giving such an answer, they are thereby answering the Extension first-order language (with predicates assumed to be predicates of
Question. our best science) and cooking up the ontologically innocent claim
it was supposed to be getting at all along. (2011: 11)
2.1.1 Existence Nihilism
These strategies by which to eliminate object-talk suggest a defensive
Perhaps the most surprising answer to the ontological question is move available to nihilists: paraphrase apparently true sentences that
‘Nothing’, according to which the extension of object is empty. It’s not

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appear to require objects into sentences that do not. Such a strategy may quantify, or one can give a translation of every intuitively true sentence of
neutralize objections to nihilism. But another question remains; is there first-order logic into another language that doesn’t quantify over objects,
reason to affirm nihilism in the first place? then ontological nihilism is vindicated. That is, if one can give an
“ontologically innocent” (that is, one that doesn’t quantify over anything)
One such reason may derive from nihilism’s economy. Dasgupta (2009) paraphrase of every sentence, or a scheme for so doing, then ontological
thinks that objects (he calls them “individuals”) are physically redundant nihilism is on good footing.
and empirically undetectable. More precisely, he thinks that every physical
theory considered over the past 400 years entails that objects are 2.1.2 Existence Monism
physically redundant and empirically undetectable. They’re empirically
undetectable because two situations differing only in their individualistic Existence Monism, chiefly sponsored in recent times by Horgan and Potrč,
facts are indistinguishable. And they’re physically redundant because two says that there is exactly one object.[15] (Or at least, exactly one concrete
systems that only differ with respect to their individualistic facts will object, or one concrete physical object.) The one thing (which Horgan and
continue to only differ with respect to those facts. And given two theories Potrč call ‘the blobject’) is huge, and very complex, though it does not
—the only difference between the two being that one posits physically have any parts. It has different properties at different regions (2000: 249
redundant and empirically undetectable things—we should prefer the one and 2008: 8).
that does not.
On Horgan and Potrč’s view, common-sense statements are true, but not
Dasgupta says that if there are no individuals, then the fundamental facts made true by any thing(s) other than the only thing there is—the blobject.
are all general facts, like ∃xFx , ∃x∃yGxy, and the like (see also Dasgupta So truth isn’t direct correspondence between propositions and the parts of
2016). But what do the variables range over in those sentences? the world they’re about, but rather between propositions and the entire
Individuals? Objects? To bypass such questions, we must construct a world—indirect correspondence (2000: 250–51).
language that doesn’t quantify over objects. Dasgupta uses a version of
predicate functorese, which replaces individuals with predicates and a One compelling argument for existence monism (2000: §2.4, also Schaffer
defined adicity. So instead of “x is round”, “something is round”, or (2007)) is that the complete causal story of the world can be told in terms
“something loves someone”, we have “Round1 obtains”, “cRound1 of the world and the laws without appeal or reference to parts of the world.
obtains”, and “ccLoves2 obtains”. In systematically doing this for all So, if there were parts of the world, they would be redundant and/or
sentences, we can do away with all reference to objects, replacing them epiphenomenal (see entry). But we shouldn’t posit explanatorily redundant
with general states of affairs. And since individuals are physically or epiphenomenal things. So, we shouldn’t posit parts of the world. So,
redundant and empirically undetectable, this is a good thing. only one object—the world—exists.

The aforementioned authors all seem to agree that if first-order logic, One compelling argument against existence monism takes a Moorean
which quantifies over objects, can be replaced with a logic that doesn’t so shape. Russell (1918 [1985: 36]) says,

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 Object Bradley Rettler and Andrew M. Bailey

I share the common-sense belief that there are many separate then she’ll think that whatever is in the extension of object is all there is.
things; I do not regard the apparent multiplicity of the world as (But not because she holds the Umbrella View.) The proponent of the
consisting merely in phases and unreal divisions of a single former formulation may countenance non-abstracta or non-universals that
indivisible Reality. aren’t objects. And so she might pursue the ontological question and the
Extension Question separately.
If the multiplicity of things is really this obvious, the point may be
extended: the rejection of one of the premises of any valid argument that
Miscellaneous
has as a conclusion that there is only one concrete object will always be
more plausible than accepting the conclusion.[16]
There are other views of what there is that are less general than existence
nihilism, existence monism, existence pluralism, or nominalism. For
2.1.3 Existence Pluralism
example, possibilism is the view that there are merely possible objects (see
Existence pluralism is the view that there is more than one thing. Certainly section on possibilist realism in the entry on possible objects). This view
existence pluralism is the standard view—even among metaphysicians. doesn’t say that every thing is a merely possible thing; it just says that the
Indeed, most people think that there are a great many things. The answer to the ontological question ought to include merely possible things.
conjunction of the Umbrella View and existence pluralism entails that Mereological universalism says that whenever you have two or more
there is more than one object. But if one thinks there are a great many things, there is an object composed of all and only those things (see
things, one might also think that they are not all objects. And so existence section on permissivism in entry on ordinary objects). It doesn’t tell you
pluralists may want to try to treat the ontological question as distinct from that every thing is a composite thing; it just says that the answer to the
the Extension Question (for them, see §2.2). ontological question needs to include such objects. Perdurantism says that
objects are composed of temporal parts—at each time at which an object
Nominalism exists, there is an instantaneous object composed of all its parts at that
time and is a part of it at that time, so those objects ought to be in the
extension of the answer to the ontological question (see entry on temporal
One exception is nominalism; or at least, one version of nominalism is an
parts). Meinongianism says that there are non-existent objects, so they
exception. Although nominalism is widely discussed in ontology, precisely
would include those objects in the extension of the answer to the
what the view is differs. Some say that nominalism is the view that there
ontological question (see entry on nonexistent objects).
are no abstracta or universals. Others say that nominalism is the view that
the correct answer to the ontological question is ‘particulars’, or ‘concrete These views are partial answers to the ontological question. They are
things’, or ‘objects’. partial answers because they tell us what there is, but they don’t tell us
everything there is.
For the proponent of the latter formulation of nominalism, the Extension
Question is the ontological question; if she thinks there are only objects, 2.2 The Extension Question

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If—contra the Umbrella View—it is not true by definition that ‘object’ Tugendhat quotation from above: “In ordinary language we are inclined to
picks out a maximally general category, then there may be things that are call only material objects ‘objects’.” The view is that the extension of
not objects. So the Extension Question may turn out to have a different object is all and only the things we normally think about and talk about
answer than the ontological question. And even if one and the same class and refer to and use. These things are nameable, identifiable, stable, and
or collection is identified as the correct answer to each question, it does persist through time. Examples include bees, erasers, pillows, and boats.
not follow that the questions are the same; even if everything is an object,
it need not be true by definition that the extension of ‘object’ is just what Two thoughts arise. First, such an answer to the Extension Question leads
there is. So we will also survey answers to the Extension Question that to many puzzles and problems. Second, simply listing all the things is
have it that object picks out (at least intensionally) a different group of pretty dissatisfying as an answer to the Extension Question. Better to give
things than one’s answer to the ontological question. a general answer and then see what it entails—in particular, what
entailments it has for the Extension Question. What follows is one method
2.2.1 Ordinary Objects for giving a general answer to what objects there are.[17]

For those who don’t accept the Umbrella View, the Extension Question is 2.2.2 Special Composition Question
distinct from the ontological question. What, then, does the Extension
Question amount to? Presumably one who denies the Umbrella View Most who have considered the Extension Question probably think there
thinks that there are objects, and non-objects. Put another way, her answer are such objects as photons, electrons, quarks and other things that science
to the ontological question includes objects and other things. For her, the deals with—the fundamental physical particles. And those things seem to
Extension Question is the following: of all the things there are, which ones make up other things, like atoms, molecules, elements, cells, and so on up
are the objects? Those who deny the Umbrella View have a variety of the size chain to medium-sized dry goods, large buildings, mountains, and
ways of dividing the objects from the non-objects, which we discussed in planets.
§1.2.
So it seems that things are often composed of other things. But under what
Another way of dividing the objects from the non-objects is not by first conditions does composition occur? van Inwagen (1990) calls this ‘The
answering the ontological question and then picking out the objects from Special Composition Question’ (hereafter ‘the SCQ’). More precisely, the
all the things, or by answering the Contrast Question and then placing SCQ calls for filling in for Φ in the following sentence: For any xs, there
things into either object or its contrast class. Rather, one could simply start exists a y such that the xs compose y iff Φ. An answer must be non-
with the Extension Question—one could start by listing the obvious and analytic and must have only ‘the xs’ free.[18]
ordinary candidates for the office of object (see entry on ordinary objects).
Here are some candidate answers to the SCQ. CONTACT: ‘the xs are in
A common way to start would be by listing the things we ordinarily take to contact’. LIFE: ‘the xs are caught up in a life’. MEREOLOGICAL NIHILISM:
be objects in our pre-philosophical approach to the world. Recall the

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‘there is only one of the xs’. MEREOLOGICAL UNIVERSALISM: ‘the xs are one In this section, we will consider attempts to state the nature of objects. As
or more in number’. with our treatment of the Contrast Question, our discussion will elide
some terminological details. Instead of treating only theories of the nature
Anyone who denies the Umbrella View and who has an answer to the of objects phrased in precisely those terms, we will canvas several
SCQ can consider that as a partial answer to the Extension Question. What attempts to state the nature of nearby categories as well—most notably
objects are there? CONTACT says that there are the xs, and for any xs that substance and particular—treating them as giving a theory of the nature
are in contact, there’s another object (the one that’s composed of them). of objects.
LIFE says that there are the xs, and for any xs that are caught up in a life,
there’s another object (the one that’s composed of them). MEREOLOGICAL 3.1 What Objects Do
NIHILISM says that there are just the xs, and no other objects. MEREOLOGICAL
UNIVERSALISM says that there are the xs, for any xs at all (no matter how One way to explain a thing or category is to mark out what it does—its
they are arranged), there’s another object (the one that’s composed of role. Since object is, on any view at all, a highly abstract and general
them). And so on for other answers. category, the relevant role by which object might be defined must itself be
highly abstract and general.[19] Three examples:
3. Nature
First, various linguistic items, it seems, denote or refer. “Armstrong”
Thus far we have asked two questions of object: (i) what, if any, is its denotes Armstrong, “redness” denotes redness, “the successor of zero”
contrast? (ii) what things, if any, are in its extension? These questions denotes the number 1, and so on. Reflection on these platitudes brings to
might also be phrased as the questions of what non-objects there are and the fore a role that we might call being an object of reference (or perhaps
of what objects there are. We turn now to our final question: (iii) some related modal notion such as possibly being an object of reference or
supposing there are objects, what are they like? What is their nature? being eligible for reference).

One way to specify the nature of a category is to note the theoretical role it Second, domains (classes or pluralities), it seems, are associated with
plays or the role played by items within it. This is to say what items within quantifiers (expressions like “some” and “every”). “Everything is so-and-
the category do. Another is to give a real definition of the category (or the so” quantifies over all items within an inclusive domain (maximally
items within it), where a real definition attempts to identify the real inclusive, one thinks) and says of each of those items that it is so-and-so.
essence of the members of the category. This is to say what items of Reflection on these platitudes brings to the fore a role we might call being
within category are (see entries on theoretical terms in science and Locke quantified over, or perhaps some related modal notion such as possibly
on real essence and the section on real and nominal definitions in the entry being quantified over or being a candidate for being quantified over.
on definitions).
Third, some thoughts are, it seems, about things. The thought that
Aristotle was a philosopher is at least in part about a certain person—
Aristotle. The thought that doing metaphysics is a fine pastime is at least

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in part about a certain activity. And the thought that Platonism is sensible Question. If literally every thing at all is eligible for reference or
is at least in part about a certain philosophical theory. Reflection on these quantification or thought, for example, then literally every thing would be
platitudes brings to the fore a role we might call being an object of thought an object, a thesis in line with the Umbrella View. If, on the other hand,
or being thought of, or perhaps some related modal notion such as being some items are not eligible for reference or quantification or thought, then
possibly thought of.[20] such items would fall under non-object, and the category object would
turn out to have a contrast or complement. Similarly, if , say, both concrete
These three examples isolate highly abstract or general roles—being an material objects, abstract propositions are eligible for reference or
object of reference, being quantified over, or being thought of. These roles quantification or thought, then items of both sorts would fall under the
are specified, as it were, by form rather than content; the roles alone extension of object.[22]
impose very few limitations or requirements on the kinds of things that fill
them. Plausibly, for example, both concrete material objects and abstract 3.2 What Objects Are
propositions alike might satisfy any of these roles.
Some think there’s more to being an object than playing a particular
And each role suggests, in turn, a theory of what objects are: (i) to be an theoretical role. On this view, what it is for something to be an object is a
object just is to be a referent, (ii) to be an object just is to be quantified matter of that thing’s intrinsic character or nature. One way of giving the
over, and (iii) to be an object just is to be an object of thought.[21] van intrinsic nature of a thing is by giving a real definition. Says Dasgupta
Inwagen offers a version of (i) here (note the use of “can”, indicating that (2014), a real definition is:
it is a modal role that objects play, namely being possible referents; we
here presuppose the already mentioned tight connection between ‘object’ a statement of what something is… For example, when one says
and ‘thing’): that {Socrates} is the unique singleton containing Socrates, one is
defining what the set is—that is, giving its real definition. Or,
The most general metaphysical category is the category “thing”. I equivalently, one is stating its essence or nature… (2014: 577)
use ‘thing’ as the most general count-noun. Everything is a thing.
A thing is anything that can be referred to by a third-person Statements of what something is—of a thing’s essence or nature—could
singular pronoun—as when I say, “The following is true of take a variety of forms. One says what it is to be that thing; the real
everything, that it is identical with itself.” The category “thing” definition of x might be put: to be x is to be y. Or the real definition of a
comprises everything there is, everything that exists (for I take a category F: to be an F is to be a G. When one says, “To be a bachelor is to
stern anti-Meinongian line about non-existents: non-existents be an unmarried male”, one is giving the real definition of bachelorhood.
simply don’t exist: the number of them is 0). (2007: 199)
Another way is to say what is essential to an object or category, as
These role-theoretic specifications of what it is to be an object will have suggested by Fine (1995): It is essential to x that Φ. Or, it is essential to Fs
consequences with respect to the Extension Question and the Contrast that Φ.

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In any case, the task at hand is not to write a section about what it is to be 3.2.1 Constituent Ontologies
a real definition, but rather how the notion relates to object.
Constituent ontologists agree that objects have properties or property-like
If one thinks real definitions best get at the nature of things, and one is items as constituents or parts. They disagree, however, over whether
interested in stating the nature of object or of objects, there are two objects have additional non-property-like items as constituents or parts
options. One is to substitute for Φ in the following: To be an object is to and over how the constituents or parts of objects are related.
be Φ. The second is to substitute for Φ in the following: It is essential to
objects that Φ. Bundle theory

Note the difference between this method and the method of giving
According to the bundle theory, objects are bundles of properties.
necessary and sufficient conditions: x is an object iff Φ. If one has a
Different theories of properties will make for different versions of the
contrast class in mind, then presumably one can substitute for Φ the
bundle theory. The most common theories of properties for bundle
negation of that contrast class, e.g., “x is an object iff x is not a property”.
theorists to hold are trope theory (see entry on tropes) and immanent
But that isn’t what it is to be an object. A real definition demands more.
universals.
One might think that object doesn’t have a real definition. It may be that
On the immanent universal version of the bundle theory, objects are
the contrast class (property, say) is a natural class, but object is not.
bundles of universals, and those universals are located in space and time.
Ontologies—roughly, abstract and systematic catalogues of the kinds of When some universals are in the same place and at the same time (and
things there are—divide on the question of how objects relate to their perhaps when some other condition is satisfied) that there is an object that
properties. On constituent ontologies, properties are parts or constituents is the bundle of those universals. (For some bundle theorists, not just any
or components of the objects that have them or that they characterize (see group of immanent universals forms a bundle.) The way it’s often put is
entry on mereology). So on constituent ontologies, a tall tree has tall, that objects are bundles of coinstantiated universals, where the
somehow, as a part or constituent or component. On relational ontologies, coinstantiation relation may be a primitive relation.[24]
properties are not in any sense parts or constituents or components of the
On the trope version of the bundle theory, objects are bundles of tropes.
objects that have them or that they characterize. So on relational
Like the immanent universal version, not just any collection of tropes
ontologies, though a tall tree bears an interesting relationship to tall
forms a bundle which is an object; the tropes have to be compresent. The
(perhaps it bears the instantiation relation to that property), tall is not
compresence relation is taken to be primitive.[25]
among the tree’s various parts or constituents or components.[23]
The bundle theory is a theory about objects according to which objects are
We will canvas three theories of objects that draw from constituent
composed of items of a different kind or category (namely, properties).[26]
ontologies, and then describe a relational alternative.
So the bundle theory suggests that object has a contrast or complement.

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The bundle theory also suggests this broad answer to the Extension enlightening. It still leaves open the question—what is it that
Question: whenever there is a bundle of coinstantiated universals (or, stands in the instancing relation to [Greenness]? …the only
alternatively, compresent tropes), there is an object. The extension of alternative left appears to be a ‘bare’ particular, or what I prefer to
object includes all and only the bundles, and what bundles there are is call a substratum. Once we see the need for supplying an entity to
determined by which immanent universals or tropes stand in the which the universal involved bears the relation of being
coinstantiation or compresence relation.[27] exemplified, we can see that only a bare particular would do the
job. (1954: 255)
Bare particularism
Second, bare particulars individuate. Consider two objects that are exactly
alike in relevant respects (they are both royal blue, weigh 1kg, and so on);
Like the bundle theory, bare particularism maintains that objects have their
what could make them two and not one? What might explain their
properties as constituents. But bare particularism adds that there’s
distinctness? Since they are exactly alike in relevant respects no appeal to
something else too. In addition to its properties, every object has as a
differences in their property-like constituents (being royal blue, weighing
constituent a bare particular (or ‘thin particular’ or ‘substratum’) that
1 kg, and so on) would seem to do the trick. So, the bare particularists
instantiates those properties. Bare particulars are ‘bare’ in at least this
maintain, there must be non-property-like constituents by virtue of which
sense: unlike objects, they have no properties as parts.
they are distinct.[28]
Bare particularism, then, is the conjunction of two theses. First, every
object has at least two kinds of constituents: its properties and its bare Hylomorphism
particular. Second, every object has its properties by having as constituents
properties that are instantiated by another of its constituents: its bare According to hylomorphism, objects consist of matter and form (see entry
particular. on form vs. matter). Objects are comprised of various parts: electrons and
upquarks, for example. In addition to these ordinary material parts, objects
Bare particulars play two important roles in the theory at hand. First, they have rather special components or constituents—forms—property-like
are the subjects of properties or the items to which the properties are items that inform the matter of their host substance. Forms give objects
attached by instantiation or exemplification. Thus Alston: structure and shape and are what make each object the kind of thing it is.
Forms account for the character or nature of objects; they are property-like
We must ask concerning any situation involving this relation (e.g.,
in that respect. Socrates, for example, is a human animal comprising form
a exemplifying [Greenness]) what the relata are. One of them is a
and matter; and Socrates is a human animal because he has a certain form
universal. What is the other? It will obviously not do to reply—a
as a constituent.
grum (defined as an instance of [greenness]); for this would
amount to saying that the relatum in question is that which stands Hylomorphism may be thought of as a special case of or variation on the
in the instancing relation to [Greenness]; true enough but hardly bare particular view. For on hylomorphism, an object has both a property-

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like constituent (in this case, form) that bears a special tie to non-property- and causally inert. Clearly such things cannot be parts of ordinary material
like constituents (in this case, matter).[29] objects which are inside space and time, change, and participate in causal
chains. But objects still are red, large, heavy, and the like—and this in
3.2.2 Relational Ontologies virtue of standing in some relation to the transcendent universals. That
relation is usually called exemplification or instantiation, and it is taken as
We turn now to relational ontologies. Constituent ontologies, recall, have primitive. But, importantly, it is external—objects are related to things
it that objects have properties as parts or constituents. Relational outside of themselves—whereas the relation between object and property
ontologies accept that the extension of both object and property is not on constituent ontologies is internal.
empty[30]—but for them, no object has any property as a part or
constituent. Objects are, one might say with Armstrong, blobs (1989: 76– So, while Platonism is primarily a view about the nature of properties, it
77). Most relational ontologists will be perfectly happy to say that objects has implications for the nature of objects. In particular, it entails that they
have parts—it’s just that none of those parts are properties; they’re other don’t have properties as parts. As Armstrong puts the point:
objects.
It is interesting to notice that a separate-realm theory of universals
permits of a blob as opposed to a layer-cake view of particulars.
Objects as blobs
For on this view, what is it for a thing to have a property? It is not
the thing’s having some internal feature, but rather its having a
In contrast to the constituent ontologies surveyed above, relational
relationship, the instantiation relationship, to certain universals or
ontologies posit no internal structure to objects beyond ordinary
Forms in another realm. The thing itself could be bloblike.
mereological structure. Objects are not layer-cakes of thin particulars and
(Armstrong 1989: 76–77)
properties (or layer-cakes of matter and form); they are blobs instead. Put
this way, the blob view of objects has only negative content; it tells us As it turns out, Platonism is not the only account of properties that sits
what objects are not. It offers, then, a partial account of the nature of well with an unstructured or bloblike view of objects.
objects, and thus invites supplementation.[31]
Class Nominalism
We will now consider two relational ontologies and their implications for
the theory of objects.
On class nominalism, properties are classes of things or classes of possible
things. The property being green is the class of all green things, the
Platonism
property being wise is the class of all wise things, the relation is the sister
of is the class of ordered pairs the first member of which is the sister of the
The Platonist view of properties is that they are transcendent universals.
second member, and so on. [32]
They exist independently, and are outside of space and time, unchanging,

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For an object to have (or exemplify, or instantiate, or whatever) a property, Boulder, CO: Westview.
on this view, is for it to belong to a class of things. Class membership, like –––, 1997, A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge Studies in
set membership, is an external relation; so class nominalism sits best with Philosophy), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Armstrong, David M., 2005, “Four disputes about properties”, Synthese,
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possible objects. (Something is a property if and only if it is a set Ayer, A.J., 1933, “On Particulars and Universals”, Proceedings of the
all of whose members are possible objects.) The property of being Aristotelian Society, 34(1): 51–62. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/34.1.51
a pig or porcinity, Lewis says, is simply the set of all possible pigs –––, 1952, “Individuals”, Mind, 61(244): 441–457.
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Freddy. Freddy of course has porcinity. And what is this relation Bacon, John, 1995, Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of
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doi:10.1093/aristotelian/25.1.305 University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316535608
Strawson, P.F., 1954, “Particular and General”, Proceedings of the Turner, Jason, 2011, “Ontological Nihilism”, in Karen Bennett & Dean W.
Aristotelian Society, 54: 233–260. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/54.1.233 Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 6,
–––, 1959, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–54.
Methuen. Van Cleve, James, 1985, “Three Versions of the Bundle Theory”,
Thomasson, Amie L., 1997, “Ontological Categories and How to Use Philosophical Studies, 47(1): 95–107. doi:10.1007/BF00355089
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Uwe Meixner (ed.), Wien: ÖbvetHpt Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 61–71. Wildman, Nathan, 2015, “Load bare-ing particulars”, Philosophical
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107–138. Williams, Donald C., 1953, “The Elements of Being”, Review of
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Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic, L. Novák, D. Novotný, P. doi:10.2307/2186012
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Massimiliano Carrara, and Daniele Giaretta (eds.), Individuals, 106(422): 305–309. doi:10.1093/mind/106.422.305
Essence, and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics, Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 49–75. Academic Tools
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Hylomorphism, Leiden: Brill. How to cite this entry.
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Significance, Oxford: Clarendon. Society.
Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285044.001.0001
Project (InPhO).
Wetzel, L., 2009, Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects, Cambridge,
Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links
MA: MIT Press. to its database.
Wheeler, Samuel C., 1979, “On That Which is Not”, Synthese, 41(2): 155–
173. doi:10.1007/BF00869569 Other Internet Resources
Wieland, Jan Willem, 2008, “What problem of universals?”, Philosophica,
81: 7–21. Wieland 2008 available online> Laycock, Henry, “Object”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall

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 Object Bradley Rettler and Andrew M. Bailey

2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 1. On ontological categories, see Aristotle Categories, Thomasson 1997
<[Link] [This and 2008, van Inwagen forthcoming, and Westerhoff 2005. See also
was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of entries on metaphysics and categories.
Philosophy — see the version history.]
2. On object and closely related concepts, see Ayer (1952), Casati (2004),
Related Entries Denkel (1996: ch 2 and 3), Frege (1892), Goodman (1972), Heller (1990:
ch 2), Hirsch (1993: 88–96), Hoffman & Rosenkrantz (1997: 1–42), Keyt
abstract objects | Aristotle | categories | causation: the metaphysics of | (1963), Laycock (1989, 2005, 2006), Ludwig (1976), Markosian (2000),
consciousness | epiphenomenalism | existence | form vs. matter | identity: Miller (1990), Quine (1957), Saunders (2006), Strawson (1954, 1959), and
of indiscernibles | intentionality | laws of nature | Leibniz, Gottfried van Inwagen (2007: 199).
Wilhelm: modal metaphysics | logic: classical | mass expressions:
3. On merely verbal disputes, see Balaguer (forthcoming), Chalmers
metaphysics of | material constitution | mereology | metaphysics | monism |
(2011), Jenkins (2014), and Thomasson (2017).
Moore, George Edward | natural kinds | nominalism: in metaphysics |
nonexistent objects | ontological commitment | ordinary objects | 4. On such paradoxes and puzzles, see Rayo & Uzquiano (2006), van
perception: the contents of | physicalism | Platonism: in metaphysics | Inwagen (2001), and Williamson (2003). See also entry on quantification.
plural quantification | possible objects | properties | propositions |
quantifiers and quantification | Quine, Willard van Orman | reference | 5. For two overviews of what properties might be, see the papers in Mellor
relations | Russell, Bertrand | Strawson, Peter Frederick | substance | & Oliver (1997) and Oliver (1996) and the entry on properties.
temporal parts | tropes | truth | truth: correspondence theory of
6. On the object/property distinction in its various guises, see Armstrong
Acknowledgments (2005), Ayer (1933), Bealer (1993), Berman (2008), Casullo (1981, 1984),
Denkel (1996), Duncan-Jones (1933), Ehring (2004), Freundlich (1974),
Thanks to Henry Laycock, author of the original SEP entry for ‘Object’; Hochberg (1995, 1996, 2004), Hoy (1998), Kates (1979), Klemke (1960),
we learned much from his entry, especially his research into primary Lehrer & McGee (1992), Lewis (1983), Long (1968), Loux (1970), Lowe
sources on the topic. Thanks also to Yale-NUS College (Bailey) and the (2004), MacBride (1998, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2009), McGilvary
Templeton Religion Trust (Rettler) for generous research support; the (1939a, 1939b), Moravcsik (1981), Myers (1973), Nounou (2012), Oliver
statements made in this entry are those of the author and are not (1996), Ramsey (1925), Russell (1911), Simons (1991), Stebbing (1924),
necessarily endorsed by Yale-NUS College or the Templeton Religion van Inwagen (2004), and Wieland (2008).
Trust.
7. Ramsey (1925) demurs. He thinks that the consideration that Russell
Notes to Object thought was most important is not at all important, because language could
be manipulated in such a way as to turn any subject-predicate sentence

54 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2017 Edition 55

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into a sentence where what was the predicate becomes the subject, and 13. On the ontological question, see van Inwagen (1998, 2009) and
what was the subject becomes part of the predicate. Take a particular Wheeler (1979). See entry on ontological commitment.
example, “Socrates is wise”. This can be restated: “Wisdom is a
characteristic of Socrates”. So the former subject, Socrates, becomes part 14. For more on stuff, see Cartwright (1972), Chappell (1971), Hacker
of the predicate—“a characteristic of Socrates”. And former predicate, “is (2004), Kleinschmidt (2007), Markosian (2004, 2015), and Zimmerman
wise”, becomes the subject—wisdom. (1995, 1997a). See also entries on plural quantification and the
metaphysics of mass expressions.
So, Ramsey concludes that positing this distinction is ill-motivated:
15. On existence monism see Rea (2001).
All we are talking about is two different types of objects, such that
two objects, one of each type, could be sole constituents of an 16. For more on existence monism, see Horgan & Potrč (2000, 2008,
atomic fact. The two types being in every way symmetrically 2012). For more on priority monism (which has it that there are many
related, nothing can be meant by calling one type the type of objects, but they all depend on one fundamental object), see Schaffer
individuals and the other that of qualities, and these two words are (2009, 2010a, 2010b). See also the section on common sense and certainty
devoid of connotation. (1925: 416) in the entry on G.E. Moore.

8. For more, see Effingham (2015) and van Inwagen (2004: 134–135). 17. On ordinary objects, see L.R. Baker (2007), Caplan & Bright (2005),
Elder (2004, 2011), Korman (2016), Lowe (2000), Markosian (1998),
9. For more on properties and multi-location, see Ehring (2004) and McDaniel (2001), McGrath (1998), Merricks (2001), Sanford (1979,
Gilmore (2003). See also entry on location and mereology. 1993), Saunders (2006), Thomasson (2006, 2007, 2015), and van Inwagen
(1990: 17–18).
10. On the abstract/concrete divide and related matters, see Bealer (1982,
1993, 1998), Jacquette (1999), Kaufman (2002), Lewis (1986: 81–86), 18. For a state-of-the-art treatment of the Special Composition Question,
Lowe (1995), Moltmann (2013), Oliver (2005), Quine (1948), Thompson including a variety of answers, see Korman & Carmichael (2016). See also
(1965), van Inwagen (2004: 108; 2007: 199–203), Wetzel (2009), and entries on material composition.
Williamson (2002).
19. The canonical treatment of defining a theoretical term by its role is
11. For more on the sense-perception criterion of objecthood, see Addis Lewis (1970).
(1967) and van Inwagen (2004: 135–136).
20. For more on the role of object being possible object of thought, see
12. Of course, electron, number, composite thing, bachelor, or person may Busuioc (2009). Some have thought that the object of thought role for
not be genuine categories. We’re permissive here about the categories for objects gives us reason to posit non-existent objects; for more on this, see
the sake of illustration. Parsons (1980, 1987) and Priest (2000). See also entry on intentionality.

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 Object Bradley Rettler and Andrew M. Bailey

21. In this connection, see Peirce (1931: paragraph 339): “A sign stands 28. On bare particulars, see Alston (1954), Armstrong (1989: 94ff; 1997:
for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle ch 3, 4, 7), Bailey (2012), R. Baker (1967), Benovski (2008, 2010),
conveying into the mind something from [Link] for which it stands Bergmann (1947), Brower (2014: 35–41), Connolly (2015), Davis (2013a,
is called its Object…” 2013b), Garcia (2015b), Giberman (2012, 2015), Koons & Pickavance
(2015: ch 5), Korman (2010), Losonsky (1987), Loux (1997), Moreland
22. We here treat the object role as being the referent of a singular (1998, 2001, 2013), Moreland & Pickavance (2003), Morganti (2011),
referring term. A related view will treat the objects role as being the Oaklander & Rothstein (2000), Pasnau (2011: ch 2), Pickavance (2009,
referents of plural referring terms; for more on this, see Boolos (1984), 2014), Preston (2005), Sider (2006), and Wildman (2015).
McKay (2006), Shoemaker (1988), and Varzi (2002).
29. Aristotle is the most well-known proponent of hylomorphism (see
23. On the distinction between relational and constituent ontologies, see Metaphysics VII 8.1034a5–6, Metaphysics VII 8.1033b23–25,
Loux (2006: 207–212), van Inwagen (2011), and Wolterstorff (1970). Metaphysics VII 11.1037a29–30, Metaphysics VII 15.1939b20–25, and
Metaphysics XI 9.1058b80–12), but Plato may have beat him to the punch
24. On immanent universals, see Armstrong (1997) and Lewis (1983).
(Timaeus 48c–53c).
25. On tropes, see Ehring (2004, 2011) and Williams (1953).
For the contemporary discussion, see Bailey (2015), Bailey & Wilkins
26. Paul (forthcoming) is one important exception; on the mereological (forthcoming), Barnes (2003), Britton (2012), Brower (2014), Fine (1992,
bundle view proposed there, there is no fundamental divide between object 1994, 1999, 2008), Harte (2002), Inman (2014), Jaworski (2014, 2016),
and property, for every bundle of properties is itself a property. Johnston (2006), Koons (2014), Koslicki (2008), Manning (2013),
Marmodoro (2013), Oderberg (2007), Pasnau (2010: 635–646), Rea
27. On the bundle theory, including its relation to the problem of (1998, 2011), Robinson (2014), Sattig (2015), Sellars (1952), Sidelle
individuation, see Armstrong (1989: 59–74; 1997: ch 3, 4, 7), Bacon (2014), Toner (2010, 2013), Toner & Madden (forthcoming), and Ward
(1995), Benovski (2008), Black (1952), Carmichael (2010, 2015), Casullo (2014).
(1984, 1988), Curtis (2014), Ehring (2001), Garcia (2015a), Gyekye
(1973), O’Leary-Hawthorne (1995), O’Leary-Hawthorne & Cover (1998), 30. Austere nominalists—those who think the category property is empty
Hawthorne & Sider (2002), Kluge (1973), Lafrance (2015), Losonsky —count as blob theorists (see below), because they deny that objects have
(1987), Loux (1998), Lowe (2003), McDaniel (2001), Noone (2003), properties as parts or constituents. But they do not count as relational
Oaklander (1977), Paul (2002, 2012, 2017, forthcoming), Schmidt (2005), ontologists; they don’t think that objects bear any relation at all to
Shiver (2013), Simons (1994), Van Cleve (1985), Williams (1953), and properties, since there are no properties.
Zimmerman (1997b).
31. On objects as blobs, see Armstrong (1989) and van Inwagen (2011:
390–391).

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 Object

32. On class nominalism, see Lewis (1986: §1.5) and Manley (2002).

Copyright © 2017 by the authors

Bradley Rettler and Andrew M. Bailey

60 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 pdf version of the entry
Ordinary Objects
[Link] Ordinary Objects
from the Fall 2020 Edition of the First published Thu Dec 8, 2011; substantive revision Mon Aug 31, 2020

Stanford Encyclopedia Our everyday experiences present us with a wide array of objects: dogs
and cats, tables and chairs, trees and their branches, and so forth. These
of Philosophy sorts of ordinary objects may seem fairly unproblematic in comparison to
entities like numbers, propositions, tropes, holes, points of space, and
moments of time. Yet, on closer inspection, they are at least as puzzling, if
not more so.

This entry concerns a variety of problems that arise in connection with

Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson ordinary material objects. Proposed solutions to the problems, as we shall
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor
see, almost invariably have one of three unpalatable consequences. First,
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overpopulating the world with things that seem not to be there, be it too
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many tables, or too many things in one place, or too many causes of the
Library of Congress Catalog Data same events, or a plenitude of objects with extraordinary mereological or
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modal profiles. Second, unpalatable arbitrariness, be it arbitrariness
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please visit [Link] . For this reason, some view the problems as constituting a powerful case
for the elimination of the ordinary objects that give rise to them in the first
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Copyright c 2020 by the publisher place.
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Center for the Study of Language and Information Section 1 articulates a variety of ways of departing from an ordinary,
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conservative conception of which objects there are, either by eliminating
Ordinary Objects ordinary objects or by permitting more objects than we would ordinarily
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Daniel Z. Korman take to exist. Section 2 examines the puzzles and arguments that are meant
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1
 Ordinary Objects Daniel Z. Korman

eliminative and permissive views. Finally, Section 4, turns from the 1. The Positions
question of which objects exist to the question of which objects exist
fundamentally. 1.1 Conservatism
1. The Positions We find ourselves naturally inclined to make certain judgments about
1.1 Conservatism which objects are before us in various situations. Looking at a pool table
1.2 Eliminativism just before the break, we are naturally inclined to judge there to be sixteen
1.3 Permissivism pool balls on the table, perhaps various parts of the individual balls (their
2. Against Conservative Ontologies top and bottom halves), and no other macroscopic objects. Looking at my
2.1 Sorites Arguments nightstand, I am naturally inclined to judge there to be an alarm clock, a
2.2 The Argument from Vagueness lamp, their various parts (lampshade, buttons, cords), and nothing else.
2.3 Material Constitution
2.4 Indeterminate Identity Conservative views are those according to which these sorts of judgments
2.5 Arbitrariness Arguments are by and large correct. Giving a precise characterization of conservatism,
2.6 Debunking Arguments or of ordinary objects, is no easy task. Very roughly, ordinary objects are
2.7 Overdetermination Arguments objects belonging to kinds that we are naturally inclined to regard as
2.8 The Problem of the Many having instances on the basis of our perceptual experiences: dog, tree,
3. Against Revisionary Ontologies table, and so forth. Extraordinary objects, by contrast, are macroscopic
3.1 Arguments from Counterexamples objects belonging to kinds that we are not ordinarily inclined to regard as
3.2 Arguments from Charity having instances. (More on these in §1.3.) And conservatism is roughly
3.3 Arguments from Entailment the view that there are just the ordinary objects and none of the
3.4 Arguments from Coincidence extraordinary objects.[1]
3.5 Arguments from Gunk and Junk
4. Fundamental Existents Revisionary views about which objects there are are those that depart in
Bibliography one way or another from conservatism. These include both eliminative
Academic Tools views, on which there are fewer ordinary objects than are recognized by
Other Internet Resources conservatives, and permissive views, on which there are extraordinary
Related Entries objects that conservatives do not recognize. There is, however, some
controversy about whether these departures from conservatism actually
deserve to be called ‘revisionary’. As we shall see in §3.1, many
eliminativists and permissivists take their views to be entirely compatible
with common sense and ordinary belief.

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 Ordinary Objects Daniel Z. Korman

Our target question—namely, which macroscopic objects exist—may be 1.2. Eliminativism

distinguished from related but independent questions concerning the
nature of ordinary objects. Some views about the natures of objects may Eliminative views are those that deny the existence of some wide range of
seem to be at odds with common sense, for instance, the view that ordinary objects. (Denying merely that ordinary objects are fundamental is
ordinary objects can’t survive the loss of any of their parts, or that not by itself enough to qualify as an eliminativist; see §4 below.)
ordinary objects are all mind-dependent. But these views are entirely
compatible with conservatism, as characterized above, because they do not Some eliminativists accept nihilism, the thesis that no objects ever
(or at least need not) have any revisionary implications regarding which compose anything. In other words, every object is mereologically simple
objects there are at a given place and time. That said, questions about the (i.e., partless). Together with the plausible assumption that ordinary
nature of ordinary objects are intimately connected with questions about objects (if they exist) are all composite objects, nihilism entails that there
which objects exist, insofar as certain views about the nature of these are no ordinary objects. Nihilists typically accept that there are countless
objects (including those just mentioned) provide the resources for microscopic objects: although there are “simples arranged dogwise” and
addressing some of the puzzles and arguments that motivate revisionary “simples arranged statuewise”, there are no dogs or statues. But nihilism is
conceptions. also compatible with existence monism—the thesis that there is a single,
all-encompassing simple (the cosmos, a.k.a. “the blobject”)—as well as
A few terminological preliminaries. ‘Object’ is used in its narrow sense, the extreme nihilist thesis that there are no objects whatsoever.[3]
which applies only to individual material objects and not to other sorts of
entities like numbers or events. ‘Part’ is used in its ordinary sense, on Since many of the arguments for eliminativism actually fall short of
which it is not true—or at least not trivially true—that things are parts of establishing that composition never occurs, it is also open to eliminativists
themselves. And when the entry notes that some objects compose to reject nihilism and accept certain classes of composites. Many
something, or that they have a fusion, what is meant is that there is eliminativists make an exception for persons and other organisms. Some,
something that has each of them as parts and every part of which overlaps for instance, accept organicism, the thesis that some objects compose
at least one of them. The entry avoids the word ‘sum’, but newcomers to something just in case the activities of those objects constitute a life. In
this literature should bear in mind that it gets used in different ways: ‘sum other words, organisms are the only composite objects.[4]
of x and y’ is sometimes used to mean object that is composed of x and y
The motivations for making an exception for organisms vary. Van Inwagen
and is other times used to mean object that is composed of x and y and that
(1990: Ch. 12) accepts organicism on the grounds that it yields the best
has all of its parts essentially.[2]
answer to the special composition question (“under what conditions do
some objects compose something?”), one that allows for one’s own
existence and physicality, while at the same time escaping various
problems that arise for competing answers. Merricks (2001: Ch. 4) argues
that persons and some other composites must be recognized on account of

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 Ordinary Objects Daniel Z. Korman

their nonredundant causal powers. Making such exceptions naturally gives What universalism does not tell us is which kinds of objects there are.
rise to concerns about the stability of the resulting positions, either Whenever there are some atoms arranged turkeywise, universalism entails
because the reasoning behind allowing the exceptions threatens to that there is some object that they compose. But it remains open to
generalize to all ordinary objects or because the arguments for eliminating universalists (like the aforementioned non-nihilistic eliminativists) to deny
ordinary objects threaten to generalize to the objects one wishes to permit. that this composite is a turkey. However, assuming that there are such
[5] objects as turkeys, trout, and their front and back halves, universalism will
entail that there are trout-turkeys, where a trout-turkey is a single object
It is also open to eliminativists to adopt non-nihilistic views that are fairly composed of the undetached front half of a trout and the undetached back
liberal about composition, allowing that composition occurs at least as half of a turkey. These are objects that have both fins and feathers and
often as we ordinarily suppose (if not more so). Peter Unger is one such whose finned parts may be a good distance from their feathered parts.[7]
non-nihilistic eliminativist:
Diachronic universalism is the permissivist thesis that, for any times and
There is nothing in these arguments [for eliminativism] to deny the any function from those times to sets of objects that exist at those times,
idea, common enough, that there are physical objects with a there is an object that exists at just those times and has exactly those parts
diameter greater than four feet and less than five. Indeed, the at those times. Roughly: there is an object corresponding to every filled
exhibited [arguments] allow us still to maintain that there are region of spacetime. So, assuming that your kitchen table and living room
physical objects of a variety of shapes and sizes, and with various table both exist, there also exists a klable: an object that’s entirely made up
particular spatial relations and velocities with respect to each other. of your kitchen table every day from midnight till noon and is entirely
It is simply that no such objects will be ordinary things; none are made up of your living room table from noon till midnight. This is an
stones or planets or pieces of furniture. (1979b: 150) object that, twice a day, instantly and imperceptibly shifts its location.[8]
While Unger does use the label ‘nihilism’ for his view, he is not a nihilist Some accept even more plenitudinous forms of permissivism.
in our sense because he affirms that there is a highly visible composite Formulations vary, but the rough idea is that, so long as the empirical facts
object occupying the exact location where we take the table to be. He is, don’t rule out there being an object with a given modal property in a given
however, an eliminativist insofar as he denies that that object is a table.[6] location, then there is an object in that location with that modal property.
When there is a red car parked in the garage, the empirical facts (e.g., that
1.3 Permissivism there is nothing blue there) do rule out there being an object in the exact
location of the car that is necessarily blue. But they do not rule out there
Permissive views are those according to which there are wide swathes of
being an object colocated with the car that is inside the garage as a matter
extraordinary objects.
of metaphysical necessity (an “incar”) and that would cease to exist if the
Universalism is the permissivist thesis that composition is unrestricted: for car were to leave the garage.[9]
any objects, there is a single object that is composed of those objects.

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One further way of being a permissivist is by permitting a multitude of Premises SR2 and SR3 together entail that, for any finite number of atoms,
parts of ordinary objects that we do not naturally judge them to have. For nothing made up of that many atoms is a stone. But this, together with
instance, one might hold that, in addition to ordinary parts like arms and SR1, entails that there are no stones.[11]
legs, you have extraordinary parts like leg complements, where your left-
leg complement is an object made up of all of you except for your left leg. Similar arguments may be given for the elimination of individual ordinary
Together with some natural assumptions (e.g., about regions of space), leg objects. One can construct a sorites series of contiguous bits of matter,
complements and a legion of other extraordinary parts will be delivered by running from a bit of matter, mk, at the peak of Kilimanjaro to a bit of
the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts—or DAUP—the thesis that for matter, mp, in the surrounding plains. From the sorites premise that a bit of
any material object o, if r is the region of space occupied by o, and if rʹ is matter that’s n inches along the path from mp to mk is part of Kilimanjaro
an occupiable sub-region of r, then there exists a material object that iff a bit of matter that’s n+1 inches along the path is part of Kilimanjaro
exactly occupies rʹ and which is part of o. (Roughly: for every region of (for any number n), together with the fact that mp is not part of
space within the boundaries of a given a object, that object has a part that Kilimanjaro, we reach the absurd conclusion that mk isn’t part of
exactly fills that region.)[10] Kilimanjaro. So, by reductio, we may conclude that Kilimanjaro does not
exist.[12]
2. Against Conservative Ontologies Why accept SR3? Imagine a series of cases, beginning with a case
involving a single atom and terminating with a case involving what would
2.1 Sorites Arguments seem to be a paradigm stone, where each case differs from the preceding
case only by the addition of a single atom. It seems highly implausible that
Sorites arguments proceed from a premise to the effect that minute
there should be adjacent cases in any such series where there is a stone in
differences cannot make a difference with respect to whether some
one case but not in the other. Rejecting SR3 would look to commit one to
property F (or kind K) is instantiated to the conclusion that nothing (or
just such a sharp cut-off.
everything) is F (or a K). Here is a sorites argument for the elimination of
stones: But one can deny that SR3 is true without accepting that there is a sharp
transition from stones to non-stones in such series, that is, without
(SR1) Every stone is composed of a finite number of atoms.
accepting that there is some specific object in the series that definitely is a
(SR2) It is impossible for something composed of fewer than two
stone and whose successor definitely is not a stone. For one may instead
atoms to be a stone.
hold that there is a range of cases in which it is vague whether the object
(SR3) For any number n, if it is impossible for an object composed of n
in question is a stone.[13]
atoms to be a stone, then it is impossible for an object composed
of n+1 atoms to be a stone. Here is an illustration of how that sort of strategy might go. Let S be some
(SR4) So, there are no stones. object in the series that clearly seems to be a stone, let NS be an object

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that clearly seems to be a non-stone, and let BS be an object that seems to not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for
be a borderline case of being a stone. One might suggest that ‘stone’ is composition.
vague as a result of there being a range of candidate precise meanings (or (AV2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or
“precisifications”) for the word ‘stone’, borderline cases of composition.
(AV3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series.
(i) all of which apply to S, (AV4) There cannot be borderline cases of composition.
(ii) none of which apply to NS, (AV5) So, either every plurality of objects composes something or none
(iii) some but not all of which apply to BS, and do.
(iv) none of which is definitely the meaning of ‘stone’.
If the argument is sound then either universalism or nihilism must be
‘S is a stone’ is true because S falls under all of these precisifications of correct, though which of them is correct would have to be decided on
‘stone’. ‘NS is a stone’ is false because NS doesn’t fall under any of them. independent grounds.[15]
And ‘BS is a stone’ is neither true nor false because BS falls under some
but not all of the precisifications. And then SR3 itself turns out to be false: A sorites series for composition is a series of cases running from a case in
on every precisification of ‘stone’, there is some object in the series such which composition doesn’t occur to a case in which composition does
that it but not its successor falls under that precisification. (This is occur, where adjacent cases are extremely similar in all of the respects that
sometimes known as a “supervaluationist” account.) one would ordinarily take to be relevant to whether composition occurs
(e.g., the spatial and causal relations among the objects in question).
Defenders of sorites arguments often complain that this line of response Understood in this way, AV1 should be unobjectionable. If it’s true that the
still commits one to some “sharp status transition”, for instance, a sharp handle and head compose something only once the hammer is assembled,
transition from a case in which ‘there is a stone’ is true to a case in which then a moment-by-moment series of cases running from the beginning to
it is neither true nor false.[14] the end of the assembly of the hammer would be just such a series.
Premise AV2 looks trivial: any such series obviously must contain some
2.2 The Argument from Vagueness transition from composition not occurring to composition occurring, and
there either will or won’t be a determinate fact of the matter about where
It is natural to suppose that objects sometimes do, and other times do not,
exactly that transition occurs in any given series.
compose a further object. When a hammer head is firmly affixed to a
handle, they compose something, namely, a hammer. When they’re on AV3 is plausible as well. If composition occurs in one case but not in
opposite ends of the room, they don’t compose anything. The following another, then surely there must be some explanation for why that is. In
argument—known as “the argument from vagueness”—purports to show other words, the facts about composition are not “brute”. Yet the sorts of
that this natural assumption is mistaken. differences that one finds among adjacent cases in a sorites series for
composition—for instance, that the handle and head are a fraction of a
(AV1) If some pluralities of objects compose something and others do

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centimeter closer together in the one than in the other—can’t plausibly To see the motivation for AV6, notice that if the handle and head do
explain why composition occurs in one case but not in the other.[16] compose something then there are three things: the handle, the head, and a
hammer. If they don’t, then there are only two things: the handle and head.
Certain sorts of eliminativists are well positioned to resist AV3 without And if it is vague whether they do, then it will be vague whether there are
having to accept that compositional facts are brute. Suppose, for instance, two things or three. As for AV7, notice that one can specify how many
that one accepts a view on which conscious beings are the only composite objects there are using what would seem to be entirely precise vocabulary.
objects. Such eliminativists will deny that there is a sorites series for For any finite number, one can produce a “numerical sentence” saying that
composition running from the beginning to the end of the assembly there are exactly that many concrete objects. Here, for instance, is the
process, since they will deny that anything is composed of the handle and numerical sentence for two: ‘∃x∃y(x≠y & Cx & Cy & ∀z(Cz→(x=z ∨
head (or that there are a handle and head) even at the end of the series. y=z)))’. (The restriction to concreta ensures that numerical sentences
Every sorites series for composition, by their lights, will have to run from aren’t trivially false simply on account of there being infinitely many
a case involving a conscious being to one that doesn’t. And assuming that numbers, sets, and so forth.) And since these numerical sentences contain
that there can’t be borderline cases of consciousness, every such series no vague vocabulary, it would seem to follow that it cannot be
will contain a sharp cut-off with respect to the presence of the additional indeterminate how many objects there are.
subject of consciousness. This, in turn, is poised to explain why
composition occurs in the one case but not the other.[17] AV6 can be resisted by denying that composition affects the number of
objects in the way suggested. For instance, one might contend that even
Why, though, should anyone accept AV4? On the face of it, it seems just before the handle and head definitely come to compose something, there
as clear that there can be borderline cases of composition (e.g., when the exists an object—a “proto-hammer”—located in the region that the two of
hammer head is just beginning to be affixed to the handle) as it is that them jointly occupy. The proto-hammer definitely exists, but it is a
there can be borderline cases of redness and baldness. This is not, borderline case of composition: it is indeterminate whether the handle and
however, “just another sorites,” to be blocked in whichever way one head compose the proto-hammer or whether they instead compose nothing
blocks the sorites arguments in §2.1. That’s because questions about when at all (in which case the proto-hammer has no parts).[19]
composition occurs look to be intimately bound up with questions about
how many objects exist. This suggests the following line of argument in Alternatively, one might resist AV7 by pinning the vagueness on the
defense of AV4, no analogue of which is available for other sorts of sorites quantifiers in the numerical sentence. After all, what seems to be vague is
arguments.[18] whether the handle and head are everything that there is and whether there
is something other than the handle and head. But it is difficult to see how
(AV6) If there can be borderline cases of composition, then it can be the quantifiers can be vague and, in particular, how their vagueness could
indeterminate how many objects exist. be accounted for on the sort of standard, precisificational account of
(AV7) It cannot be indeterminate how many objects exist. vagueness discussed in §2.1.[20]
(AV4) So, there cannot be borderline cases of composition.

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2.3 Material Constitution pieces of clay either).[22]

Ordinary objects are constituted by, or made up out of, aggregates of More often, however, the puzzles are taken to motivate constitutional
matter. A gold ring is constituted by a certain piece of gold. Clay statues pluralism, the thesis that ordinary objects are typically, if not always,
are constituted by pieces of clay. We are naturally inclined to regard the distinct from the aggregates of matter that constitute them. (‘Typically’
statue and the piece of clay as being one and the same object, an object because, in rare cases in which the ordinary object and the aggregate come
that simply belongs to multiple kinds (statue and piece of clay). into existence at the same time and cease to exist at the same time, some
pluralists will take the ordinary object to be identical to the aggregate.)
The puzzles of material constitution put pressure on this natural Pluralists reject MC2: clay statues are not identical to the pieces of clay
inclination. Here is one such puzzle. Let ‘Athena’ name a certain clay that constitute them. Pluralists may deny that having the same parts at a
statue and let ‘Piece’ name the piece of clay that constitutes it. What is given time suffices for identity, or they may instead deny that the statue
puzzling is that all of the following seem true: and the piece of clay have all of the same parts.[23]

(MC1) Athena exists and Piece exists. One of the main problems facing the pluralist solution is the grounding
(MC2) If Athena exists and Piece exists, then Athena = Piece. problem: the modal differences between Athena and Piece (e.g., that the
(MC3) Athena has different properties from Piece. one but not the other can survive being flattened) seem to stand in need of
(MC4) If Athena has different properties from Piece, then Athena ≠ explanation and yet there seems to be no further difference between them
Piece. that is poised to explain, or ground, these differences.[24]

The motivation behind MC2 is that Athena seemingly has exactly the Defenders of the pluralist response to these puzzles may, by similar
same location and exactly the same parts as Piece. So ‘Athena’ and ‘Piece’ reasoning, be led to accept that, in special cases, two objects of the same
are plausibly just different names for the same thing. The motivation kind can coincide. Suppose, for instance, that we have a fantastically big
behind MC3 is that Piece and Athena seem to have different modal net (Thin) with very thin netting. We then roll it up into a long rope, and
properties: Piece is able to survive being flattened and Athena isn’t. MC4 we weave that rope into a smaller net (Thick) with a thicker weave. Since
follows from the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (a.k.a. the nets intuitively have different modal properties—Thin, but not Thick,
Leibniz’s Law): ∀x∀y(x=y → ∀P(Px iff Py)). In other words, if x and y can survive the unraveling of the thicker net—the same sort of reasoning
are identical, then they had better have all the same properties. After all, if that leads one to reject MC2 underwrites an argument that the nets are not
they are identical, then there is only one thing there to have or lack any identical. In other words, there are two exactly colocated objects, both of
given property.[21] which are nets.[25]

The puzzles are sometimes taken to motivate eliminativism, since Constitutional monists, according to whom Athena is identical to Piece,
eliminativists can simply deny MC1: there are no statues (and perhaps no will deny MC3. There are various ways of developing the monist

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response. First, one might insist that both Athena and Piece (which, on this collecting the discarded original planks, and—three hundred years after
view, are identical) can survive flattening: upon flattening, Athena ceases the christening—they obtain the last of them and construct a ship that is
to be a statue, but does not cease to exist. We can call those who opt for indistinguishable from the original. Call the resulting ship ‘the
this approach ‘phasalists’, since they take being a statue to be a temporary reconstructed ship’. Which, if either, of these two ships is identical to
phase that Piece (i.e., Athena) is passing through.[26] Theseus II? It is natural to suppose that there is no fact of the matter: it is
indeterminate which of the two ships is Theseus II.
Alternatively, monists might deny that Piece (i.e., Athena) can survive
being flattened. When Piece is flattened, Piece ceases to exist, at which However, there arguably can never be indeterminate cases of identity:
point an entirely new piece of clay (composed of the same atoms) comes
into existence. This strategy is sometimes called “the doctrine of dominant (ST1) Suppose that it is indeterminate whether Theseus II = the
kinds”, since the idea is that when an object belongs to multiple kinds, the mended ship.
object has the persistence conditions associated with whichever of the (ST2) If so, then Theseus II has the property of being indeterminately
kinds “dominates” the others. Because statue dominates piece, Piece is a identical to the mended ship.
statue essentially, and therefore cannot survive ceasing to be statue- (ST3) The mended ship does not have the property of being
shaped.[27] indeterminately identical to the mended ship.
(ST4) If Theseus II has this property and the mended ship lacks this
Finally, monists might agree that Piece is able to survive being flattened property, then Theseus II ≠ the mended ship.
and that Athena is not able to survive being flattened, and yet deny that (ST5) If Theseus II ≠ the mended ship, then it isn’t indeterminate
Athena and Piece have different properties. How can that be? On one whether Theseus II = the mended ship.
version of this approach (often associated with counterpart theory), the (ST6) So (by reductio), it isn’t indeterminate whether Theseus II = the
idea is that ‘is able to survive being flattened’ is context-sensitive, mended ship.
expressing one property when affixed to ‘Athena’ and another when
affixed to ‘Piece’. On another, the idea is that ‘is able to survive being ST2 relies on two seemingly innocuous inferences: (a) from its being
flattened’ does not express a property at all. Either way, we do not end up indeterminate whether Theseus II is identical to the mended ship to
with any one property that Piece has but Athena lacks.[28] Theseus II’s being indeterminately identical to the mended ship and (b)
from there to Theseus II’s having the property of being indeterminately
2.4 Indeterminate Identity identical to the mended ship. ST3 seems trivial as well: the mended ship is
definitely self-identical, so it does not itself have this property. ST4 looks
A wooden ship is constructed and christened ‘Theseus II’. As planks come to be an immediate consequence of Leibniz’s Law: if Theseus II and the
loose over the years, they are discarded and replaced. After three hundred mended ship differ with respect to even one property, then they are
years, the last of the original planks is replaced. Call the resulting ship ‘the distinct. ST5 is trivial: if they’re not identical, then it isn’t indeterminate
mended ship’. The descendants of the original owners have been whether they are identical.[29]

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Eliminativists may go on to argue from ST6 to the conclusion that there The prima facie problem with this response is that there do not seem to be
are no ships, as follows. If indeed it isn’t indeterminate whether Theseus II multiple objects such that it’s indeterminate which one ‘Theseus II’ picks
is the mended ship, then there would seem to be five options: out. After all, when ‘Theseus II’ was first introduced, there was only one
ship around to receive the name! One can address this problem by
(i) Theseus II is identical only to the mended ship. maintaining that, despite appearances, two ships were present at the
(ii) Theseus II is identical only to the reconstructed ship. christening: one that would later be composed of entirely different planks
(iii) Theseus II is identical both to the mended ship and to the and another that would later be reassembled from a pile of discarded
reconstructed ship. planks. What is indeterminate is which of these two temporarily colocated
(iv) Theseus II is neither ship; it has ceased to exist. ships was christened ‘Theseus II’.[32]
(v) Theseus II never existed in the first place; there are no ships.
Other responses are available. One might deny ST2 on the grounds that
Options (i) and (ii) seem intolerably arbitrary, since the mended ship and there is no such property as the property of being indeterminately identical
reconstructed ship seem to have equal claim to being Theseus II. Option to Theseus II. One might deny ST3, affirming that the mended ship is
(iii) is out as well. If Theseus II is identical to both ships, then (by the indeterminately identical to the mended ship. One might deny ST4 by
transitivity of identity) they must be identical to one another; but they denying that the distinctness of Theseus II and the mended ship can be
cannot be identical because they have different properties (e.g., the one but inferred from the fact that they do not share the indicated property. Or one
not the other is composed of the original planks). Option (iv) is might embrace option (iv), on the (stage-theoretic) grounds that the ship
problematic as well. The history of maintenance by itself would have that existed at the time of the christening is not identical to any ship that
sufficed for the persistence of Theseus II; the preservation and reassembly exists at any earlier or later time. [33]
of the original parts by itself would likewise have sufficed for the
persistence of Theseus II; and here we have managed to secure both. As 2.5 Arbitrariness Arguments
Parfit (1971: 5) would say, “How could a double success be a failure?”
Thus, we get (v) from argument by elimination. Fitting.[30] Arguments from arbitrariness turn on the observation that there would
seem to be no ontologically significant difference between certain ordinary
Some respond to the argument by maintaining that it is indeterminate
and extraordinary objects, that is, no difference between them that can
which of various objects ‘Theseus II’ picks out. If that’s right, then ST2 is
account for why there would be things of the one kind but not the other.
arguably false. One cannot infer the existence of an individual who is
Here is an example (drawn from Hawthorne 2006: vii):
indeterminately identical to Sue from the fact that it is indeterminate
whether Sue (or rather Morgan) is Harry’s best friend. Analogously, one (AR1) There are islands.
cannot infer the existence of an individual that is indeterminately identical (AR2) There is no ontologically significant difference between islands
to the mended ship from the fact that it is indeterminate whether Theseus and incars.
II is the mended ship.[31] (AR3) If there is no ontologically significant difference between islands

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and incars, then: if there are islands then there are incars. to cease to exist when their matter ceases to be inside a garage. But
(AR4) So, there are incars. islands, contra hypothesis, do not cease to exist when they are completely
submerged; they merely cease to be islands.[36]
The idea behind AR2 is that islands and incars (see §1.3) would seem to
be objects of broadly the same sort, namely, objects that go out of How about AR3? Part of why it seems arbitrary to countenance islands but
existence simply by virtue of changing their orientation with respect to not incars is that one would seem to be privileging islands over incars by
some other thing (the water level in the one case, the garage in the other), virtue of taking them to exist. For this reason, proponents of certain
without their constitutive matter undergoing any intrinsic change. The idea deflationary ontological views are well positioned to deny AR3.
behind AR3 is that, if there truly are islands but no incars, then this is Relativists, for instance, may maintain that islands exist and incars do not
something that would seem to stand in need of explanation: there would exist—relative to our conceptual scheme, that is. Relative to other, equally
have to be something in virtue of which it’s the case. To think otherwise good schemes, incars exist and islands do not. Quantifier variantists, who
would be to take the facts about what exists to be arbitrary in a way that maintain that there are counterparts of our quantifiers that are on a par
they plausibly are not. with ours and that range over things that do not exist—but rather exist*—
may maintain that islands exist but do not exist* while incars exist* but do
Similar arguments may be used to establish the existence of leg not exist. On such views, islands and incars receive a uniform treatment at
complements (on the grounds that there’s no ontologically significant bottom; islands are not getting any sort of “special treatment” that cries
difference between them and legs) and trout-turkeys (on the grounds that out for explanation.[37]
there’s no ontologically significant difference between them and scattered
objects like solar systems).[34] 2.6 Debunking Arguments
Eliminativists may of course resist the argument by denying AR1.[35]
We encounter some atoms arranged treewise and some atoms arranged
The argument may also be resisted by denying AR2 and identifying some dogwise, and we naturally take there to be a dog and a tree. But there are
ontologically significant difference between islands and incars. For different ways we might have carved up such a situation into objects.
instance, a certain sort of anti-realist will say that which objects there are Instead of taking there to be a tree there, we might instead have taken
is largely determined by which objects we take there to be. Accordingly, there to be a trog: a partly furry, partly wooden object composed of the
the very fact that we take there to be islands but not incars marks an dog and the tree-trunk.
ontologically significant difference between them. Alternatively, one may
Why, though, do we naturally take there to trees rather than trogs?
attempt to identify an ontologically significant difference between the
Plausibly, this is largely the result of various biological and cultural
ordinary and extraordinary objects without endorsing anti-realism. In the
contingencies. If so, then there arguably is little reason to expect that our
case at hand, one might resist AR2 by insisting that islands have
beliefs about which objects there are would be even approximately
importantly different persistence conditions from incars. Incars are meant

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correct. This realization, in turn, is meant to debunk our beliefs about Such debunking arguments fall short of establishing that eliminativism is
which objects there are: true or that conservatism is false. But, if successful, they do lend powerful
support to eliminativism, by effectively neutralizing any reasons we might
(DK1) There is no explanatory connection between how we believe the take ourselves to have for accepting conservatism or for wanting to resist
world to be divided up into objects the how the world actually is the arguments for eliminativism.[39]
divided up into objects.
(DK2) If so, then it would be a coincidence if our object beliefs turned The arguments also lend indirect support to permissivism, insofar as
out to be correct. permissivists are well positioned to deny DK2. By permissivist lights,
(DK3) If it would be a coincidence if our object beliefs turned out to be having accurate beliefs about which kinds of objects there are is a trivial
correct, then we shouldn’t believe that there are trees. accomplishment (not a coincidence), since there are objects answering to
(DK4) So, we shouldn’t believe that there are trees. virtually every way that we might have perceptually and conceptually
divided up a situation into objects. The ordinary and extraordinary objects
The idea behind DK1 is that we are inclined to believe in trees rather than are all already out there waiting to be noticed; all that our conventions do
trogs largely because prevailing conventions in the communities we were is determine which ones are selected for attention.[40]
born into generally prohibit treating some things as the parts of a single
object unless they are connected or in some other way unified. These Deflationists also seem well positioned to deny DK2. Relativists will say
conventions themselves likely trace back to an innate tendency to perceive that, while we could easily have divided up the world differently, we could
only certain arrays of qualities as being borne by a single object and its not easily had divided up the world incorrectly. For had we divided the
being adaptive for creatures like us to so perceive the world. But the facts world into trogs rather than trees, we would then have had a different
about which distributions of atoms do compose something, or about which conceptual scheme, and we would have correctly believed that trogs exist-
arrays of qualities truly are borne by a single object, have no role to play relative-to-that-scheme. Quantifier variantists will say that, had we divided
in explaining why this is adaptive. Thus, it would seem that we divide up the world into trogs but not trees, we would then have correctly believed
the world into objects the way that we do for reasons having nothing at all that trogs exist*.[41]
to do with how the world actually is divided up.
Alternatively, one might try to resist DK1 by identifying an explanatory
The idea behind DK2 is that if there truly is this sort of disconnect connection between the way the world is divided up and our beliefs about
between the object facts and the factors that lead us to our object beliefs, how it is divided up. For instance, one might say that we have the object
then it could only be a lucky coincidence if those factors led us to beliefs beliefs that we do as a result of intelligent design: God, wanting us to have
that lined up with the object facts. And the idea behind DK3 is that since largely accurate beliefs, arranged for us to have experiences that represent
we have no rational grounds for believing that we got lucky, we shouldn’t trees and not trogs. Or one might take a rationalist line, according to
believe that we did, in which case we should suspend our beliefs about which, through some capacity for rational insight, we intellectually
which objects there are and, in particular, our belief that there are trees.[38] apprehend relevant facts about which objects together compose

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something. Or one might opt for an anti-realist line and insist that there is look to be in tension with the plausible claim that there is a complete
a mind-to-world explanatory connection: object beliefs determine the causal explanation for every physical event wholly in terms of
object facts and are therefore an excellent guide to which kinds exist.[42] microphysical items. Moreover, this line of response would seem to
require that baseballs have emergent properties—causally efficacious
2.7 Overdetermination Arguments properties that cannot be accounted for in terms of the properties of their
atomic parts—which seems implausible.[44]
Overdetermination arguments aim to establish that ordinary objects of
various kinds do not exist, by way of showing that there is no distinctive OD2 can be motivated as follows:
causal work for them to do. Here is one such argument:
(OD6) If an event is caused by a baseball and by atoms arranged
(OD1) Every event caused by a baseball is caused by atoms arranged baseballwise, then the event is overdetermined by the baseball
baseballwise. and atoms arranged baseballwise.
(OD2) No event caused by atoms arranged baseballwise is caused by a (OD7) No event is overdetermined by a baseball and atoms arranged
baseball. baseballwise.
(OD3) So, no events are caused by baseballs. (OD2) So, no event caused by atoms arranged baseballwise is caused
(OD4) If no events are caused by baseballs, then baseballs do not exist. by a baseball.
(OD5) So, baseballs do not exist.[43]
Let us say that an event e is overdetermined by o1 and o2 just in case:
For the purposes of this argument, ‘atoms’ may be understood as a
(i) o1 causes e,
placeholder for whichever microscopic objects or stuff feature in the best
(ii) o2 causes e,
microphysical explanations of observable reality. These may turn out to be
(iii) o1 is not causally relevant to o2’s causing e,
the composite atoms of chemistry, they may be mereological simples, or
(iv) o2 is not causally relevant to o1’s causing e, and
they may even be a nonparticulate “quantum froth”.
(v) o1≠ o2.
One could resist OD1 by maintaining that some things that are caused by
This can be taken as a stipulation about how ‘overdetermined’ is to be
baseballs are not also caused by their atoms. On one way of developing
understood in the argument, thus preempting nebulous debates about
this line of response, baseballs “trump” their atoms: atoms arranged
whether satisfying these five conditions suffices for “real” or “genuine”
baseballwise can’t collectively cause anything to happen so long as they’re
overdetermination. To say that o1 is causally relevant to o2’s causing e is
parts of the baseball. On another, there is a division of causal labor:
to say that o1 enters into the explanation of how o2 causes e to occur in
baseballs cause events involving macroscopic items like the shattering of
one of the following ways: by causing o2 to cause e, by being caused by
windows, while their atoms cause events involving microscopic items like
o2 to cause e, by jointly causing e together with o2, or—where o2 is a
the scatterings of atoms arranged windowwise. Both strategies, however,
plurality of objects—by being one of them.[45]

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Can OD6 be resisted? The idea would have to be that, although some of the relevant events wholly in terms of the activities of the atoms. And
events are caused both by atoms and by baseballs composed of those the debunking arguments in §2.6 purport to show that our ordinary
atoms, those events are not overdetermined (in the indicated sense). But if perceptual reasons for believing in baseballs are no good. So we would
they are not overdetermined, then which of the five conditions for seem to have no good reason at all to accept that there are baseballs, in
overdetermination do the baseball and the atoms fail to meet? This line of which case we ought to accept OD7.[47]
response takes for granted that (i) and (ii) are satisfied. And it is extremely
plausible that (iii) and (iv) would be satisfied as well. However it is that Premise OD4 can be motivated in much the same way as OD7. If
baseballs “get in on the action”, it isn’t by entering into the causal baseballs don’t cause anything to happen, then we have no good reason to
explanation of how the atoms manage to cause things. Baseballs don’t believe in them, in which case we should accept OD4. One might also
cause their atoms to shatter windows, nor do their atoms cause them to give a more direct defense of OD4 by appealing to the controversial
shatter windows. So those who would deny OD6 will need to deny that Eleatic Principle (a.k.a. Alexander’s Dictum), according to which
condition (v) is satisfied, by taking the baseball to be identical to the everything that exists has causal powers. Together with the plausible
atoms. See §3.3 below for discussion of the thesis that objects are identical assumption that if baseballs don’t cause anything it’s because they can’t
to their various parts. cause anything, the Eleatic Principle entails OD4.[48]

Why accept OD7? In certain cases, overdetermination strikes us as an 2.8 The Problem of the Many
overt violation of Ockham’s Razor: do not multiply entities beyond
necessity. But given the intimate connection between baseballs and their The office appears to contain a single wooden desk. The desk is
atoms, it is natural to feel that even if these do count as cases of constituted by a single hunk of wood whose surface forms a sharp
overdetermination (in the indicated sense), this isn’t an especially boundary with the environment, without even a single cellulose molecule
objectionable sort of overdetermination. One may then attempt to resist coming loose from the others. Call this hunk of wood ‘Woodrow’. Now
OD7 by articulating a further condition which distinguishes problematic consider the object consisting of all of Woodrow’s parts except for a single
from unproblematic cases of overdetermination. For instance, one might cellulose molecule, ‘Molly’, making up part of Woodrow’s surface. Call
hold that overdetermination by o1 and o2 is unproblematic so long as o1 this ever-so-slightly smaller hunk of wood ‘Woodrow-minus’. Because
and o2 aren’t entirely independent.[46] Woodrow-minus is extraordinarily similar to Woodrow, there is
considerable pressure to accept that Woodrow-minus is a desk as well.
Even supposing, however, that the line between objectionable and This, in short, is the problem of the many.
unobjectionable sorts of overdetermination can be drawn in some
satisfactory way, there would still be pressure to accept OD7. We should (PM1) Woodrow is a desk iff Woodrow-minus is a desk.
accept that something other than the atoms shatters the window only if we (PM2) If so, then it is not the case that there is exactly one desk in the
have good reason to believe in this something. But there is no explanatory office.
need to posit baseballs, since there is a complete causal explanation for all (PM3) There is exactly one desk in the office.

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PM1 and PM2 straightforwardly entail that PM3 is false; one of these PM1ʹ can be resisted by proponents of the supervaluationist strategy
claims has to go.[49] sketched in §2.1 above. The vague term ‘desk’ has multiple
precisifications, some of which apply to Woodrow-plus, some of which
PM1 is plausible. Woodrow-minus seems to have everything that it takes apply to Woodrow-minus, but none of which applies to both. Accordingly,
to be a desk: it looks like a desk, it’s shaped like a desk, it’s got a flat PM1ʹ is false on some precisifications, and therefore is not true simpliciter.
writing surface, and so forth. Accordingly, it seems arbitrary to suppose [52]
that Woodrow but not Woodrow-minus is a desk. Moreover, if Molly were
removed, Woodrow-minus would certainly then be a desk. But since Constitutional pluralists can deny both PM2 and PM2ʹ. Regarding the
Woodrow-minus doesn’t itself undergo any interesting change when Molly original story, they may insist that neither Woodrow nor Woodrow-minus
is removed (after all, Molly isn’t even part of Woodrow-minus), it stands is a desk. Each is a mere hunk of wood, and no mere hunk of wood is a
to reason that Woodrow-minus must likewise be a desk even while Molly desk. Rather, there is exactly one desk, it is constituted by Woodrow, and
is attached to it. while Woodrow-minus would constitute that desk if Molly were removed,
as things stand it constitutes nothing at all. Regarding the revised story,
One might deny PM1 on the grounds that being a desk is a “maximal” pluralists may again say that there is exactly one desk, neither Woodrow-
property, that is, a property of an object that cannot be shared by large plus nor Woodrow-minus is a desk, and it is simply indeterminate whether
parts of that object. Since Woodrow is a desk, and since Woodrow-minus it is Woodrow-plus or Woodrow-minus that constitutes that desk. In that
is a large part of Woodrow, Woodrow-minus is not a desk.[50] case, PM2ʹ is false. It’s true that each is a desk iff the other is—since
neither is a desk—but it doesn’t follow that there’s more than one or fewer
But this style of response can be rendered unavailable by introducing an
than one desk.[53]
element of vagueness into our story. Suppose now that Molly has begun to
come loose from the other molecules, in such a way that it is naturally Finally, one might deny PM3, either by accepting an eliminative view on
described as being a borderline part of the desk in the office. Let which there is no desk in the office or by accepting a permissive view on
Woodrow-plus be the aggregate of cellulose molecules that definitely has which there is more than one desk in the office. Proponents of the latter
Molly as a part. PM1 can then be replaced with PM1ʹ: response will end up committed to far more than two desks, however. By
parity of reason, there will also be a desk composed of all of the cellulose
(PM1ʹ) Woodrow-plus is a desk iff Woodrow-minus is a desk.
molecules except Nelly (≠ Molly). Likewise for Ollie. And so on. So there
Woodrow-plus and Woodrow-minus each seem to have everything that it will be at least as many desks as there are cellulose molecules on the
takes to be a desk, and neither seems to be a better candidate than the other surface of the desk.[54]
for being a desk. PM2 would then be replaced with PM2ʹ:

(PM2ʹ) If Woodrow-plus is a desk iff Woodrow-minus is a desk, then: it

is not the case that there is exactly one desk in the office.[51]

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3. Against Revisionary Ontologies entirely compatible with there being non-ordinary finned-and-feathered
things like trout-turkeys. Universalists may then hold that the argument
3.1 Arguments from Counterexamples from counterexamples rests on an equivocation. If the quantifiers are
meant to be restricted to ordinary objects, then CX2 is true, but CX1 is
Universalism seems to conflict with our intuitive judgment that the front false: universalism does not entail that any ordinary things are trout-
halves of trout and the back halves of turkeys do not compose anything. turkeys. If on the other hand the quantifiers are meant to be entirely
Put another way, universalism seems to be open to fairly obvious unrestricted then CX2 is false; but in denying CX2 (so understood), one is
counterexamples. Here is an argument from counterexamples against not running afoul of anything we are inclined to say or believe or intuit.
universalism: [56]

(CX1) If universalism is true, then there are trout-turkeys. This is just one of many compatibilist strategies that have been deployed
(CX2) There are no trout-turkeys. in defense of revisionary views. Universalists have also invoked an
(CX3) So universalism is false. ambiguity in ‘object’ to explain the appeal of ‘there is no object that has
both fins and feathers’. Eliminativists have claimed that ordinary
Similar arguments may be lodged against other revisionary theses. The utterances of ‘there are statues’ are instances of “loose talk”, or that they
various forms of eliminativism wrongly imply that there are no statues; are context-sensitive, or that quantifiers are being used in a special
plenitudinism wrongly implies that there are incars; the doctrine of technical sense in the “ontology room”.[57]
arbitrary undetached parts wrongly implies that there are leg
complements; and so forth.[55] One common complaint about compatibilist accounts is that these
proposals about what we are saying and what we believe are linguistically
Compatibilist accounts of the apparent counterexamples take the targeted or psychologically implausible. For instance, when ordinary speakers are
revisionary views to be entirely compatible with the intuitions or beliefs speaking loosely or restricting their quantifiers, they will typically balk
that are meant to motivate CX2. Such accounts often take the form of when their remarks are taken at face value. (“There’s no beer anywhere in
assimilating recalcitrant ordinary utterances to some familiar linguistic the world?”) But this sort of evidence seems just to be missing in the cases
phenomenon that is known to be potentially misleading. For instance, at hand. (“You think there literally are statues?” “There’s nothing at all
when an ordinary speaker looks in the fridge and says ‘there’s no beer’, with both fins and feathers?”) Others have criticized compatibilist
she obviously doesn’t mean to be saying that there is no beer anywhere in strategies by pointing to limitations of their recipes for paraphrasing
the universe. Rather, she is tacitly restricting her quantifier to things that ordinary utterances. For instance, Uzquiano (2004: 434–435) argues that
are in the fridge. Universalists often suggest that something similar is the standard eliminativist strategy of paraphrasing constructions of the
going on when ordinary speakers say ‘there are no trout-turkeys’ (or form ‘there are Fs’ in terms of there being atoms arranged Fwise cannot be
‘there’s nothing that has both fins and feathers’). Speakers are tacitly adapted to handle constructions like ‘some Fs are touching each other’.[58]
restricting their quantifiers to ordinary objects, and what they are saying is

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Revisionaries may instead wish to give incompatibilist accounts of the To see the idea behind CH1, notice that both eliminativists and
putative counterexamples, conceding that the revisionary views they conservatives can agree that there are atoms arranged statuewise. The
defend are incompatible with ordinary belief (ordinary discourse, common question is whether the English sentence ‘there are statues’ should be
sense, intuition, etc.), but maintaining that the mistakes can be explained interpreted in such a way that the existence of such atoms suffices for it to
or excused. For instance, revisionaries may contend that the mistaken come out true. Let us call interpretations of ‘there are statues’ on which the
beliefs are nevertheless justified, so long as one is not aware of the existence of atoms arranged statuewise suffices for its truth liberal, and
defeaters that undercut our usual justification (e.g., those mentioned in interpretations on which that does not suffice for its truth demanding. The
§2.6). Or they may contend that ordinary speakers are not especially idea then is that, given the availability of both liberal and demanding
committed to these beliefs, which may in turn suggest that they do not interpretations, the former would clearly be more charitable. CH2 is
deserve to be treated as data for purposes of philosophical inquiry. Or they motivated by the thought that there are no other content-determining
may call attention to some respect in which the ordinary utterances and factors that favor a demanding interpretation over a liberal interpretation,
beliefs are “nearly as good as true”.[59] in which case charity wins out and ‘there are statues’ is true. CH3 looks to
be a straightforward application of a plausible disquotation principle: if
3.2 Arguments from Charity sentence S says that p, and S is true, then p.[60]

One way of approaching the question of whether there are statues is by One might challenge CH1 on the grounds that charitable interpretation is a
asking whether the correct interpretation of the English language is one holistic matter, and, while the liberal interpretations are charitable in some
according to which ordinary utterances of ‘there are statues’ come out true. respects, they are uncharitable in others. After all, the puzzles and
The interpretation of populations of speakers is plausibly governed by a arguments discussed in §2 seem to show that no interpretation can secure
principle of charity that prohibits the gratuitous ascription of false beliefs the truth of everything that we are inclined to say about ordinary objects.
and utterances to populations of speakers. Such a principle—which is For instance, the liberal interpretations on which MC1 comes out true
independently motivated by reflection on how it is that utterances come to (‘Athena and Piece exist’) must, on pain of contradiction, make at least
have the meanings that they do—can be put to work in arguments for the one of MC2 through MC4 come out false. But then some other intuitively
existence of ordinary objects and for the nonexistence of extraordinary true claim—perhaps, ‘Athena and Piece (if they exist) are identical’—will
objects. Here is one such argument from charity: come out false. The demanding interpretations on which MC1 comes out
false do better than the liberal interpretations on this score, since they can
(CH1) The most charitable interpretation of English is one on which make all of MC2 through MC4 come out true. This gain in charity might
ordinary utterances of ‘there are statues’ comes out true. then be held to counterbalance the loss in charity from rendering MC1
(CH2) If so, then ordinary utterances of ‘there are statues’ are true. false.[61]
(CH3) If ordinary utterances of ‘there are statues’ are true, then there
are statues. One might also challenge CH1 on the grounds that the principle of charity,
(CH4) So, there are statues. properly understood, demands only that the utterances and beliefs of

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ordinary speakers be reasonable, not that they be true. Since it looks to 3.3 Arguments from Entailment
ordinary speakers as if there are statues, and since they have no reason to
believe that appearances are misleading (having never encountered the Arguments from entailment purport to establish that eliminativism is self-
arguments for eliminativism), their utterances and beliefs would be defeating, insofar as certain things that eliminativists affirm entail the
reasonable even if false. The principle of charity, so understood, would not existence of the very ordinary objects that they wish to eliminate. Here is a
favor liberal interpretations over demanding interpretations.[62] representative argument from entailment:

Another strategy involves resisting the argument at CH2, by maintaining (ET1) There are atoms arranged statuewise.
that there are constraints beyond charity that favor the demanding (ET2) If there are atoms arranged statuewise, then there are statues.
interpretations. Charity, after all, is not the only factor involved in (ET3) So, there are statues.
determining the meanings of our utterances. Certain puzzles about content
determination have been thought to show that the content of an expression Now consider two arguments for ET2: the argument from identity and the
or utterance cannot be determined solely by which sentences we are argument from application conditions.
inclined to regard as true; it is also partly a matter of the relative
The argument from identity proceeds from the assumption that ordinary
“naturalness” or “eligibility” of candidate contents. One who accepts this
objects are identical to the smaller objects of which they are composed.
sort of account may maintain that the demanding interpretations, although
The statue, for instance, is identical to its atomic parts. Accordingly, by
less charitable, nevertheless assign more natural contents to English
affirming that there are atoms arranged statuewise, eliminativists let into
sentences than the liberal interpretations, for instance by assigning a more
their ontology the very things that they had intended to exclude.[65]
natural meaning to the quantifiers.[63]
However, the view that composites are identical to their parts is highly
Finally, CH3 may be resisted by compatibilists, according to whom what
controversial. One common objection is that the identity relation simply
ordinary speakers are saying is compatible with the eliminativist’s claim
isn’t the sort of relation that can hold between a single thing and many
that statues do not exist. Since ontological discussions (like this one) are
things. Another common objection is that ordinary objects have different
not carried out in ordinary English or ordinary contexts, one cannot infer
persistence conditions from their parts. For instance, the atoms arranged
that there are statues from the fact that ordinary speakers can truly say
statuewise, unlike the statue, will still exist if the statue disintegrates and
‘there are statues’, any more than I can infer that I am on the moon from
the atoms disperse. It would then seem to follow by Leibniz’s Law that the
the fact that an astronaut truly utters ‘I am on the moon’.[64]
atoms are not identical to the statue.[66]

The argument from application conditions arises out of some general

considerations about how it is that kind terms refer to what they do.
Suppose an archaeologist uncovers an unfamiliar artifact, gestures towards
it, and introduces the name ‘woodpick’ for things of that kind. Yet there

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are numerous things before her: the woodpick, the woodpick’s handle, the 3.4 Arguments from Coincidence
facing surface of the woodpick, etc. Furthermore, the woodpick itself
belongs to numerous kinds: woodpick, tool, artifact, etc. So how is it that The material constitution puzzles from §2.3 can be repurposed as
‘woodpick’ came to denote woodpicks rather than something else? (This is arguments against two forms of permissivism: universalism and the
an instance of what is known as the qua problem.) It must be because the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts (DAUP). The basic idea behind both
speaker associates certain application conditions and perhaps other arguments is that permissivists end up committed to objects that are
descriptive information with the term ‘woodpick’, which single out distinct and yet share all of their parts, which is impossible.[70]
woodpicks—rather than all tools or just the facing surfaces of woodpicks
—as the denotation of the term. And the same is plausibly so for already- Here is a coincidence argument against universalism. Let the ks be the
entrenched kind terms like ‘statue’: their reference is largely determined atoms that presently compose my kitchen table, K, and let us suppose that
by the application conditions that speakers associate with them.[67] there is some time, t, long before the table itself was made, at which the ks
all existed.
Armed with this account of reference determination, one might then argue
for ET2 as follows. The application conditions that competent speakers (CU1) If universalism is true, then there is some object, F, that the ks
associate with ‘statue’—together with facts about the distribution of atoms composed at t.
—determine whether it applies to something. But these applications (CU2) If the ks composed F at t, then F exists now.
conditions are fairly undemanding: nothing further is required for their (CU3) If F exists now, then F = K.
satisfaction than that there be atoms arranged statuewise. Accordingly, so (CU4) If F = K, then K existed at t.
long as there are atoms arranged statuewise, ‘statue’ does apply to (CU5) K did not exist at t.
something, from which it trivially follows that there are statues.[68] (CU6) So, universalism is false.

This argument may be resisted on the grounds that the application CU1 looks to be a consequence of universalism, given our assumption that
conditions that ordinary speakers associate with ‘statue’ aren’t quite so the ks all existed at t. The idea behind CU2 is that there would seem to be
undemanding. It’s not enough simply that there be atoms arranged only two nonarbitrary accounts of the persistence conditions of the widely
statuewise. Rather, there must be an object that is composed of the atoms scattered fusion F: (i) that F exists for as long as the ks are in precisely the
—and (eliminativists might go on to insist) there are no such objects. arrangement that they enjoy at t or (ii) that F exists for as long as the ks
However, those who are moved by the qua problem might respond that exist. Option (i) imposes an implausibly severe constraint on the sorts of
‘object’ itself must be associated with application conditions, which are changes an object can survive, which leaves us with option (ii)—from
likewise sufficiently undemanding as to be satisfied so long as there are which it follows that, since the ks exist now, so does F. The idea behind
atoms arranged statuewise.[69] CU3 is that there cannot be distinct objects which (like F and K) have
exactly the same parts and exactly the same location. CU4 is a
straightforward consequence of Leibniz’s Law: F by hypothesis existed at

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t, so if F = K then K must also have existed at t. As for CU5, tables t1 and t2 that could threaten its existence; all that happens is that it is
plausibly are essentially tables, in which case K could not have existed separated from something (Molly) that was not even a part of it. CD3, like
before the table was made. CU3, is motivated by the intuition that objects with the same parts and
same location must be identical. CD4 is an application of the transitivity
Here are some options for resisting the argument (some mirroring of identity: Woodrow-minus1 = Woodrow-minus2, so if Woodrow-minus2
responses to the puzzles of material constitution). One can deny CU2 on = Woodrow2, then (by transitivity) Woodrow-minus1 = Woodrow2; and
the grounds that table is the “dominant kind”, and once K comes into since Woodrow2 = Woodrow1, it follows (by transitivity) that Woodrow-
existence, it takes F’s place and F is annihilated. Constitutional pluralists minus1 = Woodrow1. Finally, CD5 is a straightforward consequence of
can deny CU3 and affirm that F ≠ K, perhaps granting that distinct objects Leibniz’s Law: Woodrow-minus1 and Woodrow1 have different parts and
can have exactly the same parts and location, or insisting that F and K thus cannot be identical.
have different (e.g., temporal) parts. Or one can deny CU5, insisting that
K is only contingently a table and (like F) was once a scattered fusion.[71] As with the argument against universalism, one can resist this argument by
denying CD2 and insisting that once Molly is removed, Woodrow-minus
Now for the coincidence argument against DAUP. Take the example of is “dominated” by Woodrow and ceases to exist. Or one can deny CD3
Woodrow and Woodrow-minus from §2.8. At t1, Molly the cellulose and insist that Woodrow and Woodrow-minus are distinct at t2 despite
molecule is a part of Woodrow and at t2 Molly is removed and destroyed. having all the same material parts at t2. Or one can deny CD4 by insisting
Let Woodrow1 be that (if anything) which ‘Woodrow’ picks out at t1; that Woodrow has all of its parts essentially, in which case Woodrow1 ≠
Woodrow2, that (if anything) which ‘Woodrow’ picks out at t2; and Woodrow2.[72]
mutatis mutandis for Woodrow-minus1 and Woodrow-minus2. Here is the
argument: 3.5 Arguments from Gunk and Junk
(CD1) If DAUP is true, then Woodrow-minus1 exists.
A “gunky” object is a composite object all of whose parts themselves have
(CD2) If Woodrow-minus1 exists, then Woodrow-minus2 exists.
parts. The mere possibility of gunky objects underwrites an argument
(CD3) If Woodrow-minus2 exists, then Woodrow-minus2 = Woodrow2.
against the nihilist thesis that (actually) there are no composite objects.
(CD4) If Woodrow-minus2 = Woodrow2, then Woodrow-minus1 =
Woodrow1. (GK1) It is possible for there to be gunky objects.
(CD5) Woodrow-minus1 ≠ Woodrow1. (GK2) If gunky objects are possible, then nihilism isn’t necessarily
(CD6) So, DAUP is false. true.
(GK3) If nihilism isn’t necessarily true, then nihilism isn’t actually true.
CD1 looks trivial: DAUP guarantees that there is an arbitrary undetached
(GK4) So, nihilism is false.
part of Woodrow composed of all of its parts other than Molly. The idea
behind CD2 is that Woodrow-minus doesn’t undergo any change between

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GK1 is plausible. It seems easy enough to imagine gunky objects, for are thought not to be “distinct” in the relevant sense). But assuming that it
instance by imagining an object with a right and left half, each of which does, then it will rule out any principle of composition according to which
itself has a right and left half, which themselves have right and left halves simples in certain arrangements cannot fail to compose something—for
… “all the way down”, and never terminating in simple parts. Moreover, it this would be to impose a necessary connection between simples being in
may even be that actually all objects are gunky. GK2 is trivial: if there are that arrangement and the existence of a (numerically distinct) whole that
gunky objects in world w, then there is something with parts in w, in they compose. And if we cannot in general expect theories of composition
which case there are composites in w and nihilism is false in w. GK3 is to be necessary if true, we should not expect nihilism to be necessary if
plausible as well: the actual world contains what would seem to be true.[75]
paradigm cases of composites (trees, etc.), so if composition occurs
anywhere, it surely occurs here. Moreover, nihilism is meant to be an Just as the possibility of infinite descent can be wielded against nihilism,
answer to the special composition question, and one would expect such an the possibility of infinite ascent can be wielded against universalism. Let
answer to be giving necessary and sufficient conditions for composition— us say that a world is “junky” iff every object in that world is a part of
in which case one would expect proponents of nihilism to regard it as a some further object.
necessary truth.[73]
(JK1) Junky worlds are possible.
Some will deny GK1. What does seem obviously possible (and easily (JK2) If junky worlds are possible, then universalism isn’t necessarily
imaginable) for there to be certain kinds of infinite descent. But infinite true.
descent need not be mereological. For instance, it does seem possible for (JK3) If universalism isn’t necessarily true, then universalism isn’t
there to be objects that can be divided into two halves, and whose halves actually true.
can in turn be divided into two halves, and so on. But it is controversial (JK4) So, universalism is false.
whether the fact that o can be divided into two halves, h1 and h2, entails
The idea behind JK1 is supposed to be that, just as there is no logical or
that o is not simple. One might deny that h1 and h2 exist at all before the
conceptual barrier to an infinite descent of parts, there is no logical or
division: they are brought into existence when o is divided and, a fortiori,
conceptual barrier to an infinite ascent of wholes. (Though not everyone
are not parts of o prior to division. Or one might concede that, prior to
finds themselves able to conceive of junky worlds.) The idea behind JK2
division, h1 and h2 exist and are partially colocated with o, but deny that
runs as follows. According to universalism, every plurality of objects has a
they are thereby parts of o.[74]
fusion, and, in particular, the plurality consisting of all things has a fusion.
One might instead reject GK3 on the grounds that it runs afoul of “Hume’s But there can be no fusion of all things in a junky world. For that fusion
Dictum”, according to which there can be no necessary connections would have to be a part of something (since the world is junky); but if it
among distinct existences. There is some controversy about how best to already has everything as a part, there is nothing left for it to be a part of.
understand Hume’s Dictum and, in particular, whether it prohibits JK3 can be motivated in much the same way as GK3: universalism is
necessary connections even between overlapping items (which typically meant to be an answer to the special composition question, and thus will

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presumably be necessary if true. The strategies considered above for quantifier is a fundamental quantifier, that does not obviously entail that
resisting the gunk argument seem to apply equally to the junk argument— everything in its domain (namely: everything) is fundamental as well.[79]
one can, for instance, deny that we are imagining what we think we are, or
one can invoke Hume’s Dictum and deny that universalism is necessary if Even so, one might deny that the ordinary existential quantifier is a
true.[76] fundamental quantifier on grounds of parsimony. Explanations involving
quantifiers whose domains include nonfundamental objects (the idea goes)
4. Fundamental Existents will be less parsimonious than explanations involving quantifiers whose
domains include only fundamental objects. And since the ordinary
As we have seen, there are some who deny that ordinary composite existential quantifier includes nonfundamental objects (e.g., ordinary
objects exist, and we have examined some of their reasons for embracing composites), it will be less fundamental than restricted quantifiers ranging
one or another form of eliminativism. But there are also some who grant only over fundamental objects.[80]
that ordinary objects exist but deny that they exist fundamentally. This is
How do these stances on fundamentality—that ordinary objects are not
an importantly different claim, which can be spelled out in either of two
fundamental or are not in the domain of fundamental quantifiers—
importantly different ways.[77]
compare to the eliminativist theses discussed above? Although there is a
First, one might deny that any ordinary composite objects are superficial resemblance, the differences are manifest when we consider
fundamental, that is, one can insist that there is something in which they how the views interact with the arguments against conservatism in §2.
are grounded. Even those who think that ordinary objects exist will likely Eliminativists, who say that ordinary objects do not exist, can accept AV5,
find it natural to suppose that no ordinary composites are fundamental: all DK4, OD5, SR4, and ST8 and can reject AR1, MC1, and PM3 in the
ordinary composites are ultimately going to be grounded in their simple arguments above, since the latter affirm, and the former deny, the
microscopic parts.[78] existence of ordinary objects. But those who are willing to deny only that
ordinary objects exist fundamentally (in one or the other sense) must find
On the second understanding of the claim that ordinary objects do not some other way of addressing the arguments.
exist fundamentally, the idea is that they are not in the domain of a
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Academic Tools ‘compose’, which prohibits things that share parts (e.g., my hand and
fingers) from together composing something.
How to cite this entry.
Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP 3. Hossack (2000), Dorr (2005), Grupp (2006), Contessa (2014), Brenner
Society. (2015a, 2015b, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, forthcoming), Benovsky (2018),
Look up this entry topic at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Caves (2018), and Kantin (forthcoming) defend the microphysicalist
Project (InPhO). version of nihilism. Horgan (1991: §2, 1993: §2), Horgan and Potrč (2000,
Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links 2008: Ch. 7, 2012), Rea (2001), Cornell (2016), and Builes (forthcoming:
to its database. §4) defend existence monism; see Sider (2007a), Goff (2012), Lowe
(2012, 2013b), and Schaffer (2012) for criticism. Sidelle (1998: §§4–6),
Other Internet Resources Turner (2011), and Le Bihan (2013, 2015, 2016) explore the extreme
nihilist view that there are no objects; cf. Cowling (2014). See Siderits
[Please contact the author with suggestions.]
(2003: Ch. 4) for discussion of nihilism in the Buddhist tradition. See
Toner (2006), Williams (2006b: §5), Liggins (2008), Saucedo (2011: §6),
Related Entries Contessa (2014), Goldwater (2015), and Long (2019) on attempts to
emergent properties | grounding, metaphysical | identity: over time | many, reconcile nihilism with the existence of ordinary objects. See van Inwagen
problem of | material constitution | mereology | metaphysics | monism | (1990: 109), Merricks (2001: §1.1), Lowe (2005a: 527–531), Elder (2007:
personal identity | Sorites paradox | temporal parts | vagueness §1, 2011: §6.1), Williamson (2007: 219), Korman (2011), Tallant (2014),
Brenner (2015a), and Goswick (2018b: 147–148) for discussion of the
Notes to Ordinary Objects ‘arranged K-wise’ locution.

4. See van Inwagen (1990: Ch. 9) on organicism. Other eliminativists who

1. For defenses of conservatism, see Sanford (1993), Hirsch (1993, 2002a,
make an exception for (at least some) organisms, but who do not
2005), Markosian (1998a, 2008, 2014), Elder (2004, 2011), Simons
necessarily endorse organicism, include Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997),
(2006), Lowe (2007), Koslicki (2008), Gilmore (2010), Korman (2010,
Merricks (2001: §4.6, 2017), and Olson (2007: §§9.4–9.5). See Dowland
2015b, forthcoming), Kriegel (2011), Carmichael (2015), Beebee (2017),
(2016) for a related view which eliminates organisms but makes an
Pearce (2017), Remhof (2017: ch.8), Bowers (2019), and Petersen (2019).
exception for brains. See also Lowe (2011: §§8–9) and Evnine (2016a: Ch.
See deRosset (forthcoming) on how (not) to formulate conservatism.
6) who affirm the existence of organisms and artifacts, but eliminate non-
2. See van Inwagen (1990: 17) and Markosian (2000) for more on the organic natural objects (like mountains).
relevant use of ‘object’. See Simons (1987: 11) on the reflexive use of
5. The special composition question is due to van Inwagen (1990: Ch. 2);
‘part’. See van Inwagen (1990: 29) for a more demanding use of
see Hestevold (1981) for a precursor, and see Markosian (1998a, 2008),

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Simons (2006: §§3–4), Kriegel (2008), Vander Laan (2010), Newman nor is it clear that it entails four-dimensionalism (see Lowe 2005b, Miller
(2013), Silva (2013), Carmichael (2015), Beebee (2017), Balaguer (2018), 2005, Heller 2008: 91–93, Kurtsal Steen 2010, and Magidor 2015 and
Bowers (2019), Petersen (2019), and Spencer (forthcoming) for further 2016: §3.1).
discussion. See van Inwagen (1990: 138–140), Zimmerman (1999: 121–
122), Merricks (2001: Chs. 4–5), Rea (2001: §2.2), Eklund (2002: §§4–5), 9. The example of incars is due to Hirsch (1976: §2, 1982: 32). Advocates
and Carroll and Carter (2005) on concerns about the stability of of plenitudinism (or something in the vicinity) include Fine (1982: 100,
eliminativist views that make an exception for organisms. 1999: 73), Sosa (1987: 178–179, 1999: 142–143), Yablo (1987: 307),
Hawley (2001: 6–7), Bennett (2004: §4), Hawthorne (2006: vii–viii),
6. For more on non-nihilistic eliminativism, see Unger (1979a, 1979c, Johnston (2006: §17), Thomasson (2007: §10.3), Eklund (2008: §4),
1980), Heller (1990: §§2.4–2.5), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997: Ch. 5), Leslie (2011), Cameron (2014: 103–104), Inman (2014), Sattig (2015: 25),
and Van Cleve (2008: §2). Thomasson (2015: §6.1), Cotnoir (2016b), Dasgupta (2016: §5), Barker
and Jago (2018: 2984), and Fairchild and Hawthorne (2018). See Fairchild
7. The example of trout-turkeys is due to Lewis (1991: 7–8). Proponents (2019) on how to (and not to) formulate the plenitudinism. See Eklund
of universalism include Leśniewski (1916/1922), Leonard and Goodman (2006: 111–115), Elder (2011: §1.4), Evnine (2016b: §5.4), Fairchild
(1940), Goodman and Quine (1947), Cartwright (1975), Quine (1981a: (2017), and Spencer (2020) for criticism of various forms of
10), Thomson (1983: 216–217), Lewis (1986: 212–213, 1991: §1.3), Van plenitudinism; others critics will be cited below in connection with
Cleve (1986, 2008), Heller (1990: §2.9), Jubien (1993), Armstrong (1997: specific arguments.
13), Sider (1997: §3.1, 2001a: §4.9), Rea (1998), Fine (1999: 73), Hudson
(2000, 2001: §3.8, 2006: 636), Morreau (2002: 337), Varzi (2003), 10. Proponents of DAUP include Carter (1983), Zimmerman (1996: §4),
Bigelow and Pargetter (2006), Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006), Baker and Hudson (2001: 88). For criticism, see van Inwagen (1981), Markosian
(2007: 191–193), Schaffer (2009b: 358), Parsons (2013: 328), Noonan (1998: 242–243), McDaniel (2007: 138–141), and Carmichael (2020).
(2014: 1057), Sattig (2015: 13–14), Thomasson (2015: 221), Bricker
(2016), Cotnoir (2016a, 2016b), and Lando (2017: Part 3). Critics include 11. Sorites arguments for eliminativism have been advanced by Unger
Comesaña (2008), Elder (2008, 2011: Ch. 7), Effingham (2011b, 2011c), (1979a, 1979b, 1979c), Wheeler (1979: §3), and Horgan and Potrč (2008:
Bailey (2016) Evnine (2016a: §6.2.1), and Saenz (2018); others will be §2.4).
cited below in connection with specific arguments.
12. See Heller (1990: §2.8), Merricks (2001: §2.2), Horgan and Potrč
8. The example of klables is due to Shoemaker (1979, 1988: 201). See (2008: §2.4), and Benovsky (2018: 10–14).
Sider (1997: §3.3, 2001a: §4.9.3) in defense of diachronic universalism;
13. See Sanford (1979: §1), Tye (1990: §3), Elder (2000: §1), Sider
see Markosian (2004: §2), Balashov (2005, 2007) and Miller (2005: 321–
(2001a: 188), and Thomasson (2007: §5.3).
322) for criticism. While many four-dimensionalists accept diachronic
universalism, it is not entailed by four-dimensionalism (see Heller 1993),

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14. See Unger (1979a: §3, 1979b: 128–130), Heller (1990: §§2.8–2.10), Hawthorne (2006: 106), Baker (2007: 130–132), Donnelly (2009: §5),
Williamson (1994: §4.6), and Horgan and Potrč (2008: 25–26). See Effingham (2009), Elder (2011: §7.1), Wake (2011: §3), Woodward (2011:
Williamson (1994: Ch. 6) on the broader repercussions of embracing §3), Williamson (2013: 7 n.9), Nolan (2014: §5), Korman (2015b: Ch.
sorites reasoning. 9.4), Korman and Carmichael (2016: §4.4), Magidor (2016: §3.2.2), and
Pearce (2017: §3); cf. Gallois (2004: 652).
15. The argument from vagueness is advanced by Lewis (1986: 212–213),
Sider (1997: §3.1, 2001a: §4.9.1), Varzi (2005), Van Cleve (2008: §3), and 20. For discussion of vague quantifiers and vague existence, see van
Lando (2017: ch. 13) in defense of universalism. See Heller (2000) for a Inwagen (1990: Ch. 19), Lewis (1991: 80–1), Hirsch (1999: 149–151,
related argument. See Noonan (2010) on the relation between Lewis’s and 2000: 42–43, 2002b: 65–66, 2004a: 663, 2008b: 376), Hossack (2000:
Sider’s formulations of the argument. Sider (1997: §3.3, 2001a: §4.9.3, 428), Sider (2001a: 128–130, 2003a, 2009a), Hawley (2002, 2004),
2008a: §4) shows how a structurally similar argument can be given for Koslicki (2003, 2008: 34–40), Barnes (2005, 2013), Dorr (2005: 248
diachronic universalism; see Koslicki (2003: §3) and Balashov (2005: §3) n.25), López de Sa (2006), Liebesman and Eklund (2007), Campdelacreu
for criticism. See Wallace (2014), Graham (2015), and Korman (2015b: (2010), Båve (2011), Woodward (2011: §5), Korman (2014b, 2015b:
18–19) for modalized versions of the argument. §9.5), Torza (2017), Loss (2018a), and Goldwater (forthcoming a: §6.1).

16. See Markosian (1998a: 237–239, 2004: 668–669), Sider (2001a: 123– 21. The example of Piece and Athena is due to Paul (2006: 625). See Rea
124 and 130–132), Merricks (2005, 2007), Hawthorne (2006: 107–109), (1995) for discussion of the different varieties of constitution puzzles. See
Nolan (2006: 725–728), Simons (2006: 603–604), Smith (2006), Barnes Fine (2003, 2006), Bennett (2004: 340–341), Frances (2006), King (2006),
(2007), Cameron (2007: 114–117), Tahko (2009), Kurtsal Steen (2014, Paul (2010: 583), and Almotahari (2014, 2017) on versions of the puzzle
2019), Korman (2015b: Ch. 9.3), Remhof (2017: §8.1), and Inman (2018: that turn on putative nonmodal differences. See Wallace (2011a: 804–805)
§6.1) for discussion of AV3. See Horgan (1993: §1), Markosian (1998a: and Cameron (2014: 98–99) on the colocation of objects and their parts.
§3), Hudson (2001: 22–25), Sider (2001a: 123–124 and 130–132), and
Gabriel (2017) on brute compositional facts. 22. Heller (1990: §§2.4–2.7), van Inwagen (1990: 125–127), Hoffman and
Rosenkrantz (1997: §5.2), Merricks (2001: §2.3), Olson (2007: §9.4), and
17. Merricks (2005: §5) and Hawthorne (2006: 106–109) defend this sort Benovsky (2018: 20–22) advance the problem of material constitution as
of strategy. See Papineau (1993: §4.8), Tye (1996b), Antony (2006, 2008), an argument for eliminativism; cf. Renz (2016). Rettler (2018) argues that
and Simon (2017b) on the possibility of borderline cases of consciousness. embracing mereological nihilism is not sufficient to block the argument.

18. See Howard-Snyder (1997: §4) and Sider (1997: 21–22, 2001a: 125– 23. Proponents of constitutional pluralism include: Quine (1953: §1),
127). Wiggins (1968, 2001), Perry (1970: §5), Kripke (1971: n.19), Chisholm
(1973: 590–591 and 601–602), Doepke (1982, 1986b), Fine (1982, 1999,
19. Carmichael (2011) defends this line of response. For other attempts to 2003, 2008), Hirsch (1982: 57–64, 2002a: §3, 2005: §5), Lowe (1983a,
secure vague composition without vague existence, see Smith (2005),

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1983b, 1989: Ch. 5, 2002, 2003b, 2009: Ch. 6, 2013a), Thomson (1983: (1986a), Oderberg (1996), Hughes (1997), Fine (2000, 2008: 106),
§6, 1998), Simons (1987: Ch. 6), Yablo (1987), Heller (1984: 332–333), Hershenov (2003), Johnston (2006: §§9–10), Korman (2015b: §11.1.2),
Johnston (1992, 2006: §8), Lewis (1993: 167–168), Tye (1996a: 222), and Evnine (2016a: §3.4.3).
Baker (1997, 2000, 2007), Hudson (2001: 57–61), McDaniel (2001: §3,
2004: §4), Paul (2002: §5, 2006), Moyer (2006), Thomasson (2006: §4, 26. Phasalists include Ayers (1974: 128–129), Price (1977), Tichý
2007: Ch. 4), Koslicki (2008, 2018a: Ch.4, 2018b), Mackie (2008), (1987/2004: §3), Jubien (1993: 37–40, 2001: 7), Markosian (2010: 143–
Cotnoir (2010), Crane (2012), Shoemaker (2012), Korman (2015b: Ch. 144), and Biro (2018: 1134–1137); see Olson (1996: §4, 2007: Ch. 3.2),
11), Evnine (2016a: §1.1.1), Lando (2017: Ch. 7), Longnecker (2018), Sidelle (1998: §2), and Korman (2015b: §11.1.1) for criticism.
Goldwater (forthcoming b), and Guillon (forthcoming). The labels
27. Burke (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1997, 2004) and Rea (2000) defend the
‘pluralism’ and ‘monism’ are from Fine (2003).
doctrine of dominant kinds; cf. Moran (2018). See Denkel (1995), Lowe
24. The grounding problem is advanced by Heller (1990: §2.1, 2008: 94– (1995), Noonan (1999b), Sider (2001a: 163–165, 2008a: §3.3), Stone
97), Burke (1992), Sidelle (1992a: 288, 2014, 2016), Zimmerman (1995: (2002), and Korman (2015b: §11.1.2) for criticism.
§9), Olson (1996: §3, 2001), Hawley (2001: 146–148), Merricks (2001:
28. See Lewis (1971, 1986: §4.5), Gibbard (1975: §5), Noonan (1988,
39–40), Shagrir (2002), Noonan (2015), van Elswyk (2018: §5), and
1991, 1993: §1), Sider (1996, 2001: ch. 5), Hawley (2001), Mackie (2007,
Madden (2019). For responses to the problem, see Sosa (1987: 173–178),
2008: §4), Fara (2008, 2012: §2), and Cray (2014) for the first version (or
Baker (1997: §2, 2000: 185–189), Rea (1997b: §4), Corcoran (1999: 16–
something in the vicinity); see Sidelle (2010: 121–122), Barker and Jago
17), Lowe (2002), Wasserman (2002), Bennett (2004: §4), Hawley (2006:
(2014), Korman (2015b: §11.1.3), and Mackie (forthcoming) for criticism.
§4), Hawthorne (2006: 101–103), Johnston (2006: §9), Moyer (2006:
See Heil (2003: 186–187) and Dyke (2008: 144–149) on the second
§6.2), Paul (2006: §5), Thomasson (2007: §4.4), Fine (2008), Koslicki
version. See Sattig (2015: Ch. 3) for an attempt to resolve the puzzle
(2008: 179–183, 2018a: Ch. 4, 2018b), Mackie (2008: 167–168), Sider
without denying any of MC1–MC4; see Korman (2015c) for criticism. See
(2008b), deRosset (2011), Einheuser (2011), Crane (2012: §5), Sutton
the entry on material constitution for a more detailed discussion of these
(2012), Wilson (2013: 379), Korman (2015b: §11.3), Saenz (2015), Sattig
issues.
(2015: §5.2), Evnine (2016a: §3.2.3), Jago (2016), Korman and
Carmichael (2016: §5.2), Barker and Jago (2018), Goldwater (2018: §4), 29. This version of the puzzle of the Ship of Theseus—in which a second
Inman (2018: 177–178), and Kurstal (2019: 217–218). See Bennett (2004) ship is constructed from the discarded planks—is due to Hobbes (1655:
for an argument that the grounding problem is best solved by embracing II.11.7). The reasoning here is due to Evans (1978) and Salmon (1981:
plenitudinism, and see her (2009: 70–71) for a grounding problem for 243–246). Those who do not find themselves gripped by this particular
monists. example may replace it with an example of an amoeba dividing in two
(see Robinson 1985).
25. The example is due to Spolaore (2012). For further discussion of
same-kind coincidence, see Shorter (1977), Simons (1985), Doepke

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30. Van Inwagen (1990: 128–135), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997: Korman (2010: §5, 2015b: Ch. 8, forthcoming: §2), Effingham (2011b:
§5.4), and Hossack (2000: 428) put the reasoning to work in defense of §6), and Carmichael (2020: §2) for realist responses to arbitrariness
eliminativism. arguments.

31. See Lewis (1988) and Stalnaker (1988: 349–350). 37. See Putnam (1987, 1994), Hawthorne and Cortens (1995: 158–160),
and Hirsch (2000: 44, 2002b, 2004b: 135–136, 2011: xi–xvi) for
32. See Lewis (1976: §3), Robinson (1985), Simons (1987: §5.5), deflationary responses.
Shoemaker (1988: 208–209), Stalnaker (1988), and Moyer (2008: §3).
38. See Joyce (2006: Ch. 6), Street (2006), and Vavova (2015) on
33. See Lowe (1994: 113) and Hirsch (1999) on ST2; van Inwagen (1990: structurally similar, moral debunking arguments. See Korman and
251–252), Lowe (2011: 20–32), and Goldwater (forthcoming a: §5.1) on Carmichael (2017), Rose and Schaffer (2017), and Kovacs (forthcoming
ST3; Parsons (1987: 8–11) and Thomasson (2007: §5.6) on ST4; Burke b) on a debunking argument from experimental philosophy.
(1980: 405) on (ii); and Sider (1996: §2, 2001a: ch 5.8) and Hawley
(2001: Ch. 4) on (iv). [Link] Inwagen (1981: §3), Heller (1990: 41–42), Merricks (2001: 72–76,
2017), Sider (2013: §2), and Benovsky (2015: §2, 2018: ch. 2) all advance
34. For arguments from arbitrariness for permissivism, see Cartwright debunking arguments (or something in the vicinity) in support of
(1975: 167), Quine (1981a: 13), Ginet (1985: 220–221), Van Cleve (1986: eliminativism; cf. Jubien (1993: §1.1). See Bagwell (forthcoming) for
145, 2008: §2), Yablo (1987: 307), Heller (1993: 59), Rea (1998: 354– criticism.
355), Sosa (1999), Hudson (2001: 108–112), Johnston (2006: 696–698),
Moyer (2006: 408), Schaffer (2009: 358 n.11), Parsons (2013: 333), 40. Yablo (1987: 307), Shoemaker (1988: 209), Hawley (2001: 6–7),
Noonan (2014), Beebee (2017: §4), and Fairchild and Hawthorne (2018: Hudson (2001: §3.8, 2006: 636), Sider (2001a: 156–157), Witmer (2003:
§§4–5); cf. Sider (2001a: 165, 2008a: 260), Sidelle (1992b: 417–418, 606), Nolan (2005: 35), Hawthorne (2006: vi and 109), Moyer (2006:
2002: 119–120), and deRosset (forthcoming: §§3–4). 408), Sattig (2015: 25–26), and Barker and Jago (2018: 2984) advance
debunking arguments (or something in the vicinity) in support of
35. See van Inwagen (1981: §3, 1990: 126), Olson (1995: §1), Hoffman permissivism. See Korman (2014a: §3, 2015b: §7.3) and Fairchild and
and Rosenkrantz (1997: 177–178), Rea (2001: §2.2), Van Cleve (2008: Hawthorne (2018: §§2–3) for criticism.
§2), and Benovsky (2018: 15) for eliminativist responses to arbitrariness
arguments. 41. See Hirsch (2004b: §1) on deflationary treatments; see Korman
(2014a: §4.1) for criticism.
36. See Goodman (1978), Putnam (1981: 52–54), Sidelle (1992a: §7),
Einheuser (2006, 2011), Kriegel (2008), Varzi (2011), Remhof (2017: 42. For further discussion of realist responses, see Rea (2002: Ch. 9),
§8.2), and Goswick (2018a) for defense of anti-realism. See Shoemaker Korman (2014a: §7, 2015b: ch. 7, 2019a, forthcoming: §3), Osborne
(1988), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997: 178–179), Lowe (2007), (2016), Hofweber (2017: §3, 2019), Sattig (2017), Barker (forthcoming),

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Kovacs (forthcoming a), and Tillman and Spencer (forthcoming). See 49. The problem is due to Geach (1980: §110) and Unger (1980). See
Remhof (2017: §8.3) for an anti-realist response. Chihara (1994), Hudson (2001: Ch. 1), Unger (2004, 2005: Ch. 7),
Hawthorne (2006: Ch. 9), O’Connor (2007), Olson (2010), Johnston
43. The argument is advanced by Merricks (2001: Ch. 3, 2017) and (2016), Simon (2017a), and Eklund (2020) for special problems that arise
Benovsky (2018: 22–23). in connection with persons. Olson (2007: 224–225) puts the problem of
the many to work in an argument against universalism.
44. See Merricks (2001: 61–66, 2003: §1) in defense of OD1. See Baker
(2003: 598), Lowe (2003a, 2005a: 526–531), Kim (2005: 56), Elder 50. See Lewis (1976: §2), Quine (1981b: 92–93), Hirsch (1982: 40–42),
(2007: §3, 2011: §6.3), Parsons (2013: 332–333), Pearce (2017: §4), and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997: §5.3), Hawley (2001: 166), Sider
Inman (2018: §6.3) for attempts to resist OD1. See Merricks (2001: Ch. 4, (2001b: §1), Burke (2003), Kovacs (2010), Williams (2013: §§5–9),
2003: §§1–2), Dorr (2003), and Carroll and Carter (2005) on whether Sutton (2014), Korman (2015b: §12.1), Inman (2018: 191–194), and
persons and other conscious composites escape overdetermination Francescotti (2019) on maximal properties.
arguments by virtue of having nonredundant causal powers.
51. See Quine (1981b: 93), Lewis (1993: 166–167), and Hawley (2001:
45. See Merricks (2001: 57) on causal relevance. See Bernstein (2016: §1) 167) on this strategy for fortifying the problem. See van Inwagen (1990:
on varying uses of ‘overdetermination’. 216–217) and Korman (2015b: §12.1) on how the puzzle arises even for
those who deny that there is such an object as Woodrow-minus (e.g.,
46. See Merricks (2001: 66–72), Olson (2002: §6), Sider (2003b: 722–
because they deny DAUP).
723), Carroll and Carter (2005: §7), Thomasson (2006: §1, 2007: Ch. 1),
Schaffer (2007: §8), Bennett (2009: 68), Yang (2013), Árnadóttir (2015), 52. See Lewis (1993: 171–175), Parsons and Woodruff (1994: §5), McGee
Korman (2015b: §10.2), Bernstein (2016: §§2–3), Beebee (2017), and and McLaughlin (2000), McKinnon (2002), Weatherson (2003: §§3–5),
Baker and Jago (2018: 2985) for relevant discussion. Williams (2006a), Cameron (2010c: 286–287), López de Sa (2014),
Korman (2015b: §12.2), Sattig (2015: §7.1), Liebesman (forthcoming),
47. See Merricks (2001: 72–79, 2003: §3, 2017), Sider (2003b: 723–725),
and Woods (forthcoming) for discussion of this strategy or others in the
Korman (2015b: §10.2–10.3), Hofweber (2016: 191–196), Beebee (2017),
vicinity.
and Barker (forthcoming) on epistemic defenses of OD7.
53. See Lowe (1982, 1995, 2011: §2.6), Johnston (1992: §4), Tye (1996a:
48. The principle is controversial because numbers and other abstracta, if
§3), Morreau (2002: §2), Wilson (2013: 377–379), Donnelly (2014), Jones
they exist, are plausibly causally inert. See Merricks (2001: 80–81) in
(2015), and Korman (2015b: §12.3) for the constitutional pluralist
defense of OD4, and see Toner (2008) for criticism. For general discussion
response (or nearby responses). See Noonan (1993), Williams (2013: 447–
of the Eleatic Principle, see Armstrong (1978: 139), Oddie (1982),
448), and Sattig (2015: §7.2) for criticism.
Colyvan (1998), Cowling (2015), and the papers in Topoi (2003: v. 22.2).

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54. Chisholm (1973: 589–590, 1976: §3.4, 1986: 69–70), Kim (1976: §3), Chalmers (2009: §2), Cotnoir (2013b), Brenner (2015a), Keller (2015),
Lewis (1993: 177–180), Noonan (1993: 139), Unger (2004: 203), Rettler (2016: §4), and Kitsik (2020) for further compatibilist strategies.
Williams (2006a), and López de Sa (2014: §§7–11) endorse the permissive
response (or something in the vicinity); cf. Leslie (2011), Kment (2014: 58. See Noonan (1992: 240–241, 2014: 1058–1061), Tye (1992), Mackie
§7.3), and Fairchild (2019). See Donnelly (2014: §3.2) for criticism. (1993), Rosenberg (1993), Hawthorne and Cortens (1995: 156–157),
Unger (1980), Heller (1990: 38), Horgan (1993: §2), Horgan and Potrč Hawthorne and Michael (1996: §2), Markosian (1998a: §4, 2008: §§3–4),
(2008: §2.4.4), and Benovsky (2018: 9–10) endorse the eliminative Noonan (1999a: 280–284), Hirsch (2000: 42, 2002a: 109–112, 2002b: 64–
response; see Bennett (2009: 66–67) for criticism. See the entry on the 65, 2004b: 136–137, 2008a: §5, 2008b: 370–371), Merricks (2001: §7.1),
problem of the many for a more detailed discussion of these issues. Varzi (2002: 65), Uzquiano (2004), Korman (2008b, 2009: §3, 2015b:
Chs. 5–6), Fine (2009: 161–165), Wallace (2013), Daly and Liggins
55. See van Inwagen (1987: §3, 1990: 73), Markosian (1998a: §4), Hirsch (2016a), Wilkins (2016), Biro (2017), and Rose and Schaffer (2017: §3.6)
(2002a), Koslicki (2007: §4.3.2), Elder (2008: 440), Kelly (2008), Sider for criticism of various compatibilist strategies. See McGrath (2005),
(2008a: 254), Schaffer (2009b: 358), Kriegel (2011), Korman (2015b: Ch. Bennett (2009: §9), Nolan (2010), and Kantin (forthcoming) on whether
4), and Evnine (2016a: §6.2.1) for arguments from counterexamples (or counterparts of the arguments for eliminativism cause trouble for the
something in the vicinity) against various revisionary ontologies. See ordinary utterances that compatibilist eliminativists wish to affirm.
Zerbudis (2018), Korman (forthcoming: §1) and Wallace (forthcoming) on
whether the arguments are question-begging. See Kriegel (2013), 59. For a variety of incompatibilist strategies, see Unger (1979b: 150),
Hofweber (2016, 2017: §3, 2019), Sattig (2017), and Byrne (2019) on the Heller (1990: Ch. 4), van Inwagen (1993: 712), Merricks (2001: §§7.2–
related question of whether there is immediate perceptual evidence against 7.3), Rosen and Dorr (2002: §§4–5), Sider (2004: 680), Eklund (2005),
eliminativism. Olson (2007: 222), Horgan and Potrč (2008: §6.2.2), Cornell (2016), and
Kovacs (forthcoming a). See Korman (2009) for discussion of the
56. Proponents of this domain-restriction strategy include Lewis (1986: constraints on a satisfactory incompatibilist account.
213, 1991: §3.5), Sosa (1999: 142), Jubien (2001: 14 n.2), Sider (2001a:
218, 2004: 680), Rosen and Dorr (2002: §4), Varzi (2003: 213–214), 60. The argument from charity is due to Hirsch (2002a, 2002b: §6, 2004a,
Richard (2006: 173), Cameron (2007: 116, 2008c: 14), Keller (2015: 2005, 2008b). See Davidson (1974: 19, 1989/2008: 130–2), Grandy (1973:
§4.2.2), and Kurtsal (2019: 211–212). §1), Lewis (1974: 336–337), Gauker (1986), Hirsch (2005: §5), and
Williamson (2007: Ch. 8) for general discussion of principles of charity.
57. See van Inwagen (1981: 127–128, 1990: Chs. 10–11, 2014: 1–14),
Horgan (1991: §2), Olson (1995: 189–190), Merricks (2000: 49–50), Sider 61. See Hirsch (2002a: §§3–4, 2005: 88–89, 2008b: 372–373) for criticism
(2004: 680–681, 2009b: §11, 2011: §5.3 and §9.3, 2013: §3, 2014: 565), of this line of response. See Hirsch (2008a) and McGrath (2008) for
Dorr (2005: §7, 2008: §1), Thomasson (2007: §10.3), Cameron (2008a: further discussion of conflicts of charity.
300–301, 2010a: 256, 2010b: 25), Horgan and Potrč (2008: Ch. 3),

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62. See Lewis (1974: 336), Hirsch (2002a: 105–106, 2005: 78, 2008b: 67. See Sidelle (1989: 161–166), Devitt and Sterelny (1999: §4.5), and
370), Korman (2008a, 2008b: 324–325, 2015b: §4.4), Daly and Liggins Thomasson (2007: Ch. 2, 2009, 2015: 95) on the qua problem.
(2010: §6), and Horden (2014: §§3–4) for relevant discussion.
68. The argument from application conditions is due to Thomasson (2007:
63. See Merrill (1980: 77–80), Lewis (1983: 370–377, 1984: 226–229), §1.2 and §9.4). Thomasson herself defends the stronger claim that ET2 is
Sider (2001a: xxi–xxiv), and Williams (2007) on the role of naturalness— analytic, on account of the fact that these application conditions enter into
or “reference magnets”—in accounts of content determination. Sider the content of ‘statue’ and the associated concept. See Bennett (2009: 56),
(2004: 679–682, 2009b: §11) and Keller (2015: §4.2.3) advance an Schaffer (2009a: §1), Yablo (2014: §11), Thomasson (2015: Ch. 7),
argument from naturalness against CH2; see Hirsch (2002a: §5, 2005: §6, deRosset (2015), Hofweber (2016: 189–190), Horden (2017), Brenner
2008a: §5, 2008b: 377–378, 2009: 243–244) for criticism. (2018a), Goswick (2018b: 147–8), van Inwagen (2019), and Button (2020:
§3) for further discussion of application conditions and analytic
64. See Korman (2015b: §5.5.1, 2015c), Sattig (2015: 72–73 and 89–90), entailments.
and Keller (2015: §4) on arguments from charity for compatibilism. See
Dorr (2005) for an argument from charity for nihilism. For further 69. See Thomasson (2007: 157–159, 2009, 2015: 108–111), Schaffer
discussion of arguments from charity, see Hawthorne (2009), Hirsch (2009a), Korman (2015b: §4.4, 2019b), Evnine (2016a: §6.2.3, 2016b),
(2013), Jackson (2013), Daly and Liggins (2016b), and Belleri (2018: §5). and Thomasson (2019) for discussion of this line of response.

65. See Baxter (1988), Wallace (2011a, 2011b), Cotnoir (2013), Turner’s 70. Both arguments are due to van Inwagen: see his (1981) for the
C (2013), and Bricker (2016) for defense of this “composition as identity” argument against DAUP and his (1987: 35–40, 1990: 75–80) for the
thesis (a.k.a. CAI). argument against universalism; cf. Koslicki (2008: 4) against
universalism.
66. See Lewis (1991: 87), van Inwagen (1994), Yi (1999, forthcoming),
Merricks (2001: §1.4), McKay (2006: 36–42), Sider (2007b: §3.3), 71. See Noonan (1992: 241–242), Rea (1998: §1, 1999), McGrath (1998),
McDaniel (2008), Bailey (2011), Turner’s N (2013), Cameron (2014: §1), Eklund (2002: §7), Hudson (2001: 93–95), McDaniel (2001: §5), Merricks
Korman (2015b: 16), Carrara and Lando (2017), and Lando (2017: ch.15) (2009: 302), and Korman (2015b: §9.6.2) for discussion of the argument
against the thesis that composition is identity. See Harte (2002: 114), against universalism.
Merricks (2005: 629–631), Cameron (2007: 104, 2010b: §3, 2012), Sider
(2007b: 61–62), McDaniel (2010b), Calosi (2016: §4), Spencer (2017), 72. See Carter (1983), Burke (1994b), and Parsons (2004) on the argument
Loss (2018b), Falls (forthcoming), and Lechthaler (forthcoming) on against DAUP. See Chisholm (1976: ch. 3 and appendix B) against CD4.
whether the thesis that composition is identity entails universalism. See
73. See Sider (1993, 2003b: 724–725), Hudson (2007), Van Cleve (2008:
the papers in Cotnoir and Baxter (2014) for further discussion of CAI.
325), Effingham (2011a), Markosian (2015: 672–673), and Brzozowski
(2016) for relevant discussion.

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74. On denying the possibility of gunk, see Zimmerman (1996: 8), §6.2) for relevant discussion.
Markosian (1998b: §4), Lowe (2000: 20), Holden (2004: §2.3), Williams
(2006b: 504–506), Sider (2013: §10), Strohminger (2013), Kitamura 80. See Cowling (2013: §8), Sider (2013: §1), Cameron (2010a: 262–263,
(2016: 157–9), Korman and Carmichael (2016: §6.1), and Miller and 2014: 100–101), Brenner (2015b, forthcoming), and Korman (2015a: §4,
Hariman (2017). 2015b: §6.3.2) on arguments from parsimony.

75. See Nolan (2005: 36), Rosen (2006), Willams (2006b: §5), Cameron Copyright © 2020 by the author

(2007), Bohn (2009a, 2009b: §1), Miller (2009, 2010), Parsons (2013), Daniel Z. Korman

Sider (2013: §10), Benovsky (2018: ch.4), and Dershowitz (forthcoming)

on the contingency of composition. See, in particular, Bohn (2009b: 196)
on applying Hume’s Dictum to overlapping objects. See Cameron (2008b)
and Wilson (2010) for general discussion of Hume’s Dictum.

76. See Markosian (2005: §4), Bohn (2009a, 2009b), Schaffer (2010: 64–
65), Watson (2010), Contessa (2012), Spencer (2012: §2), Cotnoir (2014),
Giberman (2015a, 2015b, 2019a), Kitamura (2016: 160–165), Sanson
(2016), Inman (2018: 203–207), and Smith (2019) for discussion of junk.

77. See Hawthorne and Cortens (1995), Markosian (2005: §3), Schaffer
(2007: §8, 2010), Horgan and Potrč (2008), Cameron (2008c: §3, 2010a,
2010b, 2014: §3), Dasgupta (2009), McDaniel (2010a: 641–642), French
(2010, 2014: Ch. 7), Sider (2013), Korman (2015a, 2015b: Ch. 6), Skiles
(2015: §3), Carmichael (2016), Rettler (2016, 2019), and Azzouni (2017)
for views on which ordinary objects exist but—in one sense or another—
are not among the fundamental constituents of reality. See the entry on
metaphysical grounding for a more detailed discussion of fundamentality.

78. Though see Schaffer (2010: §2.4) for an argument from the possibility
of gunk that the entire (composite) cosmos must be more fundamental
than any of its concrete parts.

79. See McDaniel (2010a: 644, 2017: §5.4), Korman (2015a: §4, 2015b:
§6.3), Thomasson (2015: ch. 10), and Korman and Carmichael (2017:

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 pdf version of the entry
Abstract Objects
[Link] Abstract Objects
from the Summer 2022 Edition of the First published Thu Jul 19, 2001; substantive revision Mon Aug 9, 2021

Stanford Encyclopedia One doesn’t go far in the study of what there is without encountering the
view that every entity falls into one of two categories: concrete or
of Philosophy abstract. The distinction is supposed to be of fundamental significance for
metaphysics (especially for ontology), epistemology, and the philosophy
of the formal sciences (especially for the philosophy of mathematics); it is
also relevant for analysis in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of
mind, and the philosophy of the empirical sciences. This entry surveys (a)
attempts to say how the distinction should be drawn and (b) some of main
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman
theories of, and about, abstract objects.
Principal Editor Senior Editor

Colin Allen Hannah Kim Paul Oppenheimer 1. Introduction

Associate Editor Associate Editor Associate Editor
1.1 About the Expression ‘Object’
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1.2 About the Abstract/Concrete Distinction
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2. Historical Remarks
2.1 The Provenance of the Distinction
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3.4 The Way of Abstraction Principles
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3.5 The Ways of Negation
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3.8 Eliminativism
Abstract Objects
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1
 Abstract Objects José L. Falguera, Concha Martı́nez-Vidal, and Gideon Rosen

Other Internet Resources two categories nor is there a definite list of items that fall under one or the
Related Entries other category (assuming neither is empty).

The first challenge, then, is to articulate the distinction, either by defining

1. Introduction the terms explicitly or by embedding them in a theory that makes their
connections to other important categories more explicit. In the absence of
The abstract/concrete distinction has a curious status in contemporary such an account, the philosophical significance of the contrast remains
philosophy. It is widely agreed that the ontological distinction is of uncertain, for the attempt to classify things as abstract or concrete by
fundamental importance, but as yet, there is no standard account of how it appeal to intuition is often problematic. Is it clear that scientific theories
should be drawn. There is a consensus about how to classify certain (e.g., the general theory of relativity), works of fiction (e.g., Dante’s
paradigm cases. For example, it is usually acknowledged that numbers and Inferno), fictional characters (e.g., Bilbo Baggins) or conventional entities
the other objects of pure mathematics, like pure sets, are abstract (if they (e.g., the International Monetary Fund or the Spanish Constitution of
exist), whereas rocks, trees, and human beings are concrete. In everyday 1978) are abstract?
language, it is common to use expressions that refer to concrete entities as
well as those that apparently refer to abstractions such as democracy, It should be stressed that there may not be one single “correct” way of
happiness, motherhood, etc. Moreover, formulations of mathematical explaining the abstract/concrete distinction. Any plausible account will
theories seem to appeal directly to abstract entities, and the use of classify the paradigm cases in the standard way or give reasons for
mathematical expressions in the empirical sciences seems indispensable to proceeding otherwise, and any interesting account will draw a clear and
the formulation of our best empirical theories (see Quine 1948; Putnam philosophically significant line in the domain of objects. Yet there may be
1971; and the entry on indispensability arguments in the philosophy of many equally interesting ways of accomplishing these two goals, and if we
mathematics). Finally, apparent reference to abstract entities such as sets, find ourselves with two or more accounts that do the job rather well, there
properties, concepts, propositions, types, and possible worlds, among may be no point in asking which corresponds to the real abstract/concrete
others, is ubiquitous in different areas of philosophy. distinction. This illustrates a general point: when technical terminology is
introduced in philosophy by means of examples, but without explicit
Though there is a pervasive appeal to abstract objects, philosophers have definition or theoretical elaboration, the resulting vocabulary is often
nevertheless wondered whether they exist. The alternatives are: platonism, vague or indeterminate in reference. In such cases, it usually is pointless to
which endorses their existence, and nominalism, which denies the seek a single correct account. A philosopher may find herself asking
existence of abstract objects across the board. (See the entries on questions like, ‘What is idealism?’ or ‘What is a substance?’ and treating
nominalism in metaphysics and platonism in metaphysics.) But the these questions as difficult questions about the underlying nature of a
question of how to draw the distinction between abstract and concrete certain determinate philosophical category. A better approach may be to
objects is an open one: it is not clear how one should characterize these recognize that in many cases of this sort, we simply have not made up our
minds about how the term is to be understood, and that what we seek is

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 Abstract Objects José L. Falguera, Concha Martı́nez-Vidal, and Gideon Rosen

not a precise account of what this term already means, but rather a 1.2 About the Abstract/Concrete Distinction
proposal for how it might fruitfully be used for philosophical analysis.
Anyone who believes that something in the vicinity of the Though we’ve spoken as if the abstract/concrete distinction must be an
abstract/concrete distinction matters for philosophy would be well advised exhaustive dichotomy, we should be open to the possibility that the best
to approach the project of explaining the distinction with this in mind. sharpening of it will entail that some objects are neither abstract nor
concrete. Holes and shadows, if they exist, do not clearly belong in either
So before we turn to the discussion of abstract objects in earnest, it will category; nor do ghosts, Cartesian minds, fictional characters,[2] immanent
help if we clarify how some of the key terms will be used in what follows. universals, or tropes. The main constraint on an account of the distinction
is that it draws a philosophically significant line that classifies at least
1.1 About the Expression ‘Object’ many of the standard examples in the standard ways. It is not a constraint
that everything be shoehorned into one category or the other.
Frege famously distinguished two mutually exclusive ontological
domains, functions and objects. According to his view, a function is an Finally, some philosophers see the main distinction not as between
‘incomplete’ entity that maps arguments to values, and is denoted by an abstract and concrete objects but as between abstract objects and ordinary
incomplete expression, whereas an object is a ‘complete’ entity and can be objects, where the distinction is a modal one – ordinary objects are
denoted by a singular term. Frege reduced properties and relations to possibly concrete while abstract objects (like the number 1) couldn’t be
functions and so these entities are not included among the objects. Some concrete (Zalta 1983, 1988). In any case, in the following discussion, we
authors make use of Frege’s notion of ‘object’ when discussing abstract shall assume that the abstract/concrete distinction is a division among
objects (e.g., Hale 1987). But though Frege’s sense of ‘object’ is existing objects, and that any plausible explanation of the distinction
important, it is not the only way to use the term. Other philosophers should aim to characterize a distinction among such objects.
include properties and relations among the abstract objects. And when the
background context for discussing objects is type theory, properties and 2. Historical Remarks
relations of higher type (e.g., properties of properties, and properties of
relations) may be all be considered ‘objects’. This latter use of ‘object’ is 2.1 The Provenance of the Distinction
interchangeable with ‘entity.’[1] Throughout this entry, we will follow this
last usage and treat the expressions ‘object’ and ‘entity’ as having the same The contemporary distinction between abstract and concrete is not an
meaning. (For further discussion, see the entry on objects.) ancient one. Indeed, there is a strong case for the view that, despite
occasional exceptions, it played no significant role in philosophy before
the 20th century. The modern distinction bears some resemblance to
Plato’s distinction between Forms and Sensibles. But Plato’s Forms were
supposed to be causes par excellence, whereas abstract objects are
generally supposed to be causally inert. The original ‘abstract’/‘concrete’

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 Abstract Objects José L. Falguera, Concha Martı́nez-Vidal, and Gideon Rosen

distinction was a distinction among words or terms. Traditional grammar mine? In that case, the appearance of a common mathematical subject
distinguishes the abstract noun ‘whiteness’ from the concrete noun ‘white’ matter would be an illusion.) In The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884),
without implying that this linguistic contrast corresponds to a Frege concludes that numbers are neither external concrete things nor
metaphysical distinction in what these words stand for. In the 17th century, mental entities of any sort.
this grammatical distinction was transposed to the domain of ideas. Locke
speaks of the general idea of a triangle which is “neither Oblique nor Later, in his essay “The Thought” (1918), Frege claims the same status for
Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural nor Scalenon [Scalene]; but all the items he calls thoughts—the senses of declarative sentences—and also,
and none of these at once,” remarking that even this idea is not among the by implication, for their constituents, the senses of subsentential
most “abstract, comprehensive and difficult” (Essay, [Link].9). Locke’s expressions. Frege does not say that senses are abstract. He says that they
conception of an abstract idea as one that is formed from concrete ideas by belong to a third realm distinct both from the sensible external world and
the omission of distinguishing detail was immediately rejected by from the internal world of consciousness. Similar claims had been made
Berkeley and then by Hume. But even for Locke there was no suggestion by Bolzano (1837), and later by Brentano (1874) and his pupils, including
that the distinction between abstract ideas and concrete or particular ideas Meinong and Husserl. The common theme in these developments is the
corresponds to a distinction among objects. “It is plain, …” Locke writes, felt need in semantics and psychology, as well as in mathematics, for a
“that General and Universal, belong not to the real existence of things; but class of objective (i.e., non-mental) non-physical entities. As this new
are Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own realism was absorbed into English-speaking philosophy, the traditional
use, and concern only signs, whether Words or Ideas” ([Link].11). term ‘abstract’ was enlisted to apply to the denizens of this third realm. In
this vein, Popper (1968) spoke of the ‘third world’ of abstract, objective
The abstract/concrete distinction in its modern form is meant to mark a entities, in the broader sense that includes cultural products such as
line in the domain of objects or entities. So conceived, the distinction arguments, theories, and works of art.
becomes a central focus for philosophical discussion primarily in the 20th
century. The origins of this development are obscure, but one crucial As we turn to an overview of the current debate, it is therefore important
factor appears to have been the breakdown of the allegedly exhaustive to remember that the use of the terms platonist (for those who affirm the
distinction between mental and material objects, which had formed the existence of abstract objects) and nominalist (for those who deny
main division for ontologically-minded philosophers since Descartes. One existence) is somewhat lamentable, since these words have established
signal event in this development is Frege’s insistence that the objectivity senses in the history of philosophy. These terms stood for positions that
and aprioricity of the truths of mathematics entail that numbers are neither have little to do with the modern notion of an abstract object. Modern
material beings nor ideas in the mind. If numbers were material things (or platonists (with a small ‘p’) need not accept any of the distinctive
properties of material things), the laws of arithmetic would have the status metaphysical and epistemological doctrines of Plato, just as modern
of empirical generalizations. If numbers were ideas in the mind, then the nominalists need not accept the distinctive doctrines of the medieval
same difficulty would arise, as would countless others. (Whose mind nominalists. Moreover, the literature also contains mention of anti-
contains the number 17? Is there one 17 in your mind and another in platonists, many of whom see themselves as fictionalists about abstracta,

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though this doesn’t help if it turns out that the best analysis of fictions is to language); and (iii) the entities required for the truth on an empirical
regard them as abstract objects. So the reader should therefore be aware theory are those in the range of the variables bounded by its first-order
that terminology is not always well-chosen and that the terms so used quantifiers (i.e., the entities in the domain of the existential quantifier ‘∃x ’
sometimes stand for doctrines that are more restricted than the traditional and the universal quantifier ‘∀x ’). He concluded that in addition to the
doctrines that go by the same name. Henceforth, we simply use platonism concrete entities contemplated by our best empirical science, we must
for the thesis that there exists at least one abstract object, and nominalism accept the existence of mathematical entities, even if they are abstract (see
for the thesis that the number of abstract objects is exactly zero (Field also Quine 1960, 1969, 1976).
1980).
Quine’s argument initiated a debate that is still alive. Various nominalist
2.2 An Initial Overview of the Contemporary Debate responses questioned one or another of the premises in his argument. For
instance, Field (1980) challenged the idea that mathematics is
Before we survey the various proposals for drawing the abstract/concrete indispensable for our best scientific theories—i.e., rejecting (i) above—
distinction, we should briefly say why the distinction has been thought to and thus faced the task of rewriting classical and modern physics in
matter. Among philosophers who take the distinction seriously, it is nominalistic terms in order to sustain the challenge. Others have taken on
generally supposed that while concrete objects clearly exist, abstract the somewhat less daunting task of accepting (i) but rejecting (ii) and (iii);
entities are problematic in distinctive ways and deny the existence of they’ve argued that even if our best scientific theories, in regimented form,
abstract entities altogether. In this section we briefly survey the arguments quantify over mathematical entities, this doesn’t entail a commitment to
for nominalism and the responses that platonists have offered. If the mathematical entities (see Azzouni 1997a, 1997b, 2004; Balaguer 1996,
abstract objects are unified as a class, it is because they have some feature 1998; Maddy 1995, 1997; Melia 2000, 2002; Yablo 1998, 2002, 2005,
that generates what seems to be a distinctive problem—a problem that 2009; Leng 2010.) Colyvan (2010) coined the expression ‘easy-roaders’
nominalists deem unsolvable and which platonists aim to solve. Before we for this second group, since they avoided the ‘hard road’ of paraphrasing
ask what the unifying feature might be, it may therefore help to our best scientific theories in non-mathematical terms.
characterize the various problems it has been thought to generate.
By contrast, some mathematical platonists (Colyvan 2001; Baker 2005,
The contemporary debate about platonism developed in earnest when 2009) have refined Quine’s view by advancing the so-called ‘Enhanced
Quine argued (1948) that mathematical objects exist, having changed his Indispensability Argument’ (though see Saatsi 2011 for a response). Some
mind about the nominalist approach he had defended earlier (Goodman & participants describe the debate in terms of a stalemate they hope to
Quine 1947). Quine’s 1948 argument involves three key premises, all of resolve (see Baker 2017, Baron 2016, 2020, Knowles & Saatsi 2019, and
which exerted significant influence on the subsequent debate: (i) Martínez-Vidal & Rivas-de-Castro 2020, for discussion).[3]
mathematics is indispensable for empirical science; (ii) we should be
Aside from the debate over Quine’s argument, both platonism and
ontologically committed to the entities required for the truth of our best
nominalism give rise to hard questions. Platonists not only need to provide
empirical theories (all of which should be expressible in a first-order

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a theory of what abstract objects exist, but also an account of how we attempt to explain knowledge of abstracta on the same model that is used
cognitively access and come to know non-causal, abstract entities. This to explain knowledge of concrete objects. They argue that not only a
latter question has been the subject of a debate that began in earnest in certain plenitude principle for abstract objects (namely, the comprehension
Benacerraf (1973), which posed just such a dilemma for mathematical principle for abstract objects put forward in Zalta 1983, 1988—see below)
objects. Benacerraf noted that the causal theory of reference doesn’t seem yields unproblematic ‘acquaintance by description’ to unique abstract
to make it possible to know the truth conditions of mathematical objects but also that their approach actually comports with naturalist
statements, and his argument applies to abstract entities more generally. beliefs. Balaguer (1995, 1998) also suggests that a plenitude principle is
On the other hand, nominalists need to explain the linguistic uses in which the best way forward for the platonist, and that our knowledge of the
we seem to appeal to such entities, especially those uses in what appear to consistency of mathematical theories suffices for knowledge of
be good explanations, such as those in scientific, mathematical, linguistic, mathematical objects. And there are views that conceive of abstract
and philosophical pursuits (see Wetzel 2009, 1–22, for a discussion of the objects as constituted by human—or, in general, intelligent—subjects, or
many places where abstract types are used in scientific explanations). Even as abstract artifacts (see Popper 1968; Thomasson 1999).
though nominalists argue that there are no abstracta, the very fact that
there is disagreement about their existence suggests that both platonists A number of nominalists have been persuaded by Benacerraf’s (1973)
and nominalists acknowledge the distinction between the abstract and epistemological challenge about reference to abstract objects and
concrete to be a meaningful one. concluded that sentences with terms making apparent reference to them—
such as mathematical statements—are either false or lack a truth value.
On the platonist side, various proposals have been raised to address the They argue that those sentences must be paraphrasable without vocabulary
challenge of explaining epistemic access to abstract entities, mostly in that commits one to any sort of abstract entity. These proposals sometimes
connection with mathematical objects. Some, including Gödel (1964), suggest that statements about abstract objects are merely instrumental;
allege that we access abstract objects in virtue of a unique kind of they serve only to help us establish conclusions about concrete objects.
perception (intuition). Maddy (1990, 1997) developed two rather different Field’s fictionalism (1980, 1989) has been influential in this regard. Field
ways of understanding our knowledge of mathematics in naturalistic ways. reconstructed Newtonian physics using second-order logic and
Other platonists have argued that abstract objects are connected to quantification over (concrete) regions of space-time. A completely
empirical entities, either via abstraction (Steiner 1975; Resnik 1982; different tactic for avoiding the commitment to abstract, mathematical
Shapiro 1997) or via abstraction principles (Wright 1983; Hale 1987); objects is put forward in Putnam (1967) and Hellman (1989), who
we’ll discuss some of these views below. There are also those who speak separately reconstructed various mathematical theories in second-order
of existent and intersubjective abstract entities as a kind of mental modal logic. On their view, abstract objects aren’t in the range of the
representation (Katz 1980). existential quantifier at the actual world (hence, we can’t say that they
exist), but they do occur in the range of the quantifier at other possible
A rather different line of approach to the epistemological problem was worlds, where the axioms of the mathematical theory in question are true.
proposed in Linsky & Zalta 1995, where it is suggested that one shouldn’t

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These nominalistic approaches must contend with various issues, of a new kind of entity, we must have a linguistic framework for talking
course. At the very least, they have to successfully argue that the tools about those entities. He then distinguished two kinds of existence
they use to avoid commitments to abstract objects don’t themselves questions: internal questions within the framework about the existence of
involve such commitment. For example, Field must argue that space-time the new entities and external questions about the reality of the framework
regions are concrete entities, while Putnam and Hellman must argue that itself. If the framework deals with abstract entities such as numbers, sets,
by relying on logical possibility and modal logic, there is no commitment propositions, etc., then the internal question can be answered by logical
to possible worlds considered as abstract objects. In general, any analysis of the rules of the language, such as whether it includes terms for,
nominalist account that makes essential use of set theory or model- or implies claims that quantify over, abstract objects. But, for Carnap, the
theoretic structures must convincingly argue that the very use of such external question, about whether the abstract entities really exist, is a
analytic tools doesn’t commit them to abstract objects. (See Burgess & pseudo-question and should be regarded as nothing more than the
Rosen 1997 for a systematic survey of different proposals about the pragmatic question of whether the framework is a useful one to adopt, for
existence of abstract objects.) scientific or other forms of enquiry. We’ll discuss Carnap’s view in more
detail in subsection 3.7.1.
Another nominalistic thread in the literature concerns the suggestion that
sentences about (posited) abstract objects are quasi-assertions, i.e., not Some have thought that Carnap’s view offers a deflationist view of
evaluable as to truth or falsehood (see Yablo 2001 and Kalderon 2005). objects, since it appears that the existence of objects is not language
Still others argue that we should not believe sentences about abstracta independent. After Carnap’s seminal article, several other deflationist
since their function, much like the instrumentalism discussed earlier, is to approaches were put forward (Putnam 1987, 1990; Hirsch 2002, 2011;
ensure empirical adequacy for observational sentences (Yablo 1998). This Sider 2007, 2009; Thomasson 2015), many of them claiming to be a
may involve differentiating between apparent content, which involves vindication of Carnap’s view. However, there are deflationist proposals
posited abstract objects, and real content, which only concerns concrete that run counter to Carnap’s approach, among them, deflationary
objects (Yablo 2001, 2002, 2010, 2014). (For more on these fictionalist nominalism (Azzouni 2010) or agnosticism about abstract objects (Bueno
accounts, see Kalderon 2005, Ch. 3, and the entry on fictionalism.) 2008a, 2008b, 2020). Additionally, philosophers inspired by Frege’s work
have argued for a minimal notion of an object (Rayo 2013, Rayo 2020
A final group of views in the literature represents a kind of agnosticism [Other Internet Resources]; and Linnebo 2018). We’ll discuss some of
about what exists or about what it is to be an object, be it abstract or these in greater detail below, in subsection 3.7.2. A final agnostic position
concrete. These views don’t reject an external material world, but rather that has emerged is one that rejects a strict version of platonism, but
begin with some question as to whether we can have experience, suggests that neither a careful analysis of mathematical practice (Maddy
observation, and knowledge of objects directly, i.e., independent of our 2011), nor the enhanced version of the indispensability argument (Leng
theoretical frameworks. Carnap (1950 [1956]), for example, started with 2020) suffice to decide between nominalism and moderate versions of
the idea that our scientific knowledge has to be expressed with respect to a platonism. Along these lines, Balaguer (1998) concluded that the question
linguistic framework and that when we wish to put forward a theory about doesn’t have an answer, since the arguments for ‘full-blooded’ platonism

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can be matched one-for-one by equally good arguments by the anti- abstract/concrete distinction and theorize about abstract objects. Even if
platonist. there is no single, acceptable account, these various ways of drawing the
distinction and theorizing about abstract objects do often cast light on the
For additional discussion about the basic positions in the debate about questions we’ve been discussing, especially when the specific proposals
abstract and concrete objects, see Szabó 2003 and the entries on are integrated into a supplementary (meta-)ontological project. For each
nominalism in metaphysics and platonism in metaphysics, nominalism in method of drawing the distinction and specific proposal adopting that
the philosophy of mathematics and platonism in the philosophy of method acquires a certain amount of explanatory power, and this will help
mathematics. us to compare and contrast the various ideas that are now found in the
literature.
3. What is an Abstract Object?
3.1 The Way of Example and the Way of Primitivism
As part of his attempt to understand the nature of possible worlds, Lewis
(1986a, 81–86) categorizes different ways by which one can draw the According to the way of example, it suffices to list paradigm cases of
abstract/concrete distinction.[4] These include: the way of example (which abstract and concrete entities in the hope that the sense of the distinction
is simply to list the paradigm cases of abstract and concrete objects in the will somehow emerge. Clearly, a list of examples for each category would
hope that the sense of the distinction will somehow emerge); the way of be a heuristically promising start in the search for some criterion (or list of
conflation (i.e., identifying abstract and concrete objects with some criteria) that would be fruitful for drawing the distinction. However, a
already-known distinction); the way of negation (i.e., saying what abstract simple list would be of limited significance since there are too many ways
objects are by saying what they are not, e.g., non-spatiotemporal, non- of extrapolating from the paradigm cases to a distinction that would cover
causal, etc.); and the way of abstraction (i.e., saying that abstract objects the unclear cases, with the result that no clear notion has been explained.
are conceptualized by a process of considering some known objects and
omitting certain distinguishing features). He gives a detailed examination For example, pure sets are paradigm examples of abstract entities. But the
of the different proposals that typify these ways and then attempts to show case of impure sets is far from clear. Consider the unit set whose sole
that none of them quite succeeds in classifying the paradigms in accord member is Joe Biden (i.e., {Joe Biden}), the Undergraduate Class of 2020
with prevailing usage. Given the problems he encountered when analyzing or The Ethics Committee, etc. They are sets, but it is not clear that they are
the various ways, Lewis became pessimistic about our ability to draw the abstract given that Joe Biden, the members of the class and committee are
distinction cleanly. concrete. Similarly, if one offers the characters of Sherlock Holmes stories
as examples to help motivate the primitive concept abstract object, then
Despite Lewis’s pessimism about clarifying the abstract/concrete one has to wonder about the object London that appears in the novels.
distinction, his approach for categorizing the various proposals, when
extended, is a useful one. Indeed, in what follows, we’ll see that there are The refusal to characterize the abstract/concrete distinction while
a number of additional ways that categorize attempts to characterize the maintaining that both categories have instances might be called the way of

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primitivism, whenever the following condition obtains: a few predicates no doubt that some authors have used the terms in this way. (Thus Quine
are distinguished as primitive and unanalyzable, and the explanatory 1948 uses ‘abstract entity’ and ‘universal’ interchangeably.) This sort of
power rests on the fact that other interesting predicates can be defined in conflation is however rare in recent philosophy.
terms of the primitives and that interesting claims can be judged true on
the basis of our intuitive understanding of the primitive and defined 3.3 The Way of Abstraction
notions. Thus, one might take abstract and concrete as primitive notions. It
wouldn’t be an insignificant result if one could use this strategy to explain Another methodology is what Lewis calls the way of abstraction.
why abstract objects are necessarily existent, causally ineffiacious, non- According to a longstanding tradition in philosophical psychology,
spatiotemporal, intersubjective, etc. (see Cowling 2017: 92–97). abstraction is a distinctive mental process in which new ideas or
conceptions are formed by considering the common features of several
But closer inspection of this method reveals some significant concerns. To objects or ideas and ignoring the irrelevant features that distinguish those
start with, when a distinction is taken as basic and unanalyzable, one objects. For example, if one is given a range of white things of varying
typically has to offer some intuitive instances of the primitive predicates. shapes and sizes; one ignores or abstracts from the respects in which they
But it is not always so easy to do this. For example, when mathematicians differ, and thereby attains the abstract idea of whiteness. Nothing in this
take set and membership as primitives and then assert some principles of tradition requires that ideas formed in this way represent or correspond to
set theory, they often illustrate their primitives by offering some examples a distinctive kind of object. But it might be maintained that the distinction
of sets, such as The Undergraduate Class of 2020 or The Ethics between abstract and concrete objects should be explained by reference to
Committee, etc. But these, of course, aren’t quite right, since the members the psychological process of abstraction or something like it. The simplest
of the class and committee may change while the class and committee version of this strategy would be to say that an object is abstract if it is (or
remain the same, whereas if the members of a set change, one has a might be) the referent of an abstract idea; i.e., an idea formed by
different set. A similar concern affects the present proposal. If one offers abstraction. So conceived, the way of abstraction is wedded to an
sets or the characters of the Sherlock Holmes novels as examples to help outmoded philosophy of mind.
motivate the primitive concept abstract object, then one has to wonder
about impure sets such as the unit set whose sole member is Aristotle (i.e., It should be mentioned, though, that the key idea behind the way of
{Aristotle}) and the object London that appears in the novels. abstraction has resurfaced (though transformed) in the structuralist views
about mathematics that trace back to Dedekind. Dedekind thought of
3.2 The Way of Conflation numbers by the way of abstraction. Dedekind suggested that when
defining a number-theoretic structure, “we entirely neglect the special
According to the way of conflation, the abstract/concrete distinction is to character of the elements, merely retaining their distinguishability and
be identified with one or another metaphysical distinction already familiar taking into account only the relations to one another” (Dedekind 1888
under another name: as it might be, the distinction between sets and [1963, 68]). This view has led some structuralists to deny that numbers are
individuals, or the distinction between universals and particulars. There is abstract objects. For example, Benacerraf concluded that “numbers are not

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objects at all, because in giving the properties (that is, necessary and The number of Fs = the number of Gs if and only if there are just as
sufficient) of numbers you merely characterize an abstract structure—and many Fs as Gs
the distinction lies in the fact that the ‘elements’ of the structure have no
properties other than those relating them to other ‘elements’ of the same These biconditionals (or abstraction principles) appear to have a special
structure” (1965, 70). We shall therefore turn our attention to a variant of semantic status. While they are not strictly speaking definitions of the
the way of abstraction, one that has led a number of philosophers to functional expression that occurs on the left hand side, they would appear
conclude that numbers are indeed abstract objects. to hold in virtue of the meaning of that expression. To understand the term
‘direction’ is (in part) to know that the direction of a and the direction of b
3.4 The Way of Abstraction Principles are the same entity if and only if the lines a and b are parallel. Moreover,
the equivalence relation that appears on the right hand side of the
In the contemporary philosophical literature, a number of books and biconditional would appear to be semantically and perhaps
papers have investigated a form of abstraction that doesn’t depend on epistemologically prior to the functional expressions on the left (Noonan
mental processes. We may call this the way of abstraction principles. 1978). Mastery of the concept of a direction presupposes mastery of the
Wright (1983) and Hale (1987) have developed an account of abstract concept of parallelism, but not vice versa.
objects on the basis of an idea they trace back to certain suggestive
The availability of abstraction principles meeting these conditions may be
remarks in Frege (1884). Frege notes (in effect) that many of the singular
exploited to yield an account of the distinction between abstract and
terms that appear to refer to abstract entities are formed by means of
concrete objects. When ‘f ’ is a functional expression governed by an
functional expressions. We speak of the shape of a building, the direction
abstraction principle, there will be a corresponding kind Kf such that:
of a line, the number of books on the shelf. Of course, many singular terms
formed by means of functional expressions denote ordinary concrete x is a Kf if and only if, for some y, x = f (y).
objects: ‘the father of Plato’, ‘the capital of France’. But the functional
terms that pick out abstract entities are distinctive in the following respect: For example,
where f (a) is such an expression, there is typically an equation of the
form: x is a cardinal number if and only if for some concept F, x = the
number of Fs.
f (a) = f (b) if and only if Rab
The simplest version of the way of abstraction principles is then to say
where R is an equivalence relation, i.e., a relation that is reflexive, that:
symmetric and transitive, relative to some domain. For example:
x is an abstract object if (and only if) x is an instance of some kind Kf
The direction of a = the direction of b if and only if a is parallel to b whose associated functional expression ‘f ’ is governed by a suitable
abstraction principle.

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The strong version of this account—which purports to identify a necessary style. If so, the abstractionist approach does not provide a necessary
condition for abstractness—is seriously at odds with standard usage. Pure condition for abstractness as that notion is standardly understood.
sets are usually considered paradigmatic abstract objects. But it is not clear
that they satisfy the proposed criterion. According to a version of naïve set More importantly, there is some reason to believe that it fails to supply a
theory, the functional expression ‘set of’ is indeed characterized by a sufficient condition. A mereological fusion of concrete objects is itself a
putative abstraction principle. concrete object. But the concept of a mereological fusion is governed by
what appears to be an abstraction principle:
The set of Fs = the set of Gs if and only if, for all x, x is F if and only
if x is G. The fusion of the Fs = the fusion of the Gs if and only if the Fs and
Gs cover one another,
But this principle, which is a version of Frege’s Basic Law V, is
inconsistent and so fails to characterize an interesting concept. In where the Fs cover the Gs if and only if every part of every G has a part
contemporary mathematics, the concept of a set is not introduced by an in common with an F. Similarly, suppose a train is a maximal string of
abstraction principle, but rather axiomatically. Though attempts have been railroad carriages, all of which are connected to one another. We may
made to investigate abstraction principles for sets (Cook 2003), it remains define a functional expression, ‘the train of x’, by means of an
an open question whether something like the mathematical concept of a ‘abstraction’ principle: The train of x = the train of y if and only if x and y
set can be characterized by a suitably restricted abstraction principle. (See are connected carriages. We may then say that x is a train if and only if for
Burgess 2005 for a survey of recent efforts in this direction.) Even if such some carriage y, x is the train of y. The simple account thus yields the
a principle is available, however, it is unlikely that the epistemological consequence that trains are to be reckoned abstract entities.
priority condition will be satisfied. That is, it is unlikely that mastery of
It is unclear whether these objections apply to the more sophisticated
the concept of set will presuppose mastery of the equivalence relation that
abstractionist proposals of Wright and Hale, but one feature of the simple
figures on the right hand side. It is therefore uncertain whether the way of
account sketched above clearly does apply to these proposals and may
abstraction principles will classify the objects of pure set theory as
serve as the basis for an objection to this version of the way of abstraction
abstract entities (as it presumably must).
principles. The neo-Fregean approach seeks to explain the
On the other hand, as Dummett (1973) has noted, in many cases the abstract/concrete distinction in semantic terms: We said that an abstract
standard names for paradigmatically abstract objects do not assume the object is an object that falls in the range of a functional expression
functional form to which the definition adverts. Chess is an abstract entity, governed by an abstraction principle, where ‘f ’ is governed by an
but we do not understand the word ‘chess’ as synonymous with an abstraction principle when that principle holds in virtue of the meaning of
expression of the form ‘f (x) ’, where ‘f ’ is governed by an abstraction ‘f ’. This notion of a statement’s holding in virtue of the meaning of a word
principle. Similar remarks would seem to apply to such things as the is notoriously problematic (see the entry the analytic/synthetic distinction).
English language, social justice, architecture, and Charlie Parker’s musical But even if this notion makes sense, one may still complain: The

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abstract/concrete distinction is supposed to be a metaphysical distinction; Abstraction functions have two key features. First, for each abstraction
abstract objects are supposed to differ from concrete objects in some function f there is an equivalence relation R such that it lies in the nature
important ontological respect. It should be possible, then, to draw the of f that f (x) = f (y) iff Rxy . Intuitively, we are to think that R is
distinction directly in metaphysical terms: to say what it is in the objects metaphysically prior to f , and that the abstraction function f is defined (in
themselves that makes some things abstract and others concrete. As Lewis whole or in part) by this biconditional. Second, each abstraction function
writes, in response to a related proposal by Dummett: is a generating function: its values are essentially values of that function.
Many functions are not generating functions. Paris is the capital of France,
Even if this … way succeeds in drawing a border, as for all I know but it is not essentially a capital. The number of solar planets, by contrast,
it may, it tells us nothing about how the entities on opposite sides is essentially a number. The notion of an abstraction function may be
of that border differ in their nature. It is like saying that snakes are defined in terms of these two features:
the animals that we instinctively most fear—maybe so, but it tells
us nothing about the nature of snakes. (Lewis 1986a: 82) f is an abstraction function if and only if

The challenge is to produce a non-semantic version of the abstractionist 1. for some equivalence relation R, it lies in the nature of f that
criterion that specifies directly, in metaphysical terms, what the objects f (x) = f (y) if and only if Rxy; and
whose canonical names are governed by abstraction principles all have in 2. for all x , if x is a value of f , then it lies in the nature of x that
common. there is (or could be) some object y such that x = f (y).

One response to this difficulty is to transpose the abstractionist proposal We may then say that:
into a more metaphysical key (see Rosen & Yablo 2020). The idea is that
each Fregean number is, by its very nature, the number of some Fregean x is an abstraction if and only if, for some abstraction function f , there
concept, just as each Fregean direction is, by its very nature, at least is or could be an object y such that x = f (y),
potentially the direction of some concrete line. In each case, the abstract
and that:
object is essentially the value of an abstraction function for a certain class
of arguments. This is not a claim about the meanings of linguistic x is an abstract object if (and only if) x is an abstraction.
expressions. It is a claim about the essences or natures of the objects
themselves. (For the relevant notion of essence, see Fine 1994.) So for This account tells us a great deal about the distinctive natures of these
example, the Fregean number two (if there is such a thing) is, essentially, broadly Fregean abstract objects. It tells us that each is, by its very nature,
by its very nature, the number that belongs to a concept F if and only if the value of a special sort of function, one whose nature is specified in a
there are exactly two Fs. More generally, for each Fregean abstract object simple way in terms of an associated equivalence relation. It is worth
x , there is an abstraction function f , such that x is essentially the value of f stressing, however, that it does not supply much metaphysical information
for every argument of a certain kind. about these items. It doesn’t tell us whether they are located in space,

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whether they can stand in causal relations, and so on. It is an open artifacts owe their existence to the mind. What can this mean? One
question whether this somewhat unfamiliar version of the promising approach is to say that an object should be reckoned mind-
abstract/concrete distinction lines up with any of the more conventional dependent when, by its very nature, it exists at a time if and only if it is the
ways of drawing the distinction outlined above. An account along these object or content of some mental state or process at that time. This counts
lines would be at odds with standard usage, but may be philosophically tables and chairs as mind-independent, since they might survive the
interesting all the same. In any case, the problem remains that this annihilation of thinking things. But it counts paradigmatically mental
metaphysical version of the way of abstraction principles leaves out items, like a purple afterimage of which a person X may become aware, as
paradigmatic cases of abstract objects such as the aforementioned game of mind-dependent, since it presumably lies in the nature of such items to be
chess. objects of conscious awareness whenever they exist. However, it is not
clear that this account captures the full force of the intended notion.
3.5 The Ways of Negation Consider, for example, the mereological fusion of X’s afterimage and Y ’s
headache. This is surely a mental entity if anything is. But it is not
According to the way of negation, abstract objects are defined as those necessarily the object of a mental state. (The fusion can exist even if no
which lack certain features possessed by paradigmatic concrete objects. one is thinking about it.) A more generous conception would allow for
Many explicit characterizations in the literature follow this model. Let us mind-dependent objects that exist at a time in virtue of mental activity at
review some of the options. that time, even if the object is not the object of any single mental state or
act. The fusion of X’s afterimage and Y ’s headache is mind-dependent in
3.5.1 The Combined Criterion of Non-Mental and Non-Sensible the second sense but not the first. That is a reason to prefer the second
account of mind-dependence.
According to the account implicit in Frege’s writings:
If we understand the notion of mind-dependence in this way, it is a
An object is abstract if and only if it is both non-mental and non- mistake to insist that abstract objects be mind-independent. To strike a
sensible. theme that will recur, it is widely supposed that sets and classes are
abstract entities—even the impure sets whose urelements are concrete
Here the first challenge is to say what it means for a thing to be ‘non- objects. Any account of the abstract/concrete distinction that places set-
mental’, or as we more commonly say, ‘mind-independent’. The simplest theoretic constructions like {Alfred, {Betty, {Charlie, Deborah}}} on the
approach is to say that a thing depends on the mind when it would not (or concrete side of the line will be seriously at odds with standard usage.
could not) have existed if minds had not existed. But this entails that tables With this in mind, consider the set whose sole members are X’s afterimage
and chairs are mind-dependent, and that is not what philosophers who and Y’s headache, or some more complex set-theoretic object based on
employ this notion have in mind. To call an object ‘mind-dependent’ in a these items. If we suppose, as is plausible, that an impure set exists at a
metaphysical context is to suggest that it somehow owes its existence to time only when its members exist at that time, this will be a mind-
mental activity, but not in the boring ‘causal’ sense in which ordinary

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dependent entity in the generous sense. But it is also presumably an objects, in a broad sense, are concrete), there are mental entities that are
abstract entity. neither concrete nor abstract. As mentioned above (section 1.2), there is no
need to insist that the distinction is an exhaustive one. Second, while the
A similar problem arises for so-called abstract artifacts, like Jane Austen’s approach may well draw an important line, it inherits one familiar
novels and the characters that inhabit them. Some philosophers regard problem, namely, that of saying what it is for a thing to be a physical
such items as eternally existing abstract entities that worldly authors object (Crane and Mellor 1990; for discussion, see the entry on
merely describe but do not create. But of course the commonsensical view physicalism). In one sense, a physical entity is an entity in which physics
is that Austen created Pride and Prejudice and Elizabeth Bennett, and might take an interest. But physics is saturated with mathematics, so in
there is no good reason to deny this (Thomasson 1999; cf. Sainsbury this sense a great many paradigmatically abstract objects—e.g. π—will
2009). If we take this commonsensical approach, there will be a clear count as physical. The intended point is that abstract objects are to be
sense in which these items depend for their existence on Austen’s mental distinguished, not from all of the objects posited by physics, but from the
activity, and perhaps on the mental activity of subsequent readers.[5] These concrete objects posited by the physics. But if that is the point, it is
items may not count as mind-dependent in either of the senses canvassed unilluminating in the present context to say that abstract objects are non-
above, since Pride and Prejudice can presumably exist at a time even if no physical.
one happens to be thinking at that time. (If the world took a brief
collective nap, Pride and Prejudice would not pop out of existence.) But
3.5.2 The Non-Spatiality Criterion
they are obviously mind-dependent in some not-merely-causal sense. And
yet they are still presumably abstract objects. For these reasons, it is
Contemporary purveyors of the way of negation typically amend Frege’s
probably a mistake to insist that abstract objects be mind-independent.
criterion by requiring that abstract objects be non-spatial, causally
(For more on mind-dependence, see Rosen 1994, and the entry platonism
inefficacious, or both. Indeed, if any characterization of the abstract
in the philosophy of mathematics.)
deserves to be regarded as the standard one, is this:
Frege’s proposal in its original form also fails for other reasons. Quarks
An object is abstract if and only if it is non-spatial and causally
and electrons are usually considered neither sensible nor mind-dependent.
inefficacious.
And yet they are not abstract objects. A better version of Frege’s proposal
would hold that: This standard account nonetheless presents a number of perplexities.

An object is abstract if and only if it is both non-physical and non- First of all, one must consider whether there are abstract objects that have
mental. one of the two features but not the other. For example, consider an impure
set, such as the unit set of Plato (i.e., {Plato} ). It has some claim to being
Two remarks on this last version are in order. First, it opens the door to
abstract because it is causally inefficacious, but some might suggest that it
thinking that besides abstract and concrete entities (assuming that physical
has a location in space (namely, wherever Plato is located). Or consider a

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work of fiction such as Kafka’s The Metamorphosis. It, too, has some Other abstract objects appear to stand in a more interesting relation to
claim to being abstract because it (or at least its content) is non-spatial. spacetime. Consider the game of chess. Some philosophers will say that
But one might suggest that works of fiction as paradigmatic abstract chess is like a mathematical object, existing nowhere and ‘no when’—
objects seem to have causal powers, e.g., powers to affect us. either eternally or outside of time altogether. But the most natural view is
that chess was invented at a certain time and place (though it may be hard
In the remainder of this subsection, we focus on the first criterion in the to say exactly where or when); that before it was invented it did not exist
above proposal, namely, the non-spatial condition. But it gives rise to a at all; that it was imported from India into Persia in the 7th century; that it
subtlety. It seems plausible to suggest that, necessarily, if something x is has changed over the years, and so on. The only reason to resist this
causally efficacious, then (since x is a cause or has causal powers) x, or natural account is the thought that since chess is clearly an abstract object
some part of x , has a location in time. So if something has no location in —it’s not a physical object, after all!—and since abstract objects do not
time, it is causally inefficacious. The theory of relativity implies that space exist in space and time—by definition!—chess must resemble the cosine
and time are nonseparable, i.e., combined into a single spacetime function in its relation to space and time. And yet one might with equal
manifold. So the above proposal might be restated in terms of a single justice regard the case of chess and other abstract artifacts as
condition: an object is abstract if and only if it is non-spatiotemporal. counterexamples to the hasty view that abstract objects possess only trivial
Sometimes this revised proposal is the correct one for thinking about spatial and temporal properties.
abstract objects, but our discussion in the previous section showed that
abstract artifacts and mental events may be temporal but non-spatial. Should we then abandon the non-spatiotemporality criterion? Not
Given the complexities here, in what follows we use spatiotemporality, necessarily. Even if there is a sense in which some abstract entities possess
spatiality, or temporality, as needed. non-trivial spatiotemporal properties, it might still be said that concrete
entities exist in spacetime in a distinctive way. If we had an account of this
Some of the archetypes of abstractness are non-spatiotemporal in a distinctive manner of spatiotemporal existence characteristic of concrete
straightforward sense. It makes no sense to ask where the cosine function objects, we could say: An object is abstract (if and) only if it fails to exist
was last Tuesday. Or if it makes sense to ask, the sensible answer is that it in spacetime in that way.
was nowhere. Similarly, for many people, it makes no good sense to ask
when the Pythagorean Theorem came to be. Or if it does make sense to One way to implement this approach is to note that paradigmatic concrete
ask, the only sensible answer for them is that it has always existed, or objects tend to occupy a relatively determinate spatial volume at each time
perhaps that it does not exist ‘in time’ at all. It is generally assumed that at which they exist, or a determinate volume of spacetime over the course
these paradigmatic ‘pure abstracta’ have no non-trivial spatial or temporal of their existence. It makes sense to ask of such an object, ‘Where is it
properties; that they have no spatial location, and they exist nowhere in now, and how much space does it occupy?’ even if the answer must
particular in time. sometimes be somewhat vague. By contrast, even if the game of chess is
somehow ‘implicated’ in space and time, it makes no sense to ask how
much space it now occupies. (To the extent that this does make sense, the

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only sensible answer is that it occupies no space at all, which is not to say An object is abstract (if and) only if it either fails to occupy space at
that it occupies a spatial point.) And so it might be said: all, or does so only in virtue of the fact some other items—in this case,
its urelements—occupy that region.
An object is abstract (if and) only if it fails to occupy anything like a
determinate region of space (or spacetime). But of course Peter himself occupies a region in virtue of the fact that his
parts—his head, hands, etc.—together occupy that region. So a better
This promising idea raises several questions. First, it is conceivable that version of the proposal would say:
certain items that are standardly regarded as abstract might nonetheless
occupy determinate volumes of space and time. Consider, for example, the An object is abstract (if and) only if it either fails to occupy space at
various sets composed from Peter and Paul: {Peter, Paul}, all, or does so of the fact that some other items that are not among its
{Peter, {Peter, {{Paul}}}}, etc. We don’t normally ask where such things parts occupy that region.
are, or how much space they occupy. And indeed many philosophers will
say that the question makes no sense, or that the answer is a dismissive This approach appears to classify the cases fairly well, but it is somewhat
‘nowhere, none’. But this answer is not forced upon us by anything in set artificial. Moreover, it raises a number of questions. What are we to say
theory or metaphysics. Even if we grant that pure sets stand in only the about the statue that occupies a region of space, not because its parts are
most trivial relations to space, it is open to us to hold, as some arrayed in space, but rather because its constituting matter occupies that
philosophers have done, that impure sets exist where and when their region? And what about the unobserved electron, which according to some
members do (Lewis 1986a). It is not unnatural to say that a set of books is interpretations of quantum mechanics does not really occupy a region of
located on a certain shelf in the library, and indeed, there are some space at all, but rather stands in some more exotic relation to the spacetime
theoretical reasons for wanting to say this (Maddy 1990). On a view of it inhabits? Suffice it to say that a philosopher who regards ‘non-spatiality’
this sort, we face a choice: we can say that since impure sets exist in as a mark of the abstract, but who allows that some abstract objects may
space, they are not abstract objects after all; or we can say that since have non-trivial spatial properties, owes us an account of the distinctive
impure sets are abstract, it was a mistake to suppose that abstract objects relation to spacetime, space, and time that sets paradigmatic concreta
cannot occupy space. apart.

One way to finesse this difficulty would be to note that even if impure sets Perhaps the crucial question about the ‘non-spatiality’ criterion concerns
occupy space, they do so in a derivative manner. The set {Peter, Paul} the classification of the parts of space itself. If they are considered
occupies a location in virtue of the fact that its concrete elements, Peter concrete, then one might ask where the spatiotemporal points or regions
and Paul, together occupy that location. The set does not occupy the are located. And a similar question arises for spatial points and regions,
location in its own right. With that in mind, it might be said that: and for temporal instants or intervals. So, the ontological status of
spatiotemporal locations, and of spatial and temporal locations, is
problematic. Let us suppose that space, or spacetime, exists, not just as an

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object of pure mathematics, but as the arena in which physical objects and Concrete objects, whether mental or physical, have causal powers;
events are somehow arrayed. It is essential to understand that the problem numbers and functions and the rest make nothing happen. There is no such
is not about the numerical coordinates that represent these points and thing as causal commerce with the game of chess itself (as distinct from its
regions (or instants and intervals) in a reference system; the issue is about concrete instances). And even if impure sets do in some sense exist in
the points and regions (or instants and intervals). Physical objects are space, it is easy enough to believe that they make no distinctive causal
located ‘in’ or ‘at’ regions of space; as a result, they count as concrete contribution to what transpires. Peter and Paul may have effects
according to the non-spatiality criterion. But what about the points and individually. They may even have effects together that neither has on his
regions of space itself? There has been some debate about whether a own. But these joint effects are naturally construed as effects of two
commitment to spacetime substantivalism is consistent with the concrete objects acting jointly, or perhaps as effects of their mereological
nominalist’s rejection of abstract entities (Field 1980, 1989; Malament aggregate (itself usually regarded as concretum), rather than as effects of
1982). If we define the abstract as the ‘non-spatial’, this debate amounts to some set-theoretic construction. Suppose Peter and Paul together tip a
whether space itself is to be reckoned ‘spatial’. To reject that these points, balance. If we entertain the possibility that this event is caused by a set, we
regions, instants, and intervals, are concrete because they are not located, shall have to ask which set caused it: the set containing just Peter and
entails featuring them as abstract. However, to think about them as Paul? Some more elaborate construction based on them? Or is it perhaps
abstract sounds a bit weird, given their role in causal processes. Perhaps, it the set containing the molecules that compose Peter and Paul? This
is easier to treat them as concrete if we want to establish that concrete proliferation of possible answers suggests that it was a mistake to credit
entities are spatiotemporal—or spatial and temporal. sets with causal powers in the first place. This is good news for those who
wish to say that all sets are abstract.
The philosopher who believes that there is a serious question about
whether the parts of space-time count as concrete would thus do well to (Note, however, that some writers identify ordinary physical events—
characterize the abstract/concrete distinction in other terms. Still—as causally efficacious items par excellence—with sets. For David Lewis, for
mentioned above—the philosopher who thinks that it is defensible that example, an event like the fall of Rome is an ordered pair whose first
parts of space are concrete might use non-spatiality to draw the distinction member is a region of spacetime, and whose second member is a set of
if she manages to provide a way of accounting for how impure sets relate such regions (Lewis 1986b). On this account, it would be disastrous to say
to space differs from the way concreta do. both that impure sets are abstract objects, and that abstract objects are non-
causal.)
3.5.3 The Causal Inefficacy Criterion
The biggest challenge to characterizing abstracta as causally inefficacious
entities is that causality itself is a notoriously problematic and difficult to
According to the most widely accepted versions of the way of negation:
define idea. It is undoubtedly one of the most controversial notions in the
An object is abstract (if and) only if it is causally inefficacious. history of thought, with all kinds of views having been put forward on the
matter. Thus, causally efficacious inherits any unclarity that attaches to

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causality. So, if we are to move the discussion forward, we need to take hitting the window is an event in which the rock ‘participates’ in a certain
the notion of causation—understood as a relation among events—as way, and it is because the rock participates in events in this way that we
sufficiently clear, even though in fact it is not. Having acknowledged this credit the rock itself with causal efficacy. But what is it for an object to
no doubt naïve assumption, several difficulties arise for the suggestion that participate in an event? Suppose John is thinking about the Pythagorean
abstract objects are precisely the causally inefficacious objects. Theorem and you ask him to say what’s on his mind. His response is an
event—the utterance of a sentence; and one of its causes is the event of
The idea that causal inefficacy constitutes a sufficient condition for John’s thinking about the theorem. Does the Pythagorean Theorem
abstractness is somewhat at odds with standard usage. Some philosophers ‘participate’ in this event? There is surely some sense in which it does. The
believe in ‘epiphenomenal qualia’: objects of conscious awareness (sense event consists in John’s coming to stand in a certain relation to the
data), or qualitative conscious states that may be caused by physical theorem, just as the rock’s hitting the window consists in the rock’s
processes in the brain, but which have no downstream causal coming to stand in a certain relation to the glass. But we do not credit the
consequences of their own (Jackson 1982; Chalmers 1996). These items Pythagorean Theorem with causal efficacy simply because it participates
are causally inefficacious if they exist, but they are not normally regarded in this sense in an event which is a cause.
as abstract. The proponent of the causal inefficacy criterion might respond
by insisting that abstract objects are distinctively neither causes nor The challenge is therefore to characterize the distinctive manner of
effects. But this is perilous. Abstract artifacts like Jane Austen’s novels (as ‘participation in the causal order’ that distinguishes the concrete entities.
we normally conceive them) come into being as a result of human activity. This problem has received relatively little attention. There is no reason to
The same goes for impure sets, which come into being when their concrete believe that it cannot be solved, though the varieties of philosophical
urelements are created. These items are clearly effects in some good sense; analysis for the notion of causality make the task full of pitfalls. Anyway,
yet they remain abstract if they exist at all. It is unclear how the proponent in the absence of a solution, this standard version of the way of negation
of the strong version of the causal inefficacy criterion (which views causal must be reckoned a work in progress.
inefficacy as both necessary and sufficient for abstractness) might best
respond to this problem. 3.5.4 The Discernibility / Non-Duplication Criteria
Apart from this worry, there are no decisive intuitive counterexamples to
Some philosophers have supposed that, under certain conditions, there are
this account of the abstract/concrete distinction. The chief difficulty—and
numerically different but indiscernible concrete entities, i.e., that there are
it is hardly decisive—is rather conceptual. It is widely maintained that
distinct concrete objects x and y that exemplify the same properties. If this
causation, strictly speaking, is a relation among events or states of affairs.
can be sustained, then one might suggest that distinct abstract objects are
If we say that the rock—an object—caused the window to break, what we
always discernible or, in a weaker formulation, that distinct abstract
mean is that some event or state (or fact or condition) involving the rock
objects are never duplicates.
caused the break. If the rock itself is a cause, it is a cause in some
derivative sense. But this derivative sense has proved elusive. The rock’s

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Cowling (2017, 86–89) analyzes whether the abstract/concrete distinction has pointed out that “if two individuals are indiscernible then so are their
thus rendered is fruitful, though criteria in this line are normally offered as unit sets” (1986a, 84). If this is correct, {A} and {B} would be
glosses on the universal/particular distinction. As part of his analysis, he indiscernible, but (at least for some philosophers) distinct abstract objects,
deploys two pairs of (not uncontroversial) distinctions: (i) between contrary to the discernibility criterion.[8] It is possible to counter-argue
qualitative and non-qualitative properties, and (ii) between intrinsic and that we could happily accept impure sets as concrete; after all, it was
extrinsic properties. Roughly, a non-qualitative property is one that always a bit unclear how they should be classified. Obviously, this has the
involves specific individuals (e.g., being the teacher of Alexander the problematic consequence of having some sets—pure sets—as abstract and
Great, being Albert Einstein, etc.), while qualitative properties are not other sets—impure sets—as concrete. But the idea that abstract objects
(e.g., having mass, having a shape, having a length, etc.). Intrinsic have distinctive intrinsic natures allows one to establish a criterion less
properties are those an object has regardless of what other objects are like strong than that of discernibility; if an entity has a distinctive intrinsic
and regardless of its relationships with other objects (e.g., being made of nature, it cannot have a duplicate. So, the next criterion of non-duplication
copper). By contrast, an object’s extrinsic properties are those that depend can be put forward:
on other entities (e.g., being the fastest car).[6]
x is an abstract object iff it is impossible for there to be an object
With these distinctions in mind, it seems impossible that there be distinct which is a duplicate of x but distinct from x .
abstract entities which are qualitatively indiscernible; each abstract entity
is expected to have a unique, distinctive qualitative intrinsic nature (or But there is a more serious counterexample to this criterion, namely,
property), which is giving reason for its metaphysical being. This wouldn’t immanent universals. These are purportedly concrete objects, for they are
be the case for any concrete entity given the initial assumption in this universals wholly present where their instances are. But this criterion
section. Therefore, the following criterion of discernability could be renders them abstract. Take the color scarlet; it is a universal wholly
pondered: present in every scarlet thing. Each of the scarlets in those things is an
immanent universal. These are non-duplicable, but at least according to
x is an abstract object iff it is impossible for there to be an object Armstrong (1978, I, 77, though see 1989, 98–99), they are
which is qualitatively indiscernible from x but distinct from x. paradigmatically concrete: spatiotemporally located, causally efficacious,
etc. Despite how promising they initially seemed, the criteria of
However, one can develop a counterexample to the above proposal, by discernibility and non-duplicability do not appear to capture the
considering two concrete objects that are indiscernible with respect to their abstract/concrete distinction.
intrinsic qualitative properties. Cowling (2017) considers the case of a
possible world with only two perfectly spherical balls, A and B, that share
the same intrinsic qualitative properties and that are floating at a certain
distance from each other. So A and B are distinct concrete objects but
indiscernible in terms of their intrinsic qualitative properties.[7] But Lewis

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3.6 The Way of Encoding but they are not abstract, since abstract objects, like the number one,
couldn’t be concrete. Indeed, Zalta’s theory implies that abstract objects
One of the most rigorous proposals about abstract objects has been (A!) aren’t possibly concrete, since he defines them to be objects that
developed by Zalta (1983, 1988, and in a series of papers). It is a formal, aren’t ordinary (1993, 404):
axiomatic metaphysical theory of objects (both abstract and concrete), and
also includes a theory of properties, relations, and propositions. The theory O!x =df ◊E!x
explicitly defines the notion of an abstract object but also implicitly A!x =df ¬O!x
characterizes them using axioms.[9] There are three central aspects to the
Thus, the ordinary objects include all the concrete objects (since E!x
theory: (i) a predicate E! which applies to concrete entities and which is
implies ◊E!x), as well as possible objects that aren’t in fact concrete but
used to define a modal distinction between abstract and ordinary objects;
might have been. On this theory, therefore, being abstract is not the
(ii) a distinction between exemplifying relations and encoding properties
negation of being concrete. Instead, the definition validates an intuition
(i.e., encoding 1-place relations); and (iii) a comprehension schema that
that numbers, sets, etc., aren’t the kind of thing that could be concrete.
asserts the conditions under which abstract objects exist.
Though Zalta’s definition of abstract seems to comport with the way of
(i) Since the theory has both a quantifier ∃ and a predicate E!, Zalta offers primitivism—take concrete as primitive, and then define abstract as not
two interpretations of his theory (1983, 51–2; 1988, 103–4). On one possibly concrete—it differs in that (a) axioms are stated that govern the
interpretation, the quantifier ∃ simply asserts there is and the predicate E! conditions under which abstract objects exist (see below), and (b) the
asserts existence. On this interpretation, a formula such as ∃x¬E!x, which features commonly ascribed to abstract objects are derived from principles
is implied by the axioms described below, asserts “there is an object that that govern the property of being concrete. For example, Zalta accepts
fails to exist”. So, on this interpretation, the theory is Meinongian because principles such as: necessarily, anything with causal powers is concrete
it endorses non-existent objects. But there is a Quinean interpretation as (i.e., ◻∀x(Cx → E!x)). Then since abstract objects are, by definition,
well, on which the quantifier ∃ asserts existence and the predicate E! concrete at no possible world, they necessarily fail to have causal powers.
asserts concreteness. On this interpretation, the formula ∃x¬E!x asserts
(ii) The distinction between exemplifying and encoding is a primitive one
and is represented in the theory by two atomic formulas: F n x1 … xn
“there exists an object that fails to be concrete”. So, on this interpretation,
(x1 , … , xn exemplify F n ) and xF 1 (x encodes F 1 ). While both ordinary
the theory is Platonist, since it doesn’t endorse non-existents but rather
asserts the existence of non-concrete objects. We’ll henceforth use the
and abstract objects exemplify properties, only abstract objects encode
Quinean/Platonist interpretation.
properties;[10] it is axiomatic that ordinary objects necessarily fail to
In the more expressive, modal version of his theory, Zalta defines ordinary encode properties (O!x → ◻¬∃FxF). Zalta’s proposal can be seen a
objects (O!) to be those that might be concrete. The reason is that Zalta positive metaphysical proposal distinct from all the others we have
holds that possible objects (i.e., like million-carat diamonds, talking considered; a positive proposal that uses encoding as a key notion to
donkeys, etc.) are not concrete but rather possibly concrete. They exist, characterize abstract objects. On this reading, the definitions and axioms

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of the theory convey what is meant by encoding and how it works. relations, and propositions. Here we describe only the theory of properties.
Intuitively, an abstract object encodes the properties by which we define or It is governed by two principles: a comprehension principle for properties
conceive of it, but exemplifies some properties contingently and others and a principle of identity. The comprehension principle asserts that for
necessarily. Thus, the number 1 of Dedekind-Peano number theory any condition on objects expressible without encoding subformulas, there
encodes all and only its number-theoretic properties, and whereas it is a property F such that necessarily, an object x exemplifies F if and only
contingently exemplifies the property being thought about by Peano, it if x is such that ϕ , i.e., ∃F◻∀x(Fx ≡ ϕ) , where ϕ has no encoding
necessarily exemplifies properties such as being abstract, not having a subformulas and no free Fs. The identity principle asserts that properties F
shape, not being a building, etc. The distinction between exemplifying and and G are identical just in case F and G are necessarily encoded by the
encoding a property is also used to define identity: ordinary objects are same objects, i.e., F = G =df ◻∀x(xF ≡ xG) . This principle allows one to
identical whenever they necessarily exemplify the same properties while assert that there are properties that are necessarily equivalent in the
abstract objects are identical whenever they necessarily encode the same classical sense, i.e., in the sense that ◻∀x(Fx ≡ Gx), but which are
properties. distinct.[11]

(iii) The comprehension principle asserts that for each expressible Since α = β is defined both when α and β are both individual variables or
condition on properties, there is an abstract object that encodes exactly the both property variables, Zalta employs the usual principle for the
properties that fulfill (satisfy) that condition. Formally: substitution of identicals. Since all of the terms in his system are rigid,
∃x(A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ ϕ)), where ϕ has no free xs. Each instance of this substitution of identicals preserves truth even in modal contexts.
schema asserts the existence of an abstract object of a certain sort. So, for
example, where ‘s ’ denotes Socrates, the instance The foregoing principles implicitly characterize both abstract and ordinary
∃x(A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ Fs)) asserts that there is an abstract object that objects. Zalta’s theory doesn’t postulate any concrete objects, though,
encodes exactly the properties that Socrates exemplifies. Zalta uses this since that is a contingent matter. But his system does include the Barcan
object to analyze the complete individual concept of Socrates. But any formula (i.e., ◊∃xFx → ∃x◊Fx), and so possiblity claims like “there
condition ϕ on conditions on properties with no free occurrences of x can might have been talking donkeys” imply that there are (non-concrete)
be used to form an instance of comprehension. In fact, one can prove that objects at our world that are talking donkeys at some possible world. Since
the object asserted to exist is unique, since there can’t be two distinct Zalta adopts the view that ordinary properties like being a donkey
abstract objects that encode exactly the properties satisfying ϕ . necessarily imply concreteness, such contingently nonconcrete objects are
ordinary.
The theory that emerges from (i)–(iii) is further developed with additional
axioms and definitions. One axiom asserts that if an object encodes a Zalta uses his theory to analyze Plato’s Forms, concepts, possible worlds,
property, it does so necessarily (xF → ◻xF). So the properties that an Fregean numbers and Fregean senses, fictions, and mathematical objects
object encodes are not relative to any circumstance. Moreover, Zalta and relations generally. However, some philosophers see his
supplements his theory of abstract objects with a theory of properties, comprehension principle as too inclusive, for in addition to these objects,

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it asserts that there are entities like the round square or the set of all sets The traditional platonist conception is a realist one: abstract objects exist
which are not members of themselves. The theory doesn’t assert that in just the same full-blooded sense that objects in the natural world exist—
anything exemplifies being round and being square—the theory preserves they are mind-independent, rather than artifacts of human endeavor or
the classical form of predication without giving rise to contradictions. But dependent on concrete objects in any way. But a number of deflationary,
it does assert that there is an abstract object that encodes being round and metatontological views, now established in the literature, are based on the
being square, and that there is an abstract object that encodes the property idea that the problems traditional platonists face have to do with “some
of being a set that contains all and only non-self-membered sets. Zalta very general preconceptions about what it takes to specify an object”
would respond by suggesting that such objects are needed not only to state rather than with “the abstractness of the desired object” (Linnebo 2018,
truth conditions, and explain the logical consequences, of sentences 42). These views suggest that abstract objects exist in some weaker sense.
involving expressions like “the round square” and “the Russell set”, but Various approaches therefore articulate what may be called the ways of
also to analyze the fictional characters of inconsistent stories and weakening existence. One clear precedent is due to Carnap 1950 [1956],
inconsistent theories (e.g., Fregean extensions). whose deflationary approach may go the furthest; Carnap rejects the
metaphysical pursuit of what “really exists” (even in the case of concrete
It should be noted that Zalta’s comprehension principle for abstract objects objects) since he maintains that the question “Do Xs really exist?” are
is unrestricted and so constitutes a plenitude principle. This allows the pseudo-questions (if asked independently of some linguistic framework).
theory to provide objects for arbitrary mathematical theories. Where τ is a
term of mathematical theory T , the comprehension principle yields a But there are other ways to suggest that abstract objects have existence
unique object that encodes all and only the properties F that are attributed conditions that demand little of the world. For example, Linsky & Zalta
to τ in T (Linsky & Zalta 1995, Nodelman & Zalta 2014).[12] Zalta’s (1995, 532) argued that the mind-independence and objectivity of abstract
theory therefore offers significant explanatory power, for it has multiple objects isn’t like that of physical objects: abstract objects aren’t subject to
applications and advances solutions to a wide range of puzzles in different an appearance/reality distinction, they don’t exist in a ‘sparse’ way that
fields of philosophy.[13] requires discovery by empirical investigation, and they aren’t complete
objects (e.g., mathematical objects are defined only by their mathematical
3.7 The Ways of Weakening Existence properties). They use this conception to naturalize Zalta’s comprehension
principle for abstract objects.
Many philosophers have supposed that abstract objects exist in some thin,
deflated sense. In this section we consider the idea that the Other deflationary accounts develop some weaker sense in which abstract
abstract/concrete distinction might be defined by saying that abstract objects exist (e.g., as ‘thin’ objects). We further describe some of these
objects exist in some less robust sense than the sense in which concrete proposals below and try to unpack the ways in which they characterize the
objects exist. weakened, deflationary sense of existence (even when such
characterizations are not always explicit).

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3.7.1 The Criterion of Linguistic Rules Carnap’s paper (1950 [1956]) considers a variety of linguistic frameworks,
such as those for: observable things (i.e., the spatiotemporally ordered
Carnap held that claims about the “real” existence of entities (concrete or system of observable things and events), natural numbers and integers,
abstract) do not have cognitive content. They are pseudo-statements. propositions, thing properties, rational and real numbers, and
However, he admitted: (a) that there are sentences in science that use spatiotemporal coordinate systems. Each framework is established by
terms that designate mathematical entities (such as numbers); and (b) that developing a language that typically includes expressions for one or more
semantic analysis seems to require entities like properties and kinds of entities in question, expressions for properties of the entities in
propositions. Since mathematical entities, properties, and propositions are question (including a general category term for each kind of entity in
traditionally considered abstract, he wanted to clarify how it is possible to question), and variables ranging over those entities. Thus, a framework for
accept a language referring to abstract entities without adopting what he the system of observable things has expressions that denote such things
considered pseudo-sentences about such entities’ objective reality. (‘the Earth’, ‘the Eiffel Tower’, etc.), expressions for properties of such
Carnap’s famous paper (1950 [1956]) contained an attempt to show that, things (‘planet’, ‘made of metal’, etc.), and variables ranging over
without embracing Platonism, one can use a language referring to abstract observables. The framework for natural numbers has expressions that
entities. denote them (‘0’, ‘2+5’), expressions for properties of the numbers
(‘prime’, ‘odd’), including the general category term ‘number’), and
To achieve these goals, Carnap begins by noting that before one can ask variables ranging over numbers.
existence questions about entities of a determinate kind, one first has to
have a language, or a linguistic framework, that allows one to speak about For Carnap, each statement in a linguistic framework should have a truth
the kinds of entity in question. He then distinguishes ‘internal’ existence value that can be determined either by analytical or empirical methods. A
questions expressed within such a linguistic framework from ‘external’ statement’s truth value is analytically determinable if it is logically true (or
existence questions about a framework. Only the latter ask whether the false), or if it’s truth is determinable exclusively from the rules of the
entities of that framework are objectively real. As we’ll see below, Carnap language or on the basis of semantic relationships among its component
thought that internal existence questions within a framework can be expressions. A statement is empirically determinable when it is
answered, either by empirical investigation or by logical analysis, confirmable (or disconfirmable) in the light of the perceived evidence.
depending on the kind of entity the framework is about. By contrast, Note that the very attempt to confirm an empirical statement about
Carnap regards external questions (e.g., ‘Do Xs exist?’, expressed either physical objects on the basis of the evidence requires that one adopt the
about, or independent of, a linguistic framework) as pseudo-questions: language of the framework of things. Carnap warns us, however, that “this
though they appear to be theoretical questions, in fact they are merely must not be interpreted as if it meant … acceptance of a belief in the
practical questions about the utility of the linguistic framework for reality of the thing world; there is no such belief or assertion or
science. assumption because it is not a theoretical question” (1950 [1956, 208]).
For Carnap, to accept an ontology “means nothing more than to accept a
certain form of language, in other words to accept rules for forming

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statements and for testing, accepting, or rejecting them” (1950 [1956, All of the existence assertions just discussed are therefore internal to their
208]). respective linguistic frameworks. Carnap thinks that the only sense that
can be given to talk of “existence” is an internal sense. Internal questions
Carnap takes this approach to every linguistic framework, no matter about the existence of things or abstract objects are not questions about
whether it is a framework about physical, concrete things, or a framework their real metaphysical existence.[15] Hence, it seems more appropriate to
about abstract entities such as numbers, properties, concepts, propositions, describe his view as embodying a deflationary notion of object. For
etc. For him, the pragmatic reasons for accepting a given linguistic Carnap concludes “the question of the admissibility of entities of a certain
framework are that it has explanatory power, unifies the explanation of type or of abstract entities in general as designata is reduced to the
disparate kinds of data and phenomena, expresses claims more efficiently, question of the acceptability of the linguistic framework for those entities”
etc. And we often choose a framework for a particular explanatory (1950 [1956, 217]).
purpose. We might therefore choose a framework with expressions about
abstract entities to carry out an explication (i.e., an elucidation of Thus, for each framework (no matter whether it describes empirical
concepts), or to develop a semantics for natural language. For Carnap, the objects, abstract objects, or a mix of both), one can formulate both simple
choice between platonism or nominalism is not a legitimate one; both are and complex existential statements. According to Carnap, each simple
inappropriate attempts to answer an external pseudo-question. existential statement is either empirical or analytic. If a simple statement is
empirical, its truth value can be determined by a combination of empirical
As sketched earlier, the truth of such existence claims as ‘there are tables’ inquiry and consideration of the linguistic rules governing the framework;
and ‘there are unicorns’, which are expressed within the framework for if the simple existential statement is analytic, then its truth value can be
observable entities, is to be determined empirically, since empirical determined simply by considering the linguistic rules governing the
observations and investigations are needed. These statements are not true framework. Whereas the simple existential statements that require
in virtue of the rules of the language. By contrast, existence claims such as empirical investigation assert the existence of possible concrete entities
‘there are numbers’ (‘∃xNx ’) expressed within the framework of number (like ‘tables’ or ‘unicorns’), the simple existential statements that are
theory, or ‘there is a property F such that both x and y are F’ analytic assert the existence of abstract entities. Let us call this criterion
(‘∃F(Fx & Fy) ’) expressed within the framework of property theory, can for asserting the existence of abstract objects the criterion of linguistic
be determined analytically. For these statements either form part of the rules.
rules of the language (e.g., expressed as axioms that govern the terms of
the language) or are derivable from the rules of the language. When these The case of mixed frameworks poses some difficulties for the view.
statements are part of the rules that make up the linguistic framework, they According to the Criterion of Linguistic Rules,
are considered analytic, as are the existential statements that follow from
those rules.[14] x is abstract iff “x exists” is analytic in the relevant language.

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But this criterion suggests that impure sets, object-dependent properties, objects, she prefers a simpler kind of realism (see Thomasson 2015, 145–
abstract artifacts, and the rest are not abstract. For this criterion appears to 158). She argues that everyday uses of existential statements provide
draw a line between certain pure abstract entities and everything else. The acceptable ontological commitments when those assertions are supported
truth of simple existence statements about {Bob Dylan} or Dickens’ A either by empirical evidence or merely by the rules of use that govern
Christmas Carol, which usually are considered abstract entities, does not general terms (e.g., sortal terms); in both cases she says that “application
depend solely on linguistic rules. The same goes for simple and complex conditions” for a general term are fulfilled (see Thomasson 2015, 86, 89–
existential statements with general terms such as ‘novel’, ‘legal statute’, 95). She, too, therefore offers a criterion of linguistic rules for accepting
etc. abstract objects. Given her defense of simple realism, it appears that she
takes both observable objects and theoretical entities in science as
In the end, though, Carnap doesn’t seem to be either a realist or nominalist concrete.
about objects (abstract or concrete). Carnap rejects the question whether
these objects are real in a metaphysical sense. But, contrary to the
3.7.2 The Criterion of Minimalism
nominalist, he rejects the idea that we can truly deny the real existence of
abstract objects (i.e., a denial that is external to a linguistic framework).
In what follows, two ways of formulating criteria for the abstract/concrete
This attitude, which settles the question of which framework to adopt on
distinction are considered. The views start with the idea that our concept
pragmatic grounds (e.g., which framework best helps us to make sense of
of an object allows for objects whose existence places very few demands
the data to be explained), is the reason why we’ve labeled his view as a
on reality over and above the demands imposed by claims that do not
way of weakening existence. See the entry on Carnap for further details.
mention abstract objects. Those philosophers who maintain this
Proposals by other philosophers are related to Carnap’s view. Resnik philosophical thesis are what Linnebo (2012) calls metaontological
(1997, Part Two) has put forward a postulational epistemology for the minimalists. Their proposals are typically put forward in connection with
existence of mathematical objects. According to this view, all one has to issues in the philosophy of mathematics, but then applied to other
do to ensure the existence of mathematical objects is to use a language to domains.
posit mathematical objects and to establish a consistent mathematical
Parsons (1990), Resnik (1997), and Shapiro (1997) contend that, in the
theory for them.[16] Nevertheless, their existence does not result from their
case of mathematical theories, coherence suffices for the existence of the
being posited. Instead, we recognize those objects as existent because a
objects mentioned in those theories.[17] They do not offer an explicit
consistent mathematical theory for them has been developed. Resnik
criterion for distinguishing abstract and concrete objects. Nevertheless,
requires both a linguistic stipulation for considering mathematical objects
their proposals implicitly draw the distinction; abstract objects are those
and a coherency condition for recognizing them as existent. Thomasson
objects that exist in virtue of the truth of certain modal claims. In
(2015, 30–34) advocates for an approach which she takes to be inherited
particular, the existence of mathematical objects is “grounded in” pure
from Carnap. She calls it easy ontology. Since she is not trying to find
modal truths. For example, numbers exist “in virtue of” the fact that there
ultimate categories or a definitive list of basic (abstract or concrete)

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could have been an ω-sequence of objects; sets exist because there might It is important for Linnebo that sufficiency be asymmetric. He wouldn’t
be entities that satisfy the axioms of one or another set theory, etc. Since accept mutual sufficiency, i.e., principles of the form Rab ⇔ f (a) = f (b),
these pure modal truths are necessary, this explains why pure abstract since these would imply that both sides are equivalent as a matter of
objects exist necessarily. It also explains a sense in which they are meaning. Instead, the point is that the seemingly unproblematic claim Rab
insubstantial: their existence is grounded in truths that do not (on the face renders the claim f (a) = f (b) unproblematic, and this is best expressed by
of it) require the actual existence of anything at all.[18] sufficiency statements of the form Rab ⇒ f (a) = f (b), on which the left
side grounds the right side. So Linnebo’s notion of reconceptualization is
Linnebo (2018) advances a proposal about how to conceive abstract not the Fregean notion of recarving of content.
objects by revising our understanding of Fregean biconditional principles
of abstraction (see subsection 3.4). Some philosophers take these Fregean Moreover, in a sufficiency statement, Linnebo doesn’t require that the
abstraction principles to be analytic sentences. For example, Hale & relation R be an equivalence relation; he requires only that R be symmetric
Wright (2001; 2009) consider the two sides of an abstraction principle as and transitive. It need not be reflexive, for the domain might contain
equivalent as a matter of meaning; they ‘carve up content’ in different entities x such that ¬Rxx (e.g., in the case of the sufficiency statement for
ways (to use Frege’s metaphor). But Linnebo (2018, 13–14) rejects this directions, not every object x in the domain is such that x is parallel with
view and the view that such biconditional principles are analytic. x —being parallel is restricted to lines). Linnebo calls such symmetric and
transitive relations unity relations. When a sufficiency statement—
He suggests instead that we achieve reference to abstract (and other Rab ⇒ f (a) = f (b)—holds, then new objects are identified. The new
objects) by means of a sufficiency operator, ⇒ , which he takes to be a objects are specified in terms of the less problematic entities related by R;
strengthening of the material conditional. He starts with conditional for example, directions become specified by lines that are parallel.
principles of the form “if Rab, then f (a) = f (b) ” (e.g., “if a and b are According to Linnebo, the parallel lines become specifications of the new
parallel, then the direction of a = the direction of b”) and takes the right- objects. A unity relation R is therefore the starting point for developing a
hand side to be reconceptualization of the left-hand side. He represents sufficient (but not necessary and sufficient) condition for reference.
these claims as ϕ ⇒ ψ , where the new operator ‘⇒’ is meant to capture
the intuitive idea that ϕ is (conceptually) sufficient for ψ , or all that is Sometimes the new objects introduced by conditional principles do not
required for ψ is ϕ . For ϕ to be sufficient for ψ , sufficiency must be make demands on reality; when that happens, they are said to be thin (for
stronger than metaphysically implies but weaker than analytically implies example, directions only require that there be parallel lines). However,
(see Linnebo 2018, 15). The notion Linnebo considers is a ‘species of when the new objects introduced by sufficiency statements make more
metaphysical grounding’. Hence, sufficiency statements allow us to substantial demands on reality, the objects are considered thick. Suppose
conceptualize statements mentioning abstract objects (or other problematic Rab asserts a and b are spatiotemporal parts of the same cohesive and
objects) in terms of metaphysically less problematic or non-problematic naturally bounded whole. Then a and b become specifications for physical
objects. bodies via the following principle: Rab ⇒ Body(a) = Body(b) . In this
case, the principle “makes a substantial demand on the world” because it

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requires checking that there are spatiotemporal parts constituting a abstract objects of a mixed nature; namely, those that are thin relative to
continuous stretch of solid stuff (just looking at the spatiotemporal parts other objects. For example, the type of the letter ‘A’ is abstract because it
does not suffice to determine whether they constitute to a body; see is thin and has a shallow nature, but it is thin with respect the tokens of the
Linnebo 2018, 45). letter ‘A’.

However, Linnebo does not identify being abstract with being thin (2012, This view, as Linnebo himself admits, faces some problems. One of them
147), for there are thin objects in a relative sense that are not abstract, is that the methodologies used by working mathematicians, such as
namely those that make no substantial demands on the world beyond those classical logic, impredicative definitions, and taking arbitrary
introduced in terms of some antecedently given objects. The mereological subcollections of infinite domains, seem to presuppose objects that are
sum of your left hand and your laptop makes no demand on the world more independent, i.e., objects that don’t have a shallow nature (2018,
beyond the demands of its parts.[19] Instead, he suggests that abstract 197; for a discussion of independence, see Section 4.1 of the entry on
objects are those that are thin and that have a shallow nature. The notion platonism in mathematics). Another problem (2018, 195) is that in order
of shallow nature is meant to capture “the intuitive idea that any question for an object to count as having a shallow nature, an intrinsic unity
that is solely about Fs has an answer that can be determined on the basis relation has to be available. An investigation is required to establish that
of any given specifications of these Fs” (2018, 192–195). For example, there is such an intrinsic unity relation in each case. It is far from clear that
directions have a shallow nature because any question about directions a conditional principle with an intrinsic unity relation is available for each
(e.g., are they orthogonal, etc.?) can be determined solely on the basis of of problematic cases mentioned in this entry, such as chess, legal
the lines that specify them. Shapes have a shallow nature because any institutions or the English language. Finally, Linnebo doesn’t discuss the
question about them (e.g., are they triangular, circular, etc.?) can be question of whether sets of concrete urelements are themselves abstract or
determined solely on the basis of their underlying concrete figures. By concrete. At present, there may be an important question left open by his
contrast, mereological sums of concrete objects are not shallow because theory that other theories of abstract objects answer.
there are questions about them that cannot be answered solely on the basis
of their specifications; for instance, the weight of the mereological sum of 3.8 Eliminativism
your laptop and your left hand depends not only on their combination but
also on the gravitational field in which they are located.[20] We come finally to proposals that reject the abstract/concrete distinction.
We can consider three cases. First, there are the nominalists who both
Linnebo thus contrasts abstract objects, which are thin and have a shallow reject abstract entities and reject the distinction as illegitimate. They focus
nature, with concrete objects, which do not have a shallow nature. Linnebo on arguing against the formulations of the distinction proposed in the
extends this view in several ways. He constructs an account of literature. A second group of eliminativists reject real objects of any kind,
mathematical objects that goes beyond the way of abstraction principles thereby dismissing the distinction as irrelevant; these are the ontological
by providing a reconstruction of set theory in terms of ‘dynamic nihilists. A final group of eliminativists agree that there are prototypical
abstraction’ (2018, ch. 3). This form of minimalism also allows for cases of concrete objects and abstract objects, but conclude that a rigorous

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–––, 2018, Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account, Oxford: Oxford –––, 2002, “Response to Colyvan,” Mind, 111(441): 75–79.
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Linsky, Bernard, and Zalta, Edward N., 1995, “Naturalized Platonism Natural Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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248–270. doi:10.1093/philmat/3.3.248 Synthese, 84(3): 303–346.
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Rayo, Agustín, 2013, The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford: Oxford Oxford University Press, pp. 237–93.
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Epistemology,” Noûs, 16(1): 95–105. doi:10.2307/2215419 Swoyer, Chris, 2007, “Abstract Entities,” in T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, & D.
–––, 1997, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns p. 290, Oxford: Oxford W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, pp.
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(ed.), Meaning in Mathematics, pp. 113–131, Oxford: Oxford Thomasson, Amie L., 1999, Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge:
University Press. Cambridge University Press.
Rosen, Gideon, and Yablo, Stephen, 2020, “Solving the Caesar Problem – –––, 2015, Ontology Made Easy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, pp. MA: The MIT Press.
116–131, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wright, Crispin, 1983, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects,
Saatsi, Juha, 2011, “The Enhanced Indispensability Argument: Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Representational Versus Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Yablo, Stephen, 1998, “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?” Proceedings
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143–154. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00044
Sainsbury, Mark, 2009, Fiction and Fictionalism, London: Routledge. –––, 2001, “Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism,” Midwest Studies in
Shapiro, Stewart, 1997, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Philosophy, 25: 72–102. doi:10.1111/1475-4975.00040
Ontology, New York: Oxford University Press. –––, 2002, “Abstract Objects: A Case Study,” Philosophical Issues, 12(1):
doi:10.1093/0195139305.001.0001 220–240.
Sider, Theodore, 2007, “Parthood,” The Philosophical Review, 116(1): –––, 2009, Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality, New
51–91. doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-022 York: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2009, “Ontological Realism,” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. –––, 2010, “The Myth of the Seven,” in Things: Papers on Objects,
Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, pp. 384–423, Oxford: Oxford Events, and Properties, pp. 233–245, Oxford: Oxford University

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 Abstract Objects José L. Falguera, Concha Martı́nez-Vidal, and Gideon Rosen

Press. object | physicalism | Platonism: in metaphysics | Platonism: in the

–––, 2014, Aboutness, Princeton: Princeton University Press. philosophy of mathematics | states of affairs | types and tokens
Zalta, Edward N., 1983, Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic
Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Acknowledgments
–––, 1988, Intensional Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. This entry was revised, updated, and expanded in 2021 by José L.
–––, 1993, “Twenty-Five Basic Theorems in Situation and World Theory,” Falguera and Concha Martínez-Vidal. The author of the previous version
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 22: 385–428. of this entry, Gideon Rosen, remains credited on this entry since
–––, 2006, “Essence and Modality,” Mind, 115(459): 659–693. significant content in Sections 1, 2.1, 3.5.1–3.5.3, and 4 has been retained
–––, 2020, “Typed Object Theory,” in Falguera & Martínez-Vidal (eds.) from the previous version.
2020, pp. 59–88.
Notes to Abstract Objects
Academic Tools
1. See Swoyer 2007 and Cowling 2017 for further discussion of abstract
How to cite this entry. and concrete entities.
Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP
Society. 2. Some (van Inwagen 1977, 1983; Kripke 1973 [2013]), analyze these
Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet names as referring to theoretical entities of literary criticism or abstract
Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). objects, but only in so far as they occur in the context of statements about
Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links fictions (e.g., when we critically reflect on the characters of a story), while
to its database. others (Thomasson 1999) regard all the uses of these names as signifying
abstract artifacts (and thus ontologically dependent on concrete objects).
Other Internet Resources
3. Indispensability arguments in other areas of philosophical enquiry, such
Rayo, A., 2020, “The Ultra-Thin Conception of Objecthood,” as ethics, have also been developed. See Enoch 2011, 2016; Leibowitz
unpublished manuscript. & Sinclair 2016.

Related Entries 4. Lewis was trying to determine whether any of the ways for defining
abstract objects would categorize nonactual possible worlds (as he
analytic/synthetic distinction | Carnap, Rudolf | fictionalism | Frege, understood them) as abstract.
Gottlob | mathematics, philosophy of: indispensability arguments in the |
mathematics, philosophy of: nominalism | nominalism: in metaphysics | 5. Donato and Falguera 2020 make a similar case in connection with the
idea that scientific models are abstract artifacts.

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6. The two distinctions allow us to consider four kinds of properties: even for the fictionalist version). His view is that there may be no fact of
qualitative intrinsic (e.g., being human); extrinsic qualitative (e.g., being the matter since the best arguments for platonism and the best arguments
the largest planet); intrinsic non-qualitative (e.g., being Barack Obama); for nominalism/fictionalism cancel each other out and are inconclusive.
non-qualitative extrinsic (e.g., being 5 cm taller than Napoleon
Bonaparte). 13. See, for example, Zalta 2006 for a discussion of how object theory
handles the case of the unit set of Socrates, i.e., {Socrates} .
7. Note, however, the limitations of the example, since the molecular
compositions of A and B cannot be the same. 14. These rules include syntactic and semantic rules, rules of reasoning,
and methods of proof.
8. Cowling (2017, 89) also discusses a ‘non-duplication’ criterion.
15. When the concept of reality occurs in internal questions about the
9. Some reminiscences of this proposal can be traced in the work of existence of things, then it “is an empirical non-metaphysical concept”
Meinong (1904, 1915) and in that of Mally (1912); more recently in (Carnap 1950 [56]).
Parsons’ attempt (1980) to reconstruct Meinong’s theory axiomatically.
16. See Fine 2005 for a different postulational proposal, namely his
10. The fact that only abstract objects encode properties cannot be used to procedural postulationist account of mathematical knowledge.
define abstract objects because it leaves out the null abstract object, an
abstract object which encodes no properties. 17. This criterion goes back to Hilbert, who suggested that mathematical
existence is guaranteed by consistency.
11. Zalta’s theory of properties extends to a theory of relations and
propositions. The comprehension principle for relations and propositions 18. See Rosen 2011 for an analysis of the notion of grounding in relation
is just a generalization of the principle for properties, extended to the cases to these issues.
where n ≥ 2 and n = 0. Relation and proposition identity are then defined
19. Thin objects in an absolute sense (i.e., pure sets, directions, numbers)
in terms of property identity. See Zalta 1983, 1988, and 1993.
simply make no substantial demand on the world (see Linnebo 2018, 4).
12. Balaguer (1998) also formulates a plenitude principle for what he calls
20. Linnebo does attempt to make the notion of having a shallow nature
‘full-blooded’ platonism. But his principle is primarily about mathematical
precise. He appeals to the notion of an intrinsic relation and the notion of a
objects and is a conditional one; his principle essentially asserts that every
relation being reducible on a sortal F. Intrinsic relations are similar to
possible mathematical object exists, though see Colyvan & Zalta 1999 for
intrinsic properties (which were discussed earlier, in Section 3.5.4); they
criticism. Balaguer (2020) asserts a similar principle for wrong-like
are relations that things bear to one another in virtue of how they are and
properties. In any case, Balaguer does not advocate for platonism, not
how they are related to each other, as opposed to how they are related to
even one based on a plenitude principle (though he agrees that the latter is
things outside of them and how things outside of them are (see the entry
the best version of platonism). Nor does he advocate for nominalism (not
on intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties). (For example, the relation of being

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 Abstract Objects

parallel is intrinsic because of how the lines are related to each other, and
the relation of similarity, which may hold between concrete geometrical
figures, is intrinsic because of the shape of the figures.) The definition of a
relation being reducible on a sortal F occurs in 2018, 192–195, and we
omit the explanation here. But with these notions, Linnebo says that an
object x has a shallow nature if and only if there is a sortal F, such that x
is an F and all the intrinsic relations on x are reducible on F.

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68 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 pdf version of the entry
Possible Objects
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Stanford Encyclopedia Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible
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of Philosophy intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely
discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds:
actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two
opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which
they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular
approach, which has been influenced by the philosophy of Alexius
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizing about
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possible objects because it attempts to construct a general theory of
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2. Possible Worlds
The Metaphysics Research Lab
Department of Philosophy 2.1 Possibilist Realism
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 2.1.1 Modal Counterpart Theory
Possible Objects 2.1.2 Modal–Dimensionalism
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2.1.3 Specificity Problem
Takashi Yagisawa
2.2 Actualist Representationism
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 Possible Objects Takashi Yagisawa

2.2.1 Nesting Problem possible objects are not objects, that is, they are nothing. Thus on this
2.2.2 Essence Solution view, the adjective ‘possible’ is equivalent to ‘actual’ when applied to
2.2.3 Other Solutions objects and (ii) is false. This makes the notion of a possible object, or
3. Without Possible Worlds equivalently the notion of an actual object, uninteresting. The notion of an
3.1 Subsistence vs. Existence object is the basic notion and does all the work. There is another
3.1.1 Theory of Non-Existent Objects conservative view on objects, which does not deal in actuality or
3.1.2 Theory of Encoding possibility directly. It deals in existence instead. It is the view that any
4. Unicorns object is an existing object. On this view, the following analog of (ii) is
5. Fictional Objects false: not every object is an existing object, that is, some object is a non-
6. Quantified Modal Logic existing object. This view makes the notion of an existing object
Bibliography equivalent to that of an object; existence adds nothing to objecthood. If we
Academic Tools combine talk of actuality and talk of existence, we obtain five alternative
Other Internet Resources conservative views with varying degrees of conservatism:
Related Entries
(1) Any object is an actual existing object;

1. What They Are (2) Any object is an actual object, that is, it is either an actual existing
object or an actual non-existing object;
Possible objects—possibilia (sing. possibile)—are objects that are
(3) Any object is an existing object, that is, it is either an actual
possible. What it is to be an object—which is a basic and universal
existing object or a non-actual existing object;
metaphysical category—will not be discussed but will be simply assumed
as understood. What it is to be possible is the focus. Possibility of an (4) Any object that is actual is an existing object;
object should be understood in tandem with another notion, namely,
actuality. The two notions are related at least in the following way: (i) (5) Any object that exists is an actual object.
every actual object is a possible object. A more controversial relation
between the two notions is expressed as follows: (ii) not every possible (1) is a stronger claim than the other four. (2) and (3) are stronger than (5)
object is an actual object, that is, some possible object is a non-actual and (4), respectively. (1)-(3) give characterizations of all objects, whereas
object. (4) and (5) are more limited in scope. When the verb ‘exists’ is understood
with the most comprehensive domain of discourse (assuming the
There is a wide-spread conservative view on objects, which says that any availability of such a domain), (5) is known as actualism. If the domain of
object is an actual object. In other words, the adjective ‘actual’ is discourse for ‘exists’ is stipulated to consist only of actual objects, (5) is
redundant, for it excludes no object. From this it follows that non-actual trivial and compatible with possibilism, the position which says that some

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 Possible Objects Takashi Yagisawa

object is outside the domain consisting of all actual objects; cf. (ii). Most assassinated at some possible world, and to say that Julius Caesar was
of those who advertise their positions as actualist hold not only (5) with actually assassinated is to say that Julius Caesar was assassinated at the
the most comprehensive domain of discourse in mind but also (1), and actual world. Likewise with existence: to say that Julius Caesar possibly
therefore (2)-(4) as well. There are some theorists who hold (5), or at least existed is to say that Julius Caesar existed at some possible world, and to
do not deny (5), but deny (1). They do so by denying (3), that is, by say that Julius Caesar actually existed is to say that Julius Caesar existed
maintaining that some object is a non-existing object. Such a view is one at the actual world. Assuming that the actual world is a possible world, it
version of Meinongianism. But let us start with actualism and possibilism. follows that if Julius Caesar actually existed, he possibly existed.

We shall first examine possibilism. It is superficially the most In general, any object that actually exists possibly exists. Assuming that
commonsensical position. It is superficially commonsensical to hold that actuality (of an object) is nothing but actual existence and possibility (of
some objects are not actual: e.g., Santa Claus, the Fountain of Youth. If we an object) is nothing but possible existence, this grounds the plausible
understand this view in terms of existence, that is, as the claim that there conceptual connection between actuality and possibility noted earlier: (i)
are—that is, there exist—some objects that are not actual, we have every actual object is a possible object. The overall philosophical merit of
possibilism. As we have noted, ‘exist’ here should not mean “actually the possible-worlds framework cannot be judged without close scrutiny of
exist” but should be understood with a larger domain of discourse in mind. its metaphysical foundations. Specifically, the two key questions which
Such a domain is the domain containing not only actual objects but also need to be asked are: “What are possible worlds in general?” and “What is
non-actual possible objects as genuine objects. To flesh out the idea of the actual world in particular?” Metaphysical theorizing about possible
such a domain as proposed by the best-known version of possibilism, it is worlds goes back at least to Leibniz, but the contemporary theorizing is
necessary to start with the idea of a possible world. After we articulate and pursued largely on two distinct fronts; possibilist realism and actualist
examine possibilism as couched in the possible-worlds framework, we representationism.
shall discuss versions of actualism also couched in the possible-worlds
framework. We shall then examine other theories outside the possible- 2.1 Possibilist Realism
worlds framework.
Possibilist realism takes non-actual possible objects to be (real, genuine)
2. Possible Worlds objects; it takes their metaphysical status to be on a par with that of actual
objects. When possibilist realists assert, “Non-actual possible objects
According to the framework of possible worlds, all alethic modal exist”, their word ‘exist’ has the same linguistic meaning as when
statements involving possibility are existential quantifications over actualists assert, “Actual objects exist”. Possibilist realists believe that
possible worlds and all alethic modal statements involving actuality are some domains of discourse with respect to which ‘exist’ may be
singular statements about a particular possible world, namely, the actual understood include more than actual objects, whereas actualists deny it.
world (Kripke 1959, 1963a, 1963b). For example, to say that Julius Caesar Thus according to possibilist realism, to call an object non-actually
was possibly not assassinated is to say that Julius Caesar was not possibly existent is merely to deny its inclusion in a particular realm—call

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 Possible Objects Takashi Yagisawa

it ‘actuality’—and affirm its inclusion in some other realm. That other spatiotemporal” instead of “spatiotemporal” but we shall let that pass.) By
realm is no less a realm of existence than actuality is a realm of existence. most criteria, Lewis’s possible worlds, hence also his possible objects, fall
All realms of existence are metaphysically on a par with one another. under the label ‘concrete’ rather than ‘abstract’. Every non-actual possible
Every token use of the existence predicate is to be understood with respect object (apart from pure Cartesian egos, perhaps) is a spatiotemporal object
to some realm of existence, either explicitly or implicitly. and bears no spatiotemporal relation to any actual object, or to any
possible object exiting at any possible world at which it does not exist.
What distinguishes actuality from all other realms? The leading answer is This makes non-actual possible objects as real as non-actual possible
due to David Lewis, who is the proponent of the best-known version of worlds. It is worth while to remind ourselves that this does not make it
possibilist realism, namely, modal counterpart theory. Lewis’s view on automatically true to say that non-actual possible objects exist, even if we
actuality is known as the indexical theory of actuality (Lewis 1970). The accept non-actual possible worlds. Whether it is true to say so depends on
basic idea is that actuality for us is the realm which includes us, and more the domain of discourse with respect to which the existence predicate is to
generally, actuality for x is the realm which includes x. But there are many be understood.
different realms which include us: this room, this building, this town, this
continent, this planet, this galaxy, this minute, this hour, this day, this
2.1.1 Modal Counterpart Theory
month, this year, this century, etc. So, to fix our actuality as a unique realm
which includes us, Lewis takes the largest spatiotemporal whole which
On Lewis’s modal counterpart theory, every possible object is confined to
includes us. More precisely, actuality for us is the maximal
one possible world. Indeed, Lewis defines a possible object as an object all
spatiotemporally related whole of which we are (mereological) part. In
of whose parts exist at some single possible world (Lewis 1986: 211). This
general, actuality for x is the maximal spatiotemporally related whole of
conception of a possible object forces Lewis to resort to his counterpart
which x is part. For anything to exist non-actually-for-x but possibly is for
theoretic account of modality de re (Lewis 1968). According to any
it to be part of some realm outside actuality for x, that is, to be part of
possible-worlds theory of modality, to say that you could have been the
some maximal spatiotemporally related whole of which x is not part. Note
leader of a religious cult is to say that at some possible world you are the
that this is a reductionist view of existence, both actual and non-actual
leader of a religious cult. According to Lewis, to say that at a possible
possible. Existence is first relativized to a maximal spatiotemporally
world you are the leader of a religious cult is to say that at that possible
related whole, and then existence in such a whole is defined reductively in
world there is a counterpart of you, that is, someone who resembles you to
terms of (mereological) parthood. Lewis characterizes possible worlds as
sufficient degrees in relevant respects, who is the leader of a religious cult.
maximal spatiotemporally related wholes. Actuality is the actual world,
The counterpart relation is a similarity relation in most cases (but arguably
and all other maximal spatiotemporally related wholes are non-actual
not in all cases). As such, it is not an equivalence relation. This affords
possible worlds.
Lewis ample theoretical maneuverability but at the same time causes him
A possible object is simply a part of a maximal spatiotemporally related some theoretical trouble. For example, as Lewis himself admits, his
whole (Lewis 1986). (Strictly speaking Lewis prefers to say “analogically counterpart theoretic account of modality either yields the consequence

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 Possible Objects Takashi Yagisawa

that every actual object necessarily exists or yields the consequence that latter lacking (a counterpart of) P and the former not lacking it. Thus, even
some actual object is not identical to itself (Lewis 1983: 32). There is also if B is identical with W and W could not have lacked P, B could have
a famous complaint voiced by Saul Kripke (Kripke 1972: 344–45, note lacked P, i.e., B without P is a possible object even though W without P is
13). It in effect says that whether someone other than you is the leader of a not. Whereas Lewis invokes similarity, which is relative to contextually
religious cult at some possible world is irrelevant to whether you could shifting respects, Fara invokes sortal sameness, which is less shifty. Fara’s
have been the leader of a religious cult. Lewis’s reply to this is that the de counterpart theory also interestingly avoids denying the necessity of
re character of the possibility is preserved by the stipulation that the identity.
person who is the cult leader is the counterpart of you, rather than the
counterpart of someone else, at an appropriate possible world. For an Independently of his counterpart theory, Lewis’s definition of a possible
attempt to avoid counterparts and still retain a broadly Lewisian realistic object has some peculiar consequences, given that existence in general is
framework, see McDaniel 2004. understood as bearing of the part-of relation to the whole that constitutes
the domain of discourse. Take any two possible worlds w1 and w2. Lewis
A significantly different counterpart theory is proposed by Delia Graff wants to assert that both w1 and w2 exist in some sense. So for the
Fara (Fara 2008, 2012). Fara analyzes modality de re in terms of sortal assertion to be true, it must be true relative to a domain of discourse which
sameness rather than similarity. She clearly distinguishes sortal sameness contains as a sub-domain some whole of which both w1 and w2 are part.
(e.g., “is the same boat as”) from identity (“is identical with”), and this Not both are part of a single possible world or of its part. The smallest
qualifies her analysis as a version of counterpart theory: a given boat is F whole of which they both are part is the (mereological) sum of w1 and w2.
at a world if and only if at that world something that is the same boat as-- So, some domain D containing such a sum as a sub-domain must count as
rather than identical with--that given boat is F. This also somewhat an acceptable domain of discourse for the evaluation of an existence
alleviates Kripke’s famous complaint against counterpart theory. Suppose claim. Consider a proper part p1 of w1 and a proper part p2 of w2. Let
that a boat B is actually made up of a hunk of wood W and a small plank P Gerry be the sum of p1 and p2. Then it is true to say that Gerry exists when
is a proper part of W. It is intuitively sensible to hold that B is identical the domain of discourse is D. So, there is a sense in which Gerry exists. In
with W, that B could have lacked P as a part, and that W could not have fact it is the same sense in which w1 and w2 exist. But Gerry is not a
lacked P as a part. But this intuitive view appears internally incoherent. If possible object, according to Lewis’s conception, for Gerry does not have
B is identical with W and W could not have lacked P as a part, then it all of its parts at a single possible world. This is peculiar. Gerry is an
appears that B also could not have lacked P as a part; in other words, B object which exists in the same sense in which possible worlds exist but
without P appears to be an impossible object. On Fara’s analysis, B could Gerry is not a possible object. Since—as sanctioned by the universality of
have lacked P if and only if at some possible world, some x is such that x mereological summation, which Lewis accepts—Gerry is an object, Gerry
is the same boat as B and x lacks P, and W could have lacked P if and only is an impossible object. But there is nothing impossible about Gerry any
if at some possible world, some y is such that y is the same hunk of wood more than there is about the sum of w1 and w2. Perhaps the sum of w1 and
as W and y lacks P. Since y may not be the same boat as x (e.g., y may not w2 is an impossible object, too. But this idea flouts the initially plausible
be a boat at all), there is not even an appearance of inconsistency with the principle of recombination for possibility of objects, which says that if x is

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a possible object and y is a possible object independent of x, then the 2.1.2 Modal–Dimensionalism
totality consisting exactly of x and y is a possible object. Defenders of
Lewis’s theory may take this to mean that the principle of recombination, Lewis’s is the most developed version of possibilist realism based on
despite its initial plausibility, is to be rejected. There is another unexpected possible worlds. As a result, discussion of possibilist realism almost
consequence of Lewis’s theory. If the sum of w1 and w2 is an impossible always focuses exclusively on Lewis’s version. There are, however, other
object, then the sum of all possible worlds is an impossible object, for the versions of possible-worlds-based possibilist realism, and one of them
former is part of the latter and no impossible object is part of a possible deserves a brief mention. Assume that the universe is spread out in three-
object. But this makes the domain in which all possible worlds reside, or dimensional space and persists through one-dimensional time. The non-
“logical space”, an impossible object. This appears unwelcome. Lewis Lewisian version of possibilist realism in question may then be called
does consider an alternative conception of a possible object, which says ‘modal–dimensionalism’. It says that in addition to the four physical
that a possible object is an object every part of which exists at some (spatiotemporal) dimensions, the universe has modal dimensions. Possible
possible world or other (Lewis 1986: 211). This allows a possible object to worlds are points in modal space as defined by the modal axes just as
have parts at different possible worlds. Lewis, who accepts the physical spatiotemporal points are points in physical spacetime as defined
universality of mereological summation, does not deny that possible by the four physical spatiotemporal axes, and possible objects “persist”
objects in this sense are as real as possible objects in his preferred sense. through possible worlds. A version of modal–dimensionalism is what W.
He however dismisses them as unimportant on the ground that we do not V. Quine argued against when he took himself to be arguing against a
normally name them, speak of them, or quantify over them. But given that typical possibilist realism (Quine 1976), and it is arguably the view many
sets of possible worlds and sets of possible objects figure in important possible-worlds theorists adumbrated, however vaguely and inchoately, as
philosophical discussions concerning the identity of propositions and the representative possibilist realist theory before Lewis forcefully
properties, these sets seem important. If the sum of the members of an articulated his own version.
important set is important, then Lewis’s dismissal appears hasty. Again,
defenders of Lewis may stand this line of reasoning on its head and Modal–dimensionalism differs from Lewis’s theory in a number of
conclude that the sum of the members of an important set is not always important respects but the most striking is the absence of counterpart
important. theory. Modal–dimensionalism eschews counterparts and proposes that to
say that you are the leader of a religious cult at a possible world is to say
A useful overview of various issues concerning Lewis’s possibilist that you yourself exist at that world and are the leader of a religious cult at
realism, as well as actualist representationism, is found in Divers 2002, that world. Another difference between modal–dimensionalism and
which is the first systematic attempt to defend parts of Lewis’s theory Lewis’s theory is that unlike the latter, the former avoids the mereological
since Lewis 1986. Cameron 2012 presents a defense of Lewis’s reductive conception of the existence of a possible object at a possible world.
analysis of modality. Loux 1979 is the standard anthology of classical According to modal–dimensionalism, just as a temporally or spatially
writings in modal metaphysics in 1963–79. persisting object is (arguably) not part of the temporal or spatial points or
regions at which it exists, a modally persisting object is not part of the

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possible worlds at which it exists. Modal–dimensionalism also differs he uses follows Lewis and defines the existence of a possible object at a
from Lewis’s theory in not being a thoroughly reductionist theory. It does possible world in terms of the object being mereological part of the world.
not analyze the notion of a possible world in mereological terms but leaves Varzi notes some differences between this theory and Lewis’s. Vacek 2017
it as largely primitive (Yagisawa 2002, 2010, 2017). This enables modal– defends modal-dimensionalism from some objections.
dimensionalists to allow the possibility of there being no concrete object,
whereas on Lewis’ theory, if there is no concrete object, there is no 2.1.3 Specificity Problem
possible world. For a different attempt to reconcile possibilist realism with
the possibility of the non-existence of anything concrete, see Rodriguez- It is well known that Quine fiercely objects against the ontology of non-
Pereyra 2004. actual possible objects. Referring to an unoccupied doorway, he asks
whether the possible fat man in the doorway and the possible bald man in
Though free from some difficulties inherent in Lewis’s theoretical
the doorway are one possible man or two possible men (Quine, 1948). The
machinery, modal–dimensionalism has its own obstacles to overcome, not
point of this rhetorical question is that there is no serious issue here
the least of which is to make substantive sense of the idea of an object’s
because we have no non-trivial criterion of identity for non-actual possible
persisting not just in physical space and time but in modal space. One idea
objects. No respectable ontology should embrace objects for which we
is to mimic the “endurantist” approach to temporal persistence and say
have no non-trivial criterion of identity. Quine encapsulates this in his
that a possible object persists through many possible worlds by having all
famous slogan: “No entity without identity”. Actual ordinary mid-sized
of its parts existing at each of those worlds. Another idea is to mimic the
objects have vague boundaries, so the sorites argument may be used to
“perdurantist” approach to temporal persistence and say that a possible
show that we have no coherent non-trivial criterion of identity for them.
object persists through many possible worlds by having different parts
Quine’s slogan then appears to apply to such objects. Some take this to be
(world stages) at different possible worlds and being the modal-
good reason against the ontology of actual ordinary mid-sized objects,
dimensional “worm” consisting of those world stages. Note that this does
whereas others take this to be good reason against Quine’s slogan.
not make the object mereological part of a possible world at which it
Whatever the ultimate fate of Quine’s slogan may be, there is an objection
exists. It only makes each of the object’s world stages part of the object.
against possibilist realism which, while not explicitly invoking Quine’s
Lewis, in contrast, has it that a possible object has all of its parts at a
slogan, is at least Quinean in spirit. It goes as follows:
single possible world (where they are mereological part of that world) and
therefore does not persist through different worlds at all. Despite these Lewis’s possibilist realism faces the problem of specifying non-actual
differences, Lewis, speaking of the “perdurantist” version of modal– possible objects. Take Vulcan, the innermost planet between Sun and
dimensionalism, says that it is but a notational variant of his own theory. Mercury erroneously believed to exist by some astronomers in the
He then proceeds to criticize it (Lewis 1968: 40–2). Lewis formulates his nineteenth century, when the universe was assumed to be Newtonian.
opposition to modal–dimensionalism more carefully in Lewis 1986: 213– Vulcan is not actually between Sun and Mercury or actually anywhere at
20. Achille Varzi derives Lewis’s theory from a theory similar to modal– all. Vulcan also does not actually have any mass, shape, or chemical
dimensionalism (Varzi 2001). Unlike modal–dimensionalism, the theory composition. Still it is possible that Vulcan be a unique planet between

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Sun and Mercury and have a particular mass m, a particular shape s, and a the object between Sun and Mercury at w1 and far away at w2 is Vulcan
particular chemical composition c. Or so it seems. It is also possible, it and the object far away at w1 and between Sun and Mercury at w2 is
seems, that Vulcan be a unique planet between Sun and Mercury and have Nacluv, rather than the other way around? It is unhelpful to say that
a slightly different particular mass m′, a slightly different particular shape Vulcan and Nacluv are distinguished by the fact that Vulcan possesses
s′, and a slightly different particular chemical composition c′, where the Vulcan’s haecceity and Nacluv does not. An object’s haecceity is the
slight differences in question lie within the range of deviations the original property of being that very object (Kaplan 1975, Adams 1979, Lewis
astronomers would have tolerated. So at some possible world w Vulcan is 1986: 220–48). Since what is at issue is the question of which object is
a unique planet between Sun and Mercury and has m, s, and c, and at some Vulcan, it does not help to be told that Vulcan is the object possessing the
possible world w′ Vulcan is a unique planet between Sun and Mercury and property of being that very object, unless the property of being that very
has m′, s′, and c′. Clearly w and w′ are different worlds. On Lewis’s theory, object is clarified independently. To say that it is the property of being that
every possible object exists at only one world. So either the planet in very object which is Vulcan is clearly uninformative. It is not obvious that
question at w is not Vulcan or the planet at w′ is not Vulcan. Whichever there is any way to clarify it independently.
planet that is not Vulcan is Vulcan’s counterpart at best. Is either planet
Vulcan? If so, which one? If neither is, where is Vulcan? What possible Alternatively, one might choose to insist that if anything at any possible
world hosts Vulcan? There seems to be no non-arbitrary way to answer world is Vulcan, it has to possess at that world the properties relevant to
these questions within Lewis’s theory. the introduction of the name ‘Vulcan’, such as being the heavenly body
with such-and-such mass and orbit and other astrophysical characteristics
The modal-dimensionalist version of possibilist realism is capable of and being between Sun and Mercury in a Newtonian universe. This is
offering the ready answer, “The planet at w and the planet at w′ are both supported by descriptionism concerning the semantics of proper names,
(world stages of) Vulcan”, but faces an only slightly different challenge of according to which ‘Vulcan’ is a proper name which is semantically
its own. It seems intuitive to say that there is a possible world at which equivalent to a definite description (‘the heavenly body with such-and-
Vulcan exists between Sun and Mercury and some remote heavenly body such mass and ...’). But forceful criticisms of descriptionism for proper
distinct from Vulcan but qualitatively identical with it in relevant respects names were launched in the early 1970s (Donnellan 1972, Kripke 1972).
(such as mass, shape, size, chemical composition, etc.) also exists. Let w1 Kripke’s criticism has been especially influential. The kernel of Kripke’s
be such a world and call Vulcan’s double at w1 ‘Nacluv’. Thus at w1, criticism rests on the intuitive idea that a sentence containing a referring
Vulcan and Nacluv exist, Vulcan is between Sun and Mercury, and Nacluv proper name expresses a singular proposition about the referent
is somewhere far away. It is possible for Vulcan and Nacluv to switch independently of any qualitative characterization of the referent but that a
positions. So there is a possible world, w2, which is exactly like w1 except corresponding sentence containing a description does not so express a
that at w2 Nacluv is between Sun and Mercury and Vulcan is far away. singular proposition. If Kripke’s criticism applies to ‘Vulcan’, it is difficult
Since Vulcan and Nacluv are two distinct objects, w1 and w2 are two to defend descriptionism for ‘Vulcan’. But ‘Vulcan’ and other apparent
distinct worlds. But this difference seems empty. Given that w1 and w2 are proper names of non-actual possible objects may not be as readily
exact qualitative duplicates of each other, on what ground can we say that amenable to the Kripkean considerations as proper names of actual objects

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are. The so-called “problem of empty names” is the problem of providing may not be feasible. Not even every possibilist realist believes in thorough
a semantic theory for “empty names” like ‘Vulcan’ as non-descriptional reduction; cf. modal–dimensionalists.
designators. For some recent contributions to the project of solving this
problem, see Braun 1993, 2005, Everett & Hofweber 2000, Brock 2004, It is important to note that according to most versions of actualist
Piccinini & Scott 2010, Cullison & Caplan 2011, Kripke 2013. representationism, the universe, as it (actually) is, is not the actual world.
Since the actual world is a possible world and every possibly world is a
2.2 Actualist Representationism representation, the actual world is a representation. The universe, as it
(actually) is, is not a representation but includes all representations, along
According to actualist representationism, which is also known under with everything else. But it does not include non-actual possible objects.
Lewis’s tendentious label ersatzism, a possible world is an actual The universe includes all and only those objects which exist.
maximally consistent representation of how the universe could possibly
In actualist representationism, existence is conceptually prior to actual
have been, and the actual world is the representation of how the universe
existence. This is in concert with the priority of the truth of any
actually is. A representation r is maximally consistent if and only if r is
proposition P over the actual truth of P. P is actually true if and only if P
consistent and for any representation r′, either r & not-r′ is not consistent
is true at the actual world, which in turn is so if and only if the actual
or r & r′ is not consistent (assuming the appropriate conceptions of the
world represents P as true. And by definition, the actual world is the
negation and conjunction of representations). Different actualist
possible world which represents P as true if and only if P is true.
representationists employ different actual items to play the role of the
Likewise, for an object to exist at the actual world is for the actual world
maximally consistent representations, such as sentences, propositions,
to represent it as existing; the actual world represents an object as existing
states of affairs, properties, etc. (Adams 1974, Armstrong 1989, Bigelow
if and only if the object exists. Actual existence is thus reducible to
and Pargetter 1990, Carnap 1947, Cresswell 1972, Forrest 1986, Hintikka
existence simpliciter.
1962, Jeffrey 1965, Lycan 1979, Lycan & Shapiro 1986, Plantinga 1974,
1987, Prior & Fine 1977, Quine 1968, Roper 1982, Skyrms 1981, Non-actual possible existence is defined as existence at some possible
Stalnaker 1976). Note that the notion of consistency of a representation is world other than the actual world, which in turn is defined in terms of
not ultimately eliminated in actualist representationism. Most actualist existence simpliciter as follows: x exists at a possible world w not identical
representationists accept consistency as a modal notion, for they doubt it with the actual world if and only if x would exist if w were actual, that is,
can be reduced to a non-modal notion, such as a proof-theoretic notion or if the universe were as w represents it to be. According to this picture,
a model-theoretic notion. If those actualist representationists are right and non-actual possible existence is not a special mode of existence
consistency is indeed a modal notion, then actualist representationism is completely separate from actual existence. It is not existence simpliciter,
not a reductionist theory of modality. This, however, should not but instead “would-be” existence simpliciter on a counterfactual
automatically be taken to be a serious challenge to actualist supposition. There is no room for non-actual possible objects in this
representationism, for a thoroughly reductionist theory of modality may or picture. Many representations which are possible worlds other than the

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actual world include representations of the existence of non-actual pronoun ‘it’ in (a) is unproblematic; it is replaceable by ‘Julius Caesar’s
possible objects, but non-actual possible objects are not mereological part sixth right finger’. How about the pronoun ‘it’ in (b)? It should designate
of those possible worlds. Neither are they set-theoretic members, or the sixth right finger Julius Caesar is said to have had within the scope of
constituents in any other sense, of those possible worlds. For them to exist the first possibility operator. It should therefore be bound by the
at those possible worlds is for the worlds to say (represent) that they exist; appropriate existential quantifier, just like the pronoun ‘it’ in (a). But
nothing more, nothing less. This is a non-realist picture of the existence of unlike the pronoun ‘it’ in (a), the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) occurs separated from
the non-actual. Non-actual possible objects are thus nothing at all. This is the quantifier by the intervening second possibility operator, ‘the
the conservative view (1). following is possible’. This “quantifying in” from outside the possibility
operator forces the sentence representing the possibility specified in (b) to
Let us examine how actualist representationists handle apparent modal retain the pronoun ‘it’: ‘it was burnt’. Thus, unlike the pronoun ‘it’ in (a),
truths asserting the possibility of non-actual objects. There are two types the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) is not eliminable in the representation of the
of such truth and the first type is easy to handle. It is possible that Julius possibility in question. But no part of the representation that is the possible
Caesar (congenitally) had a sixth finger on his right hand (whereas, we world in question, or any other possible world, may serve as the object
assume, he actually had only five fingers). This possibility only calls for a which the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) designates, as the pronoun needs to designate
possible world to represent Julius Caesar as having had a sixth finger on something that is said to be a human finger but no part of any such
his right hand, which may easily be done by means of, say, the (interpreted representation is said to be a human finger. Notice that Lewis has no
English) sentence, ‘Julius Caesar had a sixth finger on his right hand’. corresponding difficulty here. On his theory, the modal statement in
question is true if and only if at some possible world there is a counterpart
2.2.1 Nesting Problem of Julius Caesar who had a sixth right finger f such that f was never burnt
and at some possible world there is a counterpart of f which was burnt.
The second type of apparent modal truth, however, is more challenging. Julius Caesar, his counterpart, and the counterpart’s sixth finger f are all
Julius Caesar could have had a sixth right finger which was never burnt real objects, and the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) designates f. (Note that the
but which could have been burnt. This involves a nested possibility, which pronoun ‘it’ in (b) does not designate the counterpart of f any more than
is troublesome to actualist representationism (McMichael 1983). To reveal ‘it’ in (a) does.)
the nesting clearly, let us articulate the possibility in question in a more
pedantic and rigorous way. The following is possible: Julius Caesar had a One way to handle this without postulating a non-actual possible object is
sixth right finger such that (a) it was never burnt, and (b) the following is to say that there was an actual finger belonging to someone else and that it
possible: it was burnt. The trouble for actualist representationism is that could have belonged to Julius Caesar’s right hand as his extra finger
there is no obvious way to make sense of the pronoun ‘it’ in (b). The (congenitally). If this sounds biologically too bizarre, actualist
possibility of Julius Caesar having had a sixth right finger which was representationists may say instead that there are actual elementary
never burnt is, as before, easily representable by, say, the sentence, ‘Julius particles none of which was part of Julius Caesar’s body but which
Caesar had a sixth right finger which was never burnt’. This means that the collectively could have constituted his sixth right finger. This is along the

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lines of David Kaplan’s possible automobile (Kaplan 1973: 517, note 19) actually is not a human being but is a collection of an egg and a sperm and
and Nathan Salmon’s Noman (Salmon 1981: 39, footnote 41). Kaplan which is possibly a human being. The case of Julius Caesar’s sixth finger
imagines a complete set of automobile parts laid out on a factory floor can be handled likewise. There exists an actual object which actually is
ready for assembly. If the parts are assembled, a particular automobile will not a finger but is a (widely scattered) collection of particles and which is
be created; if not, not. Suppose that the parts are destroyed before they are possibly Julius Caesar’s sixth right finger.
assembled. Then the particular automobile which would have been created
if the parts had been assembled is in fact not created. It is a non-actual But now consider the planet Vulcan. There is no collection of actual
possible automobile. Salmon, taking a cue from Kripke’s suggestion of the particles which were supposed to constitute Vulcan. So, if Vulcan is a non-
necessity of origin (Kripke 1972), imagines a particular human egg and a actual possible object, which it apparently is, it seems possible for Vulcan
particular human sperm which could merge into a particular human zygote to exist and not be constituted by any actual particles differently located
and develop into a particular human being. Suppose that the egg and the and arranged. Likewise, it seems perfectly possible that Julius Caesar had
sperm in fact fail to merge, hence fail to develop into a human being. The a sixth finger which was not constituted by any actually existing particles
particular human being, Noman, who would have been created if the egg and satisfied (a) and (b). Despite initial plausibility, actualist
and the sperm had merged and developed normally is in fact not created. representationists may choose to deny such a possibility. To do so is, in
Noman is a non-actual possible human being. These lines of thought effect, to commit oneself to the position that the universe, as it actually is,
afford actualist representationists a powerful means to accommodate many already contains maximally possible constituents of any possible state of
apparently recalcitrant modal truths about non-actual possible objects, the universe, that is, it is impossible for the universe to contain even a
provided that these non-actual possible objects can be individuated single constituent object not already in the universe as it actually is. To
uniquely by means of actually existing potential parts or origin. In fact, it make this plausible is not an easy task. If, on the other hand, actualist
may even be taken further to afford actualist representationists a way to representationists choose not to deny the possibility in question, they
maintain that Kaplan’s automobile is not only possible but is an actual appear to have to say that Julius Caesar’s entirely new sixth finger is not
object after all. This can be done by not only individuating Kaplan’s an object but is possibly an object. But then the problem is to make sense
automobile uniquely by means of the collection of the automobile parts of the finger’s being nothing yet possibly something. How can there be a
but also identifying it with the collection. Call Kaplan’s automobile ‘k’. true predication of any kind, including “is possibly an object”, of nothing?
Suppose that k is identical with the collection. Then there exists an actual (Oliver & Smiley 2013 offers the beginning of a partial answer to this
object, namely k, which actually is not an automobile but is a collection of question.)
automobile parts and which is possibly an automobile. That is, k is
represented as an unassembled collection of automobile parts by the actual 2.2.2 Essence Solution
world and is represented as an automobile by some possible world.
Similarly, actualist representationists may identify Noman with the Alvin Plantinga is responsible for a widely-discussed actualist
collection of the egg and the sperm. Noman is an actual object which representationist response to this problem. He invokes unactualized
individual essences (Plantinga 1974, 2003). Every object is said to have an

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individual essence. An individual essence of a given object is a property individual essence to the level of the constituent parts or origin of the
which that object necessarily has and everything else necessarily lacks. object of which it is an individual essence. This difficulty is magnified
Moreover, and this is crucial to the solution of the problem at hand, when we ask for a specification of an individual essence of Vulcan or
individual essences are independent of the objects which have them, Julius Caesar’s entirely new finger. For more on individual essence, see
whether the objects are actual or non-actual. That is, an individual essence Adams 1981, McMichael 1983, Fine 1985, Menzel 1990, Lycan 1994,
can exist without being an individual essence of any existing object. The Linsky & Zalta 1994, Plantinga 2003.
problematic pronoun ‘it’ in (b) is then said to designate such an individual
essence, and the rest of the characterization of the possibility in question is 2.2.3 Other Solutions
appropriately and systematically reinterpreted. For example, ‘it was burnt’
in (b) is reinterpreted to mean that the individual essence in question is an Theodore Sider proposes a different solution to the nesting problem (Sider
individual essence of something that was burnt. 2002). According to his proposal, we should not regard different non-
actual possible worlds as achieving their representation more or less
One difficulty with this view is the failure to produce a single plausible
independently of one another. Instead, we should regard all possible
example of such an essence. We saw that possibilist realism faces the
worlds as representations which are given all at once in concert with one
problem of specifying non-actual possible objects. Plantinga’s version of
another so that cross references to non-actual possible objects by different
actualist representationism faces its own version of the Quinean challenge,
possible worlds are guaranteed from the outset.
namely, the problem of specifying the individual essences which are
supposed to replace non-actual possible objects. What individual essence Reina Hayaki proposes yet another solution (Hayaki 2003). When we say
did Julius Caesar have? What readily comes to mind is the property of that Julius Caesar had an unburnt sixth right finger at some possible world
being Julius Caesar. As Ruth Barcan Marcus and Kripke have forcefully w1, we take w1 to represent Julius Caesar as having an unburnt sixth right
argued (Barcan 1947, Marcus 1961, Kripke 1972), identity is necessary; finger. When we say further that that finger at w1 was burnt at a different
that is, if an object x is identical with an object y, it is necessarily the case possible world w2, we should likewise take w2 to represent that finger as
that x is identical with y. Given this, it is easy to see that Julius Caesar having been burnt. According to Hayaki, this requires a hierarchical
necessarily had the property of being Julius Caesar and everything other arrangement of possible worlds in which the representation of the finger
than Julius Caesar necessarily lacks it. However, it is implausible to by w2 is parasitic on the representation by w1.
suggest that this property is independent of Julius Caesar. Our canonical
specification of it by means of the noun phrase ‘the property of being Other solutions to the nesting problem include the claim that despite
Julius Caesar’ certainly is not independent of our canonical specification strong appearance to the contrary, there are no modal statements about
of Julius Caesar by means of the name ‘Julius Caesar’, and this does not objects which do not actually exist; see Adams 1981, Fitch 1996.
seem to be an accidental fact merely indicative of the paucity of our
language devoid of deep metaphysical underpinnings. Kaplan’s
automobile and Salmon’s Noman merely push the dependence of the

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3. Without Possible Worlds objects. It, however, does not avoid talk of non-actual possible stuff. So it
does embrace the ontology of the non-actual possible in a broad sense.
Some important theories concerning possible objects and related issues do
not invoke possible worlds as a theoretical cornerstone. Most prominent 3.1 Subsistence vs. Existence
among them are so-called Meinongian theories. But before turning to
them, let us briefly take note of two non-Meinongian approaches outside Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects has had much influence on some
the framework of possible worlds: Kit Fine’s and Michael Jubien’s. contemporary theorists, resulting in a variety of proposals. These
proposals are known broadly as Meinongian. According to Meinong, a
Like Plantinga, Fine takes individual essences seriously but he regards the subject term in any true sentence stands for an object (Meinong 1904). So
notion of necessity as prior to the notion of a possible world, and the the subject term in the sentence, ‘The sixth right finger of Julius Caesar is
notion of an individual essence as prior to the notion of necessity (Fine a finger’, stands for an object, assuming that the sentence is true. (Such an
1994, 1995a, 1995b, 2000). Fine’s modal theory is based on the broadly assumption is strongly disputed in Salmon 1987.) Even though the exact
Aristotelian idea that alethic modality stems from natures of things. respects in which contemporary Meinongian proposals are Meinongian
Understanding of actual or non-actual possible objects should therefore be and the extent of their Meinongianism differ from one proposal to another,
firmly grounded on understanding of natures of things. Fine believes that all of them inherit this claim by Meinong in some form. They are thus
‘There is a possible object x’ is reducible to ‘Possibly there is an object x’ united in resisting Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Meinong, which
(Prior and Fine 1977: 130–9, Fine 1979, 1981, 2003). For a similar mandates analyzing sentences containing a definite description, like the
reductive proposal, see Peacocke 1978, 2002. For some difficulties with one above concerning the sixth right finger of Julius Caesar, as general
such a project, see Hazen 1976. statements rather than singular statements (Russell 1905); see 3.1.2 for a
particularly famous piece of Russell’s criticism and how two leading
Jubien builds his modal theory out of properties and their relations (Jubien
Meinongian theories handle it.
1996, 2009). The possibility of Julius Caesar’s having had an entirely new
sixth right finger satisfying (a) and (b) is analyzed roughly as follows: the Meinong distinguishes two ontological notions: subsistence and existence.
property of being a particular sixth finger on Julius Caesar’s right hand is Subsistence is a broad ontological category, encompassing both concrete
simultaneously compatible with the properties of existing, being objects and abstract objects. Concrete objects are said to exist and subsist.
composed of non-actual stuff, and being never burnt, and also Abstract objects are said not to exist but to subsist. The talk of abstract
simultaneously compatible with the properties of existing, being objects may be vaguely reminiscent of actualist representationism, which
composed of non-actual stuff, and being burnt. The underlying idea is to employs representations, which are actual abstract objects. At the same
start with the ontology of stuff and use properties and relations, including time, for Meinong, the nature of an object does not depend on its being
modal properties and relations, as the fundamental metaphysical items to actual. This seems to give objects reality that is independent of actuality.
account for all statements about objects, including all modal statements Another interesting feature of Meinong’s theory is that it sanctions the
about possible objects. It specifically avoids talk of non-actual possible postulation not only of non-actual possible objects but also of impossible

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objects, for it says that ‘The round square is round’ is a true sentence and possibilist conception of existence relativized to the largest available
therefore its subject term stands for an object. This aspect of Meinong’s domain, then Parsons’ ontology goes beyond that of possibilists. There is
theory has been widely pointed out, but non-trivial treatment of good evidence that the latter is the case, for Parsons’ ontology, as a
impossibility is not confined to Meinongianism (Lycan & Shapiro 1986). typically Meinongian ontology, includes the round square and other
For more on Meinong’s theory, see Chisholm 1960, Findlay 1963, impossible objects, which the possibilist ontology does not include.
Grossmann 1974, Lambert 1983, Zalta 1988: sec.8. For some pioneering Lewis’s discussion (Lewis 1990) of how the non-Meinongian should
work in contemporary Meinongianism, see Castañeda 1974, Rapaport understand “noneism”, which is the view that some things do not exist,
1978, Routley 1980. We shall examine the theories of two leading held by another Meinongian, Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan), is
Meinongians: Terence Parsons and Edward Zalta. We shall take note of helpful in this connection. For differences between Routley’s theory and
some other Meinongians later in the section on fictional objects, as their Parsons’, see Parsons 1983. A sympathizer of Routley, Graham Priest,
focus is primarily on fiction. Parsons and Zalta not only propose accounts uses dialetheism (the thesis that some contradictions are true) and
of fictional objects but offer comprehensive Meinongian theories of paraconsistent logic, along with the (possible- and impossible-) worlds
objects in general. framework, to bolster noneism (Priest 2005, 2016).

Parsons’ theory is based on the Meinongian distinction between nuclear

3.1.1 Theory of Non-Existent Objects
and extra-nuclear properties. Nuclear properties include all ordinary
properties, such as being blue, being tall, being kicked by Socrates, being
Quine thought it curious that the ontological problem was so simple as to
a mountain, and so on. Extra-nuclear properties include ontological
be put in three monosyllables: “What is there?” He famously answered
properties such as existence and being fictional, modal properties such as
this simple question equally simply: “Everything” (Quine 1948). Parsons
being possible, intentional properties such as being thought of by Socrates,
rejects Quine’s claim that every object exists, and asserts that some objects
and technical properties such as being complete. See Parsons 1980: 24–27,
do not exist. Parsons proposes a theory of all objects, both existent and
166–74 for more on nuclear and extra-nuclear properties and a test for
non-existent (Parsons 1980). He uses the word ‘actual’ as a synonym for
distinguishing between them. Parsons’ theory can be encapsulated in the
‘existent’, so he rejects (1), (2), and (3), but accepts (4) and (5) as
following two principles:
trivialities. It would be a mistake to classify him as an actualist simply
because he accepts (5). On the contrary, he has much in common with (P1) No two objects have exactly the same nuclear properties;
possibilists in claiming that some objects are not actual, that is, in denying
(2). He, however, admits only one sense of existence and claims that some (P2) For any set of nuclear properties, some object has all the nuclear
objects do not exist in that sense. If this sole sense of existence properties in the set and no other nuclear properties.
corresponds to the possibilist conception of existence relativized to any
domain of discourse smaller than the largest available domain, then Take the set of nuclear properties, {being golden, being a mountain}. By
Parsons is in agreement with possibilists. But if it corresponds to the (P1) and (P2), some unique object has exactly the two nuclear properties
in the set. That object is the golden mountain. Take another set of nuclear

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properties, {being square, being round}, and the two principles give us the present theory is very neutral about de re modalities”), but we should at
round square. Both of these objects are radically incomplete; they have no least note that on Parsons’s theory, objects are allowed to have properties
weight, height, shape, or size, for example. The need for distinguishing not included in their corresponding sets of nuclear properties: e.g., the
nuclear properties from extra-nuclear properties is readily seen by round square, whose corresponding set only includes roundness and
considering the set, {being golden, being a mountain, being existent}. If squareness, has the property of being non-existent and the property of
(P2) is to apply to such a set, it should yield an object having the three being incomplete. Also, Parsons allows nuclear properties which are
properties in the set. Such an object is golden, a mountain, and existent, “watered-down” versions of extra-nuclear properties. So the set may
that is, it is a golden mountain which exists. So it should be true that a include the “watered-down” versions of the two extra-nuclear properties in
golden mountain exists, but it is in fact not true. Parsons defines a possible question and that may be enough. For more on these and related issues in
object as an object such that it is possible that there exist an object having Parsons’ theory, see Howell 1983, Fine 1984.
all of its nuclear properties. On this conception, all existing objects are
possible objects, some golden mountains are possible objects, and the 3.1.2 Theory of Encoding
round square is not a possible object. It is worth noting that in Parsons’
theory, negation needs to be handled delicately (Parsons 1980: 19–20, Zalta’s theory is based on the distinction made by Meinong’s student,
105–06, Zalta 1988: 131–34). Take the set, {being round, being non- Ernst Mally, between two kinds of predication: exemplification and
round}. By (P2), we have an object, x, which is round and non-round. So, encoding (Mally 1912, Zalta 1983, 1988). The idea is to maintain the
x is non-round. If we can infer from this that it is not the case that x is Meinongian claim that the round square is a genuine object while avoiding
round, then we should be entitled to say that x is round and it is not the contradicting oneself. Russell argues that since the round square is round
case that x is round, which is a contradiction. Thus, we should not be and square, and since if an object is square it is not the case that it is
allowed to infer ‘It is not the case that x is round’ from ‘x is non-round’. round, it follows that the round square is such that both it is round and it is
not the case that it is round, which is a contradiction. Parsons avoids the
If Julius Caesar’s entirely new right finger satisfying (a) and (b) is to be a
contradiction by refusing the inference from ‘x is square’ to ‘it is not the
Meinongian object of Parsons’ theory, the best candidate appears to be a
case that x is round’, where ‘x’ ranges over all objects. In contrast, Zalta
non-existent incomplete object corresponding to the set of properties,
accepts the inference for all objects and avoids the contradiction by
{being a finger, belonging to Julius Caesar’s right hand, being never
refusing to interpret the predication, ‘is round and square’, of the round
burnt}. This set includes neither the property of being constituted by
square as exemplification. He instead interprets it as encoding; the round
particles which do not (actually) exist nor the property of being possibly
square encodes roundness and squareness. Encoding squareness is not
burnt. Both of these properties are extra-nuclear properties, hence
incompatible with encoding roundness, even though exemplifying
ineligible to be included in a set to which (P2) applies. So (P2) does not
squareness is incompatible with exemplifying roundness. Predication as
confer them on the object corresponding to the set. How then does the
understood as encoding follows a different logic from predication as
object come to have the properties? It is not obvious how this question
should be answered (Parsons 1980: 21, note 4, where Parsons says, “The

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understood as exemplification. The crux of Zalta’s theory is encapsulated spatial location but do not. This is compatible with actualism, provided
in the following two principles: that all such objects are actual in the sense of actually existing (Linsky &
Zalta 1994, also Williamson 1998, 2002, 2013; it is noteworthy that
(Z1) Objects which could sometimes have a spatial location do not, Timothy Williamson independently argues for what he calls necessitism,
and cannot, encode properties; which says [in a nutshell] that every possible object is a necessary object).
If we understand Zalta’s theory this way, we have the following actualist
(Z2) For any condition on properties, some object that could never
picture: all objects are actual and existing, some objects are necessarily
have a spatial location encodes exactly those properties which satisfy
non-spatial, and other objects are possibly spatial and possibly non-spatial.
the condition.
(For an alternative interpretation of Zalta’s formal theory, according to
Some object is the round square, for, by (Z2), among objects which could which some objects do not exist, see Zalta 1983: 50–52, 1988: 102–04,
never have a spatial location is an object which encodes roundness and Linsky & Zalta 1996: note 8.) Among the latter type of objects are those
squareness. The noun phrase, ‘the round square’, unambiguously denotes which are actually spatial but possibly not, like you and me, and those
such a necessarily non-spatial object. Other noun phrases of the same kind which are possibly spatial but actually not, like the golden mountain in the
include those which denote numbers, sets, Platonic forms, and so on. appropriate sense. The distinction between the golden mountain in this
There are, however, many noun phrases which are ambiguous. They allow (exemplification) sense and the golden mountain in the other (encoding)
an interpretation under which they denote an object that is necessarily sense is key to overcoming some objections (Linsky & Zalta 1996). See
non-spatial, and also allow an interpretation under which they denote an Bennett 2006 for the claim that the Linsky-Zalta view is not actualist, and
object that is possibly spatial and possibly non-spatial. The phrase, ‘the Nelson & Zalta 2009 for a response. Hayaki 2006 critiques both Linsky-
golden mountain’, is an example. The golden mountain in one sense is an Zalta and Williamson.
object which is necessarily non-spatial and which encodes goldenness and
If we confine our attention to necessarily non-spatial objects, a definition
mountainhood. The golden mountain in the other sense is an object which
of a possible object which corresponds to Parsons’ definition is easily
actually is non-spatial but could be spatial. When we say that the golden
available to Zalta: a possible (necessarily non-spatial) object is a
mountain in the second sense is golden, it means that necessarily if the
(necessarily non-spatial) object such that some object could exemplify
golden mountain is spatial, it is golden. Since, by (Z1), such an object
exactly the properties it encodes. In this sense, some object which encodes
cannot encode properties, all predications in the preceding sentence have
goldenness and mountainhood, among other properties, is a possible
to be understood as exemplification. Similarly with Julius Caesar’s
object but the object which encodes squareness and roundness is not.
entirely new finger satisfying (a) and (b).
Julius Caesar’s entirely new finger satisfying (a) and (b) can be treated in
Zalta endorses the claim that some objects are non-actual possible objects, the same way as the golden mountain. Complications similar to those
so he appears to side with possibilists. But he defines a non-actual possible which arise for Parsons’ theory do not arise for Zalta’s theory, for all
object as an object which could have a spatial location but does not (Zalta properties are equally subject to encoding, including those properties
1988: 67). So the claim means for Zalta that some objects could have a Parsons regards as extra-nuclear. For a comparison of the two-kinds-of-

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property approach and the two-kinds-of-predication approach, see them, and the universe does not instantiate them. This surprising argument
Rapaport 1985. has convinced many philosophers of the impossibility of unicorns, but
others have raised doubt by arguing that the notion of a biological kind,
4. Unicorns such as a species, is far more malleable than Kripke assumes (Dupré
1993).
If anything is a non-actual possible object, a unicorn is. Or so it appears.
But Kripke vigorously argues against such a view in the 1980 version of The line of argument Kripke uses, if successful, is applicable to all non-
Kripke 1972: 24, 156–58. His argument starts with the assumption that the actual natural kinds and their analogs (except for natural-kind analogs of
unicorn is (intended to be) an animal species if anything. This excludes the Kaplan’s automobile or Salmon’s Noman). It is unclear that it or
possibility that a horse with a horn artificially attached to its forehead is a something like it is successfully applicable to individuals like Vulcan, but
unicorn. Kripke assumes obviously that there are actually no unicorns and if it is, then we must say that such individuals are impossible objects.
that unicorns are purely mythical creatures. Also assumed is the absence in Some theorists liken Vulcan to fictional objects, as we will see in the next
the relevant myth of any specification of the genetic structure, section, and some theorists argue that fictional objects are impossible
evolutionary history, or other potentially defining essential features of the objects (Kaplan 1973, 1980 version of Kripke 1972: 157–58, Fine 1984:
unicorn. (Possession of a horn is not a defining essential feature of the 126–28, Yagisawa 2010: 271–77). If Vulcan is an impossible object, the
unicorn any more than having tawny stripes is a defining feature of the problem of uniquely specifying Vulcan, as opposed to Nacluv, becomes
tiger.) The myth describes the unicorn only in stereotypical terms: looking less urgent, for it is not evident that we should be able to specify an
like a horse, having a horn protruding from its forehead, etc. Suppose that impossible object uniquely and non-trivially.
there are objects with all such stereotypical features of the unicorn. This
seems perfectly possible and Kripke accepts such a possibility. But he 5. Fictional Objects
rejects its sufficiency for establishing the possibility of unicorns. Suppose
that among the objects with the stereotypical unicorn features, some have Let us shift our attention from mythological creatures to fictional objects.
a genetic makeup, an evolutionary history, or some other potentially Fictional objects include fictional characters but not all fictional objects
defining essential unicorn characteristic which is radically different from are fictional characters. Sherlock Holmes is a fictional object and a
the corresponding characteristic had by the others with the same fictional character. His liver is a fictional object but not a fictional
stereotypical unicorn features. Which ones among those with the character. It may be tempting to think that fictional objects are non-actual
stereotypical unicorn features would then be real unicorns and which ones possible objects, even though it is obvious that not all non-actual possible
fool’s unicorns (à la fool’s gold)? There is no fact of the matter. Given that objects are fictional objects.
the unicorn is an animal species, not everything that looks and behaves
There are two main problems with the claim that fictional objects are
like a unicorn is guaranteed to be a unicorn. To be a unicorn, an object has
possible objects. One is the problem of impossible fictional objects. Some
to possess the defining essential characteristics of the unicorn. But there
fictional objects are ascribed incompatible properties in their home fiction
are no defining characteristics of the unicorn; the myth does not specify

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by their original author (usually inadvertently). This seems to be sufficient also think that fictional objects are brought into existence by their authors
for them to have those properties according to their home fiction, for what as actual objects. Even if this type of view is to be followed, it must still
the author says in the fiction (inadvertently or not) seems to hold the be denied that Holmes is actually a detective, for if we enumerate all
highest authority on truth in that fiction. On the assumption that a fictional individuals who are actually detectives, Holmes will not be among them.
object has a given property if it has that property according to its home By the same token, Holmes is not actually a resident of Baker Street or
fiction, those fictional objects are impossible objects, for no possible even a human being. Though actual, Holmes is actually hardly any of
object has incompatible properties. The other problem is the failure of those things Conan Doyle’s stories describe him as being. Holmes must
uniqueness. It may be viewed as the problem of meeting the Quinean not be a concrete object at all but instead an abstract object which has the
demand for clear identity conditions. Holmes is a particular fictional property of being a detective according to Doyle’s stories, the property of
object. So if we are to identify Holmes with a possible object, we should being a resident of Baker Street according to Doyle’s stories, and so on.
identify Holmes with a particular possible object. But there are many
particular possible objects that are equally suited for the identification with Meinongian theories overcome the problems of impossibility and non-
Holmes. One of them has n-many hairs, whereas another has (n+1)-many uniqueness in a straightforward way. According to Parsons’ theory, a
hairs. No fictional story about a particular fictional object written or told fictional object x which originates in a certain story is the object that has
by a human being is detailed enough to exclude all possible objects but exactly the nuclear properties F such that according to the story, Fx
one to be identified with that fictional object, unless it is a fiction about an (Parsons 1980: 49–60, 228–23). A fictional object to which the story
actual object or a non-actual possible object analogous to Kaplan’s ascribes incompatible properties is simply an impossible object, but such
automobile or Salmon’s Noman. an object is harmless because it does not exist. As for the problem of non-
uniqueness, Sherlock Holmes is not identified as a complete object.
Strangely enough, there is also a problem with the claim that fictional Instead Holmes is said to be the object having just the nuclear properties
objects are non-actual objects. That is, there is some plausible Holmes has according to the stories. There is no number n such that
consideration in support of the claim that fictional objects are actual Holmes has exactly n-many hairs according to the stories. So Parsons’
objects. We make various assertions about fictional objects outside the Holmes does not have n-many hairs, for any n. It is an incomplete object.
stories in which they occur and some of them are true: for example, that
Sherlock Holmes is admired by many readers of the Holmes stories. The Zalta offers a similar picture of fictional objects which is subsumed under
simplest and most systematic explanation appears to be to postulate his general theory of encoding. According to him, a fictional object x
Holmes as an actual object possessing the properties such true assertions which originates in a certain story is the object that encodes exactly the
ascribe to him. Fictional objects may then be said to be theoretical objects properties F such that according to the story, Fx (Zalta 1988: 123–29).
of literary criticism as much as electrons are theoretical objects of physics. Zalta’s treatment of the problem of impossibility is similar to Parsons’. A
This type of view enjoys surprisingly wide acceptance. (Searle 1974, van fictional object to which the story ascribes incompatible properties is an
Inwagen 1977, 1983, Fine 1982, Salmon 1998, Thomasson 1999). The object which encodes those properties, among others. Such an object is
theorists in this camp, except van Inwagen (van Inwagen 2003: 153–55), harmless because it does not exemplify the incompatible properties.

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Zalta’s solution to the problem of non-uniqueness is equally similar to existential quantifier in the way suggested by Frank Ramsey (Ramsey
Parsons’. Sherlock Holmes, for Zalta, is simply an incomplete object 1931).
which does not encode the property of having exactly n-many hairs, for
any n. Kendall Walton urges that we should take seriously the element of make-
believe, or pretense, inherent in the telling of a fictional story by the author
Though not meant to be a fictional object, Vulcan may be given the same and the listening to it by the audience (Walton 1990, also Evans 1982:
treatment as explicitly fictional objects. According to Parsons, the word 353–68, Kripke 2013). According to this pretense theory, the pretense
‘Vulcan’ is ambiguous. In one sense, it is the name of a fictional object involved in the language game of fictional discourse shields the whole
which originates in a false astronomical story. In the other sense, it does language game from a separate language game aimed at non-fictional
not refer to anything. Zalta does not recognize Parsons’ second sense and reality, and it is in the latter language game that we seek theories of
simply regards ‘Vulcan’ as the name of a fictional object. objects of various kinds as real objects. If this is right, any search for the
real ontological status of fictional objects appears to be misguided. For the
For another Meinongian approach to fictional objects, see Castañeda 1979. view that the pretense theory is compatible with a theory of fictional
Charles Crittenden offers a view in a Meinongian spirit but with a later- objects as real objects, see Zalta 2000.
Wittgensteinian twist (Crittenden 1991). Like Parsons, Crittenden
maintains that some objects do not exist and that fictional objects are such 6. Quantified Modal Logic
objects. Following later Wittgenstein, however, he sees no need to go
beyond describing the “language game” we play in our fictional discourse One important theoretical use of non-actual possible objects is to bolster
and dismisses all metaphysical theorizing. Robert Howell criticizes the most straightforward quantified modal logic (Scott 1970, Parsons
Parsons’ theory, among others, and recommends an approach which 1995). If we add a modal sentential operator meaning “it is possible that”
construes fictional objects as non-actual objects in fictional worlds, where or “it is necessary that” to classical first-order quantificational logic, along
fictional worlds include not just possible but impossible worlds (Howell with appropriate axioms and an appropriate rule of inference catering to
1979). Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for the view that fictional objects are the added operator, the resulting system yields a sentence meaning the
kinds (Wolterstorff 1980). For criticism of this view, see Walton 1983. Van following as a theorem:
Inwagen 2003 contains useful compact discussions of some Meinongian
and non-Meinongian theories of fictional objects. If it is possible that something is F, then something is such that it is
possible that it is F.
Gregory Currie denies that fictional names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ are
proper names or even singular terms (Currie 1990). He claims that The formal logical sentence with this meaning is known as the Barcan
sentences of fiction in which ‘Sherlock Holmes’ occurs should be regarded Formula, after Ruth C. Barcan, who published the first systematic
as jointly forming a long conjunction in which every occurrence of treatment of quantified modal logic, in which she postulated the formula as
‘Sherlock Holmes’ is replaced with a variable bound by an initial an axiom (Barcan 1946), and who has published under the name ‘Ruth

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Barcan Marcus’ since 1950. If we read ‘F’ as meaning “non-identical with that something does not exist, for it is contradictory provided that
every actual object”, the Barcan Formula says that if it is possible that ‘something’ means “some existing thing”. So if the consequent is to be
something is non-identical with every actual object, then something x is true on actualist representationism, ‘something’ should not mean “some
such that it is possible that x is non-identical with every actual object. The existing thing” but rather should mean “some thing, irrespective of
antecedent is plausibly true, for there could have been more objects than whether it exists”. That is, the existential quantifier in the consequent
the actual ones. But if so, the consequent is true as well, assuming the needs to have a free range independently of the possibility operator in
truth of the Barcan Formula. But no actual object is non-identical with whose scope it occurs, which is hard to fathom on actualist
every actual object, for every actual object is identical with itself, an actual representationism but which the possibilist view allows. The consequent
object. Assuming the necessity of identity, if an object y is identical with does not even appear to be threatened with contradiction if we assume the
an object z, it is not possible that y is non-identical with z. So, no actual possibilist view and let the existential quantifier range over all possible
object is such that it is possible that it is non-identical with every actual objects, including non-actual ones.
object. Therefore, any object x such that it is possible that x is non-
identical with every actual object must be a non-actual possible object. In classical logic, the domain for quantification is assumed to be non-
empty and every individual constant is assumed to refer to something in
The converse of the Barcan Formula is also a theorem along with the the domain. In free logic, neither of these assumptions is made. Thus free
Barcan Formula in classical logic augmented with a possibility or logic appears to be particularly suited to theorizing about non-existent
necessity operator, and is as interesting. The Converse Barcan Formula, as objects; see Lambert 1991, Jacquette 1996. For a criticism of the free-
it is known, says the following: logical approach to fictional discourse, see Woods 1974: 68–91.
Interestingly, the Barcan Formula and the Converse Barcan Formula are
If something is such that it is possible that it is F, then it is possible not derivable in free logic.
that something is F.
Marcus herself proposes the substitutional reading of quantification to
The ontology of non-actual possible objects is an integral part of the skirt the need for non-actual possible objects (Marcus 1976), and later
possibilist view that quantifiers in quantified modal logic range over all suggests combining it with objectual quantification over actual objects
possible objects, non-actual as well as actual. This possibilist view (Marcus 1985/86).
validates the Converse Barcan Formula. If we read ‘F’ as meaning “does
not exist”, the Converse Barcan Formula says that if something x is such Williamson 2013 contains a detailed and useful discussion of the Barcan
that it is possible that x does not exist, then it is possible that something Formula and the Converse Barcan Formula.
does not exist. The antecedent is plausibly true, for any one of us, actual
people, could have failed to exist. But if so, the consequent is true as well, Williamson 2013 also proposes that we should replace the possibilism-
assuming the truth of the Converse Barcan Formula. But on actualist actualism distinction in favor of the distinction between necessitism
representationism, no possible world contains a representation which says (necessarily everything is necessarily something) and contingentism,
which is the negation of necessitism. Necessitism entails that everything

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necessarily exists. Possibilism holds that some things are contingent Brock, S., 2004, “The Ubiquitous Problem of Empty Names”, The Journal
existents, like you and me. Intuitively contingentism seems correct; it of Philosophy, 101: 277–98.
seems that you and I fail to exist at some possible worlds. But according to Cameron, R., 2012, “Why Lewis’s Analysis of Modality Succeeds in Its
necessitism, such worlds are worlds where you and I do not exist as Reductive Ambitions”, Philosophers’ Imprint , 12(8): 1–21.
concrete objects but do exist as abstract objects. Williamson defends his –––, 2016, “On Characterizing the Presentism/Eternalism and
proposal by arguing that the possibilism-actualism distinction is a Actualism/Possibilism Debates”, Analytic Philosophy, 57(2): 110–40.
distinction between a logical falsity and a logical triviality and that it Carnap, R., 1947, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago
neglects impossibilia. Menzel 2020 gives a critical examination of Press.
Williamson’s proposal. Also see Cameron 2016. Castañeda, H., 1974, “Thinking and the Structure of the World”,
Philosophia, 4: 4–40.
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62.
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Armstrong, D., 1989, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
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Bennett, K., 2006, “Proxy Actualism”, Philosophical Studies, 129: 263– Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
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Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R., 1990, Science and Necessity, Cambridge: University Press.
Cambridge University Press. Davidson, D. & Harman, G. (eds.), 1972, Semantics of Natural Language,
Braun, D., 1993, “Empty Names”, Noûs, 27: 449–69. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
–––, 2005, “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names”, Noûs, 39: Divers, J., 2002, Possible Worlds, London and New York: Routledge.
596–631.

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 Possible Objects Takashi Yagisawa

Donnellan, K., 1972, “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions”, in –––, 2000, “Semantics for the Logic of Essence”, Journal of Philosophical
Davidson and Harman 1972: 356–79. Logic, 29: 543–84.
Dupré, J., 1993, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the –––, 2003, “The Problem of Possibilia”, in Loux & Zimmerman 2003:
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Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University –––, 2005, Modality and Tense, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Everett, A. & Hofweber, T. (eds.), 2000, Empty Names, Fiction and the Perspectives, 10: 53–71.
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Metaphysics, 7: 3–40. Studies, 115: 149–78.
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–––, 1981, “First-Order Modal Theories I—Sets”, Noûs, 15: 117–206. Hintikka, J., 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
–––, 1982, “First-Order Modal Theories III—Facts”, Synthese, 53: 43– Press.
122. Hintikka, J., Moravcsik, J., and Suppes, P. (eds.), 1973, Approaches to
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Philosophical Studies, 45: 95–142. Howell, R., 1979, “Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They
–––, 1985, “Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse” in J. Aren’t”, Poetics, 8: 129–77.
Tomberlin & P. van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, –––, 1983, Review of Terence Parsons: Nonexistent Objects, Journal of
Dordrecht: Reidel, 145–86. Philosophy, 80: 163–73.
–––, 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. Jacquette, D., 1996, Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and
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Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Studies, 84: 109–25.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53–73. –––, 2009, Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Kaplan, D., 1973, “Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice”, in Hintikka, –––, 1999, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge:
Moravcsik, and Suppes 1973: 490–518. Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1975, “How to Russell a Frege-Church”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: Linsky, B. and Zalta, E., 1994, “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified
716–29. Reprinted in Loux 1979: 210–24. Modal Logic”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431–58.
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Symbolic Logic, 24: 1–15. Studies, 84: 283–94.
–––, 1963a, “Semantic Analysis of Modal Logic”, Zeitschrift für Linsky, L., 1971, Reference and Modality (ed.), London: Oxford
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–––, 1963b, “Semantic Considerations on Modal Logic”, Acta Loux, M. (ed.), 1979, The Possible and the Actual, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Philosophica Fennica, 16: 83–94. Reprinted in Linsky 1971: 63–72. University Press.
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355. Published as a book with the same title in 1980 with a Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
substantial preface and seven addenda, from Cambridge, MA: Lycan, W., 1979, “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”, in Loux 1979:
Harvard University Press. 274–316. Reprinted with additional material as chapters 1, 3, and 4 in
–––, 2013, Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, Oxford: Lycan 1994.
Oxford University Press. –––, 1994, Modality and Meaning, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Lambert, K., 1983, Meinong and the Principle of Independence, ––– & Shapiro, S., 1986, “Actuality and Essence”, Midwest Studies in
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Philosophy 11, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 343–77.
–––, 1991, Philosophical Applications of Free Logic, New York: Oxford Reprinted in part with additional material in Lycan 1994: 95–134.
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Lewis, D., 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Logistik, Leipzig: Barth.
Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–26. Reprinted with postscripts in Marcus, R., 1961, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese, 13:
Lewis 1983: 26–46. 303–22. Reprinted in Marcus 1993: 3–35, with appendices.
–––, 1970, “Anselm and Actuality”, Noûs 4: 175–88. Reprinted with –––, 1976, “Dispensing with Possibilia”, Proceedings and Addresses of
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–––, 1983, Philosophical Papers, Volume I, New York and Oxford: –––, 1985/86, “Possibilia and Possible Worlds”, Grazer Philosophische
Oxford University Press. Studien, 25/26: 107–33. Reprinted in Marcus 1993: 189–213.
–––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, London and New York: Basil –––, 1993, Modalities: Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University
Blackwell. Press. Also see Barcan for her earlier publications under the name
–––, 1990, “Noneism or Allism?”, Mind, 99: 23–31. Reprinted in Lewis ‘Ruth C. Barcan’.
1999: 152–63.

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McDaniel, K., 2004, “Modal Realism with Overlap”, Australasian Journal Plantinga, A., 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon.
of Philosophy, 82: 137–52. Reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The –––, 1987, “Two concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal
Philosophy of David K. Lewis, F. Jackson and G. Priest (eds.), Reductionism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231. Reprinted in
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Plantinga 2003: 192–228.
McMichael, A., 1983, “A Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds”, –––, 2003, Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Oxford
Philosophical Review, 92: 49–66. University Press.
Meinong, A., 1904, “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, in Untersuchungen zur Priest, G., 2005, Towards non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of
Gegenstandstheorie und1Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth. Translated as Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Expanded second
“On the Theory of Objects”, in Chisholm (ed.) 1960: 76–117. edition in 2016.
Menzel, C., 1990, “Actualism, Ontological Commitment and Possible Prior, A. & Fine, K., 1977, Worlds, Times and Selves, Amherst, MA:
World Semantics”, Synthese, 85: 355–89. University of Massachusetts Press.
–––, 2020, “In Defense of the Possibilism-Actualism Distinction”, Quine, W., 1948, “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics. Reprinted
Philosophical Studies, 177: 1971–97. in Quine 1953: 1–19.
Murray, A. & Wilson, J., 2012, “Relativized Metaphysical Modality”, –––, 1953, From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper and Row.
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 7: 189–226. –––, 1968, “Ontological Relativity”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 185–212.
Nelson, M. & Zalta, E., 2009, “Bennett and ‘Proxy Actualism’”, –––, 1976, “Worlds Away”, Journal of Philosophy, 73: 859–63.
Philosophical Studies, 142: 277–92. Ramsey, F., 1931, “Theories”, in The Foundations of Mathematics and
Oliver, A. & Smiley, T., 2013, “Zilch”, Analysis, 73 (4): 601–13. Other Logical Essays, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 212–236.
Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven and London: Yale Rapaport, W., 1978, “Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox”,
University Press. Noûs, 12: 153–80.
–––, 1983, Review of Richard Routley: Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and –––, 1985, “To Be and Not To Be”, Noûs, 19: 255–71.
Beyond, Journal of Philosophy, 80: 173–79. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 2004, “Modal Realism and Metaphysical
–––, 1995, “Ruth Barcan Marcus and the Barcan Formula”, in Modality, Nihilism”, Mind, 113: 683–704.
Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, W. Roper, A., 1982, “Towards an Eliminative Reduction of Possible Worlds”,
Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher (eds.), Cambridge: Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 45–59.
Cambridge University Press, 3–11. Routley, R., 1980, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond: An
Peacocke, C., 1978, “Necessity and Truth Theories”, Journal of Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items, Departmental
Philosophical Logic, 7: 473–500. Monograph #3, Philosophy Department, Research School of Social
–––, 2002, “Principles for Possibilia”, Noûs, 36: 486–508. Sciences, Canberra: Australian National University.
Piccinini, G. & Scott, S., 2010, “Recovering What is Said with Empty Russell, B., 1905, “On Denoting”, Mind, 14: 479–93.
Names”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40: 239–73.

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Salmon, N., 1981, Reference and Essence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton –––, 2001, Ontology, Identity, and Modality, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. University Press.
–––, 1986, “Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and –––, 2003, “Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities”,
Counterpoints”, in P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (eds.), in Loux and Zimmerman 2003: 131–57.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism, Varzi, A., 2001, “Parts, Counterparts, and Modal Occurrents”, Travaux de
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 75–120. Logique, 14: 151–71.
–––, 1987, “Existence”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 1, Metaphysics, Walton, K., 1983, Review of Nicholas Wolterstorff: Works and Worlds of
49–108. Art, Journal of Philosophy, 80: 179–93.
–––, 1989, “The Logic of What Might Have Been”, The Philosophical –––, 1990, Mimesis as Make Believe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Review, 98: 3–34. Press.
–––, 1998, “Nonexistence”, Noûs, 32: 277–319. Williamson, T., 1998, “Bare Possibilia”, Erkenntnis, 48: 257–73.
Scott, D., 1970, “Advice on Modal Logic”, in Philosophical Problems in –––, 2002, “Necessary Existents”, in A. O’Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and
Logic, K. Lambert (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 143–73. Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:, 233–51.
Searle, J., 1974, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse”, New –––, 2013, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Literary History, 6: 319–32. Wolterstorff, N., 1980, Works and Worlds of Art, New York: Oxford
Sider, T., 2002, “The Ersatz Pluriverse”, Journal of Philosophy, 99: 279– University Press.
315. Woods, J., 1974, The Logic of Fiction, the Hague: Mouton.
Skyrms, B., 1981, “Tractarian Nominalism”, Philosophical Studies, 40: Yagisawa, T., 2002, “Primitive Worlds”, Acta Analytica, 17: 19–37.
199–206. –––, 2010, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise, Oxford:
Stalnaker, R., 1976, “Possible Worlds”, Noûs, 10: 65–75. Reprinted in Oxford University Press.
Loux 1979: 225–34. –––, 2017, “S4 to 5D”, Argumenta, 2(2): 241–61.
Thomasson, A., 1999, Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge Zalta, E., 1983, Abstract objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic
University Press. Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Vacek, M., 2017, “Extended Modal-Dimensionalism”, Acta Analytica, 32 –––, 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality,
(1): 13–28. Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, the MIT Press.
Van Inwagen, P., 1977, “Creatures of Fiction”, American Philosophical –––, 2000, “The Road Between Pretense Theory and Abstract Object
Quarterly, 14: 299–308. Theory”, in Everett and Hofweber 2000: 117–47.
–––, 1983, “Fiction and Metaphysics”, Philosophy and Literature, 7: 67–
77.
–––, 1986, “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, 11: 185–213. Reprinted in van Inwagen 2001: 206–42.

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abstract objects | essential vs. accidental properties | existence |
fictionalism: modal | God: and other necessary beings | haecceitism |
haecceity: medieval theories of | identity: of indiscernibles | identity: over
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Nonexistent Objects
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Stanford Encyclopedia Are there nonexistent objects, i.e., objects that do not exist? Some
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of Philosophy hypothetical planet postulated by the 19th century astronomer Le Verrier),
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ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell of
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 Nonexistent Objects Maria Reicher

1. The Concept of a Nonexistent Object necessarily to think of an existent object, or to put it differently, that to
1.1 The Logics of Nonexistent Objects think of an object and to think of the same object as existing are just one
2. Historical Roots: Alexius Meinong and the Problem of and the same thing. Immanuel Kant took up Hume’s idea and claimed that
Intentionality existence is not a “real predicate”, a claim that is often interpreted as an
3. Further Motivations for Belief in Nonexistent Objects anticipation of Gottlob Frege’s famous doctrine that existence is not a
3.1 The Problem of Negative Singular Existence Statements predicate of individuals. (See Hume 2000, Book 1, Part 2, Sect. 6; Kant
3.2 The Problem of Fictional Discourse 2003, B 627; Frege 1966, pp. 37f.) Kant’s motivation for rejecting the
3.3 The Problem of Discourse about the Past and the Future view that existence is a “real predicate” was the so-called “ontological
3.4 The Problem of Alleged Analytic Truths Like “The round proof” of God’s existence, which says, roughly, that God’s perfection
square is square” entails God’s existence, since a being that would have all of God’s
3.5 Nonexistent Objects in Practical Philosophy perfections except existence (i.e., omniscience, omnipotence,
4. Problems with Belief in Nonexistent Objects benevolence) would be less perfect than a being with the same perfections
5. Contemporary Theories of Nonexistent Objects: From plus existence. For centuries, philosophers have felt that there is
Nonexistence to Abstractness something wrong with this proof, but Kant was the first one who was able
5.1 The De-ontologization Strategy to point out a possible error: he argued that the mistake of the “ontological
5.2 Fictionalism and Indifferentism argument” lies in the treatment of existence as a “real predicate”.
5.3 The Other Worlds Strategy
5.4 Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties If Hume is right, then the concept of an object includes the concept of
5.5 The Dual Copula Strategy existence, and the concept of a nonexistent object would be as self-
5.6 Nonexistence Does Not Hold the Key contradictory as the concept of a round square. If existence is not a
6. Themes for Further Investigation predicate of individuals, then one might suppose that neither is
Bibliography nonexistence. Therefore, if Frege is right, to say of an object that it is
Academic Tools nonexistent is a kind of nonsense that arises from a violation of logical
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Related Entries exists/does not exist” is to be understood as a claim about the concept
God, or about the property of being God. On this view, the logical form of
“God exists” is not Exists (God)—where Exists is a predicate of
1. The Concept of a Nonexistent Object individuals, but rather: The concept God applies to something, or
Something possesses the property of being God.)
The very concept of a “nonexistent object” has an air of paradox about it,
at least for those philosophers whose thinking is rooted in the Humean Thus, in order to take the idea of nonexistent objects seriously, one has to
tradition. For Hume suggested that to think of an object is always and give up views held by important philosophers about the nature of

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 Nonexistent Objects Maria Reicher

existence and adopt the view that existence is some kind of predicate of is an x such that … x …” is expressed by “∃x(… x …)”, whereas “there
individuals. This view entails, among other things, that to say, for instance, exists an x such that … x …” is expressed by “∃xE!x & … x …)”,
that some white elephants exist is to say that some white elephants have where “E!” is the existence predicate (Parsons 1980, Zalta 1983, Zalta
the property of existence (or, to put it the other way around, that not all 1988, Jacquette 1996). “Some things do not exist” could thus be rendered
white elephants are nonexistent)—a consequence that might strike some as in logical notation as follows: “∃x(¬E!x)”; “Pegasus does not exist” as “
strange. ¬E!p”; and so forth.

Furthermore, in order to assert “there are nonexistent objects” without Graham Priest (2005) has proposed a theory of nonexistent objects that
implying “nonexistent objects exist”, one has to suppose that sentences of treats “there is” and “exists” as synonyms. He interprets quantification as
the form “There are F s” mean something different from sentences of the utterly ontologically neutral. The quantifier should express neither “there
form “F s exist”.[1] Some philosophers reject a distinction between “there is” nor “there exists”. Rather, quantifier expressions should be read “For
is” and “exists” (see, for instance, Lewis 1990, Priest 2005, Quine 1953), some x, … x …”, where “For some x, … x …” does not imply that
some philosophers (e.g., Meinong 1960, Parsons 1980, Zalta 1988) think “there is (or exists) an x such that … x …”.
that there are good reasons for making this distinction. Some of the latter
think that the distinction between “there is” and “exists” is rooted in Thus, Priest belongs to those philosophers who distinguish between
ordinary language, but others deny this firmly (see, for instance, Geach “quantifier commitment” and “ontological commitment” (see Azzouni
1971). Obviously, although there might be a tendency among competent 2004), claiming that to “quantifier over” objects of a certain kind does not
English speakers to use “there is” and “exists” in different contexts, entail an ontological commitment to objects of this kind.[2]
ordinary language use is too wavering and non-uniform in this respect to
The various logics of nonexistent objects cannot be described and
be a stable ground for a philosophical theory. Of course, this does not rule
discussed here in detail. However, it is now clear that there is no formal
out that there are theoretical reasons for a distinction between “there is”
obstacle to a theory of nonexistent objects. The only questions are
and “exists”, some of which are discussed below.
philosophical: can the concepts that such theories aim to formalize be
explained, and do we have good reason to accept a theory formulated in
1.1 The Logics of Nonexistent Objects these terms? In the following two sections, the main motivations for
believing in nonexistent objects are delineated.
In those logics that stand in the Frege-Quine tradition, both “there is” and
“exists” are expressed by means of the “existential quantifier” (“∃”),
which is, consequently, interpreted as having “ontological import”. Thus,
2. Historical Roots: Alexius Meinong and the
in these formal systems, there is no means to distinguish between “there Problem of Intentionality
is” and “exists”. However, it has been shown that the distinction between
Philosophical writings on nonexistent objects in the 20th and 21st century
the two can be coherently regimented in various ways. In the systems of
usually take as their starting point the so-called “theory of objects” of the
Terence Parsons, Edward N. Zalta and Dale Jacquette, for instance, “there

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 Nonexistent Objects Maria Reicher

Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853–1920). Therefore, it is 3. Further Motivations for Belief in Nonexistent
appropriate to give an outline of the basic principles of and motives behind
Objects
this theory. (For a detailed presentation see the entry on Meinong.)

Meinong was concerned about the problem of intentional states which are 3.1 The Problem of Negative Singular Existence
not directed at anything existent. The starting point of this problem is the Statements
so-called “principle of intentionality”, which says that mental phenomena
are characterized by an “intentional directedness” towards an object. For Very briefly, the problem can be stated as follows: it seems that in order to
instance, to love is always to love something, to imagine is always to deny the existence of a given individual, one must assume the existence of
imagine something, and so forth. In other words, every intentional act is that very individual. Thus, it seems that it is impossible to deny the
“about” something. The problem is that sometimes people imagine, desire existence of an individual without getting involved in a contradiction.
or fear things that do not exist. Some people fear the devil, although the
However, this conclusion seems hard to accept. In fact, there are many
devil doesn’t exist. Many people hope for peace in the Middle East. But
negative existence statements that we take not only to be sensible but also
there is no peace in the Middle East. Ponce the Leon searched for the
to be true (or at least not to be necessarily false). Consider, for instance:
fountain of youth, even though it doesn’t exist. It is easy to imagine a
golden mountain, even if no such thing exists. Pegasus does not exist.
Yugoslavia does not exist anymore.
Cases like these seem to be clear counterexamples to the principle of
The perpetual motion machine does not exist and never will exist.
intentionality. However, many philosophers found this principle too
appealing to be given up completely. While some came to the conclusion From the common sense point of view, negative singular existence
that intentionality is not a real relation and therefore does not require the statements are ubiquitous, comprehensible and sometimes true. So why is
existence of an object (see, for instance, Brentano 1874, Prior 1971, Searle it that many philosophers are so puzzled about them? In particular, why
1983, Crane 2013), Meinong offered another solution: there is indeed an think one has to assume the existence of an individual in order to deny its
object for every mental state whatsoever—if not an existent object then at existence?
least a nonexistent one.[3]
One traditional reason that has been given is based on the following
The problem of intentionality may still count as one of the most important assumptions:
motivations for thinking there are nonexistent objects.[4] But there are
other motivations as well. 1. Only meaningful sentences can be true.
2. In a meaningful sentence, every constituent of the sentence must be
meaningful.
3. If a singular term is meaningful, then it denotes something.

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 Nonexistent Objects Maria Reicher

4. If a singular term “b” denotes something, then “b does not exist” is Thus, combining these two steps, it follows that:
false.
To say “Pegasus doesn’t exist” is to say “it is not the case that there is
Let’s see how these assumptions lead to a problem in light of the negative exactly one x which is a flying horse of Greek mythology”.[5]
singular existence sentence “Pegasus does not exist”. If “Pegasus does not
exist” is true, then it must be meaningful (by (1) above). If it is If “Vulcan” is short for “the planet between Mercury and the sun”, then:
meaningful, all of its constituents must be meaningful, including the
To say “Vulcan doesn’t exist” is to say “it is not the case that there is
singular term “Pegasus” (by (2) above). If “Pegasus” is meaningful, then
exactly one x which is such that x is a planet between Mercury and
“Pegasus” denotes something (by (3) above). If “Pegasus” denotes
the sun”.
something, then “Pegasus does not exist” is false (by (4) above). Thus, the
assumption that “Pegasus does not exist” is true leads to the conclusion The point of these paraphrases is to show that the original sentences can
that this same sentence is false. So if the above premises are correct, it is be analyzed in terms of sentences in which the singular terms (“Pegasus”,
impossible that “Pegasus does not exist” is true: either “Pegasus” denotes “Vulcan”, “the flying horse of Greek mythology” and “the planet between
something, in which case “Pegasus does not exist” is false; or “Pegasus” Mercury and the sun”) have all disappeared. The paraphrases involve the
does not denote anything, in which case “Pegasus does not exist” is not general terms “flying horse from Greek mythology” and “planet between
even meaningful, let alone true. Mercury and the sun”, along with the existential quantifier (“there is”) and
a uniqueness condition (“exactly one”). (Let’s ignore the fact that the
There are several ways to resolve this problem, i.e., to account for
singular terms “Mercury” and “Le Verrier” appear within the general
meaningful and true negative singular existence sentences. One solution
terms; of course, this means that the procedure isn’t complete, but, in
that became very prominent in the 20th century consists in the strategy of
principle, it can be completed.) The problem of negative singular
“analyzing away” the proper names and definite descriptions appearing in
existentials is thereby resolved because sentences containing names which
negative singular existential claims. This strategy consists of two steps:
appear to be about nonexistent objects are paraphrased in terms of
Ordinary proper names are interpreted as disguised definite sentences involving general terms, quantifiers and uniqueness conditions.
descriptions. For instance, “Pegasus” is to be analyzed as short for These latter sentences are meaningful independently of whether the
“the flying horse from Greek mythology”. This is often called the general terms apply to anything.
description theory of proper names. Thus to say “Pegasus exists” is
However, both the description theory of proper names and Russell’s theory
simply to say “the flying horse of Greek mythology exists”.
of definite descriptions have been subject to serious criticisms. One might
Definite descriptions are to be analyzed along the lines of Bertrand
object that they fail to do full justice to our actual use of proper names and
Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. On Russell’s theory, to say
definite descriptions. Often we use proper names—successfully—without
“the flying horse of Greek mythology exists” is to say “there is
having any definite description in mind. Sometimes we don’t need a
exactly one x which is a flying horse of Greek mythology”.
definite description in order to refer to a particular object, because we

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individuate the respective object by means of perception or perceptual who lived on Mt. Olympus and who …”. Thus, the above true sentence
memories. Sometimes we simply do not know of a definite description that would get analyzed in terms of the following false one: “There exists one
individuates the object we wish to refer to. Most of us know about Cicero and only one Greek god who lived on Mt. Olympus and who … and who
just that he was a famous Roman orator; but the Romans had more than was such that the ancient Greeks worshipped him.” There are numerous
one famous orator. Nevertheless, we can use the name “Cicero” other true sentences like this, such as “Sherlock Holmes is more famous
successfully to refer to a particular famous Roman orator. Moreover, even than any real detective”, etc., all of which appear to involve real relations
when we do have something like the mental correlate of a definite between existent objects and nonexistent ones, but whose Russellian
description in mind when we use a proper name, we do not usually treat paraphrases are false. Third, the use of the anaphoric pronoun “it” in
the description as a definition of the proper name (as the Russellian picture “Teams of scientists have searched for the Loch Ness monster, but since it
suggests). Suppose what I have in mind when I use the name “Socrates” doesn’t exist, no one will ever find it” seems problematic. The pronoun in
corresponds to the description “the ancient Greek philosopher who died both of its occurrences in this sentence seems to pick up its
from drinking hemlock”. Suppose furthermore that the famous story about meaning/denotation from the definite description “the Loch Ness
Socrates’ death is actually a myth and that Socrates in fact died peacefully monster”—which is not easy to explain given Russell’s theory of definite
of old age. Do I then simply fail to refer to Socrates whenever I use the descriptions.
name “Socrates”? It does not seem so. When I eventually come to know
that Socrates did not die from drinking hemlock, I will take this as a piece There might be ways to defend the theory of definite descriptions, but they
of information about Socrates, the person I referred to all the time by will not be pursued here. In the context of this article, the relevant point is
using the name “Socrates”. (See Kripke 1980.) that Russell’s theory does not provide a generally accepted solution to the
problem of negative existence sentences. The appeal to nonexistent
As to the theory of definite descriptions, two kinds of problem arise. First, objects, on the other hand, provides a very simple solution to this problem.
some philosophers simply deny that the paraphrases properly capture the It consists in rejecting the premise
meaning of sentences with definite descriptions, simply on the grounds
that the meaning of a proper name like “Pegasus” is just less specific than 4. If a singular term “b” denotes something, then “b does not exist” is
the meaning of the definite description “the flying horse of Greek false.
mythology”. Second, some philosophers have objected that the theory of
If there are nonexistent objects, then “b” may denote an object that does
definite descriptions sometimes yields the wrong results. Consider, for
not exist.
instance: “The ancient Greeks worshipped Zeus.” Prima facie, this
sentence expresses a real relation between the ancient Greeks and Zeus; The idea here is that whereas the quantifiers “there is” and “something”
and it is surely a historical fact that the ancient Greeks worshipped Zeus. range over everything whatsoever, the objects that exist constitute only a
Yet on Russell’s analysis, proper names like “Zeus” have to be replaced by portion of that domain. Therefore, it would be fallacious to derive from “‘b
definite descriptions, even in contexts other than existence claims. So ’ denotes something” that “b” denotes something that exists. According to
“Zeus” would get replaced by a definite description like “the Greek god this picture, “Pegasus does not exist” simply expresses that Pegasus is a

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nonexistent object. Premises 1–3 from above can be accepted without different sense, namely for objects (characters, things, events etc.) which
restriction. “Pegasus” denotes a nonexistent flying horse and thus is occur in fictions, i.e., in myths or fairy tales, in fictional novels, movies,
meaningful. Thus, the whole sentence “Pegasus does not exist” is operas etc. Pegasus is a fictitious object in this sense (as are Sherlock
meaningful as well. Since it is true that Pegasus does not belong to the Holmes and Hamlet) but Vulcan (the hypothetical planet sought by Le
class of existent objects, “Pegasus does not exist” is true. Of course, this Verrier) is not.
solution can be generalized to all negative singular existence statements.
The appeal to nonexistent objects thus supplies an elegant solution to the Consider, for instance, the sentence
problem of negative singular existentials.
(1) Pegasus is a flying horse.
Naturally, there are alternative solutions to the problem of negative
Like many other sentences of fictional discourse, it appears to fulfill the
singular existence statements. Among other things, it is possible to reject
following three conditions:
premise 4 without committing oneself to an ontology of nonexistent
objects. One might simply accept a positive Free Logic, i.e., the 1. It has the grammatical structure of a predication, i.e., the structure
conjunction of the following two principles: 1. Singular terms do not need that is rendered in logical notation by “F b” (where “F ” stands for a
to denote anything in order to be meaningful. 2. Sentences containing non- predicate expression—here: “is a flying horse”—and “b” stands for a
denoting singular terms can be true. (This strategy is to be found, for singular term—here: “Pegasus”).
instance, in Crane 2013.) One of the difficulties of this solution, however, 2. The singular term in subject position is a name for a fictitious object.
is to give an account of what makes such sentences true, i.e., of what their 3. It is commonly, and with good reason, taken to be true.
truthhmakers are (given the principle that, for every true sentence, there is
something in the world that makes it true, i.e., something that is the The problem of fictional discourse is closely connected to two logical
sentence’s truthmaker). For the special case of negative singular existence principles. The first one is well known as “the principle of existential
sentences, one might claim that that their truthmaker is just the entire generalization”:
world (see, e.g., Crane 2013, Section 3.5; for more about Crane’s position
Existential Generalization (EG):
see Section 5.1 below). However, this answer to the truthmaker question is
F b → ∃x(F x), i.e.,
not available for the problem of fictional discourse, which provides
If b is F , then there is something that is F .[6]
another important motivation for a commitment to nonexistent objects.
The second principle is less prominent, rather seldom explicitly stated, but
3.2 The Problem of Fictional Discourse often tacitly assumed. We call it “the predication principle”:

By “fictional discourse” we mean here and in what follows discourse Predication Principle (PP):
about fictitious objects. Sometimes, the term “fictitious object” is used as F b → ∃x(x = b).
[7]
synonymous with “nonexistent object”. Here, the term is used in a

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(PP) may be read in two ways: The problem is that obviously true sentences of fictional discourse seem to
lead into outright contradictions. Of course, there are several ways to
(PPa) If b is F , then there is something that is identical with b. avoid the contradictions. One of them consists in rejecting the principles
(PPb) If b is F , then b exists. (EG) and (PP). By this move, one blocks the inference from “Pegasus is a
flying horse” to “There are flying horses” and “Pegasus exists”. Indeed,
Both principles are prima facie extremely plausible: If it is true of some
some logicians, notably proponents of Free Logics, take this path. (See
individual that the predicate “F ” applies to it, then the predicate “F ”
Crane 2013, Hintikka 1959, Lambert 1983 and 1991, Leonard 1956.)[8]
applies to something. If some predicate “F ” applies to an individual, then
Again (as with the case of negative singular existence statements) this
the individual has to exist (for if it were otherwise, how could the
raises the question of what the truthmakers of such sentences are. There
predicate apply to it?).
are attempts to answer this question in a “reductionist” fashion, i.e., to
Yet, when applied to fictional discourse, these two principles lead to claim that sentences about fictitious objects are made true not by fictitious
consequences that seem to contradict hard empirical facts on the one hand objects but by something else, e.g., by literary works, myths, stories or
and trivial truths about the ontological status of fictitious objects on the facts about these, respectively.[9]
other. According to (EG), the sentence
Another way to avoid the contradictions would be simply to reject the
(1) Pegasus is a flying horse. sentence “Pegasus is a flying horse” (and, in general, all alleged
predications about fictitious objects) as false or untrue. This radical
implies solution, however, fails to do justice to the widespread intuition that there
is a difference in truth-value between “Pegasus is a flying horse” and, say,
(2) There are flying horses.
“Pegasus is a flying dog”.
Yet, as we all know, there are no flying horses.
A third attempt to resolve the problem is what may be called “the story-
According to (PP), operator strategy”. According to the story-operator strategy, we have to
interpret sentences of fictional discourse as incomplete. A complete
(1) Pegasus is a flying horse. rendition of, for instance,

implies (1) Pegasus is a flying horse.

(3) Pegasus exists. would be as follows:

But Pegasus is a fictitious object; and it seems that to call an object (1′) According to the story S (where “S ” here and in what follows
fictitious is just to say that it does not exist. stands for the story of Greek mythology): Pegasus is a flying horse.

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The expression “according to the story S ” is the so-called “story The claim that there are nonexistent objects provides a solution that can be
operator”,[10] which is a sentence operator (that is, it is the sentence as a applied uniformly both to internal and external sentences of fictional
whole that is in its scope, not just a part of the sentence, for instance the discourse. It allows us to admit that fictitious objects do not exist but at the
predicate). While the sentence within the scope of the story operator (here: same time to acknowledge that there are fictitious objects. According to
“Pegasus is a flying horse”) may be false when taken in isolation, the this position, fictitious objects are just a species of nonexistent objects.
complete sentence may be true. (This strategy is developed in detail in
Künne 1990.) In order to see how this assumption is supposed to avoid the contradictions
spelled out above, consider:
Sentence (1′) does not imply that there are flying horses; neither does it
imply that Pegasus exists. Thus, the contradictions are avoided.[11] This (1) Pegasus is a flying horse.[13]
looks like an elegant solution, at least as long as we confine ourselves to a (2) There are flying horses. (1, EG)
particular kind of example. Unfortunately, however, it does not work (3) There are no flying horses.
equally well for all kinds of sentences of fictional discourse. Consider, for
According to the Meinongian solution, premise 3 has to be rejected as
instance:
false. The Meinongian grants that flying horses do not exist, but this does
(4) Pegasus is a character from Greek mythology. not imply that there are no flying horses. According to the Meinongian,
there are flying horses, and they belong to the class of nonexistent objects,
This sentence seems to be straightforwardly true; but if we put a story and Pegasus is one of them. Premise 3 may be replaced by
operator in front of it, we get a straightforward falsehood:
(3′) Flying horses do not exist.
(4′) According to the story S : Pegasus is a character from Greek
mythology. But this does not contradict

It is not true that according to the relevant story, Pegasus is a character. (2) There are flying horses.
Rather, according to this story, Pegasus is a living being of flesh and
Thus, the problem is solved.[14]
blood.
Consider next:
One may call sentences like “Pegasus is a flying horse” or “Hamlet hates
his stepfather” “internal sentences of fictional discourse”, in distinction (1) Pegasus is a flying horse.
from external sentences of fictional discourse, like “Pegasus is a character (2) Pegasus exists. (1, PP)
from Greek mythology” or “Hamlet has fascinated many psychoanalysts”. (3) Pegasus is a fictitious object.
The story operator strategy can be applied to internal sentences only and (4) Fictitious objects do not exist.
thus fails as a general solution to the problem of fictional discourse.[12] (5) Pegasus doesn’t exist. (3, 4)

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In this case, the Meinongian solution consists in rejecting premise 2. The somewhat simplified fashion, as follows: To every set of properties, there
Meinongian cannot accept 2, since Pegasus is supposed to be a nonexistent is/exists a corresponding abstract object. These abstract objects exist
object. necessarily. Some of them occur in fictional stories, and these are what we
call “fictitious objects”. Thus, fictitious objects are necessarily existent
What, then, about the predication principle? Does the Meinongian have to objects that have been somehow “discovered” or “selected” by the authors
reject it?—Not necessarily. Remember that (PP) can be read in (at least) of fictional stories. (For this position, see, for instance, Parsons 1975, Zalta
two ways: 1983 and 1988, Jacquette 1996, Berto 2008 and Priest 2011. Actually, this
is one of the applications of contemporary versions of Meinongianism.
(PPa) If b is F , then there is something that is identical with b.
See Sections 5.4 and 5.5 below.) According to the other variety of
(PPb) If b is F , then b exists.
abstractionism, fictitious objects are abstract artefacts, i.e., they are not
Within the Meinongian framework, these two readings are not equivalent. discovered or selected but created by the authors of fictional stories.[16]
According to the Meinongian, certainly there is something that is identical
The latter view (today often referred to as “creationism”) fits well into a
with Pegasus, although Pegasus does not exist. Thus, the Meinongian must
general ontology of abstract artefacts (like, for instance, literary and other
reject the reading (PPb), but she can (and does) accept the reading (PPa).
[15] works of fiction as well as non-fictional cultural entities) and does justice
to the intuition that fictitious objects as well as the works in which they
Since the Meinongian accepts only the weaker version (PPa) of the occur are literally brought into being through human acts of creation.
predication principle, the inference from premise 1 (“Pegasus is a flying However, it is objected against creationism that the creation of an abstract
horse”) to “Pegasus exists” is blocked. All that can be derived from object is something deeply mysterious.
premise 1 is the weaker claim
3.3 The Problem of Discourse about the Past and the
(2′) There is something that is identical with Pegasus. Future
But this is not in conflict with “Pegasus does not exist”. Thus, the problem
The structure of the problem of discourse about the past and the future is
is resolved.
very similar to the structure of the problem of fictional discourse. Consider
Alternatively, one may abstain from the Meinongian distinction between the following sentences:
being and existence and hold that fictitious objects are existent abstract
(1) Socrates was a philosopher.
objects. According to this position, “Pegasus does not exist” has to be
(2) The first female pope will be black.
rejected as false, and thus, again, the contradiction is avoided. This
position (it might be called “abstractionism with respect to fictitious Given that the sentences (1) and (2) have the logical structure of
objects”) comes in two varieties. The first one might be characterized, in a predications, i.e., the structure “F b”, and given that (PP) is valid, (1)

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implies that Socrates exists and (2) implies that the first female pope (4) The first female pope exists. (For a tense operator strategy see
exists. Prior 1968.)

Indeed, the sentences (1) and (2) look like predications. Grammatically There is a lot to be said in favor of this logical interpretation of tenses. Yet,
speaking, they consist of a subject term (“Socrates”, “the first female it leaves some problems unresolved. One of them is the problem of tensed
pope”) and a predicate term (“was a philosopher”, “will be black”.) But plural quantifiers. Consider, for instance:
while it is certainly true now (in the third millennium C.E.) that Socrates
was a philosopher, it is also certainly true now that Socrates does not exist (5) There have been two kings named Charles.
anymore.
The standard tense operator interpretation of (5) yields:
Second, let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that indeed there will be a
(5′) P (There are two kings named Charles).
female pope (and exactly one first female pope) at some time in the far
future and that she will be black and that she has not even been fathered However, while (5) is true, (5′) is false, since at no time in the past there
yet. Given these assumptions, it is certainly true now that the first female have been two kings named Charles simultaneously. (See Lewis 2004.)
pope does not yet exist. Thus, the standard tense operator strategy seems to fail in cases like this
one.
Again, there are several attempts to resolve this problem. One possible
strategy is to deny that sentences like (1) and (2) really have the logical Another problem that the tense operator strategy leaves unresolved is the
structure of predications. One might suggest the following alternative problem of relations between present and non-present objects. Given the
interpretations, using “P ” (read: “It has been the case”) and “F ” (read: “It principle that a real (two-place) relation can obtain only if both terms of
will be the case”) as “tense operators”: the relation exist, and given that past and future objects do not (now) exist,
relations between present and past or future objects are impossible. Yet it
(1′) P (Socrates is a philosopher).
seems that there are plenty of relations between present and past (or
(2′) F (The first female pope is black).
future) objects. For instance, I stand in the relation of being one of six
Note that the tense operators “P ” and “F ” are sentence operators, like the granddaughters of to my grandmother. Likewise, perhaps I stand in the
story operator from above. Just as the story operator blocks the inference relation of being the grandmother of to a future child.
to existence claims about fictitious objects, the tense operators block the
Here is a Meinongian solution: Suppose objects pop in and out of
inference from (1′) to
existence but thereby do not gain or lose their being. (For a Meinongian,
(3) Socrates exists. all existent objects have being but not all being objects exist.) According
to this picture, “Socrates” now denotes the nonexistent Socrates and “the
and from (2′) to

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first female pope” now denotes the nonexistent first female pope. be interpreted as a quantifier that ranges over the subdomain of past
Accordingly, although we cannot allow for the inference from objects (i.e., objects that have existed but do not exist anymore);
analogously, “there will be” may be interpreted as a quantifier that ranges
(1) Socrates was a philosopher. over the subdomain of future objects (i.e., objects that will exist but do not
exist yet).[18]
and
Furthermore, from a Meinongian point of view, relations between existent
(2) The first female pope will be black.
and nonexistent objects are ubiquitous. Remember the Meinongian
to solution to the problem of intentionality: people fear, admire, dream of,
hope for, or imagine nonexistent objects. Thus, relations between present
(3) Socrates exists. and non-present objects do not pose a particular problem for a
Meinongian.
and

(4) The first female pope exists. 3.4 The Problem of Alleged Analytic Truths Like “The
round square is square”
we can allow for the inference from (1) and (2) to
Sentences like
(3′) There is something that is identical with Socrates.
(1) The round square is round and a square.
and
seem to be logically true (at least according to the intuitions of some
(4′) There is something that is identical with the first female pope.[17] logicians—see Lambert 1983). Furthermore, they seem to have the logical
structure of predications. According to (PP) and (EG), (1) implies
This result does justice to two otherwise incompatible intuitions, namely
(i) the intuition that neither Socrates nor the first female pope exist right (2) There is something that is identical with the round square.
now, and (ii) the intuition that it is nevertheless possible to refer to
Socrates and to the first female pope (or, to put it another way: the and
intuition that the name “Socrates” and the description “the first female
pope” are not empty). (3) There is something that is both round and a square.

Tensed plural quantifiers do not pose a problem for a Meinongian. Tensed If “there is” means the same as “exist”, these are, of course, unacceptable
quantifiers in general may be interpreted as restricted quantifiers that consequences.
range over a particular subdomain of nonexistent objects: “there was” may

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There are two obvious ways out: (i) One could simply reject (1) as false beings. Some, however, go still a step further and argue that not only
(or truth-valueless). (ii) One could try to find an adequate paraphrase for future persons are morally relevant but even persons who will never exist
(1) which accounts for the intuition that (1) is “in some sense” true. Such a (and never existed). In particular, this debate concerns questions of
paraphrase might be procreative ethics and population policies.[19]

(1′) If there were such a thing as the round square, it would be round 4. Problems with Belief in Nonexistent Objects
and a square.
The foregoing considerations suggested that the claim that there are
But according to the Meinongian picture, (2) and (3) are acceptable
nonexistent objects has considerable explanatory force. Why, then, is this
consequences, since they do not entail the existence of something that is
claim not generally accepted but, rather to the contrary, so controversial?
both round and square. Something that is both round and square is an
Is the reason just, as Meinong has put it, “a prejudice in favor of the
impossible object, according to Meinong, which means that it cannot exist,
actual”? — Although ontological prejudices may play a role, there are also
but this does not entail that there is no such thing. Therefore, the
some good reasons for reservations (to put it very carefully).
Meinongian can accept (1) as true, without resorting to any kind of
paraphrase. Even in Meinong’s own writings, there are (roughly) two versions of the
theory, the original one and a later, revised one. In what follows, we will
We have seen that there are alternative solutions for every single one of
refer to the original Meinongian object theory by means of the
the abovementioned problems. But, for all we know, the assertion that
abbreviation “MOT ”.o

there are nonexistent objects is the only way to resolve all these diverse
problems in a uniform way. Perhaps the most basic principle of MOT is the so-called “principle of
o

independence”, which says, literally: So-being is independent from being

3.5 Nonexistent Objects in Practical Philosophy (see Meinong 1959). Ignoring, for the sake of simplicity, Meinong’s
particular use of the term “being”, we can paraphrase this principle as: So-
There is a debate in practical philosophy as to whether nonexistent persons being is independent from existence.
are morally relevant. The basic question is this: do nonexistent people
have interests that we ought to take into account in our decisions? The “so-being” of an object is the totality of the object’s properties apart
Obviously, some of our decisions affect not only existent but also future from the object’s existence or non-existence. The principle of
(i.e., not yet existent) persons; matters of climate change or the disposal of independence says, thus, that an object may have any properties
radioactive waste are relevant cases in point. Intuitively, we ought to act in whatsoever, independently of whether the object exists or not. For
such a way as to prevent disasters for future generations. It is a matter of instance, the (nonexistent) golden mountain literally is golden and a
controversy, though, whether, in order to take into account this moral mountain; the round square literally is round and a square.
intuition, we have to commit ourselves to an ontology of not yet existent

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To every single property and to every set of properties, there is a nonexistent but even necessarily nonexistent. Of course, the same holds
corresponding object, either an existent or a nonexistent one. Thus, there for the object round, the object red and round, and infinitely many other
is, for instance, an object that has the property of being round as its sole objects as well. Every existing object has infinitely many properties. Every
property; one might call it “the object round”, or simply “round”. There is existing object is a completely determined (or, in short: a complete) object.
also an object that has the property of being blue as its sole property (the Objects like blue and round and blue are incompletely determined (or, in
object blue, or blue, for short). Furthermore, there is an object that has the short: incomplete) objects.[21]
property of being round and the property of being blue, and no other
properties (the object round and blue); and so forth. Incomplete objects are necessarily nonexistent. They are, in this sense,
impossible objects (even though their properties may not be
In the notation of classical logic extended with definite descriptions of the contradictory). It should be noted, however, that not every complete object
form ιxϕ(x), the object that has the property of being blue as its sole exists. Consider, for instance, the object that looks exactly like me except
property may be represented by “ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = B)”[20] (where “B” that it has green eyes instead of blue ones. Let’s assume that this object
stands for “is blue”), the object that has the property of being blue and the (my nonexistent green-eyed counterpart) has all the properties that I have
property of being round as its sole properties by “ except for those that are entailed by the difference in eye color, given the
ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = B ∨ F = R)” (where “R” stands for “is round”), and so actual laws of nature. My nonexistent green-eyed counterpart is
forth. completely determined and nevertheless does not exist. But, in contrast to
blue, this counterpart could exist, i.e., it is a possible nonexistent object.
The object blue is not identical with the property of being blue; neither is [22]
it identical with the set that contains the property of being blue as its sole
member. Neither is the object round and blue identical with the set of the Unfortunately, however, MOT has a number of paradoxical
o

property of being blue and the property of being round. The property of consequences. Bertrand Russell, Meinong’s most famous critic, put
being blue is not itself blue, the property of being round is not itself round. forward two objections against MOT .[23] The first objection goes as
o

Analogous considerations hold for sets of properties: sets have neither follows: According to MOT , there is an object that is both round and
o

colors nor shapes. But the object blue is blue, and the object round is square, but such an object is “apt to infringe the law of contradiction”,
round, and so forth. since it would be both round and not round (Russell 1973c, 107).

One might wish to ask: Isn’t it impossible that there exists an object that Meinong perhaps could have replied to this objection that the object called
has the property of being blue as its sole property? Isn’t it necessarily the “the round square” has the properties of being round and being square, but
case that every colored object also has some particular shape, some not the property of being not round, and thus the round square does not
particular size, is made of some particular material, and so forth? infringe the law of contradiction (but only the geometrical law that
everything that is square is not round). Such a reply, however, would have
The Meinongian answer to this question is as follows: It is indeed been a bit beside the point, since it is clear that, according to the principles
impossible that such an object exists! Therefore, the object blue is not only

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of MOT , there is an object that is both round and not round (and
o
6. Thus, blue has exactly one property and blue has (at least) two
evidently the object that Russell had in mind was of this sort). Indeed, properties. (2, 5)
Meinong did not deny that the round square infringes the law of
contradiction. Instead, he replied to Russell’s first objection that the law of Furthermore, it seems that many Meinongian objects do not only infringe
contradiction holds for existent objects only. Objects that are both round laws of logic and geometry, but also intuitively plausible principles like “If
and not round, however, are necessarily nonexistent. something is round, it occupies some region in space” and “If something is
a mountain, it is accessible to the senses”. It seems that having a particular
Russell accepted this reply but forged a second objection that could not be shape entails occupying a region in space and that being a mountain
dismissed in the same vein. Russell argues that since it is a principle of entails accessibility to the senses (in principle). According to MOT , the
o

MOT that to every set of properties there is a corresponding object and

o
round square is round and the golden mountain is a mountain, but
since existence is treated as a property within MOT , there must be an
o
obviously neither the round square nor the golden mountain occupies any
object that has exactly the following three properties: being golden, being region in space and neither of them is accessible to the senses.
a mountain, and being existent. If “G” stands for “is golden”, “M ” stands
for “is a mountain” and “E!” stands for “is existent”, this object is denoted Another strange consequence of MOT is the following: If an object
o

by “ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = G ∨ F = M ∨ F = E!)”. Thus, it follows from the comes into existence, all that happens is that the object turns from a
principles of MOT that there is an existent object that is golden and a
o nonexistent into an existent one. Analogously, if an object goes out of
mountain. But it is an empirical fact that no golden mountain exists. Given existence, all that happens is that the object turns from an existent again
the (apparently trivial) assumption that “b is existent” is equivalent with “b into a nonexistent one. Apart from this, neither the object in question nor
exists”, this is a contradiction. the world as a whole changes in any way. For instance, when I cease to
exist, all that happens is that I will again be nonexistent (as it was from the
A further paradox seems to arise from the incompleteness of many beginning of time to 1966). In all other respects, I will stay just the same.
Meinongian objects: Maybe such a thought is potentially comforting for those who love me, but
it is surely at odds with our normal understanding of coming into existence
1. The object blue (i.e., ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = B), according to MOT ) has o

and passing away.

the property of being blue as its sole property. (Theorem of MOT ) o

2. The object blue has exactly one property. (1) 5. Contemporary Theories of Nonexistent Objects:
3. The object blue has the property of having exactly one property. (2)
From Nonexistence to Abstractness
4. The property of being blue is not identical with the property of
having exactly one property. There is a diversity of contemporary theories of nonexistent objects, where
5. Thus, blue has (at least) two properties, namely the property of being “theory of nonexistent objects” is meant to include any theory that
blue and the property of having exactly one property. (1, 3, 4) attempts to make sense of (alleged) talk about nonexistent objects and/or
(seeming) intentional directedness to nonexistent objects. Some of them,

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like the de-ontologization strategy and fictionalism, take a reductionist Crane can hold the conjunction of 1 and 2 because he interprets aboutness
route. The de-ontologization strategy claims that there can be true in a non-relational way. He can hold the conjunction of 2 and 3 because he
sentences about nonexistent objects, although there are no nonexistent denies that “there are” and its cognates (both in natural and formal
objects. Fictionalism claims that talk about nonexistent objects is not to be languages) are ontologically committing in any way. (For this reason, I
taken literally but as a sort of “pretense”. The other worlds strategy makes call this the de-ontologization strategy.) He can hold the conjunction of 4
use of the assumption of merely possible (and even impossible) worlds. and 5 because he endorses a positive free logic, i.e., the view that there
Other contemporary theories of nonexistent objects, however, are closer to may be true as well as false sentences of the form F b, where “b” stands for
Meinong’s original theory but have amended MOT in such a way as to
o
a non-referring singular term.
avoid at least some of the abovementioned paradoxes. Those are often
called “neo-Meinongian theories”. Usually, they adopt either the nuclear- By denying that Pegasus is a horse and the round square is round Crane
extranuclear strategy or the dual copula strategy in order to free circumvents some of the above-mentioned problems of Meinongianism.
Meinongian object theory from inconsistencies and counterintuitive However, his view raises another problem: Why is “Pegasus is a mythical
consequences. horse” true, while “Pegasus is a horse” is not? In general, why is it that
certain predications with non-referring singular terms are true and others
5.1 The De-ontologization Strategy are not? For, according to the de-ontologization strategy, neither “Pegasus
is a mythical horse” nor “Pegasus is a horse” can be made true by the
Tim Crane (see Crane 2012 and 2013) holds that all of the following referent of “Pegasus”, because there is no such thing.
claims are true:
Crane (2013) offers what he calls a “reductionist” solution to this problem.
1. We can think and talk about nonexistent objects. That is, according to Crane, sentences “about” nonexistent objects are
2. Nonexistent objects do not have any kind of being whatsoever. made true by something else, i.e., by something existent. For instance, the
3. The sentence “There are nonexistent objects” is true. sentence “Vulcan was a planet postulated by Le Verrier in 1859 to explain
4. Some predications with non-referring singular terms in subject the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury” is made true by certain events in
positions are true, e.g.: “Vulcan was a planet postulated by Le 1859, namely by postulation events; the sentence “Sherlock Holmes is
Verrier”; “Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any living more famous than Sir Ian Blair” is made true by the fact that more people
detective”; “Pegasus is a mythical horse”. have heard about Sherlock Holmes than about Sir Ian Blair (where to have
5. Contrary to what Meinongians think, nonexistent objects do not have heard about Holmes is to have heard about the respective stories); the
all of the properties they are characterized as having. For instance, sentence “Pegasus is a mythical winged horse that sprung into being from
Pegasus is a not a horse; thus, “Pegasus is a horse” is not true the blood of Medusa” is made true by a myth which represents Pegasus as
(although “Pegasus is a mythical horse” is). Neither is the round being such-and-such; the sentence “Siegfried is one of the most
square round. unappealing heroes in all dramatic works” is made true by certain facts
about the last two parts of Wagner’s Ring. As these examples already

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show, Crane does not give a uniform, systematic account of the truth of that are false (if taken literally), but nevertheless it may be useful in some
sentences about fictitious objects, as he himself concedes. (See Crane respects to stick to that sorts of discourse.
2013, Section 5.5.)
A general assessment of fictionalism is difficult since the positions
For another example of a reductionist solution, Frank Jackson holds that included under this heading differ considerably from each other. Much
one can assent to “Mr. Pickwick is Dickens’ most famous character” depends on how exactly the “fictional attitude” is spelled out. Many
without an ontological commitment to fictitious characters in general and versions of fictionalism are prone to the “phenomenological objection”:
Mr. Pickwick in particular. For, according to Jackson’s de-ontologization external talk about fictitious objects—to mention one of the applications of
strategy, object language sentences are ontologically neutral. Ontological the fictionalist strategy that is particularly relevant in the context of the
commitment comes in only at the meta-language level, for instance, if we present entry—does not feel like “make-believe”; introspection does not
would claim that the name “Mr. Pickwick” denotes Dickens’s most reveal that we are engaged in any kind of pretense when we say things like
famous character or that the predicate “a character in Dickens” applies to “Sherlock Holmes is one of the most famous characters of popular
something. (See Jackson 1980.) literature” and the like.

A de-ontologization strategy with respect to fictitious characters is also to A position inspired by and in important respects similar to fictionalism
be found in Crittenden 1973 and in Azzouni 2010. that, however, avoids the phenomenological objection is Eklund’s
“indifferentism”. Indifferentism is the view that speakers outside the
5.2 Fictionalism and Indifferentism “philosophy room” are often simply indifferent with regards of the
ontological implications of their utterances and thus are not committed to
In recent years, something close to the de-ontologization strategy—or the existence of those entities whose existence is implied by their
rather a bundle of more or less similar strategies—became prominent, utterances. As Eklund emphasizes, however, indifferentism does not say
known under the heading “fictionalism”. The basic idea of fictionalism is, anything about which entities one should accept in one’s ontology; it is, in
roughly put, that utterances belonging to a certain region of discourse are this sense, not an ontological thesis. (See Eklund 2005.)
not to be taken literally, that speakers producing such utterances have a
fictional attitude towards them and are engaged in a sort of pretense or 5.3 The Other Worlds Strategy
make-believe. (For an overview of the diverse versions of fictionalism as
well as a succinct presentation of its most important pros and cons see the The other worlds strategy has been proposed by Graham Priest (2005) and
entry on fictionalism.) Francesco Berto (2008). Priest calls his theory noneism; Berto names it
modal Meinongianism. The term “noneism” has been coined by Richard
Fictionalism differs from the de-ontologization strategy since fictionalists Routley, and Priest not only takes over the name but also essential features
do not claim that the relevant utterances are literally true; to the contrary, of Routley’s theory (among other things the assumption that basic
according to fictionalism, certain kinds of discourse consist of utterances principles of standard logics, like the principle of contradiction, do not

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hold without restriction—without, of course, accepting that everything is b is round/square” entails “b exists”. Therefore, even if in the actual world
true). (and in all other possible worlds) the law of contradiction holds, the round
square does not infringe this law, since in these worlds the round square is
Proponents of the other worlds strategy reject both the nuclear- neither round nor not round.
extranuclear strategy and the dual copula strategy. Instead, they assume
merely possible and even impossible worlds. All worlds (possible as well In the light of this theory, it is easy to explain why nobody has ever seen
as impossible ones) share the same domain of discourse. But not all the round square or a golden mountain and why the round square is
objects of the domain exist in all worlds. Thus, Pegasus does not exist in obviously not located in space: since the round square is neither round nor
the actual world, but it exists in a variety of merely possible worlds square in the actual world, there is no reason to assume that it occupies
(namely in those which are such as represented by the Greek mythology). space or is accessible to the senses. Similar considerations hold for the
golden mountain.
According to the other worlds strategy, nonexistent objects literally have
the properties through which they are “characterized”—but they have It is worth noting that the postulation of existence-entailing properties is
these properties not in the actual world but only in those worlds “which an implicit rejection of Meinong’s principle of independence, which is one
realize the way the objects are represented as being in the appropriate of the cornerstones of Meinongian object theory.
cognitive state […].” (Priest 2011b, 249, footnote 35) Suppose you
imagine a winged horse. In this case, in your imagination, you have an Proponents of the other worlds strategy reject the nuclear-extranuclear
intentional object that is represented as being winged and a horse. Thus, distinction because they find it “difficult to avoid the feeling that the class
the intentional object of your present intentional state is a nonexistent [of nuclear predicates] has been gerrymandered simply to avoid problems”
winged horse, which is, however, in the actual world neither winged nor a (Priest 2005, 83).
horse. In some worlds, however, this object is winged and a horse –
But Priest’s proposal has difficulties of its own.[25] To mention some of
namely in those worlds which realize the way the object is represented in
them: First, Priest does not give a principled characterization of which
your imagination.[24]
properties are existence-entailing and which are not (which looks quite
The other worlds strategy provides the following solution to the paradox similar to the problem with the nuclear-extranuclear distinction which
of contradiction: The round square exists only in impossible worlds. In Priest points out in the above quotation). Second, it remains unclear which
impossible worlds, however, the principle of contradiction does not hold. properties nonexistent objects have in the actual world (apart from logical
Therefore, the round square’s being both round and not round does not properties like being self-identical and intentional properties like being
infringe the laws of logic which hold in those worlds in which the round thought of by Priest).[26] Furthermore, Priest’s noneism raises difficult
square exists. questions about cross-world identity and the ontological status of non-
actual worlds. The ontological status of non-actual worlds is far from
In the actual world, however, the round square is neither round nor square, obvious: they may be taken to be concrete objects (structured sets of
since roundness and squareness are “existence-entailing properties”, i.e., “ physical objects) or abstract objects (sets of sentences, propositions, or

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states of affairs). (For an elaborate survey of various conceptions of non- golden mountain are probably the properties of being a material thing and
actual worlds see the entry on possible worlds, i.e., Menzel 2014.)[27] of being extended.
Apart from this, it is doubtful whether Priest’s theory provides an adequate
account of fictitious objects. Among other things, it does not do justice to According to MOT , the object called “the golden mountain” was
o

ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = G ∨ F = M ), i.e., the object that has the property of

the widespread intuition that fictitious objects are created by the authors of
the stories to which they belong.[28] being golden and the property of being a mountain (and no other
properties). According to the revised version of object theory, the object
5.4 Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties called “the golden mountain” is the object that has all the nuclear
properties that are implied by the nuclear property of being golden and the
According to the nuclear-extranuclear strategy, there are two kinds of nuclear property of being a mountain, i.e.,
⇒ F ).
[31]
properties: nuclear and extranuclear ones. (Meinong 1972, §25)[29] An
n n n n n n
ιx∀F (F x ≡ G ⇒ F ∨ M

object’s nuclear properties are supposed to constitute the object’s “nature”,

How does the nuclear-extranuclear distinction help to avoid the paradoxes
while its extranuclear properties are supposed to be external to the object’s
mentioned in the section above? — Consider again the paradox from
nature. Nuclear properties are, for instance: being blue, being tall, kicking
incompleteness: According to MOT , there is an object that has the
o

Socrates, having been kicked by Socrates, kicking somebody, being

property of being blue as its sole property (we’ve called it “the object
golden, being a mountain (Parsons 1980, 23).
blue”, for short), in logical notation: ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = B). It seems to be
Which properties are extranuclear? Terence Parsons distinguishes four true of the object blue, by definition, that it has exactly one property. Yet,
categories of “extranuclear predicates” (i.e., predicates that stand for the property of having exactly one property is clearly distinct from the
extranuclear properties): ontological (“exists”, “is mythical”, “is property of being blue. Thus, it seems that the object blue has at least two
fictional”), modal (“is possible”, “is impossible”), intentional (“is thought properties.
about by Meinong”, “is worshipped by someone”), technical (“is
According to the revised version of object theory with the nuclear-
complete”) (Parsons 1980, 23).[30]
extranuclear distinction (MOT , for short), this paradox is avoided in the
ne

Nuclear properties are either constitutive or consecutive, in Meinong’s following way: The property of being blue is a nuclear (constitutive)
terms (Meinong 1972, 176). An object’s constitutive properties are those property, the property of having exactly one property, however, is an
properties that are mentioned explicitly in a description that is used to pick extranuclear property. There aren’t any objects that have exactly one
out the object. Thus, the constitutive properties of the golden mountain are property. There are only objects that have exactly one constitutive
being golden and being a mountain. An object’s consecutive properties are (nuclear) property. Objects that have only a limited number of constitutive
those properties that are somehow included or implied by the object’s properties may (and necessarily do) have additional extranuclear
constitutive properties. Thus, among the consecutive properties of the properties—like the property of having exactly n constitutive properties or
the property of being incomplete. The object called “blue” is

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ιx∀F
n
(F
n
x ≡ B
n
⇒ F ), i.e., the object that has the property of being
n
counterparts? Meinong himself is not explicit about this point, but it seems
blue as its sole constitutive property. This does not rule out that the object very natural to extend the theory in this way. Terence Parsons has adopted
blue may have additional extranuclear properties. Thus, the paradox from this extension (Parsons 1980, 68), while Dale Jacquette rejects the doctrine
incompleteness does not arise in MOT .[32]
ne
of watered-down extranuclear properties altogether, even for existence and
possibility (Jacquette 1996, 85–87).
To Russell’s objection that the existent golden mountain infringes the law
of contradiction (since it is both existent and nonexistent), advocates of There are several paradoxes for which MOT does not supply a solution
ne

MOT may reply as follows: Existence is an extranuclear property, but

ne
(even if it is supplemented with the doctrine of watered-down extranuclear
only nuclear properties can be constitutive properties of an object. properties). It still seems that the round square infringes the law of
Therefore, according to MOT , there simply is no such object as
ne
contradiction; one still may wonder why it is impossible to discover round
ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = G ∨ F = M ∨ F = E!) (i.e., the existent golden squares and golden mountains; and one still may be baffled by the doctrine
mountain). (This route is taken by Dale Jacquette and Richard Routley. that nonexistent objects differ from existent ones only in that the former
See Jacquette 1996, 81 and Routley 1980, 496.) lack existence.[34]

This solution, however, imposes quite a heavy restriction on the theory of 5.5 The Dual Copula Strategy
objects. Probably this was the reason why Meinong himself did not even
mention it as a possible solution. Instead, he introduced in addition to the According to the dual copula strategy, there are two kinds of relations
nuclear-extranuclear distinction the doctrine of watered-down between properties and individuals.[35] Different advocates of this strategy
extranuclear properties: at least some extranuclear properties (existence, use different terminologies for it. Here are some of them:
possibility) have nuclear counterparts, i.e., “watered-down” versions of
extranuclear properties (Meinong 1972, §37).[33] The golden mountain is determined by the property of being golden
and by the property of being a mountain.
If the extranuclear property of existence has a watered-down nuclear The golden mountain satisfies the property of being incompletely
counterpart, the following answer to Russell’s objection is available: “The determined. (Mally 1912)
existent golden mountain exists” is ambiguous. It may be read as “The The golden mountain has the property of being golden and the
existent golden mountain exemplifies extranuclear existence” (which is property of being a mountain assigned to it.
false), or it may be read as “The existent golden mountain exemplifies The golden mountain immanently contains the property of being
nuclear existence” (which is true). There is no contradiction between “The incompletely determined. (Ingarden 1931 [1973], §20, p. 122)
existent golden mountain exemplifies nuclear existence” and “The existent The golden mountain is consociated with the property of being
golden mountain does not exist” (in the proper, extranuclear sense). golden and the property of being a mountain.
The golden mountain is consubstantiated with the property of being
Do other extranuclear properties (besides existence) also have nuclear
incompletely determined. (Castañeda 1972)
counterparts? Do perhaps all extranuclear properties have nuclear

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The property of being golden and the property of being a mountain not being red, the property of not encoding the property of being red, the
are ascribed to the golden mountain. property of not being determined with respect to its side length, the
The golden mountain has the property of being incompletely property of having thought of by Bertrand Russell, the property of
determined. (van Inwagen 1977)[36] encoding exactly two constitutive properties, the property of being
The golden mountain is constituted by the properties of being golden incompletely determined.
and being a mountain.
The golden mountain exemplifies the property of being incompletely To mention another popular example, consider Pegasus: Among other
determined. (Rapaport 1978) things, Pegasus encodes the properties of being a horse, of having wings,
The golden mountain encodes the property of being golden and the of having been tamed by Bellerophon. But there are also infinitely many
property of being a mountain. properties that Pegasus exemplifies, for instance, the property of not being
The golden mountain exemplifies the property of being incompletely determined with respect to the number of hairs in its tail, the property of
determined. (Zalta 1983) being a character of Greek mythology, the property of being a fictitious
object.
The various versions of the dual copula strategy share the assumption that
the copula “is” is ambiguous. In what follows, we will use the It must be emphasized that something that encodes the property of being a
exemplification-encoding terminology. In addition, we will borrow from horse is not a horse (in the usual predicative sense of “is”). Analogously,
Zalta the following notational convention: “F b” stands for “b exemplifies something that encodes the properties of being round and square is neither
the property of being F ”. “bF ” stands for “b encodes the property of being round nor square. That is to say, something that encodes the property of
F ”. Furthermore, we will use MOT
dc
as an abbreviation for “the revised being a horse does not belong to the class of horses, and something that
version of Meinongian object theory which makes use of a dual copula encodes the properties of being round and square does neither belong to
distinction”. the class of round things nor to the class of square things. Rather, things
that encode the properties of being a horse or being a square or being a
According to MOT , the object called “the round square” is the object
dc
Danish prince are abstract objects—abstract in the sense that they are
that encodes the property of being round and the property of being square neither mental nor spatio-temporal things. In general, everything which
(and all of the properties that are implied by these properties) and no other encodes at least one property is an abstract object in this sense.[37]
properties. Thus, according to MOT , the object called “the round square”
dc

is ιx∀F (xF ≡ R ⇒ F ∨ S ⇒ F ). Let’s see how MOT avoids the alleged paradoxes mentioned in section
dc

4. The first objection was that objects like the round square infringe the
Thus, according to MOT , the object called “the round square” encodes
dc
law of contradiction, since such objects would be both round and not
exactly two constitutive properties (being round and being square). round. According to MOT , however, the object called “the round
dc

However, over and above this, there are many (indeed infinitely many) square”—ιx∀F (xF ≡ R ⇒ F ∨ S ⇒ F )—is not round (i.e., does not
properties that are exemplified by this object, for instance: the property of exemplify the property of being round). Thus, no contradiction arises.

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The second objection was that the existent golden mountain would existence, the vast majority of its properties (like being human, loving
infringe the law of contradiction, since, if there were such an object, it pancakes, being violent-tempered, and so forth) stay exactly the same.
would be both existent and nonexistent. According to MOT , one could
dc
Consider again my nonexistent green-eyed counterpart. According to
answer to this objection as follows: The object called “the existent golden MOT , this object encodes being human, being female, being a
dc

mountain” is ιx∀F (xF ≡ G ⇒ F ∨ M ⇒ F ∨ E! ⇒ F ). This object philosopher, and so forth, but does not exemplify these properties;
encodes the property of being existent, but it does not exemplify it. Since “ therefore, it does not belong to the class of female philosophers, not even
b encodes F ” does not imply “b exemplifies F ”, there is no contradiction to the class of humans or to the class of living beings. Thus, it is clear that
involved here. my green-eyed counterpart’s nonexistence is by far not the only difference
between it and myself. In general, nonexistent objects are a particular kind
According to MOT , the object blue is ιx∀F (xF ≡ B ⇒ F ), i.e., the
dc

of objects, according to MOT —very different from ordinary existent

dc

object that encodes exclusively the properties that are implied by being objects. In what follows, we’ll call them “Meinongian objects”.
blue. Thus, the object blue exemplifies the property of encoding only the
properties that are implied by being blue. It is not the case that the object 5.6 Nonexistence Does Not Hold the Key
blue has exactly one property and at the same time has at least two
properties, at least not, if “has” is used in the same sense in both MOT is very remote from MOT . Recall that, according to MOT , the
dc o o

occurrences. In this way, the apparent contradiction disappears. object called “the golden mountain” is not an abstract object but
something as concrete as every existent mountain in the world. Secondly,
Furthermore, according to MOT , the object called “the round square”,
dc

and related to this, the idea that some objects do not exist is one of the
i.e., ιx∀F (xF ≡ R ⇒ F ∨ S ⇒ F ), does not occupy any region in space.
cornerstones of MOT —but it is not an essential feature of MOT , i.e., it
o dc

More exactly, it does not exemplify the property of occupying some region
doesn’t play an essential role within MOT . Within MOT , Meinongian
dc dc

in space (though, perhaps it encodes this property, if being round implies

objects are defined as a particular kind of abstract objects (namely abstract
occupying some region in space). Analogously, according to MOT , the dc

objects to which two kinds of predicates apply). Of course, one can decide
object called “the golden mountain”, i.e.,
to say that these objects are “nonexistent”; but nothing hinges upon this
ιx∀F (xF ≡ G ⇒ F ∨ M ⇒ F ), does not exemplify the property of
decision. According to MOT , the only difference between Meinongian
o

being accessible to the senses (at best, it encodes this property). Therefore,
objects and normal objects consists in the alleged nonexistence of the
there is nothing paradoxical in the fact that nobody has ever seen a golden
former. However, in MOT , Meinongian objects are distinct from normal
dc

mountain and that it is impossible to determine the location of the round

objects because only the former are abstract objects which encode
square.
properties. This suffices to distinguish Meinongian objects from normal
Finally, MOT does not have the counterintuitive consequence that the
dc objects. Thus, there is no need to assume that existence is a property of
only difference between existent and nonexistent objects is that the latter individuals and that there is a difference between “There are objects that
lack the property of being existent, such that if an object goes out of are such-and-such” and “Objects that are such-and-such exist”.

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 Nonexistent Objects Maria Reicher

If MOT is essentially different from MOT , the question arises to what

dc o
1. Both MOT and MOT could perhaps benefit from a clarification of
ne dc

extent MOT can fulfill the tasks MOT was supposed to fulfill. It seems
dc o
their basic distinctions, namely the nuclear-extranuclear distinction and the
that MOT cannot do everything MOT was supposed to do. First,
dc o
dual copula distinction, respectively.
consider the problem of intentionality: if somebody fears the devil, does
he fear an abstract object? — This seems to be psychologically 2. One feature of Meinong’s mature object theory not mentioned so far is
impossible, for an abstract object cannot do any harm to anybody.[38] the “doctrine of implexion”. Implexion is a relation between incomplete
Second, recall the problem of negative singular existence sentences: and complete objects which seems to be very close to what is often called
Astronomers claim that Vulcan does not exist. Do they thereby intend to “instantiation”, i.e., a relation between universals and particulars.
deny the existence of an abstract object that only encodes being such-and- Incomplete objects are “implected” in complete ones. (See Meinong 1972,
such a planet? — Probably not. They rather deny the existence of §29.) Meinong himself eventually came to interpret incomplete objects as
something that is a planet, i.e., a concrete material thing. Finally, consider universals (see Meinong 1972, 739f). Meinongian object theory may thus
the problem of discourse about the past and the future: when a teacher in a be interpreted as a sophisticated theory of universals, in particular as a
history of philosophy class talks about Socrates, does she then intend to theory of types (as opposed to properties), which might open further fields
talk about an abstract object that only encodes all of the properties that of application.
Socrates (the “real” one) once exemplified? — Presumably not. If there is
3. Throughout this entry, we have presupposed realism with respect to
an object which she is intentionally directed at, then it is probably the
properties. However, it is doubtful whether a theory of Meinongian objects
“real” Socrates, not its abstract counterpart.
is necessarily ontologically committed to properties. An ontologically
It may be that proponents of MOT find ways to meet these objections
dc neutral quantifier and the use of non-objectual variables for predicates (not
such that their theories provide solutions for the problem of intentionality, for names of predicates or properties) may help to avoid this commitment
the problem of singular existence sentences, and the problem of reference and thus could make Meinongian object theory much more parsimonious.
to past and future objects. But even if they don’t, it is beyound doubt that
Neo-Meinongian theories can be and indeed are fruitful in many ways. In Bibliography
particular, they provide the basis for a consistent realist ontology of
Alai, Mario, 2006, “Speaking of Nonexistent Objects,” in Raspa, Venanzio
fictitious objects. (For a variety of further applications see in particular the
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–––, 1996, “Emotion and Fictional Beings,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Acknowledgments
Criticism, 54: 41–48.
This article is an outcome of the project “Philosophie et histoire de la
Academic Tools logique. Les concepts formels” at the University of Geneva, in which I
was involved from January to September 2004. I am indebted to the
How to cite this entry. University of Geneva for financial support. I also wish to thank Gideon
Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Rosen and Edward N. Zalta for constructive criticism and helpful advice.
Society.
Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Notes to Nonexistent Objects
Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links
1. This distinction can be interpreted in one of two ways: According to one
to its database.
interpretation, “exists” expresses one mode of being and “there is”
another. (For a critique of modes of being distinctions see Reicher 2005a.)
Other Internet Resources
According to another interpretation, however, “exists” expresses the only
Plato and Meinong, web page relating Meinong’s objects and mode of being and “there is” has no ontological import whatsoever.
Platonic objects, maintained by Edward N. Zalta (Stanford
2. The view that quantification is ontologically neutral is also held by Tim
University).
Crane (see Crane 2013, Chap. 2). Some claim that Meinongians (and even
The Vocabulary of Ontology: Existence, web page on the definition
Meinong himself) are not ontologically committed to nonexistent objects
of existence, maintained by Raul Corazzon, at the website Ontology.
(see, for instance, Priest 2005). Obviously, whether or not this is correct
A Resource Guide for Philosopher.
depends not the least upon the question of what exactly it means to be
ontologically committed to something, which leads into a highly subtle,
Related Entries complex and controversial debate that cannot be pursued here. (For a
contribution to this debate see Reicher 2005a.)
abstract objects | descriptions | existence | fiction: fictional entities | Frege,
Gottlob | intentionality | Kant, Immanuel | logic: free | Mally, Ernst | 3. A similar view is held by the 18th century philosopher Thomas Reid
Meinong, Alexius | possibilism-actualism debate | possible worlds | (see Reid 1785). Reid’s view is discussed and compared with the views of
reference | Russell, Bertrand Brentano, Meinong, Findlay and Anscombe in Prior 1971.

4. Thus, Tim Crane states: “[…] I have come to realize that unless we
understand non-existence we cannot understand intentionality” (Crane
2013, ix).

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5. There is an alternative paraphrase of “Pegasus doesn’t exist” put (3′) According to the story S : Pegasus exists.
forward in Quine 1953: “Nothing pegasizes.” This is the result of
transforming the singular term “Pegasus” into the general term “to These implications, however, are unproblematic, for they do not contradict
pegasize”. The point of this is the same as the one of the Russellian “There are no flying horses” and “Pegasus does not exist”.
paraphrase, namely to get rid of the empty singular term. Quine’s proposal
12. A defense of a generalized operator strategy is to be found in Brock
avoids some objections to Russell’s theory (see below); yet it seems that
2002. Brock’s operator, however, is not a story operator but something one
the term “to pegasize” is in need of further analysis.
might call a “theory (or belief) operator”. It reads: “according to the
6. Let’s assume for the moment, in order to get a grip on the problem, that realist’s hypothesis” (where “the realist’s hypothesis” is the assumption
there is no difference between “F s exist” and “there are F s”. that there are fictitious objects). This strategy is not susceptible to the
above objection, but it is doubtful whether it does justice to the intuitions
7. For other formulations of the predication principle see Kit Fine’s that govern realism with respect to fictitious objects. The same holds true
“falsehood principle” (Fine 1981), Plantinga’s “serious actualism” of the account in Everett 2005, which says that both authors and literary
(Plantinga 1983) and Williamson’s “being constraint” (Williamson 2013). critics engage in some sort of “pretense”. Both Brock’s and Everett’s
position are versions of “fictionalism”. (For more on fictionalism see
8. This is not the place to enter a discussion about the merits and Section 5.1 below and the entry on fictionalism.)
drawbacks of various versions of Free Logics. It must be sufficient for the
present purpose to note that both (EG) and (PP) have an extraordinary 13. Throughout the whole entry, non-annotated premises are what we take
degree of prima facie plausibility. Therefore, they should not be given up to be prima facie truths.
lightly.
14. Graham Priest would even deny that 1 (“Pegasus is a flying horse”)
9. Crane (2013) proposes such a “reductionist” solution. For details, see implies “There are flying horses”. He would claim, instead, that 1 implies
Section 5.1 below. “For some x, x is a flying horse”. Whether this is more than a linguistic
difference depends, of course, partly on how “there is” is interpreted. (See
10. Sometimes, advocates of the story operator strategy use an unspecified note 1.)
story operator “according to a story” (in the sense of “according to one
story or another”). 15. Note that analogous considerations hold for the principle of existential
generalization. (EG) had been formulated as
11. Yet, (1′) may be taken to imply
(EG) F b → ∃x(F x)
(2′) According to the story S : There are flying horses.
and the following reading had been suggested:
and
(EGa) If b is F , then there is something that is F .

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This reading can be (and is) accepted by a Meinongian. However, a unrestricted neutral quantifier, and “(Existed)” is a tensed existence
Meinongian cannot accept predicate.

(EGb) If b is F , then F s exist. 18. A proponent of a Meinongian solution to the problem of past and
present objects is Mark Hinchliff in his dissertation A Defense of
16. The idea of fictitious objects as created artefacts occurs for the first Presentism, according to Markosian 2004.
time (though presented in an unfamiliar terminology) in Roman Ingarden’s
Das literarische Kunstwerk (originally published in 1931; English 19. For a critical discussion of such a view, see Weinberg 2013. Weinberg
translation: Ingarden 1973) and then in MacDonald 1954, Ferrater-Mora argues, convincingly, that “interests are contingent upon existence” and
1976/77, and van Inwagen 1977. More recently, creationist accounts can thus, that “[i]f a hypothetically possible person will never exist then there
be found, among others, in Fine 1984, Salmon 1998, Thomasson 1999, is no real subject for interests at all.” (Weinberg 2013, 473) A related
Voltolini 2006, Reicher 2010. For a criticism of creationism see, e. g., debate concerns the question of whether one can reasonably attribute a
Kroon 2011. certain degree of wellbeing to nonexistent people. (See Herstein 2013.
Herstein answers this question negatively.)
17. An anonymous referee drew my attention to the fact that this proposal
involves a potentially confusing asymmetry. For if we use “there is” as the 20. At least, this is one of the possible interpretations of what the object
neutral quantifier (i.e., as the quantifier that expresses being but not called “blue” is, according to MOT . Alternatively, one might interpret the
o

existence), as Meinongians usually do, then, prima facie, “there was” object blue as ιx∀F (F x ≡ B ⇒ F ), i.e., as the object that has all and
should be restricted to things that were (i.e., had being) at some time in the only those properties that are implied by the property of being blue (like
past, not to things that existed at some time in the past. However, for a being colored, for instance). It is difficult to decide whether Meinong, in
Meinongian, it would not make sense to understand “there was” in this the early version of his theory of objects, intended the object blue to be
way. For, according to the Meinongian, an object can gain and lose interpreted one way or the other. Since this question is of merely historical
existence, but an object cannot gain and lose being. Therefore, the domain interest, we’ll assume, for the sake of convenience, that according to MOT
of things that had being in the past is co-extensional with the domain of o
the first interpretation is the correct one and leave the more complex
things that have being now. Therefore, if “there was” were used as interpretation for later (see section 5.4).
quantifier for everything that had being in the past, it would not be
restricted at all. A Meinongian who is sympathetic to the idea of restricted 21. Incomplete objects violate the principle that for every property P and
quantification but wishes to avoid the unpleasant asymmetry pointed out every object x, either x exemplifies P or x exemplifies the negation of P .
above perhaps could do so by rendering past tense sentences formally as But incomplete objects do not violate the principle that for every property
P and every object x, either x exemplifies P or x does not exemplify P (i.
involving an untensed neutral quantifier plus a tensed existence predicate.
“Dinosaurs existed” could thus be rendered as “There is an x such that e., the principle of excluded middle). However, Anthony Everett has
(Dinosaur)x and (Existed)x”, where “there is” is the usual untensed and argued that there may be special cases of fictitious objects which violate
the latter principle, which would, if true, constitute a serious objection

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against fictional realism (see Everett 2005 and 2013). Several authors have existent detective in one nonactual world may be identical to a nonexistent
defended fictional realism against Everett’s objections by proposing ways object that is a nonexistent doctor in another nonactual world.
to avoid the violation of the principle of excluded middle even in Everett’s
examples of outlandish fictions (see Schnieder and von Solodkoff 2008, 25. For critical discussion of Priest’s theory, see Hale 2007, Kroon 2012,
Voltolini 2010, Milne 2013, Murday 2015). Sauchelli 2012, and the Book Symposium in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 76 (2008), which consists of contributions by
22. The distinction between complete and incomplete objects resolves Daniel Nolan, Frederick Kroon and, of course, Priest’s replies.
certain puzzles in connection with fictitious objects: How many hairs are
there in Pegasus’s tail? What was the shoe size of Sherlock Holmes’ 26. Although Priest does not say so explicitly, one might suggest that they
grand-grandmother? (We suppose that the respective stories do not give us have properties like being round in some non-actual world, being a
any hint with respect to these questions.) — The Meinongian answer is detective in some non-actual world etc. If so, his solution becomes
simple and plausible: Pegasus is not determined with respect to the exact structurally similar to the dual copula strategy. Priest admits “a certain
number of hairs in its tail. Sherlock Holmes is not determined with respect similarity here” in his 2011b (p. 250), but continues his comment as
to the shoe size of his grand-grandmother. In general, fictitious objects are follows:
highly incomplete.
[T]he accounts are not structurally identical. For one thing, a
23. For Russell’s criticism of MOT see Russell 1973a, 1973b, and 1973c.
o characterized object may have all sorts of properties at a
Meinong defended himself in Meinong 1973. His reply to Russell can be characterizing world that are not part of its characterization. (For
plausibly interpreted as an anticipation of a revised version of MOT (see
o example, Holmes may be either right handed or left handed at a
Rapaport 1978), which will be delineated in section 5. For a detailed world — though neither of these is in his characterization.) And
discussion of the Russell-Meinong debate see Smith 1985, Griffin 1985– since they are not part of its characterization, the object does not,
86, and Simons 1992. according to Zalta, encode them. For another, I claim that
characterization can be applied to any condition. To avoid
24. Why can’t one simply say that nonexistent objects have the properties contradiction, Zalta has to say that properties that involve encoding
they are characterized as having at the worlds at which they exist? Priest are not allowed to be part of a characterizing property. (ibid.)
explains that this is not his view, since, according to his brand of noneism,
“[t]hey may not exist at such worlds – indeed it may be part of their The problem of the underdetermination of nonexistent objects in the actual
characterization that they do not exist. Conversely, they may exist at world is also broached in Nolan 2008 (191–193). Nolan argues that this
worlds without having their characterizing properties there: there are problem is particularly pressing for objects of mathematics. Priest replies
worlds where Sherlock Holmes exists and is a doctor, not a detective” to this in his Priest 2008.
(Priest 2011b, 249, footnote 35). That is, a nonexistent object that is an
27. Priest claims that non-actual worlds themselves are nonexistent
objects. This view, together with what has been said above, seems to entail

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 Nonexistent Objects Maria Reicher

(although Priest does not say so explicitly) that nonexistent worlds are 31. We use the superscripts ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ to indicate whether the properties in
n e

constituted (partly) by existent objects. For Pegasus, for instance, exists in question are nuclear or extranuclear.
those worlds which are such as described in Greek mythology. Seemingly,
it will not do to say that Pegasus does not “really” exist in those worlds 32. If we set aside the constitutive-consecutive distinction, we may
(since those worlds are nonexistent), because Pegasus is said literally to interpret the object called “blue” as ιx∀F (F x ≡ F = B ). This object
n n n n

have existence-entailing properties in those worlds, and if existence in a has exactly one nuclear property, namely the property of being blue. But
nonexistent world were not “real” existence, it seems that, consequently, this object too has infinitely many extranuclear properties, among them the
objects existing in a nonexistent world could not literally have existence- property of having exactly one nuclear property. Thus the paradox is
entailing properties. avoided in the same way as with \(\iota x\forall F^n(F^n x \equiv B^n
\Rightarrow F^n).
28. Priest himself discusses this and other problems of the application of
his noneism to the topic of fictitious objects in Priest 2011a. Note that 33. This doctrine raises a difficult question: what is the difference between
Meinongianism in general (understood as the doctrine that there are an extranuclear property and its nuclear counterpart? For a discussion of
objects that do not exist) is, in principle, neutral with respect to the this problem see Reicher 2005b.
question of whether nonexistent objects are necessary or contingent
34. However, MOT may be made stronger by assuming that not only
ne

objects. The versions of Meinongianism presented below are compatible

there is a nuclear counterpart to every extranuclear property but that there
with the view that Meinongian objects are created, though this is not the
is also an extranuclear counterpart to every nuclear property. (This
standard view among Meinongians. But Priest’s noneism can in no way
assumption is made in Parsons 1980, see p. 167.) Of course, this makes
accommodate the “creationist” intuition, unless he abolishes the doctrine
the problem of how to distinguish nuclear from extranuclear properties
that the domain of discourse is the same in all possible (and impossible)
even more pressing. But given that all properties come in nuclear-
worlds.
extranuclear pairs, one might say: The round square exemplifies only
29. Originally, this distinction has been made by Ernst Mally, a disciple of nuclear roundness and squareness, while every existent square exemplifies
Meinong, and Meinong adopted it for the mature version of object theory. extranuclear squareness. The (nonexistent) golden mountain exemplifies
Terence Parsons and Dale Jacquette are two contemporary proponents of only nuclear goldenness and mountainhood, whereas every existent
this strategy. See Meinong 1972, Parsons 1980, Jacquette 1996, and also mountain exemplifies extranuclear mountainhood. One might argue that
Routley 1980. the principle of contradiction concerns extranuclear properties only and
that a thing’s nuclear mountainhood does not entail that the thing can be
30. However, there is no complete agreement among advocates of the perceived and is located in space, since a thing that exemplifies only
nuclear-extranuclear distinction as to which properties are extranuclear. In nuclear mountainhood is not a mountain in the usual sense. Such an
contrast to Parsons, Dale Jacquette classifies intentional properties as extension of MOT would bring MOT very close to the dual copula
ne ne

nuclear. (Jacquette 1996, 73f.) theory (see next section).

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 Nonexistent Objects

35. Like the nuclear-extranuclear distinction, this strategy too has been
introduced first by Ernst Mally (see Mally 1912). In contrast to the former,
however, Meinong never adopted the dual-copula distinction.

36. Van Inwagen applies this distinction exclusively to objects of fiction

(in the narrower sense, connected to the ontology of art), but in its
function and spirit it seems to be analogous to the ones of Mally and
Castañeda.

37. According to the interpretation adopted here, properties of the form

“encoding being F ” can be exemplified by abstract objects only.
Alternatively, one might assume that, for instance, an existent “real”
human being exemplifies both the property of being human and the
property of encoding the property of being human, while something that
encodes being human without exemplifying this property must be an
abstract object.

38. An anonymous referee suggested to me that fearing the devil might be

analogous to fearing a harmless snake that one mistakenly believes to be
poisonous: although the devil is in fact abstract (and therefore harmless),
those who fear “him” mistakenly believe that “he” is concrete and
dangerous. However, I do not believe that this analogy holds. As I see it,
those who fear the devil are not intentionally directed at an abstract object
that encodes being evil etc. Rather, they are directed at a concrete object
that exemplifies being evil. It is not that they mistakenly attribute certain
properties to an abstract devil. Rather, they do not have an abstract devil as
their intentional object of fear in the first place.

39. Contributions to a discussion of the topics mentioned below are to be

found in Reicher 2001 and Reicher 2005b.

Copyright © 2022 by the author

Maria Reicher

66 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 pdf version of the entry
Artifact
[Link] Artifact
from the Winter 2022 Edition of the First published Wed Jul 18, 2018; substantive revision Mon Oct 3, 2022

Stanford Encyclopedia The contemporary world is pervasively artifactual. Even our most
mundane, biologically based activities, such as eating, sleeping, and sex,
of Philosophy depend on engagement with artifacts. Moreover, many of the plants and
animals we encounter on a daily basis qualify as biological artifacts
(Sperber 2007). But unlike language—which also pervades human life
from top to bottom—artifacts as such are not the subject matter of any
well-defined area of philosophical research. This is as much the case today
as it has been throughout the history of Western philosophy (Dipert 1993).
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman
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Philosophy of technology might have played this role, but historically it
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Heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger’s (1954 [1977]) seminal essay,
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- “The Question Concerning Technology”, this strain of philosophy of
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(Franssen, Lokhorst, & van de Poel 2018) or “engineering” (Mitcham
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rather than on artifacts in general.
Artifact
Copyright c 2022 by the author
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The aim of this article, then, is to bring together discussions of artifacts
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1
 Artifact Beth Preston

discussions in other disciplines. Section 1 concerns questions of definition. as it exists in the mind of the maker. Both Aristotle and his contemporary
Section 2 focuses on the metaphysics of artifacts. Section 3 turns to descendants are primarily concerned to distinguish artifacts from objects
epistemological issues. There are also important normative issues that occur naturally, without any human intervention.
concerning artifacts, but these are covered in other articles in this
Encyclopedia, listed in the Related Entries section below. On this standard definition, artifacts must satisfy three conditions. They
must be intentionally produced, thus ruling out unintended by-products of
1. Definition intentional actions, such as the shavings that result from woodcarving, as
2. Metaphysics well as all naturally occurring objects, such as salamanders and stars. They
2.1 Do Artifacts Exist? must involve modification of materials, thus ruling out naturally occurring
2.2 Artifact Kinds objects even when used intentionally for a purpose, such as sticks thrown
2.3 Artifact Functions to amuse your dog. And they must be produced for a purpose. This rules
2.4 Abstract Artifacts out intentionally modified objects that are nevertheless not intended to
3. Epistemology accomplish any further goal, such as the scraps produced when you
3.1 Methodology intentionally, but for no particular reason, tear up a piece of paper before
3.2 Knowing Artifacts throwing it away. Presumably, then, these three conditions are intended to
3.3 Thinking and Acting With Artifacts be individually necessary and jointly sufficient to distinguish artifacts
Bibliography from naturally occurring objects.
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources Three remarks about this definition are in order. First, it does not rule out
Related Entries the possibility that at least some things made by non-human animals are
artifacts. Spider webs do have a purpose, for instance, and are clearly
made rather than naturally occurring. But we may hesitate to attribute
1. Definition intention to the spiders, given the instinctive nature of their web-weaving
behavior. Beavers, on the other hand, might be thought to intentionally
A standard philosophical definition of “artifact”—often assumed even construct dams in order to create ponds. This implication of the standard
when not explicitly stated—is that artifacts are objects made intentionally, definition fits well with the burgeoning evidence for sophisticated
in order to accomplish some purpose (Hilpinen 1992; 2011). This cognition among non-human animals in general, and their ability to
definition is rooted ultimately in Aristotle’s distinction between things that manufacture and use tools and other structures in particular (Shumaker,
exist by nature and things that exist by craft (Metaphysics 1033a ff., Walkup, & Beck 2011; Gould & Gould 2007). This is an important area of
Nicomachean Ethics 1140a ff., Physics 192b ff.). Those that exist by research in ethology and comparative psychology. However, for the
nature have their origin in themselves, whereas those that exist by craft purposes of this article we will focus on human artifacts.
have their origin in the craftsperson—specifically, in the form of the thing

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Second, many things we would not ordinarily label as artifacts in English category—and is usually understood to include anything made and/or used
might nevertheless count under this definition. We usually reserve the term by humans (Preston 2013; Kipfer 2007). As the examples above
“artifact” for tangible, durable objects such as an archaeologist might demonstrate, the making need not be intentional and the use need not
unearth. But objects made intentionally for a purpose include many that involve modification of the object used. And if any objects of cultural
are ephemeral or abstract. Candidates include musical performances significance are devoid of purpose or function, that condition of the
(Dipert 1993), belief systems (Hilpinen 1995), actions and languages philosophical definition, too, would fall by the wayside. Consequently, as
(Evnine 2016), software (Irmak 2012), normativity (Frugé 2022), the anthropologist Daniel Miller notes:
establishments such as restaurants (Korman 2020), and artifact types
(Reicher 2022). There is little point in attempting to distinguish systematically
between a natural world and an artefactual one, except when we
Finally, this definition is peculiar to philosophers (Hilpinen 2011; Dipert are concerned with the ways in which terms such as “natural” may
2014). In other disciplines the concern is more to investigate cognition and have particular consequences or entailments, as when a commodity
behavior involving objects quite generally, without carving out a domain in the shops is labelled “natural” simply because a single
of artifacts having special ontological status. Psychologists, for instance, ingredient, such as a chemical dye, has been deleted, or when
are interested in how children develop categorizations of things, including something as apparently natural as radiation is taken to be
artifacts as opposed to non-artifacts. But there is some evidence that antithetical to true “nature”. (Miller 1994, 398)
notions of intention or function enter into this development only at quite a
late stage, and that young children make relevant distinctions more on the From the perspective of other disciplines, then, the philosophical
basis of perceptual features such as shape or movement patterns (Keil, insistence on a strict definition of “artifact” aimed at a bright-line
Greif, & Kerner 2007). Thus the standard philosophical definition of distinction between naturally occurring objects and artifacts may well
“artifact” might well be more of a hindrance than a help in the context of appear parochial.
such investigations. Archaeologists and anthropologists, on the other hand,
This extra-disciplinary observation points us directly to the central
are concerned with the roles objects play in cultural processes quite
problem for the standard philosophical definition of “artifact”. Along all
generally. From this point of view, a discarded flint chip is just as
three definitional dimensions we encounter a continuum of cases (Koslicki
important as the hide scraper from which it was struck, because debitage
2018; Grandy 2007; Sperber 2007). Paths, for example, are often created
analysis—the study of such chips and other production debris—is
unintentionally just in virtue of people repeatedly traveling along the same
invaluable for reconstructing knapping techniques and other aspects of
straight line between points A and B—your kitchen and your vegetable
production processes, including their cognitive underpinnings (Shott 2015;
garden, say. But what is the point of saying that such a path is not an
Schick & Toth 1993). Similarly, a sharp-edged shell used without
artifact, whereas an identical one that was created intentionally by exactly
modification as a hide scraper is just as important as the purpose-made
the same process is? Moreover, what would it take to make the erstwhile
flint scraper for understanding the culture in question. In these disciplines
non-artifactual path into an artifact? Would it be enough to notice and
“artifact” tends to be absorbed into “material culture”—a much broader

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 Artifact Beth Preston

approve it? Or would I have to intentionally maintain it, by sweeping it Sperber concludes that “artifact” as a theoretical term cannot be usefully
clean of leaves, for instance? defined, as any attempt to do so will be frustrated by the continua detailed
above. We may call this the continuum problem. This concern is echoed
Similar difficulties arise with regard to modification, which is clearly a by Kathrin Koslicki (2018), who notes that the common reliance on
matter of degree. If I bring an attractive shell home from a walk on the creators’ intentional activity to distinguish artifacts from naturally
beach and put it to use as a paperweight, does the transport count as occurring objects inevitably leaves us with objects such as unintended by-
modification? If not, would washing the shell before using it be enough? products and naturally occurring objects pressed into service for human
Or polishing it to bring out the color of its markings? A further purposes which do not seem to fall readily into either category. She does
complication is that many uses to which naturally occurring objects are not think that current approaches in metaphysics have the resources to deal
put cause modifications. An unmodified stone used as a hammer soon with such puzzles about artifacts, and concludes that further development
acquires a spherical shape (Schick & Toth 1993, 130 ff.). At what point of these approaches is necessary. For Sperber—whose training is in
did it first count as modified, since even the first strike would break off anthropology—the lesson is that the social sciences simply do not need
some fragments? Or do these use-induced modifications not count for “artifact” as a term of art. But philosophers, and some other social
satisfying the definition at all? If not, why not? The stone is certainly scientists, have reacted to the continuum problem by doubling down on
being used intentionally for a purpose, so the rest of the definition is their classification efforts. Risto Hilpinen (2011), following the
satisfied. anthropologist Wendell Oswalt (1973; 1976), uses the term “naturefact”
for naturally occurring objects used intentionally, but without
Finally, Dan Sperber (2007) argues that even function is continuous
modification, for some purpose. Naturefacts thus lie between naturally
between nature and culture. He begins with the observation that what he
occurring objects and artifacts on the continuum. Hilpinen also suggests
calls biological artifacts—domesticated plants and animals, for the most
that what he calls “residue”—modified but unintended by-products of
part—have both biological and cultural functions. But they carry out their
productive activity, such as sawdust—are a conceptually distinct category
cultural functions in virtue of carrying out their biological functions, and
of objects also lying somewhere between artifacts and naturally occurring
vice versa. Take seedless grapes. Their seedlessness might seem to make
objects. (A terminological note: in archaeology, “naturefact” is more
them purely artifactual, since the reproductive function of the fruit appears
usually used to mean an object that is in fact the result of purely natural
to be lost along with the seeds. But in fact, Sperber argues, the fruit retains
processes, but is difficult to distinguish from an intentionally modified
the biological function of attracting us to eat the fruit and then spread the
object. This is a problem that bedevils paleoarchaeologists studying stone
plant—not by dispersing seeds, as with seeded grapes, but by propagating
tools, in particular (Schnurrenberger & Bryan 1985). Archaeologists also
the grapevines vegetatively. This coincidence of biological and cultural
sometimes distinguish artifacts from ecofacts—organic or inorganic
functions in domesticates shows that far from being the locus of a divide
remains of archaeological significance that have undergone no, or
between nature and culture, the realm of domestication is the locus of their
minimal, modification by humans, such as animal bones, stored grain,
imperceptible merger.
pollen, charcoal, and the like. Naturefacts and residues in Hilpinen’s sense

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are usually included in the ecofact category.) identifiable by science. Khalidi’s account joins a growing list of non-
essentialist accounts of natural kinds, according to which kinds are real,
Randall Dipert (1993) proposes a slightly different, triadic classification. but their reality does not require that they be defined in total isolation from
human beings, their activities, interests, epistemic projects, pragmatic
Instruments—naturally occurring objects that have been intentionally
concerns, and so on (Dupré 1993; Boyd 1999; Reydon 2014; Kendig
used for a purpose, but not modified, such as stones used as hammers.
2016).
Tools—intentionally modified instruments, such as stones shaped and
polished for use as hammers. Understood in this way, classification schemes such as those proposed by
Artifacts—tools intended to be recognized as tools, such as claw Hilpinen and Dipert could, in principle, constitute a perfectly adequate
hammers made from standard materials and with a standardized, response to the continuum problem. It would, of course, be nice to have a
easily recognizable shape. commonly accepted scheme in philosophy—or better yet, a scheme shared
with the other disciplines that study artifacts and material culture. But
This continuum problem for artifacts is really just a version of a well-
even failing that, classification schemes grounded in clear methodological
known problem besetting classification schemes in the natural and social
considerations would be helpful, even if the methodological
sciences. The traditional assumption was that classification is an
considerations varied from scheme to scheme. Unfortunately, it appears
exclusively ontological operation. What we are doing, it is often said, is
that the main consideration driving the schemes proposed so far is merely
carving the world at its joints. On this assumption, a continuum is a
the desire to shore up the traditional ontological distinction between
problem because it suggests that there are no joints to guide our carving
artifacts and naturally occurring objects. This leaves the methodological
efforts. A continuum is thus incompatible with classification schemes
challenge voiced by Sperber and Miller unanswered. What do we need this
understood as grounded solely in objective features of the world, and with
distinction for? Does it help us understand how objects function in human
essentialist understandings of natural kinds. We can, of course, carve the
life and culture, or does it actually hinder this understanding? If the latter,
continuum up any way we like, but this must be understood as in part a
would other distinctions serve us better? The continuum problem does not,
pragmatic operation, not a strictly ontological one reflecting only the fixed
pace Sperber, prove that there are no good methodological considerations
essences of things. This problem has loomed large in discussions of
in favor of maintaining the ontological divide between artifacts and
natural kinds in philosophy of science, as bothersome continua are
naturally occurring objects. But in light of the “epistemological” (Reydon
increasingly identified in both natural and social sciences. Muhammad
2014) or “practice” (Kendig 2016) turn in the recent literature on natural
Khalidi (2013, Chapter 5) details cases in the chemical, biological,
kinds, it does show that we cannot assume that “artifact” itself is a pure,
physiological and social sciences where widely accepted kinds are
natural kind, identifiable on ontological grounds alone. In short, there is no
“fuzzy”, or have graded membership, for instance. In response, he
guarantee that the standard definition of “artifact” with which we started
advocates an account of natural kinds that incorporates the influence of
this section expresses anything like a traditional essence. We are thus left
human interests and epistemic concerns, while still insisting that these
with more questions than answers in the matter of definition.
interests and concerns are constrained by objective features of the world

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2. Metaphysics places (Katayama 1999, 18–19). But it is clear that he doubts that they
really exist in the full sense enjoyed by things that exist by nature.
Discussions of the metaphysics of artifacts have typically arisen only in
broader investigative contexts in which they are not the primary focus of Aristotle’s invidious ontological downgrading of artifacts fed straight into
attention. In particular, the metaphysics of ordinary objects has generated 20th century trends in metaphysics that tended to downgrade ordinary
a significant literature in recent years, and the puzzles about existence objects in general (Thomasson 2009). Even after the baleful anti-
around which it revolves do apply to artifacts, but equally to the vast array metaphysical influence of logical positivism waned, metaphysics took
of other ordinary objects, like stones, stars, trees, jellyfish and deer. itself to be merely working out the details of what the dominant scientific
Similarly, reflection on artifact kinds has been largely overshadowed by theories, particularly in physics and biology, say exists. Since there is no
the vast literature on natural kinds, and discussions of artifact function science of artifacts, let alone of sticks and stones and rivers, such ordinary
exist on the periphery of the much more prominent discussions of objects had to be eliminated from our ontologies. On the radical left fringe
biological function. Finally, questions about the existence of abstract of the eliminativist spectrum is a startling long list of theorists who deny
artifacts have arisen in the context of investigations into the ontology of the existence of ordinary objects tout court, including even living
works of art. We will take up these topics in turn. organisms and persons (for the list, see Korman 2015, 19–23). In the
moderate middle are theorists such as Trenton Merricks (2001), who
2.1 Do Artifacts Exist? denies the existence of artifacts and other inanimate macrophysical
objects, as well as living organisms, with the exception of humans; Peter
Skepticism about the existence of artifacts goes back at least to Aristotle. van Inwagen (1990), who denies the existence of artifacts and other
For him, the primary existents are substances—independent things on inanimate macrophysical objects, but accepts the existence of living
which all other things depend. Individual things, such as horses or houses, organisms, including humans; and Simon Evnine (2016), who denies the
are compounds of matter and form, but it is not entirely clear whether the existence of inanimate natural objects, but accepts the existence of
substance of the thing is the form, the matter, or the compound (Shields artifacts and living organisms.
2022). That said, Aristotle is clearly ambivalent as to whether artifacts
The arguments for these varieties of eliminativism are themselves various,
have what it takes. In the Physics (192b8–39), for instance, he says that
but they revolve around what Daniel Korman (2015, 4–7) calls debunking
some things, such as chipmunks or geraniums, exist by nature and that
arguments. Why do we think that ordinary objects exist? Only because
each such thing is a substance. He follows this up in the Metaphysics
they correspond to our human needs and interests, as embodied in our
(1043b15–25), saying that perhaps only such things as exist by nature are
biology and enshrined in our cultural practices. But there is no good
substances, thus implying that things made by art, such as pots or
reason to think that the objects we pick out in accordance with our needs
pincushions, are not. Exactly why Aristotle thinks artifacts are not
and interests correspond to the objects that actually exist in reality.
substances is not entirely clear—he suggests different reasons in different
Debunking arguments go back to the very beginning of Western
philosophy. Parmenides declared that what truly is—Being, or the One—

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cannot be multiple, changing and transient after the fashion of ordinary A growing chorus of voices has been raised against this ontological
objects. Plato followed up with the doctrine of the eternal and unchanging downgrading of ordinary objects, several of whom have been especially
Forms, which truly exist, and of which ordinary objects are at best concerned to rehabilitate artifacts. Lynne Rudder Baker’s Metaphysics of
ontologically deficient copies. Thus the idea that we have no good reason Everyday Life (2007) foregrounds artifacts as paradigmatic examples of
to think that ordinary objects exist is entrenched in our metaphysical existing ordinary objects. Baker subscribes to a constitution view,
tradition. according to which material things are non-reductively made up of other
material things.
On the other hand, prima facie grounds for rehabilitating ordinary objects
also have ancient roots in atomism, which holds that macrophysical The fundamental idea of constitution is this: when a thing of one
objects are composed of particles which, while multiple, do meet the other primary kind is in certain circumstances, a thing of another
criteria for true being laid down by Parmenides. On the assumption that primary kind—a new thing, with new causal powers—comes to
composition follows regular principles, then, ordinary objects may be said exist. When an octagonal piece of metal is in circumstances of
to exist insofar as they are wholes composed of existing proper parts. This being painted red with white marks of the shape S-T-O-P, and is in
brings us face to face with what Peter van Inwagen (1990, 21 ff.) calls the an environment that has certain conventions and laws, a new thing
Special Composition Question—under what conditions do unified wholes —a traffic sign—comes into existence. (Baker 2007, 32)
arise out of parts? Answering this question has turned out to be far from
simple, and has latterly given rise to mereology, a special area of Importantly, for Baker artifacts are intention-dependent (ID) objects—they
metaphysics devoted to investigating the principles of composition. Most cannot exist in the absence of beings with relevant intentional states. Thus
of the other main arguments against the existence of artifacts and other the cosmic ray striking a sheet of scrap metal in the proverbial swamp and
ordinary objects reflect problems arising in the course of these turning it red with white lettering has not created any artifact at all, let
investigations. For example, there is the material constitution problem. An alone a stop sign. Baker builds the intentional states into the specification
artifact such as a cookie is made out of dough. So everywhere there is a of the required circumstances in terms of a relationship between the
cookie there is a coincident lump of (baked) dough, which shares all of its construction materials and the intentions and knowledge of the
parts with the cookie. But this coincidence violates our intuitions about the constructor. For a stop sign to exist, for example, it must be constructed
identity of ordinary objects. Considerations of this sort have been used by from metal and paint by someone who understands the function of stop
van Inwagen (1990, 124 ff.) and others to argue that there are no artifacts. signs, knows how to construct one, intends to construct one to fulfill this
Cookie makers do not bring anything new into existence; they merely function, and is reasonably successful in executing her intentions (2007,
move pre-existing elementary things around. Thus, while debunking 53–55). This view puts Baker at odds with Aristotle’s view that only
arguments show that we have no good reason to believe ordinary objects things with an internal principle of movement truly exist, as well as with
do exist, mereological problems show that we have good reasons to the common view that ID objects do not truly exist. Both of these views
believe they do not. are aimed at first distinguishing natural from artificial objects and then
downgrading the latter. Baker argues that the distinction itself is suspect,

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both in light of technologies such as genetic engineering and the natural satisfied, and that spoons therefore exist. On the other hand, “devil’s
status of the beings with intentional states who create artifacts (2007, 59– tuning fork” refers to an implement consisting of three cylindrical prongs
66). In short, the whole process of making artifacts is internal to nature on one end and two rectangular prongs on the other, intentionally made by
and cannot be legitimately considered separate from it by those inclined to devils for the purpose of tuning their instruments, one would suppose.
be judgmental in ontological matters. Check the music studios and the concert halls as thoroughly as you like,
you will not find these conditions satisfied. So devil’s tuning forks do not
Simon Evnine (2016) argues for a version of hylomorphism that is very exist. Thomasson’s approach does not privilege artifacts as paradigmatic
similar to the constitution view espoused by Baker. Evnine abandons existents the way Baker’s and Evnine’s accounts do. But she makes the
traditional notions of form and focuses instead on the intertwining of the intention-dependent status of artifacts equally comprehensible, since the
causes that bring a thing into existence and make it the thing it is. Artifacts intentional states of makers figure prominently in the application
thus take pride of place in his metaphysics, because, he claims, they conditions of concepts.
typically have a specifiable origin in the intentions of a maker who
chooses material and works it up in accordance with an envisioned 2.2 Artifact Kinds
function and shape. Evnine’s account of organisms as existents rests on an
analogy between this paradigmatic intentional making and organic If artifacts do not exist, then the kinds into which we classify them—
development. But he does not try to account for non-living natural objects, pillow, book, painting, flowerpot—are not real kinds on a par with natural
whose existence he denies. On the other hand, Evnine deploys his account kinds, such as oak, owl or anole. But questions about the reality and nature
of artifacts in an interesting way to argue that actions are artifacts— of artifact kinds also arise for those who do take artifacts to exist. As we
artifactual events rather than artifactual objects. Higher-level actions such have seen, these theorists resist the objection that the mind-dependence of
as turning on a light are governed by the agent’s intention and constructed artifacts compromises their ontological status. But this objection
ultimately out of the “matter” of basic, bodily actions. resurfaces with regard to artifact kinds. The mind-dependence of artifacts
implies, at a minimum, that an account of artifact kinds will be very
Amie Thomasson (2007a; and for a succinct summary, 2009) takes a
different from an account of natural kinds. This implication is resisted by
different tack, arguing that the existence of artifacts and other ordinary
Crawford Elder (2004; 2007), who seeks to establish the existence of
objects is established by the connection between our terms on the one
artifacts on the basis of a realist account of kinds. On Elder’s view, artifact
hand, and facts about the world on the other. On her view, the meaning of
kinds and many natural kinds are equally copied kinds, and equally mind-
our terms includes a specification of the conditions for their application. If
independent. A copied kind is defined by a set of properties that naturally
we then determine empirically that the application conditions of a term are
cluster together—a distinctive shape or make-up, a proper function
met, the thing to which it refers exists. For example, “spoon” refers to a
established by a mechanism that copies things of that shape on the basis of
utensil intentionally made by humans for the purposes of stirring, serving
successful performance, and a historically proper placement. For example,
and eating food, consisting of a shallow bowl with a long handle. A quick
cats’ whiskers are distinctively shaped organs that are copied from cat to
check of any kitchen will assure you that these conditions are in fact

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cat by a biologically based reproductive mechanism because they help cats Amie Thomasson does not share this fear. In a series of important papers
get around in the dark by performing successfully as touch receptors (2003; 2007b; 2014), she points out that realists about kinds are not, in
strategically located with respect to the cat’s other bodily parts. Similarly, fact, forced to choose between showing that artifact kinds can be
floor lamps are distinctively shaped artifacts that are copied from understood on the mind-independent model of natural kinds, or denying
household to household by a socially based reproductive mechanism that artifact kinds are real. There is a third option—denying that mind-
because they help humans get around in the dark by performing independence is the touchstone of reality. Thomasson then builds human
successfully as light sources strategically located with respect to other intentions and their historical connections into her account of artifact
household furniture. Human intentional states do, of course, figure in the kinds.
copying process for artifacts. However, Elder argues:
Necessarily, for all x and all artifactual kinds K, x is a K only if x is
[C]reation does not begin with the artisan’s intending what he the product of a largely successful intention that (Kx), where one
does. Rather, the essential properties that his product will inherit intends (Kx) only if one has a substantive concept of the nature of
stem from a history of function and of copying that began well Ks that largely matches that of some group of prior makers of Ks
before the artisan undertook his work. This history reaches forward (if there are any) and intends to realize that concept by imposing
through the artisan’s motions—it shapes his shaping. Its existence K-relevant features on the object. (Thomasson 2003, 600)
and its efficacy are independent, largely or even entirely, of the
artisan’s will. (Elder 2004, 142–143) Thus for Thomasson, human intentions and concepts are actually
constitutive of artifact kinds. Thomasson (2014) also objects to the
All copied kinds are thus natural, mind-independent kinds whose clustered common assumption that concepts of artifact kinds revolve exclusively
features we discover rather than invent. around intended function. While it is true that in English we often label
artifact kinds in accordance with function—flashlight, bedspread,
One acknowledged problem with Elder’s account is that many erstwhile pincushion, frying pan, and so on—artifacts actually have an array of
artifact kinds turn out not to be copied kinds. Neckties, for example, do features that figure in their concepts. These include structural or
not qualify because they do not appear to have a proper function (Elder perceptible features, for example, that are also often reflected in our terms
2004, 158–159). But his account does have the virtue of drawing out —armchair, tripod, zebra crossing (definitely not a function designation!),
useful analogies between natural kinds and artifact kinds. A number of fork, and so on. Most importantly for Thomasson, they also include
other accounts also focus on analogies between (at least some) natural normative features concerned with how that kind of artifact is to be treated
kinds and (at least some) artifact kinds (Lowe 2014; Franssen & Kroes or regarded. Although sponges and paper towels can both be used to wipe
2014). The underlying motive for pushing this analogy, clearly, is the fear up spills, it is normal to dispose of the paper towel, but to clean the sponge
that artifact kinds are not real if human intentional states and/or and reuse it.
classificatory practices are constitutive of what kinds there are.

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A distinct approach to artifact kinds is proposed by Thomas Reydon This discussion clearly reflects Reydon’s epistemological turn in that it
(2014). He points out that the nature of natural kinds is currently in play in foregrounds methodological considerations and lets the ontological chips
philosophy of science. Their mind-independence is traditionally predicated fall where they may. We will discuss methodological issues in Section 3.
on their having essences. But essentialism ran into trouble when Darwin
showed that species—up to that point the very paradigm of natural kinds 2.3 Artifact Functions
—are historically fluid and have no clear boundaries. Similar problems
have now been recognized even in the kinds of chemistry and physics Function is a salient feature of artifacts. Clearly there would be no good
(Khalidi 2013). Nevertheless, grouping natural objects into kinds does reason to keep so many of them around unless they did something for us.
license useful inferences and ground successful explanations. This has led Function is also a salient feature of biological traits. Accounts of
to what Reydon calls an “epistemological turn”. biological function, which now comprise a large literature, have inspired
many accounts of artifact function. But unlike organisms, artifacts are
The principal criteria for being a natural kind used to be made to serve human purposes, so human intentional states must be
metaphysical: a kind is a natural kind if and only if it really exists considered. Accounts of artifact function can be usefully categorized in
in the world…independently of human consciousness, human terms of the role they give to intentions in the establishment of functions
interests, and human practices, and is associated with a particular (Preston 2009; Houkes & Vermaas 2010). At one end of the spectrum are
kind essence…. On the alternative approach the principal criteria accounts that revolve around human intentions, while at the other end are
for being a natural kind no longer are metaphysical but accounts that focus on non-intentional factors; in between are a variety of
epistemological: what counts is being useful in human epistemic accounts that mix intentional and non-intentional factors in various
practices, such as inference and explanation, by corresponding in proportions.
some way (which is still to be explicated) to the state of affairs in
nature. (Reydon 2014, 132) Karen Neander (1991) distinguishes artifact function sharply from
biological function. Natural selection acting over the long course of
Rather than assimilating artifact kinds to natural kinds by showing that evolutionary history establishes specific effects of biological traits as their
artifacts are actually mind-independent in some way, as Elder and others functions, in virtue of the reproduction of those traits for those effects. For
have tried to do, the epistemological turn suggests that since natural kinds example, the wings of birds are the result of eons of selection for their
were never mind-independent to begin with, there is in principle no barrier effect as airfoils. In contrast, intentional human selection, acting with
to a unified account of artifact and natural kinds. knowledge and foresight, establishes specific effects of artifacts as their
functions immediately, without any reference to a history of reproduction
Finally, we should note that questions have been raised about the
for those effects.
legitimacy of the kind—or perhaps more precisely, the category
—“artifact” itself. We have already touched on this in Section 1 above, in It is enough, in the case of intentional selection, if the designer
the context of the definitional issues raised by the continuum problem. believes or hopes that the artifact will have the desired effect and

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selects it for that purpose. (Neander 1991, 462) were reproduced for that effect. This is what the artifact is supposed to do,
even if it is not able to do it because of damage or an unfavorable
For example, an individual who designs a hammer, or who uses the heel of environment. Thus far Millikan’s account is non-intentional, for the role of
her shoe to pound in a nail, believing these items to have the capacity to human intentional states is merely one factor in the implementation of the
deliver a hard blow and intending to use that effect for her purposes, reproduction process. However, the other half of Millikan’s account
endows them with the relevant function forthwith. John Searle (1995) calls concerns what she calls derived proper functions. These are functions that
such artifact functions “agentive” functions to distinguish them from the are established by something that has the direct proper function of
“non-agentive” functions of biological traits. Searle also distinguishes a producing something else to accomplish a purpose. Millikan’s favored
special sub-category of agentive functions which he terms “status” example of biological derived proper function is a novel shade of brown
functions. These are related in a relatively arbitrary way to the physical sported by a chameleon. It has no history of selection and reproduction for
structure of the artifact. Money, for example, runs the gamut from gold the effect of camouflaging the chameleon, and yet we want to say that that
ingots to bitcoin. Its functions—medium of exchange, measure of value, is its proper function. And we can say so, according to Millikan, because
and so on—are imposed on these physical bearers by our collective the color-alteration mechanism possessed by chameleons has the direct
acceptance of them as money. According to Searle, the intentional states proper function of changing chameleons’ skin color to camouflage them
constituting this collective acceptance create an “institutional fact” that by matching their surroundings. Thus this novel shade of brown does have
would not exist without collective human agency. Status functions thus the derived proper function of camouflaging the chameleon. Derived
illustrate not only the creative capacity of human intentionality already proper functions in the realm of artifacts bring intention back to the fore.
foregrounded in Neander’s account, but also its typically collective nature On Millikan’s view, intentional states have evolutionarily established
in the case of artifact function. Searle supplies an account of collective direct proper functions. The direct proper function of intentions is to
intentionality to underwrite this feature. Other authors who subscribe to produce something else to accomplish whatever purpose the intention
intentionalist theories of artifact function include Randall Dipert (1993), incorporates. Thus, if you intend to produce a can opener, the execution of
Peter McLaughlin (2001), Lynne Rudder Baker (2007), and Simon Evnine your intention brings into existence a device having the derived proper
(2016). function of opening cans. Even if this device works in a completely novel
way, and even if it is not capable of performing as envisioned, opening
Ruth Millikan (1984) offers a general theory of function that, in the case
cans is still what it is supposed to do. Usually, the direct and derived
of artifacts, mixes intentional and non-intentional elements. Her main
proper functions of artifacts coincide—in the case of a standard can
interest is in proper functions—what a biological trait or artifact is
opener, for instance, we have both a history of selection and reproduction
supposed to do, and is malfunctioning if it cannot do. On Millikan’s view,
and a current intention to reproduce yet another can opener. But in the case
what she calls direct proper functions, whether biological or artifactual,
of novel prototypes, especially, it is intention alone that establishes the
are established by a history of selection and reproduction for the effect
(derived) proper function.
constituting the function. So what is essential for the establishment of an
artifact’s function is whether or not its ancestors—artifacts of that kind—

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Wybo Houkes and Pieter Vermaas (Houkes & Vermaas 2004; 2010; At the lonelier, non-intentionalist end of the spectrum is Beth Preston’s
Vermaas & Houkes 2003) also have a mixed theory, although (1998; 2013) account. Her initial concern is to advance a pluralist theory
intentionalist factors predominate, in contrast to Millikan’s focus on non- of artifact function according to which artifacts have both proper functions
intentionalist history of reproduction. Their approach is to derive a theory and what Preston calls system functions. For example, the proper function
of artifact function from a theory of artifact use and design. of plates is to hold food for serving or eating. But they function equally
well as saucers for potted plants, or in a stack to weight down tofu or
On our theory, an artifact function is a capacity, supposed or actual, eggplant slices to extract the moisture. For proper function, Preston relies
which has a preferential status in the context of certain actions and on Millikan’s account of direct proper function, but without the added
beliefs. It is therefore a highly relational property, which element of derived proper function that brings intention back in. For
supervenes on both the actual physical makeup of an artifact and system function, she relies on Robert Cummins’ (1975) theory of
on the beliefs and actions of human agents, designers as well as biological function, according to which function is established by the
users. (Houkes & Vermaas 2004, 67) causal role a component plays in a system. Neither Millikan’s nor
Cummins’ account is intrinsically intentionalist, since they are designed to
Houkes and Vermaas focus on the use plan formulated by designers as
fit both the biological and the artifactual cases. Preston resists
establishing the function of the artifact in the first instance. This is the
reformulating them in intentionalist terms, while acknowledging that in
predominant intentionalist element in their account. But on their view, this
the artifact case human intentions and other intentional states do play a
use plan must be supported by a justification that the plan will realize the
role in implementing the history of selective reproduction and the system
function, and this requires knowledge of the causal roles of the
context, respectively. In support of this resolutely non-intentionalist
physicochemical capacities of the artifact. Through this required
stance, Preston argues that human intentions do not arise in a vacuum, but
justification the actual physical structure of the artifact constrains the
are reproduced in and through the process by which material culture, with
intentions articulated in the use plan. This is a non-intentionalist element.
its myriad of functional artifacts, is reproduced. Intentions to make plates
In addition, they require a historical element in the form of the
are reproduced in plate cultures as surely as the plates themselves; and
communication of the use plan from designer to user and subsequently
only in cultures with both potted plants and plates can intentions to use
from user to user. They refer to this element as “evolutionary”, in an
plates as pot saucers form.
apparent reference to cultural evolution, but clearly this element, too, is
primarily intentional since the evolution is carried out in a series of The only viable view is one that sees human purposes and the
intentional communications. Houkes and Vermaas refer to their theory as proper functions of items of material culture indissolubly linked in
the ICE (Intention, Causal role, Evolution) theory of artifact function. patterns of use and reproduction. Thus, it no longer seems
Other mixed theories include those of Paul Griffiths (1993) and Philip reasonable to ask which came first, the purpose or the proper
Kitcher (1993). function. Both are produced and reproduced through the self-same
social process. (Preston 2013, 206)

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Preston is joined here by Crawford Elder (2004), whose account of copied include Neander (1995), Baker (2007), Franssen (2006; 2009), Houkes
kinds, as we noted above, similarly characterizes human intentions as and Vermaas (2010) and Kroes (2012).
themselves dependent on the copying process rather than initiating and
controlling it. A third problem is how to account for the functions—if any—of novel
prototypes. Non-intentional accounts have more difficulty in this case, for
The theories discussed in this section encounter a number of important a truly novel prototype has no history of selection and reproduction; and if
problems in accounting for function phenomena in the artifact realm. One it does not work, as many prototypes in fact do not, then function
such problematic phenomenon is the distinction between proper and non- established in terms of systemic causal role or physicochemical capacities
proper functions. This does occur in the biological realm—pigeon beaks is not possible either. This problem is one of the main motivations for
did not evolve to peck buttons for a food reward, for example—but it is Millikan’s (1984) introduction of derived proper function, since designer
relatively rare. In material culture, it is ubiquitous. Humans are just very intention seems to be the only way unsuccessful novel prototypes could
good at adopting whatever artifact will accomplish their purposes, acquire any kind of function at all. The non-intentionalist then is caught
regardless of its proper function. Stop a random person in the street and between biting the bullet—unsuccessful novel prototypes just do not have
ask—she will have a story. Intentionalist approaches have more difficulty functions—or introducing an ad hoc intentionalist element. This issue has
making this distinction, because for these views human intentions are the been canvassed by Preston (1998; 2003; 2013), Millikan (1999), Vermaas
only mechanism for establishing functions, and this elides the distinction and Houkes (2003) and Kroes (2012). A related problem is how to account
unless some difference can be discerned in the intentions themselves. for so-called phantom functions (Preston 2013)—the functions of artifacts
Authors who have discussed this issue recently include Wybo Houkes and that are constitutionally incapable of ever fulfilling them. Talismans to
Pieter Vermaas (2010), Beth Preston (2013) and Simon Evnine (2016). ensure fertility, for example, are now widely believed in Western culture to
Another problem is accounting for malfunction. Just as any theory of have no efficacy, but it is difficult to escape the intuition that ensuring
representation must account for misrepresentation, any theory of function fertility is nevertheless their proper function. Here again, it is the non-
must say something about cases of failure to perform, and whether or not intentionalist who is caught flatfooted. Although artifacts like fertility
that failure is a malfunction or something else. Addressing this issue talismans are indeed reproduced for a purpose, the standard requirement
depends to some extent on the distinction between proper and non-proper for establishing proper function is that the artifact be selected for
functions, because malfunction only seems an appropriate designation in reproduction on the basis of successful performance. Similarly, function
the case of failure to perform a proper function—failure to do what the established by systemic causal role requires that the artifact actually
artifact is supposed to do, in other words. This issue is especially perform the relevant causal role. Worse yet, the option of just biting the
important for the philosophy of technology and engineering side of the bullet and agreeing that such artifacts have no functions is nowhere near as
artifact debates, where understanding the epistemology of problem solving plausible as in the case of unsuccessful novel prototypes because of the
and innovation depends in part on understanding failure to function and prevalence of talismans, amulets, religious artifacts, inefficacious
how to learn from and deal with it. Authors who have covered this issue medicines and supplements, and the like. Authors who have addressed this

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issue include Griffiths (1993), Preston (1998; 2013), Thomasson (2009), literary works those characters inhabit, repeatable works of art in general,
Parsons (2016) and Holm (2017). and perhaps other social objects as well. (For application to repeatable
works of art, see the essays in Art and Abstract Objects (Mag Uidhir
2.4 Abstract Artifacts 2012). Applications to other social objects include software (Irmak 2012),
establishments (Korman 2020), and normativity (Frugé 2022).)
Many works of art are typical artifacts, ontologically no more or less
mysterious than hats or hacksaws. Vermeer’s Girl with a Pearl Earring However, further difficulties beset the positing of abstract artifacts. It is
has extraordinary aesthetic qualities, but otherwise it is just a concrete, commonly thought that abstract objects are not just non-spatiotemporal,
spatiotemporal object, created by someone and straightforwardly subject but non-causal. Our causal commerce is with their instances, not with the
to change and destruction. Not so with Amy Beach’s Gaelic Symphony, abstract objects themselves. But this makes it hard to understand how
which we hesitate to identify with its performances, singly or collectively, abstract objects could possibly be created. Erik Satie could certainly create
and which therefore does not appear to be located in time and space. an instance of his Gymnopédies by playing it on his piano, but it is unclear
However, it does purport to have a creator, and may perhaps be destroyed in what sense he could be the author of this musical work as an abstract
if all traces of its performances and scores are wiped away. A symphony is object separate from its instances. According to Jerrold Levinson (1980),
a so-called repeatable work of art, that is, a work with multiple instances. the last decades of the 20th century saw a near consensus that musical
Performance arts of all kinds fall into this category, but so do cast works are abstract objects of a more familiar sort—structural types that
sculptures, limited edition prints, art photographs, films, and the like. So exist eternally and without change, independent of their instances in the
understanding the ontology of repeatable works is a central task for causally governed, spatiotemporal realm. A leading objection to this
philosophy of art. consensus is that composers cannot then bring their works into existence,
contrary to common sense. So the music ontologist faces a dilemma—give
The initial difficulty is that such works do not fit neatly into the standard up on the idea that musical works are abstract structural types, or explain
ontological bifurcation between concrete, spatiotemporal objects such as how the composer can reasonably be said to create musical works even
hats and hacksaws and abstract, eternal objects such as numbers and sets. though the abstract structural types that comprise them are already in
Like concrete objects, but unlike abstract objects, repeatable works of art existence. This difficulty generalizes to other repeatable types of artworks
appear to be created and may change or be destroyed. Unlike concrete that are held to be abstract objects. But most importantly, characterizing
objects, but like abstract objects, they do not appear to be located in space repeatable artworks as abstract artifacts does not allow the ontologist to
and time. Amie Thomasson (1999; 2004; 2006) sought to resolve this escape this difficulty. Abstract artifacts do not belong to the causal realm
difficulty by proposing an intermediate ontological category of abstract of space and time any more than their eternal and changeless cousins do.
artifacts—abstract in that they are not located in space and time; So simply saying that they are artifacts, and therefore created and
artifactual in that they are intentionally created and can be destroyed. destroyed like all other artifacts, does not by itself explain how this
Thomasson originally proposed this new category as part of her theory of creation and destruction is possible.
fictional characters, but she noted its usefulness to the analysis of the

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Responses run the gamut. Julian Dodd (2000) bites the bullet and argues discovery, nor indication of abstract structures, nor existential dependence
that musical works are discovered, not created. Levinson (1980) famously satisfies the requirements for authorship. He concludes that repeatable
proposes that composers create musical works by selecting among and works of art cannot be abstract objects of any kind, but must rather be
indicating pre-existing abstract sound structures and preferred ordinary concrete objects. Their apparent repeatability does not mean that
performance means. In western classical music, for example, these they are instances of an abstract work, but only that they bear relevant
indications are embodied in the written score for the work, which guides similarity to one another. In a related vein, Allan Hazlett (2012) claims
the production of instances. However, abstract artifacts, by hypothesis, do that there are no repeatable artworks. If there were, he says, they would
not pre-exist the creative acts of authors, so they cannot be created by have to be abstract objects. But abstract objects have all their intrinsic
Levinson’s selection-and-indication process. A popular alternative properties essentially, whereas artworks typically do not. For example,
involves the metaphysical relationship of existential dependence. On this Alvin Ailey’s major work, Revelations, premiered as a 10 section work
view, repeatable works of art have a dependence base, typically consisting lasting an hour, but evolved into a half hour long piece in three sections.
of an author’s mental and physical acts which bring an initial instance of So, clearly, many of its original properties were not essential to it. Hazlett
the work into existence, subsequent copies of that instance that sustain the concludes that apparent repetitions are not instances of an abstract object.
work, and an audience capable of appreciating and interpreting those They are either separate, similar artworks, or copies of an original.
instances. The work itself is an abstract artifact, dependent on, but existing
separately from, these acts and instances. It begins when they begin and The discussion of abstract artifacts has been largely confined to the
ends when they all cease or are destroyed. Nurbay Irmak (2021) argues ontology of art. But as some of the participants have noted (e.g., Levinson
that existential dependence allows for a non-causal type of creation. The 1980, 21–22), repeatable works are not confined to works of art. This is
artist engages in causal relations with concrete objects and by so doing particularly clear for named artifacts such as Chanel No. 5, the Ford F-
non-causally creates the dependent abstract artifact. Lee Walters (2013), 150, Campbell’s tomato soup, Earl Grey tea, the Hepplewhite chair, or the
on the other hand, argues that some abstract objects can enter into causal Washington quarter. It is possible to see each bottle of Chanel No. 5 or
relationships, so the process of creating an existentially dependent abstract each quarter not as a distinctive artifact in its own right, but as an instance
artifact might conceivably qualify as ordinary causal creation. of an abstract artifact—Chanel No. 5 tout court, or the Washington
quarter. Apart from marketing and branding concerns, what does the
These difficulties have prompted some philosophers to avoid the moves naming of such ordinary artifacts accomplish? It highlights their
that generate them. An early such attempt is Guy Rohrbaugh’s (2003) standardization, and often designates the entity responsible for
view that works of art are not abstract objects at all, but rather historical maintaining it—Ford, in the case of the F-150, for instance. But
individuals—non-physical entities ontologically dependent on a physical standardization is a virtually universal feature of human artifacts, from the
series of historically and causally linked physical objects. For example, a Acheulean handaxe to the Apple MacBook Air. There are vanishingly few
photograph is a non-physical entity dependent on its “embodiments” in a artifacts that are unique in the way non-repeatable artworks like paintings
negative and subsequent prints. In a more recent proposal, Christy Mag are supposed to be. Failed prototypes that were never reproduced might be
Uidhir (2013) argues that works of art must have authors, but that neither an example. This means that we are potentially swimming in abstract

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artifacts, with all the philosophical difficulties that would entail. This, in 3.1 Methodology
turn, highlights views opposed to the positing of abstract artifacts, which
are more plausible in the case of everyday artifacts. We resist thinking of Reydon’s identification of an epistemological turn in our understanding of
performances of Beach’s Gaelic Symphony as separate, relevantly similar kinds and categories leads to a new question about the category “artifact”.
artifacts because we are used to thinking of symphonies as unique, Rather than only asking whether it carves the world at a joint, we can also
individual works. But the Washington quarter does not seem like a work in ask: Is it serving our epistemic purposes well? A number of authors have
the same sense, and there is thus less reason to resist the idea that argued that “artifact” is methodologically counterproductive. Dan Sperber
individual quarters are just relevantly similar artifacts produced by a (2007, 136–137) claims that it is not a useful category for the purposes of
copying process managed by the United States Mint. In this regard, we a naturalistic social science.
might consider that the notion of the work, functioning as a regulatory
concept for the arts, is arguably neither universal nor of ancient lineage, I have tried to cast doubt on the idea that a theoretically useful
even in the western tradition (Goehr 1993). In short, the time may be ripe notion of artifact can be built around its usual prototypes:
for the discussion of abstract artifacts to be expanded to cover artifacts in bracelets, jars, hammers, and other inert objects, or that it can be
general, perhaps with different outcomes than in its native context. defined in a more systematic way…. There is no good reason why
a naturalistic social science should treat separately, or even give
3. Epistemology pride of place to, cultural productions that are both more clearly
intended for a purpose and more thoroughly designed by humans,
The metaphysics of artifacts is a fairly well delineated set of discussions, that is, to prototypical artifacts. (Sperber 2007, 137)
carried out by a fairly cohesive group of philosophers. In contrast, the
Sperber’s main argument for this conclusion, as we noted in Section 1, is
epistemology of artifacts is more interdisciplinary in nature, ranging over
based on the continuum problem. But Sperber also suggests that in
anthropology, archaeology, cognitive science, and psychology, in addition
focusing on paradigmatic artifacts as the basis for our categorization, we
to philosophy. Within philosophy it runs the gamut from environmental
are allowing ourselves to be epistemologically disadvantaged by “a doubly
philosophy to philosophy of mind. Section 3.1 returns in more detail to the
obsolete industrial-age revival of a Paleolithic categorization” (2007, 136).
methodological considerations already broached in Section 2.2. Section
In the Paleolithic, before there were any domesticates other than dogs, the
3.2 takes up issues concerning artifacts as objects of knowledge. Finally,
(few) technologies people used in their daily lives were paradigmatic
Section 3.3 covers issues arising in studies of cognition in which artifacts
artifacts—stone tools, baskets, beads, and so on. So, Sperber speculates,
are presented as playing significant and sometimes controversial roles in
we evolved a psychological disposition to classify things in accordance
cognitive processes themselves.
with the predominance of such artifacts. We then retained this disposition
right through the Neolithic transition to agriculture 12,000 years ago,
which made biological artifacts (as Sperber calls domesticates)
proportionally the most common type of artifact in human experience until

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the Industrial transition of only a couple of centuries ago. This is the first Steven Vogel (2003; 2015) argues that no good sense can be made of the
sense in which our “artifact” category is obsolete. Second, Sperber argues, artifact-nature distinction, making it unfit for the purposes of
information technology has increasingly contributed to our environment environmental philosophy. His argument unrolls against the backdrop of a
artifacts that would have astonished Aristotle with their ability to act on longstanding controversy in environmental philosophy about the value of
their own, beyond any intention their creators may have. Simultaneously, ecological restoration—the practice of restoring areas damaged by mining,
biotechnology has made impressing our intentions on our biological industrial waste and the like to something as close as possible to the
artifacts increasingly effective. These countervailing trends further reduce condition they were in before the damage was done. The ontological status
the dominance of erstwhile paradigmatic artifacts in our lives. This is the of such sites has been challenged on the grounds that such restoration does
second sense in which our “artifact” category is obsolete. In short, Sperber not actually restore nature but rather creates an artifact (Katz 1997). Worse
seems to suggest, if we cannot shake the Paleolithic urge to center the yet, this artifact is passed off as nature, so it is a fake (Elliot 1997). This
“artifact” category on the paradigmatic bracelets and jars, we should casts doubt on the ethical and political value of ecological restoration as an
jettison the category altogether, for the sake of an epistemologically environmental practice. Vogel responds by questioning the unspoken
adequate social science. assumption that environmental philosophy is about nature, and
environmental activism about protecting nature from human activity. He
Beth Preston (2013, 4–7) declines to use the term “artifact”, opting instead argues that nature conceived as pristine and independent in this way does
for the more open-ended “material culture”. The initial problem she not exist—certainly not now that human activity is global in its effects, as
identifies is that phenomena of interest from the point of view of human Bill McKibben (1989) noted long ago, but in principle, since humans, like
interaction with the environment do not divide naturally into interactions all other living things, change their environment simply by living in it. On
with artifacts and interactions with other sorts of things. We noted an Vogel’s view, environmental philosophy is about just that—the
example of this in Section 1—intentionally made paths, which do qualify environment, both built and not-so-built, and what we should do to ensure
as artifacts, are used in the same way as unintentionally made paths. It that it is the environment we want and need, not only for ourselves but for
thus seems methodologically wrongheaded to rule the unintentionally other beings as well.
made path out of consideration on a definitional technicality. Similarly,
residues such as sawdust, whey, or fingerprints often enter into human The important point for our purposes, though, is that Vogel’s post-nature
practices in important ways, but a focus on artifacts as traditionally environmental philosophy rests on a full-throated rejection of the nature-
defined may leave these phenomena out of account as well. Preston also artifact categorization. He begins with the claim that our concepts of
argues that it is precisely the central concepts in a field of investigation nature—already multiple, and not always carefully distinguished—are
that should be left open-ended, on pain of epistemic distortion of the riddled with antinomy-generating ambiguities. The epistemological
results. For example, defining “mind” very strictly might have ruled the backwash leaves us mired in nostalgia, unable to see and address
extended mind debate out in advance. environmental problems as they actually exist. In particular, we are unable
to see that ecological restoration does not produce artifacts by the
traditional definition, since restored areas are designed precisely to escape

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our designs and outrun our intentions. They are thus “wild” in a perfectly Putnam that the “baptismal” account is correct for natural kinds, because
straightforward sense. Furthermore, Vogel argues, all human productions, they have hidden natures to which we are not necessarily privy. Thus if we
including artifacts, are wild in this sense. Rather than focusing on are to refer to natural objects reliably at all, it cannot be by way of definite
unintentional creations, as Preston and Sperber tend to do, Vogel description. But artifacts, Schwartz says, have publicly accessible natures
emphasizes the ways in which artifacts outrun all our creative intentions. based on form and function, so reference to them is grounded in
description rather than a baptismal event. Amie Thomasson (2003; 2007b)
Building an artifact requires black boxes all the way down: to carves out a nuanced position based on her view that the intentions and
design and build anything requires presupposing a whole set of concepts of human makers are constitutive of artifact kinds (Section 2.2
processes that one does not design, and whose operation beyond above). If so, then some makers are in an epistemically privileged position
one’s understanding and intention is necessary for building to take with regard to given artifacts, and so do refer to them in virtue of having a
place. There is a gap, in the construction of every artifact, between substantive concept of what being an artifact of that kind involves.
the intention with which the builder acts and the consequences of Thomasson acknowledges that most speakers are not in this epistemically
her acts, a gap that is ineliminable and indeed constitutive of what privileged position. Users are not, and even many who qualify as makers
it is to construct something, and in this gap resides something like in the causal sense—workers on a production line, for instance—may not
what I earlier called wildness. (Vogel 2015, 113) be. So Thomasson’s view, unlike Schwartz’s, is not a return to a purely
descriptive theory of reference for artifact terms, but rather a hybrid
Thus the traditional definition of “artifact”—something intentionally made
theory. Hilary Kornblith (2007) argues against Thomasson that she has
for a purpose—while true as far as it goes, merely skates over the surface,
still not demonstrated any essential connection between makers’
leaving us at an epistemological disadvantage with regard to the full range
substantive concepts of artifacts and reference. On the one hand, in cases
and depth of the phenomena.
where a type of artifact is no longer used for the purpose the maker
intended, the users’ concept would seem decisive. On the other hand,
3.2 Knowing Artifacts
having the concept is arguably the result of familiarity with the artifact
Vogel’s position on environmental ethics resonates in an interesting way rather than any special semantic capacity enjoyed by makers. Similarly,
with a much earlier dispute about reference—specifically, about whether Kornblith (1980) argues against Schwartz that the function of artifacts is
our capacity to refer to different kinds of artifacts is grounded in a definite not necessarily accessible—a problem faced frequently by archaeologists,
description of what being a member of that kind requires, or rather in a for instance—and thus that even in cases of objects where the form and
historical connection to a “baptismal” event in which someone slapped a function are familiar, it is not this familiarity that grounds the ability to
label on something and declared that label henceforth applicable to things refer. The baptismal account of reference therefore must apply to both
of that sort. Hilary Putnam (1975) famously favors the baptismal account artifacts and natural objects, just as Putnam said. Such semantic parity
for both natural kinds and artifact kinds. Steven Schwartz (1978) between artifacts and natural objects, which rejects any privilege for
challenges Putnam’s account in the case of artifacts. He agrees with makers’ intentions, echoes Vogel’s view that artifacts and natural objects

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are equally “wild”, because artifacts outrun their makers’ intentions in artifact kinds.) Barbara Malt and Eric Johnson (1998) criticize Bloom for
practice, just as surely as natural objects outrun human intentions in failing to make clear either why we would need to resort to creator’s
principle. intention to categorize artifacts, or exactly how we might assess that
intention. More recently, Malt and Steven Sloman (2007a; 2007b) have
Much of the epistemology of artifacts is, in the first instance, the province argued that the kind of essentialist approach represented by Bloom’s
of cognitive psychology, not philosophy. Artifact kinds, for instance, can theory is misguided, and have proposed an alternative, pragmatic
be approached from the side of psychology rather than metaphysics, approach. In a series of experiments, they show that artifact categorization
yielding theories about the psychological mechanisms by means of which is sensitive to communicative goals in specific situations. Creators’
we group artifacts together, apart from any question of whether these intentions are important with regard to some goals and situations;
groupings represent reality (Malt & Sloman 2007a). In an influential unimportant with regard to others. If this approach is on the right track,
article, Paul Bloom (1996) argues that we cannot categorize artifacts based artifact kinds are not psychologically stable or clearly demarcated
on form, use, or function. Form and use are both too variable to be groupings. Moreover, this raises the possibility that “categorization” itself
reliable. Beanbag chairs do not look much like other chairs, and even if is not a psychological natural kind. It may be that this label is used for
every flatiron in existence were currently being used as a doorstop, we what is actually a heterogeneous collection of processes.
would not want to categorize them as doorstops. Experiments show that
even intended function is neither necessary nor sufficient for Developmental issues with regard to our concepts of “artifact” and specific
categorization (Malt & Johnson 1992). Vary the form of something kinds of artifacts also loom large in cognitive psychology. As philosophers
sufficiently, and people will decline to categorize it as a chair even if it is might anticipate, the underlying general issue is between empiricist and
made to be sat on. On the other hand, present them with something that nativist approaches to concept acquisition. But the now vast experimental
looks like a chair but is made to be a plant stand, and they will still literature on child development means that theories in this area are both
categorize it as a chair. In response, Bloom proposes an intentional- numerous and highly sophisticated. An empiricist-oriented theory that
historical theory, according to which categorization of artifacts depends on stands out is Jean Mandler’s (2004; 2007) comprehensive perceptual
our being able to infer that an artifact was successfully made with the meaning analysis view, according to which children construct abstract
intention that it belong to a particular category. Form and use are good image schemas on the basis of their perceptual experience, especially their
grounds for such inferences, and this explains our intuition that these experience of motion. Since artifacts and animals move in
factors have something to do with how we categorize artifacts. So if characteristically different ways, the first level of differentiation these
something looks like a chair and we regularly observe people sitting on it, image schemas provide is vague, global concepts of these two types of
we reasonably infer it was made with the intention that it be a chair, and objects. Mandler holds that there is no good reason to think these concepts
we categorize it accordingly. (Bloom’s view is clearly ancestral to Amie are innate, nor is there any good reason to think that the perceptual
Thomasson’s account of artifact kinds (Section 2.2), but he is concerned meaning analysis mechanisms that produce them are domain specific. All
only to explain how we group artifacts, and does not claim, as Thomasson that is innate, on her view, is a domain-general mechanism that enables the
does, that makers’ intentions and concepts are ontologically constitutive of child to analyze her perceptual input. Mandler’s work also indicates that

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artifacts may be first differentiated into indoor and outdoor, and only then and memory aids from individual grocery lists to monuments enshrining
into more specific kinds such as furniture and kitchen utensils, on the one cultural memory are ubiquitous. But in recent years a loosely
hand, and vehicles and buildings, on the other. The nativist alternative to interconnected collection of approaches has characterized artifacts as
Mandler’s theory is best represented by Susan Carey’s equally much more intimately involved in these processes than mere use might
comprehensive “core cognition” theory. Carey (2009, 194–196) has a suggest. Rather than trying to sort out the complex family resemblances
characteristically nativist critique of Mandler. On the face of it, Mandler’s among embodied, enactive, situated, distributed and extended approaches
image schemas represent features of motion and the paths motions to cognition (Sutton 2006; Wilson & Clark 2009), we can more profitably
describe through space. However, Carey argues, there is no explanation of focus on some representative studies of the way artifacts contribute to
how the child gets from these representations to a representation of cognition in this family of views.
agency, for example. No matter how distinctive the motions of animals,
they do not by themselves yield concepts of intention, attention, or goal- In a seminal paper, Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) propose the
directedness. On Carey’s view, these concepts must be innate in the form radical thesis that the mind extends beyond the brain and the body, right
of “core knowledge” (Spelke 2000), or “core cognition”, as Carey prefers out into the environment. In their now famous illustration, two characters,
to call it in her more recent work. Core cognition is characterized by Inga and Otto, hear about an interesting exhibition at the Museum of
innate, domain-specific mechanisms for the analysis of perceptual input, Modern Art. Inga is neurotypical. She recalls the address of the museum
designed by natural selection to construct domain-specific representations and travels there. Otto, on the other hand, has Alzheimer’s disease.
of the world, such as intention in the agent domain, or causality in the Because he forgets things so easily, he maintains a notebook with the
object domain. Both of these domains of core cognition are essential for addresses of places he is wont to visit. He looks up the address of the
the development of artifact concepts, because on Carey’s view (Kelemen museum and travels there. The moral of this illustration is the so-called
& Carey 2007) we conceptualize artifacts as objects that have been Parity Principle.
intentionally designed to carry out a specific function. The developmental
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a
issue, then, boils down to the question of whether we can construct artifact
process which, were it done in the head, we would have no
concepts with only a single, domain-general mechanism for analyzing
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that
perceptual input, or whether we need at least two domain-specific
part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.
mechanisms with quite different output.
(Clark & Chalmers 1998, 8)

3.3 Thinking and Acting With Artifacts This claim is intended as a thesis in the metaphysics of mind, but it
functions equally well as a thesis about the epistemic status of artifacts. In
Artifacts are not only objects of knowledge; they are also involved in Otto’s case—and it is clear Clark and Chalmers intend it not as an
cognition itself. No one disputes that humans use artifacts in their exceptional case, but as a particularly striking instance of a commonplace
cognitive practices—we do our sums on paper or with electronic devices; one—the notebook is cognitive in its own right. It is an essential element

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of a widely individuated cognitive process, not a cognitively neutral tool counter before starting to pack the bags. This simplifies the cognitive task
used by an encapsulated cognizer. Critics of the extended mind thesis have of spotting the large heavy items you need for the bottom of the bag, or the
been, if not legion, extremely persistent (Menary 2010). But they have medium sized boxed items you need to fill in spaces half way up.
focused mostly on the disconcerting metaphysical implications, rather than Similarly, someone preparing to bake a cake will often array all the
on the equally significant implications about cognition. John Sutton (2010) ingredients on the kitchen counter first, thus minimizing the possibility
anticipates the metaphysical tendentiousness of the Parity Principle giving that any will be left out in the heat of the moment. The general point,
way to the important work of understanding the complementarity of inner emphasized across the board by proponents of situated cognition, is that
and outer processes in cognition which is highlighted by the extended artifacts and other environmental structures “scaffold” cognition, changing
mind thesis. Individuating cognitive processes widely, so that the unit of the nature of cognitive tasks in important ways that typically make them
investigation is not the mind/brain but cognitive systems comprising more tractable (Lave 1988; Donald 1991; Clark 1997; Kirsh 2009;
tightly coupled artifacts, people, built environments and natural Michaelian & Sutton 2013).
environments, is a viable project in its own right, and one that was
underway in many quarters before the extended mind thesis was proposed. Cognition is intimately bound up with action on any construal, but the
situated cognition framework makes it even more difficult to tease them
The locus classicus is Edwin Hutchins’ Cognition in the Wild (1995). apart. On a more traditional view, the emphasis is on how cognition shapes
Hutchins preserves the traditional understanding of cognition as action. But on the situated cognition family of views, the emphasis is on
computation—that is, the manipulation of representations. But he argues how bodily activity antecedently shapes cognition, and indeed the mind in
that this computation takes place not in individual heads, but distributed general (Gallagher 2005). Since human action typically involves the
across systems of individuals, artifacts, and other environmental making and manipulation of artifacts, they, too, contribute to this mind-
structures. Hutchins works out his theory of distributed cognition in the shaping process (Malafouris 2013). But artifacts shape action and patterns
context of a magisterial study of navigation aboard a US Navy ship. He of behavior in the first instance. Some writers have focused on this action-
shows that the representations and transformations thereof required for shaping aspect of artifacts rather than on the cognition-shaping aspect. The
navigation are propagated across a complex system of charts, logs, locus classicus in this case is Michel Foucault’s (1975 [1977]) Discipline
instruments and cooperating humans, no one of whom is either directing and Punish. On Foucault’s view, human action is substantially shaped by
the process or in possession of all the knowledge the system uses or the very layout of the built environment and the specifics of the smaller
produces. Hutchins’ own studies typically involve cognition in artifacts that furnish it, not—as we naively tend to assume—primarily by
technologically sophisticated workplaces. But other researchers in the the interpersonal relationships of the inhabitants. The most obvious
distributed cognition vein apply the theory to more easily accessible examples seem innocuous. In chair cultures, for instance, people sit
everyday situations. David Kirsh (1995) argues that we use the placement upright and off the floor to eat meals, while in non-chair cultures such as
of artifacts in the surrounding space to simplify our cognitive lives in Japan they sit in various postures—depending on the social situation—on
various ways. For example, baggers in a grocery store will first group cushions on the floor. But Foucault focuses on less innocuous examples
different types of items—large, heavy, fragile, and so on—on the checkout such as prisons, which shape action in ways that manifest the exercise of

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social power. He contrasts the dungeon model, in which behavior is generation of artifactual structure is as much due to the nature of the
temporarily shaped simply by sheer physical control over the prisoners’ materials used as to any intention or plan on the part of the maker.
freedom of movement, with the Panopticon model, in which the prisoners Moreover, the nature of the materials and the tools used structure the
are kept under constant surveillance by invisible observers, prompting activity of making itself. In a similar vein, Beth Preston (2013) argues that
them to shape their own behavior in various habitual ways that survive the human action is more a matter of improvisation than planning, and that the
term of their imprisonment. This ensures a kind of continuing social continuously evolving structure of improvisatory action owes much to the
control not available under the dungeon model. Foucault’s further point is opportunities artifacts afford. Furthermore, it is in interaction with artifacts
that this “disciplinary” model is now pervasive in social institutions from in daily life that we develop the purposes and behavior patterns
education to workplace to health care to the “smart” home. Related themes appropriate to them. Thus, having started with a traditional definition of
surface in Bruno Latour’s (1994; 1999) technical mediation theory. On his “artifact” that emphasizes the dependence of artifacts on human intentions
view, agency is not a property of individual humans, but rather of and purposes, the epistemology of artifacts brings us back around to a
collectives of “actants”—humans and nonhumans related to each other in view that emphasizes instead the dependence of human cognition and
specific, systematic ways. In contemporary western culture, the non- action on artifacts.
human actants are typically artifacts. Latour’s telling illustration starts
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 pdf version of the entry
Form vs. Matter
[Link] Form vs. Matter
from the Summer 2020 Edition of the First published Mon Feb 8, 2016; substantive revision Wed Mar 25, 2020

Stanford Encyclopedia Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of
matter and form. This doctrine has been dubbed “hylomorphism”, a
of Philosophy portmanteau of the Greek words for matter (hulê) and form (eidos or
morphê). Highly influential in the development of Medieval philosophy,
Aristotle’s hylomorphism has also enjoyed something of a renaissance in
contemporary metaphysics.

While the basic idea of hylomorphism is easy to grasp, much remains

Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson unclear beneath the surface. Aristotle introduces matter and form, in the
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Physics, to account for changes in the natural world, where he is
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particularly interested in explaining how substances come into existence
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even though, as he maintains, there is no generation ex nihilo, that is that
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hylomorphic framework, which he then extends by putting it to work in a
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Form vs. Matter and core commitments. There is in any case already a considerable
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 Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

Aristotle intends to marshal arguments in support of them, and how best to Socrates, a substance, gains the property of being blue, or the property of
deal with reasonable objections to their metaphysical consequences. We weighing twelve stone. The other main kind of change is substantial
will begin by examining how Aristotle introduces his twin notions. Then change, whereby a substance comes into, or passes out of, existence. For
we will move on to discuss some of the most important interpretative example, when Socrates dies, or is born (or perhaps conceived, or
controversies: does Aristotle believe in so-called “prime” matter? Does somewhere in between conception and birth), a substantial change has
matter or form serve as the principle of individuation in his metaphysics? taken place.
Do natural forms include a specification of the kind of matter that anything
of that form has to have? Matter and form are required to account for this second kind of change, if
it is to conform to Aristotle’s general conceptual analysis of change. In
1. Matter and form introduced any change, he contends, there must be three things: (1) something which
2. Prime matter underlies and persists through the change; (2) a “lack”, which is one of a
3. The principle of individuation pair of opposites, the other of which is (3) a form acquired during the
4. Matter-involving forms course of the change (Physics i 7, 190a13–191a22). Thus, for example, in
Bibliography an accidental change, the underlying thing is the substance which acquires
Primary Sources a new accidental property. For instance, when Socrates learns to play the
Secondary Sources flute, he transitions from a state of being unmusical (the lack) to a state of
Academic Tools musicality (the form). But for us to be able to say that there is something
Other Internet Resources which has changed, there must be something which remains the same
Related Entries throughout the change, and in this case the obvious candidate is Socrates,
who is one and the same person throughout his musical training.

1. Matter and form introduced In accidental changes there is always a substance to underlie the change,
but this is not true for substantial changes, since these involve the coming
Aristotle introduces his notions of matter and form in the first book of his to be or passing away of a substance (see the amusing remark of Irving
Physics, his work on natural science. Natural science is concerned with Copi, quoted at the start of the entry on identity over time). In these cases,
things that change, and Aristotle divides changes into two main types: the thing that underlies is the matter of the substance. When someone
there are accidental changes, which involve concrete particulars, or builds a house, it is the bricks which persist through the change. They
“substances” (ousiai) in Aristotle’s terminology, gaining or losing a transition from a state of not being a house to acquire the property of being
property (see Categories 1–5, Physics i 7). For instance, the changes a house. Aristotle often uses the example of artefacts like houses, even
whereby Socrates falls in a vat of dye and turns blue, or puts on a few though he does not regard them as substances properly-speaking
pounds from excessive feasting during the Panathenaia, count as (Metaphysics vii 17, 1041b28–30), because their matter is more
accidental changes (in the categories of quality and quantity, respectively). straightforward to identify. Nevertheless, the same analysis holds in the

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 Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

case of organisms, which are the substances proper: when an organism is We need to know what the thing is made of, and the answer to this
created or destroyed, when an acorn becomes an oak tree, or a human dies, question is the thing’s matter—bricks, in the case of a house; bodily
there must be some matter which persists through the change. To say organs in the case of a human being. Next we need to know what the thing
otherwise would be to say that things can come to be out of, or vanish is, or how it is defined, and the answer to this is the thing’s form or
into, nothing, and Aristotle understandably agrees with his predecessor essence. We also need to know what made the thing come into existence,
Parmenides that this is impossible (Physics i 8, 191a23–b17). Aristotle’s who or what created it, and this is the thing’s efficient or “moving” cause.
metaphysics takes as its starting points observed phenomena, and seeks to Lastly, we need to know what the thing is for, what its purpose or function
preserve common sense beliefs where possible. We never experience is—the final cause. Now Aristotle observes that, although these are all
anything simply appearing or disappearing at random. distinct questions, in the case of the last three very often the same thing
will serve as the answer to all of them (Physics ii 7, 198a24–27). A house
The word “form” may misleadingly suggest that what is acquired in a case is defined as a shelter of a certain sort (De Anima i 1, 403b3–7;
of substantial generation is simply a shape, and this impression is Metaphysics viii 3, 1043a29–36). That is what a house is, i.e., its formal
reinforced by some of the examples that Aristotle uses, especially when cause, but it is also what a house is for, its final cause, since houses, like
focusing on artefacts: plausibly the form of a bronze statue just is its all artefacts are functionally defined. Similarly, a human being is defined
shape. When we consider organisms, however, it becomes apparent that as something which lives a certain kind of rationally-directed life. But, on
having the right shape is not sufficient to possess the form. A thing’s form Aristotle’s view, this is also what a human being is for. The human
is its definition or essence—what it is to be a human being, for example. A function is to live such a life (Nicomachean Ethics i 7, 1097b22–1098a20;
statue may be human-shaped, but it is not a human, because it cannot cf. De Anima ii 1, 412a6–22). As for the efficient cause, it is qualitatively,
perform the functions characteristic of humans: thinking, perceiving, although not numerically, identical with the formal cause, at least in the
moving, desiring, eating and growing, etc. The connection between a organism case, since human beings give birth to human beings, and the
thing’s form and its function emerges in Physics ii 3, where Aristotle same goes for all other living things. Thus, even though Aristotle admits
distinguishes his four kinds of cause: material, formal, efficient, and final, four different kinds of cause, in a sense it is only really matter and form
and suggests a special connection between the formal and final cause. that play any ineliminable explanatory role in his system.

Here one needs to proceed cautiously, however, since it is sometimes said In fact, Aristotle does not simply focus on the case of artefacts because
that Aristotle’s word “cause” (aitia) would be better translated as their pre-existing matter is easier to identify. There is a particular issue
“explanation” (or “explanatory factor”, to avoid the implication that they here with the case of organisms, which arises out of Aristotle’s insistence
are linguistic items, as opposed to things-in-the-world). Certainly modern that a human being, for instance, is composed of a rational soul, which is
philosophers tend to use “cause” in a narrower way, which approximates the form, and an organic body, which is the matter (for further discussion
to Aristotle’s efficient cause. Aristotle’s idea is that there are four kinds of of this problem, see Ackrill 1972/73). It is characteristic of the matter of
thing that need to be mentioned in order to give a full account of the artefacts that numerically the same stuff which makes up one object can
nature of an object, each corresponding to a particular kind of question. later be used as the matter of another: for instance, when one melts down a

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 Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

bronze statue, and then molds it into some jewelry, it is the same bit of 1,734b24–31). It seems as though he believes that a human being’s matter
bronze throughout. It is crucial that a thing’s matter can survive such must be contingently alive, so that it can serve as the underlying thing that
changes, if it is to play the role that Aristotle needs it to play in cases of remains when the human being comes into existence, but also that it must
substantial generation and destruction, as being the thing that underlies be essentially alive, because it is functionally defined. If so, he contradicts
such changes. If an artefact’s matter only contingently has the form it has, himself.
the same does not obviously seem true of organisms. Unlike in the case of
a house built from bricks, it does not seem as though one’s body predates The best way to resolve this apparent contradiction in Aristotle’s
one’s existence, and so can serve as the underlying thing in a case of hylomorphism is to point out that an organism can have more than one
substantial generation. One might think that at least the body does exist level of matter. Aristotle believes that all sensible substances can be
after death, but in fact Aristotle would disagree. Instead, he insists that a analyzed into matter and form, but such an analysis is not restricted to the
dead body is only “homonymously” called a body—that it is only things he calls substances. Matter can itself be divided into matter and
described as “a body” by extension, because it superficially resembles a form: for instance, bricks are made of clay, shaped into cuboid blocks.
living body (De Anima ii 1, 412b10–25; Metaphysics vii 10, 1035b9–25). Again, clay has its own matter—mud, say—and so on. Eventually, if one
It is not a real body, because it is incapable of performing the functions pursues this hierarchy of matter far enough downwards, Aristotle believes
normally associated with bodies, just as a statue’s eye, or an eye in a that one will reach the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. He agrees
painting, is not a real eye, because it is made of stone or paint, and thus with Empedocles that everything in the sub-lunar world is ultimately made
cannot serve the function that genuine eyes exist for—seeing (for further up of different ratios of these four elements. Matter then should really be
discussion, see the supplement to the entry on Aristotle’s psychology on a understood as a relative notion—it is always the matter of something.
fundamental problem about hylomorphism). Aristotle distinguishes between a thing’s proximate matter, the stuff it is
most immediately made of, and its less proximate matter, i.e., the matter of
It might seem that Aristotle is rather going against ordinary linguistic its matter, or even further down the hierarchy, culminating in its ultimate
usage here, since we in fact regularly do refer to dead bodies as “bodies”. matter, the elements. The organic body which is a human being’s
Whether a dead body is really a body might seem like a trivial linguistic proximate matter is essentially alive, but this need not apply to all of the
issue, which can simply be decided by fiat. The obvious way to resolve the other matter further down the chain. Aristotle distinguishes between
problem might seem to be simply to drop the insistence that the body homoiomerous and heteromerous parts (Parts of Animals i 1, 640b25–30).
cannot exist without being coupled to a living human soul. Allowing that a Homoiomerous parts are stuffs, like bronze or flesh, which Aristotle
dead body remains the same body as its living counterpart will not help believes have no internal structure. Every part of a homoiomerous stuff is
the difficulty of what to say about the matter that predates the coming to the same as every other part, containing the same ratio of elements. This
be of the organism, when there is no apparent body, living or dead. What view of homoiomerous parts is consistent with Aristotle’s denial of
is more, Aristotle is deeply committed to his position that the human body atomism; he believes that matter, as well as space and time, are infinitely
is essentially ensouled, because of his view that things are defined by their divisible. The bodily organs, hands, feet, eyes, hearts, etc., are
functions (Meteorologica iv 12, 390a10–15; Generation of Animals ii heteromerous, since they do have internal structure, with different parts of

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 Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

them made up of different stuffs. A person’s hand, for instance, is made of element is, then, a compound of this matter and a form. This prime matter
flesh, bones, blood and other such biological matter, which in turn are is usually described as pure potentiality, just as, on the form side, the
made of earth, air, fire and water. It may be that flesh too is functionally unmoved movers are said by Aristotle to be pure actuality, form without
defined, so that dead flesh is only called “flesh” homonymously as well. any matter (Metaphysics xii 6). What it means to call prime matter “pure
Even if nothing biological can exist when not alive, it seems clear that the potentiality” is that it is capable of taking on any form whatsoever, and
elements at least must be able to do so. Therefore there will be some, low- thus is completely without any essential properties of its own. It exists
level matter to serve as the thing that underlies the coming to be and eternally, since, if it were capable of being created or destroyed, there
passing away of organisms, even though an organism’s proximate matter would have to be some even lower matter to underlie those changes.
exists for precisely as long as it does. Because it is the matter of the elements, which are themselves present in
all more complex bodies, it is omnipresent, and underlies not only
2. Prime matter elemental generation and destruction, but all physical changes. As a
completely indeterminate substratum, prime matter bears some similarities
One obvious question pertains to how low such underlying levels might to what modern philosophy has called a “bare particular” (see Sider 2006),
go. In fact there is considerable controversy concerning how to conceive although, not being a particular, it may have more in common with so-
the bottom rung of Aristotle’s hierarchy of matter. Aristotle believes that called “gunk” (see Sider 1993).
everything is made of earth, air, fire and water. These elements are defined
by their possession of one of each of the two fundamental pairs of A similar idea is to be found in Plato’s Timaeus, 49–52, where, in addition
opposites, hot/cold and wet/dry. Aristotle also thinks that these elements to his Forms and the particulars which instantiate them, he argues for the
can change into one another (On the Heavens iii 6, 305a14–35). If his existence of a third category of thing, “a receptacle of all coming to be”
analysis of change is correct, when some water changes into some air, (49a5–6):
there must be something underlying, some substrate, which persists
it must always be called by the same term. For it does not depart
through the change, initially having the essential properties of water
from its own character at all. It both continually receives all things,
(being wet and cold, on Aristotle’s view) and then later those of air (being
and has never taken on a form similar to any of the things that
wet and hot). The thing that underlies this kind of change cannot be any of
enter it in any way. For it is laid down by nature as a recipient of
the elements, since it must be capable of possessing the properties
impressions for everything, being changed and formed variously
characteristic of each of the elements successively, capable of being first
by the things that enter it, and because of them it appears different
cold and then hot, for example. The traditional interpretation of Aristotle,
at different times. (50b6–c4)
which goes back as far as Augustine (De Genesi contra Manichaeos i 5–7)
and Simplicius (On Aristotle’s Physics i 7), and is accepted by Aquinas Plato also motivates his receptacle by appealing to the phenomenon of the
(De Principiis Naturae §13), holds that Aristotle believes in something elements changing into one another, and, although he refers to it as
called “prime matter”, which is the matter of the elements, where each

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 Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

“space” and not “matter”, the traditional interpretation has it that, as he general would be perhaps water, if everything that can be melted is
often does, Aristotle has adopted an idea first developed by his mentor. water). (1015a7–10)

More recently, opponents of attributing a doctrine of prime matter to Here Aristotle is referring to his predecessor Thales’ view that everything
Aristotle have complained that there is insufficient evidence for his is ultimately made of water, which he in fact rejects.
holding this kind of view, and that it is so philosophically unappealing that
principles of charity militate against it as an interpretation. Such scholars In other passages too Aristotle seems to leave the question of whether or
point out that Aristotle actually criticizes Plato’s account from the not there is prime matter deliberately open. In Metaphysics ix 7, he uses a
Timaeus, in On Generation and Corruption ii 1: conditional to talk about the possibility:

what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any it seems that what we call not this, but that-en—for example, we
precisely-articulated conception. For he has not stated clearly call the box not wood, but wooden, nor do we call the wood earth,
whether his “Omnirecipient” exists in separation from the but earthen, and again earth, if it is this way, we do not call
elements; nor does he make any use of it. (329a13–15) something else, but that-en—that is always potentially without
qualification the next thing…But if there is something primary,
Although Aristotle is clearly criticizing Plato here, it may be that his point which is no longer called that-en with respect to something else,
is simply that Plato was not sufficiently clear that prime matter is never to this is prime matter. For example, if earth is airy, and air is not fire
be found existing apart from the elements, and that he did not give good but firey, fire is prime matter, being a this. (1049a18–22…24–27)
enough reasons for its introduction, not that he was wrong to believe in it.
Here Aristotle uses the generic adjective “that-en” (ekeininon), a word that
In this connection it is appropriate to note that Aristotle does in fact use he coins, to mean made of that material. If a material could not be so
the expressions “prime matter” (prôtê hulê) and “primary underlying described, it would be prime matter. Again, he shows himself aware of
thing” (prôton hupokeimenon) several times: Physics i 9, 192a31, ii 1, prime matter as a possibility, without wanting to commit to it here.
193a10 and 193a29; Metaphysics v 4, 1014b32 and 1015a7–10, v 6,
1017a5–6, viii 4, 1044a23, ix 7, 1049a24–7; Generation of Animals i 20, Another key passage where Aristotle has been thought to commit himself
729a32. The mere fact that he uses the phrase is inconclusive, however, more decisively to prime matter is Metaphysics vii 3. Here we are told:
since, he makes it explicit that “prime matter” can refer either to a thing’s
By “matter” I mean that which in itself is not called a substance
proximate matter or to whatever ultimately makes it up:
nor a quantity nor anything else by which being is categorized. For
Nature is prime matter (and this in two ways, either prime in it is something of which each of these things is predicated, whose
relation to the thing or prime in general; for example, in the case of being is different from each of its predicates (for the others are
bronze works the bronze is prime in relation to them, but prime in predicated of substance, and substance is predicated of matter).
Therefore this last is in itself neither substance nor quantity nor

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anything else. Nor is it the denials of any of these; for even denials some water vanishes into nothing, and is instantly replaced by some air
belong to things accidentally. (1029a20–26) which has materialized out of nothing?

Although the word “prime” does not occur here, Aristotle is evidently The main philosophical objections to prime matter are that it is, at best, a
talking about prime matter. A natural way to read this passage is that he is mysterious entity that we cannot know anything about, since we never
saying there is a wholly indeterminate underlying thing, which he calls perceive it directly, but only the things it underlies. Of course, there can be
“matter”, and it is not a substance. Those who wish to avoid attributing a good theoretical reasons for believing in things that we never actually see.
doctrine of prime matter to Aristotle must offer a different interpretation: No one has ever seen a quark, but we can still know things about them,
that if we were to make the mistake of regarding matter, as opposed to based on the kind of theoretical work that they are required to perform.
form, as substance, we would be committed (absurdly) to the existence of Still, Aristotle’s theory will be more parsimonious, if he can manage
a wholly indeterminate underlying thing. without positing such theoretical entities. At worst, prime matter is said to
be outright contradictory. It is supposed to be capable of taking on any
In addition to disputing the correct interpretation of these passages where form whatsoever, and thus to have no essential properties of its own. The
Aristotle explicitly mentions prime matter, much of the debate has idea that it has no essential properties of its own seems to make it difficult
centered around, on the one hand, whether what he says about change for us to characterize it positively in any way: how can it be invisible, or
really commits him to it, on the other, whether the idea is really absurd. eternal, or the ultimate bearer of properties, if these are not properties that
Some opponents of prime matter have argued that Aristotle does not, after belong to it essentially? Moreover, if it is what ultimately underlies all
all, wish to insist that there is always something which persists through a properties, it seems that it must be able to take on properties that are
change (see Charlton 1970, Appendix, and 1983). In particular, when one inconsistent with what we would like to be able to think of as its own
of the elements changes into another, there is an underlying thing—the nature: when Socrates turns blue, there is also some prime matter that
initial element—but in this case it does not persist. They point out that in underlies him, which also turns blue. But how can prime matter be
the key passage of Physics i 7, where Aristotle gives his account of change simultaneous invisible and blue? To get around these problems, it looks as
in general, he uses the expressions “underlying thing” and “thing that though proponents of prime matter will have to distinguish between two
remains”. While readers have usually supposed that these terms are used different kinds of property that prime matter has, or perhaps two different
interchangeably to refer to the substance, in cases of accidental change, ways in which it has properties. There are its essential properties, which
and the matter in substantial changes, this assumption can be challenged. define the kind of entity that it is, and which it has permanently, and then
In the elemental generation case, perhaps there is no thing that remains, there are its accidental properties, which it gains and loses as it underlies
just an initial elements that underlies. The worry about this interpretation different sorts of thing. A worry about this solution is, if one can
is whether it is consistent with Aristotle’s belief that nothing can come to distinguish between the prime matter and its essential properties, this
be out of nothing. If there is no “thing that remains” in a case of elemental might suggest that there is a need for a further entity to act as the
generation, how is an instance of water changing into air to be underlying thing for those properties, and then this further entity would
distinguished from the supposedly impossible sort of change whereby need to have its own nature, and something to underlie that nature, and so

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on. It seems best to try to avoid such an infinite regress by insisting that a single whole, and he is a numerically distinct individual from Callias
prime matter can underlie its own essential properties, without being a because his matter is numerically distinct from Callias’ matter.
compound of those properties and some further matter.
It has become conventional to call an answer to Lukasiewicz’s problem a
3. The principle of individuation principle of unity, and an answer to Anscombe’s problem a principle of
individuation. The traditional view has been that individuation is a
Another reason that some scholars have thought that Aristotle needs metaphysical issue: what is it that makes one individual different from
something like prime matter is to serve as a so-called “principle of another (of the same kind)? However, some scholars have argued that
individuation”. While the predominant view has been that this role is Aristotle at no point addresses this issue, but is instead concerned with the
reserved for matter, other scholars have maintained either that Aristotle epistemological question of how we tell one individual from another (see
means it to be form, or that he does not see the need for a principle of Charlton 1972).
individuation at all. Some of this controversy seems to have resulted from
It is worth considering why one might think that the metaphysical issue is
a failure to be clear about what a principle of individuation is, or what
not worth pursuing. The obvious reason is if one thought that there was no
problem it is supposed to solve.
answer to the question “what makes this individual numerically distinct
To see why this is so, one may focus on a controversy about individuation from that one?”—that nothing makes them distinct, they just are. An
which Popper sought to dissolve, by pointing out that it derived from a advocate of this view might point out that even if we accept that matter is
false opposition. This was a controversy begotten by a disagreement what makes this individual distinct from that one, we still have no answer
between Anscombe and Lukasiewicz regarding the principle of to the question “what makes this portion of matter numerically distinct
individuation in Aristotle (see Anscombe et al. 1953). Popper points out from that one?”. There will always be certain of these numerical
that their disagreement is only apparent, due to the fact that they are distinctness facts that remain unexplained on any theory. But if
answering different questions: Lukasiewicz insists that form should be explanation has to stop somewhere, why not stop at the beginning? Why
counted as the “source of individuality” because it explains how a thing not just say that it is a bare fact that Socrates is numerically distinct from
with many parts is a single individual and not a plurality, it accounts for Callias, and leave matter out of it?
the unity of individuals. He has in mind questions like “How do all these
One might think that one could respond to this argument by insisting that
bricks constitute a single house?” or “What makes this collection of flesh
there is an answer to the question what makes Socrates’ matter
and bones Socrates?”, and here Aristotle does indeed appear to make use
numerically distinct from Callias’ matter: it is the matter itself. If matter
of form. On the other hand, Anscombe says that it is matter which makes
can explain the distinctness of individual substances, why should it not
an individual the individual it is, numerically distinct from other
also explain its own distinctness from other matter? Whether or not this
individuals of the same (and other) species. Yet this is an issue about
move is legitimate will depend on which facts are and which facts are not
numerical distinctness rather than unity. It is perfectly consistent to say
in need of explanation but may correctly be assumed to be primitive. The
that Socrates is one man because of his form, which unifies his matter into

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problem is that “this matter is distinct from that matter because it is this According to the traditional interpretation, here we have the claim that x
matter” seems to be a very similar sort of explanation to “Socrates is and y are numerically identical (or “one in number”) if, and only if, they
distinct from Callias because he is Socrates”—both are cases of x have the same matter (or the matter of x is “one” with the matter of y). An
explaining its own distinctness from y. Either both should count as alternative reading takes this passage to be about unity rather than
adequate explanations or neither should. But the advocate of matter as individuation: Aristotle would be saying that x is numerically one if and
principle of individuation adopted this view precisely because she found only if x’s matter is one, where a thing’s matter being “one” means that it
this sort of explanation unsatisfactory, or not an explanation at all. is one continuous piece (of bone, for example).
Therefore this response does not seem to be open to her.
The second important passage for detecting Aristotle’s views about
It seems that those who are committed to there being something which individuation comes at vii 8, 1034a5–8:
accounts for the numerical distinctness of individuals must say that there
is nothing that accounts for the numerical distinctness of the distinctness- And when we have the whole, a form of such a kind in this flesh
makers. The only alternative would be to introduce some further thing to and in these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are
account for their distinctness, and so on; but this results in an infinite different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same
regress, which, as well as being ontologically bloated, appears to be in form, for their form is indivisible.
vicious, since we can never grasp the full account of what makes Socrates
According to the traditional interpretation, these lines are saying that
and Callias distinct. Both sides agree that explanation must stop
Socrates and Callias are numerically distinct because of their matter, not
somewhere, but they differ over where it is appropriate to stop: is it a
their form, and on the face of it this is the clearest example of Aristotle
basic, inexplicable fact that Socrates is numerically distinct from Callias,
affirming that matter is the principle of individuation. We can adopt an
or that their matter is distinct? (See Markosian 2008, §8, for a
alternative reading, however, if we suppose that “different” means not
contemporary discussion of this question.) At any rate, even if it is
numerically distinct, but qualitatively different. In that case, the passage
difficult to prove that there is an important metaphysical question here, the
could be making an epistemological claim about how we discern Socrates
traditional interpretation of Aristotle is that he thinks there is.
and Callias: suppose Callias is pale and Socrates dark; they are different,
There are two main texts which have been thought to show Aristotle but not different in form; they differ because of their matter, since pallor
advancing the view that matter is the principle of individuation: and darkness primarily qualify their skin, i.e., part of their body.
Metaphysics v 6, 1016b31–2, and vii 8, 1034a5–8. In the first of these, we
There is a difficulty for the idea that matter can act as the principle of
are told:
individuation, which arises out of the following problem that can be raised
Moreover, some things are one in number, some in form, some in for Aristotle’s hylomorphism (see Fine 1994). It seems that two
genus, some by analogy; in number those whose matter is one… substances, e.g., Socrates and Callias, may have numerically the same
matter at different times; that it is possible (however unlikely) for all and

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only the particular elements that now compose Socrates to end up proximate matters are different. We can redescribe the situation so that not
composing Callias at some later date. In such a case, Socrates and Callias only are Socrates’ and Callias’ forms the same, but the forms of their
would have the same matter, albeit at different times. Moreover, both bodies are also the same, and the forms of the matter of their bodies, and
being human beings, they would have the same form. But they themselves so on all the way down. Although it is unclear what in general is required
are compounds of matter and form, so if their matter and form are for the matter of two things of the same form to have the same form, e.g.,
numerically the same, they must themselves be numerically the same. for Socrates’ and Callias’ bodies to have the same form, it seems
reasonable to suppose that it is sufficient for two things to have the same
Put schematically, the argument looks like this: form that they be qualitatively the same. So we can ensure that Socrates’
and Callias’ matters have the same form, if we suppose that they are
1. It is possible that Socrates and Callias be composed of numerically
qualitatively the same. One might insist that no two things are
the same matter (albeit at different times).
qualitatively the same, but there is little reason to think that Aristotle is
2. Socrates and Callias have the same form.
committed to Leibniz’s doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles. What is
3. Socrates and Callias are compounds of matter and form.
more, although strict qualitative identity, i.e., having all the same non-
4. Therefore, it is possible that Socrates and Callias are numerically the
relational and relational properties, may require demanding metaphysical
same.
assumptions such as an eternally cyclic universe, probably all that is
Of course two different people cannot be numerically the same. So, if the required is that there be no relevant qualitative difference between
argument is valid, at least one of its premises must be false. Socrates and Callias, where “relevant” means such as to result in them or
their matter having different forms. While one might insist that two things
One possible rejoinder to this argument is that it turns on an equivocation must be qualitatively the same to have the same form, this also does not
in the meaning of “matter”. As we have seen, for Aristotle matter comes in seem to be Aristotle’s view. So if we tailor our example to this
different levels. In the situation envisaged Socrates and Callias would requirement, we can thwart the charge of equivocation. The argument then
have the same remote or low-level matter (the same elements) but they is valid, so we must choose one of its premises to reject.
might still have different proximate matter, since the proximate matter of a
human being is his body. Since a substance is a compound of a substantial One might try to reject the first premise of the argument, on the grounds
form and some proximate matter, we are not entitled to conclude that that a person’s matter is essential to them. We have seen that Aristotle
Socrates and Callias are the same. Although this may be an effective way plausibly does believe this about a person’s proximate matter—their body
of dealing with the initial problem, it can be restated so as to avoid this —since a dead body is only homonymously a “body”. Nevertheless, he is
objection that the argument equivocates on “matter”. Each level of matter committed to their more remote matter—the elements that make them up,
is a compound of the matter at the level immediately below it and a form. for instance—being capable of existing independently of them. He needs
If the proximate matter of two things is to be different, despite their lower- there to be something to underlie the change whereby a substance comes
level matter being the same, the reason must be that the forms of the into or goes out of existence, to make it consistent with his account of
change in general in Physics i 7. There seems to be no reason to deny that,

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when a tree, for instance, dies, the earth, air, fire and water that constituted A final reaction to the argument would be to reject the third premise, the
it still exist in the dead stump. But, if so, there seems no reason to think idea that anything enmattered is a compound of its matter and form at a
they could not leave the stump, and end up becoming the matter of some given time. Certainly the most straightforward way of understanding
new tree. This is all that is needed for the problem to arise. Prime matter, hylomorphism is that the compound is compounded of the thing’s matter
if it exists, will not help: if the elements are allowed to escape the and form at a particular time, and the relation between the compound and
substances that they underlie, it seems that the prime matter that underlies the thing is identity. This way of understanding composition is not only
them should also be capable of doing so. It is supposed to be capable of problematic because it leads to the problem currently under discussion:
underlying anything; so insisting that it is confined to being the prime assuming that things can change their matter, we might well also wonder
matter of a particular sort of thing makes no sense. (a) how just one of the matters, which it has at a particular time, can yield
the whole thing, and (b) how different matters at different times can yield
A more promising option is to reject the second premise of the argument, the same thing. An alternative way to understand compounding would be
that co-specific or relevantly similar things like Socrates and Callias must to say that a thing is the compound of its form and all the various matters
have a common form. This one might reject if one were a believer in that it has at different times: X = F(m1, m2 , … mn), where m1 … mn are
particular forms. The question of whether Aristotle’s forms are particular X’s proximate matters in order of temporal occurrence. This would solve
or universal has garnered a huge amount of scholarly attention (those in worries (a) and (b) above, since now all the different matter-slices are
favour of particular forms include Sellars 1957, Frede 1978, and Irwin incorporated into the one object. It does not obviously help with the
1988; those in favour of universal forms include Albritton 1957, Lewis problem at hand, however, since, if it is possible for Socrates and Callias
1991, and Loux 1991). If Aristotle believed in universal forms, he could to have the same matter at a time, there seems to be no barrier to them
have constructed particular forms out of some kind of indexed version of having exactly the same sequence of matter-slices throughout their lives
the universal (e.g., an ordered pair of the universal form and the thing (provided that they are not born at the same time, and live to exactly the
which had it); but that would make the identity of the particular form same age).
dependent on that of the substance that had it. Since it is the substance’s
form which is acting as principle of individuation, if the common form Finally, one could relativize the concept of a compound to a time:
premise is rejected, particular forms cannot be individuated by the enmattered objects are absolutely identical to compounds, but a compound
substances that have them, on pain of circularity: what makes Socrates is not absolutely a compound of matter and form, but only relative to a
different from Callias is that they have different forms; and what makes particular time. X = Ft (m) , where m is the proximate matter of X at t; or,
their forms different is that one belongs to Socrates, the other to Callias. combining this idea with the previous one, X = Ft (m1 … mn ) , where t is
To play this role, particular forms would have to be defined independently the period of time for which X exists, and m1 … mn are its matters in order
of the things that have them. It would be a particular form which combines of occurrence. This solution does deal with the problem directly, since
with a thing’s matter to make it the thing that it is. Some scholars find this Socrates and Callias can have the same form and matter, and yet be
conception of particular forms problematic. different compounds because the times are different. There may also be a
modal version of the puzzle: Socrates is such that his matter and form

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could be identical with those of Callias at a certain time. This puzzle might improbably) be composed of the numerically same stuff at different times.
be solved by also relativizing compounds to worlds. It is not so obvious that Aristotle sees the need to address the second
question, but, if his forms are particular, not universal, he is in a good
There is an exegetical problem with ascribing this final way of position to do so.
understanding composition to Aristotle, and that is that it apparently
conflicts with the view that he expresses in Metaphysics viii 6, 1045a7–10, 4. Matter-involving forms
and vii 17, 1041a26, that a form is what unifies a compound. The problem
is how to understand the role of the time in the unification of the As we have seen, Aristotle introduces matter and form as contrasting
compound by the form: it cannot be just another element to be unified, for notions, distinct causes, which together make up every ordinary object. It
the time at which the matter exists does not figure as a part of the resulting may come as a surprise, then, to find that he makes comments which
unity. If we try to make the form unify a given portion of matter into many suggest that matter and form are more intimately intertwined than is
different things, depending on what time the unifying takes place at, we obviously required by the manner of their introduction. It is worth noting
also run into the difficulty that such a process no longer seems worthy of in this regard that he is eager to distance himself from Plato’s theory of
the title “unification”, since the result is many objects, not just one. Indeed Forms, which exist quite apart from the material world. He does so in part
we can reformulate the problem without mentioning composition at all: if by insisting that his own forms are somehow enmeshed in matter
a common form must unify common matter into one and the same thing, (Metaphysics vi 1 and vii 11, and De Anima i 1). He also maintains that all
and Socrates and Callias have the same form and the same matter, they are natural forms are like something which is snub, where something is snub
one and the same. Since Aristotle (and many neo-Aristotelians) would only if it is concavity-realized-in-a-nose (Physics ii 2; cf. Sophistical
surely be unwilling to give up the unifying role of form, this does not look Refutations 13 and 31). The purport seems to be that all natural forms are
like a viable solution. such that they are themselves somehow material beings, or at least that
one must mention matter in their specification. Consequently, some
We have seen that there are some textual reasons to think Aristotle makes
scholars have been inclined to suppose that a thing’s form itself contains a
matter his principle of individuation; but in fact particular forms are better
specification of the matter which anything with that form has to have (see
suited to play this role. We need to distinguish between two different
Balme 1984, Charles 2008, Peramatzis 2011). If so, rather than being
questions, one about unification, the other about individuation: (i) what
contrasted with matter, forms will be themselves somehow intrinsically
makes this giraffe (or this giraffe-matter) one and the same giraffe (over
material. Other scholars have been disinclined to draw this inference, not
time)? (ii) what makes this giraffe distinct from that one? The first
least because it seems to result in an unhappy conflation of the separate
question seems to be the one which Aristotle addresses in Metaphysics vii
roles that matter and form are meant to play in Aristotle’s metaphysics
17, and does not obviously require an answer that is unique to the giraffe
(see Frede 1990).
in question. Giraffeness in general may well suffice. The answer to the
second question, however, cannot be the universal species, since it is The passage in the Metaphysics where Aristotle most obviously addresses
common to both giraffes, nor can it be their matter, since they could (albeit this question is vii 11. He begins the chapter by asking “what sorts of thing

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are parts of the form, and which are not, but are parts of the compound” We might hope that Aristotle’s view about whether flesh and bones are
(1036a26–7). He first discusses the case of things which are realized in part of the form of man will become clearer later in the chapter.
multiple different sorts of matter: a circle may be realized in bronze or Unfortunately, the relevant passage is also open to multiple interpretations.
stone; so it is clear that its matter, bronze or stone, is not part of the form The chapter goes on to describe how
of the circle, since it is separate from them (1036a33–4). We are then told
that, in the case of things which are not seen to be separate, nothing some people are in doubt even in the case of the circle and the
prevents the same considerations from applying to them, “even if all the triangle, on the grounds that it is not right to define them in terms
circles that had been seen were bronze” (1036b1). of lines and continuity, but that these too should all be spoken of in
the same way as flesh and bones of man and bronze and stone of
Having considered the case of circles, Aristotle moves on to consider the statue. (1036b8–12)
form of a man, and to ask of flesh and bones, “Are these too parts of the
form and definition?” (1036b5). Some interpreters understand the next Presumably these thinkers object to lines and continuity being parts of the
sentence to contain Aristotle’s answer: definitions of circle and triangle on the grounds that they are matter,
comparing them to other sorts of matter that are obviously inadmissible in
In truth no, they are the matter; but, because ‹the form› is not also definitions. Aristotle criticizes this line of thought, which suggests that
in other ‹sorts of matter›, we are unable to separate them. (1036b5– maybe he does think that certain sorts of matter or at least matter-like
7) concepts are admissible in definitions. However, the fact that he groups
flesh and bones with bronze and stone as the sort of matter that is
Rendered thus, the text suggests that, as in the circle case, flesh and bones obviously inadmissible suggests that he does not think that they are parts
are not part of the form of man. However, other editors, especially those of the form of man.
friendly to matter-involving forms, print this sentence as a question, so
that it reads The impression so far is seemingly contradicted a bit later, when we are
told:
Or are they rather matter; but because ‹the form› is not also in
other ‹sorts of matter›, we are unable to separate them? And therefore to reduce everything in this way and to take away
the matter is futile: for surely some things are this ‹form› in this
This second way of understanding the sentence, though it does not require ‹matter› or these things is this state; and the comparison in the case
it, leaves open the possibility that Aristotle’s answer will be that, unlike in of animal, which Socrates the Younger used to make, is not a good
the circle case, flesh and bones are indeed part of the form of a man. Since one; for it leads away from the truth, and makes one think that it is
punctuation marks are a later invention, it is impossible to be certain possible for man to exist without his parts, as the circle can without
which reading Aristotle intended. The sentence, as it stands, is bronze. (1036b22–8)
inconclusive.

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Here Aristotle would seem to be referring back to the earlier comparison undergone by natural compounds, the claim is that they must themselves
between the flesh and bones of a man and the bronze or stone of a statue at be matter-involving. For example, the property of falling downwards
1036b11, and claiming that the comparison misleadingly suggests that when unsupported is one had by all human beings. Aristotle would explain
flesh and bones are not part of the form of a man, when in fact they are. this propensity as being due to their being made of a preponderance of the
heavier elements, earth and water. If the form of a human being is to
That anyway is how those in favour of matter-involving forms take this account for this fact, plausibly it will have to make mention of the material
passage, but there is another possible reading. Instead of failing to realize constitution of human beings that results in this sort of characteristic
that human beings, unlike circles, are essentially realized in flesh and behaviour.
bones, and as such these must be included in their form, Socrates the
Younger’s mistake might have been his paying insufficient attention to the In assessing this argument, a lot seems to depend on how extensive an
fact that circles, being mathematical objects, need not be instantiated in explanatory role can be assigned to hypothetical necessity (cf. Physics ii
any specific kind of matter at all, whereas human beings always are. If this 9). All human beings have a tendency to fall, necessarily, at least in a
is the mistake that Aristotle is identifying, this passage would not support world with laws of physics like ours. However, it is not so clear whether
any sort of matter-involving forms, but only the view that natural forms, this characteristic sort of change is one which must be explained by the
like the form of a man, are always instantiated in matter of certain sorts. form or essence of a human being, as opposed to his matter. After all,
Even if the forms were necessarily so instantiated, this would not require there are lots of other sorts of thing, both living and inanimate, which
that the matter be included in the specification of the thing’s form. share this particular characteristic. Supposing there was a characteristic
sort of change peculiar to all and only human beings, even then it is not
There are other texts, which have been used to argue directly for the view obvious (a) that this fact has to be explained by the essence of a human
that Aristotle embraces matter-involving forms: De Anima i 1, where being, and (b) that its explanation will require the essence to be matter-
Aristotle describes anger as desire for retaliation manifested in boiling of involving. To be sure, we would like some explanation of why this sort of
the blood around the heart; or Physics ii 2, where he says that natural change is peculiar to this sort of creature, but it might simply be a fact
forms are analogous to snubness, i.e., concavity realized in a nose. about the world that anything with an essence of this sort has to change in
Defenders of pure forms can attempt to deal with these passages by this sort of way, without that change being something that is specified
distinguishing between a pure form, and a broader “definition” (logos, within the essence itself.
horos, horismos) which brings in other causes.
In this connection it is important to notice that Aristotle recognizes the
As well as purely textual arguments, several more philosophical existence of idia, that is of properties that apply to all and only instances
motivations have been proffered in favour of matter-involving forms. One of a given species, which an instance of that species has necessarily, but
such argument relies on the fact that natural things, unlike mathematical which are not part of its essence: e.g., all and only human beings are
ones, are subject to change. Only things with matter are capable of change, capable of laughter (cf. Categories 5, 3a21, 4a10; Topics i 5, 102a18–30,
and, if natural forms are to account for the characteristic changes and v 5, 134a5–135b6). The essence of a human being is rationality, and

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the fact that we all (apparently) have a sense of humour follows from the A serious objection to position (4) is that it apparently leads to a vicious
essence together with how the world is. Many characteristic changes of infinite regress: if a compound’s essence or form is itself a compound of
organisms may be best explained in a similar way: all ducks waddle, but matter and form, and this second form has an essence or form which is
waddling is not part of their function. Rather anything that fulfils the also a hylomorphic compound, etc., every compound will have an infinite
functional requirements of a duck must (in a world like ours) walk series of essences or forms associated with it. Socrates is (essentially) a
inelegantly. compound of matter and form, so is his form, so is its form, etc. Note that
this regress only applies if all forms are held to be matter-involving. It
The question of whether or not Aristotelian forms are “essentially matter- does not afflict the more moderate matter-involving position, (2), since it
involving” is further complicated by some unclarity about what this holds that the form of the compound is matter-involving, and hence has
description precisely amounts to. In particular, it is unclear whether it is both material and formal parts, but that this second form, the form of the
supposed to be a thing’s form, which is also its essence, which is matter- form, is pure, and has itself as a form, e.g., the form of a computer may be
involving, or the essence of the form (or both). Aristotle identifies a computing functions in certain suitable matter, but the formal part of that
thing’s form with its essence at Metaphysics vii 7, 1032b1–2: “by form I form (computing functions) would be pure. The regress is not merely
mean the essence of each thing and ‹its› primary substance”. (He makes unattractively bloated and otiose. If a full explanation of what something
the same identity claim at vii 10, 1035b32, cf. also viii 4, 1044a36.) With is requires one to list an infinite series of forms, such explanations will not
this in mind, we can divide the possible views about matter-involving be viable for finite beings like us.
forms into the following four positions, with ascending degrees of matter-
involvement: A different way to avoid the regress which plagues (4) would be to deny
the assumption that anything that is matter-involving must be a compound
1. Pure forms: natural compounds (and their forms) have forms or of matter and form. Form is matter-involving, but that is not to say that it
essences that are not matter-involving. has its own form or essence and its own matter. Form and matter are
2. Compounds have forms or essences that involve matter, i.e., matter is introduced to explain certain facts about ordinary objects of perception,
part of the compound’s essence or form. The form that is part of the such as this man or this horse. Once those facts have been accounted for,
compound’s form, however, itself has a further form or essence that there is no need to look for the same explanations of the theoretical
is not matter-involving. entities which have been introduced to provide the original explanation.
3. As in (2), compounds have forms or essences that involve matter; but This way out of the regress involves denying that forms have essences,
forms themselves have no essences or forms. i.e., it reverts to position (3). This position faces a number of textual
4. As in (2) and (3), compounds have forms or essences that involve obstacles. For instance, at the beginning of De Anima i 1, Aristotle
matter; and so do forms, i.e., not only are the forms or essences of announces that “our aim is to grasp and understand [the soul’s] nature and
compounds themselves in some sense compounds of matter and form, essence, and secondly its properties” (402a7–8). In Metaphysics vii 11, he
as in (2) and (3), but they themselves have further essences or forms refers to the account (logos) of the essence (1037a22–3), and claims that
that are compounds of matter and form. “the account of the soul is [the account] of the man” (1037a28–9) (cf. also

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 Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

Physics ii 2, 194a13). For these textual reasons it would be preferable for a involving. On position (1), a thing has only one form, which is “pure” in
proponent of (3) to be able to say that forms do have essences or the sense that it contains no matter. However, the defender of pure forms
definitions in a sense, but they are identical with these (as snubness = must admit that there is also a broader definition of a thing, which does
concavity in a nose). Their essences are not some further thing, distinct include its matter, as well as its other causes. Superficially, the only
from them. difference seems to be whether or not this “definition” gets to be classified
as a form, and this might appear to be a merely verbal disagreement. In
The difficulty with this is that it is not clear that the defender of (3) can fact, more is at stake here: although, “definition”, “form” and “essence”
claim that forms have definitions of any sort and still maintain a doctrine are often treated as though they were interchangeable, a definition is
that is distinct from both (2), on the one hand, and (4) on the other. Given strictly-speaking something linguistic, whereas an essence or form may
that forms are definitions, they must have a structure that approximates to have a structure that corresponds to something linguistic, but it is still a
that of a linguistic entity. Whatever else one says about them then, it thing in the world. For example, the essence or form of a human being is a
seems clear that they must be divisible (in thought) into component parts, soul. A commitment to two essences or forms per compound substance is
as complex predicates are divisible into words. We may ask of these an additional metaphysical commitment in a way that a broader linguistic
component parts whether or not they are matter-involving, i.e., the definition of a thing that mentions both its form and its matter need not be.
question which the proponent of (3) answers in the affirmative with If important theoretical work cannot be found for matter-involving forms,
respect to the form or essence of the compound—does it have parts which then, pure forms are the more ontologically parsimonious choice.
correspond to material terms like “flesh” or “hand” or “matter”? If some
parts of the form’s definition are matter-involving, and others are not, this In any event, one can see that Aristotle’s initial contrast between matter
seems to make the definition in some sense a compound of material and and form grows quickly complex once hylomorphism leaves the domain
formal parts. We can then identify the formal parts, and ask if there is a of change. Although introduced as contrastive notions suited to explicate
definition of them, and, if the answer is “yes, a matter-involving one”, we change and substantial generation in the absence of generation ex nihilo,
are stuck once again with the regress which afflicted (4). On the other any easy contrast between form and matter turns out to be difficult to
hand, if no part of the form’s definition is matter-involving, the proponent sustain once it finds employment in its further applications. Even so, as
of (3) must hold that, while compounds have essences which are matter- Aristotle implies, and as many of his followers have affirmed,
involving, these essences have definitions which are not, and this seems to hylomorphism proves no less elastic than explanatorily powerful across a
make his view intolerably similar to (2). wide range of explanatory roles.

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second form or essence of this matter-involving form, which is not matter-

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 Form vs. Matter Thomas Ainsworth

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Aristotelian Society, 73: 1991–33. Reprinted in Barnes, Schofield, Oleron 28 juin-3 juillet 1987.
and Sorabji 1979: 65–75. Fine, K., 1994, “A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form”, in Scaltas,
–––, 1981, Aristotle the Philosopher, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Charles, and Gill 1994: 13–40.
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Gill, M.L., 1989, Aristotle on Substance: the Paradox of Unity, Princeton: Geschichte der Philosophie, 75: 1–30.
Princeton University Press. –––, 2007, Aristotle, New York: Routledge. Ch. 2.
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Philosophy, 28: 161–99. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 475–494.
Loux, M., 1991, Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Ζ Whiting, J., 1986, “Form and Individuation in Aristotle”, History of
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Zimmerman 2008: 341–363. Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP
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Philosophy, 6: 103–137. psychology | Aristotle, Special Topics: causality | Aristotle, Special
–––, 1993, “The Homonymy of the Body in Aristotle”, Archive für Topics: natural philosophy

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 Form vs. Matter

Copyright © 2020 by the author

Thomas Ainsworth

36 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 pdf version of the entry
Qualia
[Link] Qualia
from the Fall 2021 Edition of the First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Thu Aug 12, 2021

Stanford Encyclopedia Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over
sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright
of Philosophy purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of
a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is
something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology
that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to
refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental
lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia,
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understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart
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1. Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’
Qualia 2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia?
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 Qualia Michael Tye

5. Qualia and the Explanatory Gap (2) Qualia as properties of sense data. Consider a painting of a dalmatian.
6. Qualia and Introspection Viewers of the painting can apprehend not only its content (i.e., its
7. Representational Theories of Qualia representing a dalmatian) but also the colors, shapes, and spatial relations
8. Qualia as Intrinsic, Nonrepresentational Properties obtaining among the blobs of paint on the canvas. It has sometimes been
9. Relational Theories of Qualia supposed that being aware or conscious of a visual experience is like
10. Illusionism about Qualia viewing an inner, non-physical picture or sense-datum. So, for example,
11. Russellian Monism about Qualia on this conception, if I see a dalmatian, I am subject to a mental picture-
12. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia? like representation of a dalmatian (a sense-datum), introspection of which
Bibliography reveals to me both its content and its intrinsic, non-representational
Academic Tools features (counterparts to the visual features of the blobs of paint on the
Other Internet Resources canvas). These intrinsic, non-representational features have been taken by
Related Entries advocates of the sense-datum theory to be the sole determinants of what it
is like for me to have the experience. In a second, more restricted sense of
the term ‘qualia’, then, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, non-
1. Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’ representational features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal
objects that are responsible for their phenomenal character. Historically,
(1) Qualia as phenomenal character. Consider your visual experience as
the term ‘qualia’ was first used in connection with the sense-datum theory
you stare at a bright turquoise color patch in a paint store. There is
by C.I. Lewis in 1929. As Lewis used the term, qualia were properties of
something it is like for you subjectively to undergo that experience. What
sense-data themselves.
it is like to undergo the experience is very different from what it is like for
you to experience a dull brown color patch. This difference is a difference (3) Qualia as intrinsic non-representational properties. There is another
in what is often called ‘phenomenal character’. The phenomenal character established sense of the term ‘qualia’, which is similar to the one just
of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. given but which does not demand of qualia advocates that they endorse the
If you are told to focus your attention upon the phenomenal character of sense-datum theory. However sensory experiences are ultimately analyzed
your experience, you will find that in doing so you are aware of certain — whether, for example, they are taken to involve relations to sensory
qualities. These qualities — ones that are accessible to you when you objects or they are identified with neural events or they are held to be
introspect and that together make up the phenomenal character of the physically irreducible events — many philosophers suppose that they have
experience are sometimes called ‘qualia’. C.S. Peirce seems to have had intrinsic, consciously accessible features that are non-representational and
something like this in mind when he introduced the term ‘quale’ into that are solely responsible for their phenomenal character. These features,
philosophy in 1866 (1866/1982, para 223). whatever their ultimate nature, physical or non-physical, are often dubbed
‘qualia’.
There are more restricted uses of the term ‘qualia’, however.

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In the case of visual experiences, for example, it is frequently supposed 2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia?
that there is a range of visual qualia, where these are taken to be intrinsic
features of visual experiences that (a) are accessible to introspection, (b) The following would certainly be included on my own list. (1) Perceptual
can vary without any variation in the representational contents of the experiences, for example, experiences of the sort involved in seeing green,
experiences, (c) are mental counterparts to some directly visible properties hearing loud trumpets, tasting liquorice, smelling the sea air, handling a
of objects (e.g., color), and (d) are the sole determinants of the piece of fur. (2) Bodily sensations, for example, feeling a twinge of pain,
phenomenal character of the experiences. This usage of ‘qualia’ has feeling an itch, feeling hungry, having a stomach ache, feeling hot, feeling
become perhaps the most common one in recent years. Philosophers who dizzy. Think here also of experiences such as those present during orgasm
hold or have held that there are qualia, in this sense of the term, include, or while running flat-out. (3) Felt reactions or passions or emotions, for
for example, Nagel (1974), Peacocke (1983) and Block (1990). example, feeling delight, lust, fear, love, feeling grief, jealousy, regret. (4)
Felt moods, for example, feeling elated, depressed, calm, bored, tense,
(4) Qualia as intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties. Some miserable. (For more here, see Haugeland 1985, pp. 230–235).
philosophers (e.g, Dennett 1987, 1991) use the term ‘qualia’ in a still more
restricted way so that qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences that are Should we include any other mental states on the list? Galen Strawson has
also ineffable, nonphysical, and ‘given’ to their subjects incorrigibly claimed (1994) that there are such things as the experience of
(without the possibility of error). Philosophers who deny that there are understanding a sentence, the experience of suddenly thinking of
qualia sometimes have in mind qualia as the term is used in this more something, of suddenly remembering something, and so on. Moreover, in
restricted sense (or a similar one). It is also worth mentioning that his view, experiences of these sorts are not reducible to associated sensory
sometimes the term ‘qualia’ is restricted to sensory experiences by experiences and/or images. Strawson’s position here seems to be that
definition, while on other occasions it is allowed that if thoughts and other thought-experience is a distinctive experience in its own right. He says, for
such cognitive states have phenomenal character, then they also have example: “Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought
qualia. Thus, announcements by philosophers who declare themselves experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an
opposed to qualia need to be treated with some caution. One can agree that experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential
there are no qualia in the last three senses I have explained, while still modalities” (p. 196). On Strawson’s view, then, some thoughts have
endorsing qualia in the standard first sense. qualia. (This is also the position of Horgan and Tienson (2002).)

In the rest of this entry, we use the term ‘qualia’ in the very broad way I This view is controversial. One response is to claim that the phenomenal
did at the beginning of the entry. So, we take it for granted that there are aspects of understanding derive largely from linguistic (or verbal) images,
qualia. Later on, in section 8, we discuss specifically the view of qualia as which have the phonological and syntactic structure of items in the
intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. subject’s native language. These images frequently even come complete
with details of stress and intonation. As we read, it is sometimes
phenomenally as if we are speaking to ourselves. (Likewise when we

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consciously think about something without reading). We often “hear” an acquires information about the world outside from the black and white
inner voice. Depending upon the content of the passage, we may also books her captors have made available to her, from the black and white
undergo a variety of emotions and feelings. We may feel tense, bored, television sets attached to external cameras, and from the black and white
excited, uneasy, angry. Once all these reactions are removed, together with monitor screens hooked up to banks of computers. As time passes, Mary
the images of an inner voice and the visual sensations produced by acquires more and more information about the physical aspects of color
reading, some would say (myself included) that no phenomenology and color vision. (For a real life case of a visual scientist (Knut Nordby)
remains. who is an achromotope, see Sacks 1996, Chapter 1.) Eventually, Mary
becomes the world’s leading authority on these matters. Indeed she comes
In any event, images and sensations of the above sorts are not always to know all the physical facts pertinent to everyday colors and color
present in thought. They are not essential to thought. Consider, for vision.
example, the thoughts involved in everyday visual recognition (or the
thoughts of creatures without a natural language). Still, she wonders to herself: What do people in the outside world
experience when they see the various colors? What is it like for them to
What about desires, for example, my desire for a week’s holiday in see red or green? One day her captors release her. She is free at last to see
Venice? It is certainly true that in some cases, there is an associated things with their real colors (and free too to scrub off the awful black and
phenomenal character. Often when we strongly desire something, we white paint that covers her body). She steps outside her room into a garden
experience a feeling of being “pulled” or “tugged”. There may also be full of flowers. “So, that is what it is like to experience red,” she exclaims,
accompanying images in various modalities. as she sees a red rose. “And that,” she adds, looking down at the grass, “is
what it is like to experience green.”
Should we include such propositional attitudes as feeling angry that the
house has been burgled or seeing that the computer is missing on the list? Mary here seems to make some important discoveries. She seems to find
These seem best treated as hybrid or complex states, one component of out things she did not know before. How can that be, if, as seems possible,
which is essentially a phenomenal state and the other (a judgment or at least in principle, she has all the physical information there is to have
belief) is not. Thus, in both cases, there is a constituent experience that is about color and color vision — if she knows all the pertinent physical
the real bearer of the relevant quale or qualia. facts?

3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Non-Physical Entities? One possible explanation is that that there is a realm of subjective,
phenomenal qualities associated with color, qualities the intrinsic nature of
The literature on qualia is filled with thought-experiments of one sort or which Mary comes to discover upon her release, as she herself undergoes
another. Perhaps the most famous of these is the case of Mary, the brilliant the various new color experiences. Before she left her room, she only
color scientist. Mary, so the story goes (Jackson 1982), is imprisoned in a knew the objective, physical basis of those subjective qualities, their
black and white room. Never having been permitted to leave it, she

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causes and effects, and various relations of similarity and difference. She experience of the rose matches. Sometimes she picks one; at other times
had no knowledge of the subjective qualities in themselves. she picks the other. Nor is she able afterwards to imagine things as having
hue, red-17, or as having that very shade of red the rose had; and for
This explanation is not available to the physicalist. If what it is like for precisely the same reason.
someone to experience red is one and the same as some physical quality,
then Mary already knows that while in her room. Likewise, for The Ability Hypothesis appears to be in trouble. An alternative physicalist
experiences of the other colors. For Mary knows all the pertinent physical proposal is that Mary in her room lacks certain phenomenal concepts,
facts. What, then, can the physicalist say? certain ways of thinking about or mentally representing color experiences
and colors. Once she leaves the room, she acquires these new modes of
Some physicalists respond that knowing what it is like is know-how and thought as she experiences the various colors. Even so, the qualities the
nothing more. Mary acquires certain abilities, specifically in the case of new concepts pick out are ones she knew in a different way in her room,
red, the ability to recognize red things by sight alone, the ability to for they are physical or functional qualities like all others.
imagine a red expanse, the ability to remember the experience of red. She
does not come to know any new information, any new facts about color, One problem this approach faces is that it seems to imply that Mary does
any new qualities. This is the view of David Lewis (1990) and Lawrence not really make a new discovery when she says, “So, that is what it is like
Nemirow (1990). to experience red.” Upon reflection, however, it is far from obvious that
this is really a consequence. For it is widely accepted that concepts or
The Ability Hypothesis, as it is often called, is more resilient than many modes of presentation are involved in the individuation of thought-
philosophers suppose (see Tye 2000, Chapter One). But it has difficulty in contents, given one sense of the term ‘content’ — the sense in which
properly accounting for our knowledge of what it is like to undergo thought-content is whatever information that-clauses provide that suffices
experiences of determinate hues while we are undergoing them. For for the purposes of even the most demanding rationalizing explanation. In
example, I can know what it is like to experience red-17, as I stare at a this sense, what I think, when I think that Cicero was an orator, is not what
rose of that color. Of course, I don’t know the hue as red-17. My I think when I think that Tully was an orator. This is precisely why it is
conception of it is likely just that shade of red. But I certainly know what possible to discover that Cicero is Tully. The thought that Cicero was an
it is like to experience the hue while it is present. Unfortunately, I lack the orator differs from the thought that Tully was an orator not at the level of
abilities Lewis cites and so does Mary even after she leaves her cell. She is truth-conditions — the same singular proposition is partly constitutive of
not able to recognize things that are red-17 as red-17 by sight. Given the the content of both — but at the level of concepts or mode of presentation.
way human memory works and the limitations on it, she lacks the concept The one thought exercises the concept Cicero; the other the concept Tully.
red-17. She has no mental template that is sufficiently fine-grained to The concepts have the same reference, but they present the referent in
permit her to identify the experience of red-17 when it comes again. different ways and thus the two thoughts can play different roles in
Presented with two items, one red-17 and the other red-18, in a series of rationalizing explanation.
tests, she cannot say with any accuracy which experience her earlier

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It appears then that there is no difficulty in holding both that Mary comes philosophers contend that a proper theory of phenomenal concepts shows
to know some new things upon her release, while already knowing all the that no satisfactory answer can be given by the physicalist to the example
pertinent real-world physical facts, even though the new experiences she of Mary’s Room (Chalmers 1999). Another possibility is that the very idea
undergoes and their introspectible qualities are wholly physical. In an of a phenomenal concept, conceived of as a concept very different in how
ordinary, everyday sense, Mary’s knowledge increases. And that, it may be it functions from concepts applied elsewhere, is itself confused. On this
contended, is all the physicalist needs to answer the Knowledge view, physicalists who have appealed to phenomenal concepts to handle
Argument. (The term ‘fact’, it should be mentioned, is itself ambiguous. the example of Mary’s Room have been barking up the wrong tree (Tye
Sometimes it is used to pick out real-world states of affairs alone; 2009).
sometimes it is used for such states of affairs under certain
conceptualizations. When we speak of the physical facts above, we should Another famous anti-reductionist thought-experiment concerning qualia
be taken to refer either to physical states of affairs alone or to those states appeals to the possibility of zombies. A philosophical zombie is a
of affairs under purely physical conceptualizations. For more on ‘fact’, see molecule by molecule duplicate of a sentient creature, a normal human-
Tye 1995.) being, for example, but who differs from that creature in lacking any
phenomenal consciousness. For me, as I lie on the beach, happily drinking
Some philosophers insist that the difference between the old and the new some wine and watching the waves, I undergo a variety of visual,
concepts in this case is such that there must be a difference in the world olfactory, and gustatory experiences. But my zombie twin experiences
between the properties these concepts stand for or denote (Jackson 1993, nothing at all. He has no phenomenal consciousness. Since my twin is an
Chalmers 1996). Some of these properties Mary knew in her cell; others exact physical duplicate of me, his inner psychological states will be
she becomes cognizant of only upon her release. This is necessary for functionally isomorphic with my own (assuming he is located in an
Mary to make a real discovery: she must come to associate with the identical environment). Whatever physical stimulus is applied, he will
experience of red new qualities she did not associate with it in her room. process the stimulus in the same way as I do, and produce exactly the
The physicalist is committed to denying this claim; for the new qualities same behavioral responses. Indeed, on the assumption that non-
would have to be non-physical. phenomenal psychological states are functional states (that is, states
definable in terms of their role or function in mediating between stimuli
The issues here are complex. What the physicalist really needs to settle the and behavior), my zombie twin has just the same beliefs, thoughts, and
issue is a theory of phenomenal concepts (a theory, that is, of the allegedly desires as I do. He differs from me only with respect to experience. For
special concepts that are deployed from the first person point of view him, there is nothing it is like to stare at the waves or to sip wine.
when we recognize our experiences as being of such-and-such subjective
types) which is itself compatible with physicalism. There are proposals on The hypothesis that there can be philosophical zombies is not normally the
offer (see, for example, Hill 1991, Loar 1990, Levine 2000, Sturgeon hypothesis that such zombies are nomically possible, that their existence is
2000, Perry 2001, Papineau 2002, Tye, 2003), but there is as yet no consistent with the actual laws of nature. Rather the suggestion is that
agreement as to the form such a theory should take, and some

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zombie replicas of this sort are at least imaginable and hence are metaphysically possible. Since the anti-physicalist argument requires
metaphysically possible. metaphysical possibility — mere conceptual possibility will not suffice —
it now collapses. That conceptual possibility is too weak for the anti-
Philosophical zombies pose a serious threat to physicalist views of qualia. physicalist’s purposes (at least without further qualification and argument)
To begin with, if zombie replicas are metaphysically possible, then there is is shown by the fact that it is conceptually possible that I am not Michael
a simple argument that seems to show that phenomenal states are not Tye (that I am an impostor or someone misinformed about his past) even
identical with internal, objective, physical states. Suppose objective, though, given the actual facts, it is metaphysically impossible.
physical state P can occur without phenomenal state S in some appropriate
zombie replica (in the metaphysical sense of ‘can’ noted above). 4. Functionalism and Qualia
Intuitively S cannot occur without S. Pain, for example, cannot be felt
without pain. So, P has a modal property S lacks, namely the property of Functionalism is the view that individual qualia have functional natures,
possibly occurring without S. So, by Leibniz’ Law (the law that for that the phenomenal character of, e.g., pain is one and the same as the
anything x and for anything y, if x is identical with y then x and y share all property of playing such-and-such a causal or teleofunctional role in
the same properties), S is not identical with P. mediating between physical inputs (e.g., body damage) and physical
outputs (e.g., withdrawal behavior). On this view (Lycan 1987), qualia are
Secondly, if a person microphysically identical with me, located in an
multiply physically realizable. Inner states that are physically very
identical environment (both present and past), can lack any phenomenal
different may nonetheless feel the same. What is crucial to what it is like
experiences, then facts pertaining to experience and feeling, facts about
is functional role, not underlying hardware.
qualia, are not necessarily fixed or determined by the objective
microphysical facts. And this the physicalist cannot allow, even if she There are two famous objections to functionalist theories of qualia: the
concedes that phenomenally conscious states are not strictly identical with Inverted Spectrum and the Absent Qualia Hypothesis. The first move in
internal, objective, physical states. For the physicalist, whatever her stripe, the former objection consists in claiming that you might see red when I
must at least believe that the microphysical facts determine all the facts, see green and vice-versa; likewise for the other colors so that our color
that any world that was exactly like ours in all microphysical respects experiences are phenomenally inverted. This does not suffice to create
(down to the smallest detail, to the position of every single boson, for trouble for the functionalist yet. For you and I are surely representationally
example) would have to be like our world in all respects (having identical different here: for example, you have a visual experience that represents
mountains, lakes, glaciers, trees, rocks, sentient creatures, cities, and so red when I have one that represents green. And that representational
on). difference brings with it a difference in our patterns of causal interactions
with external things (and thereby a functional difference).
One well-known physicalist reply to the case of zombies (Loar 1990) is to
grant that they are conceptually possible, or at least that there is no This reply can be handled by the advocate of inverted qualia by switching
obvious contradiction in the idea of a zombie, while denying that zombies to a case in which we both have visual experiences with the same

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representational contents on the same occasions while still differing by-molecule duplicates (in the same external, physical settings) as it is to
phenomenally. Whether such cases are really metaphysically possible is imagine inverted qualia in functional duplicates. If the former duplicates
open to dispute, however. Certainly, those philosophers who are are really metaphysically impossible, as the physicalist is committed to
representationalists about qualia (see Section 7) would deny their claiming, why not the latter? Some further convincing argument needs to
possibility. Indeed, it is not even clear that such cases are conceptually be given that the two cases are disanalogous. As yet, to my mind, no such
possible (Harrison 1973, Hardin 1993, Tye 1995). But leaving this to one argument has been presented. (Of course, this response does not apply to
side, it is far from obvious that there would not have to be some salient those philosophers who take the view that qualia are irreducible, non-
fine-grained functional differences between us, notwithstanding our gross physical entities. However, these philosophers have other severe problems
functional identity. of their own. In particular, they face the problem of phenomenal causation.
Given the causal closure of the physical, how can qualia make any
Consider a computational example. For any two numerical inputs, M and difference? For more here, see Tye 1995, Chalmers 1996).
N, a given computer always produces as outputs the product of M and N.
There is a second computer that does exactly the same thing. In this way, The absent qualia hypothesis is the hypothesis that functional duplicates of
they are functionally identical. Does it follow that they are running exactly sentient creatures are possible, duplicates that entirely lack qualia. For
the same program? Of course, not! There are all sorts of programs that will example, one writer (Block 1980) asks us to suppose that a billion Chinese
multiply together two numbers. These programs can differ dramatically. people are each given a two-way radio with which to communicate with
At one gross level the machines are functionally identical, but at lower one another and with an artificial (brainless) body. The movements of the
levels the machines can be functionally different. body are controlled by the radio signals, and the signals themselves are
made in accordance with instructions the Chinese people receive from a
In the case of you and me, then, the opponent of inverted qualia can claim vast display in the sky which is visible to all of them. The instructions are
that, even if we are functionally identical at a coarse level — we both call such that the participating Chinese people function like individual
red things ‘red’, we both believe that those things are red on the basis of neurons, and the radio links like synapses, so that together the Chinese
our experiences, we both are caused to undergo such experiences by people duplicate the causal organization of a human brain. Whether or not
viewing red things, etc. — there are necessarily fine-grained differences in this system, if it were ever actualized, would actually undergo any feelings
our internal functional organization. And that is why our experiences are and experiences, it seems coherent to suppose that it might not. But if this
phenomenally different. is a real metaphysical possibility, then qualia do not have functional
essences.
Some philosophers will no doubt respond that it is still imaginable that
you and I are functionally identical in all relevant respects yet One standard functionalist reply to cases like the China-body system is to
phenomenally different. But this claim presents a problem at least for bite the bullet and to argue that however strange it seems, the China-body
those philosophers who oppose functionalism but who accept physicalism. system could not fail to undergo qualia. The oddness of this view derives,
For it is just as easy to imagine that there are inverted qualia in molecule- according to some functionalists (Lycan 1987), from our relative size. We

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are each so much smaller than the China-body system that we fail to see This is the famous “explanatory gap” for qualia (Levine 1983, 2000).
the forest for the trees. Just as a creature the size of a neuron trapped Some say that the explanatory gap is unbridgeable and that the proper
inside a human head might well be wrongly convinced that there could not conclusion to draw from it is that there is a corresponding gap in the
be consciousness there, so we too draw the wrong conclusion as we world. Experiences and feelings have irreducibly subjective, non-physical
contemplate the China-body system. It has also been argued (e.g., by qualities (Jackson 1993; Chalmers 1996, 2005). Others take essentially the
Shoemaker 1975) that any system that was a full functional duplicate of same position on the gap while insisting that this does not detract from a
one of us would have to be subject to all the same beliefs, including purely physicalist view of experiences and feelings. What it shows rather
beliefs about its own internal states. Thus the China-Body system would is that some physical qualities or states are irreducibly subjective entities
have to believe that it experiences pain; and if it had beliefs of this sort, (Searle 1992). Others hold that the explanatory gap may one day be
then it could not fail to be the subject of some experiences (and hence bridged but we currently lack the concepts to bring the subjective and
some states with phenomenal character). If this reply is successful (for an objective perspectives together. On this view, it may turn out that qualia
updated version of this reply and a new related thought experiment, see are physical, but we currently have no clear conception as to how they
Tye 2006), what it shows is that the property of having some phenomenal could be (Nagel 1974). Still others adamantly insist that the explanatory
character or other has a functional essence. But it does not show that gap is, in principle, bridgeable but not by us or by any creatures like us.
individual qualia are functional in nature. Thus one could accept that Experiences and feelings are as much a part of the physical, natural world
absent qualia are impossible while also holding that inverted spectra are as life, digestion, DNA, or lightning. It is just that with the concepts we
possible (see, e.g., Shoemaker 1975). have and the concepts we are capable of forming, we are cognitively
closed to a full, bridging explanation by the very structure of our minds
5. Qualia and the Explanatory Gap (McGinn 1991).

Our grasp of what it is like to undergo phenomenal states is supplied to us Another view that has been gaining adherents of late is that there is a real,
by introspection. We also have an admittedly incomplete grasp of what unbridgeable gap, but it has no consequences for the nature of
goes on objectively in the brain and the body. But there is, it seems, a vast consciousness and physicalist or functionalist theories thereof. On this
chasm between the two. It is very hard to see how this chasm in our view, there is nothing in the gap that should lead us to any bifurcation in
understanding could ever be bridged. For no matter how deeply we probe the world between experiences and feelings on the one hand and physical
into the physical structure of neurons and the chemical transactions which or functional phenomena on the other. There aren’t two sorts of natural
occur when they fire, no matter how much objective information we come phenomena: the irreducibly subjective and the objective. The explanatory
to acquire, we still seem to be left with something that we cannot explain, gap derives from the special character of phenomenal concepts. These
namely, why and how such-and-such objective, physical changes, concepts mislead us into thinking that the gap is deeper and more
whatever they might be, generate so-and-so subjective feeling, or any troublesome than it really is.
subjective feeling at all.

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On one version of this view, phenomenal concepts are just indexical your visual experience is transparent or diaphanous. When you try to
concepts applied to phenomenal states via introspection (see Lycan 1996). examine it, you see right through it, as it were, to the qualities you were
On an alternative version of the view, phenomenal concepts are very experiencing all along in being a subject of the experience, qualities your
special, first-person concepts different in kind from all others (see Tye experience is of.
2003). This response to the explanatory gap obviously bears affinities to
the second physicalist response sketched in Section 3 to the Knowledge This point holds good, according to the philosophers above, even if you
Argument. Unfortunately, if the appeal to phenomenal concepts by the are hallucinating and there is no real patch of paint on the wall before you.
physicalist is misguided, then it cannot be used to handle the gap. Still you have an experience of there being a patch of paint out there with
a certain color and shape. It’s just that this time your experience is a
There is no general agreement on how the gap is generated and what it misrepresentation. And if you turn your attention inwards to your
shows. experience, you will ‘see’ right through it again to those very same
qualities.
6. Qualia and Introspection
These observations suggest that qualia, conceived of as the immediately
In the past, philosophers have often appealed directly to introspection on ‘felt’ qualities of experiences of which we are cognizant when we attend to
behalf of the view that qualia are intrinsic, non-intentional features of them introspectively, do not really exist. The qualities of which we are
experiences. Recently, a number of philosophers have claimed that aware are not qualities of experiences at all, but rather qualities that, if
introspection reveals no such qualities (Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye they are qualities of anything, are qualities of things in the world (as in the
1995, 2000). Suppose you are facing a white wall, on which you see a case of perceptual experiences) or of regions of our bodies (as in the case
bright red, round patch of paint. Suppose you are attending closely to the of bodily sensations). This is not to say that experiences do not have
color and shape of the patch as well as the background. Now turn your qualia. The point is that qualia are not qualities of experiences. This claim,
attention from what you see out there in the world before you to your which will be developed further in the next section, is controversial and
visual experience. Focus upon your awareness of the patch as opposed to some philosophers deny outright the thesis of transparency with respect to
the patch of which you are aware. Do you find yourself suddenly qualia (see Block 1991, 2000; Stoljar 2004; Nida-Rümelin 2007).
acquainted with new qualities, qualities that are intrinsic to your visual According to Block, for example, qualia are not presented to us in
experience in the way that redness and roundness are qualities intrinsic to introspection as intrinsic, non-intentional properties of our experiences.
the patch of paint? According to some philosophers, the answer to this Still it does not follow from this that we are not introspectively acquainted
question is a resounding ‘No’. As you look at the patch, you are aware of with such properties. For we do know on the basis of introspection what it
certain features out there in the world. When you turn your attention is like to undergo a visual experience of blue, say. So, if what a state is like
inwards to your experience of those features, you are aware that you are is a matter of which intrinsic, non-intentional properties it tokens, then
having an experience of a certain sort but you aware of the very same obviously we are introspectively aware of properties of this sort (in the de
features; no new features of your experience are revealed. In this way, re sense of ‘of’). On this view, whether qualia are properties of

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experiences (in particular, intrinsic, non-intentional properties) is a experiences without any phenomenal difference. If you and I see a
theoretical matter. Introspection does not settle the matter one way or the telescope from the same viewing angle, for example, then even if I do not
other. recognize it as a telescope and you do (so that our experiences differ
representationally at this level), the way the telescope looks to both of us
7. Representational Theories of Qualia is likely pretty much the same (in the phenomenal sense of ‘looks’).
Likewise, if a child is viewing the same item from the same vantage point,
Talk of the ways things look and feel is intensional. If I have a red after- her experience will likely be pretty similar to yours and mine too.
image as a result of a flashbulb going off, the spot I ‘see’ in front of the Phenomenally, our experiences are all very much alike, notwithstanding
photographer’s face looks red, even though there is no such spot. If I live certain higher-level representational differences. This, according to some
in a world in which all and only things that are purple are poisonous, it is representationalists, is because we all have experiences that represent to us
still the case that an object that looks purple to me does not thereby look the same 3-D surfaces, edges, colors, and surface-shapes plus a myriad of
poisonous (in the phenomenal sense of ‘looks’). If I feel a pain in a leg, I other surface details.
need not even have a leg. My pain might be a pain in a phantom limb.
Facts such as these have been taken to provide further support for the The representation we share here has a content much like that of the 2 1/2-
contention that some sort of representational account is appropriate for D sketch posited by David Marr in his famous theory of vision (1982) to
qualia. which further shape and color information has been appended (for details,
see Tye 1995). This content is plausibly viewed as nonconceptual. It forms
If qualia are not qualities of experiences, as some philosophers maintain the output of the early, largely modular sensory processing and the input to
on the basis of an appeal to introspection, and the only qualities revealed one or another system of higher-level cognitive processing.
in introspection are qualities represented by experiences (qualities that, in Representationalists sometimes claim that it is here at this level of content
the perceptual case, if they belong to anything, belong to external things), that qualia are to be found (see Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2000; for an
a natural representational proposal is that qualia are really representational opposing representational view, see McDowell 1994).
contents of experiences into which the represented qualities enter. This
would also explain why we talk of experiences *having* qualia or One worry for this view is that if qualia are to be handled in terms of
*having* a phenomenal character. For the representational content of an representational content, then there had better be a content that is shared
experience is something the experience has; just as meaning is something by veridical visual experiences and their hallucinatory counterparts.
a word has. Moreover, just as the meaning of a word is not a quality the Disjunctivists have disputed the supposition that there is a common
word possesses, so the phenomenal character of an experience is not a content (see, e.g., Hinton 1973, Martin 1997, Snowdon 1990). Perhaps
quality the experience possesses. veridical experiences have only singular contents and hallucinatory
experiences have gappy contents or no content at all (for an extended
If qualia are representational contents, just which contents are these? discussion of visual experience and content, see Pautz 2010, Siegel 2011).
Obviously there can be differences in the representational contents of

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An alternative possibility is that qualia are properties represented by content are of the right sort then, according to the wide representationalist,
experiences. On this view, there need be no common content shared by microphysical twins cannot fail to differ with respect to the phenomenal
veridical experiences and their hallucinatory counterparts. It suffices that character of their experiences. What makes for a difference in
the same properties be represented. Of course, such a view requires that a representational content in microphysical duplicates is some external
further account be provided of what it is that makes a property represented difference, some connection between the subjects and items in their
by an experience a quale. respective environments. The generic connection is sometimes called
‘tracking’, though there is no general agreement as to in what exactly
Some philosophers try to ground qualia in modes of representation tracking consists.
deployed by experiences within their representational contents. On one
version of this view, visual experiences not only represent the external On wide representationalism, qualia (like meanings) ain’t in the head. The
world but also represent themselves (for a recent collection of essays classic, Cartesian-based picture of experience and its relation to the world
elaboarating this view, see Kriegel and Williford 2006). For example, my is thus turned upside down. Qualia are not intrinsic qualities of inner ideas
current visual experience of a red object not only represents the object as of which their subjects are directly aware, qualities that are necessarily
red (this is my focal awareness) but also represents itself as red (this is shared by internal duplicates however different their environments may
normally a kind of peripheral awareness I have of my experience). When I be. Rather, they are representational contents certain inner states possess,
introspect, the experience alone provides me with awareness of itself — contents whose nature is fixed at least in part by certain external relations
no higher order thought is necessary. What the experience is like for me is between individuals and their environments (Byrne and Tye 2006; for an
supposedly its redness, where this is a mode of representation my opposing but still representationalist view, see Pautz 2006).
experience uses to represent real world redness.
Representationalism, as presented so far, is an identity thesis with respect
This view is incompatible with the phenomenon of transparency (see to qualia: qualia are supposedly one and the same as certain
section 6) and it is very close to the classic qualiaphile view, according to representational contents. Sometimes it is held instead that qualia are one
which when the subject introspects, she is aware of the token experience and the same as certain representational properties of experiences (or
and its phenomenal properties. The new twist is that this awareness uses properties represented in experiences); and sometimes it is is argued that
the token experience itself and one of its contents. these representational properties are themselves irreducible (Siewert
1998). There is also a weaker version of representationalism, according to
Representationalists about qualia are often also externalists about which it is metaphysically necessary that experiences exactly alike with
representational content (but not always — see, for example, Chalmers respect to their representational contents are exactly alike with respect to
2004). On this view, what a given experience represents is metaphysically their qualia. Obviously, this supervenience thesis leaves open the further
determined at least, in part, by factors in the external environment. Thus, it question as to the essential nature of qualia.
is usually held, microphysical twins can differ with respect to the
representational contents of their experiences. If these differences in

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For further discussion, see Section 3 of the entry on representational is claimed, experiences have the same representational content but
theory of consciousness. Objections to representationalism are covered in different phenomenal character. Christopher Peacocke adduces examples
the next section. of this sort in his 1983. According to some (e.g., Block 1990, Shoemaker
forthcoming), the Inverted Spectrum also supplies an example that falls
8. Qualia as Intrinsic, Nonrepresentational Properties into this category. Another class is made up of problem cases in which
of Experiences allegedly experiences have different representational contents (of the
relevant sort) but the same phenomenal character. Ned Block’s Inverted
As noted in section 1, the term ‘qualia’ is sometimes used for intrinsic Earth example (1990) is of this type. The latter cases only threaten strong
nonrepresentational, consciously accessible properties of experience. representationalism, the former are intended to refute representationalism
Representationalists deny that there are qualia in this sense, while in both its strong and weaker forms. Counter-examples are also sometimes
identifying qualia in the broad sense (that is, qualia as phenomenal given in which supposedly experience of one sort or another is present but
character) with representational properties. However, some philosophers in which there is no state with representational content. Swampman
hold that there are qualia in the sense of intrinsic nonrepresentational (Davidson 1986) — the molecule by molecule replica of one of us, formed
properties of experience. These philosophers deny representationalism, accidentally by the chemical reaction that occurs in a swamp when a
and identify qualia in the broad sense with intrinsic nonrepresentational partially submerged log is hit by lightning — is one such counter-example,
properties of experience. This view is the subject of the present section. according to some philosophers. But there are more mundane cases.
Consider the exogenous feeling of depression. That, it may seem, has no
As noted earlier, some philosophers deny that experience is transparent. representational content. Likewise, the exogenous feeling of elation. Yet
They claim that introspection does not show that experiences lack these experiences certainly differ phenomenally.
introspectible, intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. Further, they insist
that representationalism encounters decisive objections. These objections There isn’t space to go through all these objections. We briefly discuss just
may be seen as making up one pillar in the main foundation for the view one: Inverted Earth. Inverted Earth is an imaginary planet, on which things
that experiences have qualia, conceived of now as intrinsic, have complementary colors to the colors of their counterparts on Earth.
nonrepresentational properties. The second pillar consists in what is The sky is yellow, grass is red, ripe tomatoes are green, and so on. The
sometimes called “the common kind assumption”, namely that veridical inhabitants of Inverted Earth undergo psychological attitudes and
and hallucinatory experiences sometimes share the same phenomenal experiences with inverted intentional contents relative to those of people
character (have the same qualia). This assumption is accepted by all the on Earth. They think that the sky is yellow, see that grass is red, etc.
advocates of the views discussed so far but it is denied by advocates of However, they call the sky ‘blue’, grass ‘green’, ripe tomatoes ‘red’, etc.
relational theories of qualia (see section 9). just as we do. Indeed, in all respects consistent with the alterations just
described, Inverted Earth is as much like Earth as possible.
Objections to representational views of qualia often take the form of
putative counter-examples. One class of these consists of cases in which, it

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In Block’s original version of the tale, mad scientists insert color-inverting The suggestion that tracking is teleological in character, at least for the
lenses in your eyes and take you to Inverted Earth, where you are case of basic experiences, goes naturally with the plausible view that states
substituted for your Inverted Earth twin or doppelganger. Upon like feeling pain or having a visual sensation of red are phylogenetically
awakening, you are aware of no difference, since the inverting lenses fixed (Dretske 1995). However, it encounters serious difficulties with
neutralize the inverted colors. You think that you are still where you were respect to the Swampman case mentioned above. On a cladistic
before. What it is like for you when you see the sky or anything else is just conception of species, Swampman is not human. Indeed, lacking any
what it was like on earth. But after enough time has passed, after you have evolutionary history, he belongs to no species at all. His inner states play
become sufficiently embedded in the language and physical environment no teleological role. Nature did not design any of them to do anything. So,
of Inverted Earth, your intentional contents will come to match those of if phenomenal character is a certain sort of teleo-representational content,
the other inhabitants. You will come to believe that the sky is yellow, for as some representationalists hold, then Swampman has no experiences and
example, just as they do. Similarly, you will come to have a visual no qualia. This, for many philosophers, is very difficult to believe.
experience that represents the sky as yellow. For the experiential state you
now undergo, as you view the sky, is the one that, in you, now normally There are alternative replies available (see Lycan 1996, Tye 2000) in
tracks yellow things. So, the later you will come to be subject to inner connection with the Inverted Earth problem. These involve either denying
states that are intentionally inverted relative to the inner states of the that qualia do remain constant with the switch to Inverted Earth or arguing
earlier you, while the phenomenal aspects of your experiences will remain that a non-teleological account of sensory content may be elaborated,
unchanged. under which qualia stay the same.

Perhaps the simplest reply that can be made with respect to this objection As noted above, the second pillar in the foundation of the view that qualia
is to deny that there really is any change in normal tracking with respect to are intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of experiences is the common
color, at least as far as your experiences go. “Normal”, after all, has both kind assumption. Those philosophers who accept this assumption see it (in
teleological and nonteleological senses. If what an experience normally the perceptual case) as providing the simplest, best explanation of the fact
tracks is what nature designed it to track, what it has as its biological that hallucinations and veridical perceptions sometimes seem exactly alike
purpose to track, then shifting environments from Earth to Inverted Earth to their subjects. It is granted, of course, that it does not follow that there is
will make no difference to normal tracking and hence no difference to the something common between hallucinations and perceptions in such cases
representational contents of your experiences. The sensory state that from the fact that they seem alike. Nonetheless, it is a challenge to those
nature designed in your species to track blue in the setting in which your who reject this assumption (see section 9) to provide a better explanation.
species evolved will continue to do just that even if through time, on
Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usually caused in you by
looking at yellow things.

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9. Relational Theories of Qualia from the same position may nonetheless differ in the character of their
visual experiences, depending upon how good their eyesight is (for
Relational theories of qualia typically begin with the naive realist thesis example) and how they distribute their attention.
that in normal circumstances perceivers are directly aware of the objects
around them and various properties that they have. It is then proposed that Of course, when one is (completely) hallucinating, there are no objects
since perceivers are also directly aware of what their experiences are like, that one sees. So, relationism cannot allow that the phenomenal character
the phenomenal character of their experiences in such cases is to be in this case is the same as in the veridical case. Accordingly, relationists
understood in terms of the relevant objects and their properties along with reject what was called in the last section “the common kind assumption”.
the viewpoint from which they are being observed. More precisely, it is One possible view consistent with relationism is that in hallucinatory cases
urged that the phenomenal character is constituted by the objects that the the phenomenal character is a matter of the representational content of the
perceiver sees, some of their properties and how they are arranged relative experience, as is claimed on some versions of representationalism.
to the viewer.(Campbell 2002) Another view, held by some relationists, is that there is nothing more to
the phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience — for example, an
In later work, Campbell (2009) allows that the viewer’s ‘standpoint’ needs experience of a red triangle — than its being indiscriminable or
to be factored into phenomenal character too. The standpoint a perceiver indistinguishable from a veridical experience of a red triangle (Martin
occupies includes much more than just the egocentric frame of the 2004, Fish 2009). On this view, in giving a mental characterization of a
perceiver. It includes the sense modality used to perceive, the time and hallucinatory experience, there is nothing more to be said than that it has a
place of the perceiving as well as the distance from the perceived object, certain relational and epistemological property, namely that of being
the orientation of the perceiver relative to the object, and the temporal indiscriminable from the relevant perceptual experience.
dynamics of the experience. Consciousness of an object, for Campbell,
now consists in a three-place relation between a perceiver, an object, and a Sometimes relationists try to motivate their view by arguing that since the
standpoint. With what exactly phenomenal character itself is to be seen objects are constituents of veridical visual experiences and they are
identified, on this proposal, is unclear. not in the case of hallucinatory experiences, the experiences in the two
cases must themselves be different. However, even if this is correct, it
Bill Brewer (2011) agrees with Campbell that a third relatum is needed in does not follow that they cannot share the same phenomenal character.
naïve realist accounts of perceptual experience, where the third relatum What follows is rather that if they do share a common phenomenal
includes the sense modality of the experience, the spatio-temporal point of character, then the conscious experiences are not to be individuated
view, and other relevant circumstances of perception but he does not (solely) by that phenomenal character.
specify what exactly these circumstances are. William Fish (2009) takes a
similar position, arguing that the third element should include One problem facing Martin’s relational account of hallucinatory
idiosyncracies of the perceiver’s visual system as well as attentional facts phenomenal character is that of cognitively unsophisticated perceivers.
about the perceiver since two ordinary perceivers viewing the same object Dogs can hallucinate but they lack the cognitive wherewithal to judge that

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their hallucinatory experiences of bones are the same or different from senses, we genuinely encounter a wide range of qualities, for example, in
their veridical experiences of squirrels. In at least one clear sense of perception, colors, auditory qualities such as pitch and loudness, various
‘indiscriminable’, then, their hallucinatory experiences of bones are textures and aromas. But the qualities so encountered are not properties of
indiscriminable to them from their veridical experiences of squirrels. But experiences; for we do not genuinely undergo any experiences. To be sure,
the phenomenal character of these experiences is certainly different. (For a when we introspect, it certainly seems to us that we are the subjects of
discussion of this problem and a response to it, see Martin 2004. For experiences with widely varying phenomenal character. But we are wrong.
criticisms, see Siegel 2009.)
There is a possible weaker version of this view under which it is only
Another problem for the relational view is that it cannot easily handle qualia in senses (2)–(4) that are being repudiated. And in some passages,
cases of normal misperception, for example, the Muller-Lyer illusion. some adherents of illusionism seem inclined to endorse this alternative.
Campbell tells us that idiosyncrasies of the perceiver may affect Frankish, for example, holds that we are under an illusion in thinking that
phenomenal character, but he has no account to offer of cases in which when we introspect, we come across special, private qualities. But he also
something looks other than it is even to normal observers in normal says that consciousness is a matter of being related to the world in various
circumstances. Here the scene before the eyes fails to capture the informational and reactive ways. This suggests that he holds that
phenomenology. Brewer says that illusions are to be accounted for in consciousness really does exist and thus also qualia in sense (1). Still,
terms of visually relevant similarities to paradigms of a kind of which the there are other passages in Frankish that endorse the unqualified line, and
perceived object is not an instance. In the case of the Muller-Lyer, the overall he seems to accept the strong illusionist view.
paradigm is a pair of lines one longer and more distant than its plane, the
other shorter and less distant. This proposal encounters various potential This position is not easy to take seriously; for what could be more obvious
difficulties (Pautz 2010). For example, in the waterfall illusion, the water than the existence of conscious experience? Adherents of the view may
appears to be moving and not moving at the same time. Here there are no respond that introspection simply leads us astray. On the basis of
suitable paradigms in the real world. (See the entry on the disjunctive introspection, we believe that we undergo experiences (states with qualia
theory of perception.) in sense (1)), but the beliefs so formed are false. What would help strong
illusionism here is a theory of introspection which can explain the
10. Illusionism about Qualia apparent absurdity of the view. Such a theory is proposed in Kammerer
2021.
According to illusionists (Dennett 2019, 2020; Frankish 2016; Kammerer
2021), conscious experience is an illusion. It certainly seems to us that 11. Russellian Monism about Qualia
conscious experiences, and thus qualia (at least in sense (1) of the four
senses distinguished at the beginning of this entry) exist, but in reality Russellian Monism (RM) gets its name from a view Bertrand Russell held
there are no such things. Qualia are like Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny in 1927 and that he himself called ‘neutral monism’. The key idea of this
(Dennett 2020). It is not being denied here that through the use of our view is that the fundamental entities in micro-reality have intrinsic natures

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not specified in microphysics, natures made up of properties (known as The quiddities generally that are phenomenally relevant are very different
quiddities), some of which are crucial to consciousness and conscious from macro-phenomenal properties; for it would be absurd to hold that
states. The standard reductive version holds that the relevant properties are quarks feel pains and itches and experience colors. So how are our qualia
themselves genuinely conscious properties (that is, qualia) of various related to micro-qualia? This question poses the combination problem for
sorts. Advocates include for example, Grover Maxwell (1978), David the Russellian monist about macro-qualia (see here Goff 2006, Coleman
Chalmers (1995 and 1997), Dan Stoljar (2001 and 2006), Galen Strawson 2014, Lewtas 2013, Roelofs 2019, Tye 2021). If our qualia are simple,
(2006), and Barbara Montero (2010). An alternative version of Russellian then there is real emergence and reductive Russellian Monism is false. On
Monism has it that the relevant properties are only proto-phenomenal. On the other hand, if our qualia are generated from combinations of micro-
one interesting version of this view (panqualityism), these properties are qualia, then why is it that our qualia seem (in some cases at any rate) so
not genuinely phenomenal since they are unexperienced but they are simple, so utterly lacking in components? To date, there is no agreed upon
nonetheless of the same kind as the phenomenal qualities present in our solution to the combination problem.
experiences of pain or color (Coleman 2006, 2015). It is a consequence of
this view that the latter qualities themselves are qualities of a sort that are 12. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia?
only contingently experienced. What makes these qualities qualia just is
the fact that they are experienced. Do frogs have qualia? Or fish? What about honey bees? Somewhere down
the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases. But where? It is
There is debate about whether RM is really a physicalist view. One thing sometimes supposed that once we begin to reflect upon much simpler
at least is clear: RM differs from the usual forms of physicalism in its beings than ourselves — snails, for example — we are left with nothing
reliance on quiddities and its assertion that specific quiddities are crucial physical or structural that we could plausibly take to help us determine
to macro-conscious states. Of course, if the Russellian monist holds that whether they are phenomenally conscious (Papineau 1994). There is really
some quiddities are genuinely phenomenal properties, then some physical no way of our knowing if spiders are subject to states with qualia, as they
things will have subjective properties as well as objective ones. And this spin their webs, or if fish undergo any phenomenal experiences, as they
might lead some to deny that RM is really a form of physicalism. Still, this swim about in the sea.
seems to me a verbal dispute about how to use the term ‘physicalism’.
Representationalism has the beginnings of an answer to the above
Russellian monists can say that they agree with dualists about the questions. If what it is for a state to have phenomenal character is (very
conceivability (and indeed metaphysical possibility) of zombies. Zombies roughly) that it be a state that (i) carries information about certain features,
are conceivable, they can claim, since it is conceivable that there are internal or external, and (ii) is such that this information stands ready and
beings the same as us except for the phenomenally relevant quiddities. available to make a direct difference to beliefs and desires (or belief- and
These beings are structurally, functionally, and behaviorally just like us desire-like states), then creatures that are incapable of reasoning, of
but they lack any conscious states. changing their behavior in light of assessments they make, based upon
information provided to them by sensory stimulation of one sort or

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 Qualia Michael Tye

another, are not phenomenally conscious. Tropistic organisms, on this Plants, on the representational view, are not subject to any qualia. Nothing
view, feel and experience nothing. They have no qualia. They are full- that goes on inside them is poised to make a direct difference to what they
fledged unconscious automata or zombies, rather as blindsight subjects are believe or desire, since they have no beliefs or desires.
restricted unconscious automata or partial zombies with respect to a range
of visual stimuli. Reasoning of the above sort can be used to make a case that even though
qualia do not extend to plants and paramecia, qualia are very widely
Consider, for example, the case of plants. There are many different sorts of distributed in nature (see Tye 1997, 2000). Of course, such a case requires
plant behavior. Some plants climb, others eat flies, still others catapult out decisions to be made about the attribution of beliefs and desires (or belief-
seeds. Many plants close their leaves at night. The immediate cause of and desire-like states) to much simpler creatures. And such decisions are
these activities is something internal to the plants. Seeds are ejected likely to be controversial in some cases. Moreover, representationalism
because of the hydration or dehydration of the cell walls in seed pods. itself is a very controversial position. The general topic of the origins of
Leaves are closed because of water movement in the stems and petioles of qualia is not one on which philosophers have said a great deal. (For a
the leaves, itself induced by changes in the temperature and light. These general, wide-ranging discussion of this issue that is neutral on the nature
inner events or states are surely not phenomenal. There is nothing it is like of qualia, see Tye 2016.)
to be a Venus Fly Trap or a Morning-Glory.
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Oxford: Oxford University Press. text to our attention.
–––, 2021, Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the
Copyright © 2021 by the author
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Inverted Qualia
[Link] Inverted Qualia
from the Fall 2020 Edition of the First published Wed Nov 10, 2004; substantive revision Wed Aug 26, 2020

Stanford Encyclopedia Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary

philosophy of mind (largely due to the influence of Shoemaker 1982 and
of Philosophy Block 1990). The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke’s
hypothetical case of “spectrum inversion”, in which strawberries and ripe
tomatoes produce visual experiences of the sort that are actually produced
by grass and cucumbers, grass and cucumbers produce experiences of the
sort that are actually produced by strawberries and ripe tomatoes, and so
on. This entry surveys the main philosophical applications of what
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
Dennett has called “one of philosophy’s most virulent memes” (1991,
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor
389).
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[Link]
Section 1 explains what “qualia” are supposed to be. Section 2 describes
Library of Congress Catalog Data the many different sorts of “inverted qualia” (specifically, “inverted
ISSN: 1095-5054
spectrum”) thought experiments, including a close cousin that does not
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- involve inversion. Section 3 discusses the major philosophical arguments
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP that appeal to spectrum inversion.
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please visit [Link] . (skipping subsection 1.1), section 2 (subsections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3), and
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy the topic should first read the entry on qualia.
Copyright c 2020 by the publisher
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Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 1.1 Other uses of ‘qualia’
Inverted Qualia 2. Inverted qualia scenarios
Copyright c 2020 by the author 2.1 A Simple Inverted Qualia Scenario
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 Inverted Qualia Alex Byrne

2.3 Other Inverted Spectrum Scenarios

2.3.1 Behaviorally Undetectable Scenarios
FIGURE 1: vermilion, crimson, and turquoise patches
2.3.2 Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Scenarios
2.3.3 Inverted Earth Three experiences of the imagined sort differ in their phenomenology, or
2.4 Shifted Qualia in “what it’s like” to undergo them. What it’s like to see the crimson patch
3. Spectrum Inversion in an Argument… is not the same as what it’s like to see the turquoise patch, for example.
3.1 …Against Behaviorism, Functionalism, and Physicalism Further—assuming you have normal color vision—seeing the crimson
3.2 …Against Representationalism patch is more similar, in phenomenological respects, to seeing the
3.3 …For Appearance Properties vermilion patch than it is to seeing the turquoise patch.
3.4 …For Modes of Presentation
3.5 …For Relativism Thus your experience of the crimson patch has a quale (call it ‘QC ’) that
3.6 …For Skepticism About Others’ Minds your experiences of the vermilion and turquoise patches lack. Your
3.7 …For the Explanatory Gap experience of the vermilion patch has a quale (QV ) that your experiences
3.8 …For the Ineffability of Qualia of the crimson and turquoise patches lack; likewise, your experience of the
3.9 ...For the Inconsistency of Content-Externalism, turquoise patch has quale QT . What about an experience of all three
Representationalism, and Qualia-Internalism patches, as when viewing the whole of figure 1? Which of QC , QV , and QT
3.10 Summary: Required Features of Inverted Spectrum does that have? The answer usually implicit in the literature is ‘All three’
Scenarios (as opposed to ‘None’).[1] This is probably the more natural way of
Bibliography understanding qualia terminology, given the explanation so far, and is the
Academic Tools one adopted in this article.
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries In addition to the quale QC, your experience of the crimson patch has
quale QR which it shares with your experiences of the vermilion patch,
blood, fire trucks, strawberries, ripe tomatoes, and so on. Your experience
1. Qualia of the turquoise patch (in isolation) lacks QR.

Qualia (singular ‘quale’), in a common modern usage, are properties of It must be emphasized that ‘QC ’, for example, is not explicitly defined
experiences that type them in phenomenological respects. Imagine seeing using color terminology. ‘QC’ is not stipulated to be an abbreviation of
three colored patches against a neutral background in good light, one after ‘the property of being an experience of something’s looking crimson’, for
the other. In particular, imagine seeing a vermilion patch, then a crimson instance. Rather, the role of descriptions like the latter is simply to draw
patch, and finally a turquoise patch. (Those with poor imaginations may attention to the salient property that ‘QC’ is supposed to be a name for, in
consult Figure 1.) much the same way that one might introduce the unfamiliar name ‘Eugene

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Cernan’ by saying that it refers to the last man to walk on the moon. In the consciousness” (1988, 229; cf. Tye 2002, 447). And none of this is part of
jargon, the description ‘the property of being an experience of something’s the official explanation of ‘qualia’ in the previous section.
looking crimson’ can be used to fix the reference of ‘QC ’. (See the entry on
reference.) Another use of ‘qualia’ that is particularly important to distinguish from
the present one is Dretske’s. According to Dretske, qualia include colors—
Qualia terminology can be introduced in a similar manner for other sorts properties of objects like tomatoes, not experiences. This is because he
of visual experiences (seeing differently shaped patches, for instance), for explains qualia as “the ways objects phenomenally appear or seem” (1995,
other perceptual modalities, for bodily sensations, and for thoughts, 73), and red is one way that tomatoes appear.[5] Qualia, on Dretske’s use,
imagery, emotions, and so forth. It is controversial whether some of these are properties of objects of experiences; in this article qualia are properties
mental events/states have qualia—in particular, episodes of conscious of experiences.
thought, at least some of which seem devoid of phenomenology.[2]
The American pragmatist C. I. Lewis introduced ‘qualia’ into
One might wonder why some special terminology is required. Admittedly contemporary philosophy.[6] Qualia, he explains in Mind and the World
‘QR’, for example, is not defined in terms of ‘red’, but isn’t QR in fact the Order, are “recognizable qualitative characters of the given” (1929, 121).
property of being an experience of something’s looking red?[3] And if it is, According to Lewis, what is “given” in experience are sense-data
why introduce another name? However, as discussed later (subsection (although Lewis himself preferred other terminology: see 55–7), not
3.2), there is an argument against this identification. objects like tomatoes. Goodman’s well-known discussion of qualia in The
Structure of Appearance (1951) follows Lewis’s use. Among Jackson,
1.1 Other uses of ‘qualia’ Dennett, and Dretske, Dretske’s use of ‘qualia’ is the closest to Lewis’s.
Restricting attention to the case of veridical perception, we may think of
‘Qualia’ is an especially confusing piece of terminology, even by the Dretske as basically agreeing with Lewis about the characterization of
standards of the profession that brought us ‘realism’. In the sense just qualia, but disagreeing with Lewis about the given. When one sees that a
explained, the claim that experiences have qualia seems fairly harmless.[4] tomato is red, according to Lewis a sense-datum, not the tomato, is given;
The innocent student might well be puzzled, then, to learn of Frank according to Dretske what is given is the tomato. So, since a “recognizable
Jackson’s controversial “knowledge argument for qualia” (Jackson 1982), qualitative character” of the tomato is its color, Dretske thinks that colors
and Dennett’s attempt to dismiss qualia as a philosopher’s invention are examples of qualia.[7]
(Dennett 1988). But on closer examination, much of this apparent
disagreement is merely terminological. On Jackson’s use of the term, 2. Inverted qualia scenarios
qualia are properties of mental states “which no amount of purely physical
information includes” (1982, 273); on Dennett’s, they are “ineffable”, Let us say that a scenario is a (more-or-less detailed) story, which may be
“intrinsic”, “private”, and “directly or immediately apprehensible in possible or impossible. (So, for example, there is a scenario in which
someone squares the circle.) Corresponding to a scenario is what we can

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call a hypothesis: that the scenario is possible. So, for example, the Let I be the function that takes each shade to its opposing shade, thus
hypothesis corresponding to a circle-squaring scenario is false. There are a rotating the hue circle 180°. I maps reds to greens, blues to yellows,
variety of “inverted qualia” scenarios in the literature—almost always bluish-greens to yellowish-reds, and so on (see figure 3).
involving color perception—whose corresponding hypotheses differ in
plausibility. These hypotheses are used as premises in a number of
philosophical arguments, discussed in section 3 below.

2.1 A Simple Inverted Qualia Scenario FIGURE 3: the function I

Consider the hue circle in figure 2, taken from the Natural Color System Introduce another perceiver, Invert (you are Nonvert). Imagine you are
color space, which is organized around the four hues red, green, blue, and looking at scene S: an arrangement of some fruits (see the left-hand part of
yellow.[8] These are the unique hues: they have shades that are not figure 4). Now take the apparent hues of objects in S , and transform them
perceptual mixtures of any other hue. For example, there is a shade of using the function I . Use this transformation to create a new scene SI ,
green that is neither bluish nor yellowish. The other hues are binary: all of exactly like the old scene S except that it looks to have differently colored
their shades are perceptual mixtures of two unique hues. For example, “inverted” fruits (etc.). That is, if a banana originally looks to have hue h ,
every shade of purple is bluish and reddish. The four unique hues— in SI it looks to have hue I(h) . (See the right-hand part of figure 4; notice
yellow, red, blue, green—come in two opponent pairs: red-green and blue- that the greens in S are rather yellowish, and hence get mapped to bluish-
yellow. Red is opposed to green in the sense that there are no reddish- reds.) Then one simple inverted qualia scenario is this: what it’s like for
greens or greenish-reds; likewise there are no bluish-yellows or yellowish- Invert to look at S is exactly the same as what it’s like for Nonvert (i.e.,
blues. The unique hues are equally spaced around the NCS circle, and the you) to look at SI , and similarly for all other scenes that Invert encounters.
other hues are spaced according to their perceptible proportion of the According to this scenario, if you look at the right-hand part of figure 4,
unique hues. So, for example, the orange patch equidistant from the your experience is phenomenologically the same as Invert’s experience
unique yellow pole and unique red pole is equally similar to both. when she looks at the left-hand part of figure 4. In qualia terminology: if
an object O1 looks to have hue h to Nonvert (with Q being the
corresponding quale of her experience), and O2 looks to have hue I(h)
(with corresponding quale Q∗ ), then Invert’s experience of O1 has quale
Q∗ and her experience of O2 has quale Q. In this sense Invert’s qualia are
‘inverted’ with respect to Nonvert’s.

FIGURE 2: NCS hue circle[9]

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2.2 Locke’s Inverted Spectrum Scenario

Locke appears to have been the first to formulate explicitly an inverted

spectrum scenario. (An immediate precursor is Malebranche.[12]) In the
chapter of the Essay titled Of True and False Ideas, Locke writes:

Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our simple

FIGURE 4: 180° hue inversion
Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so
Because the example concerns color qualia, this sort of inverted qualia ordered, That the same Object should produce in several Men’s
scenario is usually described as a case of “spectrum inversion”. (Note that Minds different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet
the 180° inversion takes unique hues to unique hues, and binary hues to produced in one Man’s Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a
binary hues. An inversion scenario produced by a rotation of 45° would Marigold produces in another Man’s, and vice versâ. For since this
take the unique hue red to the binary hue orange; and so presumably could never be known: because one Man’s Mind could not pass
would be behaviorally detectable: see subsection 2.3.1 below.) into another Man’s Body, to perceive, what Appearances were
produced by those Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the
Philosophy is stuck with the terminology of ‘spectrum inversion’, but it is Names, would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be in either.
potentially misleading.[10] First, a spectrum inversion scenario sounds like For all Things, that had the Texture of a Violet, producing
one which inverts either the spectrum or the colors of objects, but it constantly the Idea, which he called Blue, and those which had the
actually inverts neither. In a typical spectrum inversion scenario, the Texture of a Marigold, producing constantly the Idea, which he as
spectral band 650–700nm remains red, and lemons remain yellow.[11] constantly called Yellow, whatever those Appearances were in his
Mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his
Second, even when properly taken as an inversion of experiences, one
Use by those Appearances, and understand, and signify those
might suppose that the “spectrum inversion” function corresponds to
distinctions, marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the
flipping the spectrum over. That is, using the traditional names for the
Appearances, or Ideas in his Mind, received from those two
spectral bands, one might suppose the function maps red to violet, orange
Flowers, were exactly the same, with the Ideas in other Men’s
to indigo, yellow to blue, green to green, blue to yellow, indigo to orange,
Minds. (1689/1975, II, xxxii, 15)
and violet to red. However, this is not the usual sort of inversion scenario
(red is not mapped to green, for example). Further, this function is not Locke’s description of this inverted spectrum scenario is laden with his
defined for all hues. Many hues—in particular, a large range of “extra- own commitment to “Ideas”, which (on one interpretation) are sense-data,
spectral” purples—are not found in the spectrum. some of which possess both color and shape.[13] On this view, spectrum
inversion is a case of “sense-datum inversion”: when Invert looks at a
violet she becomes acquainted with the kind of sense-datum Nonvert is

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acquainted with when he looks at a marigold. Setting this tendentious The lightness dimension corresponds to the central vertical axis, with
theoretical gloss aside, Locke’s scenario has three notable features. First, it white at the top. The hue and saturation dimensions correspond,
is a case of spectrum inversion from birth. Second, it is a case of inversion respectively, to the angle around the vertical axis, and to the distance from
within the same linguistic community. Third, it is (or is naturally read as it. Thus the shades of maximum saturation are on the outside of the solid.
being) a case in which Invert and Nonvert are behaviorally alike—a Notice that the yellows have their maximum saturation at higher levels of
behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. lightness than the reds and the blues. So, assuming that Invert’s judgments
of the relations between colors are—modulo the inversion—normal, a
Locke does not fill in the details of his scenario, so it is left unclear possible Lockean 180° hue rotation scenario would be behaviorally
whether, for example, the leaves of marigolds and violets would produce detectable. Invert would judge the maximally saturated colors she calls
“Red Ideas” in the mind of the inverted subject. But suppose, reasonably ‘shades of blue’ to be lighter than the maximally saturated colors she calls
enough, that Locke’s scenario involved a rotation of the hue circle. Locke ‘shades of yellow’. Further, there are more distinguishable hue steps
evidently thought that the hypothesis corresponding to his scenario was between blue and red than there are between yellow and green—a fact that
true: that his scenario is possible. Was he right? is reflected in the Munsell space, whose hue circle has five hues equally
spaced: red, yellow, green, blue, purple. (Contrast the NCS space
If we assume that Invert is otherwise like a normal human perceiver, then
mentioned in the previous subsection.) Hence the Lockean inversion
a major asymmetry in color space shows that Locke was incorrect. Hue
function I , assuming it is defined on all hues, would map some distinct
(red, green, bluish-red, etc.) is not the only perceptually salient dimension
hues (in particular, some bluish reds) to the same hue (in particular, the
along which colors can vary: there are (usually taken to be) two other
same yellowish green). The range of I would therefore contain fewer hues
dimensions, saturation and lightness.[14] A color is saturated to the extent
than its domain. Invert would not be able to distinguish some stimuli
to which its hue is intense or vivid: pastels are desaturated, and achromatic
(those she calls ‘bluish red’) that Nonvert could tell apart, and so again the
colors (blacks, whites, and grays) have no saturation. Colors become
inversion would be behaviorally detectable.
lighter as they become less grayish or blackened. Arranging the colors
along these three dimensions produces a color solid, an example of which
is shown in figure 5:
2.3 Other Inverted Spectrum Scenarios

2.3.1 Behaviorally Undetectable Scenarios

As discussed in section 3 below, inverted spectrum scenarios have a wide

range of philosophical uses, and come in a correspondingly wide range of
flavors. It is not always required, for example, that Invert and Nonvert are
FIGURE 5: 3D color space: the Munsell color solid[15]
behaviorally alike. But suppose that a behaviorally undetectable scenario
is needed, and moreover one that is genuinely possible. With the

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assumption that Invert is otherwise normal, we just saw that Locke’s As noted in the previous subsection, there are more perceptually
behaviorally undetectable scenario is not possible. Without relaxing the distinguishable shades between red and blue than there are between green
simple assumption about Invert, can we find one that is? and yellow, which would make red-green inversion behaviorally
detectable.[16] And there are yet further asymmetries. Dark yellow is
Suppose we stay with the full range of normal human color experience, brown (qualitatively different from yellow), whereas dark blue is blue (see
and so with the color solid as illustrated in figure 5. The discussion of figure 6). Similarly, desaturated bluish-red is pink (qualitatively different
Locke’s scenario shows that a scenario corresponding to a rotation of the from saturated bluish-red), whereas desaturated greenish-yellow is similar
color solid around the lightness axis should be avoided. However, as to saturated greenish-yellow. Again, red is a “warm” color, whereas blue is
Palmer points out (1999a, 926), there are three inversion scenarios that at “cool”—and perhaps this is not a matter of learned associations with
least solve the problem posed by the light and saturated yellows. These temperature (see Hardin 1997, 297–7). In any event, there is clearly scope
three scenarios correspond to, respectively, a reversal of the red-green to resist the claim that one of Palmer’s three inversions would be
axis; a reversal of the blue-yellow and black-white axes; and the previous behaviorally undetectable.[17]
two reversals taken together: a reversal of the red-green, blue-yellow, and
black-white axes. These three scenarios are (approximately) illustrated in Faced with these difficulties, philosophers seeking a clearly possible
Figure 6 below. behaviorally undetectable inversion scenario have either considered a
perceiver with limited color vision (for instance black-white vision), or
else a perceiver with alien/quasi color vision, where any alien/quasi color
space that represents perceptible similarities and differences is stipulated
to have appropriate symmetries. Here is Shoemaker trying the first
strategy:

But even if our color experience is not in fact such that a mapping
of this [behaviorally undetectable] sort is possible, it seems to me
conceivable that it might have been—and that is what matters for
our present philosophical purposes. For example, I think we know
well enough what it would be like to see the world
nonchromatically, i.e., in black, white, and the various shades of
grey—for we frequently do see it in this way in photographs,
moving pictures, and television. And there is an obvious mapping
of the nonchromatic shades onto each other which satisfies the
FIGURE 6: three inversions: red-green (top right); blue-yellow/black-white conditions for inversion. In the discussion that follows I shall
(bottom left); red-green/blue-yellow/black-white (bottom right)
assume, for convenience, that such a mapping is possible for the

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full range of colors—but I do not think that anything essential strategies are misguided (see also Dennett 1991, 389–98; 1993, 927;
turns on whether this assumption is correct. (Shoemaker 1975a, 1994).
196; note omitted).
2.3.2 Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Scenarios
For some responses, see Tye 1995, 205, and Hilbert and Kalderon 2000,
206. “Black-white” inversion is also discussed by Clark (1996) (Other
If a behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion scenario is possible,
Internet Resources), Myin (2001) and Broackes (2007), and was briefly
how do we know it does not actually obtain? There is a temptation to say
mentioned by Wittgenstein (1977, III-84).[18] For a short autobiography of
that we do not know—moreover, that we cannot know. (For more
a complete achromat (someone with only black-white rod vision) who is
discussion, see subsection 3.6 below.) And if we cannot verify or falsify
also a vision scientist, see Nordby 1996 (Other Internet Resources).[19]
the claim that such a scenario does not obtain, then according to the
Here is Block trying the second strategy: verificationist theory of meaning held by the logical positivists (Ayer
1959) the scenario is meaningless. Indeed, the logical positivists
[D]o the empirical issues really matter for the challenge that the sometimes gave spectrum inversion as an example of an unverifiable claim
possibility of an inverted spectrum poses for functionalism? My (Schlick 1932/3, 93, quoted in Shoemaker 1982, 339; see also Ayer 1936,
answer is: only in a subtle and indirect way. For if there could be 173–4, and Wittgenstein 1958, §272).
creatures who have color experience or at least visual experience
for whom the relevant empirical points do not apply, then The allegedly meaningless scenario is a case of interpersonal (or
functionalism is refuted even if human spectra cannot be inverted. intersubjective) spectrum inversion: Invert is spectrally inverted with
For example, perhaps it is a consequence of the human genome respect to another person, Nonvert. But there is another sort of inversion
that humans tend to be unwilling to give a name to light green, scenario, in which a single person’s qualia are inverted with respect to her
even though they are willing to give a name to light red (‘pink’). qualia at an earlier time. As Shoemaker notes (1982, 327), a case of
Still, there could be people whose visual experience is similar if intrapersonal (or intrasubjective) spectrum inversion appears to have been
not identical to ours who find it equally natural to give names to first discussed by Wittgenstein:
light green as to light red. (Perhaps we could even genetically
Consider this case: someone says ‘I can’t understand it, I see
engineer humans to become so willing.) (Block 1999, 946; cf.
everything red blue today and vice versa.’ We answer ‘it must look
Shoemaker 1982, 336–8, and Levine 1991, 34–6.)
queer!’ He says it does and, e.g., goes on to say how cold the
For some doubts about the second strategy, see Hardin 1997, 299–300. glowing coal looks and how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we
should under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that
Hilbert and Kalderon argue that “every possible quality space must be he saw red what we saw blue. And again we should say that we
asymmetrical” (2000, 204) (that is, must lack any symmetries); if so, both know that he means by the words ‘blue’ and ‘red’ what we do as he
has always used them as we do. (Wittgenstein 1968, 284; quoted in

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Shoemaker 1982, 327–8)[20] Step 3: if (Step 2), then this is possible: an “overnight” inversion
followed by semantic adaptation, followed by amnesia about one’s
Although Wittgenstein seems to have thought that a behaviorally past experiences, with the result that one’s pre- and post- inversion
undetectable interpersonal spectrum inversion scenario is not possible behavioral dispositions are the same. At this step, one’s behavior is
(arguably for verificationist reasons), Shoemaker claims that once the just as it would have been if one had simply been stricken with
possibility of a Wittgensteinian intrapersonal inversion is granted, there is amnesia, with no prior inversion.
an inexorable slide to the possibility of a behaviorally undetectable
interpersonal scenario: Step 4: if (Step 3), then this is possible: a “from birth” behaviorally
undetectable interpersonal inversion scenario.
…if the color experience of a person can differ from that of others
at some point during his career, it should be possible for such a Similar arguments starting from a Wittgensteinian intrapersonal scenario
difference to exist throughout a person’s career. But if this a can be given for the other kinds of interpersonal inversion hypotheses
possibility, then it does seem perfectly coherent to suppose, and discussed in section 3 below.
perfectly compatible with all the behavioral evidence we have
One might think that at least step 4 is unproblematic. However, according
about the experiences of others, that, in Wittgenstein’s words, “one
to the “Frege-Schlick view” (Shoemaker 1982, 339), interpersonal
section of mankind has one sensation of red and another section
comparisons of qualia (unlike intrapersonal comparisons) do not make
another.” (Shoemaker 1982, 329)[21]
sense. The Frege-Schlick view could be supported on verificationist
We can think of this sort of argument as proceeding in four steps (see grounds; for a more interesting line of defense, see Stalnaker 1999, 2006,
Block 1990, Shoemaker 1996b): and Shoemaker 2006b and Block 2007, 103–7, for discussion. Since it
makes perfect sense (and indeed is often true) to say that tomatoes look
Step 1: this is possible: an “overnight” intrapersonal inversion, as in red to most people, a proponent of the Frege-Schlick view must deny, for
the quotation from Wittgenstein. example, that QR is the property of being an experience of something’s
looking red (see section 1 above and Stalnaker 1999, 225).
Step 2: if (Step 1), then this is possible: an “overnight” inversion
followed by semantic adaptation (applying ‘red’ to glowing coal,
2.3.3 Inverted Earth
‘blue’ to the sky, etc.), but with memory of one’s experiences before
the inversion. That is, one (re)learns to use color terminology like a
Asymmetries in color space pose problems for step 3 of the previous
normal person, while remembering that one’s experiences of glowing
argument. But—especially for those with verificationist sympathies—step
coal (etc.) used to be very different. The inversion remains detectable,
3 is problematic even if these concerns are waived. Why be so sure that
because one asserts, for example, that one’s experiences have
the “total adaptation” (semantic adaptation plus amnesia) doesn’t reinvert
drastically changed.
the qualia? After all, if you imagine being the subject yourself, after the

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period of amnesia you have no sense that anything is amiss—so perhaps subject’s internal constitution fixed. Block uses Inverted Earth in an
nothing is. Similar doubts can be raised about step 2: suppose you use argument against functionalism and representationalism (see subsections
color terminology exactly as you did before the step 1 inversion—that is, 3.1 and 3.2 below).[24]
spontaneously on the basis of how things look—but you seem to recall
that your past experiences were radically different. Would you be 2.4 Shifted Qualia
confident that you hadn’t misremembered your past experiences? (See
Dennett 1988; 1991, Ch. 12; 1993; 1994; and Rey 1992.) The qualia inversion scenarios discussed so far are merely hypothetical—
more cautiously, we do not know whether any of them obtain.[25] There
Although Block thinks “that these criticisms can be defeated on their own are, however, “shifted” qualia scenarios that actually obtain. And, in fact,
terms” (1990, 61), his “Inverted Earth” scenario is designed to sidestep many of the philosophical arguments that appeal to the possibility of an
them. (See Block 1990, 1996a, 2003.)[22] Instead of considering an inversion scenario can make do instead by appealing to the actual shifted
“overnight” inversion and the consequent confusion, semantic adaptation qualia scenario, hence avoiding potentially controversial claims about
and amnesia, your eyes are fitted with “color inverting lenses” and you are possibility.
transported to another planet—Inverted Earth. This is a place just like
Earth except that each object has “the complementary color of [its The shifted qualia scenario that is usually discussed concerns—
counterpart] on Earth. The sky is yellow, grass is red, fire hydrants are unsurprisingly—color vision. There is a substantial amount of variation
green, etc.” (1990, 60). The inhabitants also speak Color Inverted English between people classified as having “normal” color vision by standard
(‘red’ means green, ‘blue’ means yellow, etc.). The right hand part of tests, due to differences in the lens of the eye and photoreceptor pigments,
figure 4 above displays a photograph of fruits taken on Inverted Earth with among other factors. In one experiment, introduced into the philosophical
an ordinary Earthly camera. (Despite the yellow sky, the illumination on literature by Hardin (1993, 79–80), Hurvich et al. (1968) found that the
Inverted Earth is the same as it is on Earth. Note that achromatic colors are apparent location of unique green for spectral lights among 50 subjects
not inverted—on Inverted Earth snow is white and coal is black.)[23] varied from 490 to 520nm.[26] This is a large range: 15nm either side of
Because of the inverting lenses—and ignoring complications such as those unique green looks distinctly bluish or yellowish. For example, when
mentioned in subsection 2.3.1—when you arrive on Inverted Earth you Smith looks at the third patch in figure 7 (in isolation), his experience
notice no visible change. Your experience when you look at an might have the quale that Jones’s experience has when she looks at the
arrangement of fruits on Inverted Earth is phenomenologically the same as fourth patch in Figure 7, keeping the viewing circumstances fixed. And
your previous experience of the counterpart arrangement on Earth (see the when Smith looks at the fourth patch, his experience might have the quale
left hand part of figure 4), and conversation with the locals proceeds just that Jones’s experience has when she looks at the fifth patch. Thus—at
as smoothly as it did back on Earth. This scenario is therefore the converse least over a small range of hues—Jones’s and Smith’s color qualia are
of typical inverted spectrum scenarios: instead of keeping the environment “shifted” with respect to each other. Accordingly, this sort of scenario can
fixed and varying the internal constitution of the subject, Inverted Earth be described as a case of “shifted spectra” (Block 1999). (NB: here we are
varies the environment and (due to the inverting lenses) keeps the

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assuming that the Frege-Schlick view mentioned in subsection 2.3.2 is functional respects, which in turn implies difference in physical respects;
incorrect.) none of the converse implications holds.[28] So the three supervenience
theses just mentioned are related as follows: the behaviorist supervenience
thesis implies the functionalist thesis, which in turn implies the physicalist
thesis.
FIGURE 7: five patches: yellowish-green to bluish-green

Notice that if a behaviorally undetectable scenario is wanted, an actual If some behaviorally undetectable inverted spectrum hypothesis is correct,
case of shifted spectra will not fit the bill. then there could be a pair of creatures who are behaviorally alike but
mentally different: Invert and Nonvert are in different mental states when
3. Spectrum Inversion in an Argument… they each look at a tomato, and are behaviorally alike. Hence, if the
inverted spectrum hypothesis is correct, behaviorism is false. This gives us
Inversion scenarios—in particular, spectrum inversion—turn up in a wide an argument against behaviorism:
range of philosophical arguments, which we are now in a position to
examine. Argument Aa
P1a. The following spectrum inversion scenario is possible: Invert
3.1 …Against Behaviorism, Functionalism, and and Nonvert are behaviorally alike, and are both looking at a
tomato.[29]
Physicalism
Since P1a implies that the mental does not supervene on behavior:
Behaviorism in the philosophy of mind is the view that the mental is
nothing over and above behavior (including dispositions to behave). Any Ca. Behaviorism is false.
version of behaviorism implies that the mental supervenes on behavior.
That is: necessarily, two creatures who are behaviorally alike are also Since behaviorism is not a popular position these days, this application of
mentally alike. Likewise, any version of functionalism or physicalism an inverted qualia scenario is perhaps not so interesting. And given the
implies that the mental supervenes on, respectively, functional complications discussed in subsection 2.3.1, there is even room for a
organization and physical makeup. For the purposes of this subsection, it behaviorist to resist. However, of considerably more interest are similar
is not necessary to get into the details of these theories. However, two arguments against functionalism (and physicalism). Block and Fodor
points should be noted. First, it should not be assumed that either behavior, (1972), who invented the terminology of ‘inverted qualia’, were the first to
functional organization, or physical makeup is an intrinsic matter—the formulate an inverted spectrum argument against functionalism,
relevant sorts of behavioral, functional, and physical properties may be specifically Turing machine functionalism as defended in Putnam 1967.
[30] Ignoring the details of particular functionalisms, the argument is
extrinsic. In other words, perfect duplicates may differ in behavioral,
functional, or physical respects.[27] Second, as these theories are usually exactly parallel to the one against behaviorism. (Similar remarks go for the
understood, difference in behavioral respects implies difference in inverted spectrum argument against physicalism.) According to

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functionalism, mental states are functional states: states defined by their functionally undetectable inversion, Block and Fodor offer its “conceptual
causal role with respect to inputs, outputs, and other states. So, according coherence”:
to functionalism, necessarily, two creatures who are functionally alike are
also mentally alike. In order to complete the argument, an appropriate It seems to us that the standard verificationist counterarguments
inverted spectrum hypothesis must be established, where Invert and against the view that the ‘inverted spectrum’ [scenario] is
Nonvert are functional duplicates. conceptually coherent are not persuasive. If this is correct, it looks
as though the possibility of qualia inversion poses a serious prima
The anti-functionalist analogue of argument Aa is: facie argument against functionalist accounts of the criteria for
type identity of psychological states. (91)
Argument Ab
P1b The following spectrum inversion scenario is possible: Invert Block and Fodor’s apparent move from the “conceptual coherence” of the
and Nonvert are functionally alike, and are both looking at a inversion scenario to its possibility can be questioned. Even though one
tomato. cannot know a priori that not-p (that is, p is conceptually coherent), p may
yet be impossible. For example, one cannot know a priori that gold does
Since P1b implies that the mental does not supervene on functional not have the atomic number 79, but it is a necessary truth that gold has this
organization: atomic number. (This sort of separation between conceptual coherence and
possibility is not uncontroversial, but is commonly accepted.[32])
Cb. Functionalism is false.
In any case, there are other conceptually coherent scenarios that are
The possibility of a behaviorally undetectable inversion scenario (P1a) can
considerably more straightforward than an inverted spectrum scenario, for
be motivated by appeal to the sorts of considerations discussed in 2.3.1
example a scenario containing a conscious subject and a functional
above. However, in order to refute functionalism a stronger inversion
duplicate who is not conscious at all (a “zombie”, in the philosophical
hypothesis (P1b) is needed. As Block and Fodor point out, functionalism
sense). So if the move from conceptual coherence to possibility is in fact
allows us to deny that “two organisms are in the same psychological state
legitimate, functionalism may be refuted by a simpler argument that does
whenever their behaviors and/or behavioral dispositions are identical”
not have an inversion hypothesis as a premise. (Shoemaker is a notable
(1972, 86), hence avoiding the stock objections to behaviorism. The
dissenter on this point; he holds that while inverted spectrum scenarios are
functionalist, then, has no problem with behaviorally undetectable
conceptually coherent, zombie scenarios are not. See Shoemaker 1975a,
inversions. But why should she concede the possibility of a functionally
1981, 1991.)
undetectable inversion? The question can be made more pointed by
observing that (a) no one has ever articulated a detailed functionalist A defender of the utility of an inversion scenario in an argument against
theory of any mental state, and (b) any realistic version of such a theory functionalism might reply that the scenario’s possibility does not merely
would be extremely complicated.[31] In favor of the possibility of a rest on its conceptual coherence. In addition—this reply continues—there

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is a positive “Cartesian intuition” that such an inversion scenario is —if it is caused by red things in the right circumstances, and used
possible (a “clear and distinct idea” of the scenario, perhaps), and this is in thought about red things and action with respect to red things
prima facie evidence that it is possible. rightly. The functional roles I am talking about are what I call
‘long-arm’ roles, roles that include real things in the world as the
However, Cartesian intuition, just like conceptual coherence, is not a very inputs and outputs. They are to be distinguished from the ‘short-
discriminating weapon, tending to spread possibility over a wide arm’ roles that functionalists sometimes prefer, roles that stop at
landscape (cf. Tye 2003, section 4). Cartesian intuition also tends to certify the skin. (1990, 58, note omitted)[33]
the possibility of scenarios containing zombies, thinking rocks, entirely
disembodied minds (not even embodied in ectoplasm), and so forth—all Block then tries to establish that after a suitable period of time on Inverted
impossibilities, according to the functionalist. So, as with conceptual Earth, your beliefs and judgments about the colors of things would be
coherence, any inverted spectrum argument against functionalism that correct: like the locals, you would believe that fire hydrants are green, the
relies on Cartesian intuitions can be converted into an equally plausible sky is yellow, and so on:
and simpler argument that makes no mention of the inverted spectrum.
[A]ccording to me, after enough time has passed on Inverted Earth,
There is one other defense of the utility of inversion scenarios in anti- your embedding in the physical and linguistic environment of
functionalist arguments, namely that some of them are biologically Inverted Earth would dominate, and so your intentional contents
possible—and hence not as far fetched as scenarios containing zombies or would shift so as to be the same as those of the natives. Consider
thinking rocks. If this is right, then spectrum inversion would be of special an analogy (supplied by Martin Davies): if you had a Margaret
significance, since we have a firmer grip on possibilities that are closer to Thatcher recognitional capacity before your journey to Inverted
home. Earth, and on arriving misidentify twin MT as MT, you are
mistaken. But eventually your ‘That’s MT’ judgements get to be
Here is it is helpful to examine Block’s Inverted Earth argument against about twin MT, and so become right after having started out
functionalism, which at a superficial glance might not seem to stray wrong. If you were [transported] at age 15, by the time 50 years
beyond the constraints of Earthly biology. As we saw in subsection 2.3.3, have passed, you use ‘red’ to mean green, just as the natives do.
the Inverted Earth scenario is designed to avoid certain objections to the (64)
usual argument from intrapersonal inversion hypotheses to interpersonal
inversion hypotheses. How is the scenario turned into an argument against (We can also add that you know that you are on Inverted Earth, and make
functionalism? an effort to speak the local language; see Block 1996a, 42; 2003.)

The brand of functionalism (about qualia) that Block sets out to refute is This step of the argument appeals to externalism about mental content
this: (Putnam 1975, Burge 1979), specifically some sort of causal covariational
theory (see the entry externalism about mental content). Putting the basic
An experience has [QR ] if [and only if] it functions in the right way

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idea crudely: after a while on Inverted Earth certain of your inner states But what if the facts of human physiology get in the way of the
that on Earth were reliably caused by the presence of red things and case as I described it? My response is the same as the one
thereby represented redness will instead be reliably caused by the presence mentioned earlier (based on Shoemaker’s rebuttal of Harrison),
of green things, and thereby will come to represent greenness. namely that it is possible for there to be a race of people very much
like us, with color vision, and color sensations, but whose
This gives us an apparent counterexample against the “long arm” physiology does not rule out the case described (or spectrum
functionalist theory. On Inverted Earth your experiences have the inversion). The functionalist can hardly be satisfied with the claim
functional role that the functionalist theory says is necessary and sufficient that our experiences are functional states but the other race’s
for possessing QR : they are “caused by red things in the right experiences are not. (1990, 64)
circumstances, and used in thought about red things and action with
respect to red things rightly”. But on Inverted Earth your experiences with This response concedes that the Inverted Earth argument against
this functional role have QG, not (or not always) QR . functionalism may need to appeal to more-or-less outlandish possibilities.
And if it does, then since other possibilities not involving inversions, and
If we insist that the Inverted Earth scenario is constrained by actual arguably no more outlandish, will do just as well, it is doubtful that
biology, can it still be maintained that your experiences caused by red Inverted Earth-type scenarios have an essential role to play in arguments
things on Inverted Earth have the QR -role? That is not clear, even if we against functionalism.[34]
grant Block’s claim about the “shift in intentional contents” without a
corresponding change in qualia. The problem is twofold. First, because of The anti-physicalist inverted spectrum argument is:
asymmetries in color space and additional complications (see footnote 23),
to say nothing of the details of the “inverting lenses”, your total functional Argument Ac
organization would certainly change in various respects after traveling to a P1c. The following spectrum inversion scenario is possible: Invert
biologically possible Inverted Earth. Second, Block’s description of the and Nonvert are physically alike, and are both looking at a
long-arm functional theory is highly schematic. It may be that a suitably tomato.
sophisticated and developed form of this theory would not have the
Since P1c implies that the mental does not supervene on physical
consequence that, on a biologically possible Inverted Earth, your
makeup:
experiences caused by red things have the QR -role. Similar points go for
an argument against functionalism using a traditional inverted spectrum Cc. Physicalism is false.
scenario.
Although there is some controversy about just how science-fictional anti-
Unsurprisingly, Block does not rest very much—if any—weight on the functionalist inversion scenarios need to be, anti-physicalist inversion
biological possibility of the Inverted Earth scenario: scenarios are usually supposed to be very remote from actuality, and their
possibility is hotly disputed. Almost uncontroversially: if an inverted

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spectrum argument against physicalism works at all, then a simple zombie implies that, if this scenario is possible, the two experiences differ in
scenario will equally serve the purpose.[35] representational content. Hence, if the foregoing scenario can be filled out
so that (a) the two experiences have the same content and (b) the scenario
3.2 …Against Representationalism is possible, then representationalism is refuted.

It is widely held that perceptual experiences represent the perceiver’s How can these two desiderata be satisfied? Fortunately for the anti-
environment as being a certain way. For example, the experience of representationalist—or phenomenist (Block 2003)—the usual ways of
someone with normal color vision looking at figure 1 represents (inter trying to secure (a) do not require Invert and Nonvert to be behavioral
alia) her environment as containing a crimson, vermilion, and turquoise duplicates (or, for that matter, functional duplicates). The anti-
square. In the terminology of Chalmers 2004 (slightly adapted), a representationalist can therefore dismiss concerns that a behaviorally
representational property is a property of a mental state/event that undetectable inversion scenario is impossible.
specifies (perhaps only in part) the state/event’s representational content.
The description of the anti-representationalist scenario is typically
For example, the property of being a visual experience that represents that
completed with the following three features. First, Invert is able to use her
there is a crimson square before one is a representational property (for a
color vision to reidentify objects, distinguish objects from their
taxonomy of representational properties, see Chalmers 2004, section 2).
backgrounds, etc., with more-or-less the facility of Nonvert. In Locke’s
The basic idea of representationalism or intentionalism is that qualia are
phrase, Invert “would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for [her]
representational properties, or at least supervene on representational
Use by those Appearances”. Second, Invert has been spectrally inverted
properties. One advantage of representationalism is that it appears to
from birth (or at least for a long period of time). Third, Nonvert and Invert
reduce “phenomenal consciousness” (Block 1995) to a certain kind of
belong to the same linguistic community: in particular, they use color
intentionality. Since the problem of providing a naturalistic account of
vocabulary in the same way, applying ‘red’ to tomatoes, ‘yellow’ to
intentionality is often thought to be tractable, representationalism brings
bananas, and so forth.
the possibility of a naturalistic account of consciousness (see, e.g., Dretske
1995, Lycan 1996, Tye 2000, and Speaks 2015).[36] Assume that this scenario is possible (for an argument that it isn’t, see
Sundström 2002 and Gibbons 2005; for a reply see Littlejohn 2009). The
Spectrum inversion scenarios help to focus the dispute between
three features just mentioned are intended to support the view that this
representationalists and their critics. (Actual cases of shifted spectra can
scenario is one in which, when Invert and Nonvert both look at the fruits
also serve: see Block 1999.) Any version of representationalism is
depicted in figure 6, their experiences have the same representational
committed to the following thesis. Consider a case of red-green spectrum
properties. In particular (glossing over a complication to be discussed in
inversion, and imagine Invert and Nonvert are both looking at the red
subsection 3.3 below), the banana looks yellow to both Invert and Nonvert,
peppers depicted in figure 6, against a neutral background. Nonvert’s
the strawberries look red to both, and so on. So, assuming that bananas are
experience has QR , while Invert’s experience has QG. Because the two
yellow, strawberries are red, etc., neither Invert nor Nonvert is suffering
experiences have different qualia, any version of representationalism

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from some global color illusion. If this inverted spectrum hypothesis is systematically in error about how things look, and this result is not
correct, then qualia do not supervene on representational properties, and credible.[37]
therefore representationalism is false.
Naturally, each of these reasons for thinking that Invert is not
(Here is one way of putting the Inverted Earth version of this argument misperceiving the colors of objects can be questioned. Against the first,
(see subsections 2.3.3 and 3.1). After first arriving on Inverted Earth, your one might dispute the claim that it would be arbitrary to convict only
word ‘red’ means red, and to you the green peppers on Inverted Earth look Invert of error—after all, for all that’s been said, Nonvert and Invert might
red. But after a period of acclimatization, you come to speak the language differ functionally, which is presumably a relevant difference. Against the
of the locals, and your experiences come to represent correctly the colors second, there are well-known problems for the “causal covariational”
of things—green peppers on Inverted Earth look green. Now compare account of mental content that it assumes (see, e.g., Fodor 1992, Ch. 3).
your present experience of a green pepper on Inverted Earth with your Finally, against the third, it may be argued that the consequence that Invert
previous experience of peppers of exactly that shade back on Earth. Same is mistaken about the content of her experience is not unacceptable (Tye
content, but different qualia. Alternatively, the anti-representationalist 2002, 451).[38]
argument can proceed by exhibiting an example of the converse: same
qualia, but different content—see Block 1990, 64–7.) It will be useful to set out the anti-representationalist argument more
carefully. Assume as a suppressed premise that the inverted spectrum
The three features of the anti-representationalist scenario can motivate the scenario just described is possible, and suppose that Invert and Nonvert
conclusion that Invert is not systematically misperceiving the colors of are both looking at a ripe tomato in good light:
things as follows. First, because Invert’s color vision is as useful as
Nonvert’s for discriminating and identifying objects, surely it would be Argument B
arbitrary to suppose that Invert’s color vision, but not Nonvert’s, is the P1. Neither Invert nor Nonvert is misperceiving the color of the
source of pervasive illusions. Second, because Nonvert has been inverted tomato.
since birth, a complicated system of causal connections between the colors P2. The tomato is red (and not any other color).
of objects in her environment and states of her visual system has been in
Hence:
place for a long period. In particular, there is a reliable causal connection
between the presence of a red object before Invert’s eyes and a certain C1. The tomato looks the same color (namely, red) to both Invert
neural event occurring in Invert; this sort of causal connection is plausibly and Nonvert.
sufficient to bestow the property of representing redness on this type of P3. If representationalism is true, then the phenomenal difference
neural event. Third, because Invert and Nonvert belong to the same between Invert and Nonvert is due to a difference in the colors
linguistic community, Invert’s word ‘red’ means red. So when Invert says that their experiences represent the tomato as having.
(as she does), ‘Strawberries look red to me’, she means that strawberries
look red to her. So, if strawberries do not look red to her, Invert is Hence, from C1 and P3:

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C2. Representationalism is false. 1983, Ch. 1). Then, according to the sense-datum theorist, the
phenomenist equation can be spelled out more informatively thus:
Some of the dialectic surrounding P1 has been described. In the following
three subsections, other ways of resisting the argument will be discussed. Sense-data theory
QB = B = being a sensing of a blue′ sense-datum.
If Argument B is sound, tomatoes look red to both Invert and Nonvert,
although the corresponding qualia are different. This is why spectrum Orthodox phenomenists (for instance Block and Levine) have no truck
inversion was not described in subsection 2.1 as a case where tomatoes with sense-data, and typically leave the phenomenist equation unadorned.
look green to Invert (and look red to Nonvert). If spectrum inversion is However, the sense-datum theorist can offer the following consideration in
explained in these terms, the thought experiment is quite unsuitable for her favor.
anti-representationalist purposes.
Imagine two experiences: first, an experience (call it ‘e1 ’) of a blue
According to the (orthodox) representationalist, an experience has QB, say, triangle next to a red square; second, an experience (e2 ) of a red triangle
just in case it is an experience that represents blue. According to the next to a blue square. e1 has color qualia QB and QR , and also “spatial
phenomenist who endorses Argument B, an experience has QB just in case qualia”, which we can label ‘QTr ’ and ‘QSq ’. The reference of these four
it has a certain non-representational property. Let us stipulate that ‘B’ bits of qualia terminology (‘QB’, ‘QR ’, ‘QTr ’, and ‘QSq ’) has been fixed
refers to this non-representational property, if such a thing exists. Then the by, respectively, experiences of blue objects, experiences of red objects,
two views may be put as follows: experiences of triangles, and experiences of squares. e2 , of course, also
has QB , QR , QTr , and QSq. Yet e1 and e2 differ phenomenologically, and
Phenomenism therefore differ in qualia. So more qualia terminology is required: in
QB = B (a certain nonrepresentational property). particular, a quale name whose reference is fixed by experiences of blue
triangles and red squares, and another name whose reference is fixed by
Orthodox representationalism
experiences of red triangles and blue squares. In a useful notation, the first
QB = property of visually representing blue (i.e., being an experience
quale name is ‘QRx&Sq(x)&By&Tr(y)’, and the second is ‘QRx&Tr(x)&By&Sq(y)’.
of something’s looking blue).
Obviously further qualia names with ever-more complicated subscripts
The sense-datum theory is usually taken to be a form of phenomenism; it will be needed.
will be treated as such here.[39] According to the sense-datum theorist,
Now notice that there are many entailment relations between qualia-
sense-data that are associated with experiences of seeing the sky, lapis
statements—for example, ‘e has QRx&Sq(x)’ entails ‘e has QRx ’, and ‘e has
lazuli, cobalt glass, etc., have a distinctive property; the traditional sense-
QRx&Tr(x)&By&Sq(y)’ entails ‘e has QRx&Sq(y)’, and so on. The orthodox
datum theorist took this property to be the color blue (see, e.g., Moore
representationalist and the sense-datum theorist have simple accounts of
1953, 30, n.2), but let us speak more neutrally and call it ‘blue′’ (Peacocke
these entailments in terms of the structure of the objects of experiences

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(apparent structure, for the representationalist; actual structure, for the In addition to representing colors, Shoemaker thinks that visual
sense-datum theorist). Assuming representationalism: ‘e has QRx&Sq(x)’ experiences represent other (“colorlike”) properties that we do not have
(equivalently, ‘e is an experience of something’s looking red and square’) words for in English, and which he calls appearance properties.[41] On
clearly entails ‘e has QRx ’ (equivalently, ‘e is an experience of something’s this view, both Invert and Nonvert’s experiences represent the tomato as
looking red’). Assuming the sense-datum theory: ‘e has QRx&Sq(x)’ red. However, Invert’s experience also represents the tomato as having a
(equivalently, ‘e is a sensing of a red and square sense-datum’) clearly certain salient appearance property (call it ‘APG ’), while Nonvert’s
entails ‘e has QRx ’ (equivalently, ‘e is a sensing of a red sense-datum’). experience represents the tomato as having a certain salient appearance
The orthodox phenomenist cannot give a similar explanation of these property (APR ). It is this representational difference between Invert and
entailments, and it is not clear whether she is entitled to them at all.[40] Nonvert that accounts for the phenomenological difference between their
experiences. One may, then, view Shoemaker’s main argument for
3.3 …For Appearance Properties appearance properties as proceeding from P1, P2, and representationalism
(i.e., not-C2), to the conclusion that P3 is false.
Return to the anti-representationalist argument of the previous subsection:
What are the appearance properties APG and APR ? Since Shoemaker
Argument B thinks that it is implausible that Invert is systematically misperceiving the
P1. Neither Invert nor Nonvert is misperceiving the color of the colors, it is not surprising that he also thinks that neither Nonvert nor
tomato. Invert is systematically misperceiving the appearance properties. The
P2. The tomato is red (and not any other color). tomato, then, has both APG and APR . In Shoemaker 1994b, APR is said to
be (where QR “is the quale that characterizes [Nonvert’s] experience of red
Hence:
things”) the property of “currently producing [a QR ] experience in
C1. The tomato looks the same color (namely, red) to both Invert someone related to it in a certain way, namely someone viewing it under
and Nonvert. normal lighting conditions” (254), and similarly for APG (see also
P3. If representationalism is true, then the phenomenal difference Shoemaker 1994a). This secures the result that the tomato has APR when
between Invert and Nonvert is due to a difference in the colors Nonvert is looking at it; as Shoemaker notes, it implies that the tomato
that their experiences represent the tomato as having. lacks APR when it is not being perceived. This account of appearance
properties has been substantially revised and developed in Shoemaker’s
Hence, from C1 and P3: later work. According to Shoemaker 2002, appearance properties include
dispositions to produce certain experiences in certain perceivers (a
C2. Representationalism is false. suggestion that was considered but rejected in Shoemaker 1994a, b).
Shoemaker 2006a revises the account further; for discussion, see Egan
Representationalists usually resist P1. But there are other options.
2006 and Speaks 2015, ch. 22.
According to Shoemaker, the flaw in the argument is not P1, but rather P3.

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Thau (2002, Ch. 5) holds a similar view, but there are some important A similar issue arises in the philosophy of perception (see, e.g.,
differences. First, Thau’s argument does not turn on the need to secure Boghossian and Velleman 1991, Peacocke 2001, Thau 2002). When one
spectrum inversion without misrepresentation, and instead deploys an looks at a cucumber, does the propositional content of one’s experience
adaptation of Jackson’s (1982) thought experiment concerning black-and- have a constituent that is a “mode of presentation” of greenness (a neo-
white Mary. (See the entry on qualia: the knowledge argument.) Second, Fregean view) or does it instead simply contain the property greenness
because Thau is not concerned to ensure that neither Invert nor Nonvert is itself? Using the familiar ordered pair notation for propositional content
misperceiving the tomato, he does not try to argue that the tomato has both (see, e.g., Thau 2002, 83), and ignoring issues about whether the
APG and APR , leaving the question unexamined. Third, Thau’s argument cucumber itself is associated with a mode of presentation, the dispute may
for appearance properties commits him to the view that they cannot be be put as follows. On the neo-Fregean view, the content of one’s
named (222–5); Shoemaker is not so committed. Finally, Thau does not experience of the cucumber is ⟨the cucumber, MOPgreenness ⟩ ; on the neo-
think, unlike Shoemaker, that colors are visually represented (211). Russellian view, the content of one’s experiences is ⟨the cucumber,
According to Thau, beliefs about the colors of things are based on greenness⟩.
experiences that represent objects as having appearance properties. These
beliefs are justified, Thau argues, because there is a correlation between an Recall the third premise of argument B (see the previous two subsections):
object’s having color C and its looking to have APC (235–6).
P3. If representationalism is true, then the phenomenal difference
between Invert and Nonvert is due to a difference in the colors
3.4 …For Modes of Presentation that their experiences represent the tomato as having.
An illustration of “Frege’s puzzle” is this. It is apparently possible to As explained in subsection 3.3, one may resist P3 by claiming that color
believe that Michael Caine is a Cockney, while not believing that Maurice experience represents appearance properties. That amounts to a defense of
Micklewhite is a Cockney. But how can this be, since Michael Caine and representationalism by introducing a distinction “at the level of reference”.
Maurice Micklewhite are the same individual? However, P3 may also be denied by introducing a distinction “at the level
of sense”. On this view, the difference between Invert and Nonvert is like
According to many philosophers, appearances are not misleading, and the
the difference—as the Fregean has it—between Ian, who believes that
two beliefs really are different: specifically, they represent the very same
Michael Caine is a Cockney, and Nan, who believes that Maurice
individual, the beloved star of Alfie, in different ways, or under different
Micklewhite is a Cockney. On this Fregean view of the content of
modes of presentation. On this view, the propositional content of a belief
perception, the difference between Invert’s and Nonvert’s experiences is
is a Fregean Thought, with modes of presentation as constituents—as
that they represent the very same property, namely redness, in different
opposed to a structured Russellian proposition, with objects and properties
ways, or under different modes of presentation.
as constituents.[42] Put differently but connectedly, the example shows that
the names ‘Michael Caine’ and ‘Maurice Micklewhite’ have different
Fregean senses—their semantic values cannot simply be their referents.

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Thau 2002 argues against modes of presentation (and also points out the P1*. Neither Hare nor Tortoise is misperceiving the motion of the
close connections between the inverted spectrum and Frege’s puzzle). tomato.
Chalmers 2004 and Block 2007 defend a Fregean view. P2*. The tomato is moving (not stationary).

3.5 …For Relativism Hence:

C1*. The tomato looks to be moving to both Hare and Tortoise.

We are not quite finished with Argument B:
Since the tomato is moving relative to Tortoise, and is not moving relative
Argument B
to Hare, if P2* is true, it must not be taken to mean that the tomato is
P1. Neither Invert nor Nonvert is misperceiving the color of the
moving relative to Hare. Assume, then, that P2* is given the following
tomato.
true interpretation: the tomato is moving relative to Tortoise. However,
P2. The tomato is red (and not any other color).
Hare does not have to perceive that the tomato is moving relative to
Hence: Tortoise in order to perceive (correctly) the tomato’s motion—perceiving
it as not moving relative to himself will also suffice. Hence, Hare’s and
C1. The tomato looks the same color (namely, red) to both Invert Tortoise’s experiences can both be veridical, despite representing the
and Nonvert. tomato’s motion differently, which is to say that Argument B* is invalid.
P3. If representationalism is true, then the phenomenal difference
between Invert and Nonvert is due to a difference in the colors One might diagnose a similar mistake in Argument B, and thus endorse
that their experiences represent the tomato as having. relativism about color. According to relativism the tomato is not red
simpliciter: rather, it is red relative to Nonvert (not green relative to
Hence, from C1 and P3: Nonvert), and green relative to Invert (not red relative to Invert). In other
words, the tomato is simultaneously red-for-Nonvert and green-for-Invert.
C2. Representationalism is false.
Since, on this view, the tomato looks red-for-Nonvert to Nonvert, and red-
So far, reasons to reject P1 and P3 have been discussed. But one might for-Invert to Invert, both their experiences are veridical, despite
also question the step from P1 and P2 to C1. As an analogy, suppose that representing the tomato differently.
Hare is on a train, looking at a tomato in his lunchbox, and that Tortoise is
What is this property of being red-for-Nonvert? The usual answer is
on the platform, looking at the tomato as the train speeds by. Both Hare
something along the lines of the account of appearance properties in
and Tortoise have normal vision, in particular, normal visual motion
Shoemaker 2002: something is red-for-Nonvert iff it is disposed to cause
perception. Consider the following argument.
experiences with R in perceivers of Nonvert’s kind. And this, of course, is
Argument B* essentially the “secondary quality” account of color that many find in
Locke. Sometimes relativism is combined with representationalism

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(McGinn 1983, Tye 1994), but it arguably fits more naturally with is of little use, either for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or
phenomenism (McLaughlin 2003, Cohen 2004). Conveniency of Life; and so we need not trouble our selves to
examine it. (1689/1975, II, xxxii, 15)
Shoemaker did not block Argument B in this straightforward fashion
because he finds relativism implausible. As he puts it in a review of It is regrettable that Locke did not trouble his Reader, because it is not at
McGinn 1983: all clear what reasons may be offered. Malebranche was of the contrary
opinion:
Suppose…that overnight we all undergo intrasubjective ‘spectrum
inversion’…It cannot seriously be maintained that the result of the Yet I believe that it never, or almost never, happens that people see
change would be that henceforth grass is red, port wine green, etc. black or white other than as we see them, though they may not
And it is plausible that, once we were accustomed to the change, seem equally black or white to them. But as for the intermediate
we would no longer say that grass looks red (for it would look the colors, such as red, yellow, blue, and especially those compounded
way we had become accustomed to having green things look). This from these three, I do not think there are many people who have
point is even clearer if we imagine that we undergo intrasubjective exactly the same sensation of them. (1674–5/1997, I, 13, VI)
inversion one at a time rather than all of us at once. (1986, 411)
Let p be the claim that when others look at ripe tomatoes, their
Like the argument for appearance properties, the argument for relativism experiences have QR . Let S be a spectrum inversion scenario with the
can be made by appeal to shifted spectra (see, in particular, Cohen 2004). following simple feature: when others look at ripe tomatoes, their
Averill 1992 argues for a version of relativism using physically possible experiences have QG, not QR. (So p and S are incompatible.) Consider the
intrapersonal shifted spectra scenarios, involving a slight change in the following skeptical argument:
eye, or in the atmosphere.[43]
Argument C
3.6 …For Skepticism About Others’ Minds P1. One’s evidence about others’ behavior and use of color words
does not favor p over S.
The “inverted spectrum” quotation from Locke in subsection 2.2 above P2. One has no other evidence that favors p over S.
continues: P3. If one’s evidence does not favor p over S, one does not know
p.
I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible Ideas,
produced by any Object in different Men’s Minds, are most Therefore:
commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which Opinion, I
C. One does not know p.
think, there might be many Reasons offered: but that being besides
my present Business, I shall not trouble my Reader with them; but
only mind him, that the contrary Supposition, if it could be proved,

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Although philosophers have generally not been impressed by similar story for seeing green “G …” When we consider the qualitative
arguments for skepticism about the external world, there is little consensus character of our visual experiences when looking at ripe McIntosh
on the status of arguments along the above lines. For example, Block apples, as opposed to looking at ripe cucumbers, the difference is
writes: “I claim we simply do not know whether spectrum inversion not explained by appeal to G and R. For R doesn’t really explain
obtains or not” (1990, 57). Argument C is less threatening than some other why I have the one kind of qualitative experience—the kind I have
skeptical arguments because, even if sound, generalizations of it to when looking at McIntosh apples—and not the other. As evidence
skepticism about other kinds of mental states are implausible. For for this, note that it seems just as easy to imagine G as to imagine
example, a parallel argument against one’s knowledge of other’s beliefs R underlying the qualitative experience that is in fact associated
would have a dubious first premise. with R. The reverse, of course, also seems quite imaginable.
(Levine 1983, 356–7)
P1 will be denied by an orthodox representationalist. Setting a
controversial skepticism about testimony aside, presumably one can know The argument for the gap suggested by Levine 1983 can be set out as
on the basis of testimony that tomatoes look red to many people. (See follows:
Shoemaker 1982, 334.) So, since orthodox representationalism equates QR
with the property of being an experience of something’s looking red, one Argument D
may know on the basis of testimony that when others look at tomatoes, P1. If a physical theory T explains the fact that we have
their experiences have QR . experiences with QR when looking at McIntosh apples, and
experiences with QG when looking at cucumbers, then it is not
Some philosophers think that the fact that others are biologically similar to imaginable that the explanans holds without the explanandum.
oneself is an important piece of evidence for their mental similarity (see, That is, it is not imaginable that T holds and we do not have
e.g., Hill 1991, Ch. 9), and P2 might be denied on these grounds (see, e.g., experiences with QR when looking at McIntosh apples (etc.).
Papineau 2002, 132). For more discussion, see Block 2002.[44] P2. A red-green spectrum inversion scenario in which T holds is
imaginable.
3.7 …For the Explanatory Gap
Hence:
Many philosophers think there is an “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983,
C. No physical theory explains the fact that we have experiences
2001) between physical facts and facts about conscious experience. On
with QR when looking at McIntosh apples, and experiences
this view, even if consciousness is a physical phenomenon, it cannot be
with QG when looking at cucumbers.
given a physical explanation. Inverted spectrum scenarios often play a role
in arguments for the gap: Notice that Argument D does not have as a premise a spectrum inversion
hypothesis—that a certain spectrum inversion scenario is possible. All the
Let’s call the physical story for seeing red “R” and the physical
argument requires is that the spectrum inversion scenario is imaginable.

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Indeed, since Levine is a physicalist, he thinks that this scenario is not qualia” scenarios: “The conceivability of zombies…is the principal
possible. manifestation of the explanatory gap” (79).

What is the intended interpretation of ‘imagine’ in P1 and P2? (In the 3.8 …For the Ineffability of Qualia
literature ‘conceive’ is used interchangeably.) The usual answer (Levine
2001, Ch. 2) is this: p is imaginable iff not-p is not a priori. On this The introduction of ‘QR ’, ‘QG ’, and so forth, at the start of this article
interpretation, P1 amounts to this: it is a priori that if the explanans holds, might have occasioned some suspicion. Assume that spectrum inversion
so does the explanandum; that is, that the explanans a priori entails the does not occur, and consider a counterfactual situation in which, as Block
explanandum. This can be motivated by appeal to the “deductive- puts it, “spectrum inversion is rife” (1990, 55). Suppose that philosophers
nomological” model of explanation (see Hempel 1965, and the entry on in this counterfactual situation introduced qualia terminology in the way it
scientific explanation); this model is controversial, and in fact Levine was introduced in section 1. If their qualia terminology is meaningless,
rejects it, but he argues that there is a broader motivation: then it is hard to see why our terminology is better off—we use ‘QR ’ just
as it is used in the counterfactual situation. If, on the other hand, their
From the brief survey of current theories of scientific explanation
qualia terminology is meaningful, then presumably ‘QR ’, as they use it,
just presented, I think the following claim can be justified: in a
refers to something other than a quale. (Since spectrum inversion is rife,
good scientific explanation, the explanans either entails the
their use of ‘QR’ is not associated with any particular quale.) Again, given
explanandum, or it entails a probability distribution over a range of
the overlap in use, why suppose that our word ‘QR ’ is any different? Either
alternatives, among which the explanandum resides. (2001, 74)
way: ‘QR’ does not refer to a quale. There is a threat, then, that qualia
One might resist Argument D by denying P2 (for some ammunition, see cannot be named in a public language—that they are ineffable (cf. Dennett
Hardin 1987; 1993, 134–42; for a reply see Levine 1991; see also Hardin 1988, 228–9). Indeed, that seems to be Block’s opinion: “if an inverted
1991). A much more common response is to deny P1 (Block and Stalnaker spectrum is possible, then experiential contents that can be expressed in
1999; for a reply see Chalmers and Jackson 2001). public language (for example, looking red) are not qualitative contents, but
rather intentional contents” (1990, 55; see also Block 2007, 73–4).
One exegetical complication is that Levine himself now denies P1, while (“Qualitative contents” are qualia that are not representational properties:
continuing to maintain the existence of the explanatory gap on the basis of see subsection 3.2.)
an argument related to Argument D, although somewhat more complicated
(2001, Ch. 3). And in any case, just like the inverted spectrum argument Frege held a version of the ineffability view. One of his theses in The
against behaviorism, functionalism and physicalism (see subsection 3.1 Foundations of Arithmetic is that arithmetic is “objective”, which he
above), inverted spectrum scenarios are not playing an essential role in the explains as follows:
case for the gap, and indeed Levine 2001 leans more heavily on “absent
What is objective…is what is subject to laws, what can be
conceived and judged, what is expressible in words. What is purely

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intuitable is not communicable. To make this clear, let us suppose our judgement and say, for instance, ‘It appears red at present, but
two rational beings such that projective properties and relations are it is white.’ Even a colour-blind man can speak of red and green, in
all they can intuit—the lying of three points on a line, of four spite of the fact that he does not distinguish between these colors in
points on a plane, and so on; and let what the one intuits as plane his sensations; he recognizes the distinction by the fact that others
appear to the other as a point, and vice versa, so that what for the make it, or perhaps by making a physical experiment. Often,
one is the line joining two points for the other is the line of therefore, a colour word does not signify our subjective sensation,
intersection of two planes, and so on with the one intuition always which we cannot know to agree with anyone else’s (for obviously
dual to the other. In these circumstances they could understand one calling things by the same name does not guarantee as much), but
another quite well and would never realize the difference between rather an objective quality. (§26)
their intuitions, since in projective geometry every proposition has
its dual counterpart; any disagreements over points of aesthetic Although Frege seems to concede that sometimes a color word “signifies
appreciation would not be conclusive evidence. Over all our subjective sensation”, the general drift of the argument points to a
geometrical theorems they would be in complete agreement, only much stronger conclusion, that our subjective sensations are simply not
interpreting the words in terms of their respective intuitions. With “expressible in words”. A related example is Wittgenstein’s “beetle in the
the word ‘point’, for example, one would connect one intuition and box”:
the other another. We can therefore still say that this word has for
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a
them an objective meaning, provided only that by this meaning we
‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone
do not understand any of the peculiarities of their respective
says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—
intuitions. (1884/1953, §26)
Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something
This is an inverted spatial qualia scenario. According to Frege, the different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing
inversion would not show up in the semantics of words: both Nonvert and constantly changing.—But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in
Invert use the word ‘point’ with the same meaning, despite associating these people’s language?—If so it would not be used as the name
very different “intuitions” with it. In the next paragraph, Frege makes a of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game
similar claim about color terminology. at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.
No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out,
The word ‘white’ ordinarily makes us think of a certain sensation, whatever it is. (1958, §293)
which is, of course, entirely subjective; but even in ordinary
everyday speech, it often bears, I think, an objective sense. When (Notice that Wittgenstein imagines “absent beetles”, corresponding to an
we call snow white, we mean to refer to an objective quality which “absent qualia” scenario.)
we recognize, in ordinary daylight, by a certain sensation. If the
Here is one argument suggested by these passages.
snow is being seen in a coloured light, we take that into account in

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Suppose that Humbert is semantically (and otherwise) competent, has C2. ‘QR’, as Humbert uses it, does not refer to X.
normal color vision, is a member of our linguistic community, and uses
qualia terminology (‘QR ’, ‘QG’, etc.), as introduced in section 1 above. Since the rest of us are in no better position than Humbert, C2 leads
Further suppose that spectrum inversion does not in fact occur. inevitably to the conclusion that ‘QR ’, ‘QG’, etc., as introduced in the
manner of section 1, do not in fact refer to qualia. One might view
Now consider a counterfactual spectrum inversion scenario in which Argument E as showing that certain salient aspects of our mental lives are
“spectrum inversion is rife”. Invert has been spectrally inverted with linguistically elusive (as Frege apparently did); alternatively, one might
respect to some other members of his community since birth, all of whom follow Wittgenstein and conclude that the very idea of qualia rests on a
use color terminology in much the same way. Nonvert is spectrally conceptual confusion.
inverted with respect to his neighbor Invert, but—comparing this scenario
with the actual scenario described in the previous paragraph—is not In fact, C2 does not imply that qualia are completely unspeakable—it does
spectrally inverted with respect to Humbert. Further suppose that Nonvert not, that is, imply that no expression refers to X (i.e., the quale distinctive
and his neighbor Invert use qualia terminology as introduced in section 1 of Humbert’s experiences of red things). Indeed, if the sentence to the
above. Assume as a suppressed premise that this scenario is possible. right of ‘C2’ succeeds in expressing a truth, then ‘X’ (and so ‘the quale
distinctive of Humbert’s experiences of red things’) refers to X. If
Let ‘X’ abbreviate the definite description ‘the quale distinctive of Argument E is as far as we can go, then the moral seems to be that
Humbert’s experiences of red things’ (by hypothesis, this definite particular qualia can only be picked out ‘by description’—they cannot be
description is coextensive with ‘the quale distinctive of Nonvert’s referred to by semantically simple expressions, such as ‘QR’ and ‘QG’.[45]
experiences of red things in the counterfactual inversion scenario’). But—bearing in mind Wittgenstein’s remark that “the box might even be
empty”—one might attempt to extend the argument to show that even the
Argument E word ‘qualia’ itself is devoid of significance.
P1. ‘QR’, as Invert uses it, and ‘QR ’, as Nonvert uses it, refer (if at
all) to the same property. However, Argument E is not obviously sound. The premise in need of
P2. ‘QR’, as Invert uses it, does not refer to X. most defense is P3.[46] When qualia terminology was introduced in
section 1, it was tacitly presupposed that spectrum inversion was not rife.
Hence: In Invert’s and Nonvert’s community, that presupposition is false, and so it
should not be surprising if the attempt to introduce ‘QR ’ into their public
C1. ‘QR’, as Nonvert uses it, does not refer to X.
language fails. But in Humbert’s community the presupposition is true; so
P3. ‘QR’, as Humbert uses it, and ‘QR ’, as Nonvert uses it, refer (if
why wouldn’t ‘QR ’, as the members of this community use it, successfully
at all) to the same property.
refer to the quale distinctive of Humbert’s experiences of red things?[47]
Hence, from C1 and P3:

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3.9 ...For the Inconsistency of Content-Externalism, P1. Representational properties are extrinsic.
Representationalism, and Qualia-Internalism P2. Representationalism is true (for simplicity, in the simple form
of subsection 3.2 above: QC = the property of being an
Externalism about beliefs and other propositional attitudes, and also about experience of something’s looking to have color C).
perceptual experiences, was alluded to in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. Premise P3. Qualia are intrinsic.
P1 of our much-scrutinized Argument B—‘Neither Invert nor Nonvert is
misperceiving the color of the tomato’—was supported, in part, by a Consider the representational property of having an experience of
particular externalist theory of perceptual content. According to the something’s looking red. By P1, this property is extrinsic, and so there is a
externalist, some representational properties of subjects, like the property possible world w in which a subject x has this property and y —a perfect
of believing that water is wet, or that arthritis is painful, or the property of duplicate of x —lacks it. Solely for illustration, we may take w to be a
having an experience of something’s looking red, are extrinsic: these possible world in which Nonvert and his twin Invert are both looking at a
properties are not necessarily shared between perfect duplicates (or even tomato in a white bowl (but perhaps the twins are on different planets).
less-than-perfect duplicates with perfectly duplicated brains).[48] Smith Nonvert is having an experience of something’s looking red, and Invert is
may believe that water is wet, yet twin-Smith on Putnam’s Twin Earth not; more specifically: (i) the tomato looks red, and nothing looks green, to
does not believe that water is wet. The tomato may look red to Jones, yet Nonvert; (ii) the tomato looks green, and nothing looks red, to Invert. By
not to twin-Jones on Inverted Earth. (In an alternative scenario, twin-Jones P2, Nonvert’s experience has QR (and not QG ); conversely for Invert. So
has just been created by happenstance in a swamp: see Davidson 1987.) Nonvert and Invert are twins whose experiences do not share qualia; in
other words, qualia are not intrinsic. By P3, contradiction. Hence:
It is also widely held that qualia are intrinsic (see, e.g., Block 1990, 68).
(More exactly: properties of subjects like having an experience with quale C. At least one of P1, P2, and P3 is false.
Q, are intrinsic.) If Jones is having an experience with quale Q , then there
Notice that Argument F does not assume the possibility of a scenario in
is no possible world w in which twin-Jones is not having an experience
which duplicate perceivers are spectrally inverted. This spectrum
with quale Q .
inversion hypothesis is ruled out by P3, and P3 is of course consistent with
Finally, representationalism (see subsection 3.2 above) is—if not as Argument F’s conclusion.
popular as the previous two claims—at least defended by many
Argument F shows that either content-externalism, representationalism, or
contemporary philosophers.
qualia-internalism should be rejected. For a discussion of this problem, see
Now consider the following argument (cf. Byrne and Hilbert 1997b, 271– Egan and John 2003 (Other Internet Resources); Dretske (1995, Ch. 5)
2): argues against P3 (see also Tye 1995, 150–5; 2002, Ch. 6; Lycan 1996,
115–7; and Noë 2005, Ch. 7); P1 is denied in Chalmers 2004.
Argument F

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Relatedly, McGinn (1989, 58–94) runs a “spatially Inverted Earth” Color relativism is As immediately above.
argument against what he calls ‘strong externalism’ about perceptual true.
content (a particular kind of externalism); Davies (1997) adapts McGinn’s
One does not know Inversion that is not ruled out by one’s actual
example to argue for externalism about perceptual content. Both sides of about others’ qualia. evidence about others’ behavior and use of color
the “externalism/internalism” debate as encapsulated in Argument F words.
presuppose that it is possible to keep a perceiver’s internal constitution
fixed while greatly varying the environment; this assumption is critically There is an Inversion that obtains together with the actual
explanatory gap. physical theory of color experiences; the
examined in Hurley 1998, Chs. 7, 8, and Myin 2001. scenario does not need to be possible, only
imaginable.
3.10 Summary: Required Features of Inverted Spectrum
Scenarios Qualia are ineffable. Inverted and noninverted subjects in same
community, with the use of qualia terminology
similar to the actual use.
Conclusion Required features of scenario
Content- Inverted subjects who are perfect duplicates;
Behaviorism is Behaviorally undetectable inversion. externalism, this scenario is not assumed to be possible.
false. representationalism,
and qualia-
Functionalism is Functionally undetectable inversion. internalism are
false. inconsistent.

Physicalism is false. Physically undetectable inversion.

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Piantanida, T. P., 1974, “A Replacement Model of X-linked Recessive Shoemaker, S., 1975a, “Functionalism and Qualia”, Philosophical Studies,
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Web Pages and Web Sites 3. Notice that a subject S may undergo an experience with QR even if
there is no object that looks red to S. For example, a visual hallucination
A Glossary of Color Science, compiled by Alex Byrne (MIT) and of a ripe tomato has QR , as does the having of a red afterimage. (At least,
David R. Hilbert (University of Illinois/Chicago). this is the usual way qualia terminology like ‘QR ’ is understood.) So, if the
Rolf Kuehni’s article on Color Spaces. identification of QR with the property of being an experience of
Wikipedia entry on the Munsell color system. something’s looking red is to be sustained, it must be possible for S to
Eric Schwitzgebel’s Sound-Color Qualia Inversion Contest. undergo “an experience of something’s looking red” even though there is
no object that looks red to S . This might be thought unproblematic, but
Related Entries “disjunctivism” about perception raises some complications. According to
disjunctivists, a hallucination of a ripe tomato and a phenomenologically
behaviorism | color | consciousness: and intentionality | consciousness: matching veridical experience of a ripe tomato are not events of a common
representational theories of | functionalism | Locke, John | mental content | mental kind. Hence, if “an experience of something’s looking red” is
mental content: causal theories of | mental content: externalism about | supposed to be a distinctive kind of mental event, then disjunctivists will
mental content: narrow | mental content: teleological theories of | other deny that one can undergo an experience of something’s looking red when
minds | perception: the problem of | physicalism | qualia | sense-data there is no object that looks red. Relatedly, disjunctivists will deny that
events/states with QR thereby have something mental in common, which is
Acknowledgments tantamount to saying that QR is not a “natural” mental property (in the
sense of Lewis 1986, 60–1). See the entry on the disjunctive theory of
For advice and assistance I am very grateful to Jonathan Cohen, Tyler perception.
Doggett, Andy Egan, Rachel Faith, Ned Hall, Elizabeth Harman, David
Hilbert, Jim John, Fiona Macpherson, and Daniel Stoljar. 4. Of course, it might be objected that the explanation of qualia
terminology just given is too vague, and so fails to convey a unique
Notes to Inverted Qualia meaning. For the expository purposes of this article it will be assumed (not
uncontroversially) that this objection is mistaken. The explanation will be
1. For example, in Purple Haze (2001) Levine clearly assumes that disputed on other grounds by a proponent of the “Frege-Schlick” view
experiences can have both QR and QG—can be both “reddish” and (see subsection 2.3.2); another complaint against the explanation is
“greenish”, in his terminology (see, e.g., 102, 111). discussed in subsection 3.8.

2. For the view that an extensive range of states/events have qualia, see 5. In fact, this is also the opening characterization of qualia in Dennett
Horgan and Tienson 2002; for the view that episodes of conscious thought 1988 (“‘Qualia’ is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more
have qualia, see Strawson 1994, Ch. 1. familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us” (1988, 226)).

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6. Crane 2000, 177–8, points out that C. S. Pierce used qualia “in and as green or blue with the other. Yet if these people be supposed
something like its modern sense” in 1866. born one-eyed, or with two eyes disposed to see as blue what we
call green, they would think they saw objects as having the same
7. For other uses of ‘qualia’, see Lycan 1996, 176–7, and Crane 2000. color that we see them as having because they would always have
heard called green what they would see as blue. (1674–5/1997, I,
8. There are other color spaces besides the NCS, one of which (the
13, VI)
Munsell space) is mentioned below; different spaces have different
advantages and limitations. Some spaces that are sometimes called ‘color This does not correspond to a rotation of the hue circle, though. See also
spaces’ are in fact spaces of a narrow range of physically characterized Allen 2010, 246 and fn. 26.
stimuli (e.g., lights), rather than a space of colors. It should not be
assumed without argument that exactly one of the many genuine color 13. See Robinson 1994, Ch. 1; Jacovides 1999. For the view that Locke
spaces is the “real” color space; Westphal 1991, 118–22, and Hardin was not so committal, see Allen 2010.
1999b have some some relevant cautionary remarks. For a brief
introduction to color spaces, see Hardin 1993, 113–20, and Kaiser and 14. This choice and number of dimensions is not unproblematic. For
Boynton 1996, 492–8; Kuehni 2003 is a comprehensive survey. discussion and references, see Mausfeld 2003.

9. Image from Scandinavian Colour Institute. 15. Munsell image adapted from [Link].

10. An early appearance of the phrase ‘inverted spectrum’ is in Block and 16. Note that a “behaviorally detectable” inversion scenario is merely one
Fodor 1972. For ‘spectrum inversion’, see Shoemaker 1975a, b. Lewis in which the inversion is “in principle” detectable. In such a scenario,
1929 invites us to “[s]uppose that in the matter of immediate sense subjects who are inverted with respect to each other differ in relevant
qualities my whole spectrum should be exactly the reverse of yours” (75). behavioral dispositions (e.g., dispositions to apply color terms,
dispositions to sort colored chips, etc.). But these differences might be
11. On typical versions of the relativist view discussed in subsection 3.5, if extremely subtle. If red-green inversion is behaviorally detectable in the
overnight we all underwent the simple sort of spectrum inversion just sense used in this article, it does not follow that we can know whether or
described, then this would “invert the colors” in the following not it occurs.
metalinguistic sense: after the change, the word ‘red’ would correctly
apply to emeralds (etc.), and the word ‘green’ would correctly apply to 17. Harrison (1967, 1973) first raised this sort of problem for behaviorally
rubies (etc.). undetectable spectrum inversion. See also Clark 1985; 1993, 199–205;
Casati 1990; Hardin 1993, 139–42; 1997; 1999a; Kay 1999; MacLaury
12. In The Search After Truth, Malebranche writes: 1999; Palmer 1999b, 984; Campbell 2000; and Broackes 2007.

There are some people who see certain objects yellow with one eye 18. See also Kirk 1994, 188.

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19. See also Sacks 1997. viewing position are exactly the same in S and SI∗ , the situation is
underdescribed. Suppose that: (i) y and b are, respectively, determinate
20. See also Putnam 1981, 80. shades of yellow and blue; (ii) a banana in the original scene S looks to
you to have y ; and (iii) I(y) = b. So the banana in SI∗ will have hue b . If
21. Shoemaker credits the point to Taylor 1966. For other attempts to
your experience when looking at SI∗ is phenomenologically the same as
argue that a behaviorally undetectable interpersonal inversion scenario is
Invert’s when she looks at S, the banana in the new scene must look to you
coherent, see Gert 1965, Lycan 1973, and Harvey 1979. For
to have hue b . But for a variety of reasons this is not guaranteed by the
Wittgensteinian responses see Canfield 2009 (a reply to Block 2007), and
fact that the banana has hue b, that you have “normal” color vision, and
Brenner 2015.
that the lighting is (as we may assume) “standard”. For example, variation
22. Block credits the example to Harman 1982. within the class of those with normal color vision (see subsection 2.4
below), or variation within the class of standard illuminants (different
23. Suppose, in addition to a chromatic inversion, that black objects on kinds of daylight, say), can by themselves account for a difference in color
Earth are white on Inverted Earth and vice versa—so the (blackish) appearance.
blueberries in the center of the melon (figure 6, top left) are white on
Inverted Earth. A photograph of the inverted scene of fruits would not Further problems are posed by contrast effects (Hardin 1993, Ch. 1), and
look like either the bottom left or right parts of figure 6, which is why “interreflections”—illumination reflected from one colored object that is
Block specifies only a chromatic inversion. Setting aside the fact that the incident on another and then reflected into the eye. In addition, if on
white blueberries would look more distinct (and not luminous), the space Inverted Earth you see an Earth-style variety of scenes in an Earth-style
in shadow between the pepper, the banana, and the lime would look black, variety of illuminants, then you would soon notice a difference. For
and the specular (“mirror-like”) highlights (see, for instance, the red example, green objects in reddish light tend to look darker, so in reddish
pepper on the left) would look white. For discussion of other problems light green peppers (say) would look darker on Inverted Earth than their
with a black-white inversion on Inverted Earth, see Broackes 2007. red counterparts would look in similar conditions on Earth (see Myin
2001, 69–70). This is relevant to Block’s argument against functionalism,
24. Block’s official description of Inverted Earth (“fire hydrants are but it might not matter much for his argument against representationalism.
green”, etc.) raises complications. Return to the description of the inverted
qualia scenario in subsection 2.1, and in particular to scene S as depicted 25. It has been suggested that, due to the genetic basis of certain color
in the left-hand part of figure 4. Suppose an “inverted scene” SI∗ is created vision deficiencies, there will be (rare) actual cases of red-green inversion
as follows: if an object in the old scene has hue h, in SI∗ the object has I(h) (Piantanida 1974); that now seems unlikely (for references and discussion,
(compare the recipe given in subsection 2.1, in terms of apparent hues). see Byrne and Hilbert 2003a, 19). Still, the mere fact that this possibility
Take Invert as described in subsection 2.1: is her experience when she was taken seriously by vision scientists should give some philosophers
looks at S phenomenologically the same as yours when you look at SI∗ ? pause for thought (see Nida-Rümelin 1996; for further discussion see Ross
Not necessarily. Even with the stipulation that the illumination and 1999a, Nida-Rümelin 1999, Ross 1999b, Meyer 2000).

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26. A spectral light is one composed of a very narrow band of wavelengths 34. Discussions of inverted spectrum arguments against functionalism
from the visible spectrum, which runs from approximately 400nm to include: Shoemaker 1975a, 1984; Block 1980, 1990; Lewis 1980; Putnam
700nm. 1981, 79–82; Horgan 1984; Johnsen 1986; Levine 1988; Cole 1990;
Harman 1990; Lycan 1987, 59–61, 1996, 118–121; Rey 1992; Chalmers
27. For the complicated disputes over the best way to understand the 1996, 263–6; Carruthers 2000, 76–87; and Thau 2002, 17–21.
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, see the entry on intrinsic vs. extrinsic
properties. 35. P1c is an instance of Peacocke’s “most extreme form of the inverted
spectrum hypothesis…[that] asserts that another subject’s visual
28. A qualification: these implications are supposed to hold if we restrict experience can be qualitatively different from your own when you are both
attention to creatures found in worlds with the same basic laws as ours. seeing the same object, even though your relevant brain states are
physically identical and so are your environmental conditions” (1988,
29. ‘Absent qualia’ was coined by Shoemaker (1975a).
464). Peacocke argues, on grounds connected with the individuation of
30. Invert and Nonvert do not need to be behavioral duplicates simpliciter thoughts, that “the hypothesis of extreme inversion is spurious”(464). For
— just duplicates with respect to the behavioral dispositions that are a reply, see Johnsen 1993. Schoettle argues that “a person can be
supposed to determine that one has an experience with QR. Similar physically identical on two occasions (and in a physically identical
remarks go for Arguments Ab and Ac below. environment) and yet the representational content of the person’s
perceptions of color can be different on the two occasions” (2009, 111–2),
31. (a) and (b) hold just as much for “conceptual” (or “analytic”) which he takes to support the positivist view that “philosophical questions
functionalists as for “psychofunctionalists” (for the distinction, see Block about what constitutes the identity of our experience of color are
1980, 1996b). cognitively meaningless” (113).

32. For attempts to remove the separation between conceptual coherence 36. The exposition of representationalism here is greatly simplified. For
and possibility, see Chalmers 1996, 131–4, and Jackson 1998; see also further discussion of the varieties of representationalism see the entry on
Section 5 of the entry on zombies (“Does conceivability entail representational theories of consciousness, Byrne 2001, and Chalmers
possibility?”). 2004.

33. The actual quotation has ‘the intentional content of looking red’ in 37. Cf. Chalmers 1995; 1996, 256–7.
place of ‘QR’, and expresses a thesis that Block accepts: “my brand of
qualia-realism is quasi-functional; here is why it is quasi-functional: the 38. Other discussions of the inverted spectrum argument against
qualitative content of experience [i.e., qualia like QR] is not functionally representationalism include White 1994; Tye 1995, 201–7, 2000, 104–113,
characterizable” (1990, 58). See the following subsection. 2002, 450–2; Lycan 1996, 77–82; Byrne and Hilbert 1997b, 267–72; Rey
1998; Carruthers 2000, 109–112; Cohen 2001; Thau 2002, 21–35;

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Chalmers 2004; Macpherson 2005; Marcus 2006; Thompson 2008; Speaks 3.6 to argue that we have no such knowledge, and so no such
2011; Ford 2011; Speaks 2015, ch. 35; Ren 2016; Gert 2017, ch. 8. understanding. For more on ineffability and the inverted spectrum, see
Lewis 1929, 74–6; Gert 1965; Taylor 1966; Strawson 1989; and Block
39. For an argument that it should be classified as a form of 2007. Related discussions of ineffability are in Lycan 1996, 9, 11, 101–8;
representationalism, see Byrne 2001, 224–7. Nothing will turn on this Byrne 2002; Thau 2002, Ch. 5; and Hellie 2004. See also the entry on
here. private language.
40. This difficulty for the orthodox phenomenist is related to the “many 48. This conforms to the official account of “representational properties”
property objection” to adverbialism (Jackson 1977, Ch. 3). See also Clark in Chalmers 2004; for convenience in subsection 3.2 representational
2000, Ch. 2. properties were taken to be properties of mental events/states, not subjects.
41. This terminology is from Shoemaker 2002; in Shoemaker 1994a, b, Copyright © 2020 by the author
these are called phenomenal properties. Alex Byrne

42. On another view, the propositional content of belief is a set of possible

worlds (see Lewis 1986 and Stalnaker 1987).

43. For criticisms of relativism, see Byrne and Hilbert 2003b, 57–8, and
Hardin 2003.

44. A related issue concerns the experiences of people with various defects
of color vision (see, e.g., Mollon et al. 2003), which unfortunately is a
topic largely unexamined by philosophers.

45. Compare Palmer’s thesis that “Objective behavioral methods can

determine the nature of experiences up to, but not beyond, the criterion of
isomorphism”(1999a, 934), by which he means (roughly) that science can
discover the relations between qualia but not their intrinsic nature. (A
related view is the “structural realism” of Russell 1927.)

46. Tye (1994, 177–8) denies P1.

47. One reply to this objection links understanding ‘QR ’ with knowing that
‘QR ’ refers to QR , and then appeals to the skeptical argument of subsection

74 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2020 Edition 75

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Qualia: The Knowledge Argument
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 Qualia: The Knowledge Argument Martine Nida-Rümelin and Donnchadh O Conaill

Other Internet Resources mathematical skills and “gifted with the further power of perceiving the
Related Entries microscopic structure of atoms” could not predict, namely its smell:

He [the archangel] would know exactly what the microscopic

1. History of the Underlying Ideas structure of ammonia must be; but he would be totally unable to
predict that a substance with this structure must smell as ammonia
The Knowledge Argument became the subject of intense philosophical does when it gets into the human nose. The utmost that he could
discussion following its canonical formulation by Frank Jackson (1982). predict on this subject would be that certain changes would take
However, there are numerous precursors of this argument in the literature. place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. But
Precursors of the Knowledge Argument typically involve at least one of he could not possibly know that theses changes would be
two strategies which are familiar from Jackson’s formulation. The first is accompanied by the appearance of a smell in general or of the
to appeal to what Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa term the knowledge peculiar smell of ammonia in particular, unless someone told him
intuition: the intuition that no amount of knowledge of the physical so or he had smelled it for himself (1925, 71).[1]
information or physical facts concerning certain experiences can by itself
suffice for knowledge of what these experiences are like, i.e., knowledge Under the title “The Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” H. Feigl (1958)
of their qualitative character or distinctive qualia (2004, 2–3). The second briefly discusses the epistemic limitations of a Martian who studies human
is to make use of thought experiments which are similar to Jackson’s behavior but does not share human sentiments:
famous example of Mary. These thought-experiments typically involve a
The first question I wish to discuss concerns the cognitive ‘plus’,
being who has complete knowledge of the physical information or
i.e., the alleged advantages of knowledge by acquaintance over
physical facts concerning certain experiences, but who (it is claimed) lacks
knowledge by description. We may ask, for example, what does the
knowledge of what those experiences are like.
seeing person know that the congenitally blind person could not
As examples of the knowledge intuition, Stoljar & Nagasawa cite passages know. Or, to take two examples from Eddington, what could a
by Bertrand Russell (1998, 13–14) and by J.W. Dunne (1929). As Dunne someone know about the effects of jokes if he had no sense of
puts it, quoting James Ward, physical descriptions cannot entail humor? Could a Martian, entirely without sentiments of
knowledge of what it is that “you immediately experience when you look compassion and piety, know about what is going on during a
at a field poppy” (1929, 5). Around the same time as Dunne was writing, commemoration of the armistice? For the sake of argument, we
C.D. Broad (1925) used a thought-experiment as part of an argument assume compete physical predictability and explainability of the
against a mechanistic version of physicalism. Broad argues that even if the behavior of humans equipped with vision, a sense of humor, and
mechanistic theory of chemistry were true there still would be a property sentiments of piety. The Martian could then predict all responses,
of ammonia that a mathematical archangel endowed with unlimited including the linguistic utterances of the earthlings in the situations
which involve their visual perceptions, their laughter about jokes,

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or their (solemn) behavior at the commemoration. But ex hearing”, but who intuitively does not know what it is like to hear (1982,
hypothesi, the Martian would be lacking completely in the sort of 4).
imagery and empathy which depends on familiarity (direct
acquaintance) with the kinds of qualia to be imaged or empathized Finally, it is worth mentioning the extremely influential thought
(1958, 431). experiment described by Thomas Nagel (1974). According to Nagel, the
physical facts about an organism and its perceptual systems are “objective
B. A. Farrell had earlier presented a similar thought experiment featuring a facts par excellence – the kind that can be observed and understood from
Martian; in this version, it is humans who lack knowledge of what it is like many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems”
for the Martian to exercise his sensory capacities (1950, 183; though (1974, 442). Nagel argues that even if we knew all the objective facts
Farrell ultimately argues that this thought experiment does not present a about a bat’s sonar system, we would still not know what it would be like
challenge to physicalism). Paul E. Meehl, responding to Feigl, describes to perceive using this system. Therefore, complete knowledge of the
two individuals who each have complete neurophysiological knowledge, physical facts about a bat’s perceptual system would not yield knowledge
one of whom is congenitally blind; he takes it as intuitive that this person of certain facts about a bat’s experiences; these facts can only be captured
does not know something which the other does, namely “what red looks from a subjective perspective. Nagel does not argue against physicalism,
like” (1966, 151). but rather claims that we presently have no understanding of how it can be
true. In Section 4.9, we shall outline a related approach to the knowledge
More recent examples from the literature come closer to being versions of argument which interprets it as a challenge not to physicalism but to a
the Knowledge Argument rather than merely precursors to it. For example, position called objectivism.
consider the following statement of the knowledge intuition by Nicholas
Maxwell: 2. The Basic Idea
from a complete physicalist description alone it would be
Frank Jackson (1982) formulates the intuition underlying his Knowledge
impossible to deduce the perceptual qualities of things, but this is
Argument in a much cited passage using his famous example of the
due, not to the fact that things do not really possess perceptual
neurophysiologist Mary:
qualities, but to the fact that the physicalist description is
incomplete: it does not tell us all that there is to know about the Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to
world. It does not tell us what it is like to be a human being alive investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and
and experiencing in the world (1965, 309).[2] white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of
vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information
And Howard Robinson, writing the same year as Jackson published
there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes,
‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, describes a deaf scientist “who knows
or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She
everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in
discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from

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the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the a subject B: A cannot know that B has an experience of a particular quality
central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and Q on certain occasions. This particular item of knowledge about B is
expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the inaccessible to A because A never had experiences of Q herself.
sentence ‘The sky is blue’.… What will happen when Mary is
released from her black and white room or is given a color 3. Some Clarifications
television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just
obvious that she will learn something about the world and our 3.1 Two Versions of the Argument
visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous
knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical As Horgan (1984) points out, talk of ‘physical information’ in the context
information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism of the knowledge argument is ambiguous between an epistemological and
is false. an ontological reading. “Physical information” may be interpreted (a) in
the sense of what Horgan calls ‘explicit physical information’ (according
The argument contained in this passage may be put like this: to Horgan’s proposal a sentence S expresses explicit physical information
about certain processes just in case S belongs to, or follows from, a
(1) Mary has all the physical information concerning human color
theoretically adequate physical account of those processes) or (b) in the
vision before her release.
sense of ‘ontologically physical information’ which is explicated in
(2) But there is some information about human color vision that Horgan (1984, 150) as follows: a sentence S “expresses ontologically
she does not have before her release. physical information about certain processes just in case (i) all entities
referred to or quantified over in S are physical entities, and (ii) all the
Therefore properties and relations expressed by the predicates in S are physical
properties and relations.” Presupposing a distinction along these lines one
(3) Not all information is physical information. may replace ‘to have all explicit physical information about x’ by ‘to have
complete physical knowledge about x’ and one may replace ‘to have all
Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case of Mary,
ontologically physical information about x’ by ‘to know all the physical
but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article: the case
facts about x’. The argument may thus be reformulated in two different
of a person, Fred, who sees a color unknown to normal human perceivers.
ways:
We might want to know what color Fred experiences when looking at
things that appear to him in that particular way. It seems clear that no (V1) The weaker version of the knowledge argument:
amount of knowledge about what happens in his brain and about how
color information is processed in his visual system will help us to find an (1a) Mary has complete physical knowledge concerning facts about
answer to that question. In both cases cited by Jackson, an epistemic human color vision before her release.
subject A appears to have no access to particular items of knowledge about

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(2a) But there is some kind of knowledge concerning facts about Amsterdam, does not know that he is now in Amsterdam (if asked about
human color vision that she does not have before her release. his present location he would assert “I am now in Venice”). John’s
knowledge concerning the present location of people is incomplete. He
Therefore lacks a specific locating piece of de se knowledge. Still, there need not be
any fact concerning the location of people that John does not have
(3a) There is some kind of knowledge concerning facts about human
knowledge of. It does not follow from the description of the case that John
color vision that is non-physical knowledge.
does not have knowledge of the fact that John is in Amsterdam. John may
(V2) The stronger version of the knowledge argument: well know that John is in Amsterdam but, having forgotten that he is
himself John, he may fail to conclude that he is now in Amsterdam. If
(1b) Mary knows all the physical facts concerning human color vision John finally learns that he is in Amsterdam, he does not thereby learn a
before her release. new fact – or so many philosophers would insist – he gains new
knowledge of a fact that he already knew in a different way.
(2b) But there are some facts about human color vision that Mary does
not know before her release. If – in analogy to the de se case – some physical facts about color vision
can be known in two different ways, – in a ‘physical way’ (under ‘physical
Therefore
concepts’) and in some other, non-physical way (under ‘non-physical
(3b) There are non-physical facts concerning human color vision. concepts’), then it is possible to acquire new (non-physical) knowledge
about a (physical) fact without thereby acquiring knowledge of a new fact
The conclusion of the stronger version of the argument (3b) is an (the very same fact may have been known before under its physical
ontological claim that the physicalist must reject. The conclusion of the conceptualization). Many authors accept the weaker version of the
weaker version of the argument is merely an epistemological claim that is argument but reject the stronger one for the reason just sketched: they
compatible with denying the existence of non-physical facts. Although admit that Mary gains new propositional knowledge but deny that she
Jackson’s original formulation in terms of information is open to both thereby comes to know facts that she did not know before in some other
interpretations it is clear that the second stronger version is what he had in way. (These authors accept the first premise of both versions of the
mind. argument and the second premise of the first version as well, but they deny
the second premise of the second version and insist that (2a) does not
As many have pointed out, the result of the weaker version (3a) does not imply (2b)). Their position with respect to the knowledge argument will be
imply the result of the stronger version (3b). That a person has incomplete called the New Knowledge/Old Fact-View (see Section 4.6 below). Others
knowledge about a certain topic does not imply without further deny even the weaker version V1 and claim that Mary does not gain any
assumptions that there is some specific fact she does not have knowledge new propositional knowledge (no new knowledge about something that is
of. The example of knowledge about oneself (de se knowledge) may the case, no factual knowledge). Their position will be called the No
illustrate the general point. Let us suppose that John, who is at t in Propositional Knowledge View (see Sections 4.3 and 4.5 below).

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To locate the different points of disagreement it is helpful to formulate the minority of philosophers have chosen this strategy, see Section 4.2 below)
stronger version of the argument more explicitly. or he or she can avoid C2 by (b) denying premise P2 (this is the strategy
chosen by proponents of the No Propositional Knowledge View, see
(V3) Explicit formulation of the knowledge argument (stronger Sections 4.3 and 4.5 below) or by (c) blocking the inference from premise
version) : P2 to C2 (this is the strategy chosen by a majority of physicalist
Premise P1 Mary has complete physical knowledge about philosophers who subscribe to some version of the New Knowledge/Old
human color vision before her release. Fact View, see Section 4.6 below).
Therefore
3.2 Physical and Non-physical
Consequence C1 Mary knows all the physical facts about human
color vision before her release. The knowledge argument is often cited as one of those anti-physicalist
qualia-based arguments that are supposed to justify property dualism. The
Premise P2 There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning
above formulation, however, does not explicitly mention non-physical
facts about human color vision that Mary does not
have before her release. properties but only non-physical facts. But the relation between the two
claims is obvious. Friends of the knowledge argument will say that the
Therefore (from (P2)): facts at issue are non-physical because they involve the exemplification of
non-physical properties (e.g. of the property of having an experience with
Consequence C2 There are some facts about human color vision quality Q).
that Mary does not know before her release.
In the assumption that Mary has all physical knowledge (first version) or
Therefore (from (C1) and (C2)):
knows all the physical facts (second version) “physical” is meant in a very
broad sense that includes knowledge about (or facts concerning) the
Consequence C3 There are non-physical facts about human color
vision. functioning of the receptors and neurons involved in color vision
(biological and physiological knowledge/facts) as well as knowledge
Once C1 and C2 are accepted, there is obviously no way to avoid C3 about (or facts concerning) the whole network of causal relations between
(which follows logically from the former two). Moreover, is seems hard to processes underlying color vision, external stimuli and behavior
deny that it is in principle possible to have complete physical knowledge (functional knowledge/ functional facts). “Physical” knowledge in the
about human color vision (or about an appropriately chosen part thereof). broad sense at issue even includes psychological knowledge (e.g.
If so, premise P1 should be accepted as an appropriate description of a knowledge about the result of psychophysical experiments) in so far as
legitimate thought experiment. To avoid the antimaterialist conclusion C3 they can be formulated without use of phenomenal terminology. One
the physicalist can (a) object against the inference from P1 to C1 (a might try to explicate “physical knowledge” in the sense at issue in
roughly the following way: physical knowledge includes all knowledge

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that is expressible in a terminology that does not contain irreducibly four slides (a red, a blue, a green and a yellow slide) appears to her in the
mental terms. It would be natural to define physical facts as those facts color normal people experience when looking at the cloudless sky. At t2
that can be expressed in this way. But note that this definition of ‘physical Marianna knows, in a sense, what it is like to have experiences of red,
facts’ begs the question against an objection that has been raised against blue, etc. But she still lacks the relevant items of knowledge about what
the knowledge argument (see Section 4.2 below). It is certainly not easy to other people experience: there is a clear sense in which she still may not
formulate a precise, adequate and non question-begging account of know that the sky appears blue to normal perceivers, she may even have
“physical knowledge” and “physical facts” suited for the discussion of the the false belief that it appears to normal perceivers like the red slide
knowledge argument. It is, however, quite common to assume that our appears to her and thus believe, in a sense, that the sky appears red to
intuitive understanding of “physical knowledge” in the broad sense at normal perceivers. Only at t3, when Marianna is finally released and sees
issue is clear enough for the purposes of the debate, though some argue the sky, does she gain this item of knowledge. One way to describe the
that talk of “physical facts” needs clarification (see Alter 1998). two steps of epistemic progress is this: At t2, by having color experiences,
Marianna can form new concepts, she now has what has been called
3.3 Knowing what it is like ‘phenomenal concepts’ of kinds of color experiences. By acquiring these
concepts she acquires the capacity to ask new questions, and to form new
It is common to formulate Mary’s new knowledge in terms of Thomas (eventually false) hypotheses (e.g. about the appearance of the sky to
Nagel’s famous locution of knowing what it’s like: Mary does not know normal perceivers). Only at t3 does she acquire the kind of knowledge that
(while living in her black-and-white environment) what it is like to see the knowledge argument is concerned with (knowledge that involves the
colors and she learns what it is like to see colors only after her release. But application of phenomenal concepts) about experiences of other people.
this common way to put the point may lead to a confusion of (a) mere
acquaintance with kinds of color experiences by having and remembering Once these two steps are clearly distinguished one may conclude that
them and (b) knowledge about what kind of color experience other Marianna’s relevant epistemic progress at t3 (and Mary’s relevant progress
subjects have at a given occasion, and it may thereby lead to a failure to after release) is not happily described by talk of knowing what it’s like.
distinguish two steps of epistemic progress that Jackson’s Mary takes at Rather, or so one may argue, Mary and Marianna acquire a particular kind
once. To see the two steps involved one may consider an example used in of belief that the sky appears blue to normal perceivers, namely the
Nida-Rümelin (1996) and (1998): Like Mary, Marianna first (at t1) lives in phenomenal belief that it appears blue to normal perceivers, where
a black and white environment. Contrary to Mary (at a later moment t2) phenomenal belief involves the application of the appropriate phenomenal
she gets acquainted with colors by seeing arbitrarily colored objects concept. Both may have believed, in a sense (the non-phenomenal sense
(abstract paintings, red chairs, blue tables, etc. but no yellow bananas, no that does not require use of phenomenal concepts) that the sky appears
pictures of landscapes with a blue sky etc.). Marianna is therefore unable blue to normal perceivers while still in their black-and-white environment
to relate the kinds of color experiences she now is acquainted with to what (they may have been told so by their friends). (For the distinction between
she already knew about them at t1. At t2, Marianna may wonder which of phenomenal and non-phenomenal belief see Nida-Rumelin 1996 and
1998).

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4. Objections Another doubt about the thought experiment is raised by the claim that a
person who is confined to a monochromatic environment but knows
4.1 Doubts about the Thought Experiment everything physical there is to know about visual color experience would
be able to figure out what colored things look like and thus would e.g. be
Some authors have raised doubts about the thought experiment itself. It is able to imagine the kind of color experience produced in normal
sometimes pointed out, for example, that merely confining Mary to a perceivers when looking at the cloudless sky during the day (see e.g.
monochromatic environment would not prevent her from having color Dennett 1991; Dennett 2007; Churchland 1989; Maloney 1985, 36).
experiences (see Thompson 1995, 264) or that, after release, she would not Probably the most common reaction to this is simply to doubt the claim.
be able to see colors. But the example can be refined to meet these But it is not clear that the claim, if correct, would undermine the
objections. Mary might be monochromatic from birth and changed into a knowledge argument. The opponent would have to show that complete
normal perceiver by some medical procedure. It is sometimes objected physical knowledge necessarily involves the capacity to imagine blue.
that already accepted or future results of visual science are or might be One may doubt that this claim is compatible with the widely accepted
incompatible with the existence of a Mary-case (a person with assumption that physical knowledge can be acquired independently of
monochromatic experience who becomes a normal color perceiver later) one’s particular perceptual apparatus. (Arguably a subject whose visual
or that such results might require (to preserve consistence with visual apparatus is not suited for visual experiences at all will not be able to
science) the introduction of so many additional assumptions that the develop the capacity to imagine colors on the basis of physical knowledge
conceivability of the example becomes doubtful. To this one might reply alone, even if this were true for Mary).
that the thought experiment need not be compatible with visual science. If
the case of a person with monochromatic vision who turns into a normal Some have argued that Mary would recognize the colors when first seeing
perceiver really does involve serious difficulties for materialism, then the them on the basis of her complete physical knowledge about color vision
mere fact (if it were one) that our visual apparatus excludes the actual (see Hardin 1992). According to this claim she would think something like
existence of such a case does not seem to provide a convincing reply for “oh, so this is red” when first confronted with a red patch and she could
the materialist. But this point (the relevance or irrelevance of visual not be fooled by what Dennett calls ‘the blue banana trick’: when shown a
science in this context) has not received much discussion in the literature. blue banana she would know that it has the wrong color (see Dennett
It has, however, been pointed out (see Graham and Horgan, 2000, footnote 1991). A possible and common response is to simply doubt these claims.
4 with its reference to Shepard 1993) that at least presently available But, in any case, it is not clear that these claims undermine the knowledge
results of color vision science do not exclude a Mary-case. (The argument. One may respond along the following lines: If Mary when first
psychologist Knut Nordby was a real life case of a color vision specialist confronted with red were able to conclude that she is now seeing what
who was also a complete achromat. See his paper ‘Vision in a Complete people call red, she thereby acquires a large set of new beliefs about red
Achromat: A Personal Account’, linked into in the Other Internet experiences (that they are produced by roses, such-and-such wavelength
Resources section and Nordby, 2007.) combinations and so on). On the basis of seeing red she (a) acquires a new
phenomenal concept of red and (b) she forms new beliefs involving that

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new concept using her previously acquired physical knowledge. But if this 4.3 No Propositional Knowledge 1: the Ability Hypothesis
description is correct, then her previous knowledge was incomplete (for a
detailed discussion of Dennett’s argument involving the blue banana trick Two different versions of the No Propositional Knowledge-View have
see Dale 1995). been proposed. According to the Ability Hypothesis (most prominently
defended in Lewis 1983, 1988 and in Nemirow 1980, 1990, 2007), Mary
4.2 Complete Physical Knowledge without Knowledge of does not acquire any new propositional knowledge after release (no
all the Physical Facts knowledge about something that is the case, no factual knowledge), but
only a bundle of abilities (like the ability to imagine, remember and
It may appear obvious that premise P1 (Mary has complete physical recognize colors or color experiences). According to the Acquaintance
knowledge about human color vision) implies C1 (Mary knows all the Hypothesis proposed by Conee (1994), Mary’s new knowledge after
physical facts about human color vision). If all physical facts can be release is what he calls “acquaintance knowledge” which is neither
known under some physical conceptualization, then a person who has propositional knowledge nor identical to a bundle of abilities.
complete physical knowledge about a topic knows all the relevant physical
facts. But a few philosophers can be understood as objecting against Proponents of the Ability Hypothesis presuppose that Mary’s epistemic
precisely this apparently unproblematic step. Harman (1990) argues that progress after release consists in the acquisition of knowing what it is like
Mary does not know all the functional facts concerning human color (e.g. to have an experience of blue) and they claim that to know what it is
vision because she lacks the concept of what it is for an object to be red, like is to have certain practical abilities. According to Nemirow “knowing
blue, etc. Flanagan (1992) distinguishes metaphysical physicalism from what an experience is like is the same as knowing how to imagine having
linguistic physicalism. While metaphysical physicalism is the ontological the experience” (1990, 495). According to Lewis,
claim that there are no non-physical individuals, properties or relations
…knowing what it is like is the possession of abilities: abilities to
and no non-physical facts, linguistic physicalism says that “everything
recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict one’s behavior
physical can be expressed or captured in the languages of the physical
by imaginative experiments (Lewis 1983, 131).
sciences.” According to Flanagan Mary’s case may refute linguistic
physicalism but does not refute metaphysical physicalism. Alter (1998) A few years later he writes:
points out that the knowledge argument needs the premise that all physical
facts can be learned discursively and argues that this assumption has not The Ability Hypothesis says that knowing what an experience is
been established. It may be argued against this view that it becomes hard like just is the possession of these abilities to remember, imagine,
to understand what it is for a property or a fact to be physical once we and recognize. … It isn’t knowing-that. It’s knowing-how (Lewis
drop the assumption that physical properties and physical facts are just 1990, 516).
those properties and facts that can be expressed in physical terminology.
Bence Nanay suggests that what Mary acquires is the ability to
discriminate between different types of awareness, i.e., to distinguish

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having or imagining experiences of type E from having or imagining that, if there is such propositional knowledge, then it need not be acquired
experiences of other types (2009). on that particular basis but is accessible in other ways as well.

Lewis’s main argument for the Ability Hypothesis can be summarized like 4.4 Objections Against the Ability Hypothesis
this. (1) The only alternative to the Ability Hypothesis is what he calls the
Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information (HPI). (According to the HPI It has been argued against Nemirow that the ability to imagine having an
knowing what it is like is propositional in the following sense: coming to experience of a particular kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for
know what it is like involves the elimination of hitherto open knowing what it is like to have that kind of experience. To show that
possibilities). (2) The HPI is incompatible with physicalism. (3) The imaginative abilities are not necessary for knowing what it is like, Conee
Ability Hypothesis is compatible with physicalism and explains (1994) and Alter (1998) cite the example of a person who has no capacity
everything that may be explained by the HPI. Therefore: The Ability to imagine having color experiences. They claim that despite this defect
Hypothesis should be preferred. she would know what it is like to have an experience of e.g. green while
attentively staring at something that looks green to her. To show that
Note that the Ability Hypothesis is compatible with the view that we do
imaginative abilities are not sufficient for knowing what it is like Conee
sometimes acquire propositional knowledge on the basis of getting
introduces the following example: A person, Martha, “who is highly
acquainted with a new kind of experience from the first person
skilled at visualizing an intermediate shade that she has not experienced
perspective. The following remarks by Levin are hard to deny:
between pairs of shades that she has experienced…happens not to have
…it would be perverse to claim that bare experience can provide any familiarity with the shade known as cherry red.” Martha is told that
us only with practical abilities…. By being shown an unfamiliar cherry red is midway between burgundy red and fire red (she has
color, I acquire information about its similarities and experienced the latter two shades of red). Given this information and her
compatibilities with other colors, and its effects on other mental extraordinary capacity, Martha has the ability to imagine cherry red, but as
states: surely I seem to be acquiring certain facts about color and long as she does not exercise this ability she does not know what it is like
the visual experience of it (Levin 1986, 246; see also Crane 2003). to see cherry red.

But, as pointed out by Tye (2000), this does not undermine the Ability A similar example is used for the same purpose and discussed in more
Hypothesis. The Ability Hypothesis implies that there is some knowledge detail by Raymont 1999. Raymont argues that mnemic, recognitional and
that can only be acquired by having experiences of a particular kind and imaginative abilities neither separately nor conjointly amount to knowing
that this knowledge is nothing but knowing-how. This of course does not of what it is like to have a particular kind of experience. He first argues
exclude that there also is propositional knowledge that can be acquired by that none of these abilities is necessary and sufficient for knowing what it
getting acquainted with kinds of experiences from the first person is like: (a) Mnemic abilities are not necessary, since someone can learn
perspective. The proponent of the Ability Hypothesis only has to insist what an experience is like when first having it without already
remembering an experience of the relevant kind. (b) Imaginative abilities

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are not sufficient since someone can have the ability to imagine a of the Ability Hypothesis could not, anyway, be used against the
particular kind of experience without exercising it (see the example cited knowledge argument in the way that was originally intended. The reason
above). (c) To show that recognitional abilities are not sufficient either, is that the revised version is compatible with the view that Mary does
Raymont cites empirical data “in support of the view that one can have the acquire knowing-that if she is not distracted when first seeing something
ability to noninferentially recognize a certain type of visual experience red: she learns that this is a red experience (where “this” refers
without ever having had it, and thus without knowing what it is like to introspectively to her present experience) and so acquires knowing-that.
have it”. But then these three kinds of abilities cannot conjointly amount According to Tye to have indexical knowledge of this kind is sufficient but
to knowing what it is like either: if they did, then – contrary to (a) – each not necessary for knowing what it is like to have a red experience. After
of them would have to be a necessary condition for knowing what it is all, it is impossible to introspectively refer to a red experience without
like. presently having that kind of experience, but Tye wishes to concede that a
person can know what it is like to have a red experience while not
Gertler (1999) argues that the best candidate for an analysis in the spirit of presently having a red experience. This reasoning motivates his
the Ability Hypothesis is to identify knowing what it is like to have an disjunctive account of knowing what it is like: “S knows what it is like to
experience of red with the ability to recognize seeing-red experiences by undergo experience E iff either S now has indexical knowledge-that with
their phenomenal quality and then goes on to attack this candidate: she respect to E obtained via current introspection or S has the Lewis abilities
points out that the ability to recognize seeing-red experiences by their with respect to E” (Tye 2000). Tye thus defends the physicalist view
phenomenal quality can be explained by the fact that I know what it is like against the knowledge argument by a combination of the two strategies
to see red but not vice versa.[3] mentioned above: he applies the New Knowledge/Old Fact-strategy to the
person who knows what it is like to have an experience in the sense of the
Michael Tye (2000) concedes that none of the abilities considered by
first conjunct (the indexical thought at issue is made true by a physical
Lewis is necessary for knowing what it is like and he discusses the
fact) and he applies the No Propositional Knowledge-strategy to the case
following possible revision of the Ability Hypothesis: knowing what it is
of someone who has knowing what it is like in the sense of the second
like to have an experience of red is the ability to apply an indexical
disjunct.
concept to an experience of red (while having it) via introspection. But, he
goes on to argue, this revised version can again be rejected by a Lycan (1996) argues against the Ability Hypothesis and for the view that
counterexample that shows that the ability at issue is not sufficient for Mary acquires new knowledge-that after release by claiming that “S
knowing what it is like: If Mary is distracted and does not attend to her knows what it is like to see blue” means something like “S knows that it is
experience when she first sees a red object, then she need not apply any like Q to see blue” where Q names the phenomenal quality at issue. It has
concept to her experience at all. In this case, she still does not know what been objected by Tye (1995) that the use of the qualia name “Q” within a
it is like to have red experiences although she has the ability to apply an propositional attitude context creates the well-known problems: Replacing
indexical concept to her present experience (she has the ability, but, being “Q” by another name “R” for the same quale may change the truth value
distracted, she does not exercise it). Tye concedes that the revised version of the belief ascription. A proponent of Lycan’s view could however

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respond along the following lines: In the case of qualia names within theoretical mode of presentation; after her release, she comes to know the
belief contexts it does not matter which name is used to refer to the quale same proposition under a practical mode of presentation. She thus comes
at issue as long as the belief is meant in the sense of a phenomenal belief to be in a new state of propositional knowledge, but without learning any
ascription. “S believes that it is like Q to see blue” means, on the new propositions.[4]
phenomenal reading, that S has the relevant belief about Q under a
phenomenal concept of Q. Under the assumption that it is impossible to 4.5 No Propositional Knowledge 2: The Acquaintance
have two different phenomenal concepts of one and the same quale, the Hypothesis
objection is met: As long as two qualia names Q and R refer to the same
quale, replacing Q by R in an ascription of phenomenal belief cannot Earl Conee (1994) proposes another variant of the No Propositional
change the truth value of the belief ascription. Knowledge-View. According to Conee acquaintance constitutes a third
category of knowledge that is neither reducible to factual knowledge nor
As we have seen, proponents of the Ability Hypothesis assume that the to knowing-how and he argues that Mary acquires after release only
know-how which Mary acquires is distinct from any propositional acquaintance knowledge. According to Conee knowing something by
knowledge. This assumption can be challenged, based for example on the acquaintance “requires the person to be familiar with the known entity in
work of Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). On this view, for a the most direct way that it is possible for a person to be aware of that
subject S to know how to do something (to F) is for S to know that there is thing” (1994, 144). Since “experiencing a quality is the most direct way to
a way w for S to F, and for S to know this under a practical mode of apprehend a quality” (Conee 1994, 144), Mary gains acquaintance with
presentation (2001, 430). Stanley & Williamson themselves apply this color qualia only after release. According to the view proposed by Conee
thought to Lewis’s version of the Ability Hypothesis: the physicalist can defend himself against the knowledge argument in the
following way: (1) Qualia are physical properties of experiences (and
Knowing how to imagine red and knowing how to recognize red
experiences are physical processes). Let Q be such a property. (2) Mary
are both examples of knowledge-that. For example, x’s knowing
can know all about Q and she can know that a given experience has Q
how to imagine red amounts to knowing a proposition of the form
before release, although – before release – she is not acquainted with Q.
‘w is a way for x to imagine red’, entertained under a guise
(3) After release Mary gets acquainted with Q, but she does not acquire
involving a practical mode of presentation of a way (2001, 442; see
any new item of propositional knowledge by getting acquainted with Q (in
also McConnell 1994).
particular she already knew under what conditions normal perceivers have
Yuri Cath suggests that this point can be accommodated by proponents of experiences with the property Q). More recently Michael Tye (2009, 131–
the Ability Hypothesis, provided they distinguish between Mary’s learning 137) defends the acquaintance hypothesis as the right answer to the
a new proposition and her coming to be in new state of propositional knowledge argument thereby abandoning his original response (see below
knowledge (2009, 142–143). Specifically, before her release Mary can 4.7).
know that w is a way for someone to imagine red, but only under a

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A friend of the knowledge argument might concede that a person is points out that the embedded occurrence of “feels like such and such” in
acquainted with Q only if she has or had an experience with property Q sentences like “if pains feel like such and such then Q” cannot be
but he would have to insist that being acquainted with Q in that sense is a accounted for in a model that treats knowing what it is like as mere know-
necessary condition for being able to know (in the relevant sense) that an how. McConnell (1994) defends the more radical view that the acquisition
experience has Q. Another kind of criticism of the Acquaintance of knowing-how is normally accompanied by the acquisition of a
Hypothesis is developed in Gertler (1999). She argues that the property particular new item of knowing-that.
dualist can explain why the most direct way to get familiar with a quale is
by having an experience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does not Many philosophers find it hard to deny that Mary gains new factual
have any explanation for this particular feature of qualia. Similarly, Robert knowledge after release and for that reason (if they are physicalists) feel
Howell (2007, 146) argues that all other physicalist responses to the attracted by the New Knowledge/Old Fact View. Positions that clearly fall
Knowledge Argument depend upon the Acquaintance Hypothesis, and that into that category are defended in Horgan 1984; Churchland 1985; Tye
acquaintance is incompatible with objectivism (see Section 4.9 below). 1986, 1995; Bigelow and Pargetter 1990; Loar 1990/1997; Lycan 1990a,
1996; Pereboom 1994; Perry 2001; Byrne 2002; Papineau 2002, 2007;
It is interesting to see that one version of the New Knowledge/Old Fact Van Gulick 2004; Levin 2007; Balog 2012a, 2012b.
View is very similar in spirit to the Acquaintance Hypothesis. Bigelow and
Pargetter (1990) argue that Mary’s progress after release consists in the The basic ideas common to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View may be
fact that she now stands in a new acquaintance relation to color qualia, but summarized as follows:
their theory about the individuation of beliefs implies that she thereby
(1) Phenomenal character, e.g. phenomenal blueness, is a physical
acquires new factual knowledge. Different beliefs, according to Bigelow
property of experiences (but see Lycan 1990a for an exception who
and Pargetter, can be distinguished appropriately only if one takes into
construes qualia as properties of external objects).
consideration the way the subject is acquainted with the individuals and
properties her belief is about (they use the technical term “modes of (2) To gain knowledge of what it is like to have an experience of a
acquaintance” in that context). particular phenomenal character requires the acquisition of
phenomenal concepts of phenomenal character.[5]
4.6 The New Knowledge/Old Fact View
(3) What it is for an organism to acquire and possess a phenomenal
Several positive arguments for the view that Mary’s new knowledge after concept can be fully described in broadly physical terms.
release constitutes propositional knowledge (genuine information) have
been formulated in the literature. Lycan argues, for example, that Mary’s (4) A subject can acquire and possess phenomenal concepts only if
new knowledge goes along with the elimination of epistemic possibilities it has or has had experiences of the relevant phenomenal kind.
and that her new abilities are best explained by her having new
information (for further arguments see Lycan 1996, 92). Loar (1990/1997)

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(5) After release Mary gains knowledge about phenomenal But, according to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View this is an illusion.
characters under phenomenal concepts. There is no such possible situation. What Mary learns after release is made
true by a physical fact that she already knew before her release. Some
But the facts that make these new items of knowledge true are physical versions of the New Knowledge/Old Fact-View will be briefly described
facts that Mary knew before release under another conceptualization. in what follows.

The differences between variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View

concern the theoretical (physicalist) account of (a) phenomenal character,
4.7 Variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View
(b) phenomenal concepts of phenomenal characters and (c) the relation
Horgan (1984) does not provide a developed theoretical account of
between phenomenal characters and the corresponding phenomenal
phenomenal concepts but is one of the first to formulate the basic intuition
concepts. All proponents of the view point out that, according to their
shared by most or all proponents of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View:
proposal, physical concepts and phenomenal concepts are cognitively
By having experiences of blue, Mary gets acquainted with phenomenal
independent: it is impossible to see a priori that something that falls under
blueness (which is in fact a physical property of experiences) “from the
a physical concept of a particular phenomenal character also falls under
experiential perspective,” she gains what he calls “the first person
the corresponding phenomenal concept of that phenomenal character. This
ostensive perspective on that property” (Horgan 1984, 151): she now can
is why it is possible to have (like Mary) complete physical knowledge
refer to phenomenal blueness by thinking or saying “that kind of property”
about e.g. phenomenal blueness (you know everything there is to know
while having, remembering or imagining a blue experience and while
about phenomenal blueness under its physical conceptualization) without
attending to its particular quality. She thus has acquired a new concept of
having a phenomenal concept of blueness and without knowing any of
phenomenal blueness. Using this new concept she can form new beliefs
these facts under a phenomenal concept of blueness. Some have argued
(and acquire new knowledge) about phenomenal blueness. Formulated in
that the phenomenal conceptualization is not expressible in language (see
this way, the view may appear similar to Conee’s acquaintance account.
Byrne 2002 and Hellie 2004).
According to both views, Mary’s progress consists primarily in getting
In general, if a philosopher A claims that the argument of philosopher B acquainted with phenomenal blueness from an inner perspective. But
does not go through, it is a point in favor of his view if he can provide an contrary to Conee’s thesis, according to the New Knowledge/Old Fact
error theory, that is if he can explain why the argument may appear View, acquaintance with phenomenal blueness from an experiential
correct in the first place. The New Knowledge/Old Fact View can claim to perspective enables the subject to form a new concept of phenomenal
have an error theory with respect to the knowledge argument. Given the blueness and thereby implies the capacity to acquire new beliefs.
cognitive independence of physical and phenomenal concepts of blueness
An example of a more explicit theoretical account of phenomenal
it appears as if we could imagine a situation where everything Mary knew
character, phenomenal content and their relation can be found in Tye
before release were fulfilled but not what she came to know after release
(1995). He proposes a representationalist account of phenomenal
(and this can be taken to imply that she does come to know new facts).
character. For a state to have phenomenal character is to represent internal

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or external physical items in an ‘abstract’ and nonconceptual way that is functionally similar representation whose designatum was that (the
“appropriately poised for use by the cognitive system” (see Tye 1995, subject’s) very same first-order state-token, ….” And he concludes that
137–144). According to Tye, there are two kinds of phenomenal concepts: “the introspective word would certainly not be synonymous with any
indexical concepts (an example is the concept applied when thinking of a primitive or composite expression of public English,…” (Lycan 1996,
particular shade of red as “this particular hue” while having a red 101).
experience) and what he calls “predicative phenomenal concepts” that are
based on the capacity to make certain discriminations. Tye wishes to Papineau (1996) distinguishes third person and first person thoughts about
accommodate the natural intuition that Mary before release cannot fully experiences. First person thoughts involve the imagination of an
understand the nature of phenomenal blueness (she doesn’t really know experience of the relevant kind. The basic idea may be put like this: When
what it is to have a blue experience). One might think that his view is Mary is finally released and after some time sufficiently acquainted with
incompatible with the intuition at issue. Phenomenal blueness, according color experiences she can ‘reproduce’ blue experiences in her imagination.
to his view, has a physical nature and one might expect that physical These imaginations of experiences of a particular kind can be used to refer
natures are fully describable in physical terms and fully understandable to experiences of the kind at issue and to think about them. Obviously,
under a physical conceptualization. But Tye has a surprising response: Mary could not have first person thoughts about color experiences (she
although phenomenal blueness has a physical nature, a person cannot fully could not use imagined blue experiences in order to refer and to think
understand its nature unless she thinks of phenomenal blueness under a about blue experiences) before she ever had blue experiences. After
phenomenal concept. release, Mary can acquire new beliefs: first person beliefs about blue
experiences. But for every such new first person belief about a given kind
Another representationalist view about phenomenal character is combined of experience, there will be one of her old third person beliefs which refers
with the New Knowledge/Old Fact View in Lycan (1990a) and (1996). to the same kind of experience and has the same factual content.
Lycan’s account of Mary’s epistemic progress can be put, roughly, like
this: Only after release Mary can form “introspective second order Another way to understand phenomenal concepts is as a species of
representations” of her own color experiences. One may think of an indexical concepts. For instance, Perry (2001) argues that Mary’s new
introspective representation as of “a token in one of the subject’s knowledge after release does not pose a problem to physicalism any more
languages of thought, his or her Introspectorese”. It has often been said than indexical thoughts like “I am a philosopher” or “today is Sunday”
that what Mary learns is in some sense “ineffable”, that it cannot be (for a defense of this claim see also McMullen 1985). Perry treats Mary’s
communicated in public language. Lycan is led to a similar conclusion new knowledge as a particular case of demonstrative belief (and he
within his computational theory. In his view, when Mary finally has an proposes an account of Mary’s new beliefs after release in terms of his
experience of blue she “tokens a semantically primitive mental word for theory of token-reflexive thoughts). After release, when seeing the sky,
the type of first-order state being inwardly sensed”, where this word in Mary may think “Oh, so having blue experiences is like this” where “this”
Mary’s language of thought has an “inferential and/or conceptual role” refers to a physical property (the phenomenal character) of her present
that is “unique to its subject, in that no other subject could deploy a color experience. She could not have had a demonstrative belief of this

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kind before release. But, again, the fact that makes the thought true is which it is expressed or believed” (2008, 81). As an example of such
simply the fact that blue experiences have the particular physical property information, Stalnaker describes a bomb disposal expert pointing at the
at issue. Therefore, she does not learn any new fact. ground and saying “A bomb is buried there, and unless we defuse it now it
will explode within five minutes” (2008, 85). This information, Stalnaker
Doubts about Perry’s proposal have been raised along the following lines. suggests, cannot be known by someone who was not in that situation at
In normal cases of demonstrative reference the demonstrated object is in that time, even if they know the exact co-ordinates of where the bomb is
some way given to the epistemic subject (when pointing to a table and located and when it will detonate. Daniel Stoljar (2011) argues that
referring to it by “this table”, the object may be given as “the next table phenomenal knowledge is not essentially contextual. In defence of this
left to me”). But what is the way the kind of experience is given to Mary claim, he suggests there is an important dis-analogy between the
when she thinks of phenomenal blueness under the demonstrative concept difference between Mary, pre- and post-release, and the difference
“this kind of experience?” It cannot be the way it feels to have an between the bomb disposal expert and anyone who was not with her when
experience with that property, since this solution, so one may argue, she made her utterance. The thought which the bomb disposal expert
introduces phenomenal characters of phenomenal characters and thus expressed in her utterance could not even be entertained by someone who
reintroduces the original problem. Maybe “the kind of experience I am was not present at that time; it is for this reason that someone not there
now having” is the appropriate candidate. But there are problems with this could not know what the expert knew. In contrast, Stoljar suggests that
proposal too (see Chalmers 2002). There are also problems with “the fact that post-release Mary learnt could have been entertained by pre-
suggesting that the demonstrative concept is ‘thin’, in the sense that it has release Mary (e.g., she can wonder whether it obtains)” (2011, 441). This
no reference-fixing mode of presentation associated with it (for some of suggests that what Mary learns upon release is not essentially contextual,
these problems see Demircioglu 2013, 263–269). at least not in the sense which Stalnaker has in mind.
Robert Stalnaker (2008) raises further doubts regarding Perry’s treatment Another worry about demonstrative accounts is that they do not seem to
of Mary’s new knowledge. Drawing on a distinction between the two do duty to the way in which the subjective character itself is present to the
stages of Mary’s epistemic progress (see Section 3.3 above), he argues that mind of the thinker when employing a phenomenal concept of that
the cases of acquiring demonstrative beliefs which Perry compares with character. This worry is sometimes put in terms of acquaintance: the
Mary’s new knowledge are akin to the second stage of Mary’s progress, specific way in which the thinker is acquainted with the referent of her
but “It is at stage one that the problematic cognitive achievement – the thought in using phenomenal concepts does not seem to be captured by the
learning ‘what it is like’ to see red – takes place” (2008, 44). demonstrative account (see Levine 2007; Howell 2007, 164–166). Several
attempts have been made to answer objections of this kind. Papineau
Stalnaker suggests an alternative way in which Mary’s new knowledge is
(2002) and Balog (2012a) argue that the cognitive intimacy to be
demonstrative in character. On this proposal, what Mary acquires is
accounted for is well explained by a quotational theory of phenomenal
essentially contextual information, where “the content of what is
concepts: in thoughts involving phenomenal concepts token experiences
expressed or believed in a context is not detachable from the context in
are used in order to refer to the kind those tokens belong to. Levine (2007)

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argues that even these refined theories do not account for the specific 4.8. Objections Against the New Knowledge/Old Fact
intimate way in which the thinker is related to the referents of phenomenal View
concepts. Contrary to this Levin (2007) does not see any need to
‘embellish’ the original simple demonstrative account. While Balog’s An objection to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View can be made as
current position is an elaborated version of the quotational account, follows. In standard cases, if a subject does not know a given fact in one
Papineau has abandoned the quotational theory and argues in Papineau way that it does know in some other way, this can be explained by two
(2007) that phenomenal concepts are special cases of perceptual concepts modes of presentation: the subject knows the fact under one mode of
where perceptual concepts do not involve demonstration. presentation and does not know it under some other mode of presentation.
So, for example, a person may know the fact that Venus is a planet under
An influential view about phenomenal concepts which answers the the mode of presentation associated with “the morning star is a planet” and
knowledge argument admitting that Mary gains new knowledge but no fail to know the very same fact under the mode of presentation associated
knowledge of new facts is developed in Loar (1990/1997): Phenomenal with “the evening star is a planet.” In this particular case, as in many
concepts are recognitional concepts. To have the phenomenal concept of others, the difference in the mode of presentation involves two different
blueness is to be able to recognize experiences of blueness while having properties that are used to fix the referent. In one mode of presentation
them. The recognitional concept of blueness refers directly to its referent Venus is given as the heavenly body visible late in the morning (or some
(the physical property of blueness) where this means (in Loar’s similar property), whereas in the other mode of presentation the object is
terminology): there is no other property (no property of that property) given as the heavenly body visible early in the evening.
involved in the reference fixing. According to Loar’s view the
recognitional concept of phenomenal blueness refers to the physical If the New Knowledge/Old Fact View involves two modes of presentation
property phenomenal blueness in virtue of being ‘triggered’ by that of this sort, then it cannot be used to defend physicalism because this kind
property. It has been doubted that ‘directness’ in Loar’s sense provides an of explanation of the supposed double epistemic access to facts concerning
account for what one might call acquaintance: for the way in which the phenomenal types would reintroduce non-physical properties at a higher
phenomenal character is present to the mind when a thinker employs level: the subject would have to be described as referring to the
phenomenal concepts (see Levine 2007). White (2007) argues against phenomenal type at issue by some physical property in case it believes the
Loar that the account cannot explain the a posteriori character of mind- relevant fact under its physical mode of presentation and as referring to
brain identity statements in a satisfying manner. that phenomenal type by some non-physical property in case it believes
the relevant fact under its phenomenal mode of presentation.

It has been argued by several authors that the different modes of

presentation at issue in the case of beliefs about phenomenal states do
involve the introduction of different reference-fixing properties and that
therefore the proposal is unsuccessful. Arguments of that kind are found in

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Lockwood (1989, chap. 8) and McConnell (1994). White (2007) develops A general argument against the materialist strategy of appealing to
the objection in detail. Block (2007) gives a detailed answer to White phenomenal concepts is developed in Chalmers (2004; 2007); for critical
(2007) based on a distinction between what he labels cognitive and discussion see Balog (2012b).
metaphysical modes of presentation. Chalmers (1996, 2002, 2010) makes
a similar point as White (2007) using his framework of primary and Anyone who wishes to argue in the way just mentioned, that the two
secondary intensions. In that framework, primary intensions describe the modes of presentation do involve the introduction of two different
way a concept picks out its referent in the actual world and the cognitive reference-fixing properties, must deal with Loar’s proposal (see 4.7). Loar
independence of phenomenal and physical concepts is explained by their avoids the problem of two reference fixing properties by his claim that
different primary intensions. If one singular fact can be known under a phenomenal concepts refer directly to their referent. It has been argued
physical mode of presentation as well as under a phenomenal mode of against Loar that his causal account of how phenomenal concepts manage
presentation, then the two items of knowledge involve two concepts (a to directly refer to their referent (namely by being triggered by them)
phenomenal and a physical concept) with different primary intensions and cannot appropriately describe the particular cognitive role of phenomenal
these different primary intensions correspond to different properties. concepts (see McConnell 1994 and White 2007).

A two-dimensional framework is used in a different manner in Nida- A final issue concerning both the New Knowledge/Old Facts View and the
Rümelin (2007) to develop the idea that the nature of phenomenal knowledge argument itself is whether there are any phenomenal concepts.
properties is present to the mind of the thinker when using phenomenal Derek Ball (2009) and Michael Tye (2009) argue that there are no such
properties – an idea which leads to the result that the New Knowledge/Old concepts, at least as defined above: in particular, both deny claim (4)
Fact View is mistaken. This idea is also suggested by Philip Goff (2017). outlined in Section 4.6, that a subject can possess phenomenal concepts
He suggests that the knowledge argument does not by itself refute only if it has or has had experiences of the relevant kind. Ball and Tye
physicalism because it does not overcome the New Knowledge/Old Fact appeal to work on social externalism regarding the content of our concepts
View. However, things are different if the phenomenal concept which to argue that even prior to her release, Mary possesses the same concepts
Mary acquires is transparent (i.e., it reveals the nature or essence of the which she uses to think about her experiences after her release.
phenomenal property which satisfies it): Specifically, she possesses such concepts ‘deferentially’, in virtue of
interacting with her linguistic community; a crucial part of social
in this case Mary’s new knowledge is knowledge of the nature of externalism about content is that one can possess concepts deferentially
red experiences, but if pure physicalism is true, she already knew even though one is largely ignorant of the nature of what satisfies these
the complete nature of red experiences in knowing the pure concepts (Ball 2009, 947–954; Tye 2009, 63–70).[6] This result threatens
physical truths, and hence there ought to be nothing more she can to undermine the New Knowledge / Old Facts View, but Ball suggests it
learn about their nature (2017, 74–75; see also Fürst 2011, 69–70; also undermines the knowledge argument itself, since the knowledge
Demircioglu 2013, 274–275). argument itself depends on there being phenomenal concepts (2009, 940–
943).

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Torin Alter (2013) responds to these arguments by focusing on the about the world. When she left the room, she gained further
distinction between deferential and non-deferential concept possession understanding about the world. Therefore, all the objective
(the latter is conceptual mastery). He suggests that it is mastery of information about the world is insufficient for a complete
phenomenal concepts rather than mere deferential possession which understanding of the world (2007, 147).
matters for the knowledge argument: “Mary makes epistemic progress
when she leaves the room because she comes to master or non- A number of proponents of this interpretation of the Knowledge Argument
deferentially possess phenomenal colour concepts” (2013, 486). And suggest that it is compatible with a specific form of physicalism, on which
defenders of the knowledge argument can claim that mastery of a all facts are physical or metaphysically necessitated by microphysical facts
phenomenal concept requires actually having experiences with the but some facts can only be understood by having specific experiences (see,
relevant phenomenal character. e.g., Kallestrup 2006; Howell 2007; for slightly different formulations see
Crane 2003; Zhao 2012). That said, it is worth asking how the ‘physical’ is
4.9 The Knowledge Argument and Objectivism to be understood, such that facts which can only be known if one has
certain experiences can count as physical. Furthermore, it is worth
The Knowledge Argument has traditionally been understood as an questioning whether a view on which facts are either physical or
argument against physicalism or perhaps against reductive versions of metaphysically necessitated by microphysical facts thereby counts as a
physicalism. But an influential alternative approach sees the argument as form of physicalism. It has been argued that such a view is compatible
working not against physicalism per se, but against a different position with non-physicalist positions such as emergentism or certain forms of
which can be termed objectivism.[7] Objectivism is the view that an ethical non-naturalism (see Horgan 1993, 559-566; 2010, 311-314; Crane
objective description of what exists can be complete; that there are no 2010; for discussion see Stoljar 2017, section 9).
aspects of reality which can only be understood by having experiences of a
specific type. This notion is closely related to Nagel’s characterization of 5. The Dualist View About the Knowledge Argument
the physical nature of organisms as “a domain of objective facts par
excellence – the kind that can be observed and understood from many There has not been much discussion of the knowledge argument from a
points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems” dualist perspective. This is unsurprising given the small number of
(1974, 442). On this view, the point of Jackson’s thought experiment is to contemporary philosophers who defend a dualist position (for a prominent
bring out that Mary learns something which can only be known by having exception see Chalmers (1996); the knowledge argument is discussed on
an experience of a certain kind (e.g., a perceptual experience). If this is pp. 140–146). There are two possible strategies for a dualist to take who
correct, then this shows that no objective description of what exist can be wishes to defend the knowledge argument. The first is merely defensive or
complete. As Howell formulates it, the argument understood in this way ‘destructive’ in that it tries to refute the positive theoretical proposals one
runs as follows: by one that have been used by physicalists in their objections against the
knowledge argument. The second is more ‘constructive’ in that it aims at
before leaving the room, Mary knew all the objective information developing an alternative positive dualist account of phenomenal

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concepts, phenomenal properties and their relations such that on that phenomenal characters are non-physical properties and if every physical
account Mary does learn new and nonphysical facts upon release. event has a physical cause and if we exclude the possibility of
Examples (or partial examples) for the first strategy may occasionally be overdetermination (where something is caused by two different causes that
found in the literature (compare Warner 1986, Gertler 1999, Raymont are both sufficient), then, arguably, whether or not a state has a particular
1995, 1999 and Connell 1994). Examples for the second are hard to find, phenomenal character cannot have any causal relevance. But if qualia are
but Chalmers (1996, 2002) and Nida-Rümelin (2007) exemplify the causally impotent, how can a person know that she has an experience with
second strategy. Using his framework of primary and secondary intensions a particular phenomenal character? Many take it to be obvious that a
he develops a positive account of what he calls “pure phenomenal person cannot know that she now has a blue experience unless her blue
concepts” that can be described as incorporating the old and natural experience plays a prominent causal role in the formation of her belief at
intuition that in the case of qualia (phenomenal characters) there is no issue. This particular problem has been formulated as an objection against
distinction between appearance and reality, in other words: qualia ‘reveal the knowledge argument in Watkins (1989). Until some time ago Jackson
their nature’ in experience. was one of the very few philosophers who embraced epiphenomenalism.
But Jackson changed his mind. Jackson (1995) argues that knowledge
The intuitive idea just mentioned has been expressed in different ways. about qualia is impossible if qualia are epiphenomenal and he concludes
Some say that qualia ‘have no hidden sides’. Others say that qualia are not that something must be wrong with the knowledge argument. In Jackson
natural kind terms in that it is not up to the sciences to tell us what having (2003) and Jackson (2007) he argues that the argument goes wrong in
an experience of a particular kind amounts to (we know what it amounts to presupposing a false view about sensory experience and that it can be
by having them and attending to the quality at issue). It is quite clear that answered by endorsing strong representationalism: the view that to be in a
an account of this intuitive idea has to be one of the ingredients of a phenomenal state is to represent objective properties where the properties
dualist defense of the knowledge argument. Nida-Rümelin (2007) represented as well as the representing itself can be given a physicalist
develops a technical notion of grasping properties which is intended to account. Jackson admits that there is a specific phenomenal way of
serve the purposes of dualists who argue against materialism using the representing but he now insists that the phenomenal way of representing
assumption that in the special case of phenomenal concepts the relation can be accounted for in physicalist terms. Doubts about the latter claim are
that the thinker bears to the property he conceptualizes is more intimate developed in Alter (2007). Other possible reactions to the threat of
than in other cases: the thinker understands what having the property epiphenomenalism for dualism would be either to doubt that a property
essentially consists in. This idea can be used to block familiar objections dualist must embrace epiphenomenalism or to develop an account of
to the knowledge argument in particular those falling into the Old fact/ knowledge about one’s own phenomenal states that does not imply a
New Knowledge category. A similar basic idea but formulated within a causal relation between qualia and phenomenal knowledge about qualia
different theoretical framework is elaborated in Stephen White (2007). (see Chalmers 2002).

According to mainstream opinion the most serious problem for property

dualism is the danger of being driven into epiphenomenalism. If

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 Qualia: The Knowledge Argument Martine Nida-Rümelin and Donnchadh O Conaill

6. Concluding Remark –––, 2012b, “In Defence of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy”,
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 84: 1–23.
The appropriate evaluation of the knowledge argument remains Block, N., 2007, “Max Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity,” in T.
controversial. The acceptability of its second premise P2 (Mary lacks Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 249–306.
factual knowledge before release) and of the inferences from P1 (Mary has Bigelow, J. & R. Pargetter, 1990, “Acquaintance with Qualia”, Theoria,
complete physical knowledge before release) to C1 (Mary knows all the 61: 129–147
physical facts) and from P2 to C2 (Mary does not know some facts before Broad, C.D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London: Routledge.
release) depend on quite technical and controversial issues about (a) the Byrne, A., 2002, “Something about Mary”, Grazer Philosophische
appropriate theory of property concepts and their relation to the properties Studien, 62: 123–140. [Preprint available online]
they express and (b) the appropriate theory of belief content. It is therefore Cath, Y., 2009, “The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How”,
safe to predict that the discussion about the knowledge argument will not Noûs, 43: 137–156.
come to an end in the near future. Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental
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Warner, R. 1986, “A Challenge to Physicalism”, Australasian Journal of Notes to Qualia: The Knowledge Argument
Philosophy, 64: 249–265.
Watkins, M., 1989, “The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge 1. Thought experiments such as Broad’s and indeed Jackson’s are
Argument”, Analysis, 49: 158–160. descendants of Leibniz’s famous mill argument against materialism in his
White, S. L. (2007), “Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Monadology (1998, 270; originally published 1714).
Semantic Premise,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 210–248.
Zhao, Y., 2012, “The Knowledge Argument against Physicalism: Its 2. Some writers who defend the knowledge intuition (e.g., Russell and
Proponents and Its Opponents”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 7: Dunne) do not use it to argue against physicalism. Therefore, their
304–316. discussions are best thought of as precursors to the Knowledge Argument
rather than early versions of it. Stoljar & Nagasawa suggest that it is not
Academic Tools clear that Maxwell offers a version of the Knowledge Argument, since he
does not use the knowledge intuition to argue that physicalism is false
How to cite this entry. (2004, 25–26 n13). However, Maxwell certainly comes very close to
Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP claiming just this, e.g., when he concludes “‘X is experiencing the visual
Society. sensation of P’ is a fact about what is happening to X which cannot be
Look up this entry topic at the Internet Philosophy Ontology described or understood in terms of any physical theory” (1968, 135;
Project (InPhO). compare with the conclusions of the different versions of the Knowledge
Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links Argument outlined below in Section 3.1).
to its database.
3. The example involving Marianna (see Section 3.3) arguably undermines
Other Internet Resources the ability account as well. Unlike Mary, Marianna is acquainted with
color by visual contact with arbitrarily colored objects before she is freed.
Nordby, Knut, ‘Vision in a Complete Achromat: A Personal
At this stage, she has those abilities that have been proposed in order to
Account’, online paper.
account for Mary’s epistemic progress after her release (for instance, she
Bibliography on The Knowledge Argument, edited by David
can imagine and remember colors and she can sort objects according to
Chalmers.
color just by looking). But Marianna still lacks the relevant phenomenal
knowledge.
Related Entries
4. Because this version of the Ability Hypothesis appeals to different
dualism | epiphenomenalism | physicalism | propositional attitude reports | modes of presentation under which Mary can know the same proposition,
qualia | self-knowledge it is also a version of the New Knowledge / Old Facts View (see 4.6

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 Qualia: The Knowledge Argument

below). This point is acknowledge by Cath (2009, 148; see also Howell
2007, 157).

5. The crucial role of phenomenal concepts means that the New

Knowledge/Old Fact View can be seen as a specific version of a more
general physicalist strategy for dealing with a number of different
challenges, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. For discussion of how this
strategy applies to different anti-physicalist arguments, see, e.g.,
Sundström 2011; Balog 2012b.

6. Ball also argues that Mary can possess such concepts even if she lacks a
linguistic community (2009, 954–957).

7. This line of thought fits with the suggestion that the Knowledge
Argument works against certain forms of dualism as well as certain forms
of physicalism – see Section 5. This point is acknowledged by Howell
(2007, 148–149).

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Martine Nida-Rümelin and Donnchadh O Conaill

50 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy