In many of the most widely read newspapers in the world, coverage of the recent North Korea-

Russia summit was framed in terms of its significance for Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
However, it is evident that this event holds implications for the future of the Korean Peninsula that
are just as – if not more – significant as its impact on the war in Ukraine.

Sanctions Aren’t Working

First, the summit sends an explicit message that the United States lacks valid coercive means to
leverage North Korea’s denuclearization. A series of U.N. and U.S. sanctions, the last remaining tools
against North Korea, have proven to be completely ineffective. It’s time to acknowledge this. Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s overt statement expressing willingness to assist North Korea’s military
capability is further frustrating, suggesting that there may be no Security Council resolution passed
condemning another North Korean nuclear test if it happens. While the United States and its allies
have warned of an “unparalleled” response, the credibility of this threat is diminishing.

Even though Russia and China, as permanent members of the Security Council, have hindered
further sanctions on North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s intercontinental ballistic missile
launches, there has been a bleak expectation that they would act differently should North Korea
conduct a seventh nuclear test. Thanks to the deal at this summit, however, Kim Jong Un now has
highly effective leverage over Putin. In addition to his unwavering support for Russia’s Ukraine war,
Pyongyang’s massive arsenal will become a reason for Putin to overlook North Korea’s proliferation
pursuits. The extent of Putin’s desperation mirrors the strength of this leverage.

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As coercive measures become far less effective, the possibility of talks, let alone negotiations,
between North Korea and the South Korea-U.S. alliance diminishes. In 2018, Kim sought to alleviate
sanctions against North Korea and receive extensive economic compensation in exchange for
engaging in talks with his South Korean and U.S. counterparts. However, Kim now has little incentive
to come to the table, given that North Korea has weathered severe sanctions thus far and can
prevent further sanctions from being imposed. Even worse, North Korea and Russia will collaborate
and explore ways to avoid and survive existing sanctions from the Western world.

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China’s Discomfort

Second, China may not feel comfortable with North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia. While it
is uncertain how China views this development, based on its reserved comments, it is evident that
China has refrained from signaling a clear position, whether in opposition or support of this
cooperation between two neighboring countries. If China had expressed a positive stance, it could
have posed a threat to the Western world, but it chose not to do so, or it had no foundation to do
so.

Contrary to some arguments, Beijing is likely to perceive more risks than benefits for itself in this
situation. It is important to note that China’s foreign policy has not shifted toward forming an
alliance with Russia to counter its rival, the United States, since the war in Ukraine. While North
Korea remains China’s sole ally, there has always been the potential for differences between the two
nations that have prevented them from becoming too closely aligned. Furthermore, both North
Korea and Russia have not advocated for a “China-led” world; instead, they seek a multipolar world
where they can assert their respective voices and ambitions.

Kim is likely to leverage China’s fear of missing out to strengthen the relationship between North
Korea and China. Kim’s approach toward Putin signifies a diversification of North Korea’s economic
reliance, potentially reducing Chinese influence over North Korea. As China is concerned about
losing control over its only ally and the possibility of secret collaboration between North Korea and
Russia, Beijing is likely to be strongly motivated to maintain a closer alignment with Pyongyang. It
also requires close cooperation with North Korea to safeguard its vital interests, particularly in the
context of unification with Taiwan.

North Korea’s Arm Export Opportunity

Third, North Korea has seized a significant opportunity to establish a substantial testing ground for
its conventional arsenal, while also taking the chance to deplete existing artillery and rocket systems
and replace them with new products. North Korea has long maintained massive stockpiles of
munitions, estimated to number in the millions, to both deter and prepare for another all-out
conventional war with South Korea. However, these weapons were primarily developed between
the 1950s and 1970s. North Korea has had few opportunities to test their accuracy and condition,
which is questionable given that these weapons have received poor maintenance.

Furthermore, North Korea’s conventional capabilities lag far behind those of its perceived threat,
South Korea, which ranks sixth out of 145 countries in terms of conventional military power.
Additionally, the South Korea-U.S. alliance has conducted joint exercises based on scenarios where
North Korea initiates an all-out conventional war for decades. This is why Pyongyang has threatened
to initiate a nuclear attack even in response to a non-nuclear attack that is judged to be on the
horizon. North Korea would have no option but to escalate the situation by threatening to use
nuclear weapons, as its conventional arsenal is significantly weaker compared to South Korea.

The contribution of munitions to Putin’s Ukraine War aligns perfectly with Kim Jong Un’s domestic
policies, aimed at rejuvenating North Korea’s conventional force and enhancing its conventional-
nuclear integration by slightly reducing its heavy reliance on its nuclear arsenal. Since early 2022 –
coincidentally the year when Putin initiated the war – North Korea has shifted its focus toward
elevating the status of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and enhancing their operational capabilities.
Throughout 2023, Kim has been visiting munitions factories to encourage increased production.
During these visits, he has emphasized concepts such as “modernization,” “expanding production
capacity,” and “ensuring precision and quality.”

Pursuing Advanced Weaponry

Fourth, North Korea has not abandoned its pursuit of nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and spy satellites.
North Korea has demonstrated an unwavering perseverance by developing nuclear weapons over
the course of more than five decades, showing that they will never give up if they set their minds to
it.

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Knowledgeable experts have argued that it is highly unlikely that North Korea will develop an SSBN
as planned in 2021 since it requires sophisticated technology and an enormous financial investment.
However, Pyongyang now has more opportunities to successfully develop these capabilities. While in
Russia Kim visited the Pacific Fleet, where the 24,000-ton Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine Generalissimus Suvorov has been based since September. It is not a coincidence
that right before his visit to Russia, Kim encouraged the continued efforts of scientists and
technicians at the Pongdae Submarine Factory, mentioning “nuclear-powered submarines” several
times in his speech on September 8.

The National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), the space agency in Pyongyang,
confirmed its second failure in launching a spy satellite into orbit last August and vowed to try again.
A spy satellite is among the high-tech weapons systems that Kim ordered North Korea to develop in
2021. Success has become more crucial for the scientists, especially after acknowledging their two
previous failures. Fortunately, Kim received assistance by touring Russia’s most modern space launch
center, where Putin promised to help Pyongyang build satellites. It is uncertain whether this help can
immediately contribute to the scheduled third attempt in October, but it will likely serve as further
motivation for the scientists to achieve a final success.

To the best of our knowledge, North Korea has a limited capacity to build high-tech conventional and
nuclear weapons. Yet, we must acknowledge that our knowledge of North Korea is highly limited,
and it may be collaborating with Russia to become stronger. We would face greater risks if we delay
once again in rewriting our denuclearization policy on the peninsula, recasting North Korea’s
diplomatic blueprint, and reevaluating its conventional power projection.