Cambridge Review of International Affairs

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Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security

theory: insights from feminist IR

Will K Delehanty & Brent J Steele

To cite this article: Will K Delehanty & Brent J Steele (2009) Engaging the narrative in
ontological (in)security theory: insights from feminist IR, Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, 22:3, 523-540, DOI: 10.1080/09557570903104024

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570903104024

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Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Volume 22, Number 3, September 2009

Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory:

insights from feminist IR

Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

University of Kansas

Abstract Ontological security theory (OST) provides a unique account of how state
Self-identity is formed and reformed in international relations. OST postulates that
state Self-identity is usefully understood by inquiring into the foundation of a state’s sense
of Self: its autobiographical narrative. We seek to amend this line of argument by further
suggesting that the autobiographical narratives of states are ‘gendered’. Feminist
theorizing about the relationship between gender and power implies that the dominant
autobiographical narrative of state Self-identity is ‘gendered’ masculine. The power of this
masculinized autobiographical narrative flows from an ‘internal othering’ process of
counter ‘feminine’ autobiographical narratives that exist alongside the masculinized
autobiographical narrative. Our goal is to suggest that opportunities do arise for counter
‘feminine’ narratives to challenge the dominant autobiographical narrative due to their
interdependence and we explicate two practices by which masculinized narratives can be
engaged, challenged and disrupted.

Introduction
While the concept of identity has been well-developed and is used extensively
in theorizing about the actions of states in international politics, the traditional
assumptions that underlie this concept suggest that a state’s identity is in
part discursively articulated in relation to external ‘others’ (Doty 1993; Neumann
1999; Hopf 2002). Yet, current theorizing on a state’s conception of its Self-identity
from the perspective of ontological security theory (OST) suggests that a
state’s identity is not necessarily formed solely in relation to an external ‘other’.
It is rather constructed internally through the development of autobiographical
narratives that draw upon national histories and experience to provide continuity
and ‘substance’ to a state’s conception of its Self-identity (Steele 2008a).1 Within
the confines of this narrative, states sort out whom they are and how they are to act
in international politics (Lang 2002).
Coined first by RD Laing (1969, 40 fn1) who employed the term in his study of
the psychology of individuals, ontological security refers to the drive that social

1
For a non-OST rendering of this idea, see Ringmar (1996, 66 – 92).

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/09/030523–18 q 2009 Centre of International Studies

DOI: 10.1080/09557570903104024
524 Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

actors seek to satisfy by carving out continuity for their Self-identity through
time.2 Ontological security theory, then, generally refers to the study of the
practices that social beings (individuals and groups) utilize to secure their sense
of Self through time. As it has been applied to a variety of groups and levels
of analysis, OST spans across several fields of study, including sociology
(see Giddens 1984; 1991), political science, and, as discussed in this paper,
international relations (IR) theory.
By studying the role of narrative in the development of Self-identity, IR
scholars have begun to appropriate OST to nation-states. Specifically, OST in IR
theory has largely assumed that states’ conceptions of the Self are grounded in a
dominant autobiographical narrative (Steele 2008a), a narrative that uses
historical experiences of that Self to provide ‘comforting stories [about the Self]
in times of increased ontological insecurity and existential anxiety’ (Kinnvall 2004,
755). Like individuals, nation-state agents sort out what (ontologically) their states
are through the organizing device of this narrative. Yet, this internal process of the
development of an autobiographical narrative has been underspecified by OST in
several ways. First, it often assumes that the many ‘parts’ of a state’s Self-identity
utilized in narrative construction, while selectively engaged, tend nevertheless to
eventually discursively integrate into a coherent, smooth whole. This is most
crucial during crises—those situations when the ontology of the national Self
becomes most threatened. Indeed, in those situations the Self, once cast in
narrative form, may appear coherent. Yet, this obscures the ways in which
this narrative is constructed. For while states do structure a Self-identity grounded
in narrative ‘stories’ about who they are—and while these stories become most
important during times of ontological insecurity by fastening a conception of Self
which provides meanings for action—multiple autobiographical narratives are
also present (Hopf 2002). These narratives mutually contest for the dominant
fixation of the Self during moments of crisis. And while they can be constructed
from an assumed ‘national’ social-psychological artifact (such as a historical
event), they also exist interdependently with contemporary internal others.
A second element overlooked to date by OST is the multitude of ways in
which ontological insecurity is generated. OST tends to see ‘critical situations’
(Giddens 1984, 61)—unpredicted events external to agents which disrupt
established routines—as the key stimuli for ontological insecurity. Again, this is
of course not unconnected with narrative: unplanned events that threaten agents’
identities cannot be easily characterized in discursive terms. They thus threaten
the Self’s continuous and predictable place in the social world. But we submit that
ontological insecurity can also be engendered through processes internal to the, in
this case, national Self because of the presence of an interdependent internal other.
To better explicate this mutual contestation, we utilize in this paper feminist
insights on narrative and identity to help reveal how dominant autobiographical
narratives are gendered masculine—narratives that depend upon an internal
‘feminine’ other. In other words, despite this othering, the multiple narratives
obtain in relation to one another and, therefore, internal feminine ‘others’ can help

2
Laing used the term ‘ontology’ in his words ‘because it appears to be the best
adverbial or adjectival derivative of “being”’ (1969, 40). Catarina Kinnvall defines
ontological security as ‘a security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is
what it appears to be’ (Kinnvall 2004, 746). See also McSweeney (1999).
 Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory 525

transform dominant autobiographical narratives by interrogating them ‘from

within’. Our argument suggests that OST is advanced by drawing upon a
‘gendered’ analysis of the autobiographical narratives that inform state
Self-identity, as this emphasis makes apparent how states seek to provide a
coherence and unity to their sense of Self via ‘gendered’ assumptions about that
Self. It is this interrelationship between the competing gendered conceptions of
the Self, furthermore, that makes possible several avenues of resistance, tactics or
techniques which can serve to illuminate the inconsistencies in dominant national
narratives so that they can be re-formed (if not transformed) in ways which open
spaces for previously marginalized groups.
The subsequent argument proceeds in several sections. In section one, we
provide a more developed background to OST as it has been advanced in IR theory,
focusing upon those studies that more explicitly engage the discursive elements of
the OST process.3 In section two, we review how gender as a central theoretical
concept for feminist IR can be applied to questions of identity by linking it to the
discursive assumptions of OST. In section three, we suggest two practices—
maternal dissent and the ethic of care—where marginalized groups can contest the
masculinized basis of a nation-state’s autobiographical narrative, disturbing the
continuity and order that these narratives provide to a state’s sense of Self.

Totalizing the self: ontological security theory and the autobiographical narrative
Drawing from work done in social theory, and in particular the insights of
Anthony Giddens (1984; 1991), OST in IR theory begins with the notion that states
generate routine foreign policies that help to reproduce a state’s conception of
Self-identity. Actors do not do things blindly: the reasons for their action might be
implicit, but nevertheless actors are purposeful in what they do and they can, to
a large degree, account for their actions in ways that are meaningful for the
individual agent. For Giddens, without the ability to account for their actions,
individuals are exposed to a loss of self that is grounded in the ‘chaos’ that exists
in social life in the absence of a coherent framework of reality (Giddens 1984, 36).
This framework of reality is created and recreated via daily social interaction and
is not only cognitive in content but also emotional and helps to inoculate
individuals against what he terms existential anxieties or threats to an individual’s
sense of self (Giddens 1991, 38– 39). Thus, individuals seek a sense of ‘security’
against anxieties that threaten their sense of Self. Yet, what then do we mean by the
idea that agents have a conception of the Self?
For Giddens, ‘Self-identity’ is generated via reflexive awareness of one’s own
biography about one’s life. Therefore, it presumes some linguistic capacity to
differentiate the ‘I’ from other social categories such as ‘you’, but is not necessarily
reducible to linguistic differentiation. Indeed, for Giddens, actors monitor and
generate who they ‘are’ by reference to their own ‘biography’ or what they ‘tell’
about themselves (Giddens 1984; see also 1991, 54). The social construction of
Self-identity occurs through discourse—an autobiographical narrative provides
agents an understanding of social reality. The construction is not only discursive,

3
Mitzen’s (2006) work on OST is well-known, but it focuses less upon the
autobiographical narrative endemic to ontological security-seeking.
526 Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

however, as the discourse is a means of expressing historical memory, which is

also constructed (see Kinnvall 2004).
Individual conceptions of the Self are narratively based and are derived from
the ‘tales’ we tell about who we are (Lynch 1999; Lang 2002). This approaches the
construction of the Self a bit differently from its treatment in the scholarship on the
‘Self versus other nexus’.4 Yet this does not imply that the Self is taken as an
atomistic, anti-social entity in OST, rather such scholars see history and past
‘selves’ as social loci—experiences which connect the current Self with an (often
mythologized) past Self (Kinnvall 2004, 755; Steele 2008a, 57). It is through such
stories about past selves that existential anxieties of agents are attended to.
However, this is not to suggest that these biographies are completely secure.
Indeed, for Giddens, an individual’s sense of Self is ultimately fragile given that
the ‘biographies’ of individuals can be contested and questioned by others.
Actors can intervene by characterizing certain situations in a particular way to
implicate the integrity of this autobiographical narrative. Thus states can be
‘shamed’ (Steele 2008a, 13, 52 – 54) in reference to an internally constructed sense
of Self (rather than some transcendental, community-held ‘norm’) for both their
actions and inaction in reference to external events. So, for example, Steele (2007,
915) demonstrates that in the context of foreign aid from the US to those suffering
from the tragedy of the Asian tsunami, when the US was seen as being ‘stingy’
(or, in terms of ontological security, being ‘shamed’ due to low levels of aid) the US
responded by dramatically increasing its foreign aid, thus showing how an
international actor (the UN undersecretary general Jan Egeland) was able to create
a narrative-identity ‘threat’ that the US had to resolve.
This further indicates the presence of a ‘competing narrative’ that was articulated
to challenge the dominant narrative’s own array of preferred subjectivity: the US as
a powerful nation, who used that power in justifiable ways. Indeed, this moment of
ontological insecurity revealed the mutual constitution of the dominant
autobiographical narrative and subjugated ‘counter-narratives’ and how counter-
narratives work within the language presented by the dominant autobiographical
narrative to subvert that dominant narrative. As other scholars have noted,
discursive contestation occurs as challenges are made within a particular narrative
context (Weedon 1987, 107–111) that can provide the marginalized the ability to
challenge those ideas, norms and expectations which are dominant.
We posit, however, that Steele misses an opportunity here in that the domestic
context of an autobiographical narrative had to be manifested in a public sphere5
where masculine conceptions of US identity isolated identity alternatives, and
masked or occluded the possibilities of contestation by internal narrative ‘others’.
Such stories embedded in national narratives can lead to the mistaken analytical
move by OST scholars to homogenize the national Self. For instance, Jennifer
Mitzen asserts that we can ‘scale’ OST from the individual to the group and even
state level because ‘inter-societal routines help maintain identity coherence for
each group, which in turn provides individuals with a measure of ontological

4
For a review of this literature, see Hall (2001).
5
We assume following feminist literature (Okin 1979; 1989; 1998; Elshtain 1981;
Pateman 1988; Kymlicka 2002, 386– 398) that the ‘public sphere’ is ‘gendered’ masculine
and therefore is the ‘political space’ in which the dominant autobiographical narrative
operates.
 Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory 527

security’ (Mitzen 2006, 354). Instead, the transformative impact in our analysis
here originates not from some external event which manifests ‘shame’—although
we agree that such an event is still relevant to identity—but rather from an
internal site of narrative interrogation. The point is that both processes can work
to challenge a dominant autobiographical narrative, rather than just one
(as previously assumed in OST research).
Although it has not cast the binary in gendered terms, other work on
ontological security in international politics has taken note of how internal others
threaten group selves (Huysmans 1998). This is manifested discursively, in which
‘those who produce the discourse also have the power to make it ‘true’—that is, to
enforce a particular reading of a threat according to which people and groups are
defined’ (Kinnvall 2004, 745; see also Huysmans 1998). Kinnvall’s work has most
explicitly drawn out the manner in which sub-national groups both challenge and
are threatened by dominant national identities (see also Kinnvall 2007). Dominant
groups can thus order
the other both structurally (for example, immigrants as ‘bogus’ asylum seekers) and
psychologically (by turning the stranger into an enemy), constructing a discourse of
exclusion. Those who do not (seem to) subscribe to a common belief system thus
challenge the very foundation of the group. (Kinnvall 2004, 754)

Finally, (and compellingly), Kinnvall has also addressed how the idea of
‘the nation’ is in fact gendered (2004, 760 – 763). Nevertheless, like other OST
scholars, she does not explicitly examine how such gendered conceptualizations—
produced and reinforced by national narratives—can be resisted and disturbed.

Discourse, identity and the production of gender

Feminist theorizing in IR theory has shown both theoretically and empirically that
an emphasis on ‘gender’ is important for understanding international politics.6
More broadly, feminist theorizing from political theory also shows the importance
of ‘gender’ for understanding political action and the very notion of the ‘political’
itself.7 The feminist emphasis on the nexus between gender and power is used
here to show how we not only encounter ethical problems within the notion of
state Self-identity,8 but that marginalized individuals—by challenging the

6
See for instance Allison (2007); Ashworth (1999); Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002);
Elshtain (1987); Enloe (2000; 2003; 2007); Hutchings (2000); Locher and Prügel (2001);
Mohanty (1991); Ong (1994); Peterson (1992a; 1992b; 1992c; 1994); Peterson and Runyan
(1993); Peterson and True (1998); Ruddick (2001); Sjoberg (2006); Sylvester (1994); Ticker
(1992; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2005); Whitworth (1994); Zalewski (2006)
7
See Bailely (1997); Baumgardner and Richards (2000); Buchan (1999); Butler (1988;
1999; 2003); Connell (1987), Daly (1978); De Beauvoir (1989[1952]); Dworkin (1987);
Elshtain (1981); Frye (1983); Hartsock (1983); Kymlicka (2002); Mill (1997[1869]); Millet
(1970); Okin (1979; 1989; 1998); Pateman (1988); Phillips (1993); Rich (1986); Rosen (2000);
Scott (1999); Tong (1989); Weedon (1987); Weeks (1998); Wittig (2003); Young (1990).
8
‘Power’ here is considered to be multifaceted, drawing from material relations (for
example within capitalist production), but also can be found in the norms and values of
society which are internalized by actors and through their ‘actions’ become reproduced. For
some reviews of ‘power’ as a concept see Lukes (2005 [1974]) and for a description of the
‘productive’ aspects of ‘power’ see Foucault (1977, 3 – 33, 135– 169).
528 Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

contours of this gendered narrative—can be potentially emancipated from their

marginalization.
It is necessary to recognize that there are many ‘feminisms’9 and that any
argument that tries to ‘generalize’ across feminist theory must be mindful of this
theoretical tradition’s plurality. Nevertheless, we define ‘gender’ as the socially
constructed differences between masculinity and femininity that are ‘ascribed by
society and learned through the socialization experience’ (Peterson and Runyan
1993, 17). This definition is, to a large degree, agreed to by a number of feminist
scholars and writers (De Beauvoir 1989 [1952]; Butler 1988; 1990; 2003; Okin 1989;
Rich 1986; Scott 1999; Tickner 1992; 1995; 1996; Wittig 2003) and is important for at
least two reasons. First, it suggests that differences between masculinity and
femininity are not ‘innate’ characteristics; rather, they are socially ascribed via
changing norms and expectations about what it ‘means’ to be a ‘male’ or ‘female’10
(Tickner 1996). Indeed, ‘gender’ is a social category and is, therefore, constructed
over time and across political space (Scott 1999). Second, the idea of ‘gender’ as
socially constructed suggests that definitions of masculinity and femininity change
over time (Tickner 1992; Rotundo 1993). As social expectations fluctuate as to what
it means to be ‘male’ or ‘female’, so too do the meanings associated with these
social categories. While some feminist scholars suggest that historically certain
‘traits’ are associated with ‘gender’ differences (Peterson and Runyan 1993;
Peterson and True 1998), the emphasis is nevertheless upon the contingent
foundations of masculinity and femininity.
One of the central conclusions of (some) feminist theorizing is that the
differences attributed to ‘males’ and ‘females’ result in differences in power with
the conclusion being that masculinity (as a social category) is perceived as the
‘norm’ thus allowing for its dominance. The assumption is that historically,
masculinity has been constructed to represent political and social practices that
are accorded more ‘public value’. Indeed, the notion that masculinity connotes
rationality, autonomy, power, agency and strength (Peterson and True 1998;
Peterson and Runyan 1993: 22– 23; Rotundo 1993; Tickner 1995, 56– 57) indicates
that to be masculine is to have control over one’s political and social environment,
and to be able to direct that environment in accordance with one’s interests.
This emphasizes the constructed binaries that underlie social life and provide
for the development of both positive and negative gender identities. Once these
identities are ascribed to the social categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’ the familiar
binaries of ‘strong/weak, active/passive, reasonable/emotional’ help to hide
differences within social categories thus making them rigid and appear solid,
when in fact, ‘they are the mutable effects of (temporally, culturally, historically)

9
These potentially include: Marxian feminism (Hartsock 1983); Liberal feminism
(Okin 1989); as well as post-structural feminism (Weedon 1987) to name a few. Therefore,
we need to be careful in ascribing certain ‘concepts’ or ‘arguments’ to feminism as a broad
theoretical tradition given its plurality of foci. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a broad
agreement within feminist theory about the construction of ‘gender’. The subsequent
analysis which links ‘gender’ to ‘power’ might not be generalizable across feminist theory,
but is nevertheless included as a way to show how differences in ‘gender’ can result
in marginalization and domination.
10
It should also be noted that feminists have critiqued what it means to be ‘female’
by suggesting that the term itself represents a western conception of ‘woman’, which
excludes or marginalizes non-western conceptions of ‘female’. See Mohanty (1991).
 Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory 529

specific power dynamics’ (Scott 2002, 3). The central conclusion is that the
dominance of ‘masculinity’ is not ‘natural’, but rather the result of contingent
social practices that provide avenues of control and coercion via gendered
assumptions that are ascribed to the alternative social categories or binaries of
‘male’ and ‘female’. Thus, the social category ‘male’ becomes the positive gender
identity constructed over and against a negative ‘other’, the ‘feminine’, defining
what it means to be a viable political and social agent by equating agency with such
traits as strength, activity and reason. As a consequence, a political agent becomes
a ‘masculinized’ agent, one that ‘fits’ the requisite norms of what it means to be
‘male’, repressing and marginalizing those norms and social expectations that are
perceived as ‘feminine’.
In turn, historically ‘femininity’ has been constructed to connote ‘weak, passive,
naı̈ve, irrational, illogical and gentle’ (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 22). To be
‘feminine’ is to lack social and political agency: to be perceived as ‘weak’ and
‘dependent’ and, therefore, not able to be full members of political communities.
Indeed, the historical marginalization of the feminine in social and political
thought derives from the construction of the feminine as ultimately non-political
(Okin 1979; Elshtain 1981). It is the social meaning attached to the category of
feminine that results in ‘women’ being subjugated, dominated and oppressed. But,
critically, it should be seen that this is perceived to be in the best ‘interest’ of women
given that they are unable to exercise political agency. Therefore, this hierarchy is
‘naturalized’ and reinforced via political institutions that are supposed to ‘protect’
‘weaker’ members of society. As such, when women are understood as ‘beautiful
souls’ and men as ‘just warriors’ the central idea is that ‘women’ need to be
‘protected’ against the ravages of conflict and war (Elshtain 1987, 3 –4; Sjoberg
2006). Thus, ‘women’ are further disabled from exercising ‘proper agency’ by
exclusion from the political projects of society, including war. Given this argument,
how do feminists theorize the relationship between identity and political agency?

Feminism and identity

Feminist accounts of ‘identity’ begin with account of the ‘Self’ that has been
prioritized in western political thinking as masculine. As Tickner argues, the
modern ‘Self’ is defined in reference to radical individualism best understood
through the model of ‘the rational economic man’ who is self-interested, rational11
and utility-maximizing (Tickner 1997a, 149). If it is the case that the modern ‘Self’
is masculine in its foundations, then it makes sense to suggest that the gender
identity of ‘woman’ is constructed as the opposite of a rational actor, or as one
who is constructed as the ‘other’ (Locher and Prügel 2001, 79). Yet, feminists also

11
It is important to note that OST seems to equate moral action with rational action.
Therefore, feminists could suggest that this reifies the state and further entrenches
‘masculinized’ conceptions of the state. Yet, this would be problematic for two reasons.
First, OST (like feminism) argues that a state’s sense of self is constructed. Therefore, there
is nothing ‘natural’ to the autobiographical narrative that constitutes a state’s sense of self.
Secondly, OST’s conception of rationality is not necessarily equal to the ‘rational actor
model’ where agents are disembodied rational utility-maximizers. Indeed, OST suggests
that to be rational also includes being moral: to have an understanding of one’s needs as a
‘self’ and to act in ways which meet those existential needs. The ‘self’ here is not abstracted
nor is it individuated: instead, it is embedded in a narrative-structure of meaning.
530 Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

suggest that identities are constructed and therefore implicated in power

relations: ‘central to feminist investigations of identity in IR has been the
suggestion that identities do not only create interests and meanings, but also
relationships of superiority and inferiority’ (Locher and Prügel 2001, 80, emphasis
added). Therefore, feminists also are likely to stress that identity construction
is facilitated through the development and reinforcement of differences
(Tickner 1997a, 151).
Feminist IR theory suggests that state identity is to some degree fluid
(Locher and Prügel 2001, 83) given that they are constructed along lines of
‘difference’: that a state’s conception of itself is constantly changing and being
reformulated by reference to the subjugated ‘other’. Of course, feminists are likely
to suggest that this subjugated ‘other’ is the feminine,12 but it is important to note
that state identities are based upon shifting understandings, and are at the nexus
of exclusionary, homogenizing and regulative discourses. This therefore suggests
that for feminists, a state’s sense of Self is partially constituted by narratives,
which contain national legends and myths which give meaning and purpose to
who the state ‘is’ (Tickner 1997, 156).
So a state’s conception of ‘Self’ is gendered: it depends upon differentiating the
‘state’ from the ‘other’ that is usually understood in feminine terms. The ‘state’
(and its Self) is also produced and reproduced by IR scholarship, which explicates
it as a rational autonomous actor who can act independently in the realm of
international politics (Peterson 1992a, 3). Moreover, the early construction of the
state apparatus as a centralization of coercive power seemed to presuppose
gendered dichotomies and inequalities (Peterson 1992b, 34), and to some degree,
‘is the centralized ‘main organizer’ of gendered power’. Beyond the ideological
apparatus of the ‘state’, the actions of the state (and those who inhabit it) are also
representations of ‘masculine norms’ (Peterson 1992b, 39, 45). Even the discourse
of ‘security’ that supposedly informs the ‘necessity’ of the ‘state’ is gendered in so
far as it systematically ignores and devalues other aspects of ‘security’ such as
global inequality or environmental issues which are not within the ‘masculinized’
understanding of security that focuses upon war and conflict (Tickner 1996,
48– 49). Thus, theorizing in feminist IR has suggested that the ‘state’ itself is
gendered masculine, which has systematically devalued, overlooked and repressed
alternative conceptions and narrations of the state, subsequently developed by
feminist IR scholars. This can occur in relation to an external feminized other, as
Tickner posited about the formation of Western state identity vis-à-vis the
‘underdeveloped’ Third World (1997), but we also posit, as Weldes (1999) has
asserted, that this formation occurs vis-à-vis an internal feminine other (See also
Young 2003, 4– 6).
To bring the main points of this section to synopsis, the assertion that the
public discursive sphere is gendered masculine leads to the conclusion that the
autobiographical narrative of a group Self that ‘carries the day’ is itself masculine
(and contra an internal feminine ‘other’). Therefore, if the dominant narrative
shapes the Self, this Self will also be masculine, rendering ‘natural’ certain

12
The work of some feminist authors indicates that the subjugated ‘other’ is not
necessarily always gendered ‘feminine’ as differences within the social category of
‘masculinity’ can result in the denigration and marginalization of certain forms of
‘masculinity’ as well (Young 2003, 3 –4).
 Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory 531

participants (and narratives) while marginalizing others. Thus, our analysis

builds upon the work already done in feminist scholarship dealing with state
identity, but adds to this work by suggesting that the process of state Self-identity
formation relies upon an ‘internal’ othering that leads to controlling and limiting
the agency of this ‘internal’ marginalized other. Our suggestion is that while this
internalized othering process limits agency, its dependence upon the internal
other for narrated Self creates possible opportunities for these marginalized
groups to challenge and resist this marginalization by proliferating ‘counter-
narratives’ that may in-securitize dominant ontological security narratives.

Multiple narratives and resistance

As mentioned previously, OSTsuggests that a state’s sense of ‘Self’ is constituted by
a dominant autobiographical narrative. This dominant autobiographical narrative
is seen as the main ‘story’ upon which the state depends for understanding its place
within international politics and, moreover, is what the state will utilize in dealing
with identity threats. However, given the analysis of feminism generated above, it
is likely that alongside the dominant autobiographical narratives of states there
reside multiple narratives that are both: 1) related to the dominant narrative that
constitutes a state’s sense of Self; but that can also 2) potentially challenge, subvert
and transform the dominant autobiographical narrative.
While OST suggests that the narrative foundation of a state’s conception of Self
is not derived from an explicit differentiation from the ‘other’, and is rather
internally generated, this process of internal narrativization of Self-identity is
constituted by a process of internal ‘othering’—a process that internally
differentiates between the multitudes of possible narratives that can potentially
inform a state’s conception of Self. Put another way, the internal construction of a
state’s sense of Self is a process that is dependent upon the exclusion of narratives
that are internal to the state itself. And, given the feminist analysis above, the
suggestion is that the narratives that are ‘rejected’ are feminine in content. Thus
stated, ontological security theorists see identity as a ‘process of becoming’ rather
than a ‘natural, fixed state’ (Kinnvall 2004, 747 – 748), so the notion that identity-
narratives, even dominant ones, can be challenged is quite in line with OST, even
if the form of dominant narrative problematizations have not been fully proposed.
As noted, one of the insights of OST is that when a state’s sense of Self is
threatened, it is likely to engage in some type of action in order to alleviate that
threat. It is because the dominant narrative is created in opposition to the
marginalized narratives that the marginalized narratives can potentially challenge
the dominant narrative, primarily because it is only dominant in relation to the
construction of other marginalized narratives. The implication here is that
the dominant narrative retains its dominance precariously; any shift in the
construction of marginalized narratives can potentially challenge the dominance
of a particular narrative. This mutual constitution of dominant and marginalized
narratives implies that there is a fluidity to a state’s sense of Self and that actions
directed at changing the construction of either the dominant narrative or
marginalized narratives can initiate identity threats that the state (if it wants to
resolve existential threats) must account for. Moreover, the interrelationship
between the dominant narrative and marginalized narratives implies that
532 Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

actors who are using marginalized narratives can potentially contest the dominant
narrative via methods and actions that the dominant narrative legitimizes.
The constructive processes that are involved in the generation of a dominant
autobiographical narrative can be used against the dominant narrative to highlight
contradictions in the dominant narrative. This fits with the feminist analysis
presented above, since the assumption made here is that the dominant
autobiographical narrative is likely gendered masculine as a condition for
its dominance whereas those narratives which are marginalized tend to be
gendered feminine.
When does the opportunity for contestation arise? For one, in moments of
national crisis (Weldes 1999; Lang 2002); it is not just the physical security of a
nation-state that is being challenged, but also its ontology, its ‘sense of being’, or in
the words of Lang, its ‘national purpose’. It is when states articulate the justificatory
reasons for engaging in moral action that marginalized groups can contest these
reasons as they can highlight contradictions in the use of certain values (derived from the
dominant autobiographical narrative) to engage in moral action. The mere fact that a
nation-state feels compelled to narrate in the first place implies a presence of
in-decision—a sense of ‘sorting through’ its place in time and space. As such, when
the state tries to solve these threats, marginalized groups via counter-narratives can
further generate identity threats by highlighting contradictions in the ‘reasons-
action’ relationship that facilitates, and legitimizes state responses to existential
threats, thus facilitating the articulation of counter-narratives and possibly
allowing for the marginalized to be freed from their marginalization.
Recent studies on narrative in IR have termed the occasions when the
dominant narrative is ‘besieged’ as ‘phrases-in-dispute’. Such phrases ‘disturb
that “reality” by interrupting the intelligibility of its narrative logic’
(Bially Mattern 2003, 155). While the following is not an exhaustive list, we see
two possible practices, techniques or tactics that provide such a narrative
challenge, and thus can problematize the ontology of the dominant Self.

Maternal dissent
As it relates to policy, war and violence, there is perhaps no more vivid example
of the inextricable position of a feminine presence in a society than in the image of
the grieving mother. One of the most lucid, and even ‘patriotic’ films produced
in the 1990s on the Second World War, Saving Private Ryan, centralized the impact
of the grieving mother. In that film, a mother from Iowa has lost three sons already
to the war, and a team of soldiers is amassed to find the fourth son, Private Ryan.
While the viewer of the film does not see the grief of the mother on-screen, we can
anticipate it, as a US official approaches her farm home to tell her the news of
these deaths.
Work on mothers of the ‘Lost’ in Argentina and Chile (Ruddick 1989) and
Nicaragua (Bayard de Volo 2001), has demonstrated the important national role
that mothers who have lost sons to revolution or war can play in, directly or
indirectly, shaping national discourse and policy. The image of the grieving
mother, channelled back into forms of protest, is conditioned by several factors
that may affect the autobiographical narrative of nation-states. First and foremost,
it takes the narrative about Self, actions and identity to the level of a human loss,
interrogating the abstract discourse that state agents use to mobilize a population
 Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory 533

for organized violence (whether in revolution, war, or other forms of conflict).

Death in war is portrayed historically as affecting two groups: the state, concerned
with numerical loss, and the mother and/or wife who reacts in emotional terms.
For one, loss is quantitative: battle statistics, body bags and the re-manning of
troops. For the other, loss is qualitative: love, a human life, a place in one’s heart
(Bayard de Volo 2001, 19). With reference to an absence, a lost son questions the
reason for conflict in the first place. This does not mean that mothers do not
support the causes for which their sons volunteered.13 It means, however, that loss
generates questions—questions that implicate not only the discursive present but
a past and present collated narrative of justifications for action.
A notable and well known example relevant to recent US foreign policy was
the protest of Cindy Sheehan. Sheehan’s son Casey was killed in April 2004 while
serving with the US Army in Iraq. A grieving mother, in the summer of 2005
Sheehan went to President George W Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, where the
latter was vacationing. Sheehan set up her protest in a ditch outside of the ranch,
with the plea to speak to Bush to ask him why her son was killed in Iraq—what
purpose did his death serve? Sheehan’s case is even more poignant, as the details
of Casey’s death came during one of the first uprisings of a domestic Iraqi
population that had hardly been an ally of the Saddam Hussein regime, let alone
an ally of Osama bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda.
The contestation over the meanings of the loss can become particularly acute
when mothers, united by their collective identity of lost sons, disagree over the
meaning of the violence or the ‘purpose’ of the conflict. The most notable recent
example of this is Sheehan—who engendered as much opposition as support from
other mother organizations. Yet, as early as January of 2005, some seven months
before ‘Camp Casey’ was established, the US media contained reports detailing
the intense disagreements over the meanings of the Iraq War that were developing
amongst families who otherwise shared the grief of a fallen soldier (Davey 2005).
In Nicaragua as well, Bayard de Volo notes the subtle conflicts between
pro-Sandinista ‘Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs’, on the one hand, and the
pro-Contra Mothers of the Resistance, on the other—conflicts that remained
salient well after the Nicaraguan Civil War had ended (see especially Bayard de
Volo 2001, 193 –197). As delicate as they are, these intra-maternal group conflicts
are an interrogation of a narrative—an implication of the creation of meanings for
violent actions.
In addition to this interrogation, the grief a mother shares with other mothers
contains two further capacities: it serves to mobilize mothers and it provides such
mothers ‘cover for political work’ (Bayard de Volo 2001, 15). As the Nicaraguan
case demonstrated, violence was used against these women. This is evidenced in
the case of the Somozan government’s crackdown of a protest conducted by
women in January of 1978 at the United Nations office: though Nicaragua had a
long history of military repression, the violence used against these women,
reported by both the national and international media, was shocking’ (Bayard de
Volo 2001, 26). Again, however, such political cover obtains across regimes,

13
This is an important difference between the mothers groups in Nicaragua, who while
protesting the Somoza government, still largely supported the Sandinistas once they were
in power, and those mother groups in Argentina and Chile, who mobilized against a
military government throughout their protest (see Ruddick 1989).
534 Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

for even in a democratic setting where (publicized) violence against national

citizens is even less legitimate, such as in the United States, the grief of a mother
provides political cover.14
There are two possible problematic outcomes that may result from maternal
dissent. The first begins with the powerful condition found in most cases of
maternal dissent—their perceived spontaneous origins. As one scholar notes,
what made Sheehan’s visit to the ranch so powerful was that it was ‘unannounced’
and ‘unwelcome’, and that, after Bush continued to deny her a conversation, it led
to a ‘spontaneous camp of tents’ of fellow grieving mothers and war protestors
around Sheehan’s original tent (Debrix 2006, 787). Yet, after being widely hailed
for this four-month protest, Sheehan became linked by some to a cacophony of
more ‘extreme’ groups and certain actions by Sheehan reinforced this perception,
including her characterizations of Bush as a ‘terrorist’, and her visit with and
support for Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a protagonist of the Bush
administration.15 A second possible development is that this maternal identity,
while enabling transformation, can also be incredibly constraining, ‘hold[ing]
women back from developing new political identities and demands that arise out
of a heightened sense of agency’ (Bayard de Volo 2001, 221).
Even with these possible pitfalls, maternal dissent is a powerful reminder that
foreign policy narratives are inextricably connected to the maternal presence,
which focuses a society to consider and then reconsider the costs in terms of
human loss—absence—that violence entails. This ‘absence as presence’ may not
lead to a change in policy, but it can serve to disturb the rhythm of a narrative.16
It begins to manifest a modicum of ontological insecurity so that an
autobiographical narrative which otherwise disciplines the perception about the
national Self becomes problematized.

Ethic of care
A ‘feminist ethic’ in international politics does not always centre upon the state
nor the international system, but on human relations and the recognition of the

14
In this regard, see the exchange between US night-time talk show host David
Letterman and his guest, neoconservative cable host Bill O’Reilly, on the 3 January 2006
episode of Late Night with David Letterman, where the topic of Sheehan’s protest developed
into a debate over the meaning of the Iraq War. Letterman at one time asked O’Reilly: ‘So,
why are we there in the first place?’ before concluding: ‘I’m very concerned about people
like yourself who don’t have nothing but endless sympathy for a woman like Cindy
Sheehan, honest to Christ’. The exchange illustrates both the political cover that comes
from being a grieving mother, as well as the debate over the meaning of a foreign policy
action. Transcript at ,http://mediamatters.org/items/200601060009 . , accessed 14 May
2009
15
For instance, Sheehan was asked in late 2006 the following question by one cable
news anchor: ‘Why go stand side-by-side by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela? Why do that?
I mean, it sounds like—would you rather live under Hugo Chavez than George Bush?’
Norah O’Donnell, ‘Hardball’, 5 July 2006, available at ,http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
13735484/ . , accessed 14 May 2009
16
Polling from the period of Sheehan’s protest indicated a large drop in support for the
Iraq War, although we must also note that other events which may explain this drop, such
as the bungled US response to Hurricane Katrina, occurred during the same time, see
,http://pollingreport.com/iraq2.htm., accessed 14 May 2009
 Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory 535

responsibility we have towards others (Hutchings 2000, 115). It seeks to uncover

the multiple and often hidden forms of violence that occur within human relations
and it articulates practices that offer resistance to these forms of violence (Ruddick
2001, 196). Such an approach will likely contest the relations forged between moral
agents. It will also constantly question the gendered assumptions that inform
relationships between situated moral actors (Hutchings 2000, 122– 124), and what
constitutes a ‘moral actor’ in the first place (for an example, see Ashworth 1999).
A feminist ‘ethics of care’ is one that, while emphasizing relationships and the
interconnectedness of moral agents, nevertheless is critical of relations forged
between actors and constantly is aware of the gendered assumptions that inform
what it means to be an actor with moral sensibilities.17 This approach is critical of
the desire to control, manipulate or injure, but also is not committed to always
rejecting violence. Instead, it seeks to interrogate the justifications used for
violence and to be exceedingly suspicious of how, and in what ways, violence
receives justification.
This ethic is therefore committed to questioning dominant social practices that
facilitate violence and the desire to abuse, manipulate and coerce other moral
agents. By questioning dominant practices, this approach also articulates
alternative ways of acting that challenge the gendered assumptions of a state’s
autobiographical narrative. In particular, ‘feminine’ counter-narratives
committed to such ideas as mutual respect, peace and cooperation can be forms
of resistance against the ‘masculine’ norms of violence and conflict (Ruddick 2001,
196). These forms of resistance can expose contradictions that potentially inhere in
the dominant autobiographical narrative, allowing for the challenging of
gendered assumptions that inform a state’s dominant autobiographical narrative.
For example, if a state suggests that it must intervene militarily in other states
to secure human liberty, marginalized groups can highlight the contradiction in
using violence to secure human freedom.18 The notion of using force (a potentially
‘masculine’ form of action) can be challenged by marginalized groups using a
‘feminine’ narrative that suggests that to secure human liberty through force is
ultimately to destroy the value of human liberty as to secure this value might
require an ethic of ‘responsibility’ towards those that are to be freed.
The ‘feminine’ counter-narrative is able to show the contradiction in using
violence to secure freedom because this betrays the illogical result of the
‘masculine’ assumption that violence can promote freedom, when violence itself
can be a potential cause of not being free. The very fact that the value of ‘freedom’
potentially implies a rejection of violence indicates that alongside the ‘masculine’
autobiographical narrative, there is an alternative ‘feminine’ narrative—one that

17
For example, Hutchings (2000, 124– 126) indicates that to assume ‘women’ are always
‘for’ peace is a mistake; indeed, the use of violence, while context-dependent, is not ‘ruled
out’ a priori, and to assume this is to reinforce a gendered assumption that ‘women’ in
general and ‘feminists’ in particular are always committed to non-violence and therefore,
by extension are ‘passive’.
18
Of course, some might argue there is no contradiction here: sometimes violence
or force is needed to allow for the ‘freeing’ of oppressed peoples. Yet, it is important
note that the use of force (and the chance of killing those who are supposed to be
‘freed’) can be contradictory. Moreover, the assumption that force can be used for
freedom presupposes a ‘gendered’ understanding of the means by which certain ends
can be attained.
536 Will K Delehanty and Brent J Steele

can problematize the dominant gendered assumptions that inform the use and
justification for violence. The ability of the ‘feminine’ narrative to challenge the
relationship between violence and freedom draws from its binary opposition to
the dominant autobiographical narrative primarily because it renders the binary
opposition contestable and unstable. It seeks to show how the dominant
autobiographical narrative of a state’s sense of Self is contingent, precarious, and
dependent on a ‘masculine’ logic that excludes logical alternatives to the use of
violence and force.
Consequently, by understanding the ‘gendered’ assumptions that provide
legitimacy to forms of violence against moral agents, this approach stresses an
alternative conception of moral agency, one that is shared by other thinkers,
such as John Stuart Mill (1997 [1869]), who also stresses the ‘gendered’
assumptions that are a part of the way in which moral agency is understood.
Indeed, Mill is adamant that the dominant conceptions of what it ‘naturally’
means to be ‘male’ and ‘female’ are problematic in that they lack foundation
and restrict moral agency. As he states, the differences accorded to ‘males’ and
‘females’ rests upon faulty assumptions that paint ‘women’ as politically unfit
and that ‘men’ should rule over them (Mill 1997 [1869], 3). Mill, much like the
feminist emphasis on an ethics of care, suggests that the differences in political
and social power accorded to moral agents must be taken into account when
trying to understand social and political inequality. The question becomes why
these differences arise, and a key difference between agents is their gender and
the ‘gendered’ assumptions that permeate social and political relations (Mill
1997 [1869], 10– 11). It seems that Mill (much like in his other work 1978, 4 –5)
assumes that the dominant conceptions of how moral agents are to act both
influence and constrain, which can limit human freedom and the capacity to be
a viable moral being.

Conclusions
OST suggests that states have a conception of Self-identity that is grounded in an
autobiographical narrative that is the ‘story’ that a state tells about who it ‘is’. This
narrative foundation for a state’s conception of Self provides a measure of
continuity and stability for the state and aides the state in understanding its
place in the social world. The argument this paper advanced is that alternative
practices can challenge the dominant narrative, which, while not eliminated, can
be disrupted.
We admit that while we do think these challenges are theoretically and
empirically possible (or even present), practically they might be very difficult to
materialize. Such counter-narratives and resistances noted above require some
medium through which to transmit their challenges. Yet noting this difficulty, we
still observe how recent technological advances provide more media for
challenging dominant narratives. James der Derian (1990) and Roland Bleiker
(2000) were quite prescient in this regard as they recognized (via Virilio) how the
increased ‘speed’ of global communications—while at times used by the dominant
to reinforce their authority—can also ‘provide increased opportunities [for the
marginalized] to interfere with various political processes’ (Bleiker 2000, 114).
 Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory 537

Indeed, in an age of the internet, the visual and discursive messages of those on the
margins can find some audience to de-naturalize gendered discourses.19
Finally, this paper has suggested that the presence of the feminine internal
other can never be entirely marginalized nor fully extracted from the rhythm of a
society’s attempt to make sense of its group self through time. A masculine
autobiographical narrative, while in a dominant position to construct these
meanings, simplifies this national Self (necessarily so), thus creating a Self that is
always more tenuous than confident, more delicate than stout. This is especially so
when this narrative justifies organized violence—for if organized violence entails
sacrifice, it begets a series of justifications that can never fully rationalize the
human absence such violence creates. It is an influence that comes from its
permanent presence and spontaneous manifestation. Whether emerging through
support for a nation’s policies, or in dissent, or both at the same time, an internal
feminine other plays a vital role—helping to question and destabilize the
meanings of national narratives, and suggest that another sequence of actions is
always possible.

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