2020 BAR REVIEW CIVIL LAW

Handout No. 20
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

PRELIMINARY TITLE

A Year is Equivalent to 12 Calendar Months

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously
exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code
and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book
I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of
legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Co. of Asia, Inc., G.R. No. 184823, [October 6, 2010], 646 PHIL 710-732

A Foreign Law Which Does Not Oblige the Father to Support to His Child Cannot Be Made to
Apply in the Philippines

When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Additionally,
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent's obligation
to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto. Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707,
[December 10, 2014], 749 PHIL 823-840

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HUMAN RELATIONS

There is Abuse of Rights when there is Gross and Evident Malice and Bad Faith

Petitioner thus acknowledged respondents' right to use Rizal Street. It should have known from
familiarity not only with its own land, but with those adjoining it, and from the ongoing
proceedings in the case, that respondents had no other way to and from Valentin Street than
through its property.

For this reason, it is guilty of gross and evident malice and bad faith when, even while Civil Case
No. 2004-0036 was pending, it deliberately blocked respondents' access to Rizal Street by
constructing a building thereon, dumping filling materials and junk on the main gate of
respondents' home, and converting portions of the road into an auto repair shop and parking
space, making it difficult and inconvenient, if not humiliating, for respondents to traverse the
path to and from their home.

Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, "(e)very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." Petitioner's action betrays a perverse and deliberate intention to hurt and punish
respondents for legally demanding a right of way which it nevertheless knew was forthcoming,
and which, considering the size of its land, it may give without the least prejudice to its own
rights. Naga Centrum, Inc. v. Spouses Orzales, G.R. No. 203576, [September 14, 2016]

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code Extends to Places Where a Person Has a Right to Exclude the Public
or Deny Them Access

The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not mean that only
the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts.” A business office
is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals
as are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined
to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public
or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long
as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., 699 SCRA 667, G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013

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MARRIAGE

The Marriage is Valid Even If the Purpose is to Secure Foreign Citizenship

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid. Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, [October 16,
2013], 719 PHIL 622-638

The Absence of Marriage License Must Be Apparent on the Marriage Contract or Supported by
a Certification from the Local Civil Registrar

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties. Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage
contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character,
and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than
that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and
is thus, void ab initio. Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, [July 27, 2016]

The 5-Year Cohabitation Period Should Be a Period of Legal Union Where Both Parties are
Capacitated to Marry Each Other

This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-
year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing

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with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA
122, G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Article 26(2) May Be Invoked by the Filipino Spouse Who Obtained a Divorce Decree with His
Alien Spouse Abroad

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If the Court
disallows a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms"
under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime
shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such
"extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are
just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if the
Court is to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle
of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in
favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs. The Court holds that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Republic v. Manalo, G.R.
No. 221029, [April 24, 2018]

Psychological Incapacity is a Mental Illness that Leads to an Inability to Comply with or

Comprehend Essential Marital Obligations

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating

his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof
of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It
would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent
simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that
respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is
persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable. Tani-De
La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., G.R. No. 188400, [March 8, 2017], 807 PHIL 31-51

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Expert Opinions are Not Indispensable to Prove Psychological Incapacity

Even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to
be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of
his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or
psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured
the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential was the
"presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition," as the
Court said in Marcos. But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability
of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed
by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the
marriages. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always
base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No.
157649, [November 12, 2012], 698 PHIL 241-257

A Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is Now Expressly Required where the Nullity of a
Previous Marriage is Invoked for Purposes of Contracting a Second Marriage

As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting
another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage
as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging
as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone. Castillo v. De Leon Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, [April 18, 2016], 784 PHIL
667-678

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The “Well-Founded Belief” Element Requires Active Effort, Not a Passive One

The “well-founded belief” in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such,
the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that
such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places
upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of “well-
founded belief” which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts, but more
importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead. Republic vs. Tampus, 787 SCRA
563, G.R. No. 214243 March 16, 2016

The Proper Remedy for the Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death Obtained by Extrinsic
Fraud is Annulment of Judgment to Nullify its Effects

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is
not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify
the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code
is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." If it
is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before
the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive
death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may
nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children
and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy. However, "a Petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means
that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the
outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying
the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of

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an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment
of judgment will, therefore, lie. Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, [October 8, 2014], 745 PHIL
118-134

The Grounds for Annulment under Article 45 are Exclusive

Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by
refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

PROPERTY RELATIONS

Prohibition against Donation between Spouses during Marriage Applies to Common Law
Relationship

If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that
Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear
of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law”; then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent
to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, it
would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred
guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, [March 31, 1971], 148 PHIL
295-300

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A Spouse’s Consent is Indispensable for the Disposition or Encumbrance of Conjugal Properties

It is not disputed that the Reyes Spouses were married in 1973, before the Family Code took
effect. Under the Family Code, their property regime is Conjugal Partnership of Gains; thus,
Article 124 is the applicable provision regarding the administration of their conjugal property.
Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse must be consented to by
the other; otherwise, it is void. Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, [October
5, 2016], 796 PHIL 736-752, J. Leonen

All Properties Acquired During the Marriage, Regardless in Whose Name the Properties are
Registered, are Presumed Conjugal Unless Proved Otherwise

The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or
the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that
the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the
spouses." Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained
by the spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, [August 3, 2015]

For Unions Without Marriage or Void Marriage Under Article 147, Any Property Acquired
During the Marriage is Presumed to Have Been Obtained through Joint Efforts

It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The
term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party
to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part
of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife.
However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should,
therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did
not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the
same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions

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to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, [August 3, 2015]

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

SSS Form E-1 is an Admission of Legitimate Filiation in a Public Document

Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court has further held
that: In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate
child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent
as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. Aguilar vs. Siasat, 748 SCRA 555, G.R. No.
200169 January 28, 2015

The Issue of Legitimacy Cannot be Attacked Collaterally but Should Only Be Raised in a Direct
and Separate Action Instituted to Prove the Filiation of a Child

The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335)
which provides: 'The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made
by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.'
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the Code confirm this view,
because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by
the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. Geronimo v. Santos,
G.R. No. 197099, [September 28, 2015], 770 PHIL 364-388

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An Acknowledged Illegitimate Child is under No Compulsion to Use the Surname of His Father

Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of
respondent? Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. Art. 176 gives
illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It
is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. Nothing is more settled than that when
the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be
given its literal meaning free from any interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can
order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. On its face, Art. 176, as
amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words.
The use of the word “may” in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child
is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word “may” is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children. Grande vs. Antonio,
716 SCRA 698, G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

ADOPTION

The Middle Name of the Adopted Child May Be the Surname of the Biological Mother

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly
prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the
law does not prohibit, it allows. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name,
which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code
and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother." In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, [March 31, 2005], 494 PHIL 515-528)

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PARENTAL AUTHORITY

In Custody Disputes, the Paramount Consideration is Always the Welfare of the Child

Even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for
"compelling reasons." Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state
his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion
by disregarding the child's preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which
instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. Tonog v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 122906, [February 7, 2002], 427 PHIL 1-10

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