. Family Relations i.

Marriage

1. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity

Family Code, Arts. 10, 21, 26, 35-38,
2. Effects of Marriage
Family Code, Art. 80

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995

DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R.
SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, to reverse and
set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID),
ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration.

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance
with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas)
arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.

When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez,
together with Marina Cabael, met them.

Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:

That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years old, and her
two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens, who
are coming as temporary visitors.

That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality they have
accorded me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my employment
thereat.

That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they are in the
Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a public charge.

That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized stay granted them
by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.

Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
"concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent
resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who
subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash
bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the
Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a change of heart and
moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen
(Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds the second
marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).

Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo,
pp. 31-33).

Hence, this petition.

We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist from executing or
implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-
36).

On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and that he and his
mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-
175).

II

Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which
recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband and wife
are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the husband is given the right
to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public respondents have no right to order the couple to live separately
(Rollo, pp. 5-7).

When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could not order
petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of
1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).

III

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport
petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved is
the question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the
change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully admitted
into the country and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to
deport her has prescribed.

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the change of
her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through
misinterpretation.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for
temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.

The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise
of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow
the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another
woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public
interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8
ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the
territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is protected
only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
permanent residency, in the Philippines.

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws
governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed.
317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations,
71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and
does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an
alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).

Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law,
an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent
resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine
citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants
is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

IV

We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deport petitioner
has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

Said Section 37(b) provides:

Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this section at any
time after entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises. Deportation under
clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall
recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported (As amended by
Rep. Act No. 503).

Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:

The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground
for deportation as charged against the alien:

1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designating port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry.

2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry;

3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for
a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his
entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;

4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;

5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with
the management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;

6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively
shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;

7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he
was admitted a non-immigrant;

8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of
the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is
opposed to organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or
assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the
unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization
entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who on any manner whatsoever lends
assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;

9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act,
independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an
alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation,
said alien shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually
deported: Provided, however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of
Immigration with the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of
such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head, and upon
payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the
Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);

10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of violating the
provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three, otherwise
known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any
 time after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of violating the provisions of the same
Act;

11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal
action which may be brought against him;

12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four
hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines,
or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;

13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to prevent them from
being attached or executed.

Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of
false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated
port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ...
unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises"
(Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287
US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).

In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the cause of
deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as follows:

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation is applicable
only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2,
7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses of
Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that to the contrary, deportation or exclusion
may be effected "at any time after entry."

Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:

Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a)
of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.

In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained entrance into the Philippines
fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her lawful husband. The
Court, however, held that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5 years had
elapsed from the date of her admission."

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and
misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration
authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner
was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a
follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal
entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her
deportation on September 27, 1990.

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien
and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a)
which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).

The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for
deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When
public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and
deportation as an overstaying alien.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE
PERMANENT.

The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent
resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.
 3. Divorce, Separation and Annulment

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances
handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify
the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the
CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then
on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry
after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the
same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the
Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen;
that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256
of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's
Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby
ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month
to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente
lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving
legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on
a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution,
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order
dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on
May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but
the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition
for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No.
01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the
Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil
Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's
capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree
was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that
her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and
having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b)
when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18,
1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case
No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soliprinciple, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under
G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A
QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN
RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS

ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY
VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON
THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a
Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of
the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle
of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8,
2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the
1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated
October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June
8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost
five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October
11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11,
1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for
this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January
22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the
Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an
official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after
then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation
or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that
no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days
later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it
was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her
Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At
the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason
of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN
OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married
and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the
19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized
and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement38executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly
affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And
neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true
with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely
constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and
Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we
stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil
Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their
citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consists onlyof the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M.
Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between
the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by
reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations
in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause
of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
 respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She
would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente
owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the
CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and
June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Succession and Administration of Estates

ii. Adoption
Family Code, Arts. 184 and 187

1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption

R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998), as amended R.A. 8043 Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995), as amended, Rule on Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC)

G.R. No. L-21951 November 27, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE MINOR CHARLES JOSEPH BLANCAFLOR WEEKS. UGGI
LINDAMAND THERKELSEN and ERLINDA G. BLANCAFLOR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.

Campos, Mendoza & Hernandez for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General and J. Domingo de Leon for respondent-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This appeal was taken against a decision of the Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in its special
Proceedings, No. D-00007, denying appellants' application for adoption of the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor
Weeks.

The factual background of the case is stated in the decision appealed from to be as follows:

In this adoption proceeding, the petitioners are husband and wife who were married on June 2, 1962, or
barely a year ago. The minor sought to be adopted, born on February 16, 1960, is the natural child of
petitioner wife. His father was Charles Joseph Week, who abandoned mother and child after the latter's
birth. He is said to have gone back to the United States.

Except for the legal impediment hereinafter to be mentioned, the facts before the Court may warrant the
approval of the adoption sought herein. Petitioner husband is a Danish subject, who has been granted
permanent residence in the Philippines (Exhs. "D" and "E"). A former employee of Scandinavian Airlines
System, he is now Manager of M. Y. Travel International Hongkong Ltd., with a monthly salary of P1,200.00.
plus allowances. It does not appear that either petitioner has been convicted of a crime involving moral
 turpitude. On the other hand, the minor sought to be adopted has been living with them ever since the
marriage of petitioners. Petitioner husband has treated the minor as his son, and the latter calls him
"Daddy." Although the possibility exists that petitioners may yet have their own children, the adoption at this
time, before any such children are begotten, may strengthen, rather than disrupt, future domestic relations.

The court a quo denied the adoption sought, saying:

In Sp. Proc. No. D-00011, adoption of Benigno Lim, this Court has had occasion to rule that a Filipino cannot
adopt an alien (Chinese) minor about 19 years old. The adoption would not confer Philippine citizenship on
the Chinese, but could definitely legalize his stay in this country. It was also stated that conversely, an alien
cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of the alien's country. As
petitioner husband in this case is a Danish subject, it has to be held that he cannot legally adopt the minor
Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this country, following that of his natural mother.

If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely because the same would not result in the
loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if pursued to
its logical consequences, the judgment appealed from would operate to impose a further prerequisite on adoptions
by aliens beyond those required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the present Civil Code in
force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either(a) non-residents or (b) who are
residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these
two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under our law. Petitioners
admittedly do not fall in either class.

The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for the approval of the adoption that the
process should result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This
finds no support in the law, for, as observed by this Court in Ching Leng vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated
on 27 October 1958, the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which
it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to determine
how or when citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order
to forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws does not warrant, denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by
qualified alien adopting parents, since it is not shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the court a quo is directed to allow the
adoption sought. Without costs.

Paternity, Support and Parental Obligations Family Code, Arts 163, 164, 165

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

d. Wills,
i. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity of Wills

Civil Code, Arts. 16, 17, 815-819 and 1039

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish
laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection
with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides
the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.
Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 359 (1968) supra

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
1

Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as
2

co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957. 3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
7

was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo
Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
blank.9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s
salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
13

marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union
15

produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed
of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament." 17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix
of his estate.
18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. 20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate
22

in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". 26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is
also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free
portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such
let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory
of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges
on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and
to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED." 27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him. Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
29

illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.30

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared
as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED." 32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit.
34

Hence, this petition. 35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, the issue is simple. Who are
36

entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. 38
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
1ªwph!1

possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It
can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no
39

showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul
and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
40

only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no
41

longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
42

Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce
43

obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
(underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law. 45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of
the Rules of Court.

[ G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020 ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF LUZ GASPE LIPSON AND ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY,

ROEL P. GASPI, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE MARIA CLARISSA L. PACIS-TRINIDAD, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, IRIGA CITY,* RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The nationality principle is not applied when determining the extrinsic validity of an alien's last will and testament.
When it comes to the probate of an alien's will, whether executed here or abroad, the alien's national law may be
pleaded and proved before the probate court. Otherwise, Philippine law will govern by default.

This Court resolves a Petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 6,
20162 and November 16, 20163 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, which motu
proprio dismissed a petition for probate and issuance of letters testamentary.

On February 23, 2011, Luz Gaspe Lipson (Lipson), an American citizen temporarily residing in Iriga City, executed
her last will and testament and designated Roel R Gaspi (Gaspi) as executor.4

On October 17, 2015, at 70 years old, Lipson passed away due to lymphoma.5

On October 3, 2016, Gaspi filed a Petition6 for the probate of Lipson's will and the issuance of letters testamentary
without bond in his behalf.

On October 6, 2016, the Regional Trial Court7 motu proprio dismissed the petition for probate for lack of jurisdiction.

The Regional Trial Court pointed out that Lipson was an American citizen. Thus, her national law must govern and
her will must be probated in the United States of America, and not in the Philippines.8

The Regional Trial Court continued that it is only when Lipson's will is probated, according to her national law, that
the Philippines may recognize and execute her will through a petition for recognition of foreign judgment.9

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Order read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is motu proprio DISMISSED, without prejudice, for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of herein Court.

SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis in the original)

Gaspi moved for reconsideration11 of the Regional Trial Court Order, but his motion was denied on November 16,
2016.12

In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court stated that the ruling in Palaganas v.
Palaganas13 was not applicable to Gaspi's petition. It continued that the jurisprudence cited in Palaganas involved
the probate in the Philippines of an alien's will, which was executed abroad, while Lipson's will was executed in the
Philippines.14

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Order reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.15

In the Petition16 for review on certiorari, petitioner Gaspi contends that there is no prohibition under Philippine law
for the probate of wills executed by aliens. He adds that under the Civil Code, the will of an alien residing abroad is
also recognized in the Philippines, if it is made in accordance with the laws of the alien's place of residence or
country, or if done in conformity with Philippine laws.17

Citing the ruling in Palaganas, petitioner pointed out that this Court has allowed the probate of a will executed by an
alien abroad, even though it has not yet undergone probate in the alien decedent's country of citizenship or
residence. Thus, he stresses that with more reason should an alien's will executed in the Philippines, in conformity
with our law, be allowed to undergo probate.18

This Court then directed19 respondent to comment on the petition.

In her Comment,20 respondent stresses that the petition for probate was properly dismissed due to lack of
jurisdiction.21 She points out petitioner's admission that the decedent was an American citizen, yet Lipson's will was
executed in accordance with Philippine laws, contrary to the nationality principle.22 Respondent states:

Logic and reason dictate that this Court a quo cannot establish the extrinsic validity of a will in a testamentary
succession of a foreigner, which must be based on his national law and executed in accordance with the formalities
of the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject. In view thereof, clearly herein Court a quo cannot take
cognizance of the petition.23 (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent likewise posits that petitioner's reliance on the ruling in Palaganas was misplaced, as it involved the
probate of a will executed by an alien abroad, while in this case, the will was executed in the Philippines by an
alien 24 She opines that instead of Article 816 of the Civil Code, upon which Palaganas was based, the applicable
provision was Article 817.25

In his Reply,26 petitioner explains that the nationality principle adverted to by respondent in Article 16 of the Civil
Code not only pertains to the decedent's internal law, but also to conflict of laws.27

Petitioner also states that there was no basis for respondent's statement that the probate of an alien's will in the
Philippines was conditioned on its prior probate and acceptance in the alien's country of nationality or residence.28

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the competence to take
cognizance of an alien's will executed in the Philippines, even if it had not yet been probated before the alien
decedent's national court.

Generally, a person's death passes ownership over their properties to the heirs.29 When there is no will, or when
there is one—but does not pass probate, the law provides for the order of succession and the amount of
successional rights for each heir.30 When real properties are involved, law will also govern the formalities and
consequences in the transfer of properties.

However, prior to death, a person retains control as to how their estate will be distributed. This is done by executing
a written31 document referred to as a will.32

Wills may be notarial33 or holographic.34 In either case, the formalities required for their execution is more
elaborate than most deeds relating to other transfers of property.

Death makes it impossible for the decedent to testify as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, which
contains their testamentary desires. The proof of the formalities substitutes as the legal guarantee to ensure that the
document purporting to be a will is indeed authentic, and that it was duly executed by the decedent.

A will is then submitted to the Regional Trial Court for probate proceeding to determine its authenticity, as "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court."35 Heirs of Las am v. Umengan36 describes the probate proceeding:

To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that
the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it
is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was
of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the will." Moreover, the presentation of the
will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.37 (Citation omitted)

The probate court can then disallow a will under any of the following circumstances enumerated by the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or
of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will
at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

The disallowance list is likewise echoed in the Rule 76, Section 9 of the Rules of Special Proceedings:

SECTION 9. Grounds for disallowing will. — The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
 (a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its
execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary,
or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

Thus, the extrinsic validity of the will refers to a finding by a trial court that all the formalities of either a holographic
or notarial will have been sufficiently complied with, leading to the legal conclusion that the will submitted to probate
is authentic and duly executed. Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals38 elaborates:

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, particularly on three aspects:

 whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
 compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
 the testamentary capacity of the testator;
 and the due execution of the last will and testament.39 (Citations omitted)

The extrinsic validity of a will, that is, that the document purporting to be a will is determined to be authentic and duly
executed by the decedent, is different from its intrinsic validity.

The intrinsic validity of the will "or the manner in which the properties were apportioned,"40 refers to whether the
order and allocation of successional rights are in accordance with law. It can also refer to whether an heir has not
been disqualified from inheriting from the decedent.

Generally, the extrinsic validity of the will, which is the preliminary issue in probate of wills, is governed by the law of
the country where the will was executed and presented for probate.41 Understandably, the court where a will is
presented for probate should, by default, apply only the law of the forum, as we do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws.42

This is the situation here. A Filipina who was subsequently naturalized as an American executed a will in the
Philippines to pass real property found in the country. The designated executor now files a petition for probate in the
Philippines.

Respondent motu proprio dismissed the petition for probate, because it purportedly went against the nationality
principle embodied in Article 16 of the Civil Code by not adhering to the required probate proceedings of Lipson's
national law.43

Respondent is mistaken.

The nationality principle is embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The second paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil Code then provides that the national law of aliens shall regulate their
personal rights:

ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found.

Under the nationality principle, Philippine laws continue to apply to Filipino citizens when it comes to their "family
rights and duties... status, condition and legal capacity" even if they do not reside in the Philippines. In the same
manner, the Philippines respects the national personal laws of aliens and defers to them when it comes to
succession issues and "the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions."

However, the probate of a will only involves its extrinsic validity and does not delve into its intrinsic validity, unless
there are exceptional circumstances which would require the probate court to touch upon the intrinsic validity of the
will.44

When it comes to the form and solemnities of wills, which are part of its extrinsic validity, the Civil Code provides
that the law of the country of execution shall govern:
ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even if we assume that the foreign law applies, it does not necessarily mean that the Philippine court loses
jurisdiction. Foreign law, when relevant, must still be proven as a fact by evidence, as Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws.45

Courts, therefore, retain jurisdiction over the subject matter (probate) and the res, which is the real property in Iriga
in this case.

Moreso, there was no objection with respect to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

II

It was error on respondent's part to conclude that Philippine law cannot be applied to determine the extrinsic validity
of Lipson's will.

Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code provide for the probate of an alien's will. Article 816 reads:

ARTICLE 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Article 816 covers a situation where the decedent was abroad when the will was executed. It provides that the will
can be submitted for probate here in the Philippines, using either the law where the decedent resides or our own
law. Article 816 of the Civil Code clearly made our own law applicable, as seen with the phrase "in conformity with
those which this Code provides."

On the other hand, Article 817 states:

ARTICLE 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by
the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.

Article 817 provides that a will by an alien executed in the Philippines shall be treated as if it were executed
according to Philippine laws, if it was validly executed and accordingly could have been probated under the laws of
the alien's country of nationality.

Further, Article 817 does not exclude the participation of Philippine courts in the probate of an alien's will, especially
when the will passes real property in the Philippines. It provides an option to the heirs or the executor: to use
Philippine law, or plead and prove foreign law. Thus, it does not remove jurisdiction from the Philippine court.

This option is clear from the clause "which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country," which
implies that either the alien's national law or Philippine law applies in the probate proceedings. Additionally, the
clause "shall have the same effect as if executed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines" creates a fiction
that foreign law if proven will have the same effect as Philippine law.

Clearly, as to the extrinsic validity of an alien's will, Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code both allow the application
of Philippine law.

The power of our courts to probate a will executed by an alien is likewise apparent in Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules
of Special Proceedings, which provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, their will may be
proved in the Regional Trial Court of any province in which they had an estate:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

In Palaganas, this Court ruled that the trial court properly allowed the probate of an American citizen's will, which
had not yet undergone probate in the alien decedent's country of nationality:
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet
been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in
the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a)
the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devises of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom
letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of
it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of
its execution.46 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

If an alien-decedent duly executes a will in accordance with the forms and solemnities required by Philippine law,
barring any other defect as to the extrinsic validity of the will, the courts may take cognizance of the petition and
allow the probate of the will.

Wills of foreigners executed in the Philippines may be probated if they have estate in the Philippines, because
probate of the properties can only be effected under Philippine law. In Johannes v. Harvey,47 this Court held:

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning
property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That
which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration
does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is
proper, wherever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered
in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his
heirs....48 (Citations omitted)

Here, Lipson's will was executed in Iriga City, Philippines, where she had real property. Thus, Philippine law on the
formalities of wills applies. Assuming that Lipson executed the will in accordance with Philippine law, the Regional
Trial Court did not lack jurisdiction over the petition.

As respondent has yet to rule on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is proper that the petition be remanded to
determine due compliance with the formalities prescribed by law, Lipson's testamentary capacity and voluntary
execution of the will, and whether it was truly Lipson's last will and testament.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 6, 2016 and November 6, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-2919 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

ii. Interpretation of Wills

iii. Revocation

Civil Code, Art. 829

iv. Probate
v. Administration of Estates
vi. Trusts

e. Property
Civil Code, Art. 16

Capacity to Transfer or Acquire Property

G.R. No. L-29663 August 20, 1990

GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO assisted by husband Napoleon Barba, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
CO LIONG CHONG alias JUAN MOLINA, defendant-appellee.

Delfin de Vera for plaintiffs-appellants.

Antonio G. Sosito for defendant-appellee.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal perfected before the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, from the decision * of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes in Civil Case No. 611, to
quiet title with damages, entitled Gregorio Llantino, et al. vs. Cong Liong Chong alias Juan Molina, dismissing the complaint and declaring that the contract of
lease entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant valid and in accordance with law.

The facts of the case as summarized by the trial court are as follows:

Plaintiffs (petitioners herein) aver that they are the owners of a commercial-residential land situated in the
municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, described in paragraph 2 of the complaint, which sometime in 1954 they leased
to the defendant (private respondent) who was then a Chinese national and went by the name of Co Liong Chong
for a period of thirteen (13) years for the sum of P6,150.00 for the whole period. The defendant was placed in
possession of the property but knowing that the period of the least would end with the year 1967, petitioners
requested private respondent for a conference but the latter did not honor the request and instead he informed the
petitioners that he had already constructed a commercial building on the land worth P50,000.00; that the lease
contract was for a period of sixty (60) years, counted from 1954; and that he is already a Filipino citizen. The claim
of Chong came as a surprise to the Llantinos because they did not remember having agreed to a sixty-year lease
agreement as that would virtually make Chong the owner of the realty which, as a Chinese national, he had no right
to own and neither could he have acquired such ownership after naturalization subsequent to 1954. On December
16, 1967, in order to avoid a court litigation the Llantinos once more invited Chong to a conference about the matter
but again Chong ignored the invitation. (Rollo, p. 48; Appellant's Brief, p. 12)

Hence, on January 10, 1968, the Llantinos filed their complaint to quiet title with damages before the Court of First
Instance of Catanduanes (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, pp. 1-4).

After Chong has filed an answer to the complaint and the Llantinos their reply, (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, pp.
9-10) the trial court set the case for pre-trial and trial for April 2, 1968 (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, pp. 10-11).

At the pre-trial, both parties agreed upon the identity of the land as described in the complaint. It was mutually
admitted that the defendants original name was Co Liong Chong who was then a Chinese national in 1954, when he
approached the plaintiffs and offered to lease the land in question. It was also admitted by the counsel for the
defendant that prior to the filing of the case, the plaintiffs have in fact invited the defendant to a conference about
the matter (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal; p. 14).

Chong's counsel produced the carbon original of the contract of lease entered into between Chong and the
Llantinos and the existence of the contract of lease as a public instrument was admitted (Rollo, p. 12; Record on
Appeal, pp. 14-15).

It was also admitted that Chong had in fact constructed a building of strong materials on the land worth P40,000.00
(Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, p. 15); that Chong has become a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1961 and that his
name is no longer Co Liong Chong but Juan Molina (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, p. 15).

On May 17, 1968, the trial court rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the contract of lease entered
into between the plaintiffs and the defendant on October 5, 1954, valid and in accordance with law
and the complaint is dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs.

The Court, however, feels that there is no sufficient ground to award moral damages or attorney's
fees as claimed by the defendant because the Court is fairly convinced that the institution of the suit
sprung from an honest conviction on the part of the plaintiffs that on account of the period fixed in
the contract of lease and the fact that the defendant was a Chinese national at the time of its
celebration constituted valid grounds for annulment.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, p. 24).

From this judgment, plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of law (Rollo, p. 12; Record on
Appeal, pp. 24-25).

The plaintiffs-appellants filed their brief on May 26, 1969 (Rollo, p. 48). The defendant-appellee filed his
corresponding brief on July 22, 1969 (Rollo, p. 59).

The appellants raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN THE
APPELLANTS AND THE DEFENDANTS ON OCTOBER 5, 1954 VALID.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE THAT CONTRACT NOT A LEASE.
Stripping the case of irrelevant allegations, the pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the contract of lease
entered into by and between the petitioners including Virgilio Llantino now deceased and private respondent on
October 5, 1954 for a period of sixty (60) years is valid.

Petitioners contend that when the contract which is sought to be declared void was entered into by and between the
parties, private respondent was still a Chinese national (Rollo, p. 48; Appellants' Brief, p. 2). However, petitioners
also stated that they do not dispute the right of private respondent to hold the landholding in dispute under a
contract of lease but they cannot fathom how Congress could have thought of a lease contract which shall be for an
indefinite period and yet say that the period to be valid should not exceed 99 years (Rollo, p. 48; Appellant's Brief, p.
4; Article 1643 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines).

On the other hand, private respondent argued that even though he was still an alien when he entered into the
contract of lease (on October 5, 1954), he was not prohibited by law to do so. In fact, prior to his becoming a
naturalized Filipino citizen in 1961, the appellants did not question his right to enter into that contract so that the
parties are in pari delicto. He constructed a building on the property worth P40,000.00 and prays that he be awarded
P30,000.00 for moral damages and P2,000.00 for Attorney's fees. (Rollo, p. 48; Appellant's Brief, p. 2).

The position of private respondent is well taken.

The lower court correctly ruled that the defendant-appellee Chong had at the time of the execution of the contract,
the right to hold by lease the property involved in the case although at the time of the execution of the contract, he
was still a Chinese national (Rollo, p. 59; Appellee's Brief, pp. 10-11).

In the present case, it has been established that there is only one contract and there is no option to buy the leased
property in favor of Chong. There is nothing in the record, either in the lease contract or in the complaint itself, to
indicate any scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition. On the contrary, the Llantinos themselves admit
openly that right from the start and before entering into the contract, Chong had merely asked them for a lease of
the premises to which they agreed. Admittedly under the terms of the contract there is nothing to prevent the
Llantinos from disposing of their title to the land to any qualified party but subject to the rights of the lessee Chong.
Neither is there under the terms of the said contract to indicate that the ownership of the Llantinos of the leased
premises has been virtually transferred to the lessee (Rollo, p. 59; Appellee's Brief, p. 14).

Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right
to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they
may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they
desire to remain here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire
(Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 [1967], citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461
[1947]).

The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid is, if there are circumstances attendant to its
execution, which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.

If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner
cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement
is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land
(jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) — rights, the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as
if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all
the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien (Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She,
21 SCRA 52 [1967]).

Coming back to the case at bar, even assuming, arguendo, that the subject contract is prohibited, the same can no
longer be questioned presently upon the acquisition by the private respondent of Filipino citizenship. It was held that
sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino citizen is valid (De Castro vs.
Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]).

A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and when there is nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained (Marimperio Compania
Naviera, S.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 358 [1987]).

The issue of the nature of the contract in the case at bar was never raised in the basic pleadings or in the pre-trial
(Rollo, p. 59-1; Appellee's Brief, p. 22).

It is too late to raise an issue on appeal in the Supreme Court when it has not been raised in the lower court
(Espadera vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 364 [1988]).

Moreover, contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not
be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment (Plastic Town Center Corporation vs. NLRC, 172 SCRA 580 [1989];
Herrera vs. Petrophil Corp., 146 SCRA 385 [1986]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.
 i. June 22, 2009
ii. Validity of Conveyances
iii. Exception to lex situs rule