Aristotle On The Uses of Dialectic

Aristotle on the Uses of Dialectic
Author(s): Robin Smith

Source: Synthese, Vol. 96, No. 3, Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle and Early Modern
Philosophy (Sep., 1993), pp. 335-358
Published by: Springer
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ROBIN SMITH
ARISTOTLE ON THE USES OF DIALECTIC
There is now wide acceptance of the following pair of views: (1) Aristot
elian dialectic was a technique of arguing from 'common beliefs', 'ac
cepted opinions', or 'reputable views'; and (2) Aristotle thought that
dialectic provided the way to the first principles of the sciences, or at
any rate of some of them.11 want to argue that each of these is at best
a half-truth. To begin with, although Aristotle does say that dialectical
arguments are from endoxa, emphasizing this feature as its defining
characteristic omits others that are equally important and so distorts
our conception of dialectic and its powers. Next, one of these distortions
is that if we do not take account of the full picture of dialectic and of
Aristotle's specific purposes in the Topics, we will not understand what
the endoxa are and why they are important to him. Finally, Topics 1.2,
the text in which Irwin and others see Aristotle's declaration that
dialectic 'has a road to the first principles of all disciplines', actually
makes no such claim. If my arguments are sound, then a good deal of
recent work on Aristotle at least needs reconsideration.
1 . THE RECEIVED VIEW OF DIALECTIC
I shall call the first of the views distinguished above, i.e. that Aristotel
ian dialectic is by definition 'argument from endoxa', the received view.
A proof text frequently appealed to in support of this is the definition
of 'dialectical deduction' (sullogismos dialektikos) in Topics 1.1:
A deduction is an argument in which, certain things having been conceded, something else
different from the things conceded of necessity follows through the things conceded.... a
dialectical deduction is one which deduces from endoxa. (100a25-30)
Strictly speaking, this does not say that dialectic is a matter of deduction
from endoxa, but only that a dialectical deduction has endoxa for its
premises. However, even though Topics 1.12 says that deduction is only
one of two types of dialectical arguments(the other is 'induction',
epag?g?), Aristotle has hardly anything to say about inductive argu
ments in discussing dialectic, and we are probably justified in taking an
Synthese 96: 335-358, 1993.
? 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

336 ROBIN SMITH
account of dialectical deductions as giving us all that is important about

dialectic. Now, the definition in Topics 1.1 defines 'dialectical deduction'
as one species of 'deduction', in parallel with 'demonstration', and the
differentiae of these two species are simply qualities of the premises:
a deduction is dialectical if its premises are endoxa, whereas it is a
demonstration if they are 'true and primary'. Similar accounts are found
in Sophistical Refutations 2, 165bl-^, and Prior Analytics 1.1, 24a22
25 (cf. also An. Post. 1.19, 81bl8-23). Other passages also testify to
an association of dialectical argument with endoxa. Thus, Sophistical
Refutations 34 says that it is the function of dialectic to deduce "about
whatever is proposed from the most endoxa things available" (183a37
39). Metaphysics B 1, 995b21-25, says that dialecticians study "the
same, the different, the like, the unlike, contrariety, and prior and
posterior" from endoxa (as opposed to studying these as a science
would do). Still other passages (e.g., An. Pr. 11.16, 65a35-37; Top.
1.14, 105b30-37, VIII. 13, 162b31-33) contrast dialectical arguments,
which are 'according to opinion' (kata doxan) with scientific or demon
strative ones, which are 'according to truth' (kaf aletheian).
It appears from these passages that what makes an argument dialect
ical (as opposed to demonstrative or sophistical) is simply the quality
of its premises, not its logical form. Whether an argument is a deduction
is simply a matter of whether its conclusion follows from its premises;
Aristotle does not suggest that different patterns of inference are appro
priate to dialectical argument and demonstration. This leads to what
we may call the traditional account2 of dialectic. On that view, there is
a single account of valid inference, contained in the Prior Analytics (to
wit, the syllogistic), that underlies both dialectical and demonstrative
arguments. In Prior Analytics 11.23, 68b8-14, Aristotle says this in
unmistakable terms (cf. also 1.1, 24a25-27; 1.30, 46a3-4; II.1, 52b38
53a3).3 If we accept this view and the definition of dialectic as 'argument
from endoxa', then an account of dialectic could add nothing to the
theory of inference itself; all that would be proper to it would be a
study of which premises are endoxa.
A difficulty for the traditional view is the apparent absence of the
syllogistic from the Topics. Instead, to many interpreters4 it has seemed
manifest that the Topics rests on some other, far less systematic account
of validity, perhaps one that appeals to features of logical form not even
acknowledged by the Prior Analytics. The sweeping generalizations of
the Prior Analytics about the universal applicability of the syllogistic

ARISTOTLE ON THE USES OF DIALECTIC 337
are often explained developmental^ by supposing that the Topics and

the Sophistical Refutations reflect an earlier stage of Aristotle's thought
than the Prior Analytics. On such a developmental hypothesis, an early
Aristotle at first thought of demonstration and dialectical argumentation
as two diverse activities, each with its own rules. It would not be
surprising, then, to find Aristotle recognizing different types of argu
ments as valid in each sphere. With a little development, this can lend
support to the received view: we need only suppose that Aristotle
thought the inferential forms of dialectic were the ones appropriate for
establishing the principles of demonstration.
In fact, Aristotle says a great deal more about dialectical argument
and its relationship to demonstration than is contained in the opening
sections of the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations, and the Prior Ana
lytics. If we take all this evidence fairly into account, we will find that
Aristotle places at least as much stress on two other features of dialectic
as he does on argument from endoxa: dialectical arguments proceed by
question and answer, and dialectic is of unrestricted generality.
2. A SURVEY OF ARISTOTELIAN REMARKS ABOUT DIALECTIC
Even confine our attention

if we to explicit definitions of 'dialectical
deduction', we find that Aristotle emphasizes another feature of their
premises at least as much as being endoxa: dialectical premises are
questions, whereas demonstrative premises are assertions. Thus, Prior
Analytics LI, which gives an almost exact parallel to Topics 24bl8-20,
precedes it with the statement that a dialectical premise is "the asking
of a contradiction" (er?t?sis antiphaseos, 24a24-25), contrasting it with
a demonstrative premises, which is a "taking of one or the other part
of a contradiction". A few lines later, after explaining that both dialect
ical and demonstrative premises are types of 'deductive' or 'syllogistic'
premise, he says that a dialectical premise is
the posing of a contradiction as a question (for someone getting answers), or the taking
of something apparent and endoxos (for someone deducing), as was explained in the
Topics. (24M0-12)
Here, the fact that dialectical premises are endoxa is almost an after
thought, with greater stress on the fact that they are questions.5 Other
passages repeat this (Top. 104a8-9; SE 171a38-b2, 172al5-20; An.
Post. 77a32-35). On Interpretation 11 says that a 'dialectical question'

338 ROBIN SMITH
(er?t?sis dialekt?k?) is "a request for an answer, either of the premise

or of the other part of the contradiction" (20b22-23). Here, 'premise'
(protasis) has its root sense of 'what is put forward' (for acceptance or
rejection).6
Closely related to this point is another: dialectic 'deduces opposites',
that is, is equally capable of constructing arguments for a given con
clusion and for its negation, something which no science can do. Thus,
Aristotle tells us in the Sophistical Refutations:
None of the arts which proves some nature is interrogative, for a deduction does not
come about from both [alternatives]. But dialectic is interrogative; yet if it did prove,
then it would not make questions of its first things and proper principles, at any rate,
even if it did [make of something. (172al5-20)
questions]
Similarly, Posterior Analytics 1.11 says:
Dialectic is not in this way about some definite things or some single genus. For
[otherwise] it would not ask questions: it is not for the one who demonstrates to ask
questions, because it is not possible to prove the same things when opposites are the
case. (77a31-35)
(See also Rhet. LI, 1355a33-35; SE 10, 171a38-b2.)

Since Aristotle so regularly contrasts dialectic, which asks questions,
with demonstration, which does not, we may conjecture that the prov
ince of dialectic is generally that of argument with others, through
question and answer. This is confirmed in Topics VIII. 1: although a
dialectician and a philosopher might go about finding their premises in
the same way,
actually arranging them and putting them into questions is proper to the dialectician, for
everything of that sort is directed at someone else. (155b9-10)
Dialectic, then, is strongly associated with interrogation.

Some of
the passages just discussed exhibit still another feature of
dialectic, of great importance for Aristotle: dialectic is completely gen
eral in application. Unlike the various sciences, dialectic does not estab
lish truths about any subject matter from principles appropriate to it.
Instead, it is totally general in application but unable actually to prove
anything. Thus, according to Rhetoric 1.1, rhetoric is a 'counterpart' of
dialectic because "both arts are about certain sorts of things which are,
in a way, common for all to know, not for any separate science"
(1354al-3); rhetoric and dialectic are "not about any separate genus"
(1355b8-9). Similarly, Sophistical Refutations 9 notes that no single art

or science could study all possible refutations, since that would require
the infinite project of knowing everything; dialectic instead studies
refutations "from the common things which do not fall under any
[special] art" (170a20-36).
The unlimited generality of dialectic and its lack of a subject matter
are especially prominent in the discussions of the nature of dialectic in
Sophistical Refutations 11 and Rhetoric 1.1-2. At Sophistical Refutations
11, we read that "everyone, even ordinary people, makes use of dialec
tic, or a
the art of testing, in way; for everyone tries, up to a point, to
judge people's claims" (171b30-32). A similar declaration opens the
Rhetoric (1354al-3, quoted above). Elsewhere, Aristotle puts the point
more directly:
[T]he dialectician is not concerned with any genus, nor does he give proofs about
anything, nor is he a sort of universal man. For neither are all things in some single
genus, nor, if they were, would it be possible for the things that exist to be under the
same principles. (SE 172al3-15)
(See also An. Post. 1.11, 77a31-32; Rhet. 1.2, 1356a32-33.)

The 'common things' mentioned here are the basis for dialectic's
generality. Demonstrations in any special science must proceed from
the principles or starting points (archai) 'appropriate' (oikeiai) or 'pecu
liar' (idiai) to that science (cf. An. Post. 75b37-76a3); dialectic, by
contrast, makes use of 'common principles' that apply equally well to
all sciences but actually belong to none (SE 170a36-39; Rhet. 1358al0
21). The universality of dialectic prevents it from being a science, for
there is no genus into which all things fall and no principles to serve
as its principles (SE 172all-15, 172a36-bl; cf. Rhet. 1356a30-33). In
a particularly striking passage in Rhetoric 1.2 (1358al-35), Aristotle
explains that enthymemes, like deductions, may be divided into those
which belong to some one of the special sciences and those which
belong to dialectic and rhetoric. The latter are "those which are com
mon concerning forensics, natural science, politics, and many things
differing in kind" (1358al2-14), i.e., those proper to one genus in
particular.
Despite Aristotle's frequent mention of these other characteristics of
dialectic, it might still be maintained that 'argument from endoxa' is
the essential characteristic of dialectic. It may be urged, first, that
endoxa are given special prominence at the beginning of the Topics,
Aristotle's treatise on dialectic; second, that Aristotle appeals to this

340 ROBIN SMITH
feature as the specific difference between dialectical and demonstrative

arguments. Accordingly, we should not dismiss at once the notion that,
after all, 'argument from endoxa' might capture the essence of dialectic,
with the other features merely consequential upon this or accidental.
Now, I shall argue below that it is Aristotle's intention to give special
prominence to endoxa in the Topics. However, this is not because he
regards 'argument from endoxa' as the essential defining characteristic
of dialectic. Instead, his purpose is to advance a particular view of the
art of dialectic. The goal of the Topics is to present a dialectical method:
a set of procedures that will lead to success in dialectical If
exchanges.
we are to understand what the Topics offers us, we must first give some
thought to the function of a definition of a practice in such an art.
3. THE PRACTICE OF DIALECTIC
Aristotle wrote for his society, not for ours. As a result, he sometimes
takes it for granted that his audience is familiar with many things that
are not familiar to us. Sometimes, his definitions reflect this. Take, for
instance, his definition of 'tragedy' in Poetics 6, 1449b24-28. There is
indeed an indication in this that a tragedy is a kind of play (dr?nt?n
kai ou di' apangellias), provided we have correctly understood the
earlier distinction of a type of imitation in which the imitators behave
as if actually performing the actions represented (1448a23-24). But
someone who had never seen a tragedy, never encountered any sort of
dramatic - in a no a play
representations who, word, had idea what
was - could very well fail to understand this. Exactly this, of course,
happened to the medieval Islamic commentators of the Poetics. Now,
our condition, when it comes to understanding Aristotle's remarks on
dialectic, is not quite so desperate as that of Avicenna and Averroes
reading the Poetics. We can, I believe, get a reasonably good picture
of the practice that lies behind the Topics. However, we cannot do this
if we try to interpret Aristotle's words in Topics 1.1 as a self-sufficient
definition intended to enable us to recognize dialectical exchanges if
we happened to see them for the first time. That is simply not their
purpose, any more than it isAristotle's purpose in the Poetics to enable
barbarians from later centuries to get an accurate picture of what went
on in front of the audience of an Athenian tragedy. Instead, his purpose
is to provide an insightful account into the nature and function of the
dramatic spectacles he and his audience knew very well by acquaint

ance. Much the same could be said of his definition of 'rhetoric' as "the
art of perceiving the available means of persuasion about anything"
(Rhet. 1.2,1355b25-26). Unless we are similarly clear about the purpose
of his accounts of dialectic, we cannot possibly evaluate them. What,
then, was the dialectical practice behind the definition?
One source of evidence concerning a kind of dialectical practice is
Topics VIII, which contains a collection of rules7 for a type of exchange
between an answerer, who undertakes to defend a thesis, and a ques
tioner, who undertakes to refute the answerer. In these exchanges,
questioners could only ask questions that admit of yes or no answers,
and (apart from voicing certain complaints) answerers could only ans
wer yes or no. Now, it ismanifest that this practice is not perspicuously
defined as 'argument from endoxa'. However, it is also unclear what
the relationship of this practice is to the rest of Aristotle's philosophical
works. Interpreters often make a distinction between these dialectical
exchanges and some broader, or at any rate different, type of dialectical
activity. A natural way to do this is to suppose that the stylized ex
changes of Book VIII served as a kind of training to produce skill in
dialectic in a broader sense. This is reinforced by Aristotle's frequent
references in the Topics to 'practice' or 'exercise' (gumnastike). But if
that is correct, then what exactly could that broader notion of dialectic
have been?
The verb dialegesthai itself would lead us to suppose that dialectic
has something to do with argument or disputation. Long before Plato
and Aristotle, this term applied to the practice of maintaining a position
in dispute with others, or attacking the views of another. An association
between dialegesthai and dialectic persists in Aristotle: frequently in
the Topics, he uses it of drawing a conclusion in a dialectical argument.8
We should therefore expect dialectic to concern a disputative practice,
one that requires at least two opposed participants, only one of whom
can prevail. There is an obvious historical precedent for such a practice
that harmonizes well with the results surveyed above. Aristotle tells us
that dialectical arguments proceed through question and answer; that
they aim at the refutation of the answerer; that they can be about
anything; that they do not rely on knowledge of any particular subject
matter; and that they rest on opinions or endoxa. If for the moment
we set aside9 the last point, this is not a bad description of Socratic
refutation, as represented by Plato. Socrates, who claims not to know
anything, elicits answers from people about all sorts of subjects, eventu

342 ROBIN SMITH
ally leading them to contradict themselves, or at least to conclusions

that they want to reject (cf. SE 34, 183b6-8). We might generalize
further. If it is characteristic of dialectical arguments to be directed at
others, then it may also be that whatever in argument is directed at
others falls under the province of dialectic, at least to the extent that
it relies on an opponent's own views. In its most general form, then,
any argument directed at another person through question and answer
could be characterized as dialectical.
This gives us a picture of dialectical argument as a relatively neutral,
descriptive level, rather like saying that a play is an event in which
people mimic the actions and words of various characters before an
audience that takes them to be doing just that. Such a description says
nothing about why people would engage in such a practice. Likewise,
we have not yet considered why anyone would engage in dialectical
argument. We might have any number of larger purposes for doing so.
One would be to persuade others to beliefs we wish them to have, as
might happen in any sort of deliberative meeting (as well as many other
contexts). Then again, we might wish to defeat someone in argument
just for the glory of winning. Or, like Socrates, we might do it to benefit
our adversary through the purgation of false conceits to knowledge.
Or, perhaps, we might do it as part of some search for the truth. Any
of these goals would be a credible purpose to motivate engaging in
dialectic. But whatever the broader purpose, any dialectical exchange
will also have a certain narrower, proximate goal: forcing one's oppon
ent to accept a conclusion. Of course, since this is an adversarial ex
change, it would be reasonable to add: or keeping someone else from
forcing a conclusion on us. In brief, the goal will always be winning,
or at any rate not losing.
In this respect,dialectic can be compared to fencing. In bygone days,
people engaged in swordplay for any number of reasons: to avenge
outraged honor, to destroy an enemy, to murder an innocent, to humili
ate an adversary, to defend the motherland, to gain glory as a great
swordsman, to feel the thrill of victory, or simply to practice. In any
instance, however, winning (or at least not losing) is the immediate
point. We can pursue this parallel with fencing a bit further by separat
ing sport fencing from real (i.e., potentially deadly) fencing. Histori
cally, the former developed as a kind of practice to improve skill in the
latter, but soon enough sport fencing acquired its own characteristic
features, such as judges to determine who wins, conventions about what
counts as winning, rules about fair and foul play. Sport fencing then

took on a life of its own, so that it became possible to engage in sport

fencing just for the sake of winning at sport fencing, and even to
practice in order to get better at the sport. (This of course is the usual
circumstance today.)
It seems likely enough that some roughly similar story is true of
dialectic in ancient Greece. Plato thought that dialectical argument,
which Socrates and others had practiced before him, was a critical
activity for philosophy and philosophical education (see Rep. VII).
Accordingly, he fostered or encouraged some sort of sport form of it
among the members of the Academy. It is plausible enough that the
rules of Topics VIII are intended to apply to such a venue (if only
because it is so hard to imagine what else they might apply to). I
will use the term 'Lesser Dialectic' for the stylized type of exchange
presupposed by Topics VIII, reserving the term 'Greater Dialectic' for
the generalized practice of argument through question and answer,
directed at another person.
Now, there is such a thing as skill at fencing. Such a skill may be
developed through trial and error and long experience, or it may be
that some people just show a knack for doing it spontaneously. But if
it is possible to do itwell, then itmust also be possible to devise a system
of rules that one can learn and thereby become a skillful fencer.10 That
is, there could be an art of fencing. Many treatises have been written
expounding such arts. The propounder of such an art might have oc
casion to say what fencing is, but the purpose of such a definition is
not likely to be informing the ignorant as to what fencing is: those so
ignorant will hardly be interested in an art of fencing in the first place.
More likely, the point will be to give an understanding of the nature
of fencing that will lead to success.
This, I think is the proper model for Aristotle's Topics: it offers us
an art of dialectic. This art is a systematic means of bringing about
success, or as much success as circumstances allow, in dialectical en
counters.I shall try to establish that this is the real reason for Aristotle's
emphasis on endoxa at the beginning of the Topics. In a few words, he
believes that an ability to find the right endoxa from which to argue to
a given conclusion is the key to dialectical skill.
4. WHAT IS IT TO BE ENDOXOnI
Recent interpreters have generally supposed that the endoxa are a

single collection of premises that may be used in constructing dialectical

344 ROBIN SMITH
arguments. It then becomes somewhat mysterious both what these

endoxa are and why Aristotle should single out arguments from them
for special attention. Attempts to explain this mystery have led to
various accounts, some quite elaborate, of the endoxa as sources of
knowledge, and to elaborate hypotheses about concomitant epistemo
logical views presupposed by these accounts.11 If, on the other hand,
we take the Topics to be advancing an art of dialectic, there is a much
easier interpretation. Dialectic proceeds by asking questions, and so
must rest on another person's answers. Supposing that people generally
answer in accordance with what they think, an art of dialectic should
teach us how to find premises from which a desired conclusion would
follow and which our respondent believes. This is exactly what Aristotle
proposes to give us at the beginning of the Topics:
The goal of our treatise is to find a methodos by means of which we will be able to
construct deductions from endoxa about any problem that is proposed and, when we
submit to argument ourselves, will not say anything of the contrary sort. (100al8-21)
Although Irwin takes this passage to say that dialectic is "a method of
arguing from common beliefs" (1988, p. 36), what Aristotle actually
says is that it is his goal in the treatise (i.e., in the Topics) to find a
'method' that will give us the ability to argue from endoxa. He is hardly
claiming that it is his goal to 'discover' dialectic. At the end of the
treatise,12 he says in retrospect that he has achieved just this goal:
Our intention, then, was to find a certain power of deducing about a problem from the
most endoxa premises available (for this is the task of dialectic in itself and of peirastic).
(183a37-bl)
Here, it is quite explicit that his object was to find a certain ability
(dunamis). The methodos, then, is that which confers on us a certain
power of deducing, exactly the sort of thing an 'art' of dialectic should
supply.
If dialectic is a matter of argument from the opinions of others, then
it would seem that an art of dialectic teach, among other things,
should
the opinions of others. But that would be totally impractical, given the
unpredictable and limitless diversity in people's opinions. However,
there could indeed be a systematic study of what different kinds of
person believe, and this could form the basis of a dialectical art. In
fact, Aristotle says precisely this: according to Sophistical Refutations
9, dialectic studies

what appears so, not to just anyone, but to people of this or that sort (for it would be
an infinite task if someone were to examine the reasons why things appear so to people
at random).13 (170b6-8)
The same sentiment is expressed more fully in Rhetoric 1.2. Developing

his parallel between rhetoric and dialectic, Aristotle says:
Since what is persuasive is persuasive to someone (and one sort exists that is at once
and convincing through itself, while another seems so because of being proved
persuasive
through things of that sort) but no art studies the individual (e.g. medicine does not
study what is healthy for Socrates or for Callias, but rather what is healthy for this sort
of person, or these sorts: for this is a matter of art [entechnon], but the individual is
unlimited and not knowable), neither will rhetoric study what is individually endoxon [to
katK hekaston endoxon], e.g. to Socrates or to Hippias, but what is endoxon to people
of this sort, just like dialectic. (1356b28-35)
The comparison to medicine presents a familiar Aristotelian view: art

and science deal with universals, not individuals. Just as the physician's
art understands what is healthy for a given type of person, and only
incidentally what is healthy for Socrates, so the dialectician knows what
is persuasive or endoxon to this or that type of person.
Note also that Aristotle uses 'persuasive' (pithanon) and endoxon
as equivalent here. Since he begins the passage by pointing out that
'persuasive' is a relative term, we may suppose that the same is true of
endoxon. Further confirmation of this can be found in Topics 1.10,
where Aristotle defines a 'dialectical premise' as
a question which is endoxos either to everyone, or to the majority, or to the wise (and
either to all of them, or to the majority, or to the best-known, so long as it is not
paradoxical). (104a8-ll)
Compare this now with the passage from 1.1 that is commonly taken
as a definition of endoxa:
Those things are endoxa which seem so to everyone, or to the majority, or to the wise
(and either to all of them, or to the majority, or to the most familiar and famous14).
(100b21-23)
The linguistic parallels of the two are extremely close: 100b21-23 is

simply 104a8-ll with dokoun ('what seems so') in place of endoxon.
Now if, with the received view, we take this to be explaining the
meaning of endoxos from scratch, as it were, then the class of endoxa
will be a very strange one: it includes everything believed by everyone,
and everything believed by the majority of people, and everything
believed by all the 'wise', and everything believed by the majority of

346 ROBIN SMITH
the wise, and everything believed by the 'most famous' among the wise.
If the endoxa are to serve as some kind of starting points for establishing
theses, then it is puzzling why we should want to make use of such a
jumble. But now that we have set these remarks in context, it seems
more likely that Aristotle is not really defining endoxos at all but
instead just clarifying what varieties of endoxa there are: one kind is the
opinions of everyone, one kind the opinions of the majority of people,
one kind the opinions of the wise, etc. Collecting these various groups
of endoxa would be useful to a dialectician who needed to put forward
premises likely to be accepted by various respondents.
It is therefore not surprising that Aristotle enumerates 'getting prem
ises' (to protaseis labein) as one of the four 'tools' needed for dialectical
skill (Top. 1.13). According to Topics 1.14, 'getting' or 'selecting' (ekleg
ein) premises includes making lists of various opinions, divided up
exactly according to the kinds indicated:
Premises should be selected in the same number of ways as defined in connection with
'premise', noting the opinions either of all, or of the majority, or of the wise, and among
those all, or most, or the best known. (105a34-37)
The purpose of this entire procedure is to have premises that our

opponents in argument will concede. Thus, we should also include
generalizations that hold for most cases, "for people who do not per
ceive what they fail to hold about will concede them" (105bll-12),
and we should take note of which opinions were held by well-known
individuals, because "someone might concede what was said by a fam
ous person" (105bl7-18).
In fact, a number of parallels between Topics 1.10 and 1.14 show that
the various kinds of endoxa are categories of classification for selecting
premises. Note, first, that 1.10 adds another clause in the list of endoxa:
It is clear that such premises as are in accordance with arts are also dialectical: for
someone might concede what those who have investigated these things think (ta dokounta
tois huper tout?n epeskemmenois). (104a33-35)
Similarly, 1.14 adds "whatever opinions are in accordance with arts"

to its list of kinds of premises to select (105bl). Moreover, 104a8-ll
adds a qualification to the inclusion of the opinions of the wise:
[S]o long as it is not paradoxical (for someone might concede what the wise think, if it
is not contrary to the opinion of most people). (104all-12)
Here we find an explanation offered for the inclusion of categories

listed in 1.1. The opinions of the wise count as endoxa because, so long
as they are not your opponent in argument is liable to
paradoxical,15
be inclined to accept something with the support of a well-known
authority.16
5. ENDOXA AND THE ART OF DIALECTIC
Aristotle's endoxa are then just various opinions: 'things that people
think'. Such a collection, indexed according to the type of believer,
would clearly be of use in dialectic, on the assumption that the goal of
dialectic is arguing with people on the basis of their own beliefs. How
ever, that is not what Aristotle gives us in the Topics. He does tell us
what sorts of things to include in these collections, but there is nothing
at all resembling a compilation of views: we are instructed to make
those for ourselves. What, then, does the Topics offer us by way of a
dialectical methodos?
There is a valuable clue in 1.14: having collected the opinions of
various sorts of people, we then organize them according to a different
system of classification:
We should construct tables, setting them down separately about each genus, for example
about good or about animal, and about every good, beginning with what it is. (105b 12
15)
These 'tables',17 then, classify the various endoxa, not according to the
type of believer who accepts them, but according to subject matter.
Aristotle's description is brief, but I think we can see in it the indications
of a hierarchical classification. We start with very large subjects, such
as 'good' and 'animal'; then, we move to subdivisions of these, for
instance, the various goods ('every good'). Within each classification,
we start with a definition of the subject ('beginning with what it is')
and then move to further details.18 This provides exactly what is needed
for an art of dialectic. If I want to deduce a certain conclusion from
premises conceded by a certain opponent, then I must find premises
meeting two requirements: (1) the desired conclusion follows from
them, and (2) the opponent in question accepts them. Classifying opin
ions according to type of believer facilitates (2), while classifying them
according to subject matter is useful for (1). A cross-classification com
bining the two gives just what I need: premises about a given subject

348 ROBIN SMITH
accepted by a given type of person. This is not unreasonable as the

basis of a dialectical art.
However, this double classification system would only provide a store
house of materials that might turn out to be useful. A true art of
dialectic should provide a systematic way of finding premises acceptable
to one's opponent that will be useful for deducing the desired con
- are
clusion. This is what the 'topics' themselves the topoi, which the
principal content of Books II-VII - provide us. Brunschwig gives an
apt characterization of a dialectical topos:
The dialectician would know the conclusion at which he must arrive; he seeks premisses
which will allow him to do this. The locus is then a machine for making premisses,
beginning from any given conclusion. (1967, p. xxxix)
Exactly how such a 'machine" works is a matter too complex to discuss

at length here, but the main features are relatively uncontroversial.
According to Theophrastus, a topos is
a sort of starting point or element,

(arche) by means of which we obtain principles about
anything in particular, definitein outline (perigraphe) but indefinite as to the particulars.
(Alexander, In Top. 126.14-16; cf. 5.21-26)
Alexander illustrates:
For example, 'if a contrary belongs to a contrary, then the contrary belongs to the
- -
contrary' is a topos. For this statement that is, this premise is definite in outline (for
itmakes it clear that it is stated about contraries universally), but it is not yet determined
in it whether it is stated about these contraries or those contraries. (126.17-20)
The cryptic sentence Alexander uses as an example is easily interpreted

if we turn to Topics II.8. Roughly, it means: 'If A belongs to B, then
the contrary of A belongs to the contrary of B'. The topos in this case
is highly general because it contains the term 'contrary', which is one
of the 'common terms' Aristotle says are associated with dialectic.
Alexander's comments suggest that the topos is not really a full-fledged
statement, though it becomes one with appropriate substitutions for
these common terms:
Nevertheless, off from [the topos], we can make an attack any

starting concerning
contrary. If, e.g., what is sought is whether the good is beneficial, then starting off from
the topos presented we will get, as a premise relevant to the problem, 'if the bad harms,
the good benefits.' (126.20-23)
At least for a large number of topoi, it is exactly the presence of these

common terms that makes them 'general in outline'.

Associated with a topos (at least usually) is some form of instruction

to 'look for' a given feature of the conclusion. If that feature is present,
then the topos gives a general rule that will be useful for finding a
premise. To illustrate with an example from Aristotle:
In the case of contraries, see if the contrary follows the contrary. (Top. II.8, 113b27-28)
Here iswhat this means. Suppose that our task is to establish something
of the form 'A belongs to B', e.g., 'Beneficial belongs to the good' (or,
more naturally, 'The good is beneficial'). If A and B have contraries
(in the example, 'bad' and 'harmful'), then each of them is a contrary;
therefore, this is 'a case of contraries'. Therefore, we should see
whether 'the contrary follows the contrary', i.e., whether the contrary
of A follows the contrary of B: with appropriate substitutions, this
means 'see whether harmful follows bad'. If it does, then, using the
topos quoted above, we have found a premise from which to deduce
our desired conclusion: 'The bad is harmful'.20
Brunschwig and others have studied the details of topoi, and we need
not pursue those details here. What I would like to call attention to is
the instruction itself to 'see if the contrary belongs to the contrary'.
How do we 'see' this? Since our premises must be endoxa in a dialectical
exchange, that task would be a matter of seeing if the premise generated
by the application of the topos is indeed an appropriate endoxon. And
if we had a worked-out collection of various types of endoxa, indexed
according to subject matter (for instance, 'good'), we would be able to
do just that: simply consult the appropriate diagraph? and see if it
contains the premise 'the bad is harmful'. Here, the two components
of the Topics procedures intersect to give us just what we need.
What I have offered here is only the crudest of sketches of the
content of the Topics. However, I believe it is enough to show how
the combination of topoi and collections of endoxa, indexed in appropri
ate ways, would provide a method for success in dialectical argument
generally.
6. TOPICS 1.2: THE DIALECTICAL ART AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
We are nowin a position to interpret Topics 1.2, a text which is

often seen as providing strong evidence that dialectic is the method of
discovery of the first principles of sciences. Although interpreters from

350 ROBIN SMITH
Alexander forward have seen this passage as giving the uses of dialectic
itself, it says something else:
It would follow next after what we have said to state the number and variety of things
our treatise (pragmateia) is useful for. It is useful for three things: practice (gumnastike),
encounters, and philosophical sciences. (101a25-28)
These uses, then, are the uses of his treatise (the Topics), not the uses
of dialectic. Since the stated goal of that treatise is to discover an art
of dialectic, this most likely means the uses of this art. This is confirmed
in the explanations Aristotle gives for each of the three points of utility:
That it is usefulfor practice is manifest at once: for if we have an art (methodos), we
will be ableto present an attack about whatever is proposed more It is useful for
easily.
encounters because if we have reckoned up the opinions of the many, we will be able to
carry on discussions with them not on the basis of the opinions of others but on the basis
of their own beliefs, changing whatever they may appear to us not to have stated well.
(101a28-34)
With to 'practice', Aristotle

respect explicitly refers to an art or method
(methodos). What he says is not that dialectic is useful for practice
(whatever, indeed, that could mean), but that possessing a method is.
Since practice can only mean 'practice at dialectic' ('Lesser Dialectic',
as I have called it), the only possible of this sentence is
interpretation
that the art of dialectic proposed in the Topics is useful for the types
of exchanges described in Topics VIII.
There is scholarly debate about what 'encounters' (enteuxeis) might
be. My own interpretation relies on a passage in the Rhetoric, which
recalls the present text. Aristotle offers as one reason for the usefulness
of the art of rhetoric the following:
[W]ith some people, even if we possessed the most exact knowledge, it would not be
easy to persuade them if we spoke on the basis of it. For argument in accordance with
knowledge belongs to instruction (didaskalia), but that is impossible; it is instead neces
sary to make our means of persuasion and our arguments from common premises, as we
said in the Topics about encounters with the many. (1355a24-29)
Aristotle'spoint is that in arguing with the public, we must use common

premises that everyone will accept. That fits well with Topics 1.2, if we
suppose him to have in mind the same sorts of encounters. In dealing
with the general public, we must base our arguments on the general
public's opinions. Now, what Aristotle says in Topics 1.2 is quite speci
fic: if we have 'reckoned up' (katarithmemenoi) the opinions of the
many, then we will be prepared to do this. As I have interpreted it,

the compilation of a list of the views of 'the many' is part of the

dialectical art Aristotle proposes. Hence, it is the usefulness of his art
for arguments with the public that he is defending here. A further
confirmation of this is that it readily gives us a good sense for the
phrase that I have translated 'changing whatever they appear to us not
to have stated well'. Translators have struggled to give this a plausible
sense,21 but ifAristotle has in mind previously compiled tabulations of
opinions, this most likely means just 'replacing our audience's clumsy
formulations of their own views with better ones we have worked out
in advance'.
Aristotle next says his treatise is useful for 'the philosophical sciences'
because:
[I]f we are able to go through the puzzles (diapor?sai) in relation to both sides, we will
more easily detect the true and the false in any subject. (101a34-36)
'Going through the puzzles' (diaporein) is a regular feature of Aristotel

ian theoretical discussions, consisting of a review of the opinions on a
subject held by Aristotle's philosophical predecessors or by people in
general. The point of a diaporia is to bring out the difficulties and
inconsistencies in these assembled views, so to set the stage for a
scientific theory: the theory must resolve these problems by showing
which elements in the collected views are true and which elements
false. This aspect of Aristotle's method has been the subject of much
study; we need not explore its features in detail here. What is important,
for the present, is the relationship of this account to the preceding cases
of practice and encounters. As before, Aristotle singles out a specific
ability useful in connection with the case at hand and provided by his
dialectical art. In this instance, it is an ability to 'go through the puzzles
in relation to both sides'. Nowhere else in the Topics does he tell us
anything about diaporiai, but given that they arise out of the views of
others, it is at least plausible that he has in mind the collections of
endoxa that form part of the art: organized as they are by subject, they
would provide a ready-made source for the opinions out of which a
diaporia is built.
In all these cases, then, we have found that Aristotle claims his
proffered art of dialectic will be useful to a certain activity, not that
dialectic itself has certain powers. However, he proceeds to describe a
fourth use:
In addition (eti), it is useful in connection with (pros) the first ones among the principles

352 ROBIN SMITH
about any particular science. For it is impossible to give any account (eipein ti) concerning
these on the basis of the principles appropriate to the science under consideration (ek
ton oikei?n ton kata t?n protetheisan.- ?pist?m?n arch?n), since the principles of everything
are the first principles, and we must give a treatment of them (peri auton dielthein) using
the endoxa about the subject in question. But this is peculiar, or at any rate appropriate,
to dialectic: for since it is examinative with respect to the principles of all disciplines, it
has a way to do this. (101a36-b4)
My translation of this passage is controversial in a number of points

and will require defending, but let me first say what I think it means.
The fourth point concerns a new area of usefulness for the dialectical
art, not a continuation of the third point. Now, Aristotle holds that
apart from the starting points or principles (archai) of the individual
sciences, there are certain other common principles (koinai archai) that
may play a role in demonstrations concerning any subject matter22 (his
favorite examples include the laws of non-contradiction and excluded
middle). These common principles also have a special connection with
dialectic since, like them, it is of universal applicability. This does not
mean that dialectic is a universal science, for there is no such science
and dialectic establishes no conclusions. However, dialectic's univer
sality does allow it to overcome a restriction that applies to demon
strative sciences: each science is competent to prove only with respect
to its own genus, and so it is impossible (and a fallacy, for which
Aristotle has the name metabasis eis alio genos) to attempt to draw
conclusions about one subject from the starting points appropriate to
another. Dialectical argument, however, since it is not tied to a specific
subject matter, is not so restricted. Thus, since its 'examinative' capacity
applies even to the common starting points, it has a way of discussing
them. Thus, Aristotle has made no claim that dialectic has some capac
ity for establishing, or even discovering, the principles of the special
sciences, or indeed of anything.23
Now, it is time to show that my translation is both better supported
by the text and more in harmony with Aristotle's other views than the
popular alternatives.
First, I claim that the subject is the common principles, not the
proper principles of the special sciences. Aristotle initially says pros ta
pr?ta ton peri hekast?n ?pist?m?n. To get this to mean 'the principles
appropriate to each science' we must take ta peri hekast?n ?pist?m?n to
be 'the propositions concerning each science' and then suppose the first
of these are the principles. But it would be more in Aristotle's idiom

to say ta pr?ta peri hekast?n ?pist?m?n, if that were what he meant. It

is equally possible to take ton as feminine, with an understood arch?n,
so that Aristotle is talking about the first ones of the principles. In fact,
in a number of good manuscript witnesses, arch?n is not understood
but actually present. Next, the phrase pr?tai hai archai hapant?n eisi
could mean either 'the starting points are first of them all' or 'the
starting points of all are first'. I have opted for the latter reading,
influenced by a parallel with the phrase pros tas hapas?n ton method?n
archas a few lines later. This might mean 'with respect to the proper
starting points of each individual discipline', but it is Aristotle's usual
practice to use hekastos when he is talking about the special principles
of the individual sciences: pros tas archas hekast?n ton method?n, per
haps. If, however, Aristotle is talking about those starting points that
apply to every one of the disciplines, then the emphatic hapas is just
what we want; I take the meaning at a39 to be the same.
Next, exetastik? gar ousa pros tas hapas?n ton method?n archas hodon
echei can be parsed in two ways, according as we take the prepositional
phrase pros tas hapas?n ton method?n archas to modify exetastik?
('examinative with respect to the principles') or hodon ('a road to the
principles'). I have opted for the former, against the almost unanimous
opinion of interpreters and translators. The tradition supposes Aristotle
to be saying that dialectic is 'examinative', without saying what it is
that it examines, and that as a result of this dialectic 'has a road to the
starting points of all the disciplines'. But it would be amazing for
Aristotle to say that dialectic can actually establish the indemonstrable
first principles on which each science depends and which demonstration
is powerless to prove, given his frequent insistence that dialectic has
no power to prove anything. The fact is that there is not another
Aristotelian text that even suggests dialectic to have such a power: this
one sentence is the alleged proof that archai are established dialectically.
If there is a reading that eliminates this anomaly, it is to be preferred,
and my construal does just that.
Moreover, if Aristotle wanted to talk about the 'road to the archai',
he would have been much more likely to say epi tas archas. Thus,
Nicomachean Ethics 1.4, 1095a30-bl, contrasts arguments from (apo)
and arguments to (epi) starting points and recalls that Plato used to ask
"whether the road is from the archai or to the archai". It is not obvious
that a road pros something would be a road towards it, in any event.
Several translators, in fact, acknowledge this by more or less devious

354 ROBIN SMITH
renderings: "lies along the path to the principles" (Forster), "elle nous
ouvre la route aux principes" (Tricot), "essa indirizza verso i principi"
(Colli).
There is also some indication that Alexander construed the phrase
exactly as I do. He has almost nothing to say about the sentence in his
remarks on 1.2 (32.5-10), and nothing at all about a 'road to the
principles', which ismore than mildly surprising. However, he cites this
phrase elsewhere, in his commentary on the Prior Analytics (the subject
is the phrase "unless according to opinion", ? m? kata doxan, at An.
Pr. 1.27, 43a39):
Or by 'according to opinion' he meant 'endoxos and dialectically', as he said in

perhaps
the Topics: [here Alexander quotes 101b3-4]. For this reason, it is possible to draw
conclusions dialectically, in a way, even about the first things, proving that, for example,
unity belongs to them (for each of them is one), or also being. (293.6-10)
Alexander's entire reason for citing the Topics here is to show that
dialectical argumentation can apply even to the 'first things' (in this
case, the highest genera, i.e., the categories). That would make sense
only if he read the prepositional phrase as going with 'examinative'.
Lastly, the phrase hodon echei is somewhat unusual and appears to
be idiomatic. In fact, there is a comparable use of hodon echein in
Metaphysics I 4: Aristotle says that things which differ in genus "have
no way to one another" (ouk echei hodon eis al?ela: 1055a6-7). In this
sense, echei hodon just means 'have a way to get through'. All that the
phrase needs to mean is 'dialectic has a way to do this', not 'dialectic
contains the route'.
In summary, then, both philological and doctrinal reasons make it

more likely that Aristotle is asserting, not that dialectic includes a
method for establishing objective starting points in the sciences, but
that it has some use in connection with any examination of the common
principles. This is quite in line with what he says about dialectic else
where. In the Metaphysics, he notes that the dialectician and the philo
sopher both deal with these general principles, although in a different
way: dialectic is "capable of examining" (peirastike) about the things
about which philosophy is "knowledgeable" (gn?ristik?) (r 2, 1004b25
26). Similarly, B 1, 995b22-25, includes among the aporiai the problem
about which science should discuss the things that dialectic discusses
unscientifically.

7. CONCLUSIONS
My arguments have been directed at a wide spectrum of views that

have in common a general picture of Aristotelian dialectic as a kind of
method of arguing from a special class of opinions that, for some reason
or other, Aristotle thought could provide a foundation for scientific
demonstrations. However, I have been concerned in particular with
Irwin's form of this thesis because it is certainly the most powerful and
the one that has received by far the most elaborate defense. Irwin's
picture of dialectic rests on two pillars: that Aristotle claims dialectic
is 'a method of argument from common beliefs', and that Aristotle
claims dialectic can establish the first principles of sciences. The latter
claim is, I think, largely based on a reading of Topics 1.2 that I have
been at some pains to discredit; the former, I have tried to show, fails
to take into account all the evidence and does not distinguish between
dialectic itself and the dialectical art Aristotle is propounding in the
Topics. Thus, my arguments are intended to undermine the foundations
of Irwin's critical edifice.
It would be a great exaggeration, however, for me to claim to have
refuted Irwin's position. The great merit of Irwin's project is that he
takes quite seriously, and then tries to answer, one of the most vexing
problems about Aristotle's conceptions of science and of philosophy:
If the goal of the philosopher and of the scientist is to discover the
first principles of things and then to understand all other truths by
demonstrating them from those principles, then how are we to discover,
and come to know, the first principles? The great merit of Irwin's
account is that he tries to find an answer that harmonizes with Aristot
le's actual practice in the treatises. Thus, he has provided us with
an enormously detailed study of the way in which Aristotle actually
approaches philosophical problems and, in particular, tries to establish
the foundational principles of his inquiries. Far more analysis than I
have provided here will be necessary in order to determine what impact,
if any, my arguments have on the results of that analysis and on the
question what role, if any, dialectical argument plays in Aristotle's
concept of philosophy.24
NOTES
1
The most fully developed thesis this sort is in Irwin (1988); it is largelywith his position
that I am concerned. Nussbaum (1986, Chap. 8) advances a rather different (and in my
view less plausible) view. See Hamlyn (1990) for criticism of each of these.

356 ROBIN SMITH
2
This is not the same as what I am calling the 'received view'. The traditional account
was accepted by the commentators and most interpreters before Jaeger and Solmsen.
3
Recent interpreters have taken 1.32, 47a31-40, to show that Aristotle did not think
the syllogistic was
a complete account of validity. In my opinion, all that Aristotle means
to say there some valid arguments
is that can be put into figured (syllogistic) form only
when obvious but unstated premises are supplied. In any event, this single passage is far
too slender a base on which to build the notion that Aristotle allowed for a theory of
non-syllogistic valid arguments complementing the theory of the Prior Analytics, let alone
that such a theory is implicit in the Topics. See my comments in Smith (1989, pp. 161?
62).
4
E.g., Bochenski (1961, pp. 43, 49-53, 88); Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 33). Barnes
(1981) goes so far as to conclude that Aristotle's theory of demonstration originally rested
on this alternative account of validity.
5
The doctrine of Prior Analytics 1.1 on this score is perhaps something of an innovation
with respect to the Topics: Aristotle introduces the new expression 'deductive premise'
(protasis sullogistike) for the predication of 'one
thing of another' (ti kata tinos) and
claims that both dialectical and demonstrative
premises can be viewed as species of this
more general form. This is in line with the general theoretical goals of the Prior Analytics,
which makes the grand claim that "every sort of conviction whatever, in accordance with
any discipline" (68bl2-13) can be brought under the purview of its theory of sullogismoi.
6
That 'premise' here corresponds to 'question' is confirmed by the reference to the Topics
immediately following at 20b26. The actual text cited is clearly Sophistical Refutations 6,
169a6-18, wherein Aristotle refers interchangeably to a premise as a question (169al2).
7
Moraux (1968) studies the content of these rules in some detail.
8
See 110a27, 33; 110b2; 112a26; 112bl8, 20; 120al7, 19; 154a34; 159a5, 7; 159M9;
164a4, 9. In a number of places it is used absolutely to mean 'engage in dialectical
argument': 109a9-10; 120bl4-15; 153a8; 157al8; 164b8, 14. It is contrasted

'demon with
strate' (apodeiknusthai) at 157b35-37.
9
As will become evident, I think this point also fits well with Socrates' practice, once
we see what it means.
10
Please excuse the shameless parallel with Rhetoric 1.1, 1354a6ff.
11
Owen (1961) first proposed that the 'appearances' (phainomena) of which sciences
must take account include various established opinions as well as the data of empirical
observation (Irwin's position is of course partly indebted to Owen). Nussbaum, who also
builds on Owen's position, comes to a rather different picture of Aristotle as a sort
Putnamian internal realist (1986, Chap. 8). For criticisms of both positions, see Hamlyn
(1992) and Bolton (1990).

12
That is, of the Sophistical Refutations, which Aristotle always refers to as part of the
Topics.
13
Irwin reads this passage as
saying that only certain people's opinions get counted
among the endoxa. In isolation,
this might be defensible, but Rhetoric 1356b28-35 (with
the analogy to medicine) clearly has in mind the thesis that art deals with types rather
than individuals; and the similarity of these two passages makes it highly likely that
Aristotle is making the same point in the Sophistical Refutations.
14
The phrase is tois malista gn?rimois kai endoxois: thus, the endoxa include the opinions
of endoxoi. Barnes tries to capture this ambiguity of endoxos with his translation 'repu

table'. Most other translators conceal the point by using a different term for endoxos in
this second sense: 'illustrious' (Pickard-Cambridge), 'distinguished' (Forster), 'illustri'
(Colli), 'illustres' (Tricot), 'angesehen' (Rolfes). Brunschwig at least hints at a connection

with 'admis comme autorit?s'.
15
That is, contrary to the opinions of most people: this is simply what paradoxos means.
Aristotle is well aware that some of the opinions he regards as true are paradoxa in this
sense, e.g., that the side and diagonal of a square are incommensurable (cf. Met. A 1,
983all-23). However, the authority of the wise will not be very effective in getting most
people to accept such views.

16
In Top. VIII.5-6. Aristotle employs a distinction between endoxa tini and endoxa
hapl?s that at first might appear to undermine my claim that to be endoxon is always to
be endoxon tini. I do not believe this constitutes a serious problem for my view, but a
full interpretation of these sections raises difficulties too complex to discuss here (for a
view divergent from mine that relies heavily on these sections, esp. see Bolton (1990,
Sees. 7-8)).
17
Diagraphai. Aristotle uses this term once (EE II.2, 1228a28) of the tabular list of
virtues and their associated vices of excess and defect in Eudemian Ethics II.3.
18
Aristotle may be implying that we use the categories ('the kinds of predications'
spelled out in 1.9) as classificatory heads within each subject, beginning with the category
of substance ('what it is').
19
Alexander tells us that such an instruction was called a parangelma. The exact relation
ship between topos and parangelma is somewhat unclear, and Alexander's remarks
(135.2-23) indicate that Aristotle may have considered the parangelma part of the topos
or even identical with it, whereas Theophrastus distinguished between the two and
denoted some topoi as topoi parangelmatikoi. For present purposes, the details of this
issue are not critical.
20
It seems actually that we have two premises from the combination of which it follows:
'If the bad is harmful, then the good is beneficial' and 'The bad is harmful'. From these
two, the desired conclusion follows by modus ponens. Were it absolutely clear that this
is what Aristotleis doing, then we would have clear evidence that the Topics recognizes
inference patterns of propositional logic not discussed in the Prior Analytics. In fact, it
is far less than clear whether Aristotle supposes the conditional premise here to be
functioning as a premise. A full treatment of the question whether the Topics contains
an actual theory of inference
separate from that in the Prior Analytics, and of the related
question whether Aristotle
really does think that the syllogistic is the unique and complete
correct theory of inference, would far exceed the scope of this present paper. Fortunately,
nothing I want to say here depends on resolving these issues.

21
Pickard-Cambridge: "[W]hile we shift the ground of any argument they appear to us
to state unsoundly"; Forster: the course of any argument which
"[C]hanging they appear
to us to be using wrongly"; Tricot: "[N]ous ?cartons tout argument de sa part qui ne
nous para?trait pas bien fond?"; Brunschwig it to modify initial clause): the
(taking
nous voudrons de renoncer a des affirmations
"[Q]uand les persuader qui nous para?tront
manifestement inacceptables".
22
In some places, he appears to call them 'axioms' (axi?mata), although it is difficult to
be certain how fixed this usage is since he often uses axioma to mean just 'proposition'
(as the Stoics later used the term).

358 ROBIN SMITH
23
Even on my view, then, this passage concerns dialectic in general, not just the dialect
ical art. In fact, the passage is intrusive: Aristotle says he is going to state three uses and
then gives four. It is tempting to explain 101a36-b4 as an afterthought, perhaps added
by Aristotle some reflection on the relationship of dialectical argument to 'first

following
philosophy' as understood in the Metaphysics. My position, however, is not tied to any
such hypothesis.
24
I have profited by criticism of an earlier versions of this paper from those present at
the Duke conference. A much shorter (and rather different) version was read at the
meeting of the A.P.A. Eastern Division in December 1991; I am partciularly indebted

to my commentator on that occasion, Roderick T. Long, for pointing out a number of
weaknesses in my earlier attempts to state my case (which is not to say that he would
find the present version any more convincing).
REFERENCES
Barnes, Jonathan: (trans.): 1975 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Barnes, Jonathan: 1980, 'Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics', Revue International de
Philosophie 34, 490-511.

Barnes, Jonathan: 1981, 'Dialectic and the Syllogism', in Enrico Berti (ed.), Aristotle on
Dialectic: the "Posterior Analytics", Antenore, Padua, pp. 17-59.
Bochenski, I. M.: 1961, A History of Formal Logic, ed. and trans. Ivo Thomas, Chelsea
Publishing, New York.

Bolton, Robert: 1990, 'The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic', in Daniel
Devereux and Pierre Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique etM?taphysique chez Aristote,
?ditions du CNRS, Paris, pp. 185-236.
Brunschwig, Jacques (trans.): 1967, Aristote, Topiques I-TV, Les Belles Lettres, Paris.
Hamlyn, D. W.: 1990, 'Aristotle on Dialectic', Philosophy 65, 465-76.

Irwin, T. H.: 1988, Aristotle's First Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Kneale, William and Martha Kneale: 1962, The Development of Logic, Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Moraux, Paul: 1968, 'La joute dialectique d'apr?s le huiti?me livre des Topiques", in G.
E. L. Owen (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 277-311.
Nussbaum, Martha: 1986, The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge University Press, Cam
bridge.
Owen, G. E. L.: 1961, 'Tithenai ta Phainomena\ in A. Mansion (ed.), Aristote et les
Probl?mes de M?thode, Publications Universitaires, Louvain, pp. 83-103.
Smith, Robin (trans.): 1989, Prior Analytics, Hackett, Indianopolis.
Solmsen, Friedrich: 1929, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, Weid
mann, Berlin.
Department of Philosophy
Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS 66506-1004
U.S.A.


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