AN APPRAISAL OF THE

EFFICACY AND CHALLENGES OF

THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION IN SETTLEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES

Paschal Oiora

Paschal Obiora is a lawyer licensed to practice law in Nigeria. He is a member of the International Law
Association (Nigerian Branch) and currently works as an Associate with the law firm of Babajide Koku &
Co in Lagos, Nigeria.

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1|Page An Appraisal of the Efficacy and Challenges of the WTO…

ABSTRACT

The enormous growth in global commerce has occasioned a rapid increase in international commercial disputes.
Transnational trade deadlocks, if left unattended, can result in severe global economic and political problems. Thus,
the need for efficient trade dispute resolution mechanisms. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has long been
considered an effective institution because of its enforceable dispute resolution procedures. Though some of its
aspects were directly inspired by the evolution of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, there
was a clear intention to make the process quicker, more legally orientated, and binding. It has been described as an
audacious one as it creates a mechanism shared between classical diplomatic means through arbitration or
compromise and a compulsory referral to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in case of disputes arising within the
scope of WTO agreements. On all fours, the WTO overcame the inadequacies of the GATT system and successfully
coped with the increase in international commercial claims. Nonetheless, the past few years have shown that the
WTO is in dire crisis, which has brought its dispute resolution system to a halt. This piece is an academic attempt
to analyze and diffuse the efficacy vis a vis the WTO's current challenges in resolving international commercial
disputes between its members. This piece concludes that the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) has been overwhelmed by
these challenges. It also made some suggestions that may assist in fixing the gridlock.

KEYWORDS

Appellate Body (AB), Arbitration, Commercial, Compensation, Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), International
Trade, Global, Member-State, Panel, Report, Resolution, World Trade Organisation.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

As international commercial transactions have become leading agents of economic development around the globe,
disputes in this area have burgeoned. Consequently, the workings of the public and private sector mechanisms for
settling international commercial disputes, notably arbitration, have assumed particular importance.1 One
consequence of the growth in international commercial transactions and the resultant disputes has been to resolve
the latter through fast, modern, and efficient mechanisms independent of any national jurisdiction.2 Such
mechanisms are now the inseparable complement of the institutions governing international economic and financial
relationships.3 Needless to state that international commercial disputes can escalate into trade conflicts with severe
political and economic repercussions if left unresolved.

1
Gonzalo Biggs, “Resolving International Trade and Investment Disputes” (2003) Cepal Review 80 at 98.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.

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At the heart of this development are international commercial dispute resolution bodies. These bodies have a
common dispute settlement function in global commerce, and they include a variety of international tribunals,
commissions, organizations, and ad hoc bodies.4 While some adopt procedures geared towards the handing down of
binding rulings, others, like the WTO, use such mechanisms with objectives aimed at the amicable resolution of the
differences between parties in the first instance. The WTO stands out as one of the notable international commercial
dispute resolution bodies. It replaced the GATT5 system and is presently the institution that guides the multilateral
system of international trade. It was created by the Marrakesh Ministerial Agreement,6 which ended the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations. The Marrakesh Ministerial Agreement approved the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),7 which in turn established the DSB, administered by the
WTO8 and has rapidly become one of its leading agencies.

The WTO procedures apply exclusively to commercial disputes between its member States.9 These procedures are
also characterized by their gradual approach and are expressly non-contentious.10 The functions of the WTO are
discharged by the Ministerial Conference, which is empowered to resolve all matters included in the Multilateral
Trade Agreements adopted at Marrakesh,11 if a member so requests. It is composed of representatives of all member
States and meets at least once every two years.12 In the intervals, its functions are discharged by the General Council,
including representatives of all member States. The Ministerial Conference meets whenever it deems appropriate,
establishes its procedural rules, approves those of the different Committees, and performs the functions of the DSB.13
At the Ministerial Conference, the General Council meetings, and those of the DSB, each member State has a vote,
and decisions are taken by consensus.14 The Ministerial Conference appoints the Director-general and specifies his
or her powers and responsibilities. The Director-general runs the Secretariat and appoints its staff.15

4
Cesare P. R. Romano, “A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions” (2011) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 2 at
241.
5
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force 1 January 1948).
6
Marrakesh Ministerial Agreement, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (entered into force 1 January 1995).
7
Ibid, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M.
1226 at Article 2.
8
Marrakesh, supra note 6, Article III (3).
9
Ibid, Article III (2).
10
DSU, supra note 7, Article 3(10).
11
These agreements are an integral part of the Marrakesh Agreement and are: i) the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; ii) the
General Agreement on Trade in Services; iii) the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; iv) the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, and v) the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. On the other
hand, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements form part of the Marrakesh Agreement only regarding those members who have accepted them
,
12
Marrakesh, supra note 6, Article IV (1).
13
Ibid, Article IV (2) & (7).
14
DSU, supra note 7, Article 2 (4).
15
Marrakesh, supra note 6, Article IV (2) & (3).

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Given the enforceable dispute resolution procedures used by the WTO, it has long been considered an effective
institution for the settlement of international commercial disputes. The objective of its procedure is not primarily to
hand down rulings but to resolve differences between the parties. For this reason, priority is given to consultation,
mediation, and conciliation at any stage of the procedure while trying to resolve disputes over member States'
compliance with their WTO rights and obligations, subject to review by a standing AB composed of seven judges.
The AB is entrusted with addressing the legal findings and conclusions of panels by upholding, modifying, or
reversing them. Today, however, the dispute settlement mechanism is in crisis due to the WTO members' failure to
negotiate updates to the rulebook and adopt other proposed amendments.16

2.0 THE INTENDED RESULT OF THE WTO OVER THE GATT

Resolving trade disputes is one of the core functions of the WTO. A dispute arises when a member State believes
another member State is violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made in the WTO. The significant
improvements of the WTO in settlement of trade disputes over its predecessor, the GATT, are considered in this
part.

In his opening speech for the WTO Public Forum in 2008, Director-General Pascal Lamy said that “the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) is the only international body dealing with the rules of trade between nations and its importance
is hard to underestimate.”17 Gonzalo believes that the DSB has overcome the inadequacies of the GATT system and
successfully coped with the increase in international commercial claims.18 From 1995 to October 2002, 268 cases
were presented, and in over a fifth of these, the parties reached an agreement through consultation or similar
measures.19

The DSB's procedure is characterized by a faster and more intuitive approach to panel selection and creating a
permanent AB.20 It is an integrated system that allows countries to bring up disputes relating to the WTO and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements already referred to. This dispute settlement system makes it possible for the DSB to
exercise its authority over the General Council of the WTO and the Councils and Committees of the Agreements
referred to. The automatic character of the procedure is in the bindingness of its jurisdiction on an adverse party who
is a member State once another party has initiated it.21

16
Tetyana Payosova et al., "The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures” (2018) Peterson Institute
for International Economics 18-5 at 1.
17
Pascal Lamy, opening speech for WTO Public Forum 2008: “Trading into the Future” 24 September 2008.
18
Gonzalo, supra note 1, at 112.
19
Ibid.
20
The AB comprises seven people of recognized authority unaffiliated with any government, and DSB appoints them for four years, and
three are involved in each case on a rota system.
21
Marrakesh, supra note 6, Article II (2).

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In contrast to the GATT system, the DSB procedure is predictable and defined. Under GATT, rulings had to be
made by consensus, and there was no deadline, and opposition from one country was enough to block a ruling. With
the WTO, on the other hand, the opposite applies: decisions are deemed to have been approved unless there is a
consensus for rejection.22 Furthermore, proceedings are clearly defined. Unless the parties agree otherwise, they
cannot last longer than nine months if there is no appeal, or twelve months, if there is.23 In the case of perishable
goods, the procedure may last no longer than three months.24 The procedure has the following four stages: i)
consultation; ii) if no agreement is reached, the dispute is resolved by a special group or Panel, usually of three
members; iii) either of the parties may appeal to the AB on issues of law in the panel report or ruling, and iv)
execution and enforcement of AB rulings.25

The DSB panels are composed of well-qualified individuals who may be government officials but may not be
nationals of the States whose governments are parties to the dispute or third parties unless the parties agree
otherwise.26 The Secretariat maintains an indicative list of eligible people to facilitate the choice, and members may
periodically suggest names for this indicative list. Panels have three members unless the parties agree to increase
the number to five.27 The Secretariat proposes candidates, and these may be opposed only for "compelling reasons."28
The AB can confirm, amend or revoke the legal findings and conclusions of the report. The panel's recommendations
are adopted by the DSB and accepted unconditionally by the disputing parties unless the DSB decides by consensus
not to adopt the report within thirty days of its distribution to members.29

When the recommendations of the special group or AB conclude that a measure is incompatible with a covered
Agreement, the member affected must review that measure and advise, within a reasonable time, how it proposes to
apply the recommendations of the DSB, under the latter’s supervision.30 In the event of disagreement, the special
group that initially dealt with the matter will resolve this as soon as possible. If the recommendations are not applied,
a special procedure allows the member concerned to be asked for some mutually acceptable temporary
compensation. If this compensation is not agreed upon within 20 days, the other party can ask the DSB for
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations under the agreements to a level equivalent to nullification
or impairment.31 If the member concerned challenges the level of suspension proposed or the procedure followed,
the matter is submitted to the arbitration of the special group which dealt with it, if available, or of an arbitrator

22
DSU, supra note 7, Article 2 (4).
23
Ibid, Article 20.
24
Ibid, Article 12 (8).
25
Ibid, Article 4 (8) & (9).
26
Ibid, Article 8 (1) & (3).
27
Ibid, paras. (4) & (5).
28
Ibid, para. (6).
29
Ibid, Article 17 (13) & (14).
30
Ibid, Article 19 (1).
31
Ibid, Article 22 (3).

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appointed by the Director-General.32 In any case, the suspension of concessions or other obligations is temporary. It
applies only until the measure declared incompatible with the covered agreement has been reversed, or the member
country offers to resolve the nullification or impairment, or a mutually satisfactory solution is found.

Remarkably, many disputes have been resolved successfully by the DSB. An example is the US-Gasoline case.33 In
that case, Venezuela requested consultations on 24 January 1995 and Brazil on 10 April 1995. Venezuela and Brazil
alleged that a US gasoline regulation discriminated against their gasoline in violation of GATT Articles I and III and
Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The US gave the preventing air pollution reason
to set out baseline figures for gasoline sold in the US but imported, and local gasoline methods differed. It applied
a stricter rule on the chemical compositions of the importation of gasoline from overseas.

Further to Venezuela's request, the DSB established a panel at its meeting on 10 April 1995. On 26 April 1995, the
Panel was composed. Further to Brazil's request, the DSB established a panel at its meeting on 19 th June 1995. On
31 May 1995, per Article 9 of the DSU, it was agreed that a single panel would consider the complaints of Venezuela
and Brazil. The report of the Panel was circulated to Members on 29 January 1996. The Panel report found the US
regulation to be inconsistent with GATT Article III (4) and not to benefit from an Article XX exception. The US
appealed on 21 February 1996. On 22 April, the AB issued its report, modifying the panel report on the interpretation
of GATT Article XX (g), but concluding that Article XX (g) was not applicable in this case. The Appellate Report
and the panel report as modified by the Appellate Report were adopted by the DSB on 20 May 1996. The US
announced the implementation of the recommendations of the DSB as of 19 August 1997, at the end of the 15-month
reasonable time.

The US-Gasoline case shows a considerable improvement in the resolution of international commercial disputes
among States. Before the advent of the WTO and under the GATT regime, most developing States and small nations
had little or no chances of success in such cases, even though they may be in the right.34 Thus, unlike GATT’s DS,
member States whose rights are infringed can readily get protection under the WTO dispute settlement system.
Another significant result of the WTO’s DSB is emphasizing equal trade without special consideration to developed
or developing States. The Indonesia—Autos case35 is a good illustration. Japan, the United States, and the European
Communities complained against Indonesia regarding "Certain measures affecting the Automobile industry." They
contended that Indonesia violated Articles I and III of GATT 1994, Article 2 of the Trade-Related Investment
Measure (TRIMs) Agreement, and Article 3 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The Panel

32
Ibid, Article 22 (6) & (7).
33
Brazil and Venezuela v United States, (1996) Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R, WT/DS4/AB/R, Doc No 96-1597, ITL 013
online: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm> accessed 16 October 2021.
34
Law Teacher, “Was the WTO an Improvement over GATT?” (2013) online: <https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/international-
law/was-the-wto-an-improvement-over-gatt-international-law-essay.php?vref=1> Accessed 16 October 2021.
35
European Communities v Indonesia, (1998) Panel Report, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, Doc No 98-2505, ITL 014, online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds64_e.htm> accessed 16 October 2021.

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decided that Indonesia violated some of the Articles of the Agreements. Therefore, Indonesia had to issue a new
automotive policy that complied with the recommendation of the DSB. It is safe to state that the establishment of
the WTO introduced a dramatic improvement in the resolution of international commercial disputes from what used
to be the status quo under the GATT.

3.0 THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM

Since its inception in 1995, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has resolved an impressive number of trade
disputes and has earned a reputation as the “crown jewel” of the global trading system. 36 Nevertheless, the dispute
settlement mechanism of the WTO is today caught in a web of challenges arising from the failure of member States
to negotiate updates to the WTO rulebook, including the rules on settlement. The resultant effect is that the WTO
AB is forced to render decisions on inchoate or ambiguous rules. For the past few years, US officials have blocked
appointments of AB members to force WTO members to negotiate new rules that address US concerns and limit the
scope for judicial overreach.37 The US contends that the AB functions in an actively unfair manner which is
detrimental to its affairs. The objections raised by the US are highlighted hereunder.

3.0.1 Judicial Activism by the AB

The US contended that the AB did overstep its jurisdiction time and again by making laws and indulging in judicial
activism. According to the US, the AB cannot create new rules as the recommendations and rulings cannot add to
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements as per Article 3 (2) of the DSU.38 The US
argued that the AB's approach to adjudication of disputes mainly results in mere obiter dicta. The US referred to the
Argentina – Financial Services case,39 where the AB reversed the panel's findings and unnecessarily added to their
analysis by clarifying other provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The US posited that
the AB could not play the role of the Academia by deviating from the issues and only handing down an analysis at
the end of the settlement process.40 The US has maintained that any attempt by AB to fix the lacuna in the WTO
agreements violates Article 3 (2) of the DSU, which accords the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of
Multilateral Trade Agreements to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council.41

36
Tetyana, supra note 16, at 1.
37
The United States confirmed, in November 2017, that it will continue blocking appointments of Appellate Body members. See
“Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body” (22 November 2017) online: <https://gpa-mprod-
mwp.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/sites/25/2021/07/Nov22.DSB_.pdf> accessed 16 October 2021.
38
WTO “Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body” (23 May 2016) online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf> accessed 17 October 2021.
39
Panama v. Argentina, (2016) Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS453/AB/R online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds453_e.htm> accessed 17 October 2021.
40
US statement, supra note 38, at 3.
41
Amrita Bahri, “Appellate Body Held Hostage”: Is Judicial Activism at Fair Trial?” (2019) Journal of World Trade 53.2, at 10.

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3.0.2 Problem with Precedents

The US further noted that the AB creates persuasive precedents which have no binding value. It stated that the
reports adopted are not binding precedents for subsequent cases, unlike other areas of disputes in international law.
For instance, in the US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) case,42 the AB said that the reports are only binding on parties
whose particular dispute is to be resolved. Though this interpretation does not suggest that the DSB should disregard
such reports, Panels should follow previously adopted AB reports to develop a coherent and predictable body of
jurisprudence.

3.0.3 Objections to the Working Procedures

During Ministerial Conferences, the US has severally raised concerns about Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for
Appellate Review. This rule mentions that an AB member, upon AB’s authorization and with notifications to the
DSB, may complete disposal of any appeal and, for that purpose, will be deemed to be a member of the AB. The
Working Procedures are drawn up by the AB in consultation with the WTO's Director-General and the Chairman of
the DSB, as per Article 3 (9) of the DSU. The objection relates that AB members should not take any new cases as
there might be a backlog that they would have to clear. This sometimes leads to a delay in giving reports outside the
stipulated 60 days’ time limit.43

4.0 THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FIX THE WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

It was advised that unless the problem with the WTO’s dispute settlement system is resolved, the AB may soon not
have enough members to review cases, and this may bring the WTO dispute settlement system to a standstill.44
Unfortunately, the WTO’s AB has been without the quorum necessary to hear appeals since President Trump’s
administration, insisting that it had outstepped its mandate, blocked the appointment of new nominees in December
2019 – effectively cutting off its ability to resolve international trade disputes. Hence, the problem bedevilling the
WTO's dispute settlement mechanism remains unabated to date as it was one of the major priorities in the Statement
of the Director-General of the WTO to the Special Session of its General Council on 15 February 2021.45 The failure
to nip this crisis in the bud poses the risk of returning the world trading system to a power-based free-for-all, allowing
big players to act unilaterally and to use retaliation to get their way.

42
Mexico v. the United States, (2013) Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS344/RW online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds344_e.htm> accessed 17 October 2021.
43
DSU, supra note 7, Article 17 (5).
44
Soumaya Keynes and Chad P. Bown, "Holding the WTO Hostage, Trump Style," Peterson Institute for International Economics Trade
Talks, Episode, 4 September 2017.
45
WTO “Statement of Director-General of the World Trade Organization, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, to the Special Session of the WTO
General Council” (15 February 2021) online: <https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/16/special-session-of-the-general-council-at-
wto-appoints-dr-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-as-the-seventh-director-general/> accessed 17 October 2021.

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At the meeting of the DSB on 15 February 2021, The European Union stated that the WTO members have a shared
responsibility to resolve this issue as soon as possible and fill the outstanding vacancies in the AB as required by
Article 17 (2) of the DSU.46 Much to the chagrin of onlookers, the US’ response was negative. In response to a slate
of proposed AB appointments, the US said in a statement that it was “not in a position” to support the decision,
adding: “The United States continues to have systemic concerns with the Appellate body.47 As members know, the
United States has raised and explained its systemic concerns for more than 16 years and across multiple US
administrations.”48 The interregnum without a functioning AB is perceived as a massive hole in the WTO.49

The attendant result of the AB not having its appropriate quorum to date is that WTO members have lost their right
to appeal against the decisions of the WTO's Panels. The continuous blocking of AB members' appointments has
led member States to seek alternative means of appealing panels' reports. On 25 July 2019, Canada and the European
Union entered into an agreement (amended slightly on 22 October 2019) to resort to Article 25 as an interim appeal
arbitration procedure for any future disputes between the two members, should the AB not have sufficient members
to hear the appeal.

Another recent example is the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) that was agreed to by
the European Union and 15 other WTO members in March 2020. The MPIA created an alternative AB while the
official WTO body is not functional, and it mirrors the usual WTO appeal rules and can voluntarily be used between
WTO members to resolve disputes. Since being announced, the People's Republic of China and other WTO member
nations have joined the MPIA.50 On the surface, this looks sufficient, but a deeper look shows that the problem is
grave. The WTO was formed to help trade flow as freely as possible and to help settle trade disputes between
member States. Thus, if members start to look for other methods to resolve their disputes, this defeats the very
purpose of the WTO.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Before the current challenges confronting the WTO dispute settlement system, the WTO met the intended result that
necessitated its creation. No doubt, it ushered in wide innovations in resolving international commercial disputes
among member States as opposed to the GATT. However, the apparent crisis which has succeeded in crippling the
dispute settlement apparatus of the organization calls for more engagements and constructive negotiations between

46
WTO “Minutes of Meeting of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body” (22 February 2021) at 11 – 12, online:
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DSB/M449.pdf&Open=True> accessed 17 October 2021.
47
Ibid, at 13.
48
Ibid.
49
Eleanor Wragg, “Slim Chances for the WTO Appellate Body Despite US Return to Multilateralism” (2021) online:
<https://www.gtreview.com/news/americas/slim-chances-for-the-wto-appellate-body-despite-the-us-return-to-multilateralism/> accessed
17 October 2021.
50
Andrew Tillett, “China's inclusion in new trade umpire a game-changer” (2020) Australian Financial Review, online:
<https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/china-s-inclusion-in-new-trade-umpire-a-game-changer-20200504-p54pkh> accessed 17 October
2021.

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member States and the WTO Secretariat. WTO members should pay salient attention to the concerns raised by the
US against the AB. One lesson from recent events is that a reconstituted AB is urgently needed. In doing so, it is
useful for WTO members to put modalities in place for the enactment of a new rulebook that will meet the 21 st
century’s trade exigencies. Also, in order to avoid any future objection as to the competence of panel and AB
members, it is further suggested that a commission of eminent experts well-versed in General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade/WTO dispute settlement should be established and entrusted with the task of screening proposed panelists,
as well as the AB members put forward by the members of the WTO.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into
force 1 January 1948).
2. Marrakesh Ministerial Agreement, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (entered into force 1
January 1995).
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Ministerial
Agreement, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 12 (entered into force 1 January 1995).

CASE LAWS
1. Brazil and Venezuela v the United States, (1996) Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R,
WT/DS4/AB/R, Doc No 96-1597, ITL 013 online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm>
2. European Communities v Indonesia, (1998) Panel Report, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, Doc No
98-2505, ITL 014 online: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds64_e.htm>
3. Mexico v. the United States, (2013) Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS344/RW, online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds344_e.htm>
4. Panama v. Argentina, (2016) Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS453/AB/R, online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds453_e.htm>

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
1. WTO “Minutes of Meeting of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body” (22 February 2021) online:
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DSB/M449.pdf&Open=True>
2. WTO “Statement of Director-General of the World Trade Organization, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to the
Special Session of the WTO General Council” (15 February 2021) online:
<https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/16/special-session-of-the-general-council-at-wto-appoints-
dr-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-as-the-seventh-director-general/>
3. WTO “Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body” (22 November
2017) online: <https://gpa-mprod-mwp.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/sites/25/2021/07/Nov22.DSB_.pdf>
4. WTO “Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body” (23 May 2016)
online: <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf>

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JOURNALS
1. Bahri, Amrita “Appellate Body Held Hostage”: Is Judicial Activism at Fair Trial?” (2019) Journal of World
Trade 53.2.
2. Bigg, Gonzalo “Resolving International Trade and Investment Disputes” (2003) Cepal Review 80.
3. Romano, Cesare "A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions" (2011) Journal of International
Dispute Settlement 2.
4. Payosova, Tetyana, et al., "The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization: Causes and
Cures" (2018) Peterson Institute for International Economics 18-5.

ARTICLES
1. Tillett, Andrew “China's inclusion in new trade umpire a game-changer” (2020) Australian Financial
Review, online: <https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/china-s-inclusion-in-new-trade-umpire-a-game-
changer-20200504-p54pkh>
2. Wragg, Eleanor “Slim Chances for the WTO Appellate Body Despite US Return to Multilateralism” (2021)
online: <https://www.gtreview.com/news/americas/slim-chances-for-the-wto-appellate-body-despite-the-
us-return-to-multilateralism/>
3. Law Teacher, “Was the WTO an Improvement over GATT?” (2013) online:
<https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/international-law/was-the-wto-an-improvement-over-gatt-
international-law-essay.php?vref=1>

SPEECHES
1. Keynes, Soumaya and Bown, P. Chad "Holding the WTO Hostage, Trump Style," Peterson Institute for
International Economics Trade Talks, Episode 4, 22 September 2017.
2. Lamy, Pascal: opening speech for WTO Public Forum 2008: “Trading into the Future” 24/09/2008.

CITATION
Obiora, Paschal “An Appraisal of the Efficacy and Challenges of the World Trade Organization in settlement of
International Commercial Disputes” (2021).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3945211