Case #4: Ignacio vs. Hilario GR No.

L-175 April 30, 1946

FACTS:
Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres are involved in a civil lawsuit with Damian,
Francisco, and Luis, all with the last name Ignacio, over the ownership of a piece of
property that is partially used for rice farming and partially for residential use. The parcel
of property belonged to Hilario. Later, he learned that Ignacio had constructed a home
and a granary at the lot's residential section.

The case was presided over by Hon. Alfonso Felix (Lower Courts), who issued a
decision declaring Hilario the legitimate owners of the entire property (owner in good
faith) and granting Ignacio the ownership of the houses and granaries they had
constructed on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith (builder
in good faith), in accordance with Civil Code Article 361.

The case now presided over by respondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad, ordered to
remove the structure at the own expense of Ignacio and to restore plaintiffs in the
possession of said lot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to
remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents is null and void.

RULING:
Yes. It amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore,
offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled
to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article
453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361,
either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he
cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land
and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He
is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same.

We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners

to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because
the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and void.
Case #7: Reynante vs. CA GR No. 95907, April 8,1992

FACTS:
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don
Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private respondents, over a fishpond
located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his
family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2.
Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from
anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa
palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own.

After the death of Don Carlos, his heirs formally demanded that the petitioner vacate
said portion but the petitioner refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
Hence, on April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with
preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not accretion automatically becomes registered land just because
the adjoining lot is registered in the Torrens System.

RULING:
"An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which
receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is
one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the
Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to
the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this
protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein
certain judicial procedures have been provided."

Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by
accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years
subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons. It is
undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than fifty
(50) years and unless private respondent can show a better title over the subject lots,
petitioner’s possession over the property must be respected.