Altered States of Consciousness Rad Young

ABSTRACT

The philosophical investigation of consciousness has a long-standing history in

the Western world but it presents a scientific problem that no explanation or

theory is yet to answer. The only absolute is the existence of consciousness

itself. William Jamesʼ 'anesthetic revelationsʼ advanced the understanding of

altered states of consciousness (ASC) that may have influenced Timothy Leary

and the use of the psychedelic drug LSD 100 years later, but Western science

still has little knowledge of the function in the phenomenon of meditation, sleep,

hypnosis and daydreaming, and generally ignores concepts of enlightenment,

preferring scientific rationalism. The objectivity of science and subjectivity of

consciousness are still very much at odds, yet through convergent disciplines of

neurophenomenology and divergent proposals of state-specific sciences, new

investigative approaches are able to start to define and distinguish between

various levels of anatomical, functional and phenomenological aspects of many

ASC.
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This essay will discuss altered states of consciousness (ASC) as a phenomenon

broadly understood as a temporary change in brain function and conscious

experience. It has been described as a disturbance of ʻnormalʼ perception in the

experience of reality, self and of cognitive processing. Through intentional,

spontaneous, recreational or religious motivations (or, less commonly

pathological reasons), the ʻnormalʼ state of consciousness or awareness can be

temporarily altered through meditation, psychedelic drug use and hypnosis. Other

forms include sensory deprivation, neurochemical imbalances, fear, trauma or

simply sleep and daydreaming. Testimonial evidence of various levels and types

of consciousness has in the past been rejected by science as delusional or self-

deceptive. However by avoiding a priori value judgments through phenomenology

and the new science of neurophenomenology, explorations of this subject can be

attempted. This essay will discuss the correlation in a broad range of experiential

evidence with ASC, the factors involved in the subversion of ʻnormalʼ sense

perception and the adaptive and maladaptive function of this phenomenon.

Consciousness presents a scientific problem that no explanation or theory

is yet to answer. The only absolute is the existence of consciousness itself -

ʻcogito ergo sumʼ I think, therefore I am, as philosopher Rene Descartes

surmised through his methodological skepticism. Western thought has

increasingly developed a reliance on rationalism. William James declared in his

work Principles of Psychology that psychology is the scientific study of the

phenomena and condition of mental life. Yet as “we strive rigorously to simplify

the phenomena,” through empirical scientific classification, “we soon become

aware of inadequacies in our method.” (James, 1890). 12 years later James

published The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). In it he made a profound

observation on consciousness while under the influence of nitrous oxide.
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“Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler. The truth

fades out, however, or escapes, at the moment of coming to; and if any

words remain over in which it seemed to clothe itself, they prove to be the

veriest nonsense.” (James, 1985)

James used radical self-experiential empirical data to further his understanding of

consciousness and revealed; "I know of more than one person who is persuaded

that in the nitrous oxide trance we have a genuine metaphysical revelation." The

knowledge that he obtained during nitrous oxide intoxication were known by

many of his contemporaries as an ʻanesthetic revelationʼ, a phrase coined in the

book The Anesthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy (1874) by Benjamin

Paul Blood. The book had echoes 100 years later as the psychedelic drug LSD

became increasingly popular as a way to, as Timothy Leary said, “become

sensitive to the many and various levels of consciousness and the specific

triggers that engage them.” (1983)

Western scientists have generally ignored concepts of enlightenment or

transcendence of consciousness, but many parapsychologists have come to

understand the value that these concepts bring to the idea of consciousness,

namely that a baseline or ʻnormalʼ level may not exist. Charles T. Tart winner of

the 2005 Abraham Maslow Award has identified the two traditional viewpoints

commonly used for discussion on ASC. The ʻAbsolute Normocentricʼ view that

the ʻnormalʼ state is the only state of consciousness that allows a sensible

rational understanding, thus all ASC other than the norm are simply diminished

forms. Conversely ʻAbsolute Revelatoryʼ is the view that the ʻnormalʼ view is

deficient in comparison to the one or many far superior ASC and their capacity

for direct understanding of The Truth (Tart, 1972a). Tart rejected both of these
discussion viewpoints, preferring to argue from a simply empirical position. To
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overcome the problems of scientifically studying ASC, Tart proposed the

development of ʻstate-specific sciencesʼ, training scientists to enter an ASC and

using techniques of observation, logical theorising, and the testing of theories by

observable consequence all from within the specific state (Tart, 1972b).

The testimonies of meditators and mystics who have claimed enlightenment

or transcendence through the ability to enter ACS have come under great

skepticism and doubt because of the inability of scientific evaluation. In the East,

he Sufi dancers, or whirling dervishes can be explained away through simple

scientific rationalism, spinning their way into a carbon dioxide high, the apparent

separation of mind and body is mere hyperventilation delivered through feverishly

whispered mystical mantras. The focus on ASC being experientially positive is, of

course not entirely true. The West delivers direct evidence of a yearning for a

transcendence of consciousness as a way of escape from the ʻmundane worldʼ.

Through the use and abuse of mind-altering drugs, sex, music, dance, ʻhigherʼ

spiritual realities of religious belief and practice. “The most concrete and human

form of evidence is the phenomenon of suicide, wherein one seeks to [transcend]

oneself completely by destroying oneself.” (Baumann, 2005)

The varieties of human experience with ASC differ greatly and there are

many consistent psychopysiological paradigms that many types of ASC share.

Many forms of meditation and pray; Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, and Jewish,

begin with an emphasis on concentration and letting go of thoughts, this

remarkably similar to the deep relaxation and focus exercises in hypnotherapyʼs

ability to calm and subdue the conscious mind with cognition taking a less active

role. Meditation and hypnosis have both been used in pain management because
of the increased suggestibility that results from the hyper attentive state, this
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same suggestibility combined with hallucination, not uncommon to meditation, is

also found in the ASC of sensory deprivation. These states also present distinct

phenomenological characteristics that can be verbalised and seldom appear in

the ʻnormalʼ state of consciousness. In experiential comparisons separation has

been suggested between ʻSuperficialʼ and ʻProfoundʼ ASC as a result of empirical

analysis. Superficial ASC is characterised by disturbances in experiencing reality,

self, and cognitive process. Meanwhile, Profound ASC is accompanied by

experiences related to absolute, universal, eternal, and existential or religious

meanings (Kokoszka, 1999). The similarities between the mystical symptoms of

Profound ASC and schizophrenic reactions are hard to ignore. As Thomas Szasz

famously said, “If you talk to God, you are praying; If God talks to you, you have

schizophrenia. If the dead talk to you, you are a spiritualist; if you talk to the

dead, you are a schizophrenic.” (Szasz, 1974) This implies a cultural construction

in the perceptional variations of ASC. For example, the symptoms of hysteria

also fit neatly into the categorisation of Superficial ASC together with rage and

daydreaming. Hysteria no longer appears in the DSM-IV and may be now

considered a legacy diagnosis, however itʼs dissociative meaning is still current.

The ʻnormalʼ consciousness, suggests Louis Tinnin, depends only on an illusion

of mental unity which during an altered state, the unity is latent or dissociated,

“Mental organizations formed during an altered state will, in tutu, become

dissociated when the altered state is terminated and mental unity returns.”

(Tinnin, 1990) Sigmund Freud used the term ʻhypnoid statesʼ to describe ASC

and considered it a basic phenomenon of hysteria (Freud and Breuer, 2004) or

what we now know as form of dissociative disorder. Freud and Breuer believed it

is not the content of memories that causes dissociation but, rather, the

psychological state of the person at the time of the event. “…whereas our dream
psychoses do not influence us when we are awake, the products of the hypnoid
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states [ASC] jut over into waking life in the form of hysterical phenomena.” (Freud

and Breuer, 2004) Freud later rejected the idea of dissociation in favour of

repression.

Since Freudʼs influential Interpretation of Dreams, dreaming has been

traditionally defined as an unconscious state. Dreams offer a unique view of

consciousness and cognition and have been studied from a wide range of

disciplines, from philosophy and psychology to neurobiology and clinical

medicine. This interdisciplinary examination and mutual interest may lead the

way for collaborative research across disciplines. Initially dreaming was strongly

correlated to REM sleep (Aserinsky and Kleitman, 1953), this hypothesis is no

longer current since the discovery of non-REM dreaming (Dement and Kleitman,

1957). Sleep researchers in the field of neurophysiology have proposed a new

physiological state space model that may be similar in form to the

phenomenology of dreams; the Activation, Input and Modulation (AIM) model

proposes that the conscious state can be defined and distinguished using the

parameters of AIM (Hobson et al., 2000) when applied similar to the axes in a

three-dimensional Cartesian map. All the parameters are known to vary over the

sleep cycle in a nonlinear manner and the AIM model is able to “depict the highly

dynamic and variable nature of human consciousness, and thus to visually plot

specific ʻstatesʼ of consciousness within the state space.” (Hobson et al., 2000)

This allows separate monitoring of; cortical activation, input source changes in

the blockage of external sensory input and replacement with REM sleep events

and the neuromodulation of wide spread regions of the cortex. Of course, while

the neuroscientific study of dreaming has evolved to give us a better

understanding of the anatomical areas associated with the genesis of dreams

and consciousness, just as DNA doesnʼt explain life, the functional content of
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dreams and the hard problem of qualia remain a mystery.

While the objectivity of science and subjectivity of consciousness are still

very much at odds. The insights and knowledge or ʻanesthetic revelationsʼ gained

whilst in an altered state regardless whether it is a drug experience, meditation,

dream, hypnosis or within sensory deprivation, are all merely subjective and thus

out of the realm of scienceʼs stubborn view of ʻobjective realityʼ. However, new

and merging sciences similar to neurophenomenology and concepts like Charles

Tartʼs ʻstate-specific sciencesʼ are leading the way in the understanding of the

subjective experience of ASC and also psychophysiological patterns that many

types of ASC share. Convergent diciplines are creating a scientific paradigm shift

in the conceptualisation of ASC to a holistic appreciation of the anatomical,

functional and phenomenological aspects of many ASC.

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