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Theme 4 (25 marks): EU Foreign & Security Policy (2-3 pages)

In the EU Global Strategy of 2016 (Council of the EU, 2016), the concept of ‘principled
pragmatism’ was instantiated as the new organizing doctrine of EU’s foreign and security policy
in the coming years. This new approach involved the careful balancing of security and strategic
considerations with the idealistic value promotion agenda in the formulation of policy (Council
of the EU, 2016, p. 19). Some have argued that EU’s adherence to ‘principled pragmatism’ in
reality unfolds as a form of ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Cusumano, 2019), where the EU abides by
and upholds the values that have inspired its creation and development — respect for and
promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law — only when it is
convenient, but fails to uphold those values when it entails a substantive cost. For instance, in the
EU maritime missions offshore Libya, considerations about security and border safety took
precedence over humanitarian considerations (Cusumano, 2019), elevating concerns regarding
whether or not there has been a fundamental departure from conventional European values and
modes of action in the foreign policy arena.

Along similar lines, Famà and Musiol (2022, p. 4) argue that there has been a stronger
focus on hard power on the part of the EU, as evidenced by the recent unprecedented response to
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, they argue that this has been an approach to
foreign and security policy that relevant personalities like EU High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borell and French President Emmanuel Macron, have wanted
for some time. However, in their article, Rieker and Riddervold (2022) lay out what they
consider to be a pattern in the formulation of EU’s foreign and security policy, which rather than
framing the response to the recent crises as a partial departure from diplomacy and
multilateralism, it introduces a dimension of ‘urgency’ as the shaping principle in the balance of
norms and interests in EU’s foreign policymaking. Rieker and Riddervold (2022) place the
perceived urgency and geographical proximity of the threat as the two pivotal axes around which
the EU balances normative and strategic considerations for their policymaking.

Notwithstanding, Famà and Musiol (2022) argue that there has been an unprecedented
aspect to the EU’s response to the recent Ukraine crisis, where for instance — unlike any other
time in EU’s history — it has approved the provision of lethal assistance to Ukraine after the
Russian invasion, through the European Peace Facility (EPF), as well as the imposition of the

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toughest sanctions and penalties it has ever applied abroad. These measures are seen by the
authors as a substantive change in the EU’s approach, since it introduces in its foreign and
security policy toolkit the possibility of large-scale sanctions and expedited military aid. Famà
and Musiol (2022) also point out that, given the high stakes for wider European security, the
supply for military aid to Ukraine was fast-tracked and only superficial risk mitigation measures
were taken. In this sense, they warn that this may be problematic in the provision of future
military aid to other nations, since some may seek to obtain “lethal military support from the EU
under the same loosened procedures set by the precedent of fast-tracked arms supply to Ukraine”
(Famà & Musiol, 2022, p. 3).They suggest that instead, the EU should uphold the safeguards it
already has in place, such as the Integrated Methodological Framework (EU External Action,
2021), which establishes procedures to mitigate the high risks that lethal military support might
entail, and promotes the respect for human rights and international law.

Nevertheless, this unprecedented response from the EU, as laid out by Famà and Musiol
(2022), may well be within the expectations from Rieker and Riddervold’s (2022) framework,
given that both conditions of a perceived urgent security threat and the close geographical
proximity, are met. For those reasons, rather than being a fundamental departure from EU’s
normative approach, this could be the logically predictable direction the EU would take
according to Rieker and Riddervold’s model, since the recent Russian invasion on Ukraine
represents indeed an unprecedented urgent security threat at Europe’s door. In this sense, Rieker
and Riddervold (2022, p. 5) argue that, given the increasingly uncertain nature of the geopolitical
environment in recent years, it may be expected that the EU would develop into a more
traditional, interest-based foreign-policy power under those circumstances. However, they
emphasize that regarding the more far-sighted, long-term policy strategies, the EU remains
committed to the liberal multilateral order it has been promoting since its creation (Rieker and
Riddervold, 2022, p. 5), actively advocating for multilateralism and binding regulation on issues
ranging from international trade, the climate agenda, Iran’s nuclear potential, the situation in the
Artic or the more remote territorial challenges in the South China Sea.

In sum, although Famà and Musiol (2022) point to a less hesitant resort to hard power on
the part of the EU, the question we might ask ourselves is, in relation to what? Since there has
not been a threat of this magnitude in such a close geographical proximity in all of EU’s history,

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it is hard to assess whether or not the recent response to the Ukraine crisis represents indeed an
increased reliance on hard power — and therefore a departure from the focus on diplomacy and
multilateralism — , or it is the expected response when an international actor such as the EU is
subjected to situations of serious urgency, as Rieker and Riddervold (2022) contend in their
article.

Given the arguments presented by both articles, it will be an interesting exercise to keep a
close eye on the future developments of EU foreign and security policy. If Rieker and
Riddervold’s (2022) model is correct, as we witness a de-escalation of geopolitical tensions
related to the Ukraine crisis, we should also see the EU dial back on its reliance on hard power
and return to an overall diplomatic multilateral approach. If instead, as Famà and Musiol (2022)
argue, there is indeed a stronger focus on hard power on the part of the EU, we might observe a
continuation of a belligerent stance against Russia and its allies even as the conflict recedes. In
any case, maintaining a consistent pattern over time will make the EU a more reliable partner in
international relations, helping other actors anticipate and shape their diplomatic stances
accordingly.

Famà and Musiol (2022) touch on the potential hazard of setting a precedent of a fast-
tracked and loosened procedure for lethal military support on the part of the EU, and the
implications this may have for foreign and security policy in future conflicts. Given that there is
an undetermined extent to which perceived threats can be socially constructed, there is a danger
in EU leaders endorsing a hastened and overly aggressive response in the event of a crisis, due to
a highjacked sense of urgency. Even in the current crises, the degree to which the Russian
invasion of Ukraine represents an imminent menace to the rest of Europe is a highly contentious
issue. By becoming convinced of the seriousness of a threat, EU leaders could overlook or
sidestep conventional institutional safeguards designed to mitigate potential risks, even if the
facts of the matter do not justify it. What is worse, given the widespread trust in the judgement
and decision-making capacity of EU institutions (European Commission, 2021), they might do
so with virtually no opposition from the populace, since security concerns already justified
similar measures in the past. The potential for unintended consequences grows, as urgency
overshadows the necessity of acting prudently and cautiously. It is crucial, therefore, that EU
leaders understand that the peace and prosperity that Europe enjoys can become fragile if they

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recklessly relinquish the principles upon which that peace and prosperity was created:
diplomacy, multilateralism, respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms
and the rule of law.

References

Council of the European Union (2016). A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and
Security Policy. [Electronic]. Brussels. Available: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-
strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en [2023-09-29].

European Commission (2021). Eurobarometer: Trust in the European Union has increased since
last summer. [Electronic]. Brussels. Available:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1867 [2023-09-29].

European Union External Action Service (2021). Questions and answers on the European Peace
Facility’s Integrated Methodological Framework. [Electronic]. Brussels. Available:
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/questions-and-answers-european-peace-facility%E2%80%99s-
integrated-methodological-framework-0_en [2023-09-29].

Famà, G. & Musiol, L. (2022). The War in Ukraine Raises New Questions for EU Foreign
Policy. [Electronic]. International Crisis Group, April 5. Available:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/war-ukraine-raises-new-
questions-eu-foreign-policy [2023-09-29].

Rieker, P. & Riddervold, M. (2022). Not so unique after all? Urgency and norms in EU foreign
and security policy. [Electronic]. Journal of European Integration, vol. 44(4), pp. 459-473.
Available: Taylor & Francis Ltd [2023-09-29]. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2021.1977293