PLA120 Seminar 1 assignment

Question 5: Can an authoritarian regime be popular? If so, how?

The popularity of a regime can be measured by the proportion of the population living
under the state’s jurisdiction that support or have a positive/favorable opinion towards the
government of that state. Governments in general, including authoritarian governments, may see
popularity among their citizens as a desirable goal, since it provides the social legitimacy that is
necessary for them to exercise their power with less opposition. In principle, there is no
necessary correlation between the authoritarian nature of government and generalized
unpopularity. In fact, “authoritarian regimes that enjoy some level of legitimacy tend to last
longer than those that do not” (Caramani et al., 2020, p. 111), which provides an incentive to
authoritarian governments to seek popularity and social validation. To achieve popularity
governments (authoritarian or otherwise) may recur to several strategies, such as indoctrination,
propaganda, co-opting the population, clientelism, among others.
Authoritarian governments may heavily influence their social legitimacy and popularity
by introducing by fiat all sorts of elements into the education system that serve to promote a
positive view of the regime. By having a complete control over school and university curricula,
governments can indoctrinate the population by forcing children and young adults to study a
specific perspective on historical events, that positively illustrates the actions of the state and
more particularly the dominant political party. More so, promoting a sense of national identity,
through the study of history, geography, a common language and a common moral system, as
well as portraying the dominant political party as the legitimate representative of that national
identity, may foster a sense of legitimacy around the government, promoting their popularity
among the population.
Propaganda can also influence the popularity of a regime, by communicating and
promoting a common narrative shared by the citizenship that allows for the social legitimization
of authoritarian governance. Establishing restrictions on independent media and promoting
certain political perspectives through state-controlled media, can help authoritarian governments
to obscure or diminish the importance of stories that might make them unpopular, while
promoting and spreading stories that may bolster their popularity.
Furthermore, the co-optation of social elites and the practice of clientelism allows
authoritarian governments to reduce opposition to a minimum. For authoritarian governments
“buying the support of the elites is critical to preventing a fall from power” (Caramani et al.,
2020, p. 112). Also, in exchange for their loyalty, authoritarian governments may offer their
citizens various forms of handouts, financial support or job opportunities. Privileging social
elites and providing benefits and resources to a vast number of citizens at the expense of the rest
of society, can promote a positive view of the regime.
One notable strategy used in recent decades by an authoritarian regime, the Venezuelan
government, was a decision made by then-President Hugo Chávez's to nationalize (grant
citizenship to) foreigners living in Venezuela without legal status. Many critics have argued that
the decision was politically motivated since the newly nationalized citizens were granted access
to different social programs instituted by the government as well as voting rights (Medina, 2004).

Question 6: Why do authoritarian regimes choose to organize elections?

Authoritarian regimes are primarily characterized by the absence of “turnover in power of
the executive” (Caramani et al., 2020, p. 104) To ensure long-lasting control, these governments
implement various strategies aimed at bolstering their perceived legitimacy, both domestically
and internationally. One such method involves organizing elections, since this is universally
regarded as a marker of legitimate political authority and democratic governance. As a result,
labeling these regimes as purely authoritarian becomes challenging, as the presence of formal
democratic institutions obscures public perception of their legitimacy. These hybrid regimes,
referred to as “competitive authoritarianism” in the academic literature (Levitsky & Way, 2002,
p. 2), can maintain power for extended periods due to their perceived legitimacy, which
significantly impacts the level of opposition they face.
Elections under hybrid regimes generally take place within a framework of restricted civil
and political rights that ensures limitations on the turnover of power over the executive. To that
end “incumbents have access to a variety of state resources that can help them steer the election’s
outcome in their favour” (Caramani et al., p. 109). These resources include controlled media
access, favorable electoral rules and regulations, election result manipulation, and subtle
harassment or threats of violence against the opposition. To consolidate these unfair advantages,
hybrid regimes often employ institutions such as a legislature dominated by the ruling party, a
bribed or extorted judiciary, and a state-controlled media monopoly alongside restricted
independent media.
Furthermore, hybrid regimes may weaponize state intelligence agencies and police forces
to sabotage and intimidate political opposition. Through subtle and covert methods, the dominant
party can heavily influence public opinion regarding their opposition and manipulate electoral
outcomes. Notable examples include China's Great Firewall (Bradsher, 2017), which restricts
access to government-disapproved websites and content, and Iran's efforts to monitor and control
online dissent during the 2009 Green Movement (Grossman, 2009).
In conclusion, these strategies allow authoritarian regimes to camouflage their
undemocratic governance structure under the guise of democracy, thus obtaining the necessary
legitimacy for continued authoritarian encroachment. By leveraging the veneer of democratic
institutions, these hybrid regimes can expertly manipulate public perception and consolidate
power.
References
Bradsher, K. (2017). China Blocks WhatsApp, Broadening Online Censorship [Electronic].
Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/business/china-whatsapp-blocked.html [2023-
06-04].
Caramani, D. (2020). Comparative Politics. 5. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grossman, L. (2009). Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement [Electronic].
Available: https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html [2023-06-04].
Levitsky, S. & Way, L.A. (2002). Elections Without Democracy, The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism. [Electronic] Journal of Democracy, vol. 13(2), pp. 51-65. Available: Harvard
Library [2023-06-04].
Medina, I. E. (2004). Chávez Abre Nacionalizaciones [Electronic]. Available:
https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1512459 [2023-06-04].